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@JohnnyAkzam - Johnny Akzam
Jeffery Sachs thoroughly educates Piers Morgan on the Ukrainian conflict. https://t.co/2FUyx1Pa2I
Video Transcript AI Summary
The speaker argues against accepting a one-sided view of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, citing the US's history of interventionism. They claim the US illegally bombed Belgrade, initiated wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, and illegally bombed Libya. They allege the US overthrew Yanukovych in Kyiv in 2014, despite an EU-brokered agreement for early elections.
The speaker states that Russia initially sought peace through negotiations, resulting in the Minsk II agreement, which was unanimously approved by the UN Security Council. However, they claim the US government dismissed Minsk II, and Angela Merkel admitted it was a ploy to strengthen Ukraine. The speaker distrusts the US government and advocates for a transparent agreement between Russia and Ukraine, with both sides committing to non-intervention and NATO non-enlargement, to be witnessed by the world.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: You seem very reliant on accepting Putin's world view rather than perhaps the stark reality of the barbarism with which he's executed this war.
Speaker 1: Yeah. May maybe because I know too much about The United States, because the first war in Europe after World War two was The US bombing of Belgrade for seventy eight days to change borders of a European state. The idea was to break Serbia, to create Kosovo as an enclave, and then to install Banda Steel, which is the largest NATO base in the Balkans, in the Southwest Balkans. So The US started this under Clinton, that we will break the borders, we will illegally bomb another country. We didn't have any UN authority.
This was a NATO mission to do that. Then I know The United States went to war repeatedly, illegally, in what it did in Afghanistan, and then what it did in Iraq, and then what it did in Syria, which was the Obama administration, especially Obama and Hillary Clinton, tasking the CIA to overthrow Bashar al Assad, and then what it did with NATO illegally bombing Libya to topple Muammar Gaddafi, and then what it did in Kyiv in February 2014. I happened to see some of that with my own eyes. The U. S.
Overthrew Yanukovych together with right wing Ukrainian military forces. We overthrew a president. And what's interesting, by the way, is we overthrew Yanukovych the day after the European Union representatives had reached an agreement with Yanukovych to have early elections, a government of national unity, and a stand down of both sides. That was agreed. The next thing that happens is the opposition, quote unquote, says, We don't agree.
They stormed the government buildings, and they deposed Yanukovych, and within hours The United States says, Yes, we support the new government. It didn't say, Oh, we had an agreement. That's unconstitutional, what you did. So we overthrew a government, contrary to a promise that the European Union had made. And by the way, Russia, The United States, and the EU were parties to that agreement.
And The United States, an hour afterwards, backed the coup. Okay, so everyone's got a little bit to answer for. In 2015, the Russians did not say, we want the Donbas back. They said peace should come through negotiations. And negotiations between the ethnic Russians in the East Of Ukraine and this new regime in Kyiv led to the Minsk two agreement.
The Minsk two agreement was voted by the UN Security Council unanimously. It was signed by the government of Ukraine. It was guaranteed explicitly by Germany and France. And you know what? And it's been explained to me in person.
It was laughed at inside the US government. This is after the UN Security Council unanimously accepted it. The Ukrainians said, we don't want to give autonomy to the region. Oh, but that's part of the treaty. The US told them, don't worry about it.
Angela Merkel explained in desight in a notorious interview after the twenty twenty two escalation, she said, Oh, you know, we knew that Minsk II was just a holding pattern to give Ukraine time to build its strength. No. Minsk II was a UN Security Council unanimously adopted treaty that was supposed to end the war. So when it comes to who's trustworthy, who to believe, and so forth, I guess my problem, Peers, is I know the United States government. I know it very well.
Don't trust them for a moment. I want these two sides actually to sit down in front of the whole world and say, These are the terms. Then the world can judge, because we could get on paper clearly for both sides of the world. We're not going to overthrow governments anymore, the United States needs to say. We accept this agreement, the United States needs to say.
Russia needs to say. We're not stepping one foot farther than whatever the boundary is actually reached. And NATO's not going to enlarge. And let's put it for the whole world to see. You know, once in a while, treaties actually hold.
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
Douglas Macgregor: Toward War with Russia, Iran & Venezuela https://youtu.be/gR6L-R6fVKY https://t.co/HvW8F1ld8A
Video Transcript AI Summary
MacGregor says Putin’s speech signals Russia aims to partner with Asia economically and is pessimistic about Europe. He says Trump’s talk of arming Ukrainians with Tomahawks prompted a rethink; he warns the weapon’s broad reach could widen war, calling the idea "stupid" and likely to vanish. He criticizes Europe as guided by "globalist leadership" from France, Germany and Great Britain, citing "Starmer, Macron, and Mats" as graduates of the Soros School of Globalism. He warns the high-tech defenses are a "huge waste of money" and says there is "no evidence that the Russians want desperately to overwhelm and destroy Europe." He says Ukraine’s forces have deteriorated for months with terrible losses. He dismisses any "eternal peace agreement" as unlikely, notes Moscow’s support for Iran's defenses, and warns that a strike on Venezuela would be counterproductive, urging border control at home.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Welcome back to the program. We are joined again by colonel Douglas MacGregor, a combat veteran, author, and former senior adviser to The US secretary of defense. So welcome back to the program.
Speaker 1: Sure. I'm happy to be back. Thanks.
Speaker 0: So we see president Putin last week gave a very long speech. I I summarized it as Russia looking towards Asia now for economic partners and efforts to be very optimistic about US Russia bilateral relations possibly developing, and then, of course, profound pessimism about relations with Europe. And, again, using very derogatory language, calling European leaders weirdos at some point. But while there was a lot of efforts to me to have a benign posture towards The United States, there was also some warnings about sending the tomahawks, which would be seen as an American attack on Russia. I was wondering how you see this development because only now we also saw HIMARS being used to attack Belgorod, again, the Russian territory, which also is a American weapon, which is assumed to rely on US intelligence in order to pick the targets.
Again, I'm not sure if I'm re reading that correctly, but how do you see the developments with the tomahawks? How serious is this?
Speaker 1: I think that since president Trump opened his mouth and made the comment that, he would supply tomahawks to the Ukrainians, there's been a reconsideration. You know, president Trump, to be frank, is often, reckless with speech. He says things that that are not necessarily false, but certainly a little short on being true. He exaggerates and leads people to frightening conclusions. I think he's somebody who interacts with audiences.
And if he and the audience seem to be getting along well, then the rhetoric becomes increasingly hyperbolic. Let's put it that way. I think somebody got to him. I understand that he had a call with president Putin at some point that may well have had an impact, I don't know. But he clearly had somebody sit him down and explain, you're talking about a missile system with a range of a thousand miles.
It could be fired from aircraft on the ground, from submarines, surface vessels. So this is a very flexible weapon system that can reach targets deep inside Russia. And we know from experience with Ukrainians that if you give them these weapons, they will happily attack Russian civilians and civilian infrastructure. I think once that was made clear to him in the Oval Office, he subsequently said, well, you know, we we need to know what they wanna do with the Tomahawk and where they wanna shoot it and so forth and so on. I have the feeling that he's going to back away from that.
It may even go away because I think he recognizes that this is a bridge too far for us. He doesn't want a war with Russia. Remember when they began talking, that is the Russians and the Americans in Saudi Arabia, they had a very good meeting, but the meeting was focused on normalizing relations between Russia and The United States. If you listen carefully to President Putin, he frequently mentions the areas where he would like to see a resumption of normal trade. And I think President Trump privately feels the same way.
Unfortunately, you know, Trump's got himself into a lot of trouble in Ukraine. And not knowing what else to do, in frustration, he's become, or let us say he's made the transformation to become the new Biden and has begun repeating stupidities and falsehoods that were common with Biden about what is happening in Ukraine and what could happen. But in reality and you always have to distinguish what's said from what actually happens. So we can't provide the billions of dollars worth of equipment in a timely manner that would make any difference to what's happening on the battlefield of Ukraine. I think he knows that.
The Tomahawk system is sort of a last gasp effort to try and hand something to the Ukrainians that'll make a difference. Well, they're not gonna make a difference. They could they could widen the war. They could escalate the war, particularly on the Russian side, and could put us in a difficult position with Russia to the point where we could be dragged into a war we don't wanna fight. I think he's figured that out.
So my expectation is that the tomahawk stupidity, it really is a stupid idea, will vanish, will go away. It'll be quietly forgotten.
Speaker 0: How are you assessing the the Europeans here, though? Because, yes, I mentioned there seems to be only contempt these days for Europe in in Moscow. And in Europe, though, if you listen to the last speeches of Vanderleijn, they it's almost a call for war. It's a we have to we don't shouldn't shy away from retaliating against Russia, and you have a German chancellor Mertz arguing, you know, they have to build this massive army to possibly fight Russia. You have people like Kai Kallas, you know, once made a point that it would be good if we defeat Russia so they can be broken up into smaller countries.
Do do you see this as being how are you assessing the Europeans? Is this panic or well, obviously, the panic, but do you see them actually wanting to go to war against Russia, or are they just pumping themselves up for domestic audience, American audience, or Russian audience?
Speaker 1: Well, you say Europeans. I prefer to see say globalist leadership in places like France, Germany, and and Great Britain. Starmer, Macron, and Mats are, let us say, graduates of the Soros School of Globalism. They have been doing everything in their power. In fact, their predecessors did as well with Mrs.
Merkel to open borders, create unrest and civil disturbance inside their own countries by inviting people in that could never possibly assimilate. In fact, there's a great deal of evidence they came to assimilate Europeans as opposed to the opposite. So I think that's part of their problem, they're desperate. They know that they've been discovered, their sins are known publicly. Increasingly people, particularly in Great Britain and France, I think, have come to terms with the reality that Russia is not coming.
There is no massive Russian offensive into Europe, nor is there likely to be. And all they have to do is look at Slovakia, Hungary, and now the Czech Republic. These areas are right in the path of the allegedly on rushing Russian military establishment, and they have categorically rejected this. So, think the time now is one of desperation, and they want to cling to power. How do you cling to power?
Well, you continue to insist on this great danger to the East, and you start spending money you don't really have in the hopes that you can pump up the economy and you're gonna do it with military production? I don't think it's gonna work. I I don't see any future for it. The other thing is, Glenn, to build an effective force that can fight takes about ten years. It took us ten years after the Vietnam War to reconstitute our armed forces.
And it was a very expensive proposition, but it took a lot of training and several generations of equipment and new generations of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. What are the Europeans going to do? How rapidly can they build something up? How rapidly can they train and field anything? That's why I think somebody said that, Mats was talking about, some sort of production level by 2030 with a force that could use the equipment.
I think he's being very, very optimistic. I think it'll take much longer. So I think this is really all about clinging tenaciously to power. And, you know, the the the futility of this and the stupidity of it is really shocking. And I was reminded of something.
I don't think I've ever mentioned him before, but it's somebody I always admired and that is Oxensterna. Oxensterna was of course the great high chancellor in Sweden, did a wonderful job under Gustaf Ottof and then subsequently with his daughter, Christina. And his son attended a meeting with the king, Gustaf Ottof, and he wrote to his father about it. And he said, I can't believe it. He said, the king must be mad.
His ministers are crazy. These people are going to get us into terrible wars we can't possibly win. None of this is affordable. I mean, literally, you could have lifted it from today from what we're seeing in Washington or for that matter in Paris, London, and Berlin. And Oksutsternen wrote back to his son, are you surprised that we are ruled by so little wisdom?
And his point was, why are you surprised? The people that are at the top are not wise. They're not thoughtful. They're self immersed, self important, self absorbed, and they're not thinking in terms of what is in the interest of their people. So I I think that's essentially what the Europeans are finding out.
As I said, the Germans are taking longer as usual to figure this out, but they're figuring it out.
Speaker 0: But, when you assess a threat, you will look at the capabilities and intentions. Now I agree on the capabilities, though, that is that the Europeans don't don't have what it takes to fight Russia. There's a lot of ambitions about building up a military, the big drone wall. I'm not quite sure what that would actually entail in military sense. They have to flesh out this concept, I think.
But in terms of intentions, I first, I thought, you know, they're just beating their chest here, but but on the other hand, they're talking now about intercepting Russian missiles and drones from the Polish territory into Western Ukraine, hoping that Russians will agree to the new rules that they still can't be targeted. We see we saw France seize what they thought was a Russian ship, which if it was, would it be an act of war? I mean, the the crazy rhetoric does appear to translate to some extent into crazy policies, though.
Speaker 1: Do you Well, I think we have to stand back from these discussions about a drone wall and understand that what they're really talking about effectively is a high-tech Maginot line. We know how well that's worked out in the past. It's a huge waste of money. The second part is what can you reasonably achieve with the laws of physics right now? And the problem that we have, as long as we cannot break the laws of fractal mathematics and change physics, and that's what you've got to do, until you can create force fields, directed energy force fields.
You cannot possibly stop thousands of missiles, thousands of drones. In other words, the offensive strike against you will always overwhelm whatever defensive system you set up. So this high-tech Maginot line is an illusion that needs to be dropped. It's prohibitively expensive. But here's the other thing.
There's no evidence that the Russians want desperately to overwhelm and destroy Europe. This is a different era from, let us say, age age of World War II, or if you go back further, the thirty years war. Everyone is very sensitive, I think, to scientific industrial development, to infrastructure, to productivity. What's the point of fighting a war ostensibly for territory and people if you're going to destroy everything in the process. It doesn't make a lot of sense.
So I just don't see any evidence that the Russians want to put their own infrastructure at risk, let alone destroy everybody else's. So again, I think there's a lot of nonsense on the street right now and people are searching for answers, but they're coming up unfortunately with the same old ones. We have the same problem here with the so called Golden Dome. The Golden Dome is a large money pit into which people will throw hundreds of billions of dollars. The only people interested in it are of course the defense industries.
And obviously there are universities with physics departments and elsewhere that are looking forward to many wonderful grants, all of which are being asked to solve a problem they can't possibly solve. So it's a waste of time, money, and resources. But look how appealing it is so much so that, you know, the supporters of president Trump, if you bring it up, they'll say, well, you're negative. You're just being negative. This is important for us.
Well, it's sure it's important, but you can't achieve it. You can't build it. It won't work. That has a role to play. I think the Europeans and we are all in the same boat there.
Speaker 0: Yeah. The whole idea of Russia annexing Poland or marching on Paris, it's it's really lunatic stuff. I mean, it's quite extraordinary. This is what we're talking about. No one actually explains these ideas.
Like, to what end? What what would be the purpose? And also, what circumstances would the the Russians want to have the resources to both the material as well as public support and from friendly countries to, like, to to occupy a country of 40,000,000 people. Well, we're not one single one wants to actually be on the Russian rule. It's really beyond absurd, but I I I did wanna ask you about the patience, which might be running thin in in Moscow because I I I get there's a more or increasing pressure within the Kremlin on on the president that they that they think this might be going too slowly.
I mean, you can put in try to adjust not justify, but explain that during his the Valdez meeting. He was, you know, going through the numbers. This is how many people they're losing. They're losing more and more. They're able to recruit fewer and fewer.
They can't replenish their losses. So, you know, this is just about math. Without soldiers, there won't be an army. Without an army, there won't be a war. But at the same time, the longer this war drags on, not only more casualties are inflicted, but also the more likely that the Europeans or others could be pulled in to a wider war.
So some are asking, why not a decapitation strike? And I I, yeah, failed myself to answer that question properly, so I thought I would pass it on to you. Why do you think they haven't tried to do the same as, for example, the Americans tried to do against Iran?
Speaker 1: And and I think we will try something similar, unfortunately, in Venezuela in the near future. But those kinds of strikes haven't turned out very well for us. We haven't been able to make them work. We tried to do that in Iraq several times. It did not work.
So I think the whole notion of regime change based on a decapitation strike is an illusion. So the people that argue for that sort of thing, unless they're prepared to see all of Kyiv vanish or vaporized in some sort of terrible cloud of fuel air explosive, I don't see that it makes much sense. I think we have to understand a couple of things about president Putin. By the way, I don't claim to be an expert on president Putin. I don't even claim to be an expert on Russia.
But I I think I can understand to some extent his preeminent concern. And from the very first moment, preeminent concern was to avoid a war with The United States and NATO. He didn't want that. He's always been able to see far beyond the present and understand there are long term interests, strategic interests that, Russia wants to protect. He doesn't want Russia to be destroyed in some pointless nuclear exchange any more than I think, president Trump, however confused and sometimes grandiose he may be and how often he blowiates, I don't see any evidence that president Trump wants to risk a nuclear escalation and exchange either.
So I think if you understand that about President Putin, I think he said, we're going to win this. We're going to destroy this enemy. We're going to be successful, but we're not going to hand our potential opponents, our critics, our enemies on a silver platter an excuse to intervene in this against us, to rush in and say, see, the evil Russians are now marching at high speed towards Lvov in Western Ukraine. So he has avoided taking actions that would precipitate any kind of really dramatic response. In the meantime, to the credit of the Russians, they have managed to defeat the technologies of war that we have handed the Ukrainians.
Now you can you can blame some of that on the Ukrainians who may not know what they're doing, but looks an awful lot to me as though they've been taking orders and advice from the people at the top of NATO. That has turned out to be disastrous. And everything that we have encouraged them to do has failed miserably, and they have taken terrible losses as a result. So I think at this point, he's going to continue to try and exercise a certain amount of patience and restraint because of the reasons that we discussed earlier. I think he expects these governments to tumble in London, in Paris, and ultimately in Berlin.
The question is who goes first? It looks like Macron, might win the first prize for going, you know, going under along with his government. That would be a game changer because you're his old expression. I think it was Metternich who said so. When Paris sneezes, Europe catches a cold.
I think France is probably going to lead Europe in a new direction by removing Macron and the people running the show in France. And I think years of turmoil will ensue and I'm sure the French army is gonna have lots to do right there at home in France. And, you know, there's something else that we don't understand. Somebody pointed this out to me today and I think they're right. The defense budget or the military budget for Algeria is larger than the military budget for France.
That's a rather striking comparison. We usually think of the French and the Algerians in this colonial relationship, but that's misleading. And I think that reflects a broader change around the world. At some point, all of these small states in Europe with Lilliputian armies are gonna be seen as what they are, not terribly relevant.
Speaker 0: Yeah. This is and Europe exhausting itself is at such a fast rate, not just economic, but militarily as well. It is quite shocking how quickly things are changing. But I also want to ask you about what do you see happening on on the battlefield in in Ukraine because, I guess, another thing about Putin at the Voldai meeting, he seemed very confident and a bit cheerful. I've never seen him, you know, do this many jokes in one in one in one sitting.
He was quite unusual. Again, he doesn't seem like someone who fears that Russia is on its last leg on the country. You get also where the optimism grows in Russia. You also see from the Ukrainian leadership as well as from their telegram channels that the pessimism is now setting in. What do you see happening on the front line, though, and how critical do you think it could be?
Speaker 1: I think the Ukrainian forces have been deteriorating and decaying now for many months. I'm sure they are hopelessly demoralized. Unofficial polling data, in other words, opinion polls that were collected on the ground in Ukraine, that is the part of Ukraine that's not in war and not actively being attacked is all very negative on the war. Their view is it's time to throw in the towel on this. This is suicidal.
We've got to live in the future. The future is not gonna be the one that Zelensky talks about. And the question is, where do we end up? Some people are saying we're going to end up in some sort of relationship with Russia, and that's probably a good thing because it will prevent future wars. I mean, that's the kind of thing you're getting from Ukrainians.
On the other hand, there are other people who are saying, well, we have to accept neutrality. It's a very small number of people who are clinging to this notion that Ukraine must be part of the NATO and the EU. I was a little surprised that President Putin responded to somebody who asked him whether or not Ukraine could join the European Union, and he indicated, well, guess that's a possibility. I find that quite incredible. But it was interesting that he would say that.
Perhaps that's another reflection of his optimism with regard to what's happening on the battlefield. But the losses are terrific. Anyone who stands their ground and wants to oppose the Russians is sort of quietly encircled and then systematically annihilated for the most part with long range strike at which point in time, as soon as the strikes are lifted, in come Russian forces leading with both, very highly skilled infantry infiltrators, lots of drones, and hugely powerful firepower. In other words, directed, accurate, devastating firepower in the direct mode. This war is for all intents and purposes at an end, except people are still being shoved in front of the Russians.
Now, the other question is why don't they just rush forward? Well, look at the map. Where they are now, the population speaks Russian, is culturally Russian. Most of them consider themselves to be Russian. I don't think there's much enthusiasm in Moscow for ruling over large numbers of Ukrainians who are fiercely Ukrainian in every sense of the word.
They'd rather not do that. They just want them to be neutral and not a springboard for attack against Russia via NATO. That's all. So can that be resolved? Well, the problem is that the one man that could have delivered some measure of success is Donald Trump.
And he decided that since there was no Nobel Prize in this forum, that he would abdicate his responsibility for the whole thing to the Europeans. Fine. We'll give you what you want. You do what you want. And he's turning his attention to The Middle East and now, I guess, Venezuela.
Speaker 0: Yeah. On that topic, though, because I I did also wanna ask you about what is happening in The Middle East. That is he has advanced this what we call it a peace proposal, but it's more or less accepted or will destroy you. It's called a, I forgot the term, eternal peace agreement or something along those lines. Yeah.
Well, he likes the bombastic language. This is but how I'm not sure if he's overselling the eternal peace, but what do you make of this 20 agreement?
Speaker 1: Not much. It reminds me of some of the agreements made between the old Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Russians, treaties that by the way had similar titles, the treaty of eternal peace and tranquility and goodwill forever and ever and ever between the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth and the czar of Russia and so forth. It's all nonsense. If you look at the 21 points, again, you have to distinguish between wishful thinking and action. What is Mr.
Netanyahu doing and what does he continue to do? He continues to attack and strike and bomb at will. I see no evidence that he's prepared to back off. Would he withdraw some forces from parts of the Gaza Strip? Perhaps.
But he's absolutely not gonna turn the Gaza Strip over to an Arab force of any kind. This is one of the reasons that I think the Egyptians are trying to find a way to drag us in. And I can't think of anything more wasteful and stupid than for us to become involved in that conflict. It's absolutely unrewarding for us. We simply end up being everybody's enemy and a target for everybody.
That's by the way, what happened to us in Lebanon in 1982. So I don't know what people are thinking. I think people are taking what president Trump says at face value. I just don't see any evidence that it has a snowball's chance at hell of happening.
Speaker 0: But if, for some reason, the Hamas would accept this, how is well, how what would this entail? Do they have to give up all their weapons? They have to give up their tunnels. They have to give up the hostages, and then hope that without any defense, Israel and its western backers will show them some mercy, or what what are there any guarantees there for the Israelis? I know there's not to mention any state in there, but is it clear that Israelis will pull back from their territory?
I mean, what what actually is in there for the Palestinians?
Speaker 1: Not much as far as I can tell. You're you're right. What what they're expecting Hamas to do is to show up unarmed, line up in neatly organized rows, get down on their knees, beg forgiveness and hope for the best. I don't see much evidence for that happening. And again, you know, the Israelis continued to drop these leaflets everywhere, telling the population leave or you will be killed.
That's that's essentially what they're telling the people in Gaza, and I think that message is coming through increasingly on the West Bank. Was interesting to watch President Trump say, would not allow the annexation of the West Bank. Well, whatever he says is irrelevant. It's going to happen. Most people think it's already happened.
It's a de facto outcome. His backers, the people that elected him that paid for his term in the White House and control Congress want those things to happen. They're gonna happen unless Israel is destroyed in a future war or conflict. And, of course, that brings us to Iran. Could that happen against Iran?
I don't know. But I think we're
Speaker 0: gonna go through another round of war with Iran. There's no question about that. Ol' Netanyahu recently gave a speech where he pointed out that Iran now poses a nuclear threat to The United States. And, yeah, I know it's not a very original accusation to make, but Trump also warned of possible new strikes against Iran if it revives its nuclear work, which, I guess, undermines the former claim that he completely obliterated the the nuclear program of of Iran. But do do you see a pathway to a war in the foreseeable future, though?
Or because the Americans did move a lot of their weapon infrastructure. Well, the the weaponry, their their refueling tankers, all of this down to the region as you and I spoke about in the past. Do you see this do you see it sitting there, or do you see I'm not sure what indicators we should look for if there is preparations for a war.
Speaker 1: Well, you've already pointed to the most important ones. The movement of people, ammunition in the form of missiles, rockets, fuel, and other things, refueling assets, jet aircraft. All of that is moved into the region, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea. So I fully expect something to happen in the near future. What's the trigger?
I don't know. People say, it could be a false flag. I don't think it matters very much. I think mister Netanyahu knows that he has really a limited opportunity and time to strike and be successful. This the whole greater Israel project is actually hanging in the balance.
Things haven't gone very well in Gaza. The anticipated time in Gaza was less than six months. Here we are two years later. So he's got serious problems on his hands. His economy is destroyed, but it doesn't matter very much since we're pouring billions into Israel to keep the economy going.
I think though, he's worried about the turn of public opinion in The United States against Israel and support for Israel. And his fear is not today, but
Speaker 0: in the
Speaker 1: future. Therefore, you've got to act sooner rather than later to achieve your goals. So I think he's got to attack. I thought that he would have attacked by the September, certainly by the October. We'll see.
It could be pushed further into November. It all depends on the readiness indicators. When I say readiness, aircraft, personnel, people, ammunition, fuel, positioning, ships, everything. All of those things had to be taken into account. I don't have a detailed description of that.
And if I did, I wouldn't give it to you anyway, because I'm an American and I still want Americans to come through this with as few as casualties and losses as possible, whether or not I support the policy. So more than that, I cannot say, but I think it's coming and I think it's coming soon.
Speaker 0: But I guess advantage the first time around was this surprise attack because the Iranians thought they were in the middle of negotiations. They were told they were, you know, making advancements that peace was around the corner. And, of course, there's also other elements of surprise, for example, jamming of their air defense systems. How in in the absence of this element of surprise, what do you think could be in Israel's advantage to play this different this time around? Do they have more intelligence now on where the the the tunnels, where the Iranians store their missiles?
Are they gonna use proxies? I mean, do we know anything? How, given that it didn't end well last time, how how will the Israelis play it differently this time?
Speaker 1: Well, again, you're asking important questions. I don't know the precise answers. I think they have no doubt kept Iran under persistent surveillance, and to the extent that they could introduce people from Azerbaijan or Syria or Iraq or somewhere else into Iran, or from Afghanistan for that matter to find answers to these questions, I'm sure they've done it. Will that make any difference? I don't know.
I know that the Russians have now weighed in pretty dramatically to assist with integrated air defenses. Most
Speaker 0: of
Speaker 1: that is technical expertise, but some of it also involves equipment and missiles. Iran is certainly stronger now, more cohesive as a society, more capable than it was the last time around. It's also interesting that we've seen articles in the Russian press and also in Azerbaijan and elsewhere that the so called religious police in Iran will no longer stop women who fail to wear the proper headgear or veil themselves or anything else. In other words, the relaxations of the restrictions that are associated with that Islamist or Islamic revolution are beginning to vanish officially. They've already been dramatically reduced, the population has simply rejected it.
And I think they now see the wisdom of dumping most of that because it inhibits cooperation, it weakens national unity. So in that sense, I guess you could argue that the attacks on Iran have actually improved life inside Iran dramatically in a purely human sense for the men and women that live there. And they've certainly given everybody a reason to cooperate. I don't see any evidence that there's a willingness of the Azeri Turks who were Shiites up in Northwestern Iran to revolt against Tehran, not at all. So the assumptions that were there before about the weakness of Iran and how the right decapitation strike would bring chaos, I think they've had to drop those.
Now, what does that mean? Does it mean that after they've unleashed this war, if things don't go well, they'll turn to the use of a nuclear weapon? I don't know, but that's something I worry about. Worry a great deal that they will do that. And if that were to happen, that would be catastrophic for them and for the region.
Speaker 0: Yeah. It was the the religious laws, they were already getting kind of relaxed. I wasn't sure how the war would affect it, but I was in Tehran with Max Blumenthal and Alastair Crook back in May for this conference. And I that was one of the things that surprised me because, again, I haven't been following what's been happening since the revolution in '79, but I was surprised by what a significant portion of the women walk around without headscarves or, you know, just walking around in jeans and t shirt or anything without anything on their head. So this was it took me a bit by surprise because this was one of the reasons why we should support a strike on Iran that, you know, they have to wear a hit.
I'm not sure how they put two and two together on this one, but but it is interesting because usually once a country is under attack, this is when a government tightens its control over society. So I I didn't know that had gone the other way.
Speaker 1: But the What kind of control you're talking about? If you can improve the lives of your citizens, you can give them personal freedom, the right to think and behave as they see fit, but at the same time, improve your security to prevent the Israelis from buying up traders and using them against the country. That's a different thing. In other words, I think it depends on what you're trying to achieve. I think the leadership of Iran is trying to achieve modernization and it is trying to demonstrate tolerance towards its own people and demonstrate to them conclusively, it's in their interest to fight for Iran.
And I think that's what the population has decided.
Speaker 0: And my last question though was what you were referring to earlier, the Venezuela That is yeah. Mean, people around the world are watching this a bit perplexed. They see this small boats off the coast of Venezuela, pretty far away from The United States being bombed, accused of being, yeah, narco traffickers. We see The US building up I'm not sure if it's heavy, but at least building up military capabilities along the coast of Venezuela, which is seemingly not powerful enough for an invasion, but powerful enough for a decapitation strike. Again, I'm not a military man like yourself, so I would like here to to ask you how how are you how are you assessing the situation?
Speaker 1: The president has suspended any further diplomatic relations with Venezuela, so that's a rather ominous action. It suggests that some form of action against Venezuela is imminent. There are people walking around Washington saying that they're interested in working with people in Washington to put together plans for the post war Venezuelan society. That indicates to me that it's quite serious. Now, as I've said to people before, Venezuela is not an arco state.
Our interests in Venezuela are largely resource driven. We're interested in the largest reserves of oil in the world, gas. They also have emerald mines, which are very important for industrial purposes, as well as gold mines. I don't think the narcotics bit is very large. In fact, everybody tells me who is an expert in the area that narcotics continue to come out of Colombia and then find their way north to us and most of those go via the Pacific.
The other thing is that if you're looking for state, an organized crime state, it's Mexico. Mexico is for all intents and purposes by our standards in the West, a failed state. That's why it poses a great danger to us from Central America. That's why it was a criminal neglect, if you want to be kind on the part of President Biden to open our borders. They opened the floodgates, we have millions of people inside the country.
We don't know much about them. Many of them have committed terrible crimes. Now, of course, you have people out there saying, well, here's this lovely young woman, Laken Riley, who was brutally raped, murdered, whatever by a Venezuelan criminal, and talked about the Venezuelan gangs. Well, the answer to saving Lake and Riley's life was to keep the borders closed, to police them effectively, to control who comes into The United States, and to enforce the law inside our country. Bombing Venezuela, invading Venezuela is not going to be a solution to that problem.
But again, it's not popular to suggest that our problems are largely domestic. The drug problem resides here inside The United States. Attacking and destroying other countries isn't going to solve that. But that's not popular right now. There are a lot of people who think, well, yes, that's right.
Now we need to focus on the Western Hemisphere. I'm agreed on that. I think we should be much more interested in what happens in our hemisphere. I'm just not interested in attacking everybody south of the border.
Speaker 0: Yeah. It was interesting, though, that some pressure seemed to have been alleviated against Venezuela when when the Russians invaded Ukraine and the sanctions were imposed on Russia. There was an effort to say, well, Venezuela is not so bad after all. You know, now we can work with them because we needed some other sources of oil. But but now, of course, this has turned again, and they they seem to be targeted.
But but how what what would be the possible consequence here, though? Because you do see if there's an attack on Venezuela destabilizes, would create further refugees flooding the American borders. Wouldn't this exacerbate the problem already?
Speaker 1: Well, I'm more concerned about what happens if we physically go in on the ground, which appears to be part of the plan. I think this probably assumes some sort of successful decapitation strike and the ability of intelligence agencies like the CIA to foment unrest or revolt. I'm concerned that this would become a cause celeb for everybody in Latin America. You know, Venezuela has a thirteen seventy mile border with Colombia, it has a thirteen seventy nine mile border with Brazil, it has 1,700 miles of coastline, this is enormous. This is almost France and Germany together.
And you have plenty of people in other states in South America, certainly large numbers of so called paramilitaries in Brazil, or for that matter in Colombia that could pour into Venezuela with the goal of helping them fight us. So I think it could turn into a terrible morass. It could become overnight instantly a failed state that then represents a permanent threat to us in North America. It'll be much worse than anything we could have imagined was there already. But then again, that's my private opinion, which again says, what do we achieve and what do we gain by going in there?
And my answer is nothing on both counts. And again, back to the statement, control your borders, enforce the law and deal with the illegal problem that we have in our drug problem at home. That's what we ought to be doing, not not attacking and invading other people's countries.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Trump seems to have deviated significantly from this America first. He didn't mention invading Venezuela at least in his campaign speeches.
Speaker 1: Have you transformed into Joe Biden? And how long has he been in office? And this tends to also reinforce the wisdom of Putin's statement some time ago. He said, having dealt with many presidents, I find that at the end of the day, they all end up doing the same thing. Or as somebody else put it, it doesn't matter who you vote for, you get someone like John McCain.
Speaker 0: Well, he does seem to be looking more like John McCain every day. So, anyways, thank you again for your being so generous with your time, and I hope to have you back on soon. Thank you.
Speaker 1: Sure. Thanks, Lynn. Bye bye.
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
Brian Berletic: Trump's War on Russia & Pending Retaliation https://youtu.be/2SWhVR_cOjY https://t.co/sdGibd2icv
Video Transcript AI Summary
the Trump administration is providing the the data and assisting the Zelenskyy with the striking Russian energy facilities deep inside Russian borders. This is The US engaging in acts of war, obviously, against Russia. the salami slice strategy where they are always escalating but in such small increments that it's it's very hard for an adversary to point at The US and say act of war. the intelligence agencies implicated by the Financial Times in carrying out these deep strikes inside of Russia. the US military was overseeing Ukraine's armed forces in virtually everything they did from overall strategic direction. Rand Corporation said that if you provoke a war with Russia and Ukraine, Ukraine's probably going to be completely destroyed. read the policy papers.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Welcome back to the program. We are joined today by Brian Berletic, international affairs analyst, author, and also the host of the new Atlas. Well, we can also add a former US marine. So welcome back to the program.
Speaker 1: Thank you so much for having me back.
Speaker 0: So we now have news from Financial Times, not really hiding it anymore, that the Trump administration is providing the the data and assisting the Zelenskyy with the striking Russian energy facilities deep inside Russian borders. Now even Joe Biden, as he was, well, looking as if he would be more inclined towards doing policies which could trigger World War three, was hesitant about doing these kind of things. I mean, it's not that many ways to interpret this. This is The US engaging in acts of war, obviously, against Russia. And my question is just how much further The US will engage in this, but also for how long it will be one-sided because it seems to be testing Russia's patience.
I just can't imagine the situation being reversed where openly in the media, they're reporting on Russia assisting in deep strikes into America and doing nothing. How are you assessing this? Are these actual acts of war, or am I overreading this?
Speaker 1: Well, I I think you made a very important point there. If someone was doing this to The United States, The United States would openly accuse whichever nation was aiding and abetting such attacks of an act of war. And The US has done this for far less and even has fabricated claims in the past to to justify accusing other nations of acts of war. And so this is what I I think a lot of Americans and people in the West in general have a very hard time flipping the script and trying to see it from the other the other nation's point of view. What if they were doing this to us?
How would we feel? So I think that's very important for people to do, analysts and ordinary people alike. Now going back to first principles, we knew all along from the very beginning, from 2014, actually, long before the the Russians launched their special military operation, that the United States Central Intelligence Agency went in and took over Ukrainian intelligence agencies, all of them, military, the the civilian counterparts, the SBU, especially. And these are the intelligence agencies implicated by the Financial Times in carrying out these deep strikes inside of Russia. So who was who's ultimately carrying the overseeing and carrying these out and facilitating these attacks?
It was always the central intelligence agency. We knew since the beginning of the special military operation that the United States military was overseeing Ukraine's armed forces in virtually everything they did from overall strategic direction. The fighting was taking place down to picking specific targets on the battlefield, US military commanders in operating out of Germany. This began under the Biden administration, and it continues now under the Trump administration. Both aspects, the the intel and the military operations, are all being overseen by The United States.
Now you mentioned president, Joe Biden and his hesitation to escalate toward this point. I think had he let's just imagine he ran and won, a second term, he would have been doing this right now. At the time, it just wasn't it wasn't ready, to move forward toward that point of escalation. What The United States has been doing and what US foreign policy in general always does is the salami slice strategy where they are always escalating but in such small increments that it's it's very hard for an adversary to point at The US and say act of war. They do that very specifically for that purpose.
And so this is where president Trump, his administration is. I warned about this before he even won the twenty twenty four election. I pointed out people like his, vice president nominee, JD Vance, saying we're going to freeze the conflict ultimately. There was no desire for peace in Ukraine, just freezing the conflict. And at the time, J.
D. Vance, this was all the way back in September, October 2024, saying we need our weapons to go fight China, not not Ukraine. We need the Europeans to take over. And then come February, once president Trump was in office, his administration was in in power, US secretary of back then defense, now it is the secretary of war, Pete Hegseth. Again, in Brussels talking about sending in European troops to freeze the conflict, doubling down on military industrial production, arming rebuilding Ukraine's military, essentially Minsk three point o, even though he specifically said in that statement that it wasn't Minsk three point o, but then who who would believe him and and just look at the things he was saying.
But, also, I always pointed out that he talked about Russian energy production, and at that time, he was talking about targeting it. It was very vague and and ambiguous on purpose. And you might assume he was talking about price control, sanctions, tariffs, things like this, but we can see now with our own eyes, we can see the the drone strikes on Russian energy production deep inside Russia facilitated by American intelligence surveillance reconnaissance, ISR. And so that's where we are right now. It is a steady escalation in a US war on Russia simply fought through Ukraine.
Speaker 0: It's amazing that this you have some of these articles come out, but there's no debate in society. I mean, we're supposed to be democracies with a free media, and yet you have these attacks on Russia. And, you know, it's kinda obvious also why there's not more debate around this because if you criticize or skeptical about attacks direct attacks on Russia, well, then you can be labeled as being pro Russian. As long as no journalist who wants to keep their job would want to suggest that this is problematic. But, you know, I don't wanna limit my words here, but this media is just so idiotic and horrible.
I mean, this is just pure garbage. You know, if you trigger a nuclear war, this is not being pro US or Russia. We're all gonna die effectively in a nuclear holocaust. I mean, imagine someone during the Cold War would criticize the idea of a surprise attack or a limited missile attack deep inside the Soviet Union. I mean, are they pro Soviet?
This is where we are as a society. But it's but this you mentioned this incrementalism. We do this salami tactics or incrementalism. Obviously, NATO has done this over the years as well in terms of the missile defense expansion, well, everything. And but we also do this in in in the media where we now end up in a situation where, well, yeah, of course, we're attacking Russia, but it's, you know, it's not a direct it's not direct, you know, or they we're helping people defend them.
It's it's just so much nonsense. But we have another problem, though, coming up besides this, yeah, targeting the Russian energy facilities. We also have The United States considering Tomahawks, which is, again, in the spirit of salami tactics, this is, you know, one assumes that this decision has already been made, that they're just preparing the public's the the public for this future possibility. And then, of course, it will be introduced, I guess, But with some limitations, Trump doesn't want you to strike anything you want. And then much like Biden, those limitations will begin to be removed.
And I don't know. This but do you see the Tomahawks as being fundamentally different from the escalations of the past?
Speaker 1: I I think it fits in perfectly with what The United States has done. It is a major escalation, Russia has said that it is a major escalation. Although, I still believe that Russia is going to try to avoid for as long as possible, even though it may be inevitable, a direct confrontation with either Europe or The United States directly. I think they they want to avoid that for as long as possible, but the the Tomahawk cruise missile ordinarily, it's launched by by ships at sea, submarines, but they have been working on a ground launched version since this is the whole reason why the Trump administration left the INF treaty in the first place during his first term. Then all throughout the, the rest of his term and all four years of the Biden administration, they began developing and deploying the Typhoon, ground launched, cruise missile system.
It also fires, SM six air defense missiles. These are naval air defense missiles. But, people have been saying, well, the Typhoon is very cumbersome, which they're right, and deploying it to Ukraine would would be somewhat disastrous. It would severely limit what Ukraine could do with these missiles. It's likely that Russia would find them sooner rather than later and destroy these launchers.
But, as as I have pointed out recently, there was another, ground launched system. It was the long range fires developed by Lockheed Martin to fire the the Tomahawk, which is a Raytheon missile. It's it's much smaller and more mobile. It's a single cell. There's these marked 41, vertical launch systems that the Tomahawk is launched from has a single cell while while the Typhoon has four cells.
And what what this would enable Ukraine to do is they would have a few of these, and The and The US did have working prototypes of this. The US Marine Corps was testing them out, and they ultimately passed on this system, but they exist. US Army has been considering adopting it and using it to complement the Typhoon missile launcher. And so if The US does send Tomahawks to Ukraine, I would say this is the most likely candidate. It's a it's a a more mobile, easier to hide system.
And, of course, obviously, The US would be doing everything except possibly, but maybe also pushing the button to fire these. Again, almost everything Ukraine is doing is simply The US fighting Russia through Ukrainian proxies, and the tom the deployment of Tomahawks would be no exception. Now as people have pointed out, Russian air defenses would be able to to defend against this. They would probably be using these to strike oil production, energy production facilities deep inside Russia. They would try to avoid targets that are more heavily defended by Russian air defense systems.
They they wouldn't be able to deploy many of these because, again, what The United States is doing is tying Russia down in Ukraine. They want to deploy their resources, focus their resources on China. So they would be deploying, I guess, a relatively small number of these missiles, are not made in large quantities, not even a 100 a year compared to Russian counterparts, which are hundreds, sometimes a thousand or more every year. So this is what what we're looking at. It's it is an escalation.
It's not going to change the trajectory of the conflict, but it will raise the cost for Russia. It will tie Russia down more and raise the cost for Russia. People have to remember, US doesn't care about Ukraine. This isn't about Ukraine winning. In 2019, the Rand Corporation said that if you provoke a war with Russia and Ukraine, Ukraine's probably going to be completely destroyed.
So this is not why they're fighting. They're fighting to raise the cost as much as possible for Russia, and deploying Tomahawk missiles contributes toward that objective.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Remember that 2019 paper by Rand Corporation. It was also very specific that, yeah, the the benefit of raising of raising the temperature and having more direct fight is, of course, can bleed and drain the Russians. The disadvantage is once if Russia begins to win and take strategic territory, then the strategic shift will be in Russia's advantage. So as long as you can keep the war static and have the Ukrainians and Russians kill each other, then it's a win.
Once major territories begin to shift to Russia, giving its strategic advantage against The United States, then then it becomes a bad war. It doesn't mean you have to end it, but it does mean you have to go back to freezing the front lines again. And whenever we talk about peace, this appears to be what it is. So just freeze the front lines and, yeah, prepare the Ukrainians, the next generation to continue dying. But it's I guess, I I was always a bit on the fence with with Trump because, you know, you see, just you know, he's a hostile it's a hostile place in Warsaw.
Nobody wants this peace with Russia. So I'm never sure if he's pulling a fast one on the hawks at home or pulling a fast one on the Russians, and I tended to be a bit optimistic given that he recognized that NATO expansion was the source of the war. Now if you identify the source, then you can at least begin to implement a solution, but but I haven't really seen the solution. He hasn't mentioned it since. I mean, he on more than one occasion, he has said that NATO expansion was the source of the war, but yet he still deals with the conflict as if it's if, you know, he's just a mediator.
He has to make the Ukrainians and the Russians come to an agreement. But NATO expansion, this is American led. I mean, NATO is America. And, you know, we we in Europe, we will do as we're told pretty much by the Americans, but, also, NATO can't expand without The US. So why is this why is he putting, you know, allegedly pressure on Zelenskyy to accept something that is within his domain?
It's it's quite strange. Instead, the rhetoric, also consistently, I guess, since he came to power was that the Russians have to be brought to the table, but the Russians are at the table. Putin flew into The United States Of America. I mean but I haven't seen the proposals which the Russians are opposed to. I mean, it just seems to be some contradictions at play.
If you recognize NATO expansion started the war, yet The US has no role in terms of making concessions. But instead, peace is created by putting pressure on Russia, which means to go after its energy, kill some more Russian soldiers. I mean, when does this become different than what Biden did? It's very difficult to to see.
Speaker 1: Well, people have to remember that Washington primarily, its its role in all of this is to implement policy that has already been determined, and it's determined by large corporate financier interests, big arms industry, big oil, big ag, big pharma, all of these interests that that president Trump enthusiastically works for. This doesn't even make any any secret of it. And when we're talking about NATO, yes, we're talking about The United States, but much more specifically, we're not talking about 300,000,000 ordinary Americans. We're talking about this handful of corporations, the shareholders, the equity firms that that hold the shares and the the boards of directors, and these are people who circulate from the board of directors of all of these different companies across different industries. Also in and out of these think tanks that these corporations fund, which actually do develop US foreign and domestic policy.
These people also go in and out of government as well, and we always hear and what president Trump is doing is the same thing all all Washington politicians do. He's pandering to the public. He's telling them what they want to hear while continuing to do what he's told to do by by these special interests that he ultimately works for. He He sits there and talks about, say, George Soros all the time. He's this this boogeyman that that president Trump scapegoats.
It's not as if George Soros isn't a participant in all of this. This Scott Besson heading the treasury was the right hand man of George Soros for years. He was managing his his funds. And, if you look at the components of his cabinet now and during his first administration, these were all neocon warmongers, indistinguishable from the the Trump administration, eight years of Obama, and even four years, of Biden. They're different people, but they represent the exact same special interests.
So this is why nothing ever changes in Washington. If you want to know what is going to happen, you have to go and read those policy papers. The policy papers are funded by these giant corporations. Teams of lawyers transform these papers, this which is represents a consensus among these interests, turns them into bills, and they're brought to Washington by lobbyists to get them signed off on. Then the job of people like, president Trump, people in congress, it's to sell this agenda to the American people, convince them that the interests of these giant corporations are the actual interests of the American people, and we've we've watched this happen time and time again.
How many times? And almost, every single administration in the twenty first century has ran on a platform of ending endless wars before continuing all of the wars they inherited and starting, multiple new new wars. And president Trump did this during his first administration, and now he is doing it again in his administration. So it really is no surprise. The problem is people want to believe.
They understand there's something wrong. They want to believe someone is going to fix it, and that the way to fix it because they've been told since they were children in in grade school that the way you fix this in a Western democracy is by voting. We we can see that it's it's not an agent of change. It is a system of control. That is what Western style democracy actually is, and this is the end result.
And so peep you know, if you ask what is the solution to all of this, the multipolar world has the solution to all of this, create alternatives to these deeply entrenched special interests and and create an alternative system that actually pursues the best interests of of the majority of people on earth, which includes the American people, by the way. As as you say, the the if if this goes to nuclear war, the people in Europe don't benefit, and the American people don't benefit from this. But short of that, we can already see how Europe is suffering economically. They're in almost, you would say, irreversible decline. They are making decisions that just simply do not represent their own best interests because The US has politically captured them, and they serve Washington's interests at the expense of the European people's interests.
And in a way, it's exactly like what's happening in Ukraine. People say, Europe's not gonna continue to go along with this because it doesn't serve their best interests. Look look at Ukraine. So this is this is how it actually works. These countries are politically captured by these special interests in The US, just like the US government is is in a way captured or or a reflection of these interests.
And this is why things aren't going to change as long as we we continue paying into this system where you you vote, and then you're constantly lied to and disappointed.
Speaker 0: Yeah. It's it's also a bit frustrating. It's almost treated as a conspiracy theory that the the that special interest is dictating policies, but you had a lot of academic work on this as well. You have this famous Yale paper, which looked towards all policy decisions from the eighties all the way to the February, which recognized that voting has little to no influence on on policy making, that you do have special interests which are paying for this. And I like that you brought up the think tanks.
I I actually wrote a book on on the think tanks because, again, it's so blatant, yes, yet it's ignored. I mean, the think tanks, they are almost completely funded by the arms industry. They're joined today hips with military groupings like well, alliances like NATO. And you also see that their influence in the media, the extent to which they can push out actual journalists to write the the articles in the media to to influence public perception, overwhelming. You see that almost all the key officials in power, they're affiliated with one of these NGOs.
It's like a revolving door, so they have a place to sit and be relevant when they're not in office. And when they go into office, they still maintain, you know, the fellowship as they always call themselves. And so you have the people in the in the government. You have the media telling the people, but also the information which is fed to your politicians, are also paid off. I mean, this is like congressional papers, all of this all the the policy papers given, the the paid off politicians should act upon, this is also then, yeah, financed by the think tanks.
So everyone is on the pay, and it's it's all in the open. Yet because no one can criticize it, then it's as if it doesn't happen. It's it's quite extraordinary. But I like what you said about the well, that people want to believe this because if you look at it's you have to sell war as peace, though, if you want to do well in The United States. So people forget that Bush, he came to power by criticizing Clinton, you know, with his nation building.
This was unacceptable. America wouldn't be engaged in nation building. Well, then you have Bush, the ultimate nation builder from Afghanistan to Iraq. And then, of course, we have Obama. Now he wants change.
We're not gonna do this anymore. Of course, here in Norway, we gave him a peace prize on pretty much on the first day of the job because he was so wonderful. And, you know, he the way he went after journalists and his drone warfare, like, unprecedented. It doesn't matter. And then, of course, we have Trump.
He's gonna do America first. And once he's in power, he has to explain, well, America first actually is shaking hands with Giuliani and bombing Iran and doing whatever Israel wants and why not continue the Ukraine war as well. It's it's very deceptive. However, there is one difference, though. When he he takes he well, he's good at branding, though.
I mean, when he when he attacks Russia, he says, well, he's a mediator. When he supports the genocide in Gaza, he again, he's a mediator. He's bringing Israel and the Palestinians together when he's bombing Iran's nuclear reactors. Again, he has the audacity to say he ended the war. I mean, this was his war as well, and, but he's also the mediator.
It's, now he wants to, you know, bring have a nuclear deal because nuclear weapons are really dangerous, but he's the one that pulled out of the INF and brought us to this point of a possible nuclear exchange. I mean, this is quite extraordinary, though. How but but do you see anything uniquely different about Trump?
Speaker 1: No. I I I think the the problem is a lot of people don't remember how this has manifested itself over and over again in previous administrations. People have said, well, it's great that president Trump is top fine well, at least he's talking with president Putin and the Russians. But after the the two thousand eight, Georgia Russian war, which which The US provoked, they overthrew the government of Georgia. They built it up into a battering ram, and then they had them attack Russian troops, a miniature version of the conflict now raging in Ukraine.
And then after that failed, Russia basically squashed the the the Georgia military, and they wanted a reset. And they they had secretary of state Hillary Clinton at the time, with, foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, and they they reset the relations. And if you look at the articles from that time, how hopeful they were that there would be this new cooperation with Russia, it's it's it's almost a verbatim repeat of everything we just watched the Trump administration go through with Russia. It's a it's a it's a bad remake, and we're already at the at the point where we see that that facade collapsing and the truth touches of The United States, which always is continuity of agenda rolling forward. And so this is this is what people have to keep in mind.
We have to remember that the the political system in the West is is one of perception management. And the same way The US salami slices its way toward escalation against, say, Russia or Iran or China, they're also salami slicing in terms of shaping public perception. If they went from, one to the other extreme too quickly, people would recognize it. They do it very, very, very gradually. I look at where we are with with Venezuela.
I know this is on on another side of the planet, but it is directly related to everything. The The US is waging a war against multipolarism in in essence. And Venezuela is a a nearby country, a partner of both Russia and China, that Russia and China would have a very hard time defending its its its low hanging fruit in in essence, and removing it from the board would further isolate Russia and China in ways maybe The US is having a hard time doing in regards to, say, Iran or even more so in regards to North Korea. So so we are going from, I secured the border in the first one hundred days. This is what president Trump told the American people.
And if you ask Trump supporters, what has president Trump actually done that he said he he he was going to do? And they will say, he secured the borders. And yet you're from you you have convinced these same people to to support a potential war with Venezuela because Venezuela is flooding American borders with drugs. How is that possible? If you secured the borders, how are the drugs flooding over the borders?
It doesn't make any sense. And you could tell when you ask Trump supporters this, they never even thought about it that way. And this is how perception management works. It works in this this theater of politics that detaches people from their ability to use logic and reason. And and more than that, it's it's not even that, oh, we we think Trump is such a great guy.
It's also the fact that many times people are voting for people like Trump or or even Kamala Harris for that instance because they hate the the their their opponent and fear their opponent even more. And so this this creates a very intense range of emotions that blinds people from using their logic and reason, and it blinds them from the reality of continuity of agenda. And unfortunately, it works very well, and it has worked for decades and decades, and and we can see The US and Europe using this. I I still see people saying, well, in Europe, you know, you have these these parties in France and in Germany, and they're, you know, they're opposed to all of this, and they're gonna change if they you know, they're getting more popular, and if they get into power, they're gonna change everything. No.
They're not. They're going to do exactly what Trump did there. Sell it this this is all about perception management, and it's about managing people's anger and outrage. It's to redirect their energy into a into a harmless direction. That's that's what this is all about.
By the time they realize, say, the the AFD in in Germany or whatever the the equivalent is in France or in any of these other countries, by the time they get into power and people realize that they're not going to make good on their promises, it'll it'll be too late, and they'll be trapped in the same cycle all over again thinking the other guy or the other girl is going to save them. We went through this with Italy. Georgia Maloney, she was supposed to pull Italy out of all of this, the self destructive cycle of serving Washington's interests at Europe's interests. Has has she done that? No.
Speaker 0: Yeah. I recently spoke to an Italian ambassador who who said in Italy, they sometimes refer to it as post election and pre election Mello only because they're they're two different people, though. The the Yes. You know? And the the people who supported her, you know, they might be a bit disappointed.
The the people who upholster in the fear that, oh my god, she will take us in a completely direction. They're kind of nothing really changed. I mean, it's but there's one big difference, I think, if you'll with Trump. That is the way he sells the empire and war. I mean, he because there is a fundamental difference since the end of the Cold War.
Pursued this idea of liberal hegemony. That is liberalism was the source of why we should have sovereign equality, why the West should be allowed to interfere in domestic affairs of other countries, why we may have to bomb your countries every now and then, why we might have to break them up because of all the name of liberal democracy. This is also why we not just have our right to rule, but also the responsibility to do so because we're looking after the protection of other peoples as well from their own governments. So so liberal hegemony is, yeah, a bit like a civilizing mission. You have the the format for why for why this is legitimate, that one side rules, one decision making point.
But Trump appears to be rejecting the liberal premise to a large extent. I think, you know, probably some genuine concern about the the coupling from the nation state, the walkism, the deep state being entrenched in these ideas. However, I'm glad you mentioned Venezuela because he doesn't seem to lean in on, you know, human rights and all of this that much when he calls I mean, he's very open. I I want the oil. But and if it's not oil, then it's this idea that, well, Maduro's actually a drug kingpin.
You know? We're not attacking a country. We're we're fighting crime, so we're not bombing vessels. We're just, you know, stopping drug trade. It I thought the peace price, so I wanted to get your take on this because this is, of course, given by the Norwegians and this part of the world.
They really want to bring The US back into the liberal hegemony. It seems like they're handing him on the plate the the excuse to go liberal imperialism or liberal hegemony as a reasoning to attack because they gave the peace price to and we'll call it an opposition leader who has applauded all along all these crippling sanctions on Venezuela, which has led to tens of thousands of deaths, people fleeing the country, but also very much eager and supportive of The US military buildup along its coast. I mean, this is wouldn't be surprised if she would stand their applaud when the Americans invade. This is the the well, it's different from what Trump would have done because he would have pointed to to the oil and the drug trade. But but it seems that Europeans are trying to get him over to our side by suggesting, well, you know, you can do it for democracy.
We give you legitimacy here, but then you have to join our reasoning. I'm not sure if you see it in a different way.
Speaker 1: I I I I tend to stand completely on the outside and look in not not as a conservative or as liberal, and what I see is a strategy of pension, and more than that, branding. You have one giant corporation like, say, Unilever, and you think of all the subsidiaries that they have and all the target markets that they're targeting with these subsidiaries. And they're targeting people who might not like Unilever, but they brand it in such a way that you might not even notice if you don't look carefully at the packaging. And that's all conservative and liberalism across Western politics actually as it is branding, by the same, if you wanna call it a deep state, the same special interests. And they're targeting different sections of the audience.
Then when a nominally conservative is in power, they you know, they're trying to sell the same war to these different groups of people. And so they they do it through. Yes. When it's a liberal, they do it through human human rights and a civilizational mission. And then when it's a conservative, it's more of this.
We're we're superior. These people are different and dangerous. And, yes, let's let's take their oil. We could do more at these resources than they're doing it. So it's just it's just different branding for the exact same.
And Nobel Peace Prize nominally, yes, it's from it's, based in Norway, but it has served for as long as I've been aware and following geopolitics has been basically a US, again, deep state seal of approval. It's it's used to create the illusion of legitimacy for all of these tools of US empire. Aung San Suu Kyi, for example, she she wanted this was to create this this almost saint like aura around her, selling regime change in Myanmar here in Southeast Asia. You mentioned president Barack Obama didn't even do anything, and he got it. And he continued every war.
Actually, he expanded all the wars he inherited and started multiple new wars. You've mentioned the the drone warfare, which leaked out documents reveal on in certain periods killed 90%, innocent civilians. It wasn't even killing supposed terrorists. And so it it goes on and on and on in this most recent, Nobel Peace Prize, I would call it charade, is president Trump attracting all of this attention to the Nobel Peace Prize, including among audiences, like conservatives who might not have paid attention to it. And now they've they've announced this Venezuelan opposition leader who has been backed by the US government for years and years, funded by the National Endowment for Democracy, the NED, which again, people don't realize this.
It was not defunded, was not dismantled. Its website is up. And just the other day, they posted a congratulatory statement on their website congratulating this this Venezuelan opposition leader they have funded for years and years. And so, they are focusing attention on Venezuela. President Trump attracted attention to this Nobel Peace Prize among people that ordinarily would ignore it, and now you can see them.
What what are they doing? They're building consensus for this regime change war in Venezuela. Again, to stop drugs flooding the borders, president Trump claims he he already secured. And before that, we remember, president Trump claiming, yes. I want the oil.
He's a dictator. He's an evil socialist. All of this whatever he thinks he has to say to sell this war, that is what he's going to say, and this is where we are right now in terms of manufacturing consent. That I think that's what the noble that's what the noble peace prize has has been used for years and years for, and that's what they just use it again for.
Speaker 0: Yeah. And well, this is the the whole well, we talked about the think tanks. You can put the NGOs into this camp because you have the the main regime change NGO set up by the CIA chief and Reagan in 1983, as I said, the National Endowment for Democracy. The National Endowment for Democracy also financed the Norwegian Helsinki committee who also has affiliations within the Nobel Peace Prize Committee. So it's all blob of, yeah, regime change folks.
But, yeah, I thought it was quite fitting, though, because the whole idea after the Cold War was that, well, democracy creates peace, and democracy can be delivered through regime change and war. So why so war is peace. I mean, this is how you do create peace is by sending our military in to establish a democracy. And as we often see, it's the the the opposition figures we pick from Belarus and every other place. They they rarely have democratic support.
It's it's just they're toeing the line a bit like Moldova and also the people who want to have removed in Georgia. But no, it's it it it seems like it's nonetheless, the whole effort is struggling a bit. You think they're gonna be able to push back this the multipolar moment, or it's still in the air?
Speaker 1: Well, I I think it's still in the air. I think complacency is extremely dangerous. A lot of people right now, they're looking at the conflict in Ukraine, and they're saying, Look at American and Western in general, military industrial production. Look at Russian military industrial production. Darn it.
Let's not even talk about China, North Korea, how China might be helping North Korea and ultimately helping Russia in the process. Just look at that, and people will say, So that decides it. The US is not going to be able to do this. The problem is you have to look at the whole big picture. It is not just this proxy war in Ukraine against Russia is just one of a an entire global conflict taking place that The US is waging against multi polarism.
Yes. Russia and China can protect themselves militarily to a great extent economically. They have secured their information space, which is something I'm always talking about. But beyond Russia and China, are other nations doing this successfully? I would say a lot of people are are underestimating the damage that The United States and its Israeli proxies dealt to Iran and its allies like Hezbollah.
They have completely toppled the government in Syria. And, again, going back to that Rand Corporation paper, they talked about extending Russia, tying them down in one place, and then succeeding in another place where they might otherwise not have been able to. That is exactly what they did in Syria. They tied Russia down in Ukraine, and then they moved their resources to Syria to try regime change there again. Russia had stopped it, and they essentially froze the conflict, and they were protecting the the government there.
And then The United States moved its its resources there and was able to topple the government. And then that paved the way for this war on Iran. And, again, this whole conflict between Israel and, Hamas, this is another strategy of tension where where essentially The US is directing both as proxies to per to create conditions across the entire region that led us into this war in, with Iran in the first place. I warned about that just a a day or two after October 7. And and what people have to understand is, yes, The US has a military industrial deficit.
They're having a a hard time catching up. They're compensating for that with their you could call it an alliance network. I would call it a a proxy network where they have all of these proxies, all of Europe, Japan, South Korea, The Philippines. These are countries that are politically captured. People say it doesn't serve their best interest to serve, Washington's interest at their own expense, but that that's the beauty of politically capturing a country.
You installed the client regime that serves your interests at the expense of that country and the people living there, and we can demonstratively see this being done. They have that, and they have a global spanning military. Yes. Its military industrial production is not up to the same levels as Russia or China, but it's able to move around the world in ways Russia and China cannot. And they're they're playing to that advantage, this actually, this combination of advantages, the ability to reach in the the monopoly they have over information space around the globe, except for maybe places like Russia and China, their ability to reach into a country, manipulate public perception, turn these people against their own best interests, install a client regime into power, and politically capture that country as well and add to its alliance network.
This is what they are doing in the hopes of tilting the the shifting balance of power back in their favor, back to to unipolar US hegemony. This is what they're doing. I think there's a huge, huge danger of them having success in doing this, where they're able to isolate Russia and China, by turning countries in between because Russia and China are unable to defend them as Russia was unable to defend, Syria. As we we can see The US still overthrowing governments, Nepal. They just overthrew the government in Nepal raped on China's border, raped on India's border, and they were unable to do anything to stop this.
So this is still a huge danger. I think it's a an intense conflict, and I don't think that it's possible to say one way or another how how it's going to end. And I highly warn against any sense of complacency in this matter.
Speaker 0: On the political messaging, though, it is interesting. It can play different sides. And on one side, he makes the point, well, you know, the war would never happen under my administration. But, also, I broke the weapon taboo and filled up Ukraine with javelins in my first administration, which kinda brought us to this war. Yes.
Well, also strategic sequencing. I was thinking about Venezuela because they did something with them as well. That is when the Russians invaded Ukraine, there was a need and all the sanctions came in place. There was a need for alternative sources of energy. So suddenly, there was this, well, let's relax the sanctions of Venezuela.
And suddenly, emerges almost as a peace initiative that, you know, we will mend our ties, we'll get along. And but of of course, it's temporary while you adjust to the new sanctions. And now, of course, what has changed between then and now in terms of what what is happening in Venezuela? Nothing has happened. The only variable which shifted was the access to energy.
So so now, of course, they went from sanctioning Venezuela to improving some relations, and now, of course, there has to be regime change. So the peace community political messaging is it seems to be all driven by the same independent variable, which is certainly nothing to do with peace. But I wanted to ask, though, what has changed in the since Trump has taken over the Ukraine war? Because you just mentioned the idea of capturing a nation. And what's, again, if you just look at what's been confirmed by the mainstream media, Washington Post, New York Times in 2014 after the coup, not supported by the majority of Ukrainians, by the way.
On the first day, we learned that the CIO was has started to take over Ukrainian intelligence, rebuilding it from scratch to make sure it wasn't Russian friendly anymore. We learned also that to hijack the government, not just Americans taking key positions, but we also learned from general prosecutor Viktor Shokin that the Americans had to approve all new appointees. We also learned that America was taking over the military planning out of Germany. They're the one running the war. During the counter offensive in 2023 when the Ukrainian generals protested and said this will end in disaster, they were overruled by their their real planners, which were in in Washington.
We learned this as well. Even now, we have the last Pola, so 69% of Ukrainians want immediate negotiations to end the war. We don't discuss this when we talk about helping Ukraine. Helping Ukraine still means to send weapons, to keep dragging them out of their apartments and send them to the trenches as, well, cheap meat. But even Trump back in 02/2019, this is when Zelenskyy won the platform based on peace.
73% of Ukrainians voted for this for to to to implement the Minsk agreements and restore relations with Donbas and Russia to make peace. This was overturned by, again, NGOs financed and also The US backed let's call them right wing extremists. I'm just if if you go through 02/2014, I know we have to pretend as if the Russian invasion was unprovoked. Otherwise, you know, you support it and, you know, I I will lose my job. But let's hypothetically say it wasn't unprovoked.
I mean, what what has actually changed here, though? Why since since 02/2014, as Trump doing any significantly different? I know that he's sending less weapons, but it's also true that towards the end of 2024, Biden himself said that had to send cluster ammunition because they ran out of weapons. So is this is this just, recognizing temporary shortage?
Speaker 1: Well, you you're absolutely right. That is exactly why. It wasn't because president Trump, wanted peace with Russia. That's why he's sending fewer weapons. They have fewer weapons to send, to Ukraine.
And, again, this is because of the military industrial production issue, that I've been covering, others have been covering for years since this this conflict began in 2022. But but you were talking about how president Zelensky ran on a platform of peace, and then as soon as he was in office, he pivoted. That should sound familiar. That is exactly what Obama did. That is exactly what Trump just did.
This is what all of these, opposition parties in Europe are are either doing or planning on doing. And this is how they perpetuate continuity of agenda. They're they're constantly creating division, distraction, and false hope for people to chase so that people never end up on the same page realizing, no, it's not about left or right. It's about these special interests that trick us every single time. They're tricking people on the left, and on the right, they're getting us to fight each other instead of all of us coming together and fighting for our own best interests.
There are there is common ground among all of these people, and they're being just deliberately distracted away from it. And this is how they perpetuate continuity of agenda by by constantly doing this. They do it in targeted countries that they have captured, and they do it all across the the collective West, which they they already rule over without any real opposition. This is very important to to spot this pattern and realize that is what's going on. Real change.
If you see real change like the emergence of multipolarism, you see how the entire Western world reacts to it. There's there's no faction in Washington that is pro China or pro Russia, even though they accuse each other of being you know, like, I I was just you know, again, look at the think tanks, read those policy papers. That's what's actually going to happen, and ignore the public statements coming out of Washington and tune into their hearings. And all of this is public. They they play it live on YouTube, and they have all the recordings on YouTube.
In the hearings, they invite these people from the think tanks, and they sit there and they lay out what is actually going to happen and why. And you will hear people accusing president Trump of being pro China. And when president Biden was in office, they were accusing him of being pro China. And and it was all to create the illusion that not enough is being done, and we need to escalate even further. And they get at least half of the population to buy into it under one president, and then they will get the other half to buy into it when when they switch switch roles and the process starts all over again.
So it's it's very important to see through this game and understand that this is this is again, this is not an agent Western democracy is not an agent of change or self determination. It is a system of control and one that maintains continuity of agenda.
Speaker 0: My last question, though, is if how do you assess the Russian reaction so far? Because, again, what this, I guess, also what they say and what they think and do are is not the same because well, I know that Trump is disappointed in Putin because he you know, they had a nice talk and Putin isn't laying down his arms. But but from what I hear, there's a bit of a split in Moscow growing in terms of how to respond because, you know, two things can be true at the same time. One is the recognition that The US is genuinely responding to the rise of multiplicity as a reality that is many centers of power, limiting the recognizing that it has limited resources. Its relative dominance in the world or power has diminished.
So for this reason, it needs to pivot to Asia and also more on the Americas. But if you wanna pivot to Asia, you have to pivot away from somewhere, and that away is Europe. Of course, it doesn't mean that you want to stop the wars or or have too much peace in Europe, but the but it means that they want to outsource the war to the European. So this is, again, why it's also something time sometimes perplexing for the America firsters is why Trump is calling for peace in Europe, but also they all have to get 5% of their GDP spent on the military. So, again, the Europeans have to take over the fighting of Russia.
And so for for the from the Russian perspective, it looks like this is a win on its own because if The US would reduce its presence in Europe, then that would reduce the threats on Russia's western borders. So so this is this is a reason why you want to play along with Trump's, you know, theatrics that he's a mediator. He just wants to bring peace, although he can't make any concessions on America's side. On the other side, by by entertaining his well, this theatrics that he's a mediator, you also allow emboldening of Trump because now, of course, given that he's not a participant, he can do things which Biden didn't even wanna do. That is tomahawks.
That means deep strikes to knock out the Russian energy facilities. So at at some point, you know, did this contradictions have to be resolved? You see some people leaning more towards, well, let's just pay the cost while America and Europe have a bit of a divorce or a new, I guess, division of labor, while the other side is now suggesting that this is enough. I mean, again, as you said before, what would the Americans do if Russia was striking deep inside The United States? At some point, there has to be a retaliation because this opens the door, for example, to Germans who might now see that, oh, well, it's open season on Russia.
We can now send our Taurus missiles. Why not launch the Kremlin? Russia won't do anything. They don't have red lines. So did did you see do you get any signals in terms of where Russia might go on this?
Because this contradictions as The US escalates the war on Russia, it it intensifies because there's limits to how much they can be willing to accept. I mean, despite what we say, Putin's not a dictator. If Russia is struck, political economic targets enough, he's not gonna be able to to limit to the other centers of power in Russia, the political forces, which wants a much stronger response.
Speaker 1: I I I would put it this way. Europe is an extension of The United States for all intents and purposes. It is just an extension of The United States. So The United States pivoting its resources toward Asia, Europe is still there, and it's still an extension of The United States, and those generals are going to stay in Germany. They're not going to Asia.
The CIA is going to stay on the ground in Ukraine. It is still essentially a US proxy war being fought against Russia through Ukraine. I think the real change that's that we see taking shape is that take they see that Ukraine is burning out. There could be a collapse of Ukraine's fighting capacity, and they want Europe to fill the void. That's why we see all of these provocations, suddenly materializing, mysterious drones, Russia violating airspace, Russian Guran drones or, you know, the reconnaissance equivalent flying around in Poland, all of these provocations, this talk of an actual seizing of ships carrying Russian energy, shipments, all of this.
This is a huge Europe wide escalation, and what is happening is as as Ukraine's fighting collapse fighting capacity collapses, Europe is is being designated to fill that void, whether they do it in inside Ukraine with the peacekeeping forces secretary Hagstad told them to get ready all the way back in February, or if they fight it in a in a more indirect way across the the entirety of Europe and and surrounding space like in the the Baltic Sea, for example. This is what we're watching, and the the conflict is being fought to the last Ukrainian, and now they're preparing to set it up so that it's it's Europeans in general that go into the breach next. And what is Russia doing? I think nobody could be certain what president Putin is is thinking. He hasn't confided in me what he's actually really thinking.
But what I what I would believe is that they've the Russians fully understand what is going on. As as we noticed, they've made zero concessions to The United States during all all of these supposed negotiations. What they're doing is creating an exit for The United States and and their European proxies, not for what is happening right now, but as Russia continues fighting and winning the conflict on the ground in Ukraine. They're going to continue doing this. They have made no signal, no sign of stopping their military industrial capacity continues to expand.
They're carrying out almost as many, missile and drone strikes, in some cases, many times more, drone strikes than they were in the beginning of the conflict, and that was them drawing from huge mountains of of missiles and munitions that they stockpiled for years. This is what they are actually just producing month to month now. So it is a huge transformation. They're continuing to make this transformation. And as you do, as a strategy, when you're locked in in a a war essentially with another nation or group of nations, you give them an exit for them to leave out of rather than forcing them to fight to the to the absolute end and absolute death.
And I think that's what the Russians are doing. I I you know, it's easy to look at what president Putin is is saying and doing and say, this is weakness. He's he's gonna fall for Minsk three again, you know, Minsk all over again. But I think it really is just Russia being pragmatic, thinking long term, trying to avoid this escalating out of control. They know it's going to escalate, but they wanna manage the way it does escalate.
And they want to keep the advantage as it does escalate. I think they've done a very good job doing that. I think they will continue doing that. I think China is playing a very similar strategy. We can see now China is there's limits and there's lines that are being crossed, they understand where this is all going.
I don't think they're kidding themselves that there could be any sort of accommodation within a a US led unipolar world order. They understand how this is all playing out, and they're just trying to be as careful and intelligent as they they go through this process.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Actually, that's a good point, allowing a way out because as it appears that, especially over the past week, that with the step up against the electric or energy infrastructure across Ukraine that and also you see now the collapse of Perkupiansk, Bokorovsk. This is gonna have a cascading effect. So if Ukraine collapses, it's important that that at least Americans have a way out of this because because they're gonna be under great pressure to prevent them in the main proxy. I mean, this is this is a great opportunity.
They have hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian underarms, which you can use to weaken a key adversary. They're not to allow this whole thing to fall apart is gonna be very painful. But if there is a way out for Trump to save his face and then stay safe, far as a safe face, and just say, well, you know, we tried to end the war all along. It was the Europeans. It was never my war, you know, yada yada yada.
We heard all this before, but but I guess that is a important thing to keep the relations with The US and keep the narrative of America trying to end this war alive until the now at least when Ukraine collapses. And then, of course, the Europeans can also have some narrative they can lean into. They can say that, well, Putin always wanted to exterminate Ukraine as a nation. They only got, like, 25%. We win.
You know? So so every everyone kind of has a way out, which could be a positive thing, of course, if the alternative is just war. But yeah. Anyways, any final thoughts before we wrap up?
Speaker 1: Well, I I I always try to impress upon people zooming out and looking at the big picture. I know there's a a tendency for people to to folk hyperfocus on any one given conflict, And then from their perspective, that seems like the center of the universe, but we have to zoom out and see the big picture, how The United States operates worldwide. You see people who are utterly convinced that, say, Israel somehow controls The United States. But if you if you zoom out of, say, The Middle East, you can see The United States has proxies like Israel. Like, Ukraine is it exacts, copy a copy and paste proxy that they're using in Eastern Europe against Russia.
They have the Alun province of Taiwan. They have The Philippines now. Again, a carbon copy in the Asia Pacific. And this is if you look at the big picture, you can see things much more clearly. As always, read the policy papers.
I beg people, please ignore what politicians are saying. Their job is to lie to us. Read the policy papers and look at how everything almost line for line, word for word is being implemented from these papers from years ago, they are implementing. That is the plan. That's where policy comes from, and that's what's telling us, what is coming here in the near and intermediate future.
And and as always, thank you so much for having me on.
Speaker 0: Yeah. And if people wanna find you, they can go to the new Atlas where you have your own podcast. And there's this Chinese saying I always like going back to what you just mentioned now, which is, yeah, if you take a step back, the world looks larger. I like this one. It's because we often do get focused on one conflict or some tunnel vision.
So, anyways, thank you again for taking the time.
Speaker 1: Thank you.
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
Michael von der Schulenburg: How the EU Transitioned from a Peace Project to a War Project https://youtu.be/ab7fMP4xO5U https://t.co/15CBxQJo9b
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
Daniel Davis: Russia Preparing Retaliation - Oreshnik Deployed & Seizing Odessa https://youtu.be/CUxWt_NQyRU https://t.co/P5EigrcGnb
Video Transcript AI Summary
- The discussion centers on whether European actions against Russia amount to a NATO-wide escalation and could lead to direct confrontation with Russia outside Ukraine, given recent attacks on Russian energy infrastructure and civilian ships in the Black Sea, including a Russian oil tanker in the Mediterranean with reports of drones launched from Greece. Putin reportedly vowed retaliation, and the guests consider how European and U.S./NATO support for Ukraine factors into this dynamic.
- Daniel Davis argues that a segment of the Western alliance wants a conflict with Russia, framing it as peace on their terms from a position of weakness. He says there is little consideration for Russia’s security requirements or a mutually acceptable peace, and that ignoring Russia’s security concerns has driven the current cycle of escalation. He notes that Western actions since 2021–2022 have ignored the Russian side and pursued war aims on Western terms, contributing to a deteriorating situation and increasing casualties on the Ukrainian side.
- Davis contends that Russia has been reticent to respond to many provocations with significant actions outside Ukraine, implying that Moscow has avoided a full-scale escalation that could threaten NATO. He predicts that Putin will respond to Western strikes on Russian targets, possibly increasing pressure on Odessa and other civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, with a tit-for-tat pattern as Russia leverages its greater capacity to hit Western shipping and infrastructure.
- He asserts that since 2023, the West’s approach has not reversed the battlefield dynamics; sanctions, intelligence inputs, and heavy weapon transfers have not pushed Russia out of Ukraine and have allowed NATO and European stockpiles to deplete while Russia continues to build up in key categories (missiles, air defense, logistics). He claims Europe’s commitment of large sums to Ukraine will further strain their economies and shorten their stockpiles, potentially weakening Western readiness for a wider conflict.
- The guest stresses that Russia’s strategy appears to be “go slow” in Ukraine to maintain pressure without triggering a broader European or NATO intervention, while building up stockpiles to prepare for a possible expansion of war if needed. He notes that Russia has generated a stockpile advantage in missiles (including Oreshniks) and air defense that could be decisive in a broader conventional war.
- The discussion covers Oreshnik missiles, with Davis explaining Russia’s aim to maximize production and use if needed, not merely deter. He argues that Western air defenses would be ineffective against such systems and that Russia’s broader stockpiling and production could outpace Western depletion. He suggests Russia’s buildup is intended to enable a decisive move if NATO or Western forces escalate, and that the West’s capacity to sustain prolonged high-tempo combat is limited.
- Both speakers discuss Odessa as a likely target if Russia deems it necessary to retaliate against Western support for Ukraine, noting that recent strikes on bridges, trains, and energy facilities in the region indicate growing Russian intent to disrupt Ukraine’s rear and logistics in the event of a front-line escalation. They consider whether Russia could seize Odessa if Western concessions are not forthcoming, and whether European leaders would respond decisively if Russia moves against Ukrainian ports.
- The hosts warn that Western rhetoric about a “just and lasting peace” may be misaligned with Russia’s goals and that the risk of a broader conflict—potentially involving nuclear considerations—exists if provocations continue. They caution that if the conflict widens, all sides—Russia, Ukraine, Europe, and the United States—could suffer heavy losses, and express concern about the potential for miscalculation as new weapons systems and security arrangements come into play before the year ends.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Welcome back. We are here with lieutenant colonel Daniel Davis, a four times combat veteran and host of the very popular Daniel Davis deep dive podcast. You're also the recipient, of course, of the Ridenhaus sorry, Ridenhauer Prize for truth telling after speaking about how the military leadership deceived the public over the war in Afghanistan. So in these times of demand for conformity and creeping censorship, I and I, yeah, I very much appreciate your input. So thank you for your work, welcome back.
Speaker 1: Always a pleasure to be here. Professor, thank you.
Speaker 0: So we see now that the Europeans have argued that the way to defeat Russia is to go after its energy. Now initially, this was some sanctions on the Russian energy companies, then they moved on to cutting cutting themselves off from Russian imports. Then they discussed the need to bring the war to Russia. Then we saw attacks on the Russian energy inter infrastructure on Russian territory. Then we saw more attacks recently on Russian civilian vessels, that is its oil tankers and all in the Black Sea.
And now we got the news in that there's also been attack on a Russian oil tanker in the Mediterranean, which is pretty far away from Ukraine, and there's reports that the drones were launched from Greece now. Putin is saying that he will retaliate for for this against the Ukrainians. And, well, I don't doubt that he will retaliate against Ukrainians. But at the same time, with the European financing, intelligence, war planning, weapons well, not just Europe. It's all the NATO countries, including The United States.
Is this a Europe NATO attack on Russia? And do you think yes. So we now go further up the escalation ladder. Do you think this could, I guess, lead to more direct confrontation between the Russians and, NATO?
Speaker 1: Listen. I I I think we have to just acknowledge that there are those in the Western alliance and the Western world writ large that want a conflict with Russia. I I mean, it sounds absurd to say on the face value because all the words coming out of their mouths are always a just and lasting peace, etcetera, but they want a just and lasting peace according to their terms and their definitions from a position of inferiority and weakness, imposing it upon the side that has the military power, the economic power, etcetera, all those things that are irrational. And so when you say with one hand, we're trying to find a negotiated settlement and a just and lasting peace. They only want it just from the perspective of their side.
So there's not even the contemplation, not even the consideration of a mutually just and and, fair peace. And and that that really is is as telling as it could be because if you only want something from your side and you're not even willing to contemplate the other side, that continues this long decades long process that we've been going through in the West where we never give any possibility of credibility to Russia even having a view, even having a possibility of any kind of a security environment. I I think you actually talked about that the last time you were on my show, and I I thought it was a great analogy that the security, competition is something that every country needs to engage in because they have their own national security requirements. And if you say, okay, your side doesn't have any valid security requirements, only our side does, and then you take action based on that, then you were setting up a situation where conflict is almost the only outcome. We've been doing that since the beginning.
I actually was having an engagement with a colleague earlier today, and I I I went back to look at some of the things I had written prior to the the war starting in February 2022 and some things I had written throughout 2021 warning that war was coming if we ignored the Russian side of all this. We did, and then we had the war we did. And then, of course, you contract the next four years and you see that we continue to ignore the Russian side, and we continue to hold out only for the a calculation and a and a, an end of the war on our terms alone, ignoring Russia, and it keeps getting worse for our side. Now that I think that here where we're if if we're not in, we're very close to the Ukrainian death throes in terms of their military capacity, their their capacity as a state to wage war, to support war, and to conduct war. I think it's nearing the point to where it's just gonna be completely exhausted.
And instead of acknowledging that and saying, you know, man, as much as I hate this, we have to acknowledge reality, and let's let's take appropriate reasonable actions to limit the further damage. Instead of doing that, we're still where we were in 2021, ignoring the Russian side and taking actions that we want on our side, and we don't want any comp consequences. We don't want there to be any reaction. And so since Russia has been, if we're just being blunt about this, they have been very reticent to react to a lot of things. A lot of things either we claimed were Russian red lines or even Russia claimed were something close to red lines, and they have we haven't seen a strong reaction from Russia on a number of things outside of the the confines of the Ukrainian, theater of war, there's this view that there never will be so that we are free to do anything that we want to Russia, and there won't be a response, whether it's these long range strikes into their oil infrastructure, this, you know, the so called spider web operation that happened, earlier this summer, deep inside of Russia, and they were like, okay, nothing happened to that.
So let's just try another one. And I think now that he actually hitting these civilian vessels, which in almost in any other time is going to be seen as an act of piracy or an act of war. And yet, we don't seem to be bothered by it. We're just continuing to go down this path, and now that we're basically taunting Putin to actually do something about it. And according to what you said, you saw in the news that he's vowing revenge, I I suspect that probably Putin is gonna remain not gonna take the bait because I think this is I think there are those in the West who want this to expand.
And so they're trying to prompt Russia to do something outside of Ukraine so that then they can go, I told you article five. Here we go. Now then we're gonna bring this into the war. I think there are those who just absurdly, irrationally, and dangerously want that, and I think they're trying to prompt Putin to do that. What I think is he'll probably do is strike even harder in Odessa.
I think that you may see a move against them. I think you're gonna see more shots on their infrastructure and a tit for tat. You you hit our shipping, we're gonna hit your shipping, and and the Russians have a lot more capacity to do that. So we'll see how he ends up doing it, but, he's not gonna do nothing, but I don't think he's gonna take the beta here. But this just shows in my view that there's just the rot, and there's no kinder way to put this mental thinking in the West that instead of acknowledging that this thing is just lost, you you can't win this, you can't reverse this.
That was shattered in 2023. So more than two full years ago, we lost any ability to think that maybe we could reverse the battlefield by all these inputs, whether it was sanctions, intelligence, training, of course, thousands of armored vehicles, millions of rounds of various ammunition, missiles, all that kind of stuff, utterly failed to push Russia out of anything. And in the two years since that time, it's been nothing but moving to the West, albeit at a slow pace, but at a significant and sustained pace and massive casualties on the Ukraine side, are irreplaceable. And so now then here we are at this time when president Trump wants to have a negotiated settlement. The Russians are still open to a negotiated settlement, and the only two parties that are against this are Ukraine and Europe at large.
And the question is gonna remain, will Trump sit on the sidelines and just watch this play out and and allow the situation to deteriorate further, or will he finally step in and say, alright. That's it. If you wanna do this lunacy and insanity that could spark a war with Russia that could all too easily go nuclear, you're on your own. We're not gonna join you in the stupidity. I don't know if he's gonna do that or not, Glenn, but that's what probably needs to be done.
Otherwise, who knows whether or not that we get this thing expanded beyond the borders of Ukraine or not.
Speaker 0: Yeah. This reference to a just and lasting peace as well is very strange because just for whom? And this is a good question. And, and, you probably watched Zelenskyy's last speech wherein he made the point that it was not all simply enough to force the Russians into making concessions and making a deal, but indeed, they should be make made sure that Russia could never do this again. I mean, this is talking about defeating Russia, essentially.
And now the Europeans, you know, they more or less mimic the same logic that is, as you said, that there should be security guarantees for Ukraine because they are the victim. Russia should have none because they're the aggressor. This is how now international security seemingly works. So but, again, they they're saying this as they're at the, you know, edge of defeat. So it is quite extraordinary to watch.
But, of course, in in the real world, Russia's realizing that it's it's winning. Like, my to be honest, one of my concerns is that they might get too bold as they're winning and overreached. So far, that doesn't seem to be the case. If anything, the main criticism against Putin now is that he's not responding appropriately according to many in Moscow. But but Putin responded now.
He made some comments about the three pigs in Europe, and he also made the comment that before New Year's, the orechnics, which are now in mass production, will be combat ready. They will still enter service. How do you do how do you see this? Do you think they would they would actually start using the ReshNICs, they're still only intended as a deterrent? Because well, we're we're not deterred.
So at some point, you know, if if if we treat it as a bluff and it is a bluff, then, it's not gonna have a deterrent value anymore.
Speaker 1: Yeah. My my guess let me look on the or talk about the the Oreshniks first, is that Russia's main incentive and and rational from a military perspective, objective, is to build up as many of those as they can in production, to use not as a deterrent. They're not gonna provide a deterrent. There there is clearly nothing, nothing that Russia has or could have that will deter from the West because they already have tactical nuclear weapons, strategic nuclear weapons, you know, this, a navy, an air force, large ground forces, none of that has deterred us. So just adding another category of missiles on top of the several they already have with the Gonzales and the other hypersonics, etcetera, the the glide bombs, the the now expanded capable glide bombs, all that, none of that stuff is deterrent.
And so this won't either. There's no question about it. So the Russians would then would want to make sure that they have enough to actually use if they have to. And what I suspect that they'll do is to continue to to go slow because I think that they want to continue to build up to some unknown quantity and of a stockpile of all of these categories of missiles that I just mentioned, most importantly, the Oreshnik and also the air defense missiles for their own s 300, s 500, etcetera, all the different categories, that they have so that if eventually the war does expand and it does become conventional between NATO and Russia, then they can literally swamp us with all the key aspects. You may have seen this, report in the BBC, you know, two or three weeks ago, maybe it was even less than that, that if you The UK, if it's it suddenly find itself in a conventional war, then it could sustain high level combat operations for a few weeks.
And that is symptomatic of the entire West. Whether you're talking France, Germany, The United States, you can add us into that same category. We are not on a wartime footing. We do not have the capability to sustain combat. We can launch attacks.
We can launch missile strikes. We can have air defense for point targets at periods of time, but we cannot sustain it. So it appears to me that Russia is one of the reasons they're doing this go slow thing in Ukraine, which we mock them for regularly, is not because they can't go anymore, it's because they don't want to go anymore, but they do wanna keep the pressure on. So it looks like they're looking for that happy medium to where they wanna keep significant pressure on so that the Ukraine side doesn't get a chance to, catch their breath or to catch a break, but not so much that they get a breakthrough too early because I think they wanna build up all of their stockpiles in these key weapon systems so that in the event that there's an action with the NATO later, then all of the time that this goes slow is happening. And so let's take this two year period that Mino Macron mocked Russia for just a couple of months back.
All during that time, Russia has been building up stockpiles. The the rate that they're reported to be building any category you wanna look at, Kenzals, the the the glide bombs, artillery shells, etcetera, and and the are way more than they're using. Obviously, they've only used once, but all these others, the the range and the Garens the Garen twos now add that to the list. The rate at which they're using them is way, way less than they're actually producing. Ergo, they're stockpiling them up somewhere and to some degree.
Meanwhile, in the exact same period of time, our inventories are deteriorating and declining because our maximum production capacity while improved from where it was in 2022 still is not enough to offset the actual usage. So we're declining our stockpiles. So in the event that at some point there is a conflict and a clash between NATO and Russia and and, you and Russia, they can sustain combat at a pretty high level for a long period of time. And and once they get through, you know, some of these stockpiles, then they can maintain it because they already have the higher level of production capacity. We would have to go on a crash course, and that would still take a year or two, probably more than like two or three in some categories.
Even if you had an existential threat, it just takes time. So we are making ourselves weaker. They are making themselves stronger as we go through. So I think that Putin is not driven by emotions the way all of us in the West are. And I think that he will say, I'm gonna just keep this going on at a sustained level here.
We're gonna win. In his mind, there's no possibility they can lose. In the event that anything ever goes sideways, they can say, okay, that's it. We're gonna now just swamp a certain area even tactically and just blow through something if they want to. They've not tried that.
Since they went back to the offensive following the twenty twenty three Ukraine offensive, Russia has not tried a big operation anywhere. They've used small numbers of troops, they've kept the pressure on, but they haven't even attempted any kind of a big big arrow movement, so to speak. They can, and that would come at a high cost initially. But I my calculation militarily is that if they were to do that, it would not be very hard to break through at selected weak points along anywhere along this thousand plus kilometer frontline, but they've chosen not to do that so far. And I I project and assess that the reason is because they're building up these capabilities, continuing to weaken NATO in the process.
We're self weakening ourselves by continuing to now, as I think happened earlier today, where the European Union said, okay, we're gonna send now. We've committed $90,000,000,000 to give to Ukraine just to function as a state for the next two years. We still don't know for sure where that money is coming from. Apparently, it's they haven't yet approved the stolen assets issues from Russia. But otherwise, I don't know where they're gonna get it.
They're gonna have to borrow it from somewhere. It doesn't come out of thin air, but they're, they're now even gonna weaken their economic system. In addition to weaning themselves all the way off Russian oil, which will again increase the cost of just doing economic activity. And then they're they're lowering their physical, stockpiles of key ammunition systems here. This is insane for us to do all of that stuff.
Why you can see and count Russia's getting stronger and bigger in all of these categories, and they have millions more they could mobilize if they needed to. They haven't. So it's irrational what we're doing, Glenn, and yet here we are.
Speaker 0: Yeah. I see that well, in terms of not being deterred, I think it's quite evident, not just the invasion of Kursk,
Speaker 1: which I
Speaker 0: think is extraordinary on its own, but Russian intelligence, they confirmed that it was the British that led the attack on Russia's nuclear deterrent, which is, again, it's hard to grasp that this is real. But but we we've already gone to such a massive extent that, yeah, the the belief that anything will deter the West now, I think, is yeah. They they see this as being unlikely. But so, no, it might be as you suggest that these weapons are intended for actual combat if the West Western countries decide to join in on this war. But
Speaker 1: And and listen, I I can just tell you that that if it were me, if if I had that capability, and and who knows? I I can't even speculate how many of these things they may have, but it's pretty self evident that we don't have any air defense whatsoever against those because we don't have it against many other categories, but we sure wouldn't have it against those arrestniks. I mean, you there's a limited number of places where we have, arms and ammunition, factories in the West. I'm I'm talking about. And and we have unlike the Russians and the Ukrainians who now disperse all of their stuff because they've learned through, the pain of loss that, you know, if you have large stockpiles in any one place, it's an easy target.
We haven't learned that yet. We we haven't spread them out. I mean, going all the way back to the cold war, we still have these big inventories. You could target each of those things because they're well known where they are. I mean, you could in in a a short period of time, I'm talking like twelve hours, you could just systematically just destroy, like, a large portion of our industrial capacity, of our stockpiles of even what we have that's less, you can you can really damage a lot of that because a lot of these cold war ammunition storage facilities were designed to stop the technology that existed then.
Oreshnik is apparently beyond that, and it wouldn't stop it. So a lot of these things that we think are protected probably aren't, and Russia could hit a lot of those things right off the bat that could denude you even before anything joins at all in frontline in the event of a war. And, of course, if that happens, Glenn, then then the the possibility that somebody, whether it's UK or France, uses nuclear weapons because they see themselves losing is really high. Russia would no doubt calculate that and try not to have something to prompt a nuclear sunk because there is 100% certainty they would retaliate in kind. That's the danger that we're in right now and what we seem oblivious to at the leader level in the West.
Speaker 0: I'm assuming the Russians would go for a bloody nose against a country like Germany, which has taken the lead, and it's not a nuclear power Yeah. Which is probably why the British and the Germans are already preparing with this kind of a shared security agreements. But but I think you're right about this, also about the Russians building up in the rear because there's been so many reports I've seen about all these new productions from the Russians, which are not going to the front, but they're building up in back everything from armored vehicles, but especially missiles. Yes. They're just Yes.
You know, pumping them out and storing it. So I just I and that's a very good explanation. I'm always asked by people, why why aren't Russia just, you know, going hard to go for a decapitation strike, something like this? But that's a good explanation or the assumption that the Europeans would try to rescue the situation somehow by entering.
Speaker 1: And and I'll tell you, Glyn, see, to me that that from the Russian side, that that shows a very high risk averse, mentality. Because, see, I have argued again, forget about right and wrong, forget about morality, forget about, you know, east or west, who's right or wrong. Just from a military analysis perspective, I have, argued that Russia had the capacity to do this, and they could have paid that price somewhere else and brought this war to a close a lot earlier, and they would still have the risk that the west had done this. And we've already had four years of depletion of our, stockpiles and and all all the other inventories we have. I'm I'm thinking that they have a lot more to gain by bringing the the conflict in Ukraine to a quicker military conclusion, but they haven't done it.
They have chosen not to because they're risk averse in my view, but they're they're risk averse while building more capacity so that in the event it happens later, then they have a lot lower concerns than we would on our side. So, I mean, it's, it's all about what somebody wants to do, but I am on the positive side that shows that you Russia is still risk averse even though they have a power advantage. They haven't used it yet like we probably would have in the similar circumstances, and that's hopeful that we can reach some kind of negotiated settlement even in this late hour that the Russian side is still willing from a position of strength to have a negotiated settlement that's ugly and and distasteful, but not catastrophic for our side if only we'll allow it to happen?
Speaker 0: I think for our side, the the main goal, I guess, would have been just for the Ukrainians and Russians to bleed each other white. And then towards the end of it, the the West could kind of put its foot down and and step in in in some way and and just put an end to it. Very consistent with the offshore balancer strategy. But but what we see now is very different, though. The Europeans exhausted themselves militarily, economically, also politically as we see now with this unpopular governments, but also The United States pulling out, distancing itself.
Meanwhile, the Russians are now building up this powerful arsenal, which is very clearly intended for Europe if they go to war with Russia. So it just seems as if the Russians wanna make it clear that if you enter, we will come out swinging. We will make sure that, know, we'll have a powerful missile. So it's not gonna be some little war in the trenches where you tip the scales Yeah. In favor of Ukraine.
Speaker 1: Putin said that very thing, what, ten ten, twelve days ago. The exact same thing you just said there. He said, we don't want to go to a war, but if you start one, we will fight it and we can do it today. And then he specified this whole special military operation. It's like he he goes, it's like surgical.
We're we're using small steps here, but in a big war, we would not hold back like that. There's a lot more we could do. So he's quantified exactly what you just said.
Speaker 0: Well, let me just touch on the the what you mentioned about Odessa because, that this is the likely region to be punished for what has been done, the attacks on the Russian civilian vessels. Obviously, Odessa will be the key maritime city or coastal city of Ukraine on the Black Sea, and so it makes just from a strategic perspective, it kinda makes sense to retaliate against Odessa that is his ports. But we've seen now over the past weeks bridges, trains, logistics centers, ports, industrial sites, energy facilities, all of this being blown up in Odessa especially, but it's not but in terms of a possible long term solution for the Russians, if they perceive that the Europeans are not gonna accept the new status quo, that they will fight another day, you know, it would make sense for Russia to to consider seriously the conquest of Odessa. Do you think we're moving in that direction?
Speaker 1: No. Without question. There's there's no doubt in my mind. I mean, I've been seeing a lot of Russian commentary on on, on open source from their media, the even the government controlled media, definitely on Telegram and several other places where there's a lot of anger, about the hitting of these, the so called shadow fleet, the civilian tankers. They're saying, okay.
You wanna play that? Then then we'll shut down, and we'll definitely take Odessa now. The people have been talking about on the Russian side taking Odessa from for a long time to include Kharkiv in the North, etcetera. If the deal to only take the four Oblast is not accepted, they say that they're gonna go probably another four on top of that, which would include both Odessa and Kharkiv up in the North. So that already existed.
And when you see continued provocations and pokes like this, but now escalating and advancing this to literally and physically attacking civilian ships of this, here, which had not been done up to this point. So why, when we're trying to get this war to an end, are we trying to find even under your definition, in the West of, secure Starmer's, you know, just in lasting peace and all this, are you gonna now accelerate and expand, we on our side, into a new realm of fighting when you know that the likelihood is that that's gonna put, Odessa back in the target? And as you just said, even just in the last twelve hours overnight, I saw right before coming on your show here, there were three more bridges in that region that were hit, a lot with drones and some other kind of targets. So it looks like from military point of view, it looks like that Russia is preparing to cause problems and and difficulties for the Ukraine side to move troops and supplies, etcetera, around in their rear so that in the event you started something in the front, it would complicate the ability to mass forces and supplies, etcetera, along a new line of contact potentially if they were going there.
I don't know where they're going to because they've been hitting stuff in the past and it didn't result in that, but that is nevertheless happening in one potential possibility for what they're gonna do. And who knows if that's what, Vladimir Putin's talking about. He did say in an earlier, year end kind of, question and answer period today implied that bigger things were coming before the end of the year. He didn't specify what it was, but one wonders, could that be what he's gonna do before the end of the year? We're talking literal days from now, so we don't have wait too long long to wait, I guess.
Speaker 0: Well, that seems to coincide very well with the Oreshniks going into combat role before New Year's as well because well, I'm just saying the the British and the French, they obviously want Odessa, the not the next, but they want it into either NATO or some kind of security arrangement. I mean, this port city will know, they did that should be under French and and British control. So I think that once they see Russia moving towards Odessa, then, yeah, the panic will set in, and they might do something foolish. So if I was
Speaker 1: Right.
Speaker 0: Advising the Kremlin, I would suggest, you know, you should have the Oreshniks ready combat ready before you march on Odessa because at any level at any time when if Ukraine is collapsing, this is when the Europeans might do something crazy. Or as Marc Rutte said, we have to prepare for war with Russia. They never say why. The assumption is always that Russia will invade Paris or something, but I think in reality, this is why they should prepare for war. That is Europe will enter this, I think, if they do not you know?
Speaker 1: Well, I mean, you've had you've had Mark Rutgers say that in the past week. You had Kai Callis, I think it was Monday of this week, again, say, we all know that if Ukraine falls, we're next, and they're gonna continue to coming west. You had, the British, and the British air marshal on, I think it was also on Monday saying, we need to be ready for a generational struggle with Russia, and our families need to be ready to sacrifice and fight Russia by name. He said that. And, course, you've you know that the the the German senior ranking general, just a few months back said that we have to get ready for war with Russia.
French, said the same thing. Thank me. All these officials keep saying this. And listen. What the the the one of the big problems, Glenn, that we have in the West is that we never want there to be consequences for our words or actions.
We wanna be free to say and do anything we want to, and it'd be free of consequences. But there are consequences, and when you have all of these senior officials throughout the entire Western alliance continue to use such strong provocation words, a war against Russia, not even being coy about it, direct, It's going to have a consequence, especially when you see the Germans now move to combat brigade into into the Baltics, etcetera, and talking about possibly doing more. It is going to generate a response. And when the Russians see you're actually taking actions and supporting now this attack on the on the fleet, supporting these long range strikes into Russia, you know, all this I mean, at some point, they're gonna they're gonna take some action here, and we just don't know where that's gonna be. I I suspect that Russia will bend over backwards to not initiate anything, but, you know, there's there's limits to to all the provocative actions and stuff that the hit keeps happening, and we'll see, I guess.
I'm I'm just worried about it and and and worry a lot about it that everyone will be a loser. Russia, Ukraine, Europe, everyone will be a loser if there's any kind of conflict, even if it stays conventional. And I pray to God we never get to that day.
Speaker 0: I very much agree. No. It's, yeah, it's crazy we got to this point. I remember the Germans were concerned about sending helmets to Ukraine, and and now they're pretty much Yeah.
Speaker 1: Back to their old
Speaker 0: old ways. Oh, well, let's hope it's yeah. They won't this crisis won't spiral out of control now before New Year's. And well, until then, yeah, have a great holiday or Merry Christmas. But, no, this is as you said, I think the main problem here is we lived for too long in the unipolar moment.
That is the time when wars is something that happens far away. Any mistake can be and the cost of this mistake can be absorbed. And no. And our and our language doesn't have any consequences. So I think, yeah, this is coming quickly to an end, but we need a much steeper learning curve because this is kind of crazy.
Speaker 1: Yeah. It is. Well, thank you very much for having it, and same to you and your family.
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
Guy Mettan: Russophobia Made War Inevitable https://youtu.be/kDavKFoGEXE https://t.co/BggG48sfnX
Video Transcript AI Summary
Guy Mettin argues that Russophobia is rooted in religious and historical narratives that long predate modern geopolitics. He traces the irrational hostility toward Russia to deep-seated religious split dynamics, notably the Schism between Western Catholics and Eastern Orthodox in the eleventh century, and the way Catholic propaganda cast Byzantium’s Orthodox as schismatic, barbarian, and despotic. After Byzantium fell, Russia claimed the Orthodox heritage, which then fed a narrative of confrontation with Western Europe. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Western powers weaponized this narrative to justify anti-Russian sentiment as Russia rose as a European power after Peter the Great and Catherine II. A key example is the forged “testament of Peter the Great,” which France’s Louis XV, Napoleon, Britain after Vienna 1815, and later U.S. circles used to cast Russia as aiming to conquer the West, justifying preemptive actions and fear-driven policy. He notes the testament’s repeated misuse by Napoleon, the British, and even post-Vienna propaganda that shaped decades of Russophobia, including cartoons and cultural depictions like Bram Stoker’s Dracula as a symbol of Russian aristocracy.
He emphasizes that this phobia has two functions: the belief that Western security depends on opposing Russia, and the idea that failure to act against Russia invites invasion. This dual function persists in contemporary discourse, where European calls for more weapons to deter Russia echo the old premise that what happens on Russia’s borders determines Europe’s fate. He asserts that Russia has not historically aggressed against Western Europe in the way Western narratives claim; rather, invasions often originated from the West (Teutonic knights, Mongols, Poland, Sweden, Napoleonic France, Germany, Britain). Russia’s own incursions into Europe have been responses to aggression by others, such as Napoleon’s invasion or Hitler’s World War II actions.
The discussion turns to how the West constructs an ethical framework in which liberal democracy and human rights are presented as universal ideals, and any actions by Russia are interpreted through that lens. This leads to a paradox: when European powers sanction Russian academics or journalists in the name of defending freedom of expression, it appears inconsistent with the First Amendment protections observed in the United States, while Europe pursues sanctions that curb scholarly debate. He cites specific cases: sanctions against Swiss journalist Xavier Meurice and Jacques Bou, and mentions the sanctioning of other researchers; he also highlights Thierry Breton’s sanctioning by the United States as an example of perceived contradictions in Western policy. He contrasts the greater freedom of opinion in the U.S. with growing European censorship and the suppression of discourse on topics such as NATO expansion and U.S. involvement in Ukraine.
Mettin discusses how Western journalists and NGOs may be influenced or embedded within foreign policy aims. He recalls Udo Ulfkotte’s critique of the “corrupted journalist” ecosystem—NATO/N Atlantis-linked influence, seminars, and conferences designed to mold media narratives. He recounts personal experiences in Sarajevo during the 1990s, where journalists were invited by NATO and the UN and later found the narrative they were fed to be constructed. He argues that funding sources, such as Open Society foundations, can bias investigative journalism, leading to a loss of independence, as observed in his experience with the Consortium of International Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) under Soros-Open Society money.
The conversation shifts to the global dimension of Russophobia. He notes a growing anti-Russian sentiment is not shared elsewhere; in parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, there are relatively more favorable or nuanced attitudes toward Russia, which gives him optimism that the anti-Russian stance in Europe may eventually wane. He suggests broadening analysis to Ukraine and Eastern Europe—Finland, the Baltic states, Poland, Romania, Moldova—to understand how resentment toward Soviet-era rule persists and morphs into modern attitudes toward Russia, even as the Soviet past fades.
Towards the end, he mentions Orban in Hungary as an example of a leader who can separate past anti-Russian sentiment from a rational present-day policy, arguing for a more principled approach. He closes with an endorsement of discussing these issues openly and hopes that the hate of Russia will eventually diminish. He invites listeners to read his book, Russophobia, and thanks the interviewer, Maxime, for the dialogue.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Welcome back. We are here today with Guy Mettin, a journalist, a politician in parliament, and also the author of books such as creating Russophobia from the great religious schisms to anti Putin hysteria. So thank you very much for coming back on or for the first time, but it's good to see you again at least.
Speaker 1: Yes. Thank you. Thank you, Glenn. As you know, we we had meetings in the past years, and it's a pleasure to be with you today again. And and also to share this wonderful podcast you are doing since now many months with a great success.
That's a good thing. Yeah.
Speaker 0: Thank you. I appreciate that. And, well, I was thinking before we get into the the current hatred of Russia or the current affairs, which is also very deeply irrational, one can argue, especially because how it very evidently undermines our own national interest, I thought it could be interesting to delve into the historical origins, the way you see it of Russophobia, because you argue that hostility, well, the irrational hostility towards Russia is centuries old. I often make a distinction because when we talk about phobia, it's usually irrational fear or hatred. I always make the point.
There's rational reasons to fear Russia, but phobia often refers to the irrational aspect. So Yeah. Where where do you locate this true historical starting point in terms of origin of Russophobia?
Speaker 1: Yeah. You know, ten years ago when I tried to understand why the phobia of Russia was so high in the Western allies, I tried to understand and because it was also very surprising for me to see it and to see how it functioned. I had this impression, not only since ten years, but but maybe since, let's say, twenty years at the beginning of this century, just to mention an accident, an incident who gave me this feeling of of irrational phobia. It was if you remember, the Uberlingen plane crash in 2002. In 2002, there was a Russian airlines who crashed in New Berlin and near the Swiss border with 75 young Russian children on board.
And when the it was in the night, there was a collision. They it collided with the DHL plane. And in the minutes following the the crash, all the agencies, you know, the the news agencies, they said, oh, there was a crash around midnight and between the Russian plane and the Belgian DHL plane. But we think maybe the pilots, the Russian pilots, they didn't understand well English, so they didn't interpret correctly the orders. And after that, oh, but maybe they were drunken.
So that's why and so it it went during one day, twenty four hours, and after that, after the inquiry, we just discovered it was a failure of the Swiss air guides people who were at the origin of these disasters. Nothing to do with Russian, nothing to do with the Russian plane, Russian pilots, but it was the cliches, the stereotypes against the Russian who made this explanation, the first explanations with all the, you know, bad, yes, bad representation of Russian. So all the press in Switzerland, but also in Europe, accused the Russian to be the the cause of this crash without any proof, any evidence, but just based on stereotypes. So, that was very disturbing for me as a Swiss citizen and also close to a journalist to discover that. And after that, I tried to just a bit.
What what happens? You know? Why it's so irrational? And that's why I I started to dig, to to dig, and I discovered that the roots of this racial phobia, even the modern racial phobia, was based on religious, very old religious, you know, roots. I mean, the the schism between the Orthodox and Catholic church in the eleventh century.
And even now, we can see that this religious gap is still crunch functional in in our contemporary Europe.
Speaker 0: But how how do you see it evolving over the centuries? Because it became a very big topic, especially in Britain two hundred years ago, and it it kinda goes back into what you said as well. It's it almost becomes like a loyalty test that is everyone kinda have to embrace the stereotypes, and you have to repeat it. But but what what people often seem to think is, you know, if you repeat it, then you're with us. If you contest it, then you should be met with some suspicions.
But what is kind of another consistency is though it always tends to undermine our own interest because if there's some hostile policies were based on rational a rational assessment, then it would be one thing. But if it's not rational, then pretty much by definition, leads to very poor policies and poor policies often, of course, don't serve our own interests.
Speaker 1: Yeah. No. That's right. And that's that's why it is religious origins are so important because we can say religion could be a part of reason, but, no, it's not only rational, you know, it's something more than the pure reason. And just to come back to this religious origins, you know, it started with, yes, Charles the Great, a former emperor in the even in the ninth century.
So, it's it's very it's very old. But it became more obvious after the tenth century and until to schism in the eleventh. You know, it was in the year October, the official divide between the Western Catholics and the Eastern Orthodox. I don't mention the the religious clauses because it's too complicated for us and not in our focus today. But it was after that schism that the Catholic propaganda start to develop stereotypes against at that time the Greek Orthodox in Byzantium, you know, in Constantinople.
And they said, oh, you know, we cannot trust these Orthodox because they are the schismatic. It's not us, the Catholic, but it's them. They did the division, but it was completely wrong because it was the Catholic which separated from the orthodox, not the orthodox living the church, you know, first line. Second thing is, oh, but they are barbarian people, you know. They are despotic and barbarian people.
The emperor of results is a tyrant. He's a despot, you know. He's an authoritarian leader. And also, wish to conquer us. So, they built the wording, the narrative about against the orthodox, which is which is exactly the same narrative used against Russians nowadays, and that's very, very astonishing.
And after the collapse of the Byzantine Empire in the fifteenth century when they lost the war against the Ottoman, against the Turks, all these stereotypes were thrown to the Russian because Russia, at the time with the Tsar, but also with the with the Orthodox church, they decide they they said, oh, as Byzantium doesn't more exist, we are the heirs. We will take the heritage, religious heritage of the Orthodox church which collapsed at that time. And that's why all this propaganda turned against the the Russian at that time, let's say, at the Renaissance after 1453. And the modern one, the modern wasophobia is born in France in late eighteenth century when the king of France, Louis Louis the fifteen, who married the Polish princess, turned against the the Russian. And why they did it?
Why he did it? Because at the time, at the eighteenth century, Russia became a European power with the reforms of Peter the Great and after with the expansion and development brought by Empress Catherine II, Russian became a very big empire. And so for the king of France, who was the major power, was the main power at the time, it was hard to accept that a very remote Eastern Empress was asking for sharing the power on the European continent. It was very disturbing for the king of France to have this rival, to have this new competitor. And that's why he make, he developed his propaganda minister, you know, at the time it was the black cabinet, the name of that.
They forged a fake document called the testament of Peter the Great. And in this testament, Peter the Great was supposed to say to his successors that the holy goal of the Russian the Russian empire was to conquer the West, you know, to invade the Western European continent and to be the unique hegemonical power in Europe. Completely fake, but that was the starting of the unrational, let's say, phobia against the Russian. Napoleon used that in 2018. He published this fake document for the first time to justify his preemptive war against Russian tsar Alexander the first in eighteen twelve, eighteen thirteen.
He said, oh, but you know, as the mission of, as the goal of the Russian is to conquer us, we have to attack him at first in order to prevent invasion. That's why now we have to mobilize and to send our armies to Moscow. So and the British after that, they translated this fake document after the Vienna Congress in 1815. And even The United States, you know, in the modern twentieth century, they used this same document, adapted and changed with the same stereotypes against the modern Russian Russian. It
Speaker 0: is yeah. The testament is quite fascinating, though, because as you said, was used so many times, but it's not just the it's also how it was used. Because in the late eighteenth century when it was used also by the Poles to then argue that the the security of France was intrinsically linked to that of Poland because the whole premise was that the Russians would always move forward. So if you can't stop them in Poland, then they would just march on, and then all of Europe would fall. And this is this is also, yeah, how it was used or cited when Napoleon invaded.
It was also, by the way, when the French and British invaded Crimea, this was also it was used again Exactly. By Hitler during World War two. Harry Truman used it in the early stages of the Cold War, and it's just interesting because it has two functions. One, all all our security is dependent on what happens on the front lines of Russia's borders, but also what you said. If we don't attack them, then they will eventually come for us.
So we always have to like, now the Europeans are saying, well, this is more or less the same thing, that whatever happens in Ukraine will affect us. Because once the Russians have taken Ukraine, they will come for us, irrespective of the whole premise that Ukraine would never be attacked if it was part of NATO, but this is kinda the main the main thought. But, no. It is interesting that this is something that persists. And now, of course, very See, they we need more weapons because we have we have to prepare for war because otherwise Russia will attack us.
So war is now unavoidable, it seems.
Speaker 1: It's very fascinating, yes, how it was used because as and it's it's funny too. You know? I I think it's ridiculous because if you we look in the history, the Russian, they never attacked the Western Europe. In fact, if you look at the historical facts, not, you know, war narratives. Russia was attacked by the at first, by the totonic knights, you know, in the thirteenth century, the East in the East, you know, in Poland and Russia and around the nowadays Kaliningrad and so on.
It was the first attack. The second one was the Mongols, you know, with the golden horde. It was also in the thirteenth century. And after that, you have the Polish. The Polish, they forget the Polish people, they just forget that they attacked was Russian and most they invaded Moscow.
They occupied Moscow in the sixteenth seventeenth century, in 1613. You know? They they just don't they never mentioned that. But the Polish people, they attacked Russian centuries before, you know, that modern Russia came into Poland. And after that, you had Napoleon, the French, who invaded the Sweden.
The Swedish, you you come from Norwegian. Your neighbor countries was also occupying this part of Russia in seven seventeen, eighteen century until two. They were beaten by Peter the Great at the Poltava battle. You know? And after the Swedish, you had the French.
After that, you have the German. So and also the British and the German at the first Crime Year War. So you have constantly invasion coming from the West, one from the East, the Mongols, but six invasion coming from the from the West and nothing from Russia. Russia came to Paris after, but it was after Napoleon because Russia was attacked by Napoleon. It was a reaction.
It was not their decision to come. Same with Stalin in '45. They say, okay, there was Soviet occupation in Eastern Europe. But who attacked? It was Hitler.
Without Hitler attack, no Russian in Eastern Europe. No Soviet occupation. So, it's completely, you know, turned in the bad way. And this document, just to finish this, it's it's fascinating. After the Vienna Congress, you know, you had two main winners in Europe.
You had the British with the novel, you know, Nelson, Trafalgar, and so on. But the main the main winner against Napoleon was not the the British, the the British Empire. It was the Russia, Russian Empire. It is the Russian armies who defeated Napoleon. So two big winners, the main main winner being Russia.
And in 1805, unfortunately for the British, they just discover, oh, that's good. Now we are we have put Napoli on the side. It's no more a danger for us. But, oh, look, unfortunately, we have to share the victory with these Russians guys. And so they started just after the Napoleonic Wars to fight against the Russian because they cannot accept to share, let's say, the world with the the Russians.
And they they took the wrong testament, the the fake testament, they translated it into English, they published in the books and, you know, in the newspaper, and you have during decades, the first decades of the nineteenth century, a growing Russophobia in London, in the allied circus, the leadership circus in the media. And as as I mentioned in my book, you know, you have cartoons of the time, you know, of that time in the time of the newspaper, I mean, published showing, you know, a vampire, you know, with teeth like that just flying upon London and with the head of the Tsar Nicholas the first who was trying to suck the blood of the poor, innocent British citizens, you know, because they represent the bad Russian not as nowadays with the bad beers or the angry beer, but now at the time it was the vampire, the Dracula. And Dracula, it was written, the novel was written by Bram Stoker, you know, British imperialist writer in order to discredit the Russians. It was at the parent's part of Romania, was occupied by Russian empire. And so it's describing Dracula as a symbol of the of the Russian aristocrats, you know, trying to suck the blood of the people.
So it's it's fascinating to show how the propaganda used any tool and with the same, yes, let's say, stereotypes until valid valid until today.
Speaker 0: But it often seems to me, though, that the Russians kind of always serve this perfect playing the role of our opposite other. That is the the bad guy to our good guy because this is very deep in the human nature, I think, that we always divide ourself into who are the who's in group versus out group because often human beings, we find solidarity within our group based on who our adversary are. And the Russians always had this perfect role as the adversary because if we're the West, you know, they represented the East. We were the Europeans. They were Asiatics.
You know, when we said we represented civilization, we said the Russian represented barbarian, and it tended to be, I think, historically, very ethnic focused. You even saw this at the end of the second world war in '46, for example, Conrad Adenauer, he even wrote that Asia stands stands on the Elbe. So this is they're right here, Asia. And they even had The US general Patton, who, again, every American would know. Yeah.
He even wrote that we have to to understand Russians, we have to realize that they're not European. They're Asiatic, and therefore, they don't think like we do. So if you wanna understand a Russian, you can't understand them any more than you understand a Chinese or a Japanese, and the the only thing we have to learn about them is how much lead or iron it takes to kill them. This is what he actually wrote. But then my my my point is that after it seemed the World War two, because of the Cold War, the ideological aspect, we shifted more into natural division as versus them due to the ideological division.
So we said, you know, capitalist versus communist, democracies versus autocracies Yeah. Christians versus atheist. But in the post Cold War era, though, when there's not that many ideological differences, really, it seems as if the real division of Europe, everything has to be cast now as liberal democracy versus authoritarian. This is the this is the placeholder for good guys versus bad guys. Yeah.
But did you see, I guess, ethnicity making a comeback? Because I've seen comments about the Russian DNA. I saw Washington Post, was it, who said that, oh, now that Russia's looking east, they're embracing their inner Mongolian from the golden horde. This is how we spoke even at the end of World War two, and I was kinda making a little bit of a comeback. And, of course, I think the Ukrainian war contributed to this because in the Ukrainian nationalist idea with the difference between Ukrainians and Russians is that the Russians lived under the under the Mongols for two and a half century, and this is why they're not actual Europeans unlike the Ukrainians.
So it kinda pushed the ethnic propaganda into the mix again.
Speaker 1: Yeah. No. No. That's you are completely right. It's also that's why the religious origin are so important because in religion, you you think in terms of good and bad, you know.
So if you can say, I am the representative of the good, my god my god is the good one and the gods of the other people are the bad ones. That's why it's so important, these religious origins still active today. And it's also funny to say, to see how this religious gap divide is important today, functions until today. For instance, you have this line, you know, between the Western, let's say, religious protestant and Catholic coming from Finland, Baltic countries, and cutting Ukraine in two parts. We have the Western part, the who are linked with the Catholic Pope and the Eastern part linked to Moscow to Orthodox Russian Orthodoxy and to Romania and so that's still active today, and the way of thinking bad and and and good, that's the same thing.
And now, yes, we call it liberal democracy, human rights. It's no more religious, let's say, concepts or ideology, but new one, but based on the same type of of division. And you let all the arguments, yeah, authoritarian, democracy, imperial, and free free markets, you know, and free expansion, free economy. And so that's that's the same the same, yeah, topic. And that's, that's quite fascinating.
And what is, why wasophobia is so efficient? Because it has this, it's a superposition of concept from religion, all religions, from let's say, licensed or yes, political profound, let's say like that, ideology. And this and also you have, for instance, the yellow peril, you know, the the Europe developed also in Europe at the the end of the nineteenth century, you know. The yellow peril, it was to the to show how the Azyats, you know, were bad. You know?
How is it the Chinese and also the Japanese were threatening the European culture, European civilization. So the yellow peril, which is also a kind of xenophobia or asiaticophobia. So when you add this yellow peril, this xenophobia, and rejecting the washroom into the bad Asian camps, that's also a way to add more water to the Russophobia. That's why it's so effective in in the western propaganda because, yeah, that's what we could mention and how we could try to explain, but because it's so so it's so stupid. If you look at the results of this racial phobia now for European countries, you know, with all the economic loss, with with the industrial loss, losses, and so on.
But that's why it's so irrational because, rationally, you cannot explain that yet.
Speaker 0: Yeah. But this is why it's so powerful as well because Exactly. Yeah. If people buy into the premise that this is just us fighting bad guys, then essentially anything becomes permitted. And I know you're Swiss, so any do you know they sanctioned one of your citizens, colonel Yeah.
Who you know, and as a colonel in Swiss intelligence, actually used to work with NATO and and because he reached the wrong conclusions. I hear now that they also might put on sanctions list the the the Swiss journalist there, Roger Koppel as well. So it is just it it's so destructive. But Mhmm. Again, anyone who might say something which would favor the Russians are then just seen as taking the side of the enemy.
And for me, the whole war in Ukraine kinda demonstrates it because there's so much that is undisputable. Like, you can't contest it in terms of facts. For example, the involvement of NATO countries in toppling the government in Ukraine both in 2004 and '14 Mhmm. Again, which was not to promote democracy, but they all had geopolitical purposes, very well proven. We know that The US ceased the control over almost all levers of government in Ukraine, also well documented.
We know that The US from the first day began to read began to develop the intelligence service of Ukraine from scratch to make them a proxy. We know that they helped to rebuild the army there. They trained it. They armed it. They took control over the media, civil society.
They helped supported purging the Russian language, political parties, media. I mean, everything is there, but it's not even possible to discuss it because anyone who would bring it up would seen as supporting evil almost. And no one's questions whether or not, well, to what extent does this help our security? Because you can make a very strong argument that all of this made sure that Ukraine will be destroyed, and we might walk into a nuclear exchange with Russia. But we don't talk about this.
It's just it's just everyone has to march along the line. I mean, you couldn't pull this off with any other country, I think. Yeah. So it's it's quite, yeah, it's quite a powerful instrument. But do you think
Speaker 1: Just a
Speaker 0: Sorry.
Speaker 1: No. Just an anecdote. You know? I was last time I visited Kiev, it was in 2001. And when just two months before the events, you know, February 22, and when I came back, I was invited to a TV show with an American scholar, you know, a good friend of mine.
And I said, oh, I just come back from Kyiv. And he told me, oh, but you know, two years ago, it was just after the first election, only one, the election of Zelensky in '19. Oh, I was visiting also Kyiv two years ago, and, you know, I was invited to give some lecture, and I enter in the building, a very big building, quite new, and I was very surprised because it was the CIA building in Kiev, you know, with two, three hundred CIA agents working in Ukraine for, yes, for changing the government for top, you know, trying to develop your Western agenda. And they were, and I said I said to him, but you're okay, good. Tell to the TV why you don't mention that you met in Kyiv at the time the building where two three hundred CIA agents were staying.
Oh, no, no, I can't, I cannot mention that. So, it's, but it's so, just to illustrate what you said, you know, That's the reality, but it's forbidden to mention it. Yeah.
Speaker 0: Well, that's a strange thing. When the when the Europeans, be it public or politicians refer to The United States, they're they're often a condescending view, they they're seen as aggressive, often deceptive. And you you can criticize The United States some yeah. Rightly, but also sometimes wrongly. But because they're kind of the the other.
Well, we are Europeans. But as soon as the Russians enter the mix, once we talk about Russia and you say, well, perhaps American strategy doesn't revolve around developing democracy in Ukraine. Maybe this is geopolitical. Just not not maybe we can also very easily prove that the The US intelligence services are there to develop Ukraine as a proxy against the Russians. Exactly.
Suddenly, becomes almost a conspiracy theory because now the Americans are part of the West. They're part of us. Yeah. Now by questioning The US or even their moral righteousness, you are now essentially then making excuses for Russia. It is a fascinating dynamic because, otherwise, if you're not Russia's not part of the conversation, you can criticize The United States.
Actually, most would do. But as soon as Russia's there, America's all of its objectives are holy and virtuous, and anything is a conspiracy theory.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah. No. No. No.
So it's it's fascinating to see how Russia is kind of taboo, you know, in all the meanings of this of this world, in the in the Western, let's say, narrative and explanation. Even for academy, what is surprising also, it's even in the academy, you are a professor university, I am in the media, but it's a complete taboo in the academies as well as in the media to try to tell the truth when you explain, you know, that Victoria Noland, she mentioned, you know, the 5 billions of dollars invested when she mentioned it was in December 2013. She mentioned three months just before the Maidan coup d'etat, oh, you know, it was we can find it on the congress, you know, archives. She said, oh, but we invested $5,000,000,000. Now we are waiting to for being paid back, you know, of this investment.
That's just official declarations, but you cannot mention it in any media. And just to come back to Jacques Bou and, you know, the sanctions against Xavier Moro, Jacques Bou and Natalie Young, another Swiss activist woman from Cameroon and Switzerland. She's global national. She was also sanctioned by the same type of sanction in June, in May. And there were also two German journalists, very important journalists who were sanctioned last year, in the first train of sanctions last year.
So, just to mention these colleagues too, not to forget them, by the way. But what is interesting now, it's yes, one site, you know, last it was four days ago when Thierry Breton, you know, the former French commissioner, was forbidden to go to United States. And you know it. And all the media in France and abroad, they said, oh, that's incredible. United States is sanctioning Thierry Breton.
It's a new machisma. The freedom of expression is no more permitted, you know, and The USA now is prohibiting freedom of expression because they are sanctioning Theory Breton. So it's so contradictory. It was just one week after the European Union decided to sanction Jacques Bou, Xavier Meaux and others for freedom of expression. So, there is a complete contradiction, you know, in the same lights just a few days later, and that's the first point.
And the second one, just to mention also The United States. What is interesting for me, in United States, have more freedom of opinion, more freedom of expression than in Europe. Because that's the first amendment of the constitution. And I think even if the, let's say, the political ideological fight is very strong in USA, you have this kind of freedom, which is recognized by all camps, let's say. But in Europe, it's not more the case, as we could see with the sanctions against Jack Doe and Xavier Moro and other Russian academics, you know, because we can understand that there are some sanctions against Russian militaries, let's say, or secret services that we can say can be understandable, but not against academics, scholars, regular scholars, which are just trying to understand and to explain the world.
So this European growing authoritarianism is very preoccupying.
Speaker 0: And I've spoken to many academics or Russian scholars across Europe, and you always say the same idea that is well, they do recognize that it's impossible to discuss, for example, the Ukraine war without discussing NATO expansion. But everyone knows very well that if you bring that up, then that's something that the Kremlin has said. So then you would repeating the Kremlin talking points, they say, and then your career is over. If you're able to keep your job, at least you'll be so smeared that it will be the last job you have. So it's it is it's quite efficient.
But The same taboo as with the work language. You know? If you mention some non work language on on the American
Speaker 1: campuses, your career is completely broken, you know. That's the same type of, let's say, politically correctness prohibition, you know, and prohibition of real words, of the truth. Yeah. That's with Russian, that's exactly the same behavior. And yes, your academic career or your media career as a journalist will be broken in the minute, you know, if you do it.
Yeah. And that's the that's the the sign of a true censorship. It's exactly as in the old times with the, let's say, with the church, Catholic church and the inquisition trying to condemn. Even the inquisition was fairer, was more correct than the actual censorship. Because during the inquisition time, you have the right to do due process, a due suing.
You have a judicial, you have a defencer, you have, you know, you cannot be condemned without judgment. But now with this type of sanctions, you are condemned without any judgment. You don't know which law you are breaking when you are submitted with sanctions. And that's a big difference. And I think our situation in Europe is actually worse than in the ancient inquisitorial times.
Speaker 0: It's I guess the problem, though, is that the company lost because you can't even compare actions. So you can compare, of course, what Russia has done with something that the West have done. Like, for example, if it comes to seizing assets and all, you know, you can make the point that, well, we didn't seize any any not a single McDonald's after The US invaded Iraq and or or any other of the many, many wars over the past thirty years. But you're not but you you can't compare because the assumption is it's well, if if we did it, this is our side, then we might have done the wrong reason, but it's no. We did it the wrong thing, but we did it for the right reasons.
Russia, best case, they could do the right thing, but they would do it for the wrong reasons. So they're they're always and it's because what what what you alluded to, which is that what ideological fundamentalism entails is when it's not what you do, it's who you are. So for the EU, it it it is democracy. It is freedom. So if it censors people, it's because they undermine freedom.
They undermine democracy. So you advance if you advance your own your own power and your own position in the world, you're advancing freedom and democracy. This is that's the problem when you link an ideal to an entity of power. It becomes, yeah, absurd. But Yeah.
I I did wanna ask you, to what extent do you think journalists in the West now, are they aware that they are just reproducing all of this brassophobic framework, or are they is this are they not aware of what they're doing? Because part of the problem is you manipulate some of the underlying assumptions as opposed to, you know, you don't have to meet in a dark, you know, smoke filled room and agree on how to present Russia. If if everyone agrees, kind of already buys into the premise that this is a struggle between freedom and and slavery or democracy and autocracy, then then, you know, the propaganda rights itself and the stereotypes come. Yeah. In my view, the the journalists, I
Speaker 1: mean, the journalists in international relations, yeah, they are aware of what they are doing. They try to hide that, in fact, but in their, you know, in their own deep feeling, are they are aware because they know they know they are linked with NATO, with the Atlantis, with the neo conservatives ideology. They are not crazy in what I can say, you know, and in my own journalistic experience. But they are so close. They became so close from this way of thinking, let's say, Atlantis, Atlantis way of thinking.
They are not, yes, day by day aware, but in fact they are. You know, there was in, it was in 2014, I think, a German journalist, Udo Ulf Cote, who published a book about the corrupted journalist. He explained and he showed how NATO, how the, let's say, the neo conservatives step by step, they were able to buy the journalists consciousness, inviting them to seminars, inviting them to moderate workshops in Brussels, NATO countries, visiting military camps and so on, and inviting in good hotels and just that. And how, yes, step by step, little by little, they were able to because it's very easy, you know. You have maybe forty, fifty imported media in Europe.
And so, you have maybe 50 people to convert to your ideas, to your ideals or to, let's say, to corrupt in order to make them share your views. I mean, corrupt, it's not by giving cash money. It's by all this kind of, let's say, invitation and, you know, prestige and so on. And it's it's like it function. Even when I was chief editor of my newspaper, I saw so many times, you know, this kind of invitation.
I remember I was personally invited to Yugoslavia during the Yugoslavian wars, you know, in '93 in Sarajevo. It was we were invited. It was fifteen, eighteen French chief editor, director of TV, you know, star of journalism. It was completely paid, invited by the by the NATO. It was the UN at the time, but let's say mainly NATO.
And we were completely invited there, hotel paid, plane paid, and so forth. To do what? When I was there, I discovered it was a completely fake invitation because we were supposed to tell the narrative of the time about the good Bosniak, let's say, Bosniak against the bad Serbian. So all the invitation was made and arranged to make this narrative and make us share this narrative. And when I discovered that, after two, three days in Sarajevo, I came back, I took military, Italian military airplane, and I came back because I didn't wish to be the just the tool of this narrative construction.
It was thirty years ago, but it is the same now for Ukraine war and what we are seeing now. And it's very, very efficient. With the crisis of the press, with the reduction of the journalists affected and also the media competition between the media, it's still easier to do it now because there are less, let's say, job that is to corrupt.
Speaker 0: I did this interview with The US colonel Lawrence Wilkerson. He was a chief of staff to The US secretary of state, Colin Powell, under the Bush administration. And he he said that during his time in the White House that they they put up these whiteboards in the White House of of of European politicians of who they wanted to elevate and who they wanted to, well, let's say, an early retirement, make sure that their career didn't prosper or or get rid of. And so so once they decided which ones would do the bidding of Washington, and interestingly, on top of the list, they put a Stoltenberg, a Norwegian politician who Yeah. Would then be picked, of course, as NATO secretary general.
But, anyway, see, he then made the point that they then then they just activate their their the journalists across Europe, the NGOs, their influence within governments, think tanks, and how they use all this mechanism to decide who who should represent Europe because, you know, it shouldn't be left to democracy. And and, yeah, this was also premised on the need then to to to do make to do make sure that the journalists, if if they wanna be relevant, be seen as legitimate, and they have to kinda go to the same events, they have to be sponsored by the same people, and, you know, they have to gravitate towards them. Yeah. And they do the same, of course, with NGOs and everything else. So it is a it is a science behind this, though, a a quite exact one, and it works because they don't need a big army.
Just if you can control what people hear and
Speaker 1: And it's a few dozens of people. You know? It's not thousands of people. It's just a few dozens, you know, a few hundreds, let's say, but it's very, you know, very small group. And, you know, you can you can buy them very easily.
You you gave them some grants to go to Harvard, go to Columbia School of Journalists. Well, I don't, you know this guy? Or three months invitation to United States to study, let's say journalists there and there, or also giving scoops. I know a Swiss journalist, you know, he received, let's say, so called scoops directly from the CA CIA agent from the US embassy in Bern giving, oh, you know, you have to investigate this thing. Maybe it's a Russian oligarch near Putin doing this bad thing, you know, and they give some official, let's say, documentation.
So that's the the starting of investigation, but just to look always in the same direction, to ignore the other facets of the reality. You know, in 2010, I was with some friends organizing the Congress of Investigative Journalists, Consortium of International Investigative Journalists in Geneva. 400,500 participants came, including Samuel Hirsch. You know, he was our guest star at the time, as you know, and also, you know, so many, many big, big names, you know, Glenn Greenwald, people like that. And I discover I was the treasurer of the organization, and we received money from Soros Foundation Open Society for even without asking that.
And at the time, I didn't I was not aware myself, and so it was good to receive some help from a foundation and another foundation to also American one to organize that. And I said, oh, that's very friendly from from them to give some support. Oh, very happy. But after that, you know, the the one year later, I discover that all this source company, open societies and other, they they bring so much money inside the consortium that it was completely corrupted. Why?
Because with this money, it was good for the journalists, but they were able to orient the results, the investigation in such ways, just corresponding to the NATO Atlantis agenda, for instance, the targets, you know, Russian targets, you know, or in Middle East, Iranian, and so on, that after two, three years, all this organization was completely, in my view, lost. And Semo Ursch and Glengrid, they left it. In 2013. We were in Rio. It was the last year they came because they were also aware that thanks to this money, seeming good at the first glance, but in fact was correcting all the system.
And also, you have you you talk about NGOs. NGO like Bellingcat. Bellingcat is a supposed NGO with journalists to develop OSINT, you know, OSINT research, your open source information. That's the meaning of Ossent. And journalists, are like, the investigative journalists like to use Ossent data, but it's completely biased.
It's completely distorted because with Pelinkat, it's just close to the British MI6 to organize, you know, to to shape to shape the narrative of the media. In in England, you have this government communications headquarters, GCHQ, with 7,000 collaborators, employees, each day, they are collecting data and are also shaping the narrative. And after they release it for the news agency, for the main media, and that's how it function in fact. It's not only a single corrupted journalist, it's all a system and that's why it's so difficult to, yeah, to fight against, yeah. NGOs, academics, intelligence services, media, and also the owners.
I don't know the situation in your country, Norway, but in Switzerland, when I started in journalists, were maybe 100 daily papers, a little less than 100. Now there are only twenty, twenty five, but these papers are actually owned by four people, four billionaires. The same in France. You have five, seven billionaires in Italy, same thing. And all these billionaires, they are just sharing the same agenda.
They are just sharing the same, let's say, neoconservative or athleticist agenda. So if you have all this environment, all this biotope, let's say, which surrounds the press, that's you have the explanation of what happens and why the mainstream media are so distorted and biased on Ukrainian war and, you know, about Russia and so on. Yeah.
Speaker 0: This is quoted by George Orwell, who wrote about the Spanish civil war and how he said that history stopped. He wrote that as a quote, I saw newspapers in London retailing, yeah, these lies and eager intellectuals building emotional superstructure over events that had never happened. I saw, in fact, history being written, not in terms of what happened, but what ought to have happened according to various party lines. I often think about this because you do see that they're writing emotional histories and using emotional rhetoric and the language is all skewed. And as long as you have the as oral, the road to superstructures, yeah, the people would you know, they could have discussions, but they would not deviate from these main structures.
If if I can ask a last question, though. If if you would because you wrote Rhassophobia almost a decade ago. If you would update the version today, what what chapter do you think you would
Speaker 1: Oh, you can add every day. You know? There are so so many things to to to tell, and so each day you have a new event, you know, to which brings water to the, yes, this was a phobia, modern contemporary was a phobia. No. I think what could be interesting now is to show how it developed, let's say, inside Ukraine and Eastern European countries from Finland Finland, yeah, is Scandinavia, but also in Sweden and Poland, you know, Bulgaria, Romania.
I was yesterday with a Romanian friend also very active in the media, and we he told me how it was how the, let's say, the coup d'etat came in in Romania's election last year with the the eviction of the Kalin Georgescu, and when they choose this new president, Nico Schwerdan. And so because he he followed the Romanian affairs since Chiusescu, and he has all, you know, the roots, and he knows personally the the people, you know, he's now 80 years old, and it was fascinating to say that, and in Moldavia also. So, for me, it could be interesting to try to understand. We can we have an apparent explanation because there was this Soviet occupation which was not very agreeable, which was not, which was tyranny at the time during forty, more than forty years, forty five years. And we can explain that.
I think we can understand that the Soviet rule was not so agreeable, and there was some resentment against the Soviet people. But Soviet disappeared now. Now there is a new Russia during ten years from, let's say, 1990 to 2000 before Putin, if we don't like Putin, let's say before Putin, ten years without Soviet rule, with democracy or some kind of democracy in Russia, And why now, as Soviet disappeared now, there are so much, let's say, resentment against the Russian, the modern Russian, which have nothing to do, who have nothing to do with the Soviet past. So maybe that's a new focus to try to better understand and to find, yeah, to make some, let's say, development to this this feeling, I must also add, this was a phobia is only comes only from the West. You have no more or far in Africa, no more or so far in Asia, no more so far in Latin America.
So, why? You know, and these people are even more pro they are, you know, if you ask them, they are in fact more in favor of Russia than in favor of Europe or in favor of the West. So this is the new, this is also completely new now. And I have the that's why I am optimistic, just to finish on an optimistic note. When I speak with my colleagues from the South or from from China and so on, for me, it's it's let's say, warming.
Let's say, it give me some courage because sometimes we can feel very alone, very lonely, you know, and this fight. But when we go outside Europe and we can share our views with other colleagues, it's it's very supporting to see how they analyze, how they see the world, you know, from outside with distance. And they have not at all the same vision of Russia than we have in European continent now. And that's also a good motive of optimism. And I think this hate of Russia, this hatred will now go against the haters problem.
I don't know when, but I am sure it will come one day or another one. This
Speaker 0: is probably one of the mistakes of the Europeans now because when Europe kind of prides itself of doing anything to stand up to Russia, they kind of assume that most of the world hates the Russians as much as they do.
Speaker 1: But Yeah.
Speaker 0: Much of the world now are kind of shocked and even appalled by by how the Europeans are acting. And as I said, many even sympathizing with the Russian position, not necessarily invasion of Ukraine, but but but this struggle they had with NATO over the past thirty years. And, well, I I on on this channel, I in I interviewed Vaclav Klaus once, the former
Speaker 1: Oh, yes.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Prime minister and president of Czech Republic. You know, he he pretty much yeah. He hates communism and points. This is very fair for for good reason.
They did terrible things in his country. But he had a quote once, which I thought was always brilliant, who links to Russophobia, and which he said that he knows many kind people in his country who hate communism so much that he would hear the phrase, oh, I hate communism so much. I can't even read Dostoevsky, you know, who died in 1881. That's but but but kinda this is the point. Like, you can you can I mean, if if I was from Poland or Czech Republic, I would I would resent communism as well?
You can have even post post communism, like hatred and historical grievances of czarist Russia. But still, it goes the whole point of this quote I like is it goes so far that it shows the rationality of it. And once you're not rational, you can't advance your own interests anymore.
Speaker 1: And it's also interesting to note that the only European leader who is also a heir of the Soviet times, I mean, Orban in Hungary, the Hungarians, they also suffered from the Soviet rule. You know, in 1956, they just made a revolution against they tried to to get rid of, you know, Soviet rule. So, they were very anti Russian during the Soviet regime. But now, there are not more. So, it's a counter example, you know, how, let's say, a rational president leader can act without Russophobia.
But being a former anti Soviet, you know, say, it's possible. I mean, and now in Western Europe, everybody dislikes Orban, but in fact, is the only leader which acts rationally. He said that was the past. We didn't like them in the fifties, sixties, seventies, but now it's finished. That's the past.
And let's do with them as with the other people, the other nations, the other countries. So, it is also maybe also a question of the optimist. It could be possible to do it, you know. It is possible. Yeah.
Speaker 0: Yeah. I think it's Orban has a rational approach. At least when he speaks, he makes sound arguments, not the same emotional rhetoric.
Speaker 1: So Exactly.
Speaker 0: Which is what we need now in Europe. But yeah. Thank you so much. And I will leave a description to your book, Rhosophobia, in yeah. Sorry.
I will leave a link in the description.
Speaker 1: Sorry. My English is not perfect. I used to speak French, but I tried to do my best and very happy to be with you, Daniel.
Speaker 0: Maxime.
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
Stanislav Krapivnik: Massive Escalation - Attack on Putin's Residence https://youtu.be/jIg_lsqrAUA https://t.co/hTwhERdX1T
Video Transcript AI Summary
- The conversation opens with a discussion of escalating dynamics in the Ukraine conflict as a new year begins, focusing on how the rules of war have shifted over the past four years, including the depth of NATO involvement and when actions cross into direct war. The speakers note that political leadership has largely been exempt from the war, but Russia has had opportunities to strike Ukrainian leaders that have been avoided, raising questions about future targets and the diplomatic path.
- Speaker 1 argues that the political leadership has indeed been outside the war, and that voices inside Russia are growing more critical. They challenge the Western portrayal of Vladimir Putin as a dictator, suggesting Putin has restrained destruction that could hit the West, and asserting that the West and Zelenskyy have grown comfortable with exemptions. They warn that continued escalation could lead to a nuclear conflict with Europe at risk due to its geographic compactness, citing the potential fallout from attacks on American nuclear bases and the broader geopolitical consequences.
- The discussion moves to the potential consequences of Western strikes on energy infrastructure and frontline energy targets, including refineries and civilian vessels. The speakers examine how Russia might respond if its assets are attacked at sea or in the Black Sea, and the possibility of Russia forcing Ukraine to lose access to the Black Sea through strategic military actions. The analysis includes a few provocative specifics: British and European actors allegedly orchestrating or enabling attacks, the role of third-country-flagged ships, and the idea that reflagging to Russian flags could be treated as an act of war by Russia.
- The dialogue delves into the operational dynamics of the Mediterranean and Black Sea theatres, noting incidents such as sunflowers and other oil cargo damage, the Caspian transit company's facilities, and the implications for Turkish oil revenue and Western economies. The speakers argue that Western powers are drawing in broader international actors and that the war could expand beyond Ukraine, potentially dragging in NATO ships and submarines in a conflict at sea. They warn that if escalation continues, it could trigger a broader, more destructive war in Europe.
- The conversation shifts to the likely trajectory of the battlefield, with Speaker 1 offering a grim assessment: the Donbas front and the Zaporozhye region are nearing collapse for Ukrainian forces, with Russian forces dominating missile and drone capabilities and outmaneuvering on three axes. The analysis suggests that within two to three months, upper-river-front areas, including the Zaporozhzhia and surrounding Donbas fronts, could be fully compromised, leaving only a few large urban pockets. The absence of civilian protection and the encirclement of cities would accelerate Ukrainian withdrawals and surrender, while Russia could enhance pressure on remaining fronts, including Donbas and Sumy, Kharkiv, and Dnieper regions, as weather and terrain favor Russian movements.
- The speakers discuss the impact of collapsing command posts and morale, likening the abandonment of Gudai Poia to a sign of impending broader collapse, with open terrain making Ukrainian forces vulnerable to rapid Russian breakthroughs. They suggest that strategic fortifications will be overwhelmed as the front line collapses and supply lines are severed, with a predicted sequence of encirclements and city sieges.
- The US role is analyzed as both a negotiator and strategist, with the assertion that the United States has long led the proxy dimension of the conflict and continues to influence targeting and weapons delivery. The discussion questions the coherence of US policy under Trump versus Biden, arguing the conflict remains a US-led enterprise despite attempts to reframe or outsources it. The speakers describe the US as hedging its bets through ongoing military support, budgets, and intelligence cooperation, while insisting that Ukraine remains a core objective of US hegemony.
- A critical examination of European Union leadership follows, with strong claims that the EU is increasingly tyrannical and undemocratic, sanctioning dissidents andSuppressing speech. The dialogue condemns the deplatforming of individuals and argues that the EU’s leadership has undermined diplomacy and negotiated peace, instead pushing toward a broader confrontation with Russia. The speakers suggest that several European countries and elites are pursuing escalating policies to maintain power, even at the risk of deepening European instability and economic collapse.
- The conversation ends with reflections on broader historical patterns, invoking Kennan’s warnings about NATO expansion and the risk of Russian backlash, and noting the potential for the EU to fracture under pressure. The participants acknowledge the risk of a wider conflict that could redefine global power and economic structures, while expressing concern about censorship, deplatforming, and the erosion of diplomacy as barriers to resolving the crisis. They conclude with a cautious note to prepare for worst-case scenarios and hope for, but not rely on, better circumstances in the near term.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Welcome back. We are here today with Stanislav Karapivnik, a former US army officer, born in Donbas and returned to Russia fifteen years ago. So thank you very much again for coming back on.
Speaker 1: No problem. Thank you. Happy New Year's for everyone and, for, those celebrating Orthodox Christmas, it's yeah. So another week. Sup?
Upcoming.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Happy New Year's. And, well, it seems that we're starting this new year with yet another round of escalation. This attack on Putin's residence, I thought was quite interesting because well, for over the past four years, there's been a constant shift in terms of how we should define the rules of this war. So for example, how deep can the involvement of NATO be within the category of helping Ukraine, and when when when does one cross into a direct war?
This has been shifting as well. We see similarly what are acceptable targets. We heard that Europeans and Americans have been arguing for a while that the war shouldn't be taken to Russian territory in terms of refinery, the nation of Kursk. Of course, it shouldn't be taken to European territory. But importantly, the political leadership seems to have been largely largely exempted from this war, and it seems to me that Russia had has had some opportunities to take out Zelensky or other parts of the Ukrainian government, but has kind of put this outside what would be considered acceptable targets.
So I was wondering, though, how do you see this changing the nature of the war for Russia, but also the diplomatic path?
Speaker 1: Well, let's begin with that political, leadership could be outside the war and it's only been one-sided. Let's, let's just begin with that. That's flat out. And it's been the side of the Russian side. And this has been coming under more and more criticism, and now the criticism's flying high.
It's on the radio stations. People strikes. They want Zelensky destroyed. They want his, people around him destroyed. And this is, on commentary this morning.
I was, in the car listening to it, on, on FM. But people think that, well, at least the West, tries to portray that Vladimir Putin as a dictator. Everybody cow cow tos. Same line. Far from it.
What what's scary to the should be scary to West if they're, any bit, IQ higher than a snail is the fact that Vladimir Putin is holding back, a lot of destruction that could easily fall on the West. Anybody else, me included, you know, if I was in this place, I would have been striking much harder and further into the West by this point, to get the message across. And if it doesn't get across, you know, call it a warmonger, what have you. But I think that's the problem is the West has gotten, and, and Zelenskyy as part of that West, as the forward most part of that West, gotten very comfortable. They're gonna be exempt from everything no matter what they do.
And they continue up the ante to the point where they're gonna get hit and they're gonna get hard hit hard. And it could be easily escalate into a nuclear conflict, in which case Europe will be just absurd. But for the simple purpur, simple reason is it doesn't take much for Europe to go into a radioactive hellhole because Europe is very compact. So if Russia was to strike only the American bases that have, nuclear weapons on them, the, the heavy bombs, the glider bombs, that alone would be enough to cover most of Europe and nuclear fallout. It's just a fact of the geography, You know, America, Russia have huge, open areas, large distances between cities.
Europe is extremely compact population wise. So any hit in Germany will have fallout all the way up into Scotland and Ireland guaranteed. I mean, we saw that in Chernobyl Chernobyl, you know, when Chernobyl blew, and by the way, the, the Ukrainians AKA, the, the European, well, I won't say Europeans. Hate saying that we own a third of Europe. We, we were in Europe long before as R1A B, R1A Hopla Group.
We were there long before the R1Bs and the R1Bs are the Germans. So we own a third of Europe. We have been here longer than the Germans have been here and the Scandinavians and, many other nationalities. Maybe the Celts are here longer than us. So I'm not gonna say Europe.
That that's just very incorrect. The European Union and NATO. As we saw when Chernobyl, blew, the fallout, reached Scotland. And for ten years, the Scots were told not to graze their cattle up in the Highlands, or the sheep in this case, up in the Highlands, because it was radioactive, fallout that was building up in a moss and, and another organic matter. And that was just from a nuclear power plant, that never went critical, by the way.
It never went critical because three men sacrificed their lives, went, underneath the, went underneath the, nuclear power plant and manually drained the water reserves. Because if they had gotten in there, if they had melted all the way down, there would've been a massive steam explosion that would've covered much of, Central And Eastern Europe and probably gotten much more into Western Europe. And the West is trying to do this again on purpose, with attacks on the Zaporozhye Power Plant, with previous attacks on the Kurzhauer Plant. So the West seems to be absolutely, the European Union's leadership with a few exceptions. The Austro Hungarian em the Austro Hungarian empire seems to have, the only sanity left, in in the, EU, the modern EU.
They, the rest of them don't seem to understand where this is going. So they have tried several occasions, to attack, directly, Vladimir, Vladimir, Ridge. There was a, if we remember in, 2022, or '23, there was a drone that hit, that flew in and hit, the Kremlin. It's just that the anti aircraft systems were upgraded heavily all around, the edges of Moscow and internally with, Panzer systems. And the big rocket systems are held, externally.
There's been ma there's been several assassinations, flat out assassinations, including, civilian casualties, outside of the assassination target, and of civilians too, while we're at it, of poets, of, Dugan's daughter, other people who have been assassinated. Journalists have been murdered by the, Western regime, in Ukraine. I mean, the the number of journalists have been killed is innumerable. In fact, the journalists no longer wear press badges. They don't wear press badges.
They never wear blue, the dark blue that journalists don't wear, because that makes them target number one, for the Western regime, that is in Kyiv. So that, that, this just, so this is not a first time. The question is how long will Moscow continue to not retaliate in a full manner? Because the voices of criticism inside of Russia are very loud. And what the West doesn't seem to understand is believe you me, if they ever get rid of, Vladimir Vladimir, they're gonna be, they're gonna be regretting every second that comes after it.
And there won't probably be that many seconds cause the people are gonna take power afterwards are gonna make them, extinct. The, there are very hard right, hard, wing people waiting in the wings are gonna come after it. And that's gonna be revenge. And it's gonna be revenge, not on Ukraine. It's gonna be revenge on the rest of the EU, and NATO countries involved in this.
So, know, that, that this happened, I'm not surprised in the least. It's what's now a matter of what's gonna happen afterwards. What's gonna be the next step from, Moscow?
Speaker 0: Yeah. I've been making that argument for the past, decade, actually, that, the idea that, Putin is this tyrant, that this is a very dangerous thing to keep telling ourselves because it assumes that the alternative to to Putin would be some kind of a pro Western Yeltsin like figure, but but, again, it's worth noting that the criticism often against Putin in in Russia has been, even from Dugin's point of view, he's too liberal, but also the the more general public has been that he's a bit been a bit too moderate, pro Western to a large extent. I I outlined that argument back in 2016 in this Australian think tank where I wrote, you know, Putin is the last pro Western alternative. But but it is true, though. He he did want a settlement into a greater Europe.
But, of course, the what what comes after Putin the Europeans probably wouldn't like very much, neither the Americans. But how do you think this might affect the demands of Russia, though, in the negotiations? Because this is something that Sergei Lavrov made made a point out of that. Not only would Russia retaliate heavily against this, because I do think that the Russians are aware that they always face this dilemma. When there's an escalation, either you retaliate and you risk direct war or you don't retaliate, but then you embolden the opponent to go further.
So it is there's just no good solutions, but but, yeah, Lavrov said there will be retaliation. I interpret it as against the Ukrainian targets, but but also that this would impact Russia's demands in the negotiations. How do you see this? And was this a Ukrainian, European, US intelligence agencies sabotaging the peace negotiations?
Speaker 1: Oh, I'm sure that, MI six played a good role in this. Possibly CIA. Many people think the CIA is some kind of control organization. I would say it's a, fractured fiefdom. First of all, the CIA itself has went rogue about, day one, maybe day two.
Kennedy, as a matter of fact, wanted to, bring the CIA to bear. That may have been one of the reasons he was killed, as a matter of fact. There were other presidents, other, government bodies, that wanted to put some kind of control in the CIA. Nobody's been able to do it. The CIA does whatever it wants.
And there's a big question how much even the central office has control over its various houses, CIA house and, various, European countries and so on. So it's a very big question about what the role of CIA is. I think MI6 is much more controlled, but it's also much more, how should I put it? Psychotic? It's, it's ready to play the game to the extermination of England.
They are, these people, I think have lost the plot quite a bit. Either they don't understand where this can lead or they don't think that actually anything will ever happen to that, to the mother country in this case, which is an amazing thing to consider, all things considered. But arrogance and ignorance, they usually go hand in hand, unfortunately. And a lot of these people live in an echo chamber. They only hear back what, they're thinking from their fellows, because they all think the same.
It's groupthink, that leads to that arrogance and that ignorance. And we see that in the European Union on a constant basis. And as far as, yes, as, as far as, like, you know, like, know, is liberal, compared, I mean, he's gotten more conservative, but he is liberal compared to even, on the average of Russian society. And he's, always been very pro European. If, again, he's been forced to move away from that, but he's constantly trying to reintegrate into Europe.
But if we look at, realistically, the last one hundred and forty years, one hundred and fifty years, you know, the first of the big of nations proposal came from Nicholas II, the same, czar that tried to keep everybody from, starting world war one. Everybody won the glorious war. '48 Stalin wanna join NATO. That was being formed in '49. In fact, quite grasping the fact that he was the target of NATO.
Yeltsin asked to join NATO. Putin joined in, NATO. So there's been overtures from the Russian side, toward the West for one hundred and forty years. They've all been not just rebuffed, but, viciously militarily rebuffed on many occasions. So I think, whatever, whoever comes next, is absolutely is gonna make, Putin seem like an absolute pacifist.
And, and Europe doesn't seem to, well, again, Europe, the European union and the NATO countries don't seem to understand it. I think several European, NATO, NATO countries, do well understand that. I think the kind of the, the insanity is, strongest running from Poland, to The UK across Northern Europe, the Scandinavian lands. Oh, and the pre Baltics, but the pre Baltics, you, you know, the pre Baltics, you, you need to consider A, they have nothing to sell, no way to make money outside of selling themselves as a plot's darm to start a new war. That's one.
And two, oh, their leadership has a second passport. They're not gonna stick around with a dying place. They're going to be in England. They're going to be in The US. They're going to be anywhere but in the pre Baltics.
The, the peasants can go fight, or get run over, by the Russian army once we get this big war going. We're, we're going to go where real people go, the really white people go, as they say, you know, as opposed to you, local, blah, you know, it, it, oh, it translates better Russian. Oh, so, but, escalation has got to come. I think it's gotten to the point, where the Kremlin very well realizes letting anything slide is only gonna make it worse. And they've let things slide, for four years.
There should have been much worse, retaliations and into pro possibly the, NATO bases in the, on the edge of, of Ukrainian territory in Poland and Romania, from which a lot of these attacks are coming. Look, we've even had drone attacks directly out of Estonia. Those drones coming into Pskov were not flying in from Ukraine. A fact about three months ago, they had a drone crash, a big airplane style drone crash in the middle of Estonia. Tarta, I think was the name of the, province.
And the Estonia is just cream Russians. They, they try to shred it down and hush it up, but the local people there, took photos and the photos went straight to the internet, of course. What, what all photos do these days? And yes, these were Ukrainian type drones, airplane style drones. So they're either flying through the pre Baltics, which makes, Estonia part of the war, or they're being launched from Estonia.
Whether it's for Estonians or Ukrainians, it doesn't matter. Estonia is part of the war. It's, aggression against Russia. And we could probably say the same thing for, Latvia while we're at it, maybe eliciting it. So, you know, there, there you go.
It's, it's already on. It's just being ignored. It's been ignored or it's been actively ignored by the Kremlin. So it's not to expand the war. Though I think it's getting to the point where sooner than later, it's not gonna be any choice, but to expand the war.
Because the West particularly, well, in this case, the West, I won't say Putin. I mean, I'm sorry, Putin. I won't say Trump. And I won't say the Americans, even though I think a good chunk of the, Trump administration and, and the, intelligence agencies are all for it. But the, Western Europeans are gung ho on starting a big war.
They want to start it a little later. But I think they're gonna get dragged into it through their own stupidity, unfortunately. And the only way to stop that is for the people of those countries to remove the cancer in their capitals and put somebody rational in power. And voting is not gonna happen because outside of the checks, which were, I was very surprised that, Bobbitt, was elected. We've seen what the average European election is like.
It's cheating. It's autocracy. It's absolute, we'll make the rules as we go and you don't get a say in it, unfortunately. And just one comment on, on autocracy while we're at it, you know, they, they all left to scream, Russia's an autocratic state. There was a very good comparison that came out.
How many people were let, arrested in Russia in 2025, for online, commentary? It was 400 people in a country of one hundred and fifty four hundred people. And it's a question about how many of them actually went to trial, let alone if anybody went to jail, versus The UK, which has less than half the Russian population, 14,000. So if we adjusted it for a population, it'd be about almost 30,000 people that were arrested. And most of them went to jail, given two, three, four year sentences for commentaries like I'm tired of immigrants.
Okay. Whether you, whether you, it's a nice comment or not a nice comment, supposedly these people have freedom of speech. That's freedom of speech. They're not screaming for revolution. They're not screaming for murder the, the immigrant or something of that sort.
They're, they're stating they're tired of immigrants. No worse state stating that the politicians are idiots, which by the way, in Germany, what Merck has 8,000 cases that he opened against people criticizing him online, hurting his feelings. So again, you know, where's the autocracy?
Speaker 0: Well, another area though, where we seem to be moving towards, not just an intensification of the front lines, but also further escalation, even widening the war, would be the attacks on different energy and maritime infrastructure. That is we see that the targets, of course, of the energy infrastructure goes a bit both ways. That is Ukraine and NATO by targeting Russian energy, not just through a sanction, but also attacks on refineries, now also attacks on civilian vessels. And as we saw in the Mediterranean, it's hard to imagine that, of course, Ukrainians acted alone. This seems highly unlikely, but but, of course, the Russians are also going after Ukrainian energy and ports to reduce Ukraine's capabilities to attack in the Black Sea.
What what do you see now being the strategy on the on the Russian sides? Because I heard many warnings coming out of Russia that that if if its assets are attacked in the Black Sea, then well, the natural reaction would be to sever Ukraine from the Black Sea. But how are you reading all of these attacks occurring now, especially in the Odessa region? Because it's not just energy infrastructure. We see the ports, bridges.
It's it's quite yeah. It's been very, well, I guess, defining of the past two months.
Speaker 1: Well, let's begin with the fact that this isn't Ukraine attacking. There may be a Ukrainian somewhere in the group. This is The UK. Flat out, this is British intelligence. This is British drones.
Even if they slap, made in Ukraine on those, drones. What what's interesting is the, some of the targets that may hit. So the Turks have been made to look fools, because shipping has been hit inside their exclusive economic zone. One of the ships that was sunk was actually carrying a sunflower whale. Not sure how much of an ecological disaster that'll be, but, it's not, it's not fuel, at least.
So we'll see. Maybe fish eat sunflower, sunflower oil. But there was a lot of it that was leaked. So, luckily the two oil tankers that were hit were empty. They were coming in, for, fume.
But the interesting thing is, is they were heading, first of all, they were heading toward, they were under third country flags. They were heading toward, Novorossiysk. And the damage in Novorossiysk is interesting even more because this wasn't Russian facilities that were hit. This was the Caspian transit, consortium that was hit. Earlier this year in the summer, their offices were hit by, Ukrainian drones and another port facility of theirs was hit.
And this time their loading facility was hit and destroyed. It's no longer being, it's not capable of being fixed. And who owns the, CTC? Well, Russia does have a small stake in the CTC, but the CTC is owned first and foremost by Kazakhstan, who has been sitting, putting their, behinds on two seats. We'll be friendly with Russia and we'll hold all the terror, all the, sanction regimes too, somewhere in between.
Oh, and we'll help feed Ukraine. Well, you get what you get when you feed, help feed Ukraine. Turkey got the same thing. So now they can't export the majority of their oil because that's where most of their oil went. So they're losing billions.
It may bankrupt the government, because that government literally does live off of oil and gas. Who else owns that? Oh, The Us owns that. So American, assets have now been destroyed by the British. Not sure how much of a, congl- how much of a conflict that's going to cost, but, I'm sure, Americans weren't too thrilled to find out that their facilities, that they helped pay for are now longer, operable and will not be operable in any of the, near future, which cuts down into American oil imports and American revenues, interesting enough.
So I'm sure that's, probably, fit that into Trump's, position at least somewhat because Trump does represent the oil lobby as well. He hears some of them and he represents some. They are powerful in The Us. What else has been hit? So a Chinese tanker, has been hit, and that was in the Mediterranean heading to Russia, to fuel up in Russia.
So, and at this point now we're starting to hit the really, it's no longer just Russia being drawn into this war by the Europeans. Cause let's admit it. I mean, where the Western century Europeans are doing this, it's not the Ukrainians, unless Ukrainians have free travel with, weaponized, equipment through what Greece we're talking about. Greece, more likely is where, these drones came from. How do you find a tanker in the middle of the sea, to bring a drone in before its, fuel reserves go?
Satellites. You have satellite satellite data. If it's not The US given the satellite data, the EU has more than a few satellites over the area, including The UK that are given, that can give live satellite feeds, where these tankers are located. Again, it's one thing if it's in a port, it's a whole different thing. It's out to sea.
Sea is a big place. People don't realize that oftentimes when they look at a map and see, oh, I see there's a map. There's a little tanker about icon there. Yes. But that's millions of square kilometers of, of water.
Try finding that with a drone, especially a surface drone trying to find it, let alone even the air drones. The air drones that were used are not that, long distance capable. So they're not gonna be hovering around looking for this tanker out in the open sea for very long. They came in hard in a in a, basically, a swarm outfit. So what the rush and, government has already said is for all tankers coming to Russia to reflag the Russian, flags.
So far, they've been hitting, third country flags. Reflag Russian flags, that's an act of war against Russia. Go ahead and hit us. If it's a British, then it's a declaration of war by the British. If it's Bulgaria doing it or Romania doing it, it's a declaration of war by Bulgaria and Romania, on the high seas.
So that's, we'll see how that works. Alternatively, especially in the north, across the, the Baltic Sea, the Russian shipping is gonna be, it's already had this, done once or twice with military escorts. So probably run convoys with military escorts ready to fire in any Europe, any EU or NATO ship that's trying to block them or trying to, trying to land on. Them. So, I mean, this is a war time now, and now we're going further and further into wartime effects.
And believe me, if there was a convoy, there'll be submarines somewhere around there too, guess as it had a, firepower. So if Europe, European, the Western European powers really want a war, I mean, they're really itching for a war. They'll get a war. I hope they're not. I hope there's some amount of sanity left in whatever's, inbred elites are sitting in the, European commission, non elected elites.
But, unfortunately, I think, unfortunately, I think we are heading to a bigger war, at least a bigger, conglomeration, that, that will spark something that may stop, at at just a spark, or it may, continue burning and then, turn into a wildfire. Hope I'm wrong.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, I think that assessment might be incorrect because you probably saw the interview or the speech Putin gave in the in his in his military fatigues, and he essentially made this talk that our interest in this deal of Ukraine pulling out of Donetsk is close to zero now in terms of our interest. So in other words, the the former deal appears to be going away as they will ramp up. And US general Michael Flynn, he went out tweeting that the best war plans leave a lot of options open because you want to have all these alternatives, different paths to go until the last minute. That's when all the other alternatives are taken off the plate and you go for one thing.
And he he seemingly interpreted that this is what Putin is now doing by simply appearing observing Putin's appearances in terms of how he's dressed and also the content of his speech that, well, as Michael Flynn's words, damping duty is now gone, and it appears that the policies will change dramatically. I guess my my main concern is when I look around Europe, if you I mean, most most people, I don't think, see the severity of the direction we're going down. Even when I remember back earlier this year when there were attacks on the on Russia's nuclear deterrent, kind of the consensus across the media was, well, Ukraine has a right to strike back. They were attacked by Russia. Why shouldn't they respond against the planes that attacked them?
But I don't think they understand the significance. First of all, attacking the nuclear deterrent of Russia in a proxy war, and then the FSB even recognized that the British were, well, deeply involved in this attack as well on Russia's nuclear deterrent. I mean, this is this is x this is almost unthinkable during the Cold War that anyone would go to this extent. And but but they're only talking this normative ways that, oh, well, what is fear? Russia did this to Ukraine.
It's not fair. Russia Ukraine should be able to attack back. But when you look at who's behind the attacks and what they're attacking, this is really World War three stuff we're talking about. And so we were going up this escalation ladder, and people are are talking about this as their children. It's it's quite frightening.
The I think a lot of belligerence is making way because of a lot of stupidity who are just covering over. It's it's yeah. I think in such a war, everyone would effectively lose. But how do you make sense of this speech by by Putin? Do you do you see now that that the policies will begin to harden?
Of course, it depends on these negotiations, but I'm not sure if they're just for show. It doesn't seem to make much sense. All I'll I'll have to say, though, heard 90%, according to The US side of the the the peace deal was done, you know, except for the NATO stuff and the territory stuff. So so essentially the core of the matter. Yeah.
Speaker 1: You you know, Market Garden. They got 90% of the weight. That last bridge was the bridge too far. You know? As the, as the movie, as the books, it was the bridge too far.
So yeah, if, if 90% is on flat ground, the last 10% is Mount Everest and you just can't climb Mount Everest, That's the whole point. It doesn't matter if it's the 1%. If it's, if you have a point where neither side will move, everything gets settled on the battlefield. Problem is for the West, in particular for The Us, the leverage, of these negotiations is evaporating every single day by square kilometers and, and, and quite a few square kilometers, every single day, and with thousands of dead, Ukrainian soldiers. Every single day, without exception.
Let's just review the, what, what is happening on the battlefield right now. So Miregrada is over. There's just cleanup operations and a few holdouts here and there. The Pokrovsk relief operation never really got going, before it got whacked. I've got, I just coming up.
So, I mean, it's the videos coming out of there. These guys are just, basically destroyed driving down, roads, trying to speed in. What, Gudai Puede, when it fell, it fell in two weeks, basically. It fell so quickly. The last part, the Ukrainians took off running so quickly that when the Russian forces overran, the headquarters units, the computers were on.
They weren't even, pass, password protected. They didn't have time to block the screen, let alone destroy the computers. That screen's on. They just ran. So the videos were up.
We're showing the, these computers, all these monitors are still on, come in there, see what they're talking about. You know, you got full access, switch off the password control right there and, and start digging in, on their Intel. So that means that basically morale just collapsed instantly. And as the forward unit started running and they running past the headquarter units and headquarter units said, oh crap, now we're the forward units. Let's run.
When panic hits that hard, that means it's entire collapse of any discipline of any control, that you do not destroy your equipment. You don't burn documents. You don't evacuate them. I mean, in a headquarters unit, if you got a top secret computer, that computer is much more valuable than any rifle, anybody else in that unit, because one guy could get killed. That's a tragedy.
That computer gets lost. I could get a lot of people killed. Plus, whatever secrets you're holding that probably should never be leaked to the world. So all these computers were up and running. So that tells you that morale has totally collapsed.
Now, what is Gulyaipuria? North of Gulyaipuria is about a 50 kilometer, maybe actually less than that, that, fortif- zone of fortifications that's now been flanked from north is now flanked from the south. So if the Ukrainians stay in those fortifications, they die. If they make a run for it, most will die. Some will get through, because there it's closing out.
But the problem is for them running is now across mostly open terrain. And here we've started the problem, for the Ukrainian side, that most of the Porosia is flat and open. They lost their Eastern flank. Totally, total collapse of the Eastern flank. The main, the main fortress being Gudai Poya, which by the way, it's two words combined to one Gudai and Poya.
Everybody keeps harassing. And for some reason, which means Tumbleweed in English, if you translate that. So the city of Tumbleweed, they've, from here to Zaporozhir City, is 60 kilometers straight shot. So you still have Ukrainian forces on the south trying to hold the Russian forces that are advancing north while in, north of them, it's gonna be a breakthrough by Russian forces, moving, well, to the north of them. So they, again, they either fall back or they get destroyed.
It's surrounding destroy hit from, three sides. It's just gonna roll up that entire defensive line. They are the Zaporozhzhia. I'm not gonna call it loss. I mean, it is loss, but the Zaporozhzhia front, I'm not gonna say how long it takes.
It depends how fast Russia decides to move. The weather there is, pretty atrocious. It's not frozen. We've just now gotten a actual winter in Moscow and, and it's come with a vengeance snowing every day. But down there it's, it's freeze fro, defrost, freeze, defrost mud, a lot of mud.
So that's gonna save them somewhat because, heavy equipment is still gonna be sluggishly moving across, that kind of terrain. But the fact is Russia has their dominance. Russia has missile dominance. Russia has, in, areas of heavy drone dominance. It doesn't have FPV drone dominance, but it can concentrate a lot of FPV assets in a in a single area.
And Russia has armor dominance. And in this case, it it's outmaneuvering from a three directional attack. It's just gonna roll up their front. So I would if I was a guessing man or a betting man better yet, I'd say anywhere from, two to three months, most of the Upper Roja front will be collapsed and destroyed completely. Probably with Upper Roja city being, either under siege or, or invested or partially invested.
It's very hard to defend Upper Region cities. And an open flat area, has one major bridge across the Nyapar. It, it can be, you can of course, come down, the Eastern, sea, the Eastern Bank Of The Nyapar and, continue overland, but you're in an open area. So anything coming in from that, from the north side is gonna be subject to a lot of attrition. Then we look at the, Donbas itself for, in this particular case, the, Dinesse People's Republic.
And again, the front, we have a 100 kilometer frontage that's basically open. That's kind of, that goes right into Rupal Tava and right into Dnieper Peterovskovles. The last, fortifications are gone. The last major fortifications. New fortification belts that they're digging desperately are mostly in open fields, unprepared villages, and they don't have the manpower.
You look at Kupansk, they threw everything they could. And if, if you notice every offensive is getting so much smaller. You had the, in '23, you, in, '22, you had Kharkov and, you had Kherson, counteroffensive. In '23, you had Zaporozhye counteroffensive. Was already a lot smaller because they lost a lot of men and equipment.
There they lost, their, basically their second army. No. Rebuilt army is the second rebuild. Then you've had the coup, the, Kursk offensive. Then if you ever actually looked at the Kursk offensive, not the maps that the West put out, but an actual map, you saw that they captured 10% of the Obelisk.
It's far from the biggest Russian Obelisk. So that really was actually a a relatively small piece of ground, all things considered, even though the the West was blowing panic. Like, say, tomorrow, Kursk City, which was still, like, 50 kilometers away from them. And the day after, it'll be Moscow. But the reality was everything's getting smaller and smaller in scope.
And now the big counterfestive was just Western Kupits, and that's over, and that's been, been destroyed and Russian forces already moving past, Kupitsk, in the south, of Kupits. So the, the whole front is collapsing. Once Krasnoyomans is, fully, cleared, you'll have Slavinsk basically surrounded from the north. And that conglomeration of raiders fighting going on in Constantinovka. So you've got what?
Two major cities left that are not invested yet at all. And one that's, about a third invested. So what's left? The Donbas is done. And after this, it's just a matter of how much, territory in Sumy, Chernagov, Chernagov hasn't been started yet, but in Sumy, in Kharkov, in, Dnieper, and sooner or later in, on Dniepervivos and sooner or later in, Poltava is gonna be in Russian hands.
And Kharkiv, let's not forget, that's about 30 kilometers and Russia's moving. Sumy's, the Russian front has started moving again. That's less than 20 kilometers to Sumy. I mean, we're not talking huge distances, to, to surround these cities. And with the power out, most of the civilians are gonna leave if they haven't already left.
They can't survive. The cold is a rioting, an actual winter cold. Kharkiv is much colder than, than going down to Avievka. There's a big enough distance there and a difference. A lot of people leave, that's the whole point in this case, switching those areas off is to get the people to leave.
Because then fighting in that city is gonna be much more, much easier without the Ukrainians being able to use civilians as human shields.
Speaker 0: I think that the command post being abandoned in this way in Goliapola was an indicator of what will come because we always see this that when wars enter their final stages, casualties always goes through the roof, much like Germany at the end of World War two. And it as you suggest, this is always this cascading effect. If there's panic, there's more desertions, there's gonna be less recruitment, there's gonna be more surrenders, there's gonna be the the disconnection of communication lines, weakening supply lines, international supporters pulling back as nobody wants to bet on the losing horse. And it's no. It's a you can kinda see where this goes, and it is kind of frustrating that that it doesn't seem to affect very much, at least in Europe, the way they look at the way they should approach this conflict in terms of at least starting to talk to the Russians, pick up a phone.
I mean, we should at some point, things will change so fast from day to day. We wish we would have some people on the ground talking and, you know, been been in the middle of at least a process instead. Everything would have to start from scratch, then once we start from scratch, it's after we actually lost, which is it doesn't it it it boggles the mind, but it it did make me wanna ask you about The US position. How how do you make sense of The US position in these negotiations? Because Trump is, of course, famous for going a bit back and forth, and and it all seems a bit bizarre, The US position, because we you know, now The US is seemingly the main negotiator trying to bring this war to an end, but it was The US that pushed the Europeans back in 2008 to on offering future membership to Ukraine.
It was The US who took the lead in toppling Yanukovych in 2014. It was The US that took the lead in undermining the Minsk peace agreement and then the Istanbul talks. And today, it's The US generals doing most of the war planning. Ukraine is full of CI agents. It's The US intelligence agencies giving the targeting, primarily using primarily using American weapons, and this is still a US led proxy war, irrespective of, you know, Trump trying to give it over to Biden.
So yet, Trump is the mediator here. He might be genuine, though, that he wants this war to end as he sees a disaster, or he could just be trying to outsource it to the Europeans. But even as he mediates, though, the sanctions on countries like India are being imposed in efforts to cripple the Russian economy, and he either ignores or assist the Europeans in attacks on on Russia. So there's even the civilian vessels. So I I mean, you are a former US army officer.
How do you make sense of The US position in this well, let's call it a diplomatic circus because this it doesn't feel very genuine to me that if they would want to shut this thing down, they could. And I do understand that they don't wanna give up the pressure yet against Russia as they can use this as leverage in any negotiations. But still, it's been a year of the Trump administration, and they're still leading this war. So what are we looking at there?
Speaker 1: You know, for future historians, say in one hundred and fifty years, two hundred years, before they start studying these last five years and probably the last, maybe even longer, if you really want to go back to where it starts, and the next couple of years where, where it goes, I would highly suggest binging on Monty Python's flying circus, because this is basically like the most absurd episode of Monty Python's flying circus. For those that haven't re or watched this, maybe I'm dating myself. But I highly suggest watching some reruns and then watching the news. It will make much more sense. The absurd of the absurd is, what we have from the West in general.
You know, anybody with half a intellectual node in their head, would have figured out that one of the biggest targets of all of this was the European Union to begin with. The destruction of the European Union, the willful self destruction of the European Union. And that's exactly what we have. Europe, the European union is not going to negotiate. They're negotiation incapable.
What they're gonna do until they collapse is become more and more tyrannical. We see this right now. Sanction of European citizens, sanction of, of, Swiss citizens. For what? For telling the truth.
For telling the truth of what is going on. This is, you know, the USSR and their unelected Politburo, otherwise known as, commissioner, VanderLeijn or the state secretary VanderLeijn there. Actually, I think the Politburo had more of a, a democratic process in getting elected than the European commission. They have taken everything that's worse, that was worst about the USSR, and, and, and implemented that. And none of the good things like taking care for the people, forty eight hour work weeks, vacations for people, medical, treatment for people.
They just dropped all of that Anchorage. You know, why, why bother with that ballots? We'll just keep the good stuff, how we rule tyrannically over everybody. So I don't think they're capable of negotiating. The people definitely around Vanderlane are, and I don't think the people that could replace her are capable of, of that.
They are ideologues. They've sold their themselves a lot, fully their selves or souls to this mission, whether they realize it or not, but that's exactly how they're acting. And people can do that very easily. Know, they, they get so invested in something that they cannot take that one step back, let alone a tenth step. And you, you take back and take a look at the big picture, that Europe was always the, one of the major targets.
It's like, you know, world war one, world war two, the British aim wasn't just a destruction of the Germans. It was a destruction of Germans and the Russians. We're playing a bigger game. The Us is playing a bigger game on this, that The Us is now playing, both the main, con controller and the, empower of the proxy and the guys that are the neutral negotiators. Again, this is something straight out of Monty Python.
I don't think Monty Python better come up with something this hilarious. And you're looking at people, you know, at, at Trump is talking about we're neutral, you're neutral. You're giving them all the military intelligence they need. You're still giving them equipment. Yeah.
The US is still sending equipment for money that Europe someday will pay, maybe. So they're still providing equipment. There's even line items, in the direct, Pentagon budget for Ukraine. It was, it was modest, of course, compared to, previous years, it was only about 800,000,000 but it's there. And there's always supplemental budgets.
I never forget that the us military and the us government general runs on a lot of supplemental budgets. So if it's $900,000,000,000 as the main budget for the war department, the supplemental budgets could easily come to several $100,000,000,000 more easily. And there'll be ad hoc paths here and there. So, you know, you're, you're looking at a side that really is trying just to hedge its bets. I don't think it's giving up on project Ukraine as a whole, no matter what Trump is saying.
I don't believe sorry. Maybe you know, a lot of Russian news media don't like what I've had to say before because I am very critical on Trump and they're, they all, for some reason, wanna believe that maybe this time with The US president Trump and something like that. But like gentlemen, you know, this is ladies and gentlemen, this is not the end. This is only, if nothing else, a regrouping. Project Ukraine has not been abandoned.
The US has not abandoned its desire on hegemony over the world, no matter what its, new strategy, official strategy is. And if you look at the official strategy, they still talk about, possible, threats, to Europe and to other areas where they, they can't leave totally because our interests are still involved. What, meanwhile, just reinforcing that we're gonna rape, the Western Hemisphere as much as we want, like we've done for the last hundred and forty years before that. So though, where's this gonna go? I don't know.
I, I honestly don't know. From the Russian side, I think that they're finally just running out of, out of any desire to even participate in this farce. It's gonna be settled on the battlefield. What's gonna happen to the European union? I think at least a few countries are probably gonna go, thanks.
We've had enough. We're leaving. Will they be allowed to leave like the British were? I don't know. The European Union was much more democratic when the British, had their, exit.
Would the Hungarians or the, Slovakians be able to leave? I don't know. I honestly don't know, at this point, because if they start to go, they could have a cascading effect on, the European Union as a whole. And those powers that be there are sitting, up in, Brussels. They don't wanna lose power.
And the more power they grab, the more desperate they become. I mean, just look at what they're doing to European citizens. Again, sanctions aside of their own countries. They can't buy, they can't, earn, they can't sell, they can't have gifts. I mean, this is worse than putting somebody in a concentration camp.
At least worse than putting them in a prison. At least in prison, he gets food and, and board. Here, you're not an entity that can't do anything. So a union never came up with anything that, that, tyrannical. Well, I'm not gonna talk about the, the 1920s, the thirties when they had kinda, gulags.
But I'm sure those are probably on, around the corner. That's usually the next step. Well, we can't keep these people in if they're ghosted. We can't keep them in society because they're still talking. They're still coming on podcasts.
Why don't we just put them all in one place? And then the next logical steps go from that. We know how this, this play plays out. It's been played out several times before, and I don't see the European union, hitting the brakes anytime, sir. I don't see the desire.
Speaker 0: Well, the The US playing all side is a is a common theme, though, in in 1941 before Harry Truman took the presidency. There's this quote he had in the New York Times where he said that, you know, if the Germans are winning, we should help the Russians. If the Russians are winning, we should help the Germans. And that way, let them kill each other as many as possible. And this is kind of the as long as both are weakened, we win.
And, again and it's not exactly the same now, but but the the logic is still the same. You know? They can destroy, for example, Nord Stream. You weaken the Europeans, and and in their weakness, make them more dependent on The US, make them more obedient. I mean, look where the EU is now.
Twenty years ago, in terms of GDP, there was some parity between The US and the EU. Now there's nothing there. What remains of a deindustrializing Europe is being now, well, lured over to The United States with all these subsidies, and it's, yeah, it's it's it's quite remarkable. And as the Europeans are allowed the privilege of buying American weapons to fight a war, which the Americans were the main one pushing for, all the Americans want in return is for Europeans to buy American energy, much, much more expensive. And what remains of money is should be invested in The United States as per a deal the EU had to sign with Trump on this golf course given that the EU didn't have any leverage.
So it there is and, again, this hardly falls under a conspiracy theory when Trump himself comes out and say the the EU is worse than China, and he hates nothing more than China seemingly, so that would be the European. So it is quite remarkable, but it does beg the question, what what do you think is the how do you interpret the European position? Because this is a very strange thing for me because the Europeans, again, they're the one that said before, resisted The US push towards this disaster in 2008 when they warned Bush that don't give membership to offer membership to Ukraine. First of all, there's only 20% of them who want it, and it's gonna be war. Like, Angela Merkel said this.
This would be interpreted by Moscow as a declaration of war. And the predictable thing happened. Blew up in our faces. We have a war. We're losing that war.
The US is really see what's written on the wall, so they they're backing out. Not completely, obviously, but handing over responsibility to the Europeans and try to make some money of it as they outsource it. It's just and there's no course correction. It is just it's quite shocking, and I always feel like I should make some excuses for the EU, but after what they did to colonel Jacques Bou of the Swiss Army, like, if you read his books, his watched his interviews, he just relies on Western sources to give the best analysis, which was his job as a colonel. He did the intelligence analysis, and then based on interpreting reality as it is, advocates for the best policies.
His his assessments have been correct. No one can catch him on any of the facts or the analysis he does. And the policies, therefore, he recommended would have kept us away from this war. It would have saved Europe. It would have saved Ukraine.
That's not what the Europeans did, yet they sanctioned him. He can't travel. They seized his bank accounts. A colonel, which used to work with NATO. What this is just it's so dark.
I mean, I'm kind of for me, this is a nail in big nail in the coffin of the EU, and they did this to themselves. It's shocking. But, anyways, my my question was, how do you make sense of this? Because if you're losing a war, the deal is gonna be worse tomorrow than it is today. Why would you still want to prolong this?
It is difficult, yeah, thing to comprehend, I think.
Speaker 1: Well, depends on which Europeans. So if you take the 160,000,000 called Russians or Belarusians well, the Belarusians are kind of, and, and still in neutral, pseudo neutral mode. The 150,000,000 Russian Europeans, mostly Europeans are looking at it and going, we'll sell this on the battlefield. I think the 18 or 19,000,000 Ukrainians are split between those, psychotically wishing to fight to the end, and those are just wishing to for this to be over in any which way possible. As for the rest of Ukrainians, Ukrainians, outside of, Ukraine, because Ukraine itself, you know, it's a three tier society, the three tier war.
You have the, the lower middle class and lower, the other ones fighting and dying because they can't afford to buy their way out. The middle class has bought their way out, become refugees. I don't know the uber patriots to fight to the very last Ukrainian because it's not them. And then the rich are just partying everywhere they wanna party. They don't give a damn.
You know, it's all a good party. They've stolen so much money. They're willing to spend it on the poor, central and Eastern, central and Western Europeans and their resorts by buying up their trinkets and buying up, their services. Here, here, come over here, French servant. Come bring me my drink.
Cause I'm the rich Ukrainian. So it's, it's a very different society, very, very tiered society. As for the Austro Hungarian, contingent, Well, the Austrians so far are still pro war, but the, conservative party did win the majority. I think they're gonna have the, uber majority, in the next election. So they'll be out and, they'll follow the Czechs and the Hungarians and the Slovaks, out the door and saying goodbye.
We're not gonna fight this war no matter what, which is gonna be a hit for NATO too. If you think about it, those armies are not gonna fight. Oh, and Austria is neutral anyways. Well, not NATO. If, if for NATO itself, you know, the Turks aren't gonna fight.
I'm not calling them Europeans, but they're not gonna fight. The Greeks will have a revolutions. The Bulgarians will have a revolution. The Romanians may have a revolution because they didn't actually go not to have any of this. And their elections were stolen, as we saw, blatant.
The Italians are starting to distance themselves. I think they figured out that they're stepping they're standing in a precipice, and their, toes are already hanging over the cliff. And it's just a nice gust of wind, and they're going back over that cliff. But, Italy has rarely start finished the war on the same side it started it. It's like hasn't ever.
So there's there's that. Matter of fact, when I was, in Bosnia, the, the Italians were the first ones to have Velcro patches. And the joke was it may piss off some of the Italians. Know me, sorry. But that was the joke that we had was the reason to have Velcro patches because Italy's finished, every, world war on a different side than it started on.
So they could quickly switch patches, you know, whose side are we on today? Oh, okay. New patch. And then we go forward. The, well, what come, and then when you get down to the others, well, Germany is a good, question because while everybody focuses on the alternative, future for Deutschland, being, 27%, and probably higher, there's a flip side to that.
The rest, so around 70%, they give their voice to any other party are giving their voice to war. The majority the population still wants war, whether they fully realize that or not, that's a separate issue, but they're voting for war. That's that the, and, and the problem, and now you're getting into a problem with the Scandinavians, the pre Bolts, the Poles, and the Northern Europeans, and the leadership that runs in the, EUSR Polar Bureau in Brussels. The last thing they desperately can, can accept is any actual peace in Ukraine, Because if there's an actual peace and borders are set and the conflict ends, what have they got left to unify the bankrupt, corrupt, degenerated, socially degenerate, infrastructurally, crumbling, economically destroyed European union without the, the red scare. You may, if you wanna call it the Russian scare.
Okay. So the Russians have just concluded a peace treaty. Everybody's backing off. They've got a hard border. The war is over.
The Russians are coming? The Russians are coming? Well, that doesn't work anymore. Oh, oh, why did we bank you up for your economy? Why are your children going hungry by week three, by the way?
That's the average Italian these days. I have, several friends in Italy that, in, Italian politics I've talked to and they're like, you know, the average Italian can't, is, is deciding to, heat his home or feed him himself and his family by week three of the month. And it's only getting worse. You know, try explaining that Maloney, by the way, who's no number one cheerleader for NATO after she got elected, now has to explain why we gave a lot of equipment, maybe had quite a few Italians killed. The French have definitely been getting killed and the Poles have been getting killed.
And so were the Germans while we're at it, and bankrupt their economy. Let's see. I don't know that. What, what else are they gonna say? We put everything on a red five.
So even if it was red six, it wasn't a win and we didn't get red five. In fact, the roulette wheel just went away and the ball flew off somewhere and we're just stuck, with our bets on red five getting taken away. So we're all bankrupt now. Thanks. We're gonna lead for America.
And I'm sure quite a few of those leaders probably will lead for America or Canada or somewhere else run for their lives with their money. I don't see how the European union gets out of this alive. It's at least not in the form that it is now, unless it goes full third Reich tyranny. I mean, Gula, I mean, camps, Gulags are war camps. I'm talking straight up concentration camps, full repression, full, full on everything.
That's the, it's the last desperate holder in power. And the weaker the government often, or the weaker they feel, the more harsh their terms are, to, toward their own population because they have to crush anything that looks or smells like the scent. And that's what we're seeing in the EU. It's revving up. They're getting more desperate every single day.
And you're right about, the colonel. Now there's a, there was a Turkish, journalist. I cannot remember his name right now in Germany. He's a perfect example. He's Turkish by race.
He is German born in Germany and he's sanctioned. Man is living basically, he's been ghosted. He's not the only one. There was by the way, a, another Swedish journalist. She, she's been sanctioned too.
She's in Africa. She can't fly into Switzerland because she has to fly over Europe, European union territory. So now she can't go home. So we're, we're looking at, and, and you know, this is right now it's starting at the, the top level. They're grabbing the dissidents, the bigger dissidents, but it's gonna go further and further down the level, which we already see in England, by the way, England, as, as well ahead by at least a few years of the European union.
England is on full on tired. Anything you say, I mean, look at George Galloway for God's sakes. The man was a part of parliament for thirty years. He's head of a recognized registered political party. And he and his wife were coming in and they were detained, which is worse than being arrested because arrested, at least you get a solicitor.
Here you're detained, you get no solicitor, you get nothing. You are at the mercy of the state because you're not arrested. You're detained. Just in detention, we can do anything we want, basically. You have no riots.
And The UK is a full retirement, but I don't think that's gonna go for the rest of the EU. I don't think there's an off ramp for them because any off ramp is a loss of power and probably a loss of the EU, at least as we see it now, it may, it'll have to be a reformed zone. I don't think these people are ready to let go, especially the money that they're making. I mean, they're all making money. Let's not forget that.
They're, they have power, they have money, they have prestige placed in their circles. That's very hard to give up.
Speaker 0: I think it's important to know well, also recognize that this is not the end stop as you suggest. That is if you remember when they started this deplatforming and censorship, it was a controversial thing. But first, they rolled out Alex Jones because he said some appalling things, and everyone kinda say, yeah. This is goes too far. Let's deplatform him.
That's a nice different word than censorship. And and, of course, the assumption seemingly was that, okay, this will be a once off, but instead, it opens the doors. Now this is a common thing. People just disappear off Twitter and or disappear off YouTube or in any other channel, and this there's there's no recourse. There's nothing you can do.
This has just become the new normal thing that people are deplatformed, and it I think this prevents us from actually resolving this thing as well. And it's just so incredible how we're actually here now. If you remember back in the nineties, you know, this was a common this debate we had, especially in The United States, the discussion, but also many Europeans were worried about this. That is if we insist on developing a Europe without the Russians, that is an unwillingness to pursue mutually acceptable European security architecture after the Cold War, we're gonna end up in other call conflict. As George Kennan said, if we expand NATO, we do this at some point.
The Russians will then lash back. They will react. And once they do, we're have all these people on our side saying, oh, that's just how Russians are. You know, this is pretty much spot on. This was in '98.
And, you know, and, of course, the frontline states, once you revive the Cold War logic, would suffer greatly than, you know, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia. It's it's important to recognize this to restore diplomacy, but it's impossible to make this argument in Europe unless you wanna be smeared, censored, canceled, and now, of course, also sanctioned. I mean, this is yeah. What happened to colonel Bou is incredible. This is gonna it's it's gonna be, again, another step towards the EU's irrelevance.
Anyways, on that not so happy note, thank you very much for taking the time. I know you're very busy there in the holidays ahead of New Year's and the Orthodox Christmas. So thank you.
Speaker 1: Well, thank you. And I and I hope, you know, I do hope to see if it brings sanity. What what's the the Chinese animal this time? The horse? Alter the year of the horse, or the stallion, whichever it is, brings a lot more sanity, to, to Europe than has been for the last three or four years.
So we'll live and see. But, you know, hope for the best, Prepare for the worst.
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
Gilbert Doctorow: Russia's Oreshnik Strike in Warning to NATO https://youtu.be/ivuByVoV3gY https://t.co/4ncqGXGre0
Video Transcript AI Summary
Gilbert Doktorov and the host discuss the recent Russian strike aimed at Lvov, using Soreshnik (Arashnik) missiles, and what it signals about NATO, Western responses, and the trajectory of the war.
- Initial facts and uncertainties about the strike: The Russians did not provide a clear description of what they did or where. Doktorov says it’s unclear whether at least one or six to nine missiles were fired, and whether the targets included the largest single gas storage facility in Ukraine. He notes that if a gas storage facility were hit, it would imply enormous destruction and heat Ukraine’s heating, but no confirmation has been given about the exact damage or targets. Reports indicate several missiles were released, but the exact number and impact remain uncertain. A Ukrainian gas storage target would have produced a large explosion if hit.
- Context of the attack: The strike was not isolated; it occurred amid drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles hitting multiple cities, including Kyiv. Zelensky urged Ukrainians to stay indoors, suggesting the Russians intended a larger attack. Doktorov argues this demonstrates Russian confidence that their weapons cannot be stopped by existing air defenses. He contends the attack serves as a message to the West, downplaying the significance of Western “domes” or defenses.
- Western and Ukrainian reactions: Ukraine’s foreign minister called for a United Nations Security Council meeting, signaling seriousness. Ukraine’s leadership framed the strike as a response to Western provocations and ongoing escalations.
- Arashnik weapon system and balance of power: There is discussion about whether Arashnik missiles have multiple warheads or dummy warheads, and how many were launched. The conversation notes that Russia’s use of the weapon, and the surrounding firepower (drones, missiles), are part of a broader strategy to exert pressure on the region and test Western defenses.
- Domestic Russian dynamics and deterrence: Doktorov suggests the strike reflects pressure from within Moscow by hardliners who want a stronger, more forceful stance. He contrasts Putin’s leadership with Khrushchev, arguing Khrushchev was decisive and provocative, while Putin has been more restrained but could be compelled to show force by hardline factions. The conversation links recent events (attack on Putin’s residence, the northern energy and military infrastructure strikes, and the broadened use of missiles) to a perceived revival of Russian deterrence.
- Role of the United States and Trump: The discussion covers the U.S. role and ambiguities surrounding Trump, including speculation that Trump’s policies may be both deceptive and strategic. They reference reports about Trump’s possible green light for attacks on Russian tankers and the broader implications for NATO and European security. The Financial Times editorial is cited as considering incentives and pushback to manage Trump’s Greenland agenda, suggesting Europe’s limited leverage over Trump, who could push to dissolve or weaken NATO rather than sustain it.
- European strategic responses and deterrence: The editors discuss possible European tactics to counter Trump (e.g., threatening to expel U.S. troops), while recognizing that many Europeans prefer to keep U.S. military presence. They debate whether Trump’s aims include breaking NATO or extracting concessions, and consider whether European states will push back or acquiesce to U.S. leadership.
- Prospects for peace and endgame: The speakers debate whether negotiations remain possible or are now merely for optics. They discuss whether a direct war between Russia and NATO could emerge if Russia escalates further, especially with energy infrastructure and civilizational effects in Ukraine. They foresee a likely “frozen conflict” outcome, with Russia annexing territories east of the Dnieper and Odessa, leaving Ukraine landlocked and largely excluded from NATO and EU integration, while warning that Western military presence and support could trigger direct confrontation if Russia chooses to escalate.
- Civilians and dislocation: They emphasize that as the war intensifies, civilian suffering will grow, with mass displacement and humanitarian crises likely, particularly if Kyiv and other cities become uninhabitable due to outages and destruction.
- Overall tone: The discussion underscores deep uncertainty, strategic signaling, and the perception that both Western policies and Russian deterrence are shifting in ways that could escalate or reshape the conflict, with no clear, imminent path to a settlement.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Welcome back. We are joined today by Gilbert Doktorov, a historian and international affairs analyst and also author of the book War Diaries, the Russia Ukraine war. So thank you for coming on. I really wanted to discuss with you the strike last night as as Russia launched its Soreshnik missiles at Lvov in Western Ukraine. And this seems obviously to be a warning to the NATO countries in response to recent escalations.
I wanted to know how you are assessing the situation.
Speaker 1: Well, to be fair about it, we are in a fog of war. The the Russians did not did not come out quickly with a description of what they did and where. It's coming out in in bits and drabs. I I understand that they fired at least one in the Lvov region, But other reports said that they fired six or nine. It could be that that the reports are confusing the the little missiles that the single Arashnik carries and delivers to the area where they fly in separately, or it could be in fact they were six or one.
That's not clear. The damage and also not clear the extent of damage because the reports that I've seen indicated that the target one of the targets because I say there there are several mini missiles that are released by our investment. But one of the targets was the largest single gas storage in Ukraine. Now presumably, if that were a hit, there should have been an explosion of enormous proportions. It would also drain Ukraine of heating yeah.
Heating that would cover the country. So it could have been something devastating, and I suspect it was something exactly devastating because the Ukrainians are going berserk. The foreign minister of Ukraine has called for United Nations Security Council meeting to discuss this horrible attack, and that indicates that this was very serious. But no one is yet saying what exactly was hit, and no one is demonstrating the effectiveness of of the Adeshnek, which as you recall, in the first time used in Dnipro against a a military production facility, it was very disputed whether it had indeed a nuclear bomb type of energy or was simply a few tons of of TMT. So that will be very important to see the follow-up, what destruction actually took place.
Just to remember, this was not an isolated one missile attack. It was part, again, of a of a confluence of of drones, of cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. The destruction was spread across several cities, including Kyiv. And we can imagine that something serious happened in Kyiv. We can also imagine that the Russians gave advanced warning to Zelensky about the impending attack because he went on air last night telling Ukrainians to stay indoors in basements because a bigger attack was coming.
So this by itself is demonstrative of the Russians' confidence that their weapons are invincible, cannot be stopped by patriots or any other known existing anti aircraft or air defense system. That sounds logical and it would be in line with the message that they have for the West. Forget about your dome in Germany. Forget about your dome in The United States. These are utterly useless concepts given the the present state of Russian armaments.
So it would receive a big message. The minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine helped help to to spread, disseminate that message. I don't know if he is aware of how damaging his statements were overall, but trying to tell Europe they have to they have to look alive. They have they have to do something because this is on just it's just on the on the edge of the European Union. Do you realize that?
And here we have the Russians are are attacking with a with a hypersonic missile. And just add two or three more minutes, and that same missile could be in Berlin. Well, he did a wonderful job for the Russians of scaring the Europeans out of their wits. So I I think that was that was not very carefully thought through when the Ukrainians made these statements. The the little information they can now, the Russians are saying that this is a return visit.
This is a their answer to the the attack, the drone attack on president Putin's residence in Valdez in his country residence where his his common law wife and children live, small detail, that this was an answer to it. But I think that is that is just part of the story. The there have been many acts of provocation. It's mounting provocation by the West, by The United States against Russia. There was that attack on his on his residence 10 ago or whatever.
There is the seizure of the Russian flags of tanker in the off of Iceland. There is the reputed agreement of Trump to back the the so called peace terms that were finalized and agreed by the coalition of the willing willing in in Paris at the start of the week within with Whitaker present sorry. With him. Sorry. Whitcoff present.
And there the there was in the air the notion that Russia would be intimidated by the 500% tariffs that are about to be imposed, assuming that the bill in the Senate passes, which it will, and that the House backs it and the and that Trump does what he said, that he will sign it because he has no choice. The the senate has eighty two eighty two votes in favor of it, so his veto could could be overruled at once. And that 500% tariff on countries it's a secondary tariff on countries that are buying Russian one, which includes three of the four founding countries of BRICS as Brazil and India and China. That would be used as a cudgel to to get the Russians get Putin to sit at the negotiating table and sign what has just been agreed by by the EU leaders and Zelensky in Paris, up which amounts to inflicting a capitulation on Russia. This is the way things are going.
So it's understandable that with all of these developments that are against its interests and which assume that it has no ability to respond, the Russians would act. And where they've acted in a way that I think the the real patriots and the pressure the people in the close circle of Vladimir Putin in Moscow who have certainly been pressuring him to drop the friendly gently approach and to show the fist. I think these people will be satisfied because everyone has made one demand use those Hareshniks and stop just talking about them. And finally, he's done that. How many were used?
What ex with what exact damage? We'll find out in the days to come.
Speaker 0: That's a good point that how how do you assess the auraschnik strike. Is it you know, it has multiple warheads or, in this case, dummy warheads. So it's it's yeah. It's just unclear how what how much how many of them were launched, or if there was just the one. But a lot of the anger of Russia obviously came out after the attack on Putin's residence.
Many people have made this point that the Russians didn't really show this much anger in the past. And at least my my my take on it, though, has to be seen in the context on the attack on Russia Russia's strategic deterrent, because it just this it shouldn't be that hard to draw a common thread around this because between 2022 and 2025, we've seen multiple attacks on this Engels Airbase, which is where Russia hosts its nuclear armed strategic bombers. And it's very doubtful that Ukrainians would have achieved this without the backing of Western intelligence agencies. And, also, we saw back in May '24 that there was these attacks on Russia's strategic nuclear early warning radar, which obviously has no purpose at all in this war. The proxy were in Ukraine that is.
And in June, we saw this attack on Russia's nuclear bombers actually destroying many of them, which are key to their nuclear deterrent. And, of course, last month was this attack on Russia's well, sorry, Putin's residence. And according to people like Aristovich, this it's it also hosts a nuclear command center, which is why it was seen as such a dangerous attack because, you know, any any of these incidents would have been unthinkable during the Cold War. This would have been essentially what would have been seen to have triggered a possible nuclear exchange. Yet now we're seeing this becoming more and more bold, and it seems as if not just the British, but also American intelligence agencies are deeply involved in this.
Do you think this is why the Russians are reacting so fiercely now that they essentially see this as a, you know, Western attack on their nuclear deterrent?
Speaker 1: I think this is a factor. There's they have to look also at the dynamics of power within Russia and the the position of of the supreme commander. I have the highest respect for what Vladimir Putin has done to restore Russia from what I saw when I lived there in nineteen nineties, which was a wrecked economy, a destroyed society, a country that was pauperized and was demoralized, possibly beyond redemption. Now he didn't he didn't start it. We did the redemption.
It started already '28 1998. But he picked it up and carried it in a way that nobody could foresee, and the success has been dramatic, really. He he has done the achievements of a Peter the Great without having to to send hundreds of thousands or millions of peasants to their deaths and rebuilding. It has been an astonishing improvement. At the same time, I reserve the right to be critical of his role in defense and his role in dealing with the West.
I don't think only of the latest the latest events. I wrote several years ago that I was urging Vladimir Putin to take a lesson from Nikita Khrushchev. Nobody ever dared to call Nikita Khrushchev a murderer or a thug or a similar. Even if he was a murderer and a thug, they didn't dare. Imagine if they could say that in public.
They have done that to to Putin going back a decade. And this is because he never responded with force. He never took out his shoe and banged it on the table as Khushchev did. He never said to the West, we will bury you. Of course, that was later explained.
He didn't mean it literally. Figuratively, nonetheless, it was well understood that that Russia had the wherewithal to destroy destroy everybody on Earth because the the amount of nuclear weapons at the time were ten, twenty times enough to destroy all life on this planet. So Khrushchev had no hesitation to threaten. He was very brave. He may have been a crude man, but he certainly was not a stupid man.
And he was very brave, and he took risks. He took risks with the national survival of Russia. Mister Putin is a much more sophisticated man. He is a very intelligent man. He is and he is a man with legal training and legal turn of moment, but he has not had the force of Khrushchev to put the fear of God in the in the competitors dash adversaries dash outright enemies of Russia.
And we are it so the problem that Russia has, which is which is now expressing itself in these these dramatic, very threatening developments, as, for example, the firing of the Soyashnik to within a 100 kilometers of of the Polish border and an attack on on the reservoir that is the life support for gas for Ukraine. This is something that's been long and coming. And now that it's arrived, we have to expect more of the same. And this puts particularly mister Trump and particularly the hubristic command that he has around him that are now feeling so strong and powerful after they have humbled Venezuela and even taken a Russian oil tanker or Russian flagged oil tanker at sea. They are feeling like the lords of the universe.
Pete Eggseth is the most notorious and Marco Rubio next to him. They really need to be sobered up. The remark that Dmitry Medvedev said in response to the Ukrainian complaints over this Arashnik attack was that we just administered an antipsychotic inoculation on the Ukrainians. Well, put it into milder English, a kind of sobering up attack on the Ukrainians. And I think this will be understood in the capitalists of the West as a sobering up attack for them.
The notes, I think that we are past the point where where Vladimir Putin is going to tolerate visits by Rytkov to hold his hand for three hours or five hours and talk about a a peace settlement which The United States is utterly unable to to help realize. I think that the Russians will will now proceed on one track of resolving the war by their terms and by their military means. So a lot of things have changed in the last few days, but it took a long time to come to this moment.
Speaker 0: Well, we've seen all these strange developments out of The US that is they seem to have encouraged the European leaders to to push for sending their troops into Ukraine after an end of the war. They even seem to have gone to the extent that the Europeans believed that they would get some backstop from the Americans. So it's this it doesn't seem like they necessarily didn't want to end the war, but rather to ask the running out of Ukrainians instead put the Europeans on the front line. But then, so I guess my question is, are the negotiations all nonsense by now? It doesn't seem like there's anything worthless less, left of substance.
We also see these reports, of course, in the New York Times that Trump has been, giving the green light for attacks on Russian tankers, refineries. Some were wondering, are they simply trying to sabotage Trump? Or are they or are they or is Trump actually behind this? But to some extent, this point doesn't really seem relevant. I mean, is is Trump deceptive towards the Ukrainian the sorry.
Towards towards the Russians, or is it simply weak that is that he can't control his own house, that his intelligence agencies and his own staff are essentially doing a policy independent of him? I'm just wondering, does it really matter, though? Because especially now that you see the that Trump is well, the Americans are seizing Russian ships as well. The if he has to be extraordinary weak if he can't push back against any of this. So he does seem that he's just well, assume this role of a mediator, so he gets some goodwill from the Russians, and he's taking advantage to to every extent that that he can.
But, again, weak or deceptive to what does it really matter then? There there doesn't seem to be any possibility of making any peace. If anything, they say that the Europeans are the spoilers, but they seem to be egging on the Europeans as well. So how do you see this? Is the negotiations now only for optics, or is this still a possibility?
Fog of
Speaker 1: war extends also to analysis of of mister Trump. There's nothing foggier than what's going on around him. I I a day ago, I put out a an essay looking at the the question, is there a method to his madness? That he that this is mad is obvious. But is there a method to it?
Are we being deceived? Everything around Donald Trump is deception. He has used deception as his main vehicle for achieving his aims. He used the perception of the Iranians before attack by by luring that into negotiations while he's preparing to to attack them in the most vicious way. The nothing is what it sounds like or seems like, and I never take any of his words at face value.
This what he is doing now, it it it seems that, well, I'll let's devote attention to something very, very hot, what he wants to do with with Greenland. I was I was very impressed to read in the the editorial of Financial Times. I think it appeared this morning or late last night, in which they were they were addressing the question of what Europe should do in with respect to through Donald Trump's threats, his designs on grid. And they understood that Europe has almost has very few levers and that Europe is is is very very weak. So they were proposing combination of incentives and realistic pushback to deal with Trump's latest planned adventure agreement.
On on the one hand, there would be a a promise to step up Europe European, not just Danish, but all European investment in defense of of Greenland So that the issue that Trump has raised, that this is security risk for The United States, is not properly defended. You know, the Russians and Ukraine and the and the Chinese are running their ships just off of Greenland. It opens a hole in the in the in the Arctic and so forth. That would be addressed. And on the other hand, they would remind Trump that they are ready to leave NATO and that they're then if they leave NATO over this violation of basic principles of the NATO charter by The United States in seizing assets of one of the NATO members, then that would that would weaken America US defenses.
I found this amazing, this that the editorial group wrote this without thinking for a moment that these could be that is the breakup of NATO and the dissolution of the EU are exactly what Trump wants. So on the one hand, you've got his ambitions, which everyone's denouncing as as imperialism, the law, and it's entirely possible. That's all it is. But it's also possible with Trump that the man is using this attack on Greenland to achieve what he otherwise cannot achieve and very much wants to. He cannot take The United States out of NATO, but he can force NATO to dissolve itself because they see him as an enemy.
So I'd for this reason, Glenn, I'm very cautious about making a definitive interpretation of what's going on. Mister Trump is unbelievably devious person. The fact that The Washington Post had a Pinocchio shard on him in his first in his first term of counting daily what lies have spread. That that was justified, of course, and it's I think it's got it's been raised to a still greater ardent in his second term now.
Speaker 0: Yeah. No. I thought that was a great point. And, well, the Europeans, they came up with this ways that could counter Trump. That is well, we can because you can't go to war against The United States, obviously, but they could threaten to expel US troops from bases.
And I thought, but but the but the Europeans want them to stay there. That was the whole point. You know, in August when when Trump was telling more or less the Baltic States and others that we're planning to pull down our forces or draw down our forces in in in Europe and the Baltic States, the the Europeans went to panic. Suddenly, we have all these nonsense stories about Russian drones near airports with absolute zero evidence, you know, the Russians violating Estonian airspace. The hybrid war is coming.
America, you can't go. You know, this I mean, it's it's Europeans who want Americans to stay, and it's the Americans who want to reduce their presence. So it seemed like a very strange strange punishment indeed. But I also I often make the point that what the Europeans should do is just, well, essentially threaten that they will respond militarily because this would be a disaster. It looks like Trump.
He's he's the source of his success is to make everything short short wars. So but but like Panama, you know, he makes a little threat. They they give him something. You know, seems Gaza just let the Israelis just burn everything down, but then put something in place to stop it. Bomb Iran for a few days, strike, and then come in and make a peace deal, get it over with.
And now Venezuela as well. A lot of the hawks now are a bit critical because they're saying, well, this isn't nation building. We haven't taken over the government. But instead, he's claiming that the acting president will have to do as he's told, otherwise, he'll strike some more. Again, he's he's looking for quick fixes.
I think he's not a opponent of wars. He's just an opponent of a forever wars. So as soon as he can get the war over quickly and then move on to the next one, that's a success. So, you know, if the Danes don't want to lose Greenland, just put in place something that might pull in The United States over long term or create a more of a scandal, and, you know, he can't be bothered. He has so many other projects he wants to move on to, which he, you know, can be quick in and out.
And I I just I I you know, I think people either wanna see him as being a warmonger or a man of peace. I just think he's he's he's willing to use military force in any way to achieve his goals, but he doesn't wanna get drawn in. That's when all your resources, all your focus, everything gets sucked in, and you can't really do anything else. And I I think that's his main concern. I'm not sure if you if you see it the same way that this is, I guess, this is his approach.
Speaker 1: It's too early to draw conclusions on what his real objectives are. He doesn't chip his hand. That is the main tactic that he uses as a to be an unknown. I think as commentators, we have an obligation to draw a distinction between what we'd like to see happen and what we acknowledge may happen. And I've just described what I would like to see happen, that he proceeds in the bellicose way and the Europeans cut off their nose to spite their face, as we say in American English, that is they do themselves harm, thinking they're going to harm him by disbanding NATO.
But the reality is I mean, the other reality, the greater likelihood is if there will be an accommodation with Denmark. The 25 out of 27 European heads of state or heads of government will very likely, quietly behind closed doors, apply maximum pressure on Denmark to just shut up and get it over with and to take the offer that Trump gives them to buy them out. I think to buy out the the population of Greenland, the Inuits there, would probably take $1,000,000 per person. That's $55,000,000. It's small change.
Don't even count that. But some billions to Denmark to get them to agree to the sale. I think that probably has a greater likelihood than the scenario that I prefer, the end of NATO. Denmark very has strong social market economy with a very good, still intact social services. And they are going to be impacted terribly as the budget for for defense rises to 5% of GDP.
A helping hand from mister Trump could make Denmark one of the biggest winners in the proceed in the in the coming ten years by providing them with the capital to do both, both cuttings and butter, while their neighbors in the EU will not have that that cushion that mister Trump is about to provide?
Speaker 0: Well, I I recently spoke with, professor Mersheimer. He he was making the point that we already long ago crossed the line of a proxy war to a direct war. That is that these attacks are now not through Ukraine, but we are gauging directly. And I guess the only question now is when does Russia retaliate directly? Because as we saw with Derechnik, they struck energy facilities in Western Ukraine.
But the warning, nonetheless, was for the NATO countries. But the West isn't really taking these warnings, and it kinda has to be pointed out that the what the whole purpose why there's a warning, why they haven't struck yet is because, well, then you can't stop the escalation anymore, then it will spiral out of control. But how close are we to a massive direct war? Because once Russia retaliates against NATO, then we are at war, without any pretense of, simply helping Ukraine. So, again, I I know that the Russian are restrained so far, and there's but there's still a mounting pressure on president Putin.
And but in the in the West here, you especially in Europe, they they're very dismissive. They just see this as, you know, we we can't reward their bullying or or their threats. It's our moral obligation to ignore any any deterrents that the Russians are putting up there. So how close do you think we are to a well, not a world war, but a direct war between NATO countries and Russia by them actually beginning to retaliate? But then in other areas, we also see that Russia's going up the escalation ladder.
That is at least it's carrying out more more destructive attacks. So, again, not just well, obviously, on the energy infrastructure, other infrastructure that upholds the economic and military potential of of Ukraine. And as a good example, if I'm not mistaken, Klitschko, the mayor of Kyiv, He he made the request now for citizens. That is of Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine. If they can, they should start leaving the capital given that there's no electricity in many parts.
And, again, the whole idea is we we can't sustain this large population. Get out. And I've heard from several Russian sources, this is essentially what what Russia would like because once people begin to leave the big cities, then well, there's many benefits. One would be then the economy wouldn't work as usual, the military potential declines. But also, if Russia wants to seize Kyiv, it's much easier to do if you don't have millions of people there who could, well, essentially end up as human shields or or or be killed because this is not something well, nobody wants to see mass casualties.
So how do you how how do you assess this this efforts by Russia to to step up? Because many it it's been fair to predict this for some time. That is once Ukraine is starting to fall apart on the front lines, they would also simultaneously step up pressure in other areas. That is to knock out the economy, go after the political leadership perhaps. Again, just a theory so far, but do you see do you see this being the endgame of the Russians as opposed to trying to take out the political leadership when the Ukrainian army is standing strong because then they can simply be replaced?
Are they just tearing it down and then going after everything at the same time? Sorry. A lot of questions there.
Speaker 1: We're on the same wavelength. Just before you they you opened the statement about Klitschko, it's exactly what I was about to say. It it was dramatic. And what was dramatic about this precisely why they should leave because for a city like Kyiv with a lot of high rise buildings, they have no water. They have no electricity.
People are like or want to be modelling about this. I say, oh, it's in the middle of winter, they're cutting up. Oh, wait a minute. In the middle of summer, it isn't too too great if you have you live on the 20th Floor of an apartment building, and there's and there's no electricity. You can't get there.
So the point is they're making the city uninhabitable, which is their intention. They would as to does are they want do they want to save lives by that, to to clear out people for an attack, a leveling attack? I don't think so. What Russians have been saying for some time this goes back more than a year, when they were speaking about about revenge for the attacks on the neighboring oblasts to the East of Kharkov, which were being fed from Kharkov, that Russia should level Kharkov to the ground. And you do this by giving notification three days in advance, everybody clear out because we're going to destroy it.
So I think going back to their their most destructive dreams, Russian patriots were had no intention of killing millions of people, and their intention was to give a warning. And as we see, I think it's quite it's quite likely that that Putin gave a warning to Zelenskyy before firing the Arashnik Arashnik's. And and I'd say plural because it's not clear if there's one or several, and the other massive attacks that took place yesterday. They they can give this warning because they're confident there's nothing that can stop their their missiles, cruise or or ballistic missiles, hypersonic in particular. So I don't I think the FAA would be very happy to send another 10,000,000 Ukrainians running to Germany to make the system of relief so untenable in in Central Europe that they would have to go to negotiate a token with with Russia.
I think that certainly is in their plans. Leveling cities for the sake of leveling cities, I don't think is their intent. But to frighten people and drive them out of the country? Yes. I think so.
It destroys the economy, and it destroys Europe. Europe has no room for these for now 10,000,000 Ukrainians. And it would simply break the the social services and the medical services to have all of these countless Ukrainians showing up at our doors. So, yes, the Russians are getting very destructive. They're they moved into the China shop, and they've thrown everything to the ground.
This has been a long time coming. And it's just surprising that I think what you and I have discussed deterrence, I think we are witnessing now the revival of Russian deterrence because the the the warrior before was there or was in doubt and really deserved to be in doubt was was a will there to use the wherewithal. And what what we are seeing now in in these several actions, both the has confirmed that it happened, The seizure of the ships were made to see whether it's it's as described. But the Russians are clearly showing that they have the will to take to take on The United States in the West.
Speaker 0: Well, I've been saying this for months that we are now seeing the end of the war. And just as you see in other wars, the worst devastation happens towards the final stage. You saw this with the Germans in World War two as well. This is when the vast majority of the military casualties are afflicted. It's as the army falls apart.
This is also when the civilians becomes more exposed as well, and this is when people start fleeing their homes. I mean, it's it's very so incredibly predictable that a massive tragedy is about to play out if we don't start to negotiate in good faith with the Russians. And that means do not demand to like they did in Paris now, that you're gonna send troops after the war and set up military facilities. I mean, this is why the Russians invaded to prevent NATO from entrenching itself in Ukraine. And somehow, in defeat, our demand is that NATO should entrench itself in Ukraine.
It does it doesn't make any sense, and, you know, I made this point for a long time that this horror would start to play out soon. And, you know, I I was always told, you know, this is Russian propaganda. Ukraine is winning. But surely, our political leaders, you know, despite being incompetent and immoral, they must nonetheless see what is about to play out because, you know, for all this idea of standing with Ukraine, surely, then they must be at below all the efforts to weaponize all this fake empathy. There must be some recognition that at least for their own self interest that millions of Ukrainians fleeing into Europe at the time we we would like to start to send them back, that this is not in their interest.
It's not in our interest either, or that is in Europe's interest. I mean, it it doesn't none of this makes any sense to me. I I was yeah. Well, just taking me to my last question, though. If there is an effort to end this war, it doesn't look like we're ending it because let's be honest.
It's not as if the European country is gonna make peace with Russia and, okay, we're not gonna expand NATO. We're gonna come to some agreement with European security architecture. Instead, it seems like we're gonna go into different phase. I'm not sure we're gonna support some guerrilla tactics or what it is that they might do. But do you see an end to this war, or is it or if if we just wanna create a new face, what would this actually look like?
Speaker 1: Well, again, to divide this between what may happen or life in that and what I would like to happen Yeah. Those are things. Yeah. Which are very different things. I I think what's most likely to happen will be frozen conflict, but not a frozen conflict as we described going back a year and a half or two years by the West, that it would be like Korea, that that yes.
And then they would have their Western military installations to defend to Ukraine and so forth. No. It'll be a different type of of frozen conflict, very specific one, in which Russia takes all of Ukrainian territory East Of The Dnieper. It takes Odessa. It leaves Ukraine landlocked, and it ensures that by giving warning to one and all that it will destroy any military infrastructure, military personnel from the West that try to come in and and support Ukraine, that Ukraine must be free of any foreign military presence or or they would use a rationing zone.
So I think under those circumstances, rumpy Ukraine that is economically very disadvantaged, that is lost essentially its manufacturing industry and a fairly good chunk of its black earth because black earth is not just the rest of Ukraine. I think, temper is also partly in the Kherson and other oblasts of Novorossil. This very rather poor and degraded Ukraine will be left to itself. It will not be admitted to NATO to European Union. It's not a NATO, it's obvious, but not to the European Union, despite all of the promises of Orzhlav under land, because it will simply be too poor and too requiring hundreds of billions of euros of investment for the 27 nations to agree to it.
Nobody has the money for that or wants to have the money for it since they're all too busy remilitarizing. Therefore, it will be a very sad country, what's left of Ukraine after this is over.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well well, this adds to the to the lack of logic, though, that that if you know that they will lose a lot of territories, then this is when you end it. I mean, in 2019, as you know, the Brand Corporation had this report on how to extend over well, extend Russia that is and it it identified, you know, pretty much every country along the Russian border which should be destabilized. And this is the think tank of the intelligence agencies. But the main logic was, you know, we should send weapons to Ukraine and threaten NATO expansion because this would increase Russia's commitment into Donbas.
In this way, we can slowly bleed the Russians at least of their resources. But still, this report in the essentially, are presenting the argument why it could be you know, the counterargument, they said, well, if it breaks into a full scale war and the Russians begin to take strategic territory, then this war is no longer benefiting us. So translated into the last four years of proxy war, for NATO, it seems that it would be ideal to just have the Russians and Ukrainians fight each other if these front lines are stable and they just kill each other in huge numbers and the Russians bleed resources, that will be a good war. But once the Russians begin to win, the casualties overwhelmingly goes into disfavor of the Ukrainians, so they begin to lose territory. Then for NATO, it's a bad war.
But so, yeah, still, for the life of me, I can't understand why we're still doing this. I mean, this is the point in time you you you count your losses and put an end to it, but there doesn't seem to be any appetite at all.
Speaker 1: You know, putting an end to it would mean that those who invested all of their political capital in a discontinuation would be forced out of office. And I think there's a big contradiction between the nation the national interest and the personal interest of the of leadership in at least 25 out of 27 of the member states of the European Union. So they are they're in it for the same reason with Netanyahu who's continuing the war because the moment he stops continuing the war, he'll be going to prison. The same reason why Zelensky is continuing the war regardless of the massive loss of life of his of his his men. And that is as soon as he stops the war, there'll be an election.
He'll be voted out of office or simply be murdered. So we these are regrettably contrary the deep corruption in these societies involved where there is a a contradiction between the personal interests of leaders and the national interests of the people who put them in power.
Speaker 0: That's never a good thing. Well, not when you get rational policies, at least. So well, thank you very much for taking the time. These are crazy times indeed. Again, if if any of this would have happened during the Cold War, it would have been something that would have dominated the pages of a of the history books, but it seems to become almost daily occurrence, this kind of reckless escalation.
So thank you, and have a great weekend.
Speaker 1: Oh, you too.
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
Scott Ritter: Trump Set Up Putin & Escalates War With Russia https://youtu.be/zH5xP8GSArg https://t.co/SENuU6mzhN
Video Transcript AI Summary
Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss a series of escalating tensions and strategic assessments around Ukraine, NATO, Russia, and the United States.
- Nightfall concept and implications: The British Ministry of Defence announced a new deep-strike ballistic missile for Ukraine, Nightfall, intended to carry a 200 kilogram warhead with a 500 kilometer range to strike Moscow. Scott Ritter says Nightfall is a joke: it is still developing, with a budget around £9,000,000, no production facility, no prototype built or tested, and a target of producing 10 missiles a month at about £800,000 each. He argues the idea is not a real weapon but an underfinanced concept, and that Russia will watch with interest while the plan remains insufficient to matter.
- Britain’s strategic credibility and potential retaliation: Ritter contends that Britain could strike Moscow with such missiles only once before Russia responds decisively, potentially even with nuclear weapons. He asserts Russia resents Britain as a “failing power” and believes there is “great hatred” toward Britain among Russia’s political elite; he predicts Russia would not tolerate continued British escalation.
- Western troop commitments and feasibility: The discussion also covers the idea of sending British troops to Ukraine. Ritter asserts that Britain cannot deploy 7,600 troops nor sustain them logistically or politically; he describes the British military as incapable of a rapid deployment and notes the overall size and combat-readiness of the British forces as insufficient for sustained operations.
- The “keep Ukraine in the fight” plan: The speakers discuss the UK’s strategy to keep Ukraine in conflict as a political/propaganda effort, rather than a path to victory. Ritter calls much of Ukraine’s and Western rhetoric “the theater of the absurd” and says many actions by Ukraine are designed for propaganda rather than strategic success. He highlights drone strikes on Caspian oil rigs as demonstrative of “propaganda purposes.” He also notes that Russia’s response includes power and water outages across Ukraine and a strong retaliatory capability.
- Arashnik and Russia’s nuclear posture: They discuss Russia’s Arashnik program, noting that initial launches were treated as test missiles, with a brigade deployed in Belarus and other units being prepared for fielding. Ritter asserts that Arashnik is now a permanent part of Russia’s strategic posture, and that Russia is deploying production-quality missiles, though exact production rates are uncertain.
- Arms control and the European security architecture: Ritter claims there is a “total disconnect from reality” in Europe, asserting arms control is effectively dead. He argues Russia has advantages in intermediate and strategic nuclear forces, while U.S. forces are aging and expensive to modernize; he predicts a coming arms race with Russia holding an advantage. He is critical of attempts at extending New START and expresses belief that arms control is no longer feasible given the current political environment and U.S. leadership.
- The Alaska “spirit” and U.S. foreign policy: The conversation discusses the 2024-25 era, with mentions of Donald Trump and the CIA’s role in anti-Russian operations. Ritter argues that U.S. actions, including cyber and drone activities against Russian targets (oil refineries and military assets), reflect a CIA-led strategy against Russia. He contends that Trump’s approach has shifted over time from tentative peace prospects to aggressive posturing, and that American leadership lacks trustworthiness in negotiations.
- Intelligence and operational transparency: The dialogue touches on the May 2024 and June 2025 attacks on Russian deterrence assets (e.g., Engels base, and the Kerch Bridge operation). Ritter argues that the intelligence community (notably MI6 and the CIA) uses psychological operations to undermine Putin, but that Russia’s restraint and measured responses indicate limited willingness to escalate beyond a point.
- Toward a broader European security collapse: Ritter foresees NATO’s dissolution or “death,” suggesting that the United States will pursue bilateral arrangements with European states as NATO weakens. He predicts Greenland and broader European security would become dominated by U.S. strategic interests, diminishing European autonomy.
- On Trump’s transformation and democracy in the U.S.: The speakers debate Trump’s evolution, with Ritter arguing that Trump’s rhetoric and actions reveal a long-standing pattern of deceit and anti-democratic behavior, including alleged manipulation of elections and the undermining of international law. He depicts a grim view of the constitutional republic’s future, suggesting that Trump has consolidated power in ways that erode checks and balances.
- Final reflections: The conversation closes with a weighing of whether peace can be achieved given deep mistrust, the CIA’s alleged influence in Ukraine, and the wider geopolitical shifts. Both acknowledge growing instability, the potential end of NATO as a cohesive alliance, and the possibility of a broader, more dangerous security environment if current trajectories persist.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Welcome back. We are here with Scott Ritter, a former US marine intelligence officer and also a UN weapons inspector. So thank you for coming back on. We see now that the British Ministry of Defense has published that they're developing a new deep strike ballistic missile for Ukraine, Nightfall, it's called, with the objective of carrying a 200 kilo warhead with a 500 kilometer range so that it can strike Moscow. It seems almost as if it's foolish now to still pretend as if this is a proxy war.
I mean, Russia obviously hasn't escalated with NATO as it wants to avoid World War three, but the restraint seems to, time and time again, be interpreted as a weakness. How long do you think this can go on? I mean, the can the British bomb Moscow with 200 kilo warheads and still pretend this is a Russia Ukraine war?
Speaker 1: They can do it once, and then then the reality of their errors will be made manifest as Russia strikes British. I mean, I if the British don't think that the Russians won't attack Great Britain decisively. And when I say decisively, I mean up to and including nuclear weapons. There's no love lost between Russia and Great Britain. In fact, within the political elite in Russia, there's a great deal of hatred towards Great Britain.
The British have never treated the Russians well ever. And, you know, the Russians are sort of fed up with this failing power, failing power, approaching failed power, continuing to insert itself in the manner that's, you know, not just disrespectful, but, you know, it it it represents a a threat, not of existential nature, but a threat to Russia's national security. There there's only one piece of good news in all of this. Nightfall is a joke. It's an absolute joke.
I mean, just look at the numbers. Okay. We're told that the first of all, it's in developing. It's it's not developed. It's developing.
The amount of money that was allocated, I believe, was $9,000,000 or £9,000,000, 9,000,000, whatever currency element is attached to that. That's not very much. And when you look at the small print, they say that the goal is to be able to produce 10 of these skyfalls a month at a cost of £800,000 each. Now, I'm just a simple marine. I don't claim to be the greatest mathematician in the world, but 10 times 800,000 gets you to the about £8,000,000 mark.
And if the total budget for developing this missile is 9, do you understand how much of a joke this is? They don't even have a production facility yet. They have not built a prototype. They haven't tested a prototype. We don't even know if the concept works.
It's the British allowing their mouths to get ahead of their brains once again. Yes, the Russians, of course, will be following this with great interest. But the the idea that Skyfall is a weapon that's about to make its debut on the battlefields of Ukraine is a joke. It's not a weapon. It's an idea that's been totally under financed.
£9,000,000. Do you know what the payroll of a of a missile production line is? It's more than £9,000,000. You know, so they haven't even hired the people yet. They got a bunch of scientists somewhere, you know, with chalk, drawing pictures on a board, taking snapshots of it with their iPhone and send it to the defense minister saying we have a plan.
That's all they have. So I I don't think anybody's losing sleep over this. It's just another stupid idea from a nation of stupid people.
Speaker 0: Yeah. So another headline or article coming out of Britain by one of their generals, Richard Sheriff, who was was well, warning against some of this more aggressive rhetoric coming out of London. That is he made the point that the idea of sending troops to Ukraine was kind of out of the question because they don't have the manpower. They don't have the money. They don't have the military equipment, and also not the political will, either by the political class or the public.
So what is the point of all this escalatory rhetoric if they can't even back it up with anything real?
Speaker 1: Because we're we're in the theater of the absurd right now. This is pure theater. The British have a plan, a master plan they've been seeking to implement in Ukraine called keep Ukraine in the fight. A key aspect of that is the psychological preparation of Ukraine for sustaining a conflict that by any measure it's being decisively defeated in. At this juncture, any rational leadership having assessed the totality of the picture, understanding that there was no pathway to victory would be looking for a pathway to avoid an even more decisive defeat.
But that's not what's happening in Ukraine. The Ukrainian government in in a way that just defies comprehension, to double down on stupid and undermine whatever strategic resources it had plans, throwing away reserves and fruitless attacks for propaganda prayer because this is all propaganda purposes. Everything that's done in Ukraine today is for propaganda purposes. They launched drone attacks against luke oil drilling rigs in the Caspian Sea. They didn't destroy the rigs, but they got their video they were able to put out there.
And they have Zelenskyy meeting with the new head of the Ukrainian intelligence services talking about how we have struck deep into Russia. They not understand that the retaliation that Russia will inflict on them is going to be extreme? You know, chunks of Kyiv don't have power, don't have water and not going to get power and water restored. Much of Ukraine is in a similar fashion. The Russians just unleashed a second a second or eschnik on the Ukrainians, which, you know, given the silence of Ukraine about what happened implies that the Russians sort of hit what they were planning on hitting and getting done what they planned on getting done.
And so the British right now have to do, you know, staged actions. They meet in Paris, the coalition of the willing. They may be willing, but they're unable. I don't want to get too crude here, but you put a 110 year old man in bed with a 22 year old starlet, he may be willing, but he's not going to be able. And this is Europe.
This is The UK today. They can't perform. They're literally pathetic. 76,000 is the total size of the British military. That, you know, now you parse that down into how many of those are actually combatant troops.
And when the British are talking about deploying 7,600 troops, they can't. They don't have them. They literally don't have them. They can't deploy them. They're incapable of physically moving these troops out of The United Kingdom into Ukraine and then sustaining them.
The logistics along is beyond the capability of the British military. And when you talk about sending a force in, I mean, there are two things. One, where's your rapid reaction force? I mean, you're going to put 7,600 troops in harm's way. What happens when the proverbial bovine excrement hits the fan?
Who's riding to the rescue of these 7,000? There's no one to ride to their rescue. They'll be dead. All of them will die. But then also let's just assume that they don't die.
What's their rotation? Six months? That means you need another 7,600 training up to replace them, getting equipped, brought up to speed, which they are unable to do. These British troops are not combat deployable. They're not combat deployable.
They can barely get out of garrison. Okay. So now if you scrape everything together and you get 7,600 deployed, you need another 7,600 to replace them. And you need another 7,600 on top of that preparing, getting ready, getting your paperwork done, getting your final training done, preparing. That's how a standard rotation works.
The British can't do it. And they know it and they've been called out on it by their leadership. It's an absolute joke. The same thing with the rest of Europe. I mean, none of nobody in Europe can do this.
And now we come to the skyfall. It's a non existent missile. I'd be surprised if it ever existed past the prototype. It let's just put it this way. If you have a a missile that's 800,000 pounds, it's not a very sophisticated missile.
And you think that missile is going to actually penetrate Russian air defenses if it is produced? No. All it's going to do is make England a target. And I I don't know how many more times you have to listen to Dmitry Medvedev say, guys, it's gonna happen before it's going to happen. You have members of, the Russian Duma saying, We need to strike now with nuclear weapons.
I mean, is where this conversation's gone. The Russians now are taking a look at what The United States is doing with NATO, and they are firmly convinced, at least at certain levels, that they could strike Europe with nuclear weapons and The United States would do nothing. That The United States will not commit suicide on behalf of Europe, especially if Europe is provoking the Russian bear, to speak. It's a very dangerous way of thinking. I don't agree with it.
I actually think we would do something. I think we'd end up with a general nuclear exchange and all life on the planet would end. But Sergei Karagawa, was a very influential political thinker, famously or infamously said that The United States will not sacrifice Boston for Poznan, meaning that Russia could throw a nuclear weapon on Poznan and The United States would do nothing. So this is where we're at. Now we have the French pretending that they have a strategic nuclear deterrent capable of, of holding Russia at bay.
You have the British pretending that what's left of their strategic nuclear deterrent is relevant. And you have the Russians making the decision that Arashnik is staying, not just staying, but will be a part of their strategic nuclear deterrence profile indefinitely, means intermediate nuclear forces are now here to stay in Europe. Thank you, Donald Trump, and thank you Europe for destabilizing your continent. And it gives Russia the ability to do strategic escalation in a non nuclear fashion, which means Russia's more likely to use this weapon in the future. So, know, this is where we're at right now.
Total disconnect from reality in Great Britain and in Europe.
Speaker 0: Yeah. This project of keeping Ukraine in the fight is kinda strange that this is where we are now. There's no pretense that they can win. Just our goal is now for them to lose slower and, again, bleed out the rest of their their manpower. It's it's it's it's so dark because you know that if there was a British troops being slaughtered in this way, they would they would not have put this as an objective to keep the war going at any cost.
They would have made a deal or pulled out by now. But, again, they're fighting with Ukrainians, so I don't think they're counting their losses. But there was you mentioned the Oreshnyk, and this came in response to this attack on Putin's residence. I was wondering what you make of this because I listened to former adviser of Zelensky, Alexey Orestovich, who made the point that the real target was probably beneath these residents, which is a nuclear command center. And I thought it was interesting because, as we know, in June 2025, they they also attacked Russia's nuclear bombers.
That is its nuclear deterrent. Again, the the Russians see the British as being behind this. And, of course, in May 2024, we know that Russia's early warning radars for nuclear attack was attacked as well. And you can add all these attacks on the Engels Nuclear Airbase, but if you put them all together, there's a lot of attacks on Russia's nuclear deterrent here then. I mean, if any of these things had happened once during the Cold War, there would have been panic, red flags going up, possible nuclear exchange.
But now this is becoming a almost a common occurrence. What do you think is the thought process behind this? I mean, going after the nuclear deterrent of the largest nuclear power in the world?
Speaker 1: Well, first of all, when you put it that way, it sort of makes it look imbecilic. But let's let's back up for a second. MI six, the secret intelligence service of the British. When it comes to Russia, they are extraordinarily incompetent. Extraordinary because, I mean, we only have to take a look at the case of Christopher Steele, who was the former SIS operative agent who worked in the former Soviet Union and you know, the quality of his work.
There in the 1990s, they spent a whole bunch of effort and not so much money recruiting anybody they could. I mean, was, it was easy pickings. They just went out and recruited everybody, taxi drivers, hookers, know, politicians, former politicians, everybody. Then the Russians cracked down. And if you remember, there were some famous scenes coming out of Russia, the Spyrok, if you remember the Spyrok.
And the Russians, of course, uncovered the Spyrok and uncovered everything that was going on in the Spyrok and unraveled, you know, those networks that the British had that were functioning. The British have some deep sleep networks that they've activated. We see we saw them activate them in support of the Kerch Bridge Attack, which was a British operation. And we saw them bring it up with this operation with the drone striking the the airfield. But the British, they are very superficial here.
You see, they they their Russia house is appended to their London station and their London station is home of a bunch of anti Putin emigres. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, not Khodorkovsky, I think, the former, you know, oil oligarch who was imprisoned for corruption and then released. He's now there using his billions to work with MI6 to create this anti Putin propaganda machine. And they advise the British, they work hand in glove. And so you- all you have to do is listen to the stupidity that comes out of this former oligarch's mouth and the people around him.
And you see how it's translated into action by MI6. The belief that if you hit these targets, you will undermine the credibility of Vladimir Putin. They believe that Vladimir Putin is a unpopular dictator who rules through fear and intimidation. And that if they can expose him as weak and frail, that they will create the opportunity for these disaffected, enraged aspects of Russian society to remove him from power. So, they're the ones behind this.
This is a deliberate act to be seen as not destroying Russia's capability, but destroying Putin's reputation. That's the goal. That's the objective. And Donald Trump bought into it. This drone attack is an American attack.
It's not a British attack. It's an American attack in support of a British plan. Keep Ukraine in the fight. Let's bring down Vladimir Putin. But, you know, they they made a a fatal mistake.
They gave away the evidence. They, they, they, you know, these 91 drones that came in, many of them were of a type that made use of a specific, computer chip, that contains all the programming that's used to guide this drone. And this drone doesn't operate on GPS because GPS is of course jammed. It's pre programmed and then it has AI And as it flies in, it will occasionally take a picture and then compare the picture to mapping data that's stored and realign readjust based upon wind speed and all the, all these things are collecting and then fly to the target. To get that, the intelligence that has to be loaded into the chip has to be both extremely detailed and also extremely timely, meaning you need the most recent updates for this thing to hit the target it wants to.
This means that Palantir, this company that's running this operation on behalf of the CIA and the British to program these chips, they claimed that they make use of commercially available information. There's no commercially available data collectors out there that can collect the data that went into this. When the Russians reverse engineered the information in this chip, the timing of the information is linked now to assets that are capable of collecting during that window of opportunity. The specificity of the data, again, limits it to certain. The bottom line is the Russians know exactly which intelligence resource collected the information.
The way this data is packaged consolidate it because you're taking different sources of information and you're bringing them together into a single digital information packet. There's literally only one place in Europe that can do this, That's a Department of Defense organization or entity in Europe that supports the targeting of the Tomahawk missile because the same principles of targeting here applied. So the Russians know which intelligence assets collected the data, who processed it and packaged it and put it into this chip. So when the Russians turned this over to The United States at a time when Donald Trump was saying, there was no attack. If they did, they attacked this thing here.
The Russians said here. And by doing so, they said, we know everything. Yeah. I mean, it does, you know, the defense intelligence agency, the CIA is gonna reverse engineer a chip and go. They know everything, which means Trump will have been exposed as a liar, an absolute liar, a fraud.
A man who literally used negotiations to try and target president of Russia. Not in a way to kill him. I mean, look, drones have a long time of flight. They've redetected. This was a demonstration of vulnerability designed to create the impression that Putin is weak and that he is subordinated to Trump, that Trump is daddy to him, and Trump gets to dictate, Putin's the the the misbehaving little boy.
And the other signal it sends to Russians, including especially those who have become excited by Kirill Dmitryev's economic outreach that, hey, everything could be better if we just got these sanctions lifted. But now we can't because of Vladimir Putin. He's sort of losing it. I mean, he's attacked. He's doing nothing and all that.
You know, this is the impression to get British psychological operations, mental warfare, information operations. They do this for a living. I've actually done it with them in the past targeting Iraq. I know the office. I could take you into the headquarters and walk you up and take you to the office.
I don't know if I know the people anymore because I'm of a certain age where my contemporaries may not be in service anymore, but I know who they are and what they do. And you know, the Russians know this as well, but they're so wrong because Vladimir Putin isn't weak. And what the Russians just did, you know, that first Arashnik they used was a was a test missile. The Russians said it's operational test. Now they've gone into serial production and they have deployed a brigade in Belarus, but they're in the process of deploying other brigades.
Now these brigades are using production quality missiles. But at the time Vladimir Putin said, have a number of other Arashnik's in in, you know, available to us. Test missiles. These are test missiles. The missile that was launched against Ukraine was a, was a test arrest and it got out of Kapustin Yar where they continue to do operational testing.
Because remember, this is a weapon system that's been brought in fairly quickly. And so there's still some tests that are being done or have been done recently, but they have a stockpile of these missiles now that aren't operational quality, meaning they're not serial production. They don't have the certificates. They don't have the, they call them the passports that attach to them out of the production facility. I believe that Russia launched another one of these test missiles.
But in doing so, you know, they preserve their stockpile. We don't know what the production rate of the Arashnik is. We can guess that if it went into serial production in August and by December, they they are able to deploy a minimum of 10 missiles to this Belarusian Russian unit because you need nine for the three battalions of three launchers of three missiles each, and you need a tenth for training purposes. And, you know, so we have an idea what their production rate is. It may be greater than that because Russia is talking about simultaneously preparing other units for fielding.
But they didn't launch from a combat position. They launched from Kapustin Yar, which tells me it's another training missile. But the important thing is they launched. And if you look at the rhetoric that came out of Russia afterwards, the Urechnik is now a permanent part of Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent posture. Any hope we had of reviving arms control, for instance, New Start, which will expire next month, it will not be extended.
It's over. It's dead. Vladimir Putin talked about extending the caps associated with that. But to do that, you needed The United States to concur. Right now, there's no movement in that direction, but you also needed the political environment to be conducive to this.
And the key element of this political environment is that there was no escalation in the INF. Meaning, if if The United States deploys Dark Eagle to Europe, that's the end of it. Or there can be no deployment of Golden Dome. Well, Trump just turned the the the the defense budget he promised to cut in half. He now is increasing it by 33 per you know, by 50%, 1,500,000,000,000.0, much of that going to Golden Dome.
So the Russians have just basically said, we're done with arms control. I was supposed to go to Russia in March and April to Saint Petersburg where we were going to have a very cool exercise. Graduate level students would play the role of American and Russian negotiating teams. We would have a team of American arms control experts advising the team playing the Americans, a team of Russian arms control experts advising the team playing the Russians. And then we would go through this exercise, capture this data, and produce a deliverable that we were going to give to both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was supporting this endeavor at the time, and the Department of State as an effort to sort of kickstart to say, here's some ideas.
And there's a lot of excitement for this. That's dead. They just canceled. The Russians are like, no, we're not doing arms control anymore. It's just not going to happen.
There's no reason to even go through the motions of it. So this is a big deal. This is a huge deal. We are about to enter an arms race where Russia holds all of the advantages already. They have deployed intermediate forces that are unmatched.
They have the best strategic nuclear forces in the world, most modern. The United States is confronted by the reality that our bombers don't work, our missiles are old, and our submarines are aging out quickly. And it's going to cost us trillions of dollars to fix this problem, money we don't have. At the same time, the president's diverting precious resources to build a missile defense system, will never work ever. None of the technology in Golden Dome is proven and we can't afford it and it won't work.
But, you know, from the Russian perspective, the American actions combined with the fact that the president of The United States attempted to assassinate the president of Russia. It means that the Russians will never do anything to give away the advantages they have. This advantage that they have is what ensures that they will never be defeated. Nobody can defeat Russia because Russia has this unmatched nuclear capability. The Russians will never negotiate that away, ever.
They have overmatched in every aspect, except perhaps submarine launched ballistic missiles. But with the Poseidon now, I would say that Russia's submarine delivered nuclear arsenal is better than the Tridentine Mihds. So, you know, that's where we are. It's over for arms control. It's a very sad reality.
I don't know if we're going to survive this. I mean, this is a very dangerous time. I'm becoming somewhat despondent. I try to remain optimistic and I will continue to move forward and see what can be done to educate people. But you know, The United States is ruled by a dictator who doesn't care about international law, doesn't care about constitutional law, doesn't care about anything but his own, you know, ego driven narcissism.
And this is a very dangerous
Speaker 0: thing.
Speaker 1: Arms control is about international law, and The United States doesn't believe in international law anymore, which means there can be no arms control. So, we're into an arms race that America can't afford. An arms race that underpins the notion of peace through strength. But when the reality of your strength is that you have no strength and yet you want to continue to posture, that creates the potential for bluffing or, you know, biting off more than you can chew. And how long the Russians are willing to pay the pay play the patient game?
I don't know. I mean, the good news is that Russia loves itself, and they believe in their civilization, and they believe in the glory of their civilization. And having resurrected themselves, I don't see the Russians turning into a bunch of lemmings overnight rushing to the nearest cliff to jump off. And so hopefully, we can pray for continued patience and pragmatism on the part of the Russian leadership. But they tried to kill their president.
I mean, my god, could you imagine what the American response would be if Donald Trump was in Camp David and 91, Russian drones launched by Venezuela were launched against Camp David at a time where president Putin would say, hey, just hold on for another hour. I'll be right back. I'll call you back. Just stay right there at Camp David. I'll call you right back.
And then try to attack him. We'd be blowing everything up in the world. I mean, the fact that Russia limited their response to what they did, again, is proof positive that Russia is not looking to escalate. But how much longer we can count on Russian, you know, responsible Russian behavior is not known. There's people are losing their patience in Russia.
There's no doubt about that.
Speaker 0: Well, it is interesting, though, that well, I noticed when Trump got elected for the second time, there was some cautious optimism in Moscow. I guess the assumption or hope was that there's a century of conflict between The US and Russia could come to an end because a lot of this, of course, was communism. And then, of course, after the Cold War, it was the efforts of preserving well, essentially, the Cold War security architecture, which then revived the Cold War logic with Russia. But the idea that in a multiple world, the Russians and Americans could be actually friends, if not allies, it was appealing. Again, that that, yeah, that they could take out, I guess, the root of the of the conflict.
But the belief in belief in Trump, though, has diminished. He keeps talking about sanctions against Russia, the need to, you know, harm its economy. There's still US weapons being used against Russia. It's the CIA which operates and does intelligence. We saw this New York Times article in which the Trump had given the green light to attack Russian refineries and ships.
I mean, we already crossed the line long ago of what was a proxy war. This is very direct. And now, of course, boarding the Russian ships, which is it's very hard. You can't let this go because if this is accepted, it becomes the new norm. And now suddenly all Russian ships in the on at sea can be intercepted.
You even hear now more aggressive rhetoric from, yeah, from the Europeans saying, oh, we can also border ships. We can make it seem legal. I mean, it are we heading towards a major war here?
Speaker 1: Yeah. I mean, we are. This is very dangerous, a very dangerous period of time. Look, I was one of those people that shared, you know, sort of cautious optimism that Trump was serious about peace. I, I really did.
I knew that he had to fight the deep state, but I thought that it was Donald Trump versus the deep state. And I think the Russians believe that as well. But what we're finding out is that, you know, Donald Trump didn't just surround himself with Russophobic personalities who don't believe in not just don't believe in good relations, but actively seek to destroy Russia. Scott Bessen, the secretary of treasurer, he wants- he believes that he can bring Russia to its knees, that he can physically destroy the Russian economy. And he wants to do that.
He is supported by members of Congress. Lindsey Graham is one of them. I just thought that, you know, that was, you know, Trump saying, okay, speak loudly and, you know, we'll keep the pressure on the Russians until we get this deal and then I'll come in and fix everything. But it appears that no, President Trump has been behind this, this economic strangulation plan forever. That everything he was doing with Russia was, was a lie.
It was a setup that Alaska was never meant. I thought can I my mind gets blown sometimes? Julia Gaganis was the former National Intelligence Officer of Russia Eurasia back in 2016, and she honchoed the 2017 intelligence community assessment that said that, you know, Donald Trump was colluding with the Russians to steal the election in 2016. She knew it was a lie. She doctored the intelligence.
And then when it looked like she was going get called out, they put her into a, you know, sort of a semi retirement. They gave her a she was still a CIA officer, but they put her in one of the think tanks in Washington, DC. Well, she was pulled out of that think tank shortly before she was pulled out. John Ratcliffe, the CIA director underwent an emergency whitewashing. He, I guess, had found out that Tulsa Gabbard was getting ready to release the Gates report and other reports that would expose the deception and criminality of the intelligence community in manufacturing a case against Trump regarding Russia.
So, he published a five page declassified memorandum that basically gave Julia Garganis a clean bill of health. This is a woman who's on record saying, hate Donald Trump. I want to bring Donald Trump down. But he whitewashes her and she's on the airplane briefing Donald Trump on his way to meet Putin. I used to think that was just a big mistake.
I now believe that Donald Trump knew that this was a lady who hates Russia and that he- Donald Trump has won the CIO over by telling him, no, no, no. I'm not a Russian asset. I'm Russia's worst enemy. I'm Russia's worst nightmare. Tell me what I need to do to set Putin up.
I believe Trump went to Alaska to set Vladimir Putin up. And how do you set him up? You use Kuril Dimitriv. You create this artificial notion that sanctions can be lifted. And when they are lifted, it's going to be a glorious economic renaissance for Russia and The United States.
And then what happens is Putin buys into that, comes back and they start holding meetings. We wanna revitalize oil production in the North. Oh, well, let's call the mayor and the governor. You guys get a committee together and tell us what we need to do. What are our number one priorities?
And people start planning about the better times they're going to come and they start spending that money before they have it. And what you've done there is you've carried out mental warfare and you've created a fifth column inside Russia of people who are now anticipating the lifting of sanctions, which are never going to be lifted by the way. But then Trump says they're not going to be lifted because of Vladimir Putin. He's the one. I'm not happy with Putin.
I think Putin's the problem. I think Putin's this. And the idea is to create a wedge between Putin and the political and economic elites who are now you know, enthralled about the potential lifting of sanctions. That's what Donald Trump did. Radcliffe, he didn't carry out these The New York Times article came out at an interesting time because it was timed literally for the assassination attempt against Putin.
I believe the article may have had a different headline and and some paragraphs that were removed because I think the article was, hey, look what we did. We're the CIA. We were really doing this all the time. And then when it failed and the Russian found out, they changed it, but they didn't change the article. The CIA had to openly collaborate with the New York Times for this article.
This is highly classified information. The idea that the CIA is enabling Ukraine to strike Russian oil refining capacity in specific components in there, the precision necessary. And the CIA is doing this at a time when the president is talking about the spirit of Alaska. It means it's a setup. It's a lie.
There was never a spirit of Alaska. The CIA is at war with Russia today. At war with Russia. The CIA is killing Russians. Scott Besson's secretary or department of the treasury is at war with Russia to try to destroy the Russian economy.
Marco Rubio is at war with Russia seeking the isolation. Remember Rubio is dual headed, and this is where the ultimate nefariousness comes in because he can be the secretary of state and say, Hey, we're all for diplomacy. Remember his little snide comment? Hey Sergei, how are doing? Like he's friends with Sergei Lavrov.
He's not. He hates Sergei Lavrov. We know he hates Sergei Lavrov because he said he hates Sergei Lavrov. He hates every Russian, but he's pretending that he's diplomatic. Then he goes and puts on his national security advisor hat, where he's not accountable to anybody but the president.
And he's the one who green lights the CIA attacks. It goes through the national security advisor. The CIA goes through him. The treasury department goes through him. Rubio is running this anti Russian campaign as the national security adviser.
So Donald Trump's been a liar from day one. Day one. And I think the Russians are waking up to this reality. Of course, the Russians are pragmatic. And as Lavrov said, we won't end negotiations or discussions with the Americans.
They never the Russians never fully walk away, but they're going nowhere. The Russians can't trust these people at all. I mean, if they do trust these people, then you have to question, you know, are the Russians really as capable as everybody says they are, including myself? You can't trust The United States. You can't trust Donald Trump.
And now you layer this with people who, I mean, the whole boat thing, to show you how stupid people are, you know, the reflagging of this of this boat this, this, this tanker, I think it was a Ghanian ship or no, no, Gyanian ship, maybe you know, it reflagged in process, not illegal not normal, but not illegal, but the Russians used a process that only has legitimacy in Russian territorial waters. It's sort of a domestic law kind of thing. It doesn't really apply to ships on the open sea. In fact, the law of of the sea, you can't have a dual flag ship. The the the flag that the ship set out on is sort of the flag it has to be.
If it changes flag, then it has no flag. So the Russians set themselves up on this one. It wasn't wasn't a good move and the Russians themselves have sort of admitted. That's why Russia's been quiet. Everybody's like, why is Russia quiet?
Because they're weak. No, they messed up. They they reflagged the vessel in a way that is unenforceable. But the problem with this is that Europe and The United States are picking up on Russia's non reaction as a sign of weakness. And now they're talking about going against actual flagged Russian ships.
That would be a fatal mistake because the Russian Navy will intervene. The Russian Navy had- the Russians are very legal. The Russian Navy had no legal authority to intervene on behalf of this alleged Russian reflagged ship because there was no legitimacy to that ship. The ship actually didn't have a flag now because of what had happened. But that doesn't mean that the Russian Navy won't intervene if you go after a Russian ship.
And now you got the British say, well, we're going to change our laws so we can board ships. You have the Danes saying we're going prove the Americans that we're really important members of NATO and we're going to board ships. You have the Norwegians wanting to board. Everybody wants to board Russian ships now. Russians are going to kill you.
Kill you. How stupid can you be? Well, it's a rhetorical question because we know the answer. Very stupid.
Speaker 0: Yeah. I think this the past thirty years of simply having or more than that, wars being something fought far away from home and only the adversary takes major losses, I think this is gonna come to an end. I think it impacted their carelessness in terms of provoking a major war with Russia now, but it does seem that's where we're heading. So the negotiations, you mentioned that only fools would now believe in the Alaska spirit. So the the negotiations were faked over.
Is there any do you see any pathways to peace anymore? Because I I keep thinking about it. And even if you have a peace agreement, how can you possibly dislodge the the CIA from Ukraine or the MI six? Or by definition, they they wouldn't but they wouldn't be deceptive, I guess. So it's just hard to see how any deal would be able to encompass what the Russians demand.
Speaker 1: Well, first of all, the idea that Russia is gonna make compromises, I think is mooted. I can't speak on behalf of Russia. Nobody can except the Russians, so they can do whatever they want to do. But I do study Russia, and I study past patterns of behavior, and I recognize that when the Russian president commits to something publicly, that's generally what's Russia's committed to. And, you know, the Russian president's committed to terms and conditions that must be met for this conflict to end.
And I don't see him making any compromises on that. The other thing about a compromise, it requires trust. Russia can't trust anybody. None of the actors on the other side of the table are trustworthy. None.
There was some thinking that The United States could be and that Russia could lean on The United States to lean on Europe. But The United States is actually not only, you know, not trustworthy. They're at the center of this. They're the ones planning the anti Russian actions. So, would say that as long as Donald Trump is the president of The United States, there's no prospects of peace whatsoever through negotiation, that the Russians will continue to go through the process just to keep lines of communication open.
Remember, the Russians didn't have lines of communication open with the Biden administration. And I think one important element of conflict avoidance is talking. And so I think the Russians are keen on keeping the lines of communication open only so far as it supports continued communication to avoid avoidable conflict. But you have and the other good news it's not good news, but I mean, it's big picture good news. Guess NATO is about to die.
I mean, rapid death. You know, this is The United States is going to make a move very soon on Greenland. Hopefully, it won't be violent. But I mean, if the Danes and many Europeans that want to be deployed there think they're going to they don't understand the people that are getting ready to come to Greenland. Trump is tasking the Joint Special Operations Command to come to Greenland.
Okay. They just kill. Look what happened to Maduro Security Force. No effort to take any prisoners. They just rolled in.
They killed everybody. They aren't going to be, you know, sitting there crying tears of, you know, of sorrow. Oh, the end of NATO. They have a mission. They've been given a mission.
They're going to plan the mission. And when they come rolling in any Dane stupid enough to lift his weapon against him will be killed on the spot along with everybody else. But you know, we are close to having The United States militarily occupy Greenland, a NATO ally. And that'll be the end of NATO. That's, and that's the other good news because this complicates greatly.
You just saw the European, the, the, the, forget, I can't remember his name, sort of a fat old man, the head of, you know, defense, for the European union. He's sort of their defense advisor. I mean, sort of sorrowful to watch him. The United States, he said, is withdrawing from the security of Europe. Who will secure Europe?
I thought that was Europe's job. But but Europe can't defend itself. So the good news is the, all the, you know, to have theater like the British have been doing, you have to have a stage, you know, there has to be a setting. The setting is collapsing. NATO is going to die a very, hopefully not a violent, but a very sudden death.
And Europe has no plan B, none whatsoever, zero, no capacity. And we're going to be seeing the collapse of Europe because what Donald Trump does better than anybody else is he will divide and conquer. As NATO dissolves, as Europe collapses, there's gonna be countries desperate. And Trump is gonna reach out and go, we'll have a bilateral relationship. We'll do a bilateral relationship with you.
And next thing you know, The United States will build a European security architecture that Europe has no vote in. It's all gonna be based upon a bilateral relationship between, you know, baby boy and daddy. And that's the direction we're heading. So old Chinese curse, may you live in interesting times. We've been cursed very heavily because these are extraordinarily interesting times.
Interesting, not in a good way, interesting in a deeply disturbing way, but interesting nonetheless.
Speaker 0: I'd always hoped that NATO would be able to reform into some inclusive pan European security architecture where we sought security, yeah, with other members instead of against nonmembers as an alliance. But I I think it's it's just way too late. I think yeah. Well, I agree with you. He did it should probably just die.
This is it's beyond reform now. Just as a last question, though, and I I do think we're heading that direction with NATO, by the way. But, yeah, last question, how how do you make sense of this transformation of Trump? I the the new Trump, the one that bombs Venezuela, backs genocide in bombs yeah. Yeah.
Venezuela, but also Iran backs the genocide in Venezuela, will now conquer Greenland, it seems, and, of course, determined to defeat Russia. All of this, it's so contrary to the Donald Trump that runs for president. Now everything is about war. Again, he was gonna he was gonna scale back the forever wars. Now he needs a $1,500,000,000,000 military budget.
He was gonna he was worried about going bankrupt. Now, you know, he can't spend money fast enough. America first has been turned on his head. Now it essentially means America will, you know, fight wars to gain its greatness back. I mean, none of this was was what he was speaking of during the during the the campaign.
Again, he was mocking Biden for bombing Yemen, I think, and, you know, now what's the difference? So how do you make sense of this? Because it's he, you know, he fueled a lot of optimism among many people around the world that that he kinda recognized that, okay. Now it's either the American Republic or the Empire. Let's save the Republic.
This was at least the the logic I was, left with. But now he is no. Not anymore.
Speaker 1: The republic's dead, and he just killed it. And he he said he killed it. Look. He said he doesn't believe in international law. I have to remind the president, although it's a stupid reminder because he's ignorant of these things, that international law what he calls international law is the United Nations Charter.
And the United Nations Charter is a treaty obligation incurred by The United States when the president of The United States signed it and it was ratified by two thirds of United States Senate. Constitutionally, it becomes the supreme law of the land. So, you can't just disregard international law. You can't disregard the Charter because to do so, you're disregarding the constitution. But the president doesn't care about the constitution.
The constitutional republic is dead. The constitutional republic mandates three separate but equal branches of government. And the president is running roughshod over Congress and the judiciary has been tamed. You know, maybe there's some fight left. We saw Congress just pass a war powers resolution, but I don't think Trump is going to pay much attention to that because he doesn't care if Congress impeaches him.
He does. You know, the the resolution didn't pass with sufficient votes to override, you know, to to guarantee, you know, conviction at trial. And so I I this president is a carrier. You know, he said the things he said to get elected. There's no doubt about that.
This is what was very attractive. This is what brought the RFK junior and Tulsi Gabbard independence over that 12 to 20% of the vote that brought him over, you know, to to to to victory. That now there's talk that he is basically seeking to manipulate how America votes, that he is going to cook the books. He's going to steal an election, steal a midterm election to guarantee that he remains in power. Our country is physically occupied by stormtroopers who operate above the law, who are not afraid to murder American citizens in broad daylight.
This whole ICE invasion and occupation of major American cities is again fundamentally unconstitutional. And it it it's it doesn't meet anybody's vision of what a constitutional republic looks like. The president today is a is a de facto dictator. He is a dictator, with no law. He says that he doesn't need international law.
He relies upon his own morality. Well, given the Epstein files, I I think we need to question his moral moral character. I mean, given the fact that this man has lied openly to the American people and to the world. And today he is the most war hungry president ever. And there's, I mean, maybe Andrew Jackson, back when he was taken on the Cherokee Nation was as war mongering.
But this this president, you know, he he is Orwellian in in everything he does. What he says, the exact opposite is the truth. He wants the Nobel Peace Prize because he's the world's greatest warmonger. And that's where we are today. And the American people may find out that they by ceding so much trust, confidence, and power to this man, they've taken away their ability to, you know, rectify the errors of their way.
It was always the possibility in American democracy that we could vote the guys out. But if Trump takes over, continues to use ICE as a as a vehicle of intimidation and occupation, and starts gaming the system to guarantee an outcome in the midterm election, we don't function as a constitutional republic anymore.
Speaker 0: Oh, it's, it seems like he disappointed a lot of people. And, again, this is the tragedy because he seemed to have had his finger on the pulse. He realized, you know, where the where the country was going wrong, where the world was going wrong. He recognized the weaknesses, but also the opportunities in terms of how, you know, saying, well, it would be a good idea to get along with Russia. Something simple.
And and, of course, I mean, this is one of the diseases we have in NATO where I hear European leaders say, well, we can't do that. That's something Putin would want. But, you know, at some point, you want the opponent to to have some security as well if you want security for yourself. But he he seems to be on just, yeah, spot on on a lot of these things. But, yeah, this new Trump.
Well, I don't
Speaker 1: think it's a new Trump though. I think what we're seeing is he's been a liar the entire time. You know, he treated the American people like a love interest. He said all the right things. He sent us flowers.
He gave us nice perfume on our birthday. He never missed a holiday or event. He was there for every important event in our life. My God, we fell in love with this guy. We like, look at the attention he's giving us.
He has to be sincere about wanting a long and fruitful relationship. And then as soon as we got married, it turns out he had a mistress the entire time. That mistress was war and power and narcissism. This is all a plan that he's been operating on. This isn't a new Trump.
This is Trump. This is what Trump did. And the American people have every right to feel deceived, but we're now we're trapped in a relationship we can't get out of. I mean, I I hope that the American people come out and vote in the midterm and do what needs to be done to limit the power of this madman. But if he's gonna start cooking the books, if he's gonna start manipulating the system, you know, Stalin, I think said, it doesn't matter who votes.
It matters who counts the votes. And I think Trump's gonna be the guy counting the votes and the vote counts gonna be you know, and here's the irony again that this man is such a liar that he's going to do to the American people the exact thing that he accused Joe Biden of doing in 2020. He's gonna steal an election. And I I the twenty fifth amendment couldn't come quick enough in my mind.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Just watching him give us well, two times speech telling how Maduro killed millions of people, which doesn't make much sense. But, yeah, we feel to be very post truth at this point. Anyways, we ran out of time, but I wanted to thank you so much for taking time as always. I know you must be incredibly busy.
So, yeah, thanks again.
Speaker 1: Well, thank you for having me. It's a I think it was a good conversation.
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
Richard Sakwa: The Deep Roots of the Ukraine War https://youtu.be/LzftxR-Q6DA https://t.co/XQUey967JJ
Video Transcript AI Summary
Richard Sakwa, a professor of politics at the University of Kent, discusses the Ukraine war, diplomacy, and the deeper roots of the conflict across four to five interlinked levels, emphasizing how shifting narratives and power dynamics shape the path to peace.
- Current phase and diplomacy: Sakwa notes that Europe is shifting from a war-framed narrative (unprovoked invasion, good-versus-evil) toward recognizing mutual security concerns and engaging in diplomacy. He cites the evolving European appetite for diplomacy, referencing past proposals (Kirill Dmitriev–Steve Witkoff peace framework) and recent 20-point peace plan, which Moscow finds unacceptable in full. He highlights that Washington and European capitals are now planning to engage Moscow more substantively, with the battlefield still central for months, before durable diplomacy can take hold. He frames this as a liminal moment where deeper root causes must be addressed if negotiations are to succeed.
- Four to five layers of roots: Sakwa articulates a multi-layered framework to understand the war’s origins.
1) Internal Ukrainian layer: He contrasts two visions of Ukrainian statehood since 1991. The monist vision posits a primordial Ukrainian nationalism that can shed Russian (and Polish-Lithuanian) colonial legacies to reveal an inherent Ukrainian state. The alternative “Russo-Ukrainian” vision (the book and concept he has developed) portrays Ukraine as pluralistic, tolerant, multilingual, and multi-confessional. Moscow’s demand for denazification and protection of linguistic and cultural rights sits within this frame, illustrating a core domestic-divide issue in Ukraine.
2) Russo-Ukrainian interstate/intercultural layer: Sakwa emphasizes a mimetic dynamic (citing Rene Girard) where proximity and shared space between Russia and Ukraine fuel intense conflict, rooted in their shared East Slavic, Orthodox-leaning civilizational space and long entwined history. This layer explains why hostility persisted for decades and why nationalist tendencies in Ukraine resist rapprochement with Russia.
3) Intra-European layer: He argues we must go back to 1945 and beyond to understand postwar arrangements. The post-1990s “Atlanticist” settlement—NATO and EU leadership shaping Europe—marginalized Russia, fueling security dilemmas and NATO enlargement. He suggests that the Cold War’s end did not produce a pan-European continental unity; instead, European powers reinforced a Western-centered security order that contributed to the current conflict.
4) United States–Russia superpower layer: He describes a deteriorating US-led framework where attempts to manage Europe and Russia were compromised by changing US policies and leadership (including Trump’s unpredictable positioning). The envisaged peace by “above” (grand bargains among great powers) has faltered, revealing a weakened Western-led order and fragile strategic coherence.
5) Civilizational and new security architecture layer (potential fifth): He mentions a broader civilizational struggle narrative (Russia versus Western liberal order) and the possibility of shifting toward a post-Western Russia that remains European in identity. He also notes discussions about building parallel institutions (BRICS, SCO) as alternatives to Bretton Woods and a more plural security order, including the idea of a pan-European, post-American European security framework.
- Civilizational and identity dynamics: The dialogue highlights decolonial tendencies in Ukraine, cautioning that portraying Russia as an imperial relic risks domestic and international instability (purging culture, language, media, and political parties). Solzhenitsyn’s observation about Russians and Ukrainians being both brotherly and destabilizing is invoked to illustrate the double-edged sword of deep cultural ties. Sakwa argues for a nation-building Ukraine that is distinct from Russia while not being anti-Russian, to avoid inflaming internal and regional security tensions.
- European strategic trajectory and a post-American Europe: The conversation critiques ongoing European war-centering and NATO expansion, warning that a divided Europe risks becoming dependent on the US and vulnerable to external powers, including China. Sakwa advocates a pan-continental vision—potentially a North Eurasian confederation—rooted in UN Charter norms and multilateral cooperation, rather than renewed bloc confrontation. He fears the United Nations system itself is deteriorating under great-power politics, as seen in US withdrawals and the politicization of international bodies.
- Outlook and optimism: Both speakers acknowledge a subdued optimism about small openings for diplomacy but remain broadly pessimistic about rapid resolution. Sakwa emphasizes the need for new ideas and a reimagined security architecture, warning that the current trajectory risks prolonging conflict and deepening divisions.
In closing, Sakwa stresses that diplomacy is on the agenda but remains uncertain in its effectiveness, with a wary prognosis for a quick end to the war. The discussion underscores that resolving Ukraine’s crisis requires addressing deep-rooted structural issues across Ukrainian internal politics, Russo-Ukrainian relations, European security order, US–Russia dynamics, and broader civilizational narratives, while pursuing a cooperative, rules-based international framework.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Welcome back. Today, are very privileged to be joined by Richard Sakwa, a professor of politics at the University of Kent, also a prolific author and the best Russia scholar we have here in Europe. So thank you for coming back on.
Speaker 1: It's my pleasure. Thank you for your kind words.
Speaker 0: Well, the the Ukraine war now appears to be coming to an end, and this forces the Europeans to change the narrative a bit. We even saw chancellor Mertz changing his rhetoric that seemingly lays the ground to restore diplomatic ties. He made, for example, the point that Russia is a European country. We have to engage with it. So I think this is important because this war, as we know, has been fought both on the battlefield and also with narratives.
So if you wanna keep a war going and boycott diplomacy, then, of course, you have narratives like an unprovoked invasion, which is good because then negotiations become essentially appeasement that rewards aggression, and peace has to be achieved on the battlefield. But when you're losing the war and it's time to put an end to it, then you need diplomacy, then need recognition of mutual security concerns. So one would expect a shift away from these narratives of a fight between good and evil where you can't negotiate. So we may therefore have an opportunity to end this war actually through diplomatic means, and toward this end, it's a good opportunity then to discuss the the deeper roots of the Ukraine war if we're gonna solve the root causes, which the Russians keeps demanding. And lucky for us, you just finished the talk with that exact title that is, yeah, the deep roots of the Ukraine war.
So I was wondering if you can, yeah, flesh out your arguments because to understand how we got here, and it's a complex one, both on the as a division of Europe between, yeah, between NATO and Russia, but this also has a a issue, of course, between Russia and Ukraine, but also within Ukraine. We have this third layer of deep dividing lines within Ukraine. So I was wondering if you can yes. That's a very large topic, but if you can unpack your argument.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Sure. But before doing so, can I just say that you you you know, you hopefully we are coming to the end of the war, but I'm not entirely convinced about that? I think that, you know, to quote Churchill, we are at the end of the beginning, but unfortunately, I'm not entirely sure that we're at the beginning of the end. We're suddenly into a new phase.
We're into a new phase in which I think the European powers, in a very sort of confused and contradictory manner, are beginning to a little some chinks of reality are entering into their calculations.
Speaker 0: Very quickly, I do think, may maybe I sound a bit more optimistic than I am. I do still think that this is gonna be resolved on the battlefield, but Yeah. But this was the first ray of sunshine after still demanding that Russia pay reparations and all of this. As we're moving away from this, I think, as the narrative shifts, this is allows us or enables us to do many more things. If we're allowed to discuss their security concerns, at least diplomacy can progress.
But, maybe I overstated my optimism, but
Speaker 1: No.
Speaker 0: No. You're absolutely right. Please go ahead.
Speaker 1: Yeah. No. But you're absolutely right. We are into a new phase, in which diplomacy is astonishingly on the agenda of the European powers. If you remember a couple of years back, well, a year and a half ago, when there was a European council meeting, Robert Fitsow from Slovak Republic, said that he was astonished in the whole discussions.
There was never any suggestion that the European Union and its leaders should engage with Russia. And when Viktor Orban, who was at the head of the was chair of the European Council for the 2025, I think, diplomacy, he was severely ostracized. But yes, think the beginning of 2026, the European leaders are beginning to understand. However, if you remember in autumn, we had the 28 peace plan, was the Kirill Dmitryev Steve Witkoff proposal, which had a lot of it was a framework for good discussion. And of course, the European powers and Zelenskyy immediately mobilized, and as you know, in the early days of 2026, they have outlined now finally adopted a 20 peace plan, and this 20 peace plan still contains so much which is simply unacceptable to Moscow.
And so where we are now is that, Witkoff and Jared Kushner are planning to go to Moscow. And I think there has been some resistance in Moscow even to even to welcome them because, clearly, Laviev and Putin always say we're open for diplomacy, but they're saying, look, we're going around in circles. What's the point? We come to something, you come over, we talk, we end we outline our core issues, you go back, and it's completely blocked when it comes to European powers. And Trump is very volatile as we know.
So it literally is a loose cannon swiveling from one side to the other. So so that's where we are. Unfortunately, I think the battlefield is where the main action will be for the next few months until finally we may get to some serious diplomacy, not just amongst the Western powers, but engaging with Moscow more substantively. Anyway, so that's just to set the where we are now. But as you say, everything where we are now has deep roots.
I've been arguing that there are at least four, possibly five, layers to this conflict. I'd just say that the first one, obviously, is the internal Ukrainian one. Now we can formulate it in a number of different ways. I've been suggesting that there were two models, two visions of Ukrainian statehood after 1991. There was the, what I would call, the monist vision.
This is the idea that there's been some sort of primordial, very interesting word, primordial vision of Ukrainian nationalist nationality and even statehood since the beginning of time. All you have to do is to shed, to cast off the accretions of Russian colonialism, and indeed earlier on, it was Polish colonialism as well, Polish Lithuanian dominance. But it's like Michelangelo's David. You just cut have the marble and inside you have this fantastic, marvelous statue inside and all you had to do was cut off the the excess marble. This is completely false vision of how states develop, but it's it also misapplied the vision of post colonialism.
Now as far as I understand it, post colonialism is all about hybridity. It's how that states develop in, you know, in complex relationships. You can call it imperial, colonial, or whatever, but nevertheless, they are changed by this interaction, whereas the primordial vision suggests that you can get rid of it all. The alternative is, and this is to whom I've dedicated the book, the Russo Ukrainian War, follies of empire, to the other Ukraine. This is the vision of Ukraine which is pluralistic, tolerant, multilingual, multi confessional, generous.
A lot of the monist people, those who believe in, you know, deep Ukrainian nationalists, also tolerant and pluralistic, so one mustn't entirely make it too stark a contrast. But in ideal terms, we do have this vision and that in Russian demands that is now represented or it's given the terminology, the denazification of Ukraine. I think that's a very poorly chosen term because it it very much simplifies the elements, though it does deal with that issue of intolerance and lack of pluralism, involved in the society. So that is clearly one of the key demands that linguistic and other rights should be respected. That's the first level.
The second level is precisely the Russo Ukrainian relationship, very specifically an interstate, but also an intercultural relationship. Now one way in which we could look at that is through, you know, all sorts of theories, but the way I'm wanting to go, if only I had more time, is to focus on it as, you know, through the prism of mimetic theory, Rene Girard, who says that basically two states or two people well, he gives the example, for example, a lord and a serf. Now a serf usually would be in conflict with another serf because the distance between that serf and the lord is just so huge, and lords would then be quarreling amongst themselves. Whereas so in other words, the closer you are, the more liable you are to have these conflicts emerging. And, of course, Russia and Ukraine occupy a very similar, I'm not saying the same, very similar civilizational cultural space.
East eastern, well, eastern Slavic, Orthodox, and a shared history, of course, most of the country. And hence, this memetic geography is so intense, and this helps to explain in part why Ukrainian nationalists believe that as an article of faith, they have to distance themselves from Russia, and this led to this very particular relationship right from the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. And, of course, this goes back to the nineteenth century. So that's the second level, and of course, we could talk a lot about that in this memetic vision. I think it's important, and that that helps to explain why until 2022, the depth of hostility, which was a type of both countries in a sense where this narcissism of small differences, not to negate the substantive issues, but nevertheless, that was part of it.
The third level is this intra European one. Here, we've come we completely messed up. And here, we have to say, you talked about the deep roots. We need to go back not just to 1989, '91, the end of the Cold War, though that's important. We have to go back all the way to 1945, and in many ways, this war, so Ukrainian war, is putting elements and items back on the agenda that were not solved and resolved in the early postwar years.
For example, there's been a lot of discussion recently about Germany and that after 1945 and Potsdam, implicitly, the idea was and which the Soviet Union returned to many times afterwards, that the idea was then to have a demilitarized neutral Germany in the center of Europe. If that had happened, that there wouldn't have been a cold war. There wouldn't have been that division of Germany. The whole politics would have changed. And then you'd say, well, why did we have the original Cold War, which was then reproduced in new forms after 8991, the collapse of communism, the end of the first Cold War?
Well, you could say, and this is where I always argue, that we had two failures. One, the emergence of what I would call the political West Laviov and the Russians love to talk of the collective West, and the Western powers love to talk about the transatlantic alliance, this very powerful body which has dominated for eighty years. So in other words, the postwar settlement after 1945 was an Atlanticist settlement which subordinated and failed to establish a genuine pan continental unity. After 1989, the end of the Cold War, Gorbachev's common European home, Mithyrion's confederation of Europe, all these ideas were effectively saying, okay, let's rethink 1945, instead of which we just got more of more of the same, which is NATO and European Union putting itself forwards as the single the singular body which can represent all of Europe, which of course marginalized Russia, which led to the security dilemma, NATO enlargement, and the war. So that's the third level, and of course, the fourth one is United States, US Russian superpower relations, and paradoxically, we thought, and we talked about peace at the beginning, that we thought that peace could come from above.
In other words, that Russo US could, with Trump and put him personally, working together, establishing a framework which is then, well, partially imposed, but hopefully by consent, on the European powers and indeed a settlement within the Ukraine itself. Unfortunately, it looks as if The United States under Trump, even though he put questions on the table, returned to and asked questions that should have been asked in nineteen forty five, forty six, and again in nineteen eighty nine, ninety one, he's put them on the table. Unfortunately, Trump does not have coherent answers. It does mean that the old political West, the old Atlantic power system clearly is on its last legs. That's for sure.
Russia and Moscow and indeed other countries thought this was a great opportunity. Of course, the European powers in Kyiv regard that with huge alarm, but clearly things are moving and changing. So as we said, yes, we are in 2026 has opened with a bit of a bang and there's a lot of moving elements there. So we're in another sort of liminal moment just as we were in 1945, as we were in 1989, 2026 looks as if it's gonna be one of those dates.
Speaker 0: I very much agree this whole idea of a decolonial identity. It's very dangerous because what it means is it views the Russian element in the Ukrainian identity as being a foreign imperial relic, something to get rid of. This is, of course, problem domestically and and abroad because well, we saw this. If you're gonna shed if you're gonna embrace this idea as they did after 2014, then you have to begin to purge the political parties, purge the culture, the religion, the media, language, and across the board. And I I often cite Solzhenitsyn.
He was making the point that this close connection between the Russians and Ukrainians were a double edged sword, because for some Ukrainians, it was the source of brotherhood with the Russians. But for most of the western Ukrainians, it was the exact opposite. It was what prevented them from being completely sovereign. Because if you essentially want people, then why would you be a separate state? So I I always agree that it would be good for Ukraine to develop as a as a nation building project to be distinctive from Russia.
So this is Ukraine. We are different, but not anti Russian because then you trigger both domestic issues as well as international security issues. It would be a bit like Russia decoupling completely or de Tatarizing. I mean, you can't just get five hundred years together and cut it off and pretend as if, you know, after after all this year, it has to be included into the more inclusive concept of what it then means to be Russian. You can't cut off these other groups.
And but with the Russian, it's also it's more complicated because as you said, whatever relationship they have with the ethnic Russians or Russian speakers in Ukraine, this impacts the relationship with Russia and also makes them more vulnerable to being exploited by foreign actors. Because I think that as if Ukraine well, if you have foreign elements, be it traditionally the Germans or the Americans or British want to create a Europe, which is more de Russified, then you're gonna align with these more nationalist elements within Ukraine. But how do you see the interaction, though, between these different levels? How do you I mean, it looks if The US and Russians can make some kind of a deal, it makes it easier to sort the other issues, don't it? Doesn't it?
But but but, like, a nationalist government in in Kyiv doesn't only seek NATO membership. It would also seek to purge the the Russian culture out of the historical Russian lands, which is also not acceptable. So how how do you see this, working together?
Speaker 1: Yeah. That's part of the difficulty, in fitting it all together. It's like a Rubik's cube when it's so hard to get affaced altogether. And of course, all these issues, interact with each other. For example, The United States, and explicitly Spigniew Brzezinski back in the nineteen nineties in the grand chessboard, where he said that them they've worked assiduously.
The US embassy in Kyiv has worked assiduously to exploit the divisions within Ukraine to facilitate and empower one constituency as part of the attempt to contain and marginalize and, well, even humiliate, if you like, Russia. And so there's been a lot these level of course, now when The United States has changed its tune, they no longer well, we don't know what Trump's doing because he's playing he also is quite deceptive in all sorts of ways. For example, the drone strike or whatever it was towards Valdez, the 91 drones in the January were clearly, you know, with facilitated by The United States one way or the other. So, but, yeah, it's a fundamental question, how do these things all fit together? And it's, you know, I separate them purely for analytical purposes, otherwise, you know, in a sense to say that these are the threads.
You know, other approaches to it would say, well, you know, these levels are a bit mechanical and we could name other levels, one of the fifth one, for example, would be this larger the way the war is presented as a larger civilizational struggle, the Russian barbarian hordes to the East. And that, of course, brings us back not just to the 1945, the eighty years, postwar years, but then to the larger question, which I do think is fascinating, and a lot of Russian commentators like Sergei Alexanderich Karyagarnov, for example, focuses on the five hundred years of Russia's difficult relationship with Europe and that this civilizational conflict, and of course many in the West, Biden explicitly said it was a war for civilization, again, for the rules based order was one manifestation of it, but more widely, the Western culture, the rule of law, and so on against the Russian despotism. These are exactly the civilizing mission, and Macron has talked about it as well. It's a repeating nineteenth century visions of empire fighting against, visions of empire which have not died. And of course, commentators like Karagunov do argue that ultimately this war is an opportunity for Russia precisely to define its identity, to give up this five hundred year false attempt to become a European power, though he himself is ambiguous.
So the way I would say it is that we are seeing the emergence of a post Western Russia, but not a post European one. And because just simply geography won't you know, Russia is a European power. It's also an Asian power, a Eurasian power, but it's their neighbors. So well, and I speak as a European and I've always argued that we do need and as a as one of the last goalists in England to argue that we do need to have a pan continental vision, one form or another, some sort of political community because, as you well know, in Russia, we have a 145,000,000 citizens who are, you know, obviously a huge diversity of people, the Buryats and many, many others, but ultimately their culture is European. They have a common sense of cultural orientations, well, I'm gonna put it multiple religious faiths, so I don't want to emphasize the Christian, but certainly a highly Christianized culture amongst other religions to be respected, of course, just as Europe has to face that as well.
So in other words, the civilizational dimension is both exacerbating, but ultimately perhaps provides a framework for that peace which we so much desire.
Speaker 0: Yeah. This but then I can understand why the Russians now demand to resolve all the underlying issues. But as I said, the underlying the root causes, they go so far back. And if if especially if you look at the geopolitical dimension, you know, Dostoevsky was writing writing in the eighteen hundreds that the the goal in order to divide Europe and contain Russia, he wrote that the the goal of the English is to make the Slavs hate Russia as much as they do. And then, of course, in in World War one, you you saw the Germans presenting themselves largely as liberators of of of different Slavs then, but particularly the the Ukrainians because they argued, you know, well, we were gonna liberate you from Russian rule, but every historian recognizes that what they indeed wore was just to take that part of the world and decouple it from from Moscow and put it under German German Serb influence instead.
So, example, the way the World War well, World War one didn't end, but the the Russian German deal of or the treaty of Brest Litovsk, that was seen as well, essentially, what what's what's NATO was going for today. We and you saw the same thing in World War two. The the Nazis were then approaching the Ukrainian nationalists saying, well, we also empathize with your, you know, your struggle for freedom. They also present themselves as liberators. But in reality, this is for being a German dominated region.
And then, of course, we had the Orange Revolution back in 2004, also supposed to put pull Ukraine out of the Russian orbit into the EU orbit, which is German led, and again, do the same thing in 2014. So we do the same thing over and over again. It looks either, you know, we accept that Ukraine is part of the Russian orbit, but I don't think that is reasonable, at least not anymore, given the how public sentiment has shifted in Ukraine, or it becomes a bridge instead of some kind of a frontline. But then it then you need some pan European security system that that that actually, yeah, doesn't make Ukraine a frontline, which would be good for its economic development, its ability to, you know, respect all the people who live within its borders. But but but how can you break this cycle?
Because no matter what peace deal we get out of this, the the animosity will continue. The the the idea of, you know, the Russians being essentially our primary other, that is our main outgroup, all of this will likely continue for quite some time. So how do you actually deal with the root causes here?
Speaker 1: Yeah. As you say, the root once you start dealing with the root causes, you find it's a very, tangled web of interlocking conflicts and ideas which are repeating. One which way we can break this endless cycle, and as you say, cycle isn't just this last ten years, it's even the last thirty odd years since the end of the Cold War, or even that cycle since 1945, and it goes way back into the nineteenth century, the Crimean War, and so much more. But I'm arguing that, well, as you say, we maybe don't know how to get there, but usually after a war, if you're going to have some sort of enduring peace, you do need to have some new ideas on the table. Now what we haven't even got to the first stage yet, that's why I say we're only at the end of the beginning, is that where are these new ideas?
Instead of new ideas, we have a European Union and most of the European powers doubling down on war fever, if you like, this virulent eugosophobia cancellation of Russia, which even The United States is finding excessive, JD Vance, Hegsef, and others, not always because not because they love Russia, but because they'd like to focus on China, which is perhaps the only new element in all of this. In other words, they perpetuate a vision of international politics, which has to be conflictual spheres of influence, as you suggest, that either if Ukraine isn't a bridge, then it becomes a barrier and so on. Luther would need to, as it were, a classic negotiating technique is that you move, you escalate up if you like, and try to look at the picture more widely, more broadly, which is what I think we have to do. So the first element of that is to generate a new debate about you talked about a pan European security system, yes, but that will only be a reflection perhaps of some larger pan European community, political community. Now it seems absurd to be even talking, even thinking about it at this moment, but it's precisely in the darkest days of a war that we do need to start thinking the unthinkable.
How do we get there? I don't know. But that's where the second leg comes in because the danger in all of this at the moment is that this war, this it's another, it's a European civil war and of course, is what Trump's the Trumpists see it as, by the way, more and more, is that this endemic European civil war, and indeed in much of the global South, it is seen as yet again another war of the global North, and that's why so many countries in the global South want nothing to do with it, and they haven't joined the sanctions, and they just say, look, these ridiculous Europeans, they had one world war. Wasn't that enough for them? So they had to have a second, and now they want a third.
Well, guys, we don't want anything to do with it. But that then takes us to the other huge danger today, and that is to the United Nations based charter international system. Already we see Ukrainians trying to effectively to exploit it as far as they can, but ultimately to say to denigrate it, to smash it, to destroy it. And of course, the Israelis do as well. They have nothing but contempt.
We've seen that Trump just in the early days of 2026, pulled The United States out of, what was it, '56 international organizations. So The United States is defecting not just from the political West, its Atlantic alliance system, which many people would welcome to say it's time to put NATO to bed. It served its rather disruptive functions very well since 1989. But what we now need to do is to, you know, to also is he's defecting also from the charter international system, which The United States did so much to establish in 1945. That is catastrophic in my view.
We have many Russian commentators arguing that it's time to build parallel institutions, maybe the BRICS, Shanghai Corporation Organization, alternative financial institutions to the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank, IMF. Well, that's perhaps, you know, one way in which you could try to break out from this very vicious circle in which we just you know, for four years of war, we've just been repeating the same thing over and over and over again. Since 2014, repeating the same issues over and over again. Since 1989, oh, who was for NATO enlargement? Who's against it?
Oh, the Eastern Europeans wanted to join NATO. How could we stop them? This sets banal, bankrupt sort of thinking. We need to think about international politics in a new way, and this is where peace movements, where peace thinking is so important. This old classic American style international relations, which is all about power politics and so on.
Well, you know, somebody would say that humanity is facing so many challenges, and now it's stressed, just challenges, environmental and others, but also opportunities. The technological achievements in recent years are, you know, fantastic. The fact that we can sit here and talk on this machine is just unbelievable. It's it's science fiction. And yet what do we do constantly?
We squander the opportunity. And now the Europeans want to spend the next decades only arming, our magnificent foreign minister Yvette Cooper was in your country in Northern Norway, yesterday calling for massive new defenses up in what was it? Kirkenes, as we would say in English. She was up, I think, up there the other day, you know, and of course, we've just sent a huge military force to Greenland, all of one soldier to defend it against our ally. But this is just this is just so you know, we're we're getting to a level of farcical politics.
Speaker 0: In the Norwegians, we sent twice as many soldiers to Greenland as England, so we sent two.
Speaker 1: Okay. Well done, Matthew.
Speaker 0: It's no. It's not very impressive at all. But but I'm wondering if you're a bit hopeful about the new international distribution of power, though, because now that well, in the past, at least from a perspective of political realism, when when the power is concentrated in Europe, you assume that the competition between the European powers would result in them, well, as, you know, dividing the world among each other. So it kinda didn't make sense. You can have this, yeah, fragmented Europe, but still being the center of the world.
But now that the distribution power has shifted dramatically away from Europe, and this is quite evident also, well reflected in the national security strategy of The US, that is how little regard it has for Europe, how the relevance of it. But in in such a Europe, we we can't really have afforded these dividing lines. We're not the center of the world anymore. So if if if we have a divided Europe today, it's not even not even after World War two where The US will essentially try to build up the frontline states, and it will be you know, it can be in a good position. Instead, the divided Europe is one where the Western Europeans become too dependent on The US, Russia becomes too dependent perhaps on China, and this allows The US to begin to, I guess, convert all of this dependence, be it economic or security dependence into massive loyalty.
So the Europeans have to do everything they're told, I mean, and only becoming weaker and less relevant. So you would think that if there was ever a time for Europe to try to, yeah, well, do as the charter of Paris for a new Europe in 1990 stipulated, that is to have a Europe without dividing lines, you see now that at least the distribution of power favors it. Because after the Cold War, I can see why we went for the hegemon. That is the Europeans team up with The US, and we can have collective hegemony. You know, if the Russians would have joined the common Europe, then it wouldn't have brought America in in the same way.
So it it wouldn't have been a system for for collective hegemon. So there was a strong incentive there. But today, the the the unipolar order is gone. I just don't see the same well, from a structural perspective, I don't see the same incentives anymore to keep Europe divided as it was in the past. I mean, from my perspective, the redividing Europe was a price we paid to keep the Americans, know, present and focusing on Europe.
But if the Americans are deprioritizing it anyways, why why are we making an enemy out of Russia? It doesn't really make any sense.
Speaker 1: Indeed. And worse than that, we bandwagoned and spoiled relations with China to some degree. They're now trying to mend their fences, but because The United States in 2018 started the tariff war, Europe then paused the investment treaty which we've been working on for years and so on. Indeed, it doesn't make sense. What we do see now clearly is a decoupling of the Atlantic power system, but as you know, European strategy is to see this out to try to, as it were, placate the demonic energy of Donald j Trump and hope that in 2028, some new leader is elected and normality is restored.
So I don't see that there's any much strategic thinking much beyond that, except in one rather deleterious respect, and that is to build up a European army. Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, is now arguing that Europe needs to build up itself as a military power, which of course, I mean, it may be it's sensible in all sorts of ways if it was done in a positive sense to say that Europe needs to stand on its own feet and to become an independent agent. But what is Europe? United Kingdom has left. Norway is not in, but, of course, it's very close to to Europe.
But it's it's not this European Union that I think is one of the lessons of this war, that on a functionalist level, some of those elements of the European Union will be reproduced in a in a new format. But this European Union is quite clearly going to you know, we don't know how this war is going to end, but I think it's going to end badly. It's really ending badly for NATO. It's been discredited and such like, and I think also for the European Union. That's why I think that we need to start thinking what sort of Europe do we want after this war, and the one that we want is the one that was on the agenda in 1945 and the one that was on the agenda in nineteen eighty nine-ninety one, and that is, as you imply, a pan continental vision.
And of course, it would be a post American Europe, but not an anti American one. We'll work with The United States. Who wants to be in conflict? Again, it will be maybe genuinely going back to that normative foundations of the European Union, which is as a peace project. But at the moment, Europe is reconstituting itself, this post American Europe as a war project, a war to a long war, as they say, as Marc Rutte and others have been warning, against Russia for the next a generational war.
And indeed, they say in Britain, a a war a whole society war, which means of course, what they mean by that, you need to have internal repression. Some of us have really felt the harsh blows from that respect, the censorship and so on. This is a catastrophic way. So what this is why I think it's so important to outline an alternative, and that is a genuine progressive pan continental vision. It'll be hard.
And within that, a rump NATO, a rump reconstituted European Union will play a part, but we need to have something you know, a North Eurasian confederation would be my way of arguing this one.
Speaker 0: I keep hearing the rhetoric that, you know, we well, we have to keep the alliance systems and the anti Russian block alive because well, look how necessary it is because of Ukraine. But this was, again, the two different logics of of of of the role of NATO. Did it is NATO well, would NATO become more relevant because now we see the threat of Russia, or would it discredit itself for actually provoking a war? And, you know, it's hard to point out that the frontline states, which we claim that we have to protect, be it the Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, all of these countries are being crushed or or who may be crushed as a consequence of reviving the block politics. It's I
Speaker 1: I
Speaker 0: I just I have a genuine problem in understanding why the British, for example, are taking the lead as well as other Europeans in in doing this generational struggle against the Russians. What exactly is it? Why? I mean, why again, the the Russian objective since the end of the Cold War was to find a common a com create a common Europe, and they warned against expanding NATO as this would redivide the continent, recreate the logic of the Cold War, this whole zero sum competition over the shared neighborhood. And everyone recognizes Russia didn't put any claims to Ukraine before the the coup in two thousand fourteen, but thereafter, they they responded in this way.
It's just it's very strange to me to I I don't see a cohesive argument being presented in terms of why the whole imperial argument that, well, Russia's just this imperialist wanting to swallow territory, rebuild the Soviet Union. Well, this wasn't the case the day before the coup in Ukraine in 2014. I mean, I think you're the one who wrote in one of your books that NATO is now a security organization that exists for the purpose of dealing with the conflicts that derives from its own existence. I I mess up the language, of course, but more or less, that was your point.
Speaker 1: It is. Yes. Indeed. I mean, if Russia wasn't simply about territorial expansion, imperialist expansion, then it could easily have annexed or taken over the Donbas well, but in those seven years, between 2014 and 2021, it didn't. It hasn't absorbed, even though plenty of books, by the way, say that Russia has taken over Abhazia and South Ossetia.
It hasn't. It's recognized them as independent states. Of course, that perhaps to be negotiated with Georgia in due course. But the larger question, why? Is a is a question which we really have to focus on.
You you there's all sorts of answers to that. The first one is, you know, the psychosocial one, is that you have a totally degraded elite. Certainly, in The United Kingdom we do. Just look at the our leaders and all the top political parties. All you're repeating thoughtlessly the same militaristic, militant talk, except just a very few exceptions who are no longer in parliament mainly.
So you could put then you have this larger, you know, within that framework, which goes back to the, for example, Anglo Russian rivalry before the evolution, Crimean war, and all the way back. But there's a lot of counter evidence as well that, you know, Russia when Tony Blair, right at the beginning in the year 2000, when Putin came to power, it was quite clearly that, you know, there's an attempt to reset and Putin came on a state visit. So there were elements, but of course, then the Anglo American invasion of Iraq spoiled all of that, and of course, then Libya and ABM treaty and everything else. So there's, if you like, the psychosocial approach, there's the historical approach of Russophobia, there's it's really or or even you could say there is this. You could yet again go back to Rene Juga, this sort of mimetic rivalry between two representations of modernity, that Russia will always have its own civilisational distinctiveness, and that is to be welcomed just like the British distinctiveness is its own.
And of course, my specific argument after 1945, all of this, you know, we were allies in the war, of course, that all of this is because of the element of US hegemony, which had attempted to dominate after 1945. Didn't immediate. By 1947, this hegemonic project had taken shape. Right? That it was gonna dominate Western Europe, and we know that Dulles brothers are quite cynical and ruthless in imposing that, both one in the State Department, one in the head of the CIA.
So it was quite clearly that they were going to dominate Western Europe, and this is why you didn't get the unification of Germany, in in a positive sense, so you got the negative unification. And of course, 1989 was, we know, we could now see, these were negative revolutions because they have not the the countries this is why the bitterness of a country like the Baltic Republics, like Lithuania against Russia, is that the one of the failures of the European Union is that instead of transcending the logic of conflict, it has actually facilitated and amplified it. So there's, you know, many elements there, but you have no beginning. Way back in 1990 or was it 1991, I was at the political studies association conference, our British political science association conference, and Landsbergis, who was a leader of Lithuania at the time, Vittatis, I think, Landsbergis, it was a long time ago, gave us the keynote speech. And I remember the delegates, there's a very large body, 500, 600 political scientists.
We were shocked at his language, his violent racist anti Russian language. This is nineteen ninety, ninety one, where Russia had facilitated the independence under Yeltsin of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. So it was just astonishing. Where did this come from? And of course, these were the hidden demons, and these demons, instead of being slaughtered, they're being fed and nurtured.
And we have, you know, leading scholars from Estonia and someone talk about memory of politics, for example. All it boils down to is we hate Russia, that we have to have memory of politics to make sure that no one ever forgets this, and that the and we must then use all instruments at hand, and the Poles go along with this, to destroy the historic enemy. Now as I've been arguing for a long time, you know, my father was Polish. He he nearly was one of those, the cohort captured and taken to Klatyn. He met the Soviet forces on us as a Polish army reservist, on the 09/17/1939, and yet he never had the bitterness.
He he understood the larger issues and, you know, maybe that's why I am what I am because, yes, he understood how awful things were. You know, Katyn, the murder of nearly 24,000 Polish officers in cold blood. But, you know, his you know, if we don't digest his history, then we're doomed to repeat it. And unfortunately, we are repeating it in an even worse form than anything ever before.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, yeah, that is the problem when it becomes when you see one side being right, one is wrong, or good or bad, then whenever you have a form of unification in general, it's it it it doesn't harmonize the two sides. You know, the the Germans had the same discussions. That is when the West and East of Germany unified, the the assumption was always, well, the Western part got it right, so let's just discard all the stuff from the East. But, you know, the in in Eastern Germany, there wasn't only, you know, cloudy skies every day.
They did have other things. But I I want to to ask about this the the distribution power, whether you think it can Right. Help us now. Because, again, in when Russia was the largest power or you can call it an an adversary, you such as was in the nineteenth century to British or the twentieth to, well, the political West, then there's a natural in in incentive there to balance off the Russians, and then you embrace all the required ideologies which portrays them as everything you're not. But but in the under the current distribution with China being the larger power and even overtaking the American economy in terms of purchasing power parity already twelve years ago, you know, you would have an incentive then to not push Russia away.
This was even the Germans and the French before 2022 had this logic. Let's not push the Russians too far away because then they end up with China. And indeed, now you see part of the idea of Trump seems to be inspired by the advice of Kissinger, who made the point that, you know, you don't put these two Eurasian giants together. Like, let's you know, China is the big one. You should get the Russians on our side of the ledger, and then but, you know, so you have the incentives there in terms of power.
Yeah. But we're not we're not doing anything. It's all the things we knew wouldn't work or what's most dangerous, that is to go to war essentially against Russia, we we did all of these things anyway. So it's very hard to see it as only being about power politics because there is something more profound there in terms of, yeah, the the the hatred of well, I, yeah, would use the word hatred of Russia because it's been ongoing for so long.
Speaker 1: Just say, in Washington, of course, there's a big debate. You have the Eldridge Colby school of thought, which is very much focused on China, and as the main adversary, and this was reflected in part by the National Security Strategy, and then you have the Montlubios and others who are still fighting the Cold War, certainly vis a vis Cuba, but also vis a vis Russia. So you you but then in other words, you have a debate going on in Washington of the sort that we're not even beginning in London or Paris or Berlin yet, Brussels, in the way that you suggest. Because, yes, the world has moved on. Europe is marginalized.
It just it's it's lost its firmness of the ally. Even whoever is elected in 2028, we can't go back to what it was before that, you know, and even then before, there were always tensions within the Atlantic power system. And, yes, the balance of economic and indeed political authority is moving. You know, it's a multipolar world. It genuinely is.
And, you know but, of course, multipolarity take operates at many different levels. At the power level, yes. Definitely China is now emerging as as a separate power. But of course, that's one reason why there's so much effort to delegitimate it and so much work to say that this is a despotic communist dictatorship, and pointing out the deficits and deficiencies in that system, which of course are there. So yes, multiplarity ultimately, and this is where I would, you know, pitch my wagon, is really a normative vision based on the United Nations charter.
Today, a 193 sovereign independent states in the United Nations, and we powers need to work, and I use the word comedy, that work together too. And that was what the initial idea of the five permanent members in the Security Council was that they would have a special responsibility. It wasn't just a privilege to have this permanent veto power, but the responsibility was to work and try to work together to solve global issues and to work together. And, of course, what we saw at the end of the Cold War, after the end of the Cold War, is that you have France and The United Kingdom almost always voting with The United States and taking the lead with it. So you've got a block of three.
Also, the British have managed to take over the secretariat and manipulate it. You now have the United Nations General Assembly chaired by, you know, you couldn't make it up, under Lina Beerbok, a virulent Russophobe, which is undermining the credibility of the General Assembly. Of course, they have to respect the views of the global south, but nevertheless, through agenda setting for the sort of motions they put and and such like. So in other words, the catastrophe today is that the international system, the United Nations, has become an instrument of what you could call it a new Cold War, an instrument of great power politics and contestation rather than a forum for the settlement of these disputes. So we're in a very dark place and and it's entailing the destruction of the greatest achievement which we've had in the last eighty years, that is the United Nations, not just as an institution, but as an idea, an idea that we find peaceful ways, a way of working the normative foundations and of sovereign states working together.
So it isn't just West failure, it's West failure plus sovereign states working through internationalism, multilateralism within the framework of the United Nations and its norms. So that is what we're now that's even worse. Perhaps the worst thing what we're losing now is that we're losing that spirit of 1945.
Speaker 0: Well, can just put it in a wider context, though, that all historical efforts to create an inclusive security architecture, one that actually reflects international law, one where you seek security with the other members instead of against nonmembers. In other words, if you wanna distinguish between a collective security architecture and an alliance, is whether you have the Concert of Europe or League of Nations or the United Nations. It's always the threat that the that group that the countries will begin to group into alliance systems that is little exclusive blocks, and then the loyalties to that block will go beyond that of the collective security architecture or translate into current institutions that will put NATO head of the United Nations. And, well, this is essentially what was done, especially since '99. So but as we wrap up, do you have any final thoughts of optimism, or do you think, as you said, we're going to a bit of a dark place?
Speaker 1: No. I I I'm actually started this year very, very pessimistic, and unfortunately, I think that I can't see in particular because of the looking at it from a European perspective, there's almost yes. The leaders are now saying we need to actually have diplomacy with Russia. Well, isn't that amazing? That diplomacy you actually talk to in peace talks, actually, you talk to the other side across the table.
So there's certainly a tiny glimmer of understanding that we need to move towards a new dynamic in these peace talks to bring an end to this awful war. This awful war, which just last Monday exceeded in length what the Russians called the great fatherland war, the great patriotic war from 1941 to 1945. But unfortunately, for The United Kingdom, the second world war lasted five and a half years. So I have a feeling that there's still some ways to go before we get towards some sort of resolution. So I'm very pessimistic.
Speaker 0: Well, being allowed to argue for diplomacy without being smeared, censored, and canceled, I guess that is a positive development, but we're setting the bar a bit low. Nonetheless, yes, something something appears to be going in the right direction. But, yeah, share your pessimist share your pessimism as this has been a very rough start to 2026. So thank you very much for taking time.
Speaker 1: My pleasure. Thank you.
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
A fascinating conversation with the former CIA Director for Russia Analysis, George Beebe. How will the U.S. adjust to a new world order, and why is Europe failing so spectacularly? https://youtu.be/JN1kJTcz59Q https://t.co/XthB63MuUZ
Video Transcript AI Summary
George Bibi and Vlad discuss the United States’ evolving grand strategy in a multipolar world and the key choices facing Washington, Europe, Russia, and China.
- The shift from the post–Cold War hegemonic peace is framed as undeniable: a new international distribution of power requires the U.S. to adjust its approach, since balancing all great powers is impractical and potentially unfavorable.
- The U.S. previously pursued a hegemonic peace with ambitions beyond capabilities, aiming to transform other countries toward liberal governance and internal reengineering. This was described as beyond America’s reach and not essential to global order or U.S. security, leading to strategic insolvency: objectives outpaced capabilities.
- The Trump-era National Security Strategy signals a reorientation: U.S. priorities must begin with the United States itself—its security, prosperity, and ability to preserve republican governance. Foreign policy should flow from that, implying consolidation or retrenchment and a focus on near-term priorities.
- Geography becomes central: what happens in the U.S. Western Hemisphere is most important, followed by China, then Europe, and then other regions. The United States is returning to a traditional view that immediate neighborhood concerns matter most, in a world that is now more polycentric.
- In a multipolar order, there must be a balance of power and reasonable bargains with other great powers to protect U.S. interests without provoking direct conflict. Managing the transition will be messy and require careful calibration of goals and capabilities.
- Europe’s adjustment is seen as lagging. Absent Trump’s forcing mechanism, Europe would maintain reliance on U.S. security while pursuing deeper integration and outward values. The U.S. cannot afford to be Europe’s security benefactor in a multipolar order and needs partners who amplify rather than diminish U.S. power.
- Europe is criticized as a liability in diplomacy and defense due to insufficient military investment and weak capability to engage with Russia. European self-doubt and fear of Russia hinder compromising where necessary. Strengthening Europe’s political health and military capabilities is viewed as essential for effective diplomacy and counterbalancing China and Russia.
- The Ukraine conflict is tied to broader strategic paradigms: Europe’s framing of the war around World War II and unconditional surrender undermines possible compromises. A compromise that protects Ukraine’s vital interests while acknowledging Russia’s security concerns could prevent disaster and benefit Europe’s future security and prosperity.
- U.S.–Europe tensions extend beyond Ukraine to governance ideals, trade, internet freedom, and speech regulation. These issues require ongoing dialogue to manage differences while maintaining credible alliances.
- The potential for U.S.–Russia normalization is discussed: the Cold War-style ideological confrontation is largely over, with strategic incentives to prevent Russia and China from forming a closer alliance. Normalizing relations would give Russia more autonomy and reduce dependence on China, though distrust remains deep and domestic U.S. institutions would need to buy in.
- China’s role is addressed within a framework of competition, deterrence, and diplomacy. The United States aims to reduce vulnerability to Chinese pressure in strategic minerals, supply chains, and space/sea lines, while engaging China to establish mutually acceptable rules and prevent spirals into direct confrontation.
- A “grand bargain” or durable order is proposed: a mix of competition, diplomacy, and restraint that avoids domination or coercion, seeking an equilibrium that both the United States and China can live with.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Welcome back. We are joined today by George Bibi, the former CIA director for Russia analysis and currently the director of grand strategy at the Quincy Institute for responsible statecraft. So we'll definitely leave a link in the description as this is an excellent publication to follow as well. Now thank you for coming on. I I really wanted to discuss with you or ask you about America's grand strategy because, well, it seems to be requiring some shift now.
Because after the Cold War, it seems The US pursued a strategy that could be defined as a hegemonic peace. So I think on one hand, if there's only one center of power, then there wouldn't be any great power rivalries, so it would essentially mitigate the international anarchy as no state or even group of states could even aspire to rival The US. But I think it was also the assumption that if The US was had global primacy, then it would be expected to also elevate the role of liberal democratic values, which many then expected to fundamentally transform the international system. So, anyways, a lot of critics of hegemonic peace pointed out already back in the nineteen nineties though that The US would eventually exhaust its resources and encourage some collective balance balancing such as BRICS. But, you know, irrespective of how we now assess this hegemonic peace, it seems like an undeniable fact that this reality is gone.
That is there's simply a new international distribution of power. And for this reason, The US has to adjust, to, well, to some extent, at least. And I was wondering how what your take on this is. How can we understand the American position? I mean, what are the hard strategic choices The United States have to make in terms of, well, can't balance all the great powers because this would end up very unfavorable for The United States?
Speaker 1: No. I think you're you're exactly right. I think you've done a good job of describing that old order, during the post Cold War period, that unipolar moment. It was inevitably going to be temporary. The question was how long would it last?
And I think The United States during that period undertook some objectives in the world, some ambitions that were far beyond its capabilities. Not only did we aspire to that hegemonic peace, we thought that our security and world order depended on the transformation of other countries internally, on liberalization, on a transition from authoritarianism, from communist rule, to Western style liberal governance, and that The United States could facilitate that. We could roll up our sleeves and get involved in the internal affairs of other countries in such a way that we could reengineer them socially and politically and make them look more or less like The United States. And that was way beyond our capabilities. And I would argue not at all essential to order in the world or to The United States own security and prosperity.
And classic description of a situation where your objectives far outpace your capabilities is foreign policy insolvency, as the old American commentator Walter Lippmann once put it. And I think that well describes the situation that we have found ourselves in recent years. We are in strategic insolvency. We tried to do things in the world that were beyond our capability and not very closely matched to our own national interests. So we're now in a correction.
And I think the new Trump national security strategy that was published a few weeks ago is an indication that we are reorienting America's goals in the world. We are now recognizing that we do have finite resources and limited capabilities. And in that kind of situation, have to prioritize what's most important. And the strategy essentially says determining what's most important for The United States has to begin with The United States itself. What matters to our own security, to our own prosperity, to our own ability to maintain Republican governance in The United States?
And our foreign policy priorities ought to flow from that. And so you are seeing what I would call a consolidation or a retrenchment of The United States and its ambitions in the world. We have said, look, what's most important begins with geography for The United States. And this is actually something that throughout history all great powers have essentially regarded as axiomatic. What happens in their immediate vicinity and their immediate neighborhoods is more important as a matter priority to them and their well-being than what's happening in distant locations in the world.
And so The United States is returning to something that America's founding fathers would have regarded as completely uncontroversial. What happens in the Western Hemisphere, in our immediate neighborhood, is most important to The United States. And then we proceed from there to say, Okay, beyond that immediate neighborhood, what else matters? And I think the next most important thing, as listed in the National Security Strategy, is China. And then Europe and then other parts of the world.
So this is, I think, a fundamental redefinition of what matters to The United States and how we are going to match our objectives in the world with our actual capabilities. Now, there's a lot more to it than that. But this is fundamentally different than the last thirty years in US foreign policy. It is a recognition that the balance of power in the world has changed. We're now in a much more polycentric world.
We have other either peer or near peer rivals that we can't simply defeat and we can't transform into some version of The United States. So there's going to have to be a balance of power. There's going to have to be some balancing of interests. And we're going to have to think hard about how we define our goals and how we amass enough power and leverage so that we can reach bargains, understandings with other great powers that protect our own interests, but also don't cross red lines of other great powers, which would be a formula for a great power conflict, which I think would be disastrous for everybody involved. So this is a real transition for The United States.
It's going to take several years for this to work out. And it's very likely to be messy. These sorts of transitions are seldom smooth. Things happen, friends, foes, they have their own interests to pursue in all of this. And so the challenge is going to be managing this transition in a way that doesn't spin out of control.
Speaker 0: You and this massive shift to world order will happen after a great war. So it is it will be interesting to see if this can be done peacefully or not. Well, as we look at the world today, it doesn't seem very peaceful. But but often the the criticism of The United States in Europe is it seems to be organized around the idea that that is only about America's intention that has changed. That is perhaps Trump doesn't care about democracy as much.
They they focus less on the capabilities of The US to essentially continue the same strategy as in the past. But how do you see Europe adjusting to this new world, though? Because it's there's very little discussion about how the world changes. It it could be, in all fairness, that Trump, he has a tendency to suck the oxygen out of the room. So all eyes are always on him.
So I think they often don't recognize the the wider shift in the international distribution of power, which is forcing some of these changes. But how do you see Europe adjusting?
Speaker 1: Well, I think Europe is not adjusting very well to this point. Absent the forcing mechanism of Donald J. Trump, I think the Europeans would still have their heads in the sand and pretend that everything can just continue as it has for the last thirty years, where they can essentially outsource their security to The United States, focus on economic prosperity and the ambitions of the European Union, deepening the integration within Europe, broadening the membership of the European Union, trying to spread European values throughout the neighborhood. But that is an approach to things which is anachronistic. It is not recognizing the realities of the world as it is today.
The United States cannot afford to continue to serve as the security benefactor of Europe. In a multipolar order, The United States needs partners and allies who are force multipliers for The United States, who add to our capabilities in attempting to counterbalance other centers of power in the world. And it requires an ability to conduct diplomacy proactively, not just to protect one's own interests, but to ensure you understand and respect the interests of great powers that aren't in direct conflict with those of your own. And right now, isn't capable of doing that. It can't provide for its own defense.
It simply has not invested in the military capabilities that are required to play a much more active role in providing for its own security. It doesn't have an ability to conduct diplomacy, quite honestly. It issues pronouncements and directives, but diplomacy involves actually engaging with other powers. Right now, the European Union is not capable of talking to Russia, not even sitting down and talking. That's a major liability in a world where that kind of diplomacy is becoming essential.
Absent that kind of diplomacy, you are going to increasingly be subject to great power conflict. So in a world where The United States has to be concerned about counterbalancing China, counterbalancing Russia, Europe has to play a part in all of that. It has to be increasingly one of the poles in an emerging multi polar order. That would be actually a strategic asset for The United States, to have partners in Europe that are capable of playing that role. Right now, Europe is a deadweight.
It drags The United States down, not just in terms of spending in military responsibilities, but is actually a net liability in our own ability to talk with, engage with Russia, and to counterbalance China. So those things have to change. And Europe, I think, is lagging behind in its recognition of the ways that the world has changed and the requirements that it is now facing to adjust to the changes in the world. Now, Trump is, I think, engaged in a process of trying to push Europe toward making the kinds of changes that The United States believes are necessary. Part of that is increasing military spending, enhancing Europe's own military capabilities.
But that's a smaller part of it than actually healing itself internally. Getting healthy politically and societally. Believing in yourself. One of the requirements of conducting effective diplomacy is self confidence. An ability to understand where your own interests are, understand where you can compromise, and have enough self confidence to feel secure in compromising on those things where you can compromise.
And secure enough to stand up for things that you have to stand up for. Right now Europe can't do either of those things. It can't stand up for its own self interest. And it is so fearful of Russia, of its own shadow, I would say, that it can't actually compromise on things where it should be able to compromise and where compromise is necessary.
Speaker 0: So to summarize, in a multi polar world, The US needs allies who are forced amplifiers. The Europeans have become cost or a liability, and, yeah, the weak can't defend themselves, can't even do diplomacy. Is this more or less what defines their competing positions on Ukraine? Because, again, in in Europe, the rhetoric about The US and Ukraine is very shallow. It's a lot of catchphrases about, you know, we stand with Ukraine.
The the Americans are not standing with Ukraine. No one really contests what standing with Ukraine might actually mean and how it's supposed to be yeah. What what it's supposed to achieve. Again, you dis discussed the whole concept of strategic insolvency. But is this the main dividing line the way you see it in terms of why the Europeans and the Americans don't see eye to eye?
I mean, our misunderstanding, if you will.
Speaker 1: Well, I think that is a big part of it. Yes. I think Europe is trapped in its own paradigm. Its belief that this is a replay of World War II, of Nazi Germany and its expansionist aggression, and the belief that that expansionism has to be resisted by force or it will continue. And that in turn is a concept about what the war in Ukraine is about that actually precludes compromise.
And you don't compromise with Nazi Germany. That only encourages more aggression. You don't appease. But the implication of that is that this war can only end in unconditional surrender. That the path forward is to win, to defeat Russia altogether, and to dictate to Russia the terms of a settlement.
And that's an entirely unrealistic ambition. It is not possible to achieve that. The Ukrainians have already shown that they can't drive Russian forces off of Ukrainian territory. And it's, I think, should be uncontroversial to note that you're not going to drive a nuclear power to the point where it surrenders unconditionally. So I think this paradigm for understanding the war in Ukraine is flawed, both in its understanding of why this war began, but also in its prescription for ending it.
So the Europeans have to escape from that concept. They have to recognize that this war from the start has been an escalation spiral, a tug of war over Ukraine's geopolitical fate that can only end in compromise if it's not gonna end in disaster. And the sooner we reach that compromise, a compromise that understands and protects Ukraine's vital interests, but also understands that Russia has security interests at stake here too, that have to be respected. And putting together a compromise that both Russia and Ukraine can support in which both sides make concessions to the other, but both sides' core national interests are respected. That is still possible.
In fact, I'm optimistic that we're relatively close to finding that kind of compromise. But it is not detrimental to Europe. In fact, it is vital to Europe's future security and prosperity. And the Europeans are some Europeans understand this, but far from all. That's not the dominant way of understanding things in Europe.
But I think Europe has got to grasp this if it's going to find a way forward. Now, are other issues at stake between The United States and Europe. Part of them have to do with politics. I think there has been what I'll call sort of a liberal progressive approach to governance in Europe among most European leaders for quite some time that The United States, under the Trump administration, regards as self defeating for Europe, that it is, in fact, undermining the sources of good governance and stability in Europe over the long term. And that's an issue that is also in play between Washington and various European capitals right now.
There are also issues over trade, issues over internet freedom, freedom of speech. These are complicated things. And The US does have a stake in those issues. When Europe, in the interests of internet governance, bans things online, prohibits certain kinds of speech online, that inevitably affects Americans because the internet doesn't respect geographic borders. If you ban things in cyberspace in Europe, you're inevitably banning Americans and American entities in ways that affect US interests.
And we're going to have a say in that. That's inevitable. So these are things that are going to have to be worked out. It's not just about a disagreement over Ukraine. These are, I think, these are manageable issues over time, provided we're able to talk with each other and understand that reasonable allies can have differences of opinions on these things, but they can be managed.
Speaker 0: And I think that's a, yeah, a good approach to take. Well, I know you're a former, director of Russia analysis at the CI, but nonetheless, to suggest that this war isn't simply about the Europeans helping Ukraine to fight an an evil invader, again, cosplaying World War two. I mean, that that's enough to have one labeled Putin apologist in Europe these days. So there's not much room for trying to navigate these difficult times. But but in terms of one of the reasons why I was I've been become a bit more pessimistic about Trump lately, but one of the reasons was really optimistic about Trump during the election campaign was because The US and Russia kinda had almost a century now of poor relations.
But if one takes a step back, it doesn't necessarily have to be this way anymore. I mean, the the there would be ample of opportunities to have a a good relationship, which would be eventually good for the world as well by not making the world a, you know, a big chessboard. But how what would you see as being the, well, the strategic objective or the the possibility of reshaping The US Russia relationship. Because, again, a lot of this conflict we had as is end of the Cold War was related to NATO expansion, which then canceled this European security architecture. But NATO expansion was, to a large extent, linked to this hegemonic peace.
But if this is off the table, it seems it would open up a lot of opportunities for some great power settlement, a grand grand settlement, if you will, between the Americans and the Russians.
Speaker 1: No. I I think that's right. When when you look back on the history of US Russian relations, for a long period of time, there was not a lot that really caused friction between Moscow and back in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It was really with the Cold War that things really started to get out of hand, that was really a function of a regime change in Moscow that brought an ideological component to all of this. And then the result of the legacy of the aftermath of World War II and all the things that brought about this Cold War.
And that should be over, really. We don't have an ideological confrontation with Russia right now. We have different political systems, but there's no reason why they cannot coexist peacefully, provided that each side refrains from trying to transform the internal politics of the other. And my guess is that that phase is now ended for both countries. And there are areas where there's going to be competition between us, certainly.
But I don't think they're going to outweigh some strategic incentives that both The United States and Russia have to normalize their relationship. For The United States, the big strategic incentive is we don't want to drive Russia and China together towards security cooperation that's directed against The United States. That only compounds the difficulty that we face in attaining a stable balance of power with China and preventing China from pressing on US vulnerabilities in ways that are very detrimental to American security and prosperity. Our ability to deal with China is greatly complicated by the degree to which China and Russia are in some sort of entente or alliance or partnership against us. So having a more normal relationship with Russia enhances Russia's own ability to be less dependent on China, less beholden to China, have greater room for maneuver internationally and able to play a more independent role as a power in the emerging multipolar order.
And I think Russia wants that too. Russia does not want to be a dependent subordinate junior partner to China. That's not how Russia can sees of itself. It sees itself as a great power, rightfully, one that faces both east and west, that double headed eagle on the Russian state emblem. In order to face both East and West and have geopolitical room for maneuver, Russia has to have some kind of relationship with The United States.
So those are big strategic incentives to normalize relations between the two countries. Now that process isn't going to happen overnight. I think there's a lot of improvement in the relationship. But there are also lots of impediments to overcome. We have a deep amount of distrust between the countries that will not be repaired very quickly.
And a lot of the issues that we're going to have to address are complicated issues and ones that can't simply be done by two presidents operating more or less in small groups. There's going to have to be an effort, at least in The United States, to gain the buy in of much of the US government, the permanent bureaucracy, because they're going to have to implement a lot of this. And there's going to have to be some changes in attitude in The United States, some understanding on the part of the American people, Congress, the national media as to why we're trying to do this, why it's important, why it serves the interests of The United States. That's not going to be easy to do, at least not very quickly, because there is an awful lot of suspicion, an awful lot of people that don't think this is a good idea. And much of the national media are more or less opposed to this sort of thing.
And that's not going to be an easy thing to turn around very soon.
Speaker 0: Oh, I I always make the point that in this sense, the Russians are quite pragmatic, and I think that's one of the reasons why they turned around very quickly and tried to make up with The US now as well. That is they want a balance of dependence. They wanna diversify their ties. You don't wanna be excessively dependent on an asymmetrical interdependent relationship with a more powerful actor such as China. So what you wanna do is have some degree of strategic autonomy and, of course, diversify partnerships.
But this is a problem. When Europe cuts itself off Russia, it's more dependent on China, demanding that the Indians cut themselves off from Russia. China become Russia becomes more dependent on China. It's very strange. This doesn't seem to serve our interest in terms of preventing these two Eurasian giants coming together.
But just as a fast or quick last question, though, how does China fit into this wider thing? Because, again, The US and China, you know, while while their competitors, obviously, as the main two pieces in the international system, the main two economies, one nonetheless wants to find, I guess, some framework for organizing both cooperation as well as competition because, yes, there will be competition for influence. It can turn ugly at times. But, you know, if the strategy is to defeat the opponent, that that doesn't seem realistic, and it could turn very ugly. So but, again, one has to facilitate this competition as well.
So what is a good way to to get this done in order for yeah. In in order to organize this relationship in a way which would be, well, acceptable to The United States and, I guess, China as well?
Speaker 1: Well, I here again, I think the national security Strategy offers a nice framework for doing this. And it doesn't fit into a neat box. It's not containment. It's not rollback, to use some terms from the Cold War. It's a mix of things.
It's a mix of competition, of diplomatic engagement, of deterrence, and also an effort to relieve the kinds of pressures that China has put The United States in. You know, when you talk about strategic minerals and China's domination of that sphere. The degree to which critical US supply chains depend on China and infrastructure in the world, the lines of communication in space and on sea that are critical to US security, you have to have a means of making The United States less vulnerable to those pressure points that China has increasingly got a grip on. And so a lot of what The United States is doing right now, I think, is reducing its vulnerability to Chinese pressure, increasing its ability to deter China, but also reaching out and trying to engage diplomatically to forge some understandings about rules of the game. An understanding of where the red lines are for all the countries involved, a way of managing competition so that it doesn't spiral out of control into direct confrontation.
And that's going to be a long term process. We're not going to reach that kind of endpoint in a few months. It's going to be an ongoing process. But when you look at what The United States has done in Venezuela, what we appear to be heading towards on Greenland, These are efforts to relieve pressure points that the Chinese have got their grips on that make The United States less vulnerable to pressure and better able to come into that bargaining process with China from a position of strength. We're not going to be in a position where we can dictate to China on the terms of this bargain.
But we don't want to go into this at a major disadvantage where the Chinese have their boots on our neck, so to speak, on things like strategic minerals and space, things that are absolutely critical to the functioning of America's twenty first century economy and to our national security, to our military capabilities. So this makes sense to me. I'm not sure that I can wrap it up in a single term. But is a mix of all these things in a way that I think makes sense. And it's directed not at world domination or at defeating China, but at finding an equilibrium that The United States can live with and China can too.
And I think that's the way great powers have found their way towards some sort of order in the past. And I think that's the direction that we have to head today.
Speaker 0: You know, I think such a great grand bargain would be a good idea. You never want to have another great power with it back against the wall feeling that it's all or nothing. I think this is, yeah, the the worst strategic position any country can be put in. Anyways, thank you so much. It's, no.
It's fascinating to to list to ex explain this, ideas of where The US strategy can go from here on. So as you as we talked before we started recording, it's interesting times indeed. So thank you very much.
Speaker 1: You're welcome. Thanks, Vlad.
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
John Mearsheimer: Cold War 2.0 & NATO's Defeat in Ukraine https://youtu.be/OV75YsYnE8U https://t.co/PFufC76D24
Video Transcript AI Summary
Glenn: Welcome back. We are joined today by Professor John Mersheimer to understand what is happening in the world with this new great power rivalry and how the outcome of the Ukraine war will impact this new Cold War. Have we entered a new Cold War? Who are the players, competing interests, and the rules?
Mersheimer: I think we have entered a new Cold War. We're in a multipolar system, and the United States, China, and Russia are the three great powers. The United States is certainly in a cold war with China. China is powerful and threatens to dominate East Asia, and the United States will almost certainly go to great lengths to prevent that from happening, which axiomatically creates an intense security competition in China. An intense security competition is a cold war, and the name of the game is to make sure that security competition does not turn into a hot war. We are in a cold war with the Chinese, or the Chinese are in a cold war with us. The hot war is avoided.
Regarding Russia, since we moved into multipolarity, the Russians and the Chinese have been close allies against the United States. This is largely a result of the Ukraine war, which has pushed the Russians into the arms of the Chinese and caused closer Sino-Russian cooperation. The United States, through the Biden administration, was involved in a cold war with both Russia and China. Trump tried to change that, seeking good relations with Russia to form a Russia-plus-US alliance against China, but he has been unable to make that happen. The result is that the United States is basically still in a cold war with both Russia and China. The war in Ukraine has made me worry greatly that the Cold War in Europe could turn into a hot war, even as the U.S.-China relationship remains cooler so far.
Glenn: European leaders hoped the United States and Europe would unite in this new Cold War, with liberal hegemony fading and a return to unity against Russia. But Ukraine has instead divided Europe. How do you explain this? Is it the US not seeing Russia as the same threat as Europeans, or a concern about pushing Russia toward China, or Europe’s costs of the partnership? Is this uniquely a Trump-era approach?
Mersheimer: From an American point of view, good relations with Russia make sense. China is the peer competitor, and the United States wants to pivot to East Asia to prevent China’s dominance. Russia is the weakest of the three great powers and not a major threat to Europe. The Americans believe Europe can deal with Russia, freeing them to focus on China. Europe, by contrast, is threatened by Russia’s proximity and thus prioritizes Russia. NATO expansion into Ukraine is seen by many Europeans as a disaster, poisoning Russia–Europe relations, making Europe deeply committed to using Ukraine to weaken Russia. The transatlantic alliance becomes strained, especially with Trump raising the possibility of leaving NATO. Europeans fear losing the American pacifier that keeps centrifugal forces in check, which would complicate European coordination with Russia.
Glenn: If the United States signals a departure, won’t Europe face greater challenges in managing Russia? And is Russia truly an empire-building threat, or is this a post-2014 narrative that intensified after February 2022?
Mersheimer: Bringing Ukraine into NATO was destined to cause trouble. The crisis began in 2014, and the 2022 war is ongoing. The Ukrainians and Europeans want a security guarantee for Ukraine, essentially NATO membership, while Russia demands territory and rejects a security guarantee that would enshrine NATO’s presence near its borders. The Europeans see NATO expansion as threatening, while the Americans view Russia as the weaker power and the need to pivot to China. The controversy over responsibility for this disaster arises from competing interpretations of NATO expansion and Russian aggression.
Glenn: Do you see Russia changing course soon? There has been escalation—Odessa blockades, port attacks, and targeting infrastructure. Could this signal a new stage of the war?
Mersheimer: The Russians believe Ukraine is on the ropes and expect to win on the battlefield in 2026, possibly expanding fronts in Kharkiv and Sumy. They may consider increasing conventional force and possibly using nuclear weapons if the war drags on. They view the conflict as existential and fear losing, which could push them toward drastic measures to end the war. The Russians could escalate if they think they cannot win conventionally.
Glenn: What are the non-nuclear options to win quickly? Could the Russians deliver a decisive conventional victory?
Mersheimer: It’s a war of attrition. If Ukraine’s army is weakened, Russia could surround large Ukrainian formations, disrupt logistics, and open larger fronts. They may build up forces in the rear, potentially for a breakthrough or to deter Western escalation. The battlefield outcome may determine the next steps, including whether nuclear options are considered.
Glenn: How will Ukraine end? Is it a military defeat, economic collapse, or political fragmentation?
Mersheimer: Ukraine is likely to be defeated on the battlefield. Its economy is in desperate shape, and losing Odessa or more territory would worsen it. Politically, Ukraine will face internal divisions once the war ends. Europe will face a broken Russia–Ukraine relationship, with some European states viewing the conflict differently. Ukraine’s demographic decline compounds its bleak outlook, and the country may become a problematic rump state. The war should have been settled earlier; the negotiators in Istanbul in 2022 could have sought a different path. Zelensky’s choice to align with Western powers and walk away from Istanbul negotiations deepened Ukraine’s predicament.
Glenn: Any final reflections?
Mersheimer: The war’s outcome will reshape Western unity and European security. Historians may view this as a major mistake in weakening the West. The blame for the disaster will likely be attributed in the West to Russia’s imperialism, but the expansion of NATO is also central. Europe’s economic and political landscape will be altered, and Ukraine’s future will be deeply challenging.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Welcome back. We are joined today by professor John Mersheimer to get a better understanding of, what is happening in the world now with this new great power rivalry and also how the outcome of the Ukraine war will impact this new Cold War. Thank you for coming on. And I thought I wanted to open up with a very big question, which is have we entered a new Cold War? And if so, who are the players?
What are the competing interests? And what are the rules of this new Cold War?
Speaker 1: Well, I think we have entered a new Cold War. I think we're in a multipolar system, and I think, The United States, China, and Russia are the three great powers. And The United States is certainly in a cold war with China. Now what exactly do I mean by that? I think as a result of the fact that China is so powerful and threatens to dominate East Asia and that The United States will almost certainly go to great lengths to prevent that from happening, You axiomatically have an intense security competition in China.
And I, excuse me, think you've seen evidence of this over the past few years. And for me, an intense security competition is a cold war. And I distinguish a cold war from a hot war. A hot war is when two countries, like The United States and China, actually get into a fight with each other. And of course, that's what we want to avoid.
But the fact is we are in a cold war with the Chinese or the Chinese are in a cold war with us. It's an intense security competition. And the name of the game is to make sure that that security competition or that cold war does not turn into a hot war. Now this raises the question, what about Russia? Well, it's quite clear that since we moved into multipolarity, the Russians and the Chinese have been close allies, against The United States.
And this is largely a result of the Ukraine war, which has pushed the Russians and into the arms of the Chinese and caused the Chinese and the Russians to have very close relations. So The United States, certainly through the Biden administration, was involved in a cold war with the Russians as well as the Chinese. Now what's happened with president Trump is he tried to change that situation. He doesn't wanna have an intense security competition with Russia. And in fact, if anything, what the Trump administration would like to do is have good relations with Russia and make it a Russia plus US alliance raid against China.
I think that's the basic goal of president Trump. But he's been unable to make that happen. And the end result is that The United States is basically still in a cold war with Russia as well as with China. And in both cases, we wanna make sure, as I said before, that that cold war or those cold wars don't turn into a war. And if anything, if you look at what's happened with regard to Ukraine in recent years, if there is one place where it's likely that the Cold War could turn into a hot war, it's in Ukraine.
Ukraine so far, or Europe so far, or The US Russian relationship so far has actually been more dangerous than The US China competition. We've had no major crisis in East Asia involving The United States and China. So that Cold War has remained very cold, which is all for the good. But the war in Ukraine, and given some of the events that have taken place there, have made me worry greatly that the Cold War there would turn into a hot war.
Speaker 0: Well, I guess the the hope and expectation of many European leaders was that The US and Europeans would unite in this new Cold War. So the liberal hegemony is over, so they thought now we would retreat into this well, let's say, we go back in time, and we would return to this complete unity as we had in the first Cold War. That is unity in opposition to Russia as a common enemy. And, well, this was the assumption of NATO as well that Ukraine would unite us, but instead now it seems to divide. What what is it that how do you explain this, and what is it that the Europeans don't understand?
Is this The US not seeing Russia as the same threat as the Europeans? Is it the concern of pushing Russia towards China? Is Europe too costly of a partner as opposed to being a force amplifier? Or is this just a uniquely Trump policy or approach to international security?
Speaker 1: Well, just to take The United States, from an American point of view, it makes eminently good sense to have good relations with Russia. China is the peer competitor. If you sort of array these three great powers from top to bottom in terms of which one is the most powerful, there's no question that The United States remains the most powerful state on the planet. But the Chinese are a close second, and many argue that they're closing the gap. So we have this situation from an American perspective where there is a peer competitor in the system, and that peer competitor has the potential, and I underline the word potential, to dominate East Asia, which The United States does not want to have happen.
So we have a vested interest in focusing on East Asia over Europe because Russia is the weakest of the three great powers and Russia is not a threat to dominate Europe. And to the extent that Russia is a threat in Europe, and again I don't believe it's a very great threat at all, but to the extent it is a threat, we believe, and this is certainly true of President Trump, that the Europeans can deal with that threat which should free us to pivot to Asia more fully to deal with this peer competitor called China. So, we have a powerful structural incentive. And when I say structural incentive, I'm talking about what the balance of power tells us we should do. We have powerful structural incentive to pivot to East Asia and let the Europeans deal with Russia.
So that's our incentive structure and that's not Europe's incentive structure. Europe is in a very different situation. Europe, because the Russians are right next door, has to think first and foremost about Russia. Now, my view is that Russia was not a threat to Europe. But the Europeans, and of course the Americans, foolishly pushed forward NATO expansion into Ukraine, which has led to this disastrous war.
And for a variety of reasons that you know well, Glenn, the Europeans got into a situation where they ended up seeing Russia as a mortal threat. And they are therefore deeply committed to using Ukraine as a battering ram to weaken Russia because they see this Russian threat at every turn. And whether you and I think it's foolish or not is largely irrelevant because they do think that way. So the Europeans have a very different view of the so called Russian threat than the Americans do. And as I said, if anything, the Americans have an incentive to ally with the Russians against the Chinese.
This is anathema to Europeans. They don't want to hear that. And where you see this dispute between The United States and Europe, this transit transatlantic dispute playing itself out is over Ukraine. Because what's happening with regard to Ukraine is that the Americans are trying to shift the burden of dealing with Ukraine and dealing with the Ukraine war onto the shoulders of the Europeans. The Europeans, on the other hand, are scrambling like crazy to keep the Americans involved in the fight and keep the transatlantic relationship alive and well.
But it's very hard to do that when you're dealing with Donald Trump.
Speaker 0: But is it still an incentive of of the Europeans? Because if you go back to the nineties, I can see the argument for having for for redividing the continent and essentially recreating the logic of the Cold War because you would, yes, you would make an enemy out of Russia, but you bring in The United States and Europe as the main pacifier. And and, well, you essentially may maintain the same structure we had throughout the Cold War, the political West also keeps Europe united. However, now that The United States has signaled clearly that it wants to leave, won't this continued division of Europe only create more problems? Also, because we can't manage Russia on our own.
We're betting everything on The US, and The US doesn't even wanna be there. We're creating excessive dependencies. Wouldn't wouldn't make sense for the Europeans to shift the position on Russia, or or is what is the threat of Russia? I know that it has big capabilities, but but this assumption that they are an empire, that they wanna rebuild the Soviet Union, This all this narrative appears to have emerged after 2014, but, you know, it didn't appear in a vacuum. This happened in February 2022.
This is when, I guess, they began lashing back. Sorry. Lashing out, I think, is the term.
Speaker 1: Yeah. I mean, as you and I have said on numerous occasions, there's no question that bringing Ukraine into NATO was destined to lead to big trouble. And, of course, in February 2014, a major crisis broke out. And then eight years later in February 2022, a war broke out, and that war is still going on. In fact, that war between Russia and Ukraine has lasted longer than the war between Nazi Germany and The Soviet Union during World War two.
That's really quite remarkable. And the end result is that it's poisoned relations between Russia on one side and Europe on the other side. And there's no evidence that relations between those two rival sides are going to improve anytime soon. It looks like you're going to have poisonous relations between Russia and Europe for a long time to come. This is disastrous for the Europeans in large part because Russia is just not a serious threat.
And I believe if you look at Putin's behavior over time, Putin wanted to work out some sort of modus vivendi with the Europeans. He's not an aggressor. He's not bent on creating a greater Russia despite the fact that many people in the West make that argument. He wanted to live a rather peaceful existence with the Europeans. But that's all gone down the toilet bowl now.
That's over with. So you have this terrible situation where the Russians and the Europeans are bitter enemies. That's point number one. But point number two, and this is what we were talking about a few minutes ago, at the same time this poisonous relationship has developed, the Americans are talking about greatly reducing, if not leaving Europe. President Trump, as we well know, would like to take a sledgehammer to NATO if he could.
He'd wreck the he'd wreck that institution if he could. And this is another way of saying that the Americans are threatening to leave Europe, which means the American pacifier, which has played such an important role in keeping the peace in Europe, will disappear. And the Europeans, of course, understand, almost to a person, that this would not be good. That you want to keep the Americans in Europe because the Americans serve as a pacifying force. They keep all those centrifugal forces that are just below the surface in Europe below the surface.
And if the Americans leave, those centrifugal forces will come above the surface. And you will have huge collective action problems trying to work out arrangements among the European countries to deal with this Russian threat that they have done so much to create. So you're getting the worst of both worlds here. And the Europeans seem incapable of recognizing this and doing anything to fix the situation. They're just so deeply committed with Russia, and they're having so much trouble dealing with President Trump that it appears that there's no way out for them.
And the future therefore looks bleak for Europe.
Speaker 0: So how will this war end then? I mean, are you optimistic about about these negotiations taking place? Because, I guess, on one hand, we do see that the situation is going from bad to worse on the NATO and Ukraine side, which would you know, if if there's, well, if we're being rational, we would seek to, cement a good deal today if, well, better than what we would get tomorrow. On the other hand, we saw before Christmas that the this, you know, 20 plan of the Americans, which they were trying to sell to the Ukrainians and the Russians, which was already bit far apart. But the Europeans came in, essentially, trying to pull it further away towards the Ukrainian side, which would make it even more untenable for the victorious side, which is the Russian.
But but a lot of things are happening now. Do do you do you have any optimism about these negotiations?
Speaker 1: I have zero optimism. I think there is no reason at all to think that these negotiations are gonna produce a real peace. If you look at Russia's demands, which have been clearly laid out many, many times, and you recognize that these are basically non negotiable demands, at least a handful of them are and we know them well. They're non negotiable. And then you look at what the European slash Ukrainian position is on these demands, they are polar opposites.
They're just there's no overlap. The Europeans and the Ukrainians are completely at odds in terms of their demands with Russia's demands. So I I don't see how you can even come close to having some sort of agreement. I don't think maybe you can point to any of Russia's major demands where the Europeans have caved in. The Europeans and the Ukrainians both, still want Ukraine to have a security guarantee.
And from a Russian point of view, this is unacceptable because it is just another way of putting Ukraine inside of NATO. It's de facto NATO membership. The Russians do not want The United States giving Ukraine an article five security guarantee, But that's what the Ukrainians want, and that's what the Europeans want. With regard to territory, the Russians have made it manifestly clear, again, on countless occasions, that they want all of the territory in those four oblasts that they have annexed. As best I can tell, the Ukrainians and the Europeans won't even agree to give the Russians full control over those two oblasts in the Donbas, much less all four oblasts on territory.
There's just no sign of meaningful agreement. And with regard to the size of the Ukrainian army that would exist in any peace agreement, the two sides are light years apart. The the Europeans and the Ukrainians are talking about a Ukrainian military that has somewhere between 600,800 men in it. At the Istanbul negotiations back in 2022, the Russians were insisting on a Ukrainian army that had about 85,000 soldiers. So when you contrast 85,000 with 600,000 to 800,000 soldiers, you see the two sides are light years apart.
Has there been any movement, any sign of a compromise on this issue? No. Has there been any sign of a compromise on the territorial issue? No. Has there been any sign of a compromise on the issue of a security guarantee?
No. So what is all this talk about getting some sort of meaningful agreement? This is all, as I like to say, a giant kabuki dance. There's just no there there. And, nevertheless, just to take this a step further, the Ukrainians and the Europeans continue to talk about a ceasefire, and even occasionally the Americans talk about a ceasefire.
The Russians have again made it unequivocally clear there will be no ceasefire. And in fact, when Trump met with Putin in Anchorage last summer, Trump came out of the meeting saying the whole subject of a ceasefire was off the table because Putin had made it clear to him there was gonna be no ceasefire, that this war was gonna be settled one way or another on the battlefield. And Trump said that. He recognized it at the time. But with the passage of time, he's back to occasionally talking about ceasefires, and the Europeans and the Ukrainians much more frequently talk about ceasefire.
But it's not gonna happen. This one's gonna be settled on the battlefield. There's eventually gonna be, I think, an armistice because one side or the other will prevail. And that's just another way of saying it'll be settled on the battlefield. But it's not going to be settled in diplomatic negotiations in Abu Dhabi or in Istanbul or in Moscow.
It's not gonna happen, at least based on everything we've seen up to now.
Speaker 0: Yeah. I find it's very strange a lot of the rhetoric around, you know, especially when Europeans are calling for this compromise because they the compromise they could have gotten was pretty good back in 2022, but they waited for years, a long time, and they still expect the parties to somehow meet in the middle and and come to an agreement. Even more than this, they want the Russians to make the greatest concessions, it seems. And the kind of concession they want, essentially, the reason the reason why the Russians went into Ukraine to prevent the victory or sorry, prevent NATO from embedding itself into Ukraine in essentially, a peace agreement, which, you know, after a Russian victory, the it appears that the Europeans want why what the Russians went to war to prevent, which is, yeah, European NATO troops within Ukraine. And I was it baffles me a bit, though, this very normative language they have because they make the point, well, Ukraine can't make the greatest concession.
It's not fair because Russia's the aggressor. Ukraine is the victim. So they they won't even talk about security guarantees for Russia as as there's no recognition of the security competition. It's just goodies and baddies, an aggressor, and a victim. And so the Russian seems to speak in a language of of power that is, you know, we have won.
We get to dictate the terms while the Europeans are speaking this normative language, but that's not fair because you're a digressor. It's very strange to watch. It's like they're not speaking the same diplomatic language. But sorry.
Speaker 1: Yeah. If I can just jump in, Glenn. I actually have an explanation for that. I'm not saying it's the correct explanation, but it's just how I think about this issue. I think that the vast majority of people in the foreign policy elite in Europe, and this is true even in The United States because I think Trump is something of an anomaly, they all believe that Ukraine in NATO is not an existential threat to Russia.
They believe that what is going on here is that Putin is an imperialist, and he's trying to create a greater Russia. Yes. It matters for security, but, there's a deeper cause at play here. It's just that imperial gene that all Russian or Soviet leaders have, and Putin is particularly aggressive. And this has nothing to do with NATO expansion.
How could anybody possibly believe that a benign alliance like NATO and, again, this is where you see the rhetoric about us being the good guys that you were just talking about. How could a benign alliance like NATO possibly be seen by any Russian leader as a mortal threat? That's our worldview here in the West. There are of course people like you and I and a handful of others who don't accept that argument, but we're in the minority. Then on the Russian side, they have made it manifestly clear over the years that Ukraine and NATO is an existential threat.
It is, from their perspective, an existential threat. And once you understand that they see what's going on in Ukraine as a threat to their survival, again, we in the West like that argument or not, there is an abundance let me change my rhetoric there is a superabundance of evidence that they see what's going on in Ukraine, and especially with the Europeans and the Americans backing the Ukrainians as a mortal threat, as an existential threat. And that's why they are unwilling to make any meaningful compromises. And in fact, as you well know, Glenn, if anything, the situation from their perspective gives them great incentives to take even more territory than they have already taken, to annex more oblast, to go to greater lengths to wreck Ukraine, to really turn it into a dysfunctional rump state, to poison relations inside of Europe, to poison relations across the Atlantic, between The United States on one side and Europe on the other side. Again, once you understand that the Russians see this not as a case of imperialism but as a case of an existential threat, it looks very different.
But we refuse, we in the West, and this of course doesn't include us, I want to be clear on that, but people in the West, people in the foreign policy establishments in European countries and in The United States, for the most part, refused to accept that Russia's got a legitimate point of view, that the Russians actually see things this way. And that's what I think accounts for the fact that the two sides are so far apart. And furthermore, it explains why people in the West are so baffled that the Russians won't make any concessions. They should make concessions, we think, but that's because the picture we have in our head of how the Russians are thinking is simply wrong.
Speaker 0: It is interesting, though, the reluctance to accept that the Russians do see NATO as an existential threat because well, there's a good point behind the Russian view, I feel often, that if you try to create a Europe without Russia, it would unavoidably become against Russia. Because how how can you have a Europe where the largest country doesn't belong? It would be as if you create a security architecture in Americas ruled by China, and The United States would be the only one not being allowed to participate. It would unavoidably be seen as being aimed against The United States. So it's very it's very difficult to understand why there's no understanding for this, though, and especially this assumption of our benign intentions after Afghanistan, Iraq, or Yugoslavia as well, Libya, Syria, Iran, Gaza, the last twelve years in Ukraine.
There should be some understanding, though, that perhaps the yeah. It's not just a group of democracies spreading values. But you you mentioned this idea of
Speaker 1: Glenn, can I can I say can I just jump in and say a word or two about that? Because I've thought about that question. First of all, I think that it's important to understand that the decision to bring Ukraine into NATO was made in April 2008, And that was during the unipolar moment. It was at the height of the unipolar moment. And we viewed ourselves as the good guys.
We were the benign hegemon. And the Europeans bought on to that rhetoric at the time. And we thought that NATO expansion could not possibly be seen as threatening by the Russians in any meaningful way because, again, we were the good guys. We were The United States was a benign hegemon, and the Europeans were tagging along with us and behaving in benign ways as well. Now, you could argue that that was wrong, but that's how we thought about it.
Then the crisis breaks out in 2014 and, of course, the war breaks out in 2022. But as soon as the crisis breaks out in 2014 and you have really serious trouble, then the question becomes who is responsible? Right? And this question is sitting out there today. Who is responsible for this disaster?
Well, if you believe that it was NATO expansion that's largely responsible for causing this war, this disaster, this unbelievable disaster, then you're saying the West is responsible. If you say that Russia was driven by imperialist ambitions, that Putin is a classic Russian imperialist who had to be stopped, then Putin has to be blamed. So we in the West have a vested interest in making the argument that Putin was an imperialist and it was his imperial ambitions that caused the war because we want to put the responsibility for this war. We want to blame him for this war. If you go down the road that we have gone down, you and I, and make the argument that NATO expansion is principally responsible for this disaster, you're in effect saying the West is responsible.
And for leaders in the West, this is a categorically unacceptable argument.
Speaker 0: But where do we go from here on, though? Because there's been a lot of pressure on on the Kremlin, well, on Putin to to change his tactics a bit. I mean, this is not new. I remember all the way back after 2014 when he tried to patch things up with Europeans. There were a lot of hawks in the Kremlin who was making the argument that, you know, if if they don't act more assertively, the NATO would interpret Russia's efforts to make up with NATO as as weakness.
So they said, well, why are we negotiating? We should be preparing for war, essentially. But this has gone on, you know, all the way since, until now, 2026, when they're saying, why why aren't we taking off, you know, these these gloves and, you know, putting an end to this war? Do do you see it? Do you see Russia changing course anytime soon?
Because I do see some escalation lately. That is not just the efforts to destroy all of the electric grids to turn off the lights, but also this quasi blockade on Odessa by attacking ships going in and out, the ports, the bridges. It is it it seems like we might be entering a new stage of the war, or do you see it differently?
Speaker 1: Well, I think the Russians believe that the Ukrainians are on the ropes, and that there is a good chance that the over the course of this year, 2026, that Ukraine will collapse, that the Russians will win on the battlefield. And they can do that conventionally, of course. Whether that happens is hard to say. It's quite remarkable how tenacious the Ukrainians have been on the battlefield. I thought that by the end of 2025, the war would have been over.
There would have been an armistice. I didn't think that the Ukrainians would still be hanging on. They are hanging on. I think they're hanging on by a thread, but they are hanging on. And they are continuing to get support, especially from the Europeans, but also from the Americans.
So it's possible that by the end of 2026, they'll still be in the fight. It is possible. And I think as this coming year plays itself out, what you'll see is the Russians upping the ante at the conventional level. I think they'll commit more forces to the fight. They have large reserve armies that they've not committed, and I think they'll commit them.
And I think they'll try to finish off the Ukrainians in 2026. If that doesn't happen, I think there will be powerful reasons for the Russians to up the ante and even think about using nuclear weapons. If you look at Sergei Karagunov, who I take to be a mainstream Russian strategist who's been around for a long time, knows all the arguments about security and international relations theory and deterrence and so forth and so on. You listen to him talk, he's basically saying that the time is right for the Russians to use nuclear weapons to put an end to this war. But I think if the West believes that it can keep the Russians engaged in a war of attrition and prevent the Russians from winning that war for a few more years, they're wrong.
The Russians will do something to end the war. And that's something I think might very well be the use of nuclear weapons. Again, you wanna remember what I said before when I described this war as an existential threat from Russia's point of view. The Russians view what's going on as a mortal threat, number one. And number two, if they get into a position where they think they cannot win this war and in fact that they are suffering greatly because the war just hasn't come to an end, they will be in desperate straits.
When great powers with nuclear weapons are in desperate straits, you ought to really worry about what they might do. And so I think that in a very important way, everyone should hope that the Russians win this war at the conventional level rather quickly in the first part of 2026, and there's no incentive for the Russians to really go up the escalation ladder.
Speaker 0: I guess another reason why they might wanna finish off sooner is all the the logic you hear coming out of some European capitals that we have to keep the Ukrainians in the fight a bit more so we can prepare ourself. I mean, if there's a possibility that the Europeans are preparing themselves and possibly entering the war at a later stage, then it would be much better to finish the war now before it has the time, I guess, to actually expand into a wider, like, pan European war.
Speaker 1: Can I ask I ask you a question, Glenn? What is your sense of, the pressure that's on Putin to sort of up the ante to to escalate and to get this war over with? Do you have a sense that he's under tremendous pressure to do that? And if so, how do you see this playing out?
Speaker 0: Well, I think there's a lot of pressure for not to take any any, weak deal coming out of Washington because of all because they paid a heavy price as well. This has been four years of war. They lost tens of thousands of men, and and and the idea, I think, is that if they agree to any deal which would allow the West to essentially revive the Ukrainian frontline in the future, and they would have to fight this whole thing over again. That that would be completely unacceptable. So there there's many who, I guess, are questioning why why he hasn't brought this to an end already with more fierce means.
I mean, this is not just Russians. I I've spoken to many foreign ambassadors to Russia and well, not not the Europeans ones European ones, but others who who also have expressed, you know, confusion about why he hasn't taken a much harder approach yet. And, no, I I don't know. I I just Putin's not whispering in my ears. I'm not quite sure.
But it's but I do think on some level that they're also preparing that if Ukraine does fall when it falls, that this would cause massive desperation in the West, especially in Europe, and this could lead to some reckless behavior possibly joining in on the war. And if this happens, it's better for Russia to be prepared. So having built up enough weaponry, at least enough Orashnik missiles, which can strike critical infrastructure in Europe is if this is what the decision the Europeans are going for. So but, again, I'm I'm I'm, yeah, I'm I'm not sure where or what direction they're that they might be going. I know that a lot of the pressure which came from on Putin before, he rejected it.
You mentioned Karaganov. He, you know, he he would come to every yearly Valdai meeting. He would ask, you know, more or less Putin, why why aren't we changing a nuclear doctrine? And Putin every year said, well, said, now this is not the time for it. We have we have to keep it.
And then, of course, at the end, he he listened to Karagnov, and now they changed the nuclear doctrine. And and, you know, many people think this is political theater. But, you know, when I I used to work as professor in Moscow, and I actually worked in the department with Karagnov being my boss because this was the greater Eurasia focus. They focused on Russia's pivot to the East, so looking at how, yeah, the techno technology mix, how how Russia can cooperate with China. And, you know, I I I spoke to him many times, and he's quite convinced that the and, you know, NATO article five, it wouldn't be implemented in the way many people think, you know, to read the text carefully.
And, also, I I don't think this is theater. I think there's a lot of people within Moscow who who really wants this to be escalated in a big way, but I'm not sure how Putin is influenced by it, though.
Speaker 1: And if you don't go nuclear, right, what what do you think that the Russians can do at the conventional level, to win a quick victory, this coming spring or summer? In other words, do you buy the argument that they have large reserve armies that they can bring to bear, that they can change their strategy and punch through the front lines, and collapse the Ukrainian defenses? I mean, what do you think the options are that the Russians have at the non nuclear level to win this war, or put an end to this war?
Speaker 0: Well, it is a war of attrition. So, once, the adversary's army is weakened and you have opportunities to punch through the frontline, there's there's other opportunities. Now you can disrupt a lot of the communication, the logistics. It's it's more possibility to surround large grouping of troops. So I think this is where where they're going with it because now that you see the Ukrainian army being weakened, they have a massive manpower shortage.
At this point in time, the Russians seem to be opening new fronts, especially in Kharkov and Sumy. So I assume that as Ukraine seem to be on the yeah. Don't what's it called? The point of breaking, then this will be the time to open up a large frontline larger frontline. And you also had reports which have been confirmed in western media that a lot of the new military hardware being developed that is armored vehicle and all is not actually going to the front.
They're building up in the rear. So I I, again, I I it's hard to know in the fog of war what's real or not, but my impression is that they're building up a big force in the rear. Whether this is for while taking advantage of a massive breakthrough in Ukraine or if this is for us, that is, if the Europeans decide to enter the war. For me, this is unclear, though.
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 0: Yes. Just a very brief last question as we run out of time. How what is CST being the likely way if if Ukraine is, and NATO's being defeated in this war, what is it that would bring Ukraine down? Is it a military defeat? Is it economic, political fragmentation?
Do you have any views on this?
Speaker 1: Well, I think that what will happen here is that at some point, Ukraine is gonna be defeated on the battlefield. And given all the problems that the Ukrainians have and given the fact that the Europeans can only do so much to help them and the Americans are trying to wean themselves from the Ukraine war, it's hard to see how Ukraine can hang on over the long term. So I think they lose on the battlefield. At the same time, I think their economy is in desperate straits. And if they were to lose Odessa and even more territory than they've already lost, that would just add to their woes.
So I think economically, the rub state that results from this war will be a basket case. It'll be an economic basket case. And then on the political side, I would imagine that you're gonna have huge political fights inside of Ukraine once the war is over with. There's gonna be a big blame game. Who's gonna be blamed for losing this war?
And it'll be ugly. So I think economically and politically, life in this Ukrainian rump state will be ugly. And then, of course, they will have lost on the battlefield as well. And then the question you have to ask yourself is what do Ukraine Russia relations look like moving forward? And as I said before, I thought European Russian relations would be poisonous.
I think there's no question. The relations between Ukraine and Russia will be poisonous. And I think relations between Ukraine and Europe will be very messy because there'll be some countries in Europe like Hungary and Slovakia that have a very different way of thinking about Ukraine than countries like France, Britain, and Germany. And even countries like France and Germany or France and Britain will be at loggerheads on some key issues regarding Ukraine. So Ukraine's Ukraine is facing a dismal future, and we haven't even added in the demographic issue.
I mean, this is a country that's facing, you know, a democrat a demographic death spiral. It's just horrendous what's happening. There's a piece in the Wall Street Journal this morning that says it's time for Ukraine to begin to mobilize younger people, people who are in their late teens and early twenties who've been largely exempt from the draft. That would be really good, you know, take all those young people and feed them into the meat grinder. I mean, this is crazy.
Right? It'll just exacerbate the demographic situation, which is already disastrous. So once this war is over with, Ukraine is going to be in terrible shape. There's no way that it comes out of this war winning in any way. It loses on almost every dimension.
Excuse me, Glenn. And this of course is why people like you and I have long argued that this war should have been settled a long time ago. This is why the Ukrainians should not have walked away from the negotiating process at Istanbul in the 2022. Their situation has just gotten continually worse with the passage of time and if they manage to hang in there for another year or two, their situation is not going to improve. That's what's very important to understand here.
Staying in the fight has never been a smart strategy from their point of view. They should have put an end to this a long time ago. So when you add it all up, it's just categorically depressing. And by the way, this gets back to my earlier point, Glenn, that the question of who is to blame for this disaster is going to come racing to the fore once it's over, once the war is over with, once the fighting stops, once you get some sort of armistice, then the question is gonna become who caused this? And, of course, the vast majority of people in the West or in the foreign policy elites in the West are gonna argue it's the Russians who caused it because they were imperialists.
But you and I know better that this is largely a result of NATO expansion and that the West is principally responsible for this utter disaster.
Speaker 0: Well, even in the unrealistic scenario that the Ukraine would win, you know, the best possible scenario, who who would be left there to enjoy the victory, you know, with this demographic, you know, downward spiral? I I this is why it's very strange to me. And what makes it so much more sad as well is the fact that Zelensky, he he kinda knew what would be the consequence of going down this path. You mentioned this, the negotiations in early twenty twenty two. Recall that back in March 2222, he gave this interview to The Economist where he said, there are many countries in the West who don't want us to take a deal, who wants a long war.
That is the word he used, long war with Russia, because we could weaken the the Russians even if it meant the destruction of Ukraine. So it is just it's it's such a, yeah, tragedy that, yeah, we've gone down this path now for the past four years, and I'm I'm I I think the war is probably the war will end in, I say, in Odessa, as you suggested before, if this will be the best trick for the Russians, I think. Because if they can landlock Ukraine, not just would it be weakened and not be a future threat, a future frontline, but it would also lose its market value to NATO in terms of being an instrument of pushing Russia out of the Black Black Sea. And even the policies you see, the idea of de Russifying Ukraine, I mean, this would entail de Russifying Odessa, a historical Russian city, which would be just impossible for the Russians to accept and and watch. So it's it just seems to me that this is where the war would end, by the Russians, yeah, essentially stepping into a crime in the start, stepping into Odessa.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Glenn, just one more point, that came to my came to mind when you were talking about Zelensky, back in 2022. Before the war broke out this is 02/24/2022, that's when the war broke out. As you remember, in December, January, and February, the Americans were saying that war is coming. War is coming.
We were constantly saying that. And Zelensky was saying, stop saying that. You're gonna make war happen. Zelensky was not interested in getting into a war with Russia. And then, of course, once the war breaks out, he is willing to go to Istanbul or he's willing to send his negotiators to Istanbul.
He's willing to work out a deal with the Russians. But then he makes a fatal mistake and he sides with basically the Americans and the British, walks away from the negotiations in Istanbul and commits himself to a long war that he thinks he's gonna win. He buys the Western rhetoric that Ukraine's initial successes on the battlefield, and you remember they did reasonably well on the battlefield once the war started, that those initial successes coupled with economic sanctions and military backing from the West would finish the Russians off. And then what happens over the course of 2022 is that, again, the Ukrainians do quite well on the battlefield. You remember they roll the Russians back in Kherson, they roll the Russians back in Kharkiv, and by the 2022, they think they're in great shape.
And then you remember the June 2023 offensive that was supposed to, you know, produce this giant blitzkrieg that would egregiously damage the Russian military. So once he buys on at the end of the Istanbul negotiations to the western view of what's gonna happen, once he reverses direction, he he's in deep trouble because he doesn't realize it, but he's joining the losing side. You you remember general Milley again, very important. General Milley said in the fall, this is in the 2022 after the Ukrainian successes in Kharkiv and Kherson, General Milley said, now's the time to cut a deal. This is the high watermark for Ukraine.
And of course, Milley was correct, but nobody wanted to hear what Milley had to say. And that includes Zelensky because Zelensky was thinking that he was on the winning side. He was on the march. Ukraine was gonna win a great victory, and we would finish off the Russians or at least wound them mortally in the 2023. That was their thinking.
And what happened is he just got sucked into the vortex and there's no getting out. And the end result is he's gonna be seen by historians as having played a key role in destroying his own country.
Speaker 0: Well, that was on that topic as well, contributing then furthermore fracturing the political West as well. So there is I think the outcome of this will be profound. So as you suggested, I think future historians will look back at this as being one of our greatest mistakes in terms of weakening the position of the West.
Speaker 1: And it's not only political, Glenn, it's also economic. Europe has not only suffered politically, it's suffered economically from this war. Yeah. Well,
Speaker 0: thank you very much. I we went a bit over time there, so I apologize. And, thank you very much for coming and sharing your insights.
Speaker 1: My pleasure as always, Glenn.
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
Nicolai Petro: Europe at a Crossroads at Munich Security Conference https://youtu.be/BjW_x4S5kJs https://t.co/S00mSvdFez
Video Transcript AI Summary
Nikolay Petro and Gwen were discussing the Munich Security Conference and the broader shift in global order. The core theme is the destruction or breakdown of the post–Cold War order as the world moves toward multipolarity, with the United States and Europe following diverging paths.
- The transition to multipolarity is described as chaos and a vacuum of strategic thinking. From a European perspective, this is an unwanted transition into something unfamiliar, while the US debates a more pragmatic approach that may bypass traditional institutions to position itself favorably. The multipolar world would be more democratic, with more voices in actual discussion of each nation’s needs and contributions, in contrast to the hegemonic, rules-based order.
- The concept of multipolarity presumes multiple poles of interest. Nations at the top of the old order feel uncomfortable; they had a lead dog (the United States) and knew where they were going. Now the lead dog may be wandering, and the rest are lost. There’s a push to engage voices from the global South, or the global majority, though the term “global South” is viewed as imprecise.
- At Munich, Kaia Kallas and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (Mertz) urged order to avoid chaos. Kallas favored restoring or preserving the structures of the past, arguing the European Union should reconnect with the US and dominate collectively as the political West. Mertz used aggressive language, saying Germany’s army must be the most powerful in Europe and that the war in Ukraine will end only when Russia is exhausted economically and militarily; he argued Europe imposed unheard-of losses on Russia.
- In response, the US role in Munich was anticipated to feature Marco Rubio as the delegation head, signaling a security-focused agenda rather than deep internal European discourse. The discussion suggested the US may push a strategy of returning to or reshaping a hegemonic order, pressuring Europe to align with American priorities, and highlighting that the old order is over.
- There is a perception of internal German political dynamics: the rise of the anti-establishment party (IFD) could challenge the current SPD/CSU coalition, potentially altering the German stance on Russia and Europe’s strategy toward Moscow. The possibility exists that internal German shifts could counter aggressive German policy toward Russia.
- In Europe, there is a tension between those who want to sacrifice more national autonomy to please the US and those who advocate diversifying ties to avoid total dependence on Washington. In practice, EU policy has often mirrored US priorities, thereby delaying a truly autonomous European strategy.
- The EU’s foreign policy structure remains weak due to political diversity among member states, the need for cooperation with national governments, and resistance to surrendering power to Brussels. There is no cohesive grand strategy within the EU, making it hard to present a unified vision in a multipolar world. The EU’s reliance on crisis-driven centralization contrasts with those internal contradictions.
- Ukraine’s war exposed tensions in Europe’s cohesion. Initially, there was a rallying effect and unified front against Russia, aided by US support, aiming for a rapid Russian defeat. Now the EU’s rhetoric shifts toward seeking a ceasefire and preserving what remains of Ukraine, labeling victory in terms of saving Ukraine rather than expelling Russia. EU funding for Ukraine—about €90 billion over two years—may be insufficient, with Ukraine claiming higher needs.
- The discussion suggested that European leadership’s view of Russia and Putin is unstable: some European circles believe Russia could collapse economically, while others see Russia’s leadership as capable of countermeasures. Reports of France reestablishing high-level political contacts with Russia were noted as part of this flux.
- The conversation contrasted backward-looking US/EU visions with a forward-looking multipolar vision promoted by BRICS, especially Russia, which could be more promising due to its forward outlook. The EU, dominated by internal divisions, struggles to articulate an autonomous multipolar path, while the United States appears intent on reviving its dominant position and reshaping the international order, sometimes in ways that delay the shift to multipolarity.
- Overall, the speakers highlighted a shared but backward-looking orientation between the EU and the US, versus a forward-looking, multipolar alternative; they also underscored the strategic vacuum, internal European divisions, and the continuing tug-of-war between attempting to restore past structures and embracing a new global arrangement.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Welcome back. Today, we are joined by Nikolay Petro, a professor at the University of Rhode Island, who also served as The US, state department special assistant for policy on the Soviet Union. So thank you for coming back on.
Speaker 1: Nice to be with you again, Gwen.
Speaker 0: So we see that this annual Munich Security Conference has started, and theme is the, well, destruction of the international order. And my interpretation, though, is more or less that, yeah, this is a reference to the disorganized and, well, let's say, destructive transition into a multipolar system. It didn't necessarily have to be this messy, but it also appears that The US and Europe are moving in very different directions. So the this yeah. The split in this transatlantic alliance, obviously, is a key theme.
But the Americans, obviously, seems to be, well, at times, maybe overly pragmatic and disregard some of the traditional institutions in order to position themselves more favorably. The Europeans, on the other hand, seem to be trapped in wishful thinking and a strategic vacuum. That being said, the obviously, at the security conference now, is multipolarity is the a key theme, and the breakdown, therefore, of the post Cold War order. How do you define, though, the, I guess, the current transition to multipolarity?
Speaker 1: Chaos. They're the the word you use, a vacuum of strategic thinking. Yeah. That's that's a good way to think of it. The absence of strategy in a transition to something we don't know, and from a European perspective that we don't necessarily want.
And that combination has led to the very vacuum you're talking about. You and I are not at the Munich conference this year, security conference, but I wonder if there will be any defenders of the proposition that a multipolar world could be a more secure world if approached correctly. In other words, if engaged in such a way that all the participants received and saw the benefit of participating as equals in a multipolar world. The main difference between the hegemonic order, also known as the rules based order, and the multipolar order, it seems to me, is that the latter is more democratic. It involves more voices in an actual discussion of the needs of the the nations themselves and how they can contribute as well as benefit from a new participatory multipolar arrangement.
The very concept of multipolarity presumes the existence of multiple poles of interest. So from the perspective of the nations that saw themselves at the top of the international pecking order, this is an uncomfortable transition. Even though they may not have been, as in the case of Europe, the at the very top, they were nevertheless behind the lead dog, so to speak. And as a result, they knew where they were going because the lead dog, The United States, was leading them in that direction. So now that the lead dog is going who knows where and may even be biting his his harness to free himself from from the rest of the pack, well, the rest of the pack is a bit lost, I guess, I would say.
But it would be good for them to at least be able to engage and perhaps listen to the voices that are coming out of what used to be called the global South, but I think that term doesn't do it justice. It's better to refer to it as the global majority.
Speaker 0: Yeah. And then well, if you listen to some of the speeches being made there, especially Kaia Kallas as well as the German chancellor Mertz, well, from Kallas, more or less the message was that we need order, otherwise, there will be chaos. But order can only more or less be achieved by the structures of the past. That means more or to restore the system we had so the Europeans must work and reconnect with The US, and collectively, we should be allowed to dominate, that is the political West should dominate the international system. This is a well, from my perspective, this seems like a key weakness, though, for for the Europeans, the the inability to, I guess, put have have any imagination for a post hegemonic world, a world where the political West aren't unified and they aren't in a dominant position.
In other words, reluctance to accept this new distribution of power as a reality and how for Europe to find a new position. Indeed, the Mertz also came out in a most aggressive language. You don't really wanna hear from a German chancellor. That is he said, yet again that the German army must be the most powerful one in Europe. He said the war in Ukraine will only end when Russia has been exhausted economically and militarily.
And he also argued that we, being the Germans and Europeans, imposed unheard of losses and costs on Russia. So this is, yeah, the new language of Germany where this essentially sounds like Germany has gone to war now with Russia, and the defeat of Russia is what should bring stability and order back. It's it it it doesn't seem to make any peace with new realities, not just the the international dis the new international distribution of power, but also where the war is actually going. How do you how do you see the on the coming months as this as The US will continue to chart its own path, the Ukraine war war will continue to, well well, Ukraine will continue to unravel. How how are Europeans gonna, I guess, respond to this new international system?
Or how can they just
Speaker 1: If Mats were a politician here in America, we know the playbook. It would be this is not Germany's war. This is Mats' war. And I think that that was the playbook certainly that Donald Trump played successfully against Joe Biden with respect to his adventures overseas. So I suspect something similar will have to happen.
I mean, there is not a lack of political voices in Germany and other countries calling for a new approach toward Russia. There is a resistance by the established elite which has too many sunken costs in the current policy that it cannot distance itself from the policies that have been conducted so far without without damaging their own
Speaker 0: political
Speaker 1: reputation and the political reputation of the pardon. It is possible I don't know how likely it is, but it is possible and because it is logical to assume that the more the the more aggressive the tone of the German government, the more it will be opposed by other interests in Germany. Other political forces will coalesce against it. The difficulty is entirely internally German at this point. The grand coalition between SPD and TEDU, so Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, with satellite parties around them has defined, has said for so long to the German people that there is no alternative to them, that the German people will simply have to wake up one day and say, there is actually an alternative.
In this case, today, right this very moment, is the IFD, and they are the biggest party. So they just have to overcome the psychological unwillingness to have essentially what is it? A real two party system. A two party system in which there would be the establishment and then the anti establishment and to vote for the anti establishment. You know, we can speculate endlessly about how close this is, in which countries the shift to anti establishment is closer than in others.
It is a reasonable bet to assume that if things continue along the present deteriorating trajectory in foreign policy, in economic policy for the EU, The voters will respond in this way, but we just don't know when.
Speaker 0: Well, I I was thinking I was wondering how you see the or what you expect from the Americans at Munich Security Conference. I guess last year conference was very much, colored by the appearance of, JD Vance. He, you know, shook the Europeans to their core by arguing that the their threat didn't derive from China or Russia, but from within this creeping authoritarianism, which was made or sorry, which was met with outrage by the Europeans. But, you know, it it's not as if the the authoritarianism in Europe has been stable. It's been, I think, escalating over the years.
I mean, if you go back twenty years when the Europeans tried to pass this EU constitution back in 2005, You know, by back then, only France, you know, France and Netherlands, they kept they did a referendum. It didn't go through, and kind of the EU mentality has always been, well, let's just steam ahead. So they repackaged the whole thing then as the Lisbon treaty, in which you don't need any referendums at all in 2007. Yet one country demanded a referendum, which was Ireland. And as you remember, they voted no, so they were forced to vote again until they voted yes.
But this was kinda seen as laying the foundation for some authoritarianism. But since then, of course, we saw the banking crisis two thousand thirteen in Cyprus, then in Greece, where where bank closures were posed by forcing denying liquidity. And, of course, now you jump forward another decade, it's very different as the political, I guess, support collapses among the leadership. France, I mean, the rest of the now the main opposition figure, Le Pen, Germany, they have already criminalized the alternative for Germany, which is the most popular party now in Germany, Considering actually banning it, Romanians voted the wrong way, and their election was annulled on this fraudulent claims of foreign involvement. The EU is pushing now for Orban's removal in Hungary.
The EU even sanctions its own citizens, denying money and travel, essentially making their own citizens hostages. And these efforts to continue to centralize power, you know, taking advantage of this crisis, we know how. It's a it's a very authoritarian process, and you get the feeling this is not the final station, that we're gonna continue down this path. So while they were very dismissive of Vance, the Europeans, I don't think that the the view of JD Vance and all The US has changed much. Indeed, in just in December, with the new US security strategy suggesting that perhaps The US should begin to cultivate opposition in Europe to get rid of some of these authoritarians.
Do you expect something similar to be played out this year as well?
Speaker 1: It'll be interesting to see what who who the head of the delegation is. I I don't know. Do you? Of the the senior person at Munich will be?
Speaker 0: No. I didn't see the American side. No.
Speaker 1: So it'll be interesting to see if they send another symbolic figure, like the vice president or a much more junior figure. Yeah. That'll say something. And then it is likely if it's a junior figure, it'll not be so much a political statement as a new sort of vision of some kind. It'll be a restatement of the principles of the new national security strategy, which we already know about.
What I don't expect to see is and and this is this is curious in a way or something worth thinking about. The EU leadership is rejecting multipolarity, rejecting the principle in favor the principle of looking toward a diverse and multipolar future in favor of looking backward to a hegemonic past in which they knew their role. The United States, however, is not looking forward either. It is not looking forward to playing a new role in a multipolar world. It is also looking backward to reestablishing hegemony with an emphasis not on obligation to its subordinates, to its the states that are tied to it in some sort of form of dependence, but rather going its own way, asserting its primacy and demanding obedience by those states with which it is it is tied economically and politically in treaty organizations.
So that's the real source of the friction, but it doesn't help the world order, doesn't help the world move toward multipolarity. And there could easily be times when The United States and Europe reach an accommodation to further delay and undermine the transition to a multipolar world. I see that as more likely than a willingness of this or any future American administration to truly think about the benefits that The United States might gain from a multicolor world.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, I I was gonna say that Marco Rubio is going though. So I'm guessing the delegation is led by Marco Rubio that Right. Well, there wouldn't be any well, I guess, I'm ex yeah. But
Speaker 1: Well, it could have been the NATO ambassador US ambassador to NATO. But, no, Morubio is a more senior figure, a more predictable figure, I think one who will speak probably less to the internal disagreements, the philosophical disagreements that exist between the EU and The United States and probably more on the secure from about security issues as The United States sees them and therefore, from Rubio's perspective, how the Europeans need to deal with them helping The United States to solve them for the Europeans.
Speaker 0: Yeah. That's it. I think the well, it seems like The United States essentially making wants wants to make the point to the Europeans that the old order they want to bring back, that it's over, that it's a new era. But but, of course, I think Marco Rubio will deliver this in a more, let's say, diplomatic manner than perhaps j JD Vance. But but I don't think that's enough for the Europeans, though, because you heard already from chancellor Mertz that, you know, we have to repair the transatlantic ties, you know, get the gang back together, and, well, essentially go back to the way things were.
But I think
Speaker 1: No. The Trump strategy, if they haven't figured out if Europeans haven't figured this out yet, I think probably other nations have, but the Trump strategy is to place especially dependent allies, and that's a very key point, allies that that the Americans feel are totally dependent on The United States before an inevitable choice. The inevitable choice being the one that The United States will graciously allow them to have. But first, they will point out all the reasons why the European leadership needs to abandon any other course than the one set out for them by The United States. And what's interesting when you look at examples like Greenland and the other complaints that America has made about Europe in terms of defense spending and other things.
The Europeans go along with this because of their fear. In other words, they as I said, to continue the analogy of the the dog sled, they're only interested in following the leader's butt. The rest of the world is too frightening for them to go out on their own or to Well, now we see perhaps Mertz, sometimes Macron, but mostly Mertz, you know, trying to argue that he's the new lead dog. Well, I frankly don't think enough time has passed since World War two for the majority of your Europeans to feel entirely comfortable with that choice?
Speaker 0: Well, I think the Europeans are too divided in too many ways, though. First of all, in terms of how they should deal with The United States because some said suggest that the the Europeans should just sacrifice more national interest and bow to The US hoping that they will be rewarded. And the other group of Europeans think it's necessary to diversify ties so they won't be captured by The US. In other words, you have other partners, then The US won't have that much leverage over the Europeans. But this
Speaker 1: That's a long term strategy. Yeah. In the short term, it's their actual policy is very similar to the first group, which only plays into America's hands, I think.
Speaker 0: Yeah. But it's also the expectations they have because some assume that as The United States packs up and, you know, reprioritizes its where to devote its resources now, so the Western Hemisphere and Asia, that this some believe that this will force the Europeans to integrate more than ever before, that now we'll finally move out of uncle Sam's basements and stand on their own feet. The other group thinks that, well, The US has always been the pacifier. So if The US leaves, then there's there's no way the Europeans will get along that much. I mean, you just said the Germans think that they're gonna be the top dog now in Europe with they're gonna build the largest conventional army, which I don't think any European countries look forward to this prospect.
Meanwhile, the French thinks that they should probably have a key lead, while the the the British obviously think that they are the junior partner of The US, something to connect, you know, the The US and the Europeans. So they all have their different views in terms of who should take leadership. And, again, this is what the American pacifier prevented or removed.
Speaker 1: So But the the question the the most the key point, I think, that you raised is the second group believes that so the first group is given a leader and an ideology they don't have to think about because it is provided to them by the the leader of The United States. The second group argues for an alternative position of the EU in world affairs, but what is it? What what is the EU vision of its role in the world? If it is essentially a liberal order like the one that The United that that they believe The United States used to be the leader of, then its only real competitor again is The United States. So they're not helping themselves, and I don't think there's enough of a commitment to I mean, I may be wrong, but I don't think there's much of an institutional commitment of the EU to having an in a real global presence and to fostering some sort of autonomous or independent EU agenda, the position that the current leadership of the EU has always been comfortable in is providing a little bit of extra funds, a little bit of extra support to whatever The United States vision and agenda was around the world, but not to take its own initiative because that would involve debating what the substance of an EU worldview might be.
It would be interesting to speculate what such a worldview might be because at its heart, given the diversity within the EU, which is not matched by anything in The United States, multipolarity should ring a bell in the hearts and minds of many European countries and achieve and and be seen as recognizable a alternative to hegemony. But at least I think for the current political leadership of the EU, they don't have the vision and therefore to establish some sort of individual identity distinct from The United States. And therefore, they they they can't compete. Again, it's not it's not they don't have the resources. They cannot compete because they have no intellectual vision of their role in the future.
And that's a much deeper problem for the EU that won't be resolved, well, until there's a sweeping change in the current political in the leadership of both national and EU, institutions.
Speaker 0: Yeah. No. I think that's a great point. And that was one of the benefits, for the Europeans to be led by Washington. That is they they could outsource this strategic thinking instead of coming up with competing ideas and resolving it.
And whatever Washington decided, it was sold in the language of, liberal democratic values, which would then unify and create consensus. The the problem now, of course, is the, yeah, the the there's no there's no vision anymore. So, they just and and they're just stuck with this empty rhetoric where everything they do is about values, and they keep reassure reassuring themselves that they are the champions of this liberal democratic ideals. But it does beg the question, though, do do you think the European Union could realistically position itself as an autonomous poll, or is this yeah. It it it's not how power politics work.
I mean, too many divisions.
Speaker 1: The the the problem is that there, as you say, there is no consensus within the EU on the role that the EU should play in foreign policy. The EU foreign policy structure is still still in its process really of of of coming into its own, and it and it competes sometimes directly with the foreign policy leadership of the national states. So in a way that is much more dramatic than, for example, in the financial sector where the banking system is structured under the European Central Bank, and there are budgetary limits, things like that. Now there are ways of getting around this, and there are always exceptions, but nevertheless the structure is in place. The EU in terms of its foreign policy still relies, has to rely, on the cooperation of national governments, and that makes it tremendously ineffective ultimately at coming up with a grand strategy because there is too much political diversity within the EU.
I'm sure that visionaries of a of a grand EU, an imperial EU, would want to see that go away and to insist, for example, that there be a united and therefore more forceful policy that could tap into the resources of individual states. But that will never be in the interests of individual states to concede that sort of that sort of power to central organizations like the EU. And the and the EU so the fight is on two levels, and it's very difficult to see how the EU can can overcome it. One level is the institutional level at which the EU bureaucracy does not have the strength to impose its will in areas like foreign policy or even defense policy. And on the other level, there is the simple matter of political diversity within you and nation states.
So nation states faced with the prospect of the EU becoming more intrusive and taking over more functions will fight more against it as well delaying the prospects, perhaps weakening it, perhaps leading, as some often speculate, to an unraveling of the of the EU. It's not it's it's not clear what the future will hold. But again, if I'm right in speculating that anti establishment the time will come when anti establish forces that are today considered antiestablishment will be in the majority, then that will also be accompanied by a weakening of EU institutions and the strengthening of national policies.
Speaker 0: I think it's a problem with the EU. There's too many of these internal contradictions because on one end, one gets the impression that the EU prefers weak national leaders because this makes it easier to rule from Brussels. But these weak leaders, they fail then to advance, you know, basic national interests. So you hollow out not just the, yeah, the political power in the nation states, but also their economic prowess. So it it hit and then it goes from it only gets weaker and weaker, and this the stability isn't really there.
And to a large extent, the EU is also based many of the EU projects is based on the idea that, you know, you don't let a good crisis go to waste. This is when you can centralize power. Indeed, this was part of the criticism of the euro because the euro was kind of conceptualized as a half built house. That is, you know, if you impose a monetary union, you can't really make it work without a fiscal union, and you can't have a fiscal union without a political union. But they never had consent for political union, so they just put the current common currency there.
Obviously, fiscal problems will come, then you will force through a fiscal union. And in order to have this, you have to force through a political union. So, essentially, predictably cause crisis, and in this crisis, there's an opportunity to centralize power. But but the problem is that
Speaker 1: compliance EU policy in Ukraine.
Speaker 0: Yeah. But there's a problem. Once there's a crisis, shows that the EU is a problem, in weakening the continent, this is used as a reason for giving them more power. So they keep saying we need more Europe when Europe is failing. It's a very strange and contradictory approach.
But, well, I'm I'm glad you brought up Ukraine because that was kind of my next question was, do you see Ukraine having strengthened or weakened than the internal cohesion of Europe? Because on one hand, Russia's the boogeyman is now seems to be the main unifier why why we can why 27 member states can have the same foreign policy. On the other hand, it has also increased dependencies. And, of course, this whole concept of a geopolitical EU is well, it's seemingly a disaster. So it's very hard I don't know how you assess this.
Is it going both ways?
Speaker 1: I think it pulls in different phases of the conflict. So at the very outset of the conflict, there was predictable rallying effect within Ukraine, and there was a largely predictable response of the EU to support Ukraine cautiously, but to look over their shoulder at The United States to see what they would do. And when the Biden administration said, yes. We're going in, and you can go in too, basically permitting the EU to to support The United States effort. And then then we had a combined and unified front against Russia.
But it but that unified front expected a rapid defeat of Russia. So now, without going into the technical details of who's winning at this point, the rhetoric has changed. At the very least, we could all see that the rhetoric has changed. And that specifically going back to the EU, the EU no longer talks about victory in real terms of Ukraine. It is talking about a ceasefire that preserves Ukraine's what what is left of Ukraine and now defining that as victory.
The victory is no longer pushing Russia out. The victory has now been defined as saving what can be saved in Ukraine. And this is a huge defeat for the EU if if one looks back even four years over what the original demand and policy was. And of course, a large part of that comes from the perceived withdrawal of The United States from the conflict. Although as many analysts point out, it has on the one hand rhetorically withdrawn, but on the other hand continues to provide essential intelligence and technical support when needed to Ukraine, whether that's to actually achieve a peace settlement or to drag it out is is at this point not entirely clear.
So the the strategy of the EU is again, to return to the first thing we talked about, a lack of strategy because the strategy that they had at the outset of the conflict has failed, but they have no alternative. And to this day there is no EU peace plan and apparently no group that in the within the entire EU structure that is tasked with the objective of devising a peace plan. Instead, all of this is given over to to Ukraine and to ostensibly follow what Ukraine says. But, of course, that's only a viable strategy so long as the all that the EU needs to provide is funding, and funding, by the way, that comes in drips and spurts. It's not a reliable source of funding that the EU provides to Ukraine.
And over the next two years, the amount that has been allocated to date, namely the €90,000,000,000 funding for two years, is about a quarter shy of the actual amount that Ukraine believes it needs to carry on essential state functions and continue the war at a minimum level. That's all. So the EU strategy is to basically wait. Wait for what? Well, we see maybe part of the answer in the new media campaign that we've seen over the last two months or so flooding major Western newspapers and media outlets.
The expectation, again, that the Russian economy will soon collapse. We just see article after article, which when you read them, they read as if they were from the same script. They're from the same small group of think tanks, and they are based on projections off of past trends, trends that are a month or two months in the making at the end of the year that we know are seasonal trends. So any serious analyst can look at these and say, Well, there's always a downturn in the fourth quarter, and then there's a recovery in the spring, and there are these cycles to economic life that every economist knows. But the fact that we are portraying these cyclical downturns as an inevitable as leading to inevitable ruin without ever talking about the measures that the Russian government has in the past successfully taken and is already beginning to take now to counter these first.
And secondly, without ever actually discussing in a comparative fashion how the same problems are affecting the Ukrainian economy, their own problems, leads to the distorted impression that seems to be the one that the EU wants to promote. Namely that if somehow the Ukraine with the EU's assistance can continue this devastating war for at least another year or so, well two years given the the budget outlay so far by the EU, then certainly this time unlike previous times, the Russian economy will indeed collapse and then I'm not sure what exactly is supposed to happen, but in some way shape or fashion Russia will withdraw or want to make major concessions, and that can be sold as a greater defeat of Russia than the current the current terms that are being discussed. And therefore, again, Ukraine is sorry. The EU is saying to Ukraine, keep fighting, keep dying. We'll pay most of the bills.
Speaker 0: So okay. We come full circle then. We're back to the Europeans' wishful thinking and strategic vacuum. That is keep fight a little bit longer and hope that, somehow Russia will just fall apart without Yeah.
Speaker 1: Well, the main thing
Speaker 0: clear how economic crisis what what actually a victory would look like. Yeah. Think if we're honest that the Russians sees this as an existential threat, we would have to reconsider some of these assumptions. But yeah.
Speaker 1: Yeah. The the main weakness of the current spate of articles about the imminent collapse of the Russian economy is not that we've seen this argument before, although that should be a cautionary signal to anyone, but that there is no actual new information here. And the information as it is provided is extremely one-sided. Every economy has its ups and downs. Economy is a is a is a complex organism that when one side of it becomes weak, other aspects, particularly in things like interest rates, lending patterns, things like that, foreign trade partners, they all step in to rebalance the structure.
So an actual economic collapse, whatever that may mean, and again it is telling that that is never defined, is is nearly impossible to envision in the modern world. Curiously, for all the rhetoric that EU leaders occasionally spout about Putin being unreasonable, unwilling congocean, etcetera, the assumption that they are making about the impact that the collapse of the of the Russian economy would have on its military strategy is based fundamentally on the reasonableness of Putin and the Russian leadership because they say, well, once costs of this amount have been imposed, a reasonable leader presumably like Putin will indeed decide to withdraw. So there is this two facedness about how European leaders actually view the Russian leadership. And again, there are persistent reports from both Russian sources as well as European sources now that France, and for example the French administration, if not Macron personally, but the French administration has in fact reached out and begun to reestablish high level political contacts with the Russian leadership. So that is also in the wind, although not being publicly discussed.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, I think that's an excellent point. Yeah. Betting on the reason of Putin, which they're warning that there is no reason. Yeah.
There was another contradiction coming out now as well. That is the German chancellor was making the point that Smurz was saying that, you know, two years ago, Orban went to Moscow. He didn't have a mandate, you know, because the prime minister of Hungary needs permission. And and to talk to to Putin and achieve nothing. So what's the point of talking to Russia?
This was more or less the argument. But, of course, he said at the same time, you have Macron now looking to set up diplomatic ties. So there's no I think this is another indicator of the strategic vacuum that they're just punching all in different directions.
Speaker 1: Right. And seeing what sticks.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, thank you very much for sharing your insights on this. It's, yeah. To summarize, The US is seeking to revive dominant position for itself in the international system by shuffling reshuffling the deck, and the Europeans are running around like headless chickens. So
Speaker 1: If I could summarize something I sort of a one phrase that I want to emphasize, it is that the EU and The United States do share a great deal in terms of their of their political vision, but it is essentially backward looking. And it's in the but they have different visions of what they are trying to get back to, and that's going to lead to conflict even though it is backward looking, which is not a good thing in either case. By contrast, the multipolar view promoted by the BRICS nations, including in particular Russia, is forward looking. It's looking to some alternative to what was in the past. And therefore, I think that makes it ultimately more promising because it is more hopeful.
Speaker 0: Yeah. But, again, there comes the contradiction. I don't think it's possible for the Europeans to consider a multipolar system within the format of bricks because they keep looking backwards. I mean, I I've suggested that perhaps the the Europeans should consider, you know, even joining BRICS as well as the Americans. But this was seen as interpret as let's join the Warsaw Pact, you know, because they see this this block versus this block.
So going back to the Cold War, I tried to make the point that the BRICS isn't a block. That is the you know, The UAE and Iran aren't in a block. India and China aren't in a block. It's it that that's not the point. But, again, they they keep looking backwards, so there's no
Speaker 1: They keep looking for someone to discipline them. And the BRICS world, the multipolar world, is less disciplined in many respects, but it is in some ways easier it will be diplomatically easier to reach accords because questions that are values issues, axiological issues, issues of what gives you the right to have the kind of government that you have within the BRICS context, within a multipolar context are off the table. And those are the main sources today of conflict in the world.
Speaker 0: Well, yet again, let me thank you for letting me pick your brain, and have a great weekend.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Thank you. You too. Good.
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
Ian Proud: Economic Reset with Russia to Save Europe https://youtu.be/MZpF1IAVPjY https://t.co/trN0rtbXu8
Video Transcript AI Summary
Ian Proud argues that while ending the war and accelerating Ukraine’s EU membership are important, there is a missing focus on the future relationship with Russia and a broader, Pan-European security framework. He notes that Europe is already experiencing economic decline as energy policy shifts away from cheap Russian energy toward more expensive sources, which he says contributes to factory closures and cost-of-living pressures. He warns that simply ending the war or admitting Ukraine into the EU could result in a hostile, “anti-Russia” posture within Europe, unless the long-term security architecture is reset.
He emphasizes two key consequences of the Ukraine crisis since 2014: (1) Europe’s energy and economic policies are driving a decline, partly due to cutting off cheap energy from Russia; (2) focusing only on ending the war and integrating Ukraine into Europe risks creating a new, hostile dynamic with Russia if the relationship is not normalized. Without addressing the future Russia-Europe relationship, he suggests Europe could end up with a remilitarized Europe and higher defense spending, while postponing a durable settlement.
Regarding peace negotiations, Proud argues for a treaty-based, comprehensive approach to pan-European security rather than only ceasefire promises. He contends that peace cannot be achieved by refusing to discuss Russia’s security concerns or by treating Ukraine’s EU accession as a standalone solution. He traces a long history of failed attempts at a broader European security architecture—from Helsinki Accords to the OSCE and the 2005 Common Space—showing that NATO expansion and Western reluctance to embrace a wider security framework undermined these efforts. He asserts that “the red line” on Ukraine’s status was drawn too late and that a durable peace requires a broader security settlement that includes Russia and the European Union, not just NATO.
If advising Putin, Proud suggests pushing for a broader, treaty-based agreement on future pan-European security, rather than accepting merely tacit assurances or expanding NATO. He argues that Ukraine’s EU membership could become “NATO light,” potentially achieving the same military posture as a formal alliance but under EU institutions, thus reinforcing Moscow’s concerns. He calls for a comprehensive accord that reorganizes European security within a broader framework—reinstating indivisible security, sovereign equality, and an integrated approach to security that encompasses Russia, the EU, and potentially broader Eurasian arrangements. He warns that without such a deal, the conflict risks a prolonged stalemate and a dangerous re-escalation.
Proud notes that the atmosphere around diplomacy is terribly toxic, with Western leaders and institutions increasingly sidelining Russia from formal talks. He criticizes the Munich Security Conference for excluding Russia from diplomacy and laments the overemphasis on military solutions and the symbolic, sometimes confrontational rhetoric by European leaders (for example, chancellor statements about arming Europe and projecting suffering onto Russia). He argues that Europe’s foreign policy today is driven by a single objective—defeating Russia—and that this approach has left Europe economically and strategically paralyzed.
Towards the end, Proud cautions that post-war Europe will face a transition to a multipolar world, where the United States will shift priorities toward Asia and the Western Hemisphere. He questions Europe’s readiness to engage in a multipolar order and stresses the need for Europe to reestablish normal relations with Russia to avoid a new Berlin Wall-like division. He also critiques the perception of Ukraine’s resilience and Zelensky’s role, suggesting that Europe should develop its own foreign policy vision rather than being dominated by Kyiv’s stance.
Overall, the dialogue centers on the necessity of a broad, treaty-based security framework for Europe that includes Russia and the EU, a genuine normalization of relations, and diplomacy that moves beyond ceasefires and symbolic gestures to a lasting peace architecture.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Welcome back. We are joined today by Ian Proud, a British diplomat. Between 1999 and 2023, he was a senior officer and also the economic counselor at the British Embassy in Moscow between 2014 and 2019. He's also the host of the popular podcast, the Peacemonger, and I will leave a link to it in the description. So thank you, Ian, for coming back on.
Speaker 1: Thanks, Glenn. It's really nice to see you again.
Speaker 0: Likewise. You also have a a Substack, by the way, which is definitely worth reading. And I saw your article there now recently with the title, without an economic reset with Russia, a peace deal for Ukraine might might may render, Britain and Europe weakened relics of a unipolar past. I was wondering if you could, yeah, perhaps, present the argument. Why is this economic reset with Russia of such great necessity?
Speaker 1: Well, the the first thing I'll say thanks, Quinn. The first thing I'll say is that a lot of the focus now is on negotiations to end the war, right, to to end the fighting and the killing and all those terrible things, which frankly should have stopped a month after the war began at the start of 2022. And and that is a really, really important process because it's long overdue, quite frankly. And I hope it kinda bears fruit, although, frankly, I'm skeptical that it will in the next kinda few months at least, but let's let's see. Within the context of that, there's also discussion about accelerating Ukraine's membership of the EU, which is fraught with all sorts of kind of problems, of course, because it's nowhere near completing, you know, even half of the kind of 33 chapters that it needs to kind of meet the aqueue and all the rest of it.
And not not to mention the fact that it is still fighting a war, so any attempts to kinda do reforms have been put on ice and will remain so until kinda the war finishes. So anyway, but trying to accelerate, you know, Ukraine into EU, which, you know, in principle might not be a bad thing. I think there's as I said, there there are lots of challenges around that. In all of this process, one thing that's missing really apart from what the Americans are doing so trilaterally with Ukraine and Russia is is any real discussion about the future relationship with Russia. It's all about ending the war, which is good.
It's all about normalizing and rebuilding Ukraine, also good, possibly joining the EU.
Speaker 0: You know, I think that's
Speaker 1: gonna be quite a complicated process, but, you know, potentially good in the long term. Nobody's really talking about what will the future relationship with Russia is going to be, and of course, there there are two aspects to that. You know, firstly, one of the consequences of war and actually really the Ukraine crisis which started in 2014 is that Europe is going into economic decline because as a matter of policy choice, it is cutting itself off of access to cheap energy and instead choosing more expensive energy from The US instead, which is causing factories to close, you know, in Germany and across the kind of continent, which is causing ordinary people to face cost of living crises, you know, and that sort of thing. So, you know, that is a direct policy consequence of actually cutting links, you know, with with Russia, given its plentiful supply of cheap energy, you know, and so on. And the second challenge, you know, for Europe is that actually, if you only talk about ending the war and incorporating Ukraine into Europe, which, you know, may not necessarily be, you know, a bad thing, but you don't talk about the relationship with Russia, what you risk ending up with is a situation in which, you know, as with the poll, you know, Poland and the Baltic States, you have a very, very antagonistic Ukraine joining the European Union that wants to maintain an essentially hostile posture towards Russia.
And through that, you know, all you're doing really is pressing pause on the much bigger wall with with Russia as Europe remilitarizes and, you know, pushes towards 5% of GDP and defense spending. So unless you really try to address in a holistic way, you know, how how Ukraine can be normalized, how the war can end, and how, you know, you reset relations with Russia, you know, longer term, we may simply be storing up problems for ourselves in terms of Europe, you know, pressing for a much some more damaging war with with Russia in the long term.
Speaker 0: Well, this is why the I find the the recipe for how to resolve the war is so interesting because what you hear from the Europeans more or less is, well, you just have to do a ceasefire. Stop fighting, and then everything would be fine. You know, they would, of course, then begin to pump in weapons. They would perhaps send their troops, and there wouldn't be any political settlement. So this is why I'm curious.
Well because when the Russians, they say a peace deal has to address the root causes, Well, for them, you know, you can address the root causes. Well, if you put yourself in the shoes of the Russians, to some extent, you have to address what has happened since even 1945, that is when, Europe was divided. Again, some of this was resolved thirty years later in at least the main format at the Helsinki Accords in 1975, and they said, okay. Here we have the how how we can make east and west work together. We build on it.
And then this was, of course, how the Gorbachev started doing this common European home. In 1990, we finally had agreement for the charter of a the the the charter of Paris for a new Europe. This was, you know, one year after the Cold War. Now we would have indivisible security. We would have sovereign equality, a Europe without dividing lines, all these ideas.
We, again, took these ideas from 1990 and the Helsinki Accords, built the OSCE in '94. So we're always on this path building on what came before. And now and then, of course, that's why NATO expansion, I think, is so devastating for them because that canceled the entire project of a pan European secure architecture, which would end dividing lines and be able to facilitate this, you know, indivisible security. And but even then, we the it hasn't moved in thirty years. That is the Russians, both Yeltsin and Putin said, you know, we can join NATO.
They weren't they there were no such things forthcoming. The EU and Russia, they had this common space agreement back in 2005, but, you know, they agreed that they would harmonize integration efforts towards the common neighborhood, but that was breached before the, you know, ink was dry. Almost 2008, the Russians proposed this pan European security architecture. You know, NATO could be preserved, but it has to be under this wider umbrella. The Europeans and and Americans didn't really wanna discuss this at all.
The Russians proposed the EU Russia Union back in 2010. They didn't wanna hear about this either. And everyone knew that at least no Ukraine. This is the red line, as William Byrne said, the reddest of all red lines. And yet, we did it.
We have the conflict, so we tried to solve it. The Minsk agreement, seven years, turns out to be a fraud. Istanbul, it was sabotaged. And I guess where I'm going, given this whole history, you look at the root causes, the inability to for the West to want to develop a Europe based on indivisible indivisible security. If you were advising president Putin now, you're sitting in Moscow, what would you tell him?
Would you say, well, now they're ready. Now they want to make peace. They want to have a Europe where we respect each other's security, where one side shouldn't enhance its security at the other side, Or would you think that anything anything the Europeans come with now will be a temporary pause to rearm and prepare to strike again pretty much? I know I just I can understand why the Russians are are critical, which is why I'm saying the it seems like the Europeans, in order to have a peace, we have to be we should go a little bit deeper than just a ceasefire. We have to at least you know, we don't have to meet the Russians on everything, but there's no recognition even that this has very deep roots, this failure to end this block politics and accept an inclusive security format.
I was just wondering how you would do you see any prospect that would put anything else in place than a temporary halt to what we've seen over the past decades?
Speaker 1: Well, Putin has played hardball. That has been his political strategy so far. That's absolutely clear in terms of not settling an end to the conflict until he gets clear treaty based commitments about about the future and discussion of that is ongoing right now. And if I were to advise him, I'd say that actually that strategy of playing hardball is working because, you know, just accepting tacit assurances, for example, NATO expansion, which at this stage is not nearly enough actually, there needs to be something much bigger than than just NATO expansion. I'll come on to that in a minute.
Just accepting tacit assurances won't won't work anymore, and the Russians should stick to something which I know that they want because Russia's ambassador to The UK has actually told me so. They want some sort of treaty based agreement on the future. And whereas maybe at the start of the war, that should only deal with actually the kind of the the root causes of the conflict itself, the NATO expansion, you know, and that sort of thing. I think now the terms need to be much broader in terms of pan European security Because I think without that, you know, I think actually, Ukraine going into into the EU is just like NATO light now, frankly, because EU and NATO, goals are now almost indistinguishable from each other. Indeed, there was a Harvard professor, I think, last week in Project Syndicate, you know, magazine.
They're saying, well, actually, on the back of recent concerns, for example, in Central Europe, Europe should actually devolve more economic competence back to its member states, which, you know, actually I think is probably quite a good idea on the back of the blockage, for example, of the Mercosur trade deal and so on. But one trade off for that is to kind of centralize more common foreign and security policy, which immediately rang sort of arm bells, you know, for me because with massive increases in NATO spending commenced 5% with a greater centralization of decision making power in the European Commission under common reform policy and security in the future. Actually, Ukrainian membership of the EU therefore becomes NATO light, which, you know, while Russia may secure a treat a treaty commitment not to expand NATO. They may actually have de facto NATO expansion anyway by the Ukraine joining the EU. So the point being that actually in any kind of treaty that is discussed to end the conflict, there needs to be a much bigger, you know, agreement on the future of pan European security, you know, within that, which includes both obviously Russia's commitments, but also includes European Union's, not just NATO's, but the European, you know, Union's commitments to that and some sort of pan Euro Asian agreement through Congress to kind of manage interrelationships including on the economic side, you know, in terms of reopening up of of links and the breaking down of barriers that have been created by by the conflict.
So a much bigger a much bigger treaty now is needed, I think, and and Putin should actually play hardball and stick to that as a condition for sort of ending the war because half promises now and if you listen to anything that people like Mertz and and Kai Calais and Ikir Starman say, there's no obvious commitment that, you know, they have any faith in in the process or they want really to kind of offer any sort of compromise to the Russian side at all. So I think hardball is the way that he should continue to play. And the reason I say that because a, without that, he just won't actually. He'll just end up back in the situation, you know, before even the Ukraine crisis started. A new cold war, a new sort of iron curtain, you know, will have been created and actually the the tension across here will be even worse than it was, you know, before 2014, which long term will will not be in in Russia's interests.
And but he'll know that by playing hardball as well, you know, Europe will start to kind of creek under the financial pressure of maintaining the war, you know, which, you know, will continue for as long as Europe hold out on any sort of a deal. So I still think that even though Russia is feeling economic pain, he understands that actually Europe is feeling more economic pain and will take the gamble on actually sort of hanging out the war a bit longer to get this sort of treaty deal, which I think he believes meets Russia's needs.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, thought about the EU membership as well, and I I I think on the one hand, I think it would be a good consolidation price or for for the Ukrainians because, you know, they they lost a lot in this war. The, yeah, the economy, the human you know, the male population, so many people have fled not coming back. And at some point, people are gonna ask, what was this all about? If, you know, they could have gotten a much better deal with, you know, Minsk, with Istanbul.
You know, every day gets worse and worse. So I you I don't think any peace where one side is completely humiliated is stable in any way. And, also, I guess, all fairness, while I think much of this conflict was manufactured, Ukraine has very reasonable security concerns, about Russia. So I'm thinking it wouldn't be an the EU could be a a good solution as a middle way. The problem is that the EU used to be seen by the Russians as being the good West versus NATO, which had The United States in it, was the bad West.
But the the EU has changed so much, though, over the past few years now. It's become so militant, so aggressive. You've probably seen chancellor Mertz at Munich Security Conference, you know, boasting about how he he has a post unsuffer well, unprecedented suffering on the Russians. And, you know, the this only way this can stop is when they break the Russians. I mean, it's this kind of language from a German chancellor.
You know, he wants to have the largest army again in Europe. It's, yeah, it's it's not the same Europe as as in the past, the same EU. But but I I can see why the Russians would probably make some good concessions if they would be getting some kind of a settlement, some treaty, some agreement because there's so so many other conflicts which are lined up unless we address, you know, the root causes. Even once Keith Kellogg, he made this point that a deal would have to probably also include NATO's relationship with Moldova and Georgia, given that this is something that, you know, again, is part of the root causes because it looks like we can have another fight over the large Finland frontline now, the Arctic becoming more militarized, the Baltic Sea, the threats which were made against Kaliningrad, possible efforts to regime change Belarus. I mean, there's so many possible flashpoints we have now.
But but but you did mention, though, that the Russians want something else besides NATO now. Is this what you were alluding to? Or
Speaker 1: Yeah. Well, what I what I meant was was actually, you know, without some, you know, without some deal, which takes us back to the the the beginning, sort of regulating Russia's relationship with the European Union, which has become practically indistinguishable from NATO now, particularly at a time when the when the Americans are looking to pull away from NATO and essentially kind of just have, you know, a much bigger kind of European NATO, you know, replacing it as it focuses on on China. The point is that actually, even if you even if you get NATO to kind of signal and formally, you know, attest in some sort of treaty that it won't expand further to the East, Ukraine joining the EU may simply be NATO light anyway, you know, because if you look at Callis and Kubilius and all these kind of dreadful, dull potentates in in Brussels, It's hard to distinguish what they say from what what Marwata says in terms of militarization and that sort of thing. So a very antagonistic bruised, resentful Ukraine joining the EU may have the same net effect as an antagonistic bruised and hurt Ukraine joining NATO, you know, in terms of how the Russians see it.
And I also think actually, you know, that so so so there needs to be some sort of deal with with the European Union on it's always been the case right from the start of this conflict that actually the Ukraine's best future was having closer relations with Europe and maintaining close relations with Russia, and that has never really really changed. If Ukraine goes into the EU, but the EU doesn't have any sort of normalization with Russia. You just have a new Berlin Wall, effectively, new sort of iron curtain and that sort of thing between, you know, Russia and the rest of Europe. So the the economic piece is vital to that. You need to open up borders so people can move freely, restore flights, you know, and all the rest of it.
So buy buy Russian gas. Not because Russia needs Europe to buy their gas, but I mean, I I just think it because they've shifted a lot of their exports, of course, to to Asia. But it just in terms of the normalization of relations helping to kind of boost Europe's economy as well, opening up reopening up people to people links, you know, across Eurasia. All of these things can help to moderate the the the really toxic at the moment relationships that exist. So that that's what what that's what I meant.
EU membership is basically NATO light. And so that for that reason, you know, Putin should be seeking a much broader kind of treaty. And that's why whether we like it or not, whether I mean, and I I I'm embarrassed, frankly, by by some of the people leading both the institutions of Europe and European nations as well, including Merz, Macron, and Starman. Actually, Europe has to play a role in the negotiation at some point, even if that role is only to kind of have a treaty on their future relations with Russia after Ukraine joins. That's what I meant.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, how much you mentioned that the atmosphere now is quite toxic here. Do do you see any willingness, though, to move forward on this? Because in order to reach any peace, one would have to discuss the mutual security guarantees. I don't see I mean, if you listen to the people of, like, Callas, and I I, of course, understand she's one of the more radical elements within the EU, but, you know, they're saying very openly that Russia does need security guarantees.
It's the aggressor Ukraine needs because it's the victim. I mean, this is the intellectual level of these people if they actually mean what they're saying. But also the whole concept of having some inclusive diplomacy. Again, at this Munich Security Conference, Mertz made the comment that, well, what's the point of talking to the Russians? Orban tried to do it two years ago, and he didn't achieve anything.
So why what's the point? There's no point of talking. I mean, this is this is a country that came up with the Uzpolitik. You know? This is it's just disgraceful, but but but they all frame it as if this is somehow in Ukraine's interest.
But, you know, as long as they don't talk to Ukraine, the country continues to burn. It's Yeah. It's just the whole idea that a peace agreement has to be accepted by both sides because we had four years of all these peace summits where they didn't even invite the Russians. Remember the
Speaker 1: Well, yeah.
Speaker 0: Switzerland talked about breaking up Russia in pieces. I mean, they called it a peace summit. It's just it's it's really, yeah, strange.
Speaker 1: And it and it hasn't changed. No. You know, the the Munich Security Conference doesn't have the world's largest nuclear power attending it. It doesn't, you know, Russia isn't included. Russia is not welcome in in forms for diplomacy, and in any case, the Munich Security Conference is no longer a form for, you know, for for diplomacy, quite frankly, if you look at some of the bizarre things, you know, that that that people say.
And, you know, we've made Ukraine a far bigger asset than it really is. You know, Ukraine is a large by geography kind of country, but not huge, you know, by, you know, by, you know, population and and, you know, objectively poor and functionally bankrupt with, you know, resources, but not a huge kind of wealth of of resources in its society, broken cities, largely depopulated, a massive demographic crisis facing it. I mean, and you know, that we invite them to these big grand global events like their royalty and and, you know, exclude Russia. So we're in a position where, you know, talking talking to the Russians is just seen as as unnecessary despite the fact that Russia is appears to be navigating the turbulence of conflict in terms of the economic sort of consequences, but also the political consequences in terms of Russia's standing in the wider developing world, you know, better than Europe. We've collectively got our heads, you know, in the sand that if we carry on doing what we've been doing, and I've been saying this all along, if we carry on doing what we've been doing since 2014, which is not talking to Russia, eventually things will be fine, but they really aren't they really aren't fine.
We have to get back to diplomacy, as you say, inclusive diplomacy. We have to talk to the Russians. Now, there is a small shaft of light at the end of the tunnel after about six months of discussing it. You know, the Europeans are nudging in tiny steps towards, you know, somebody in Europe actually having a dialogue with with Putin. That could be Macron, that could be Alexander Stubb.
It definitely won't be Kai Callus because, you know, the Russians won't agree to that, of course. But it's taken them months to agree that, and they haven't even agreed. I mean, that that maybe somebody should talk to the Russians. If it takes them that long to agree, who should actually have any sort of dialogue with, you know, are these children? This is this is not school.
This is like the most dangerous kind of war since for us in Europe since the end of World War two. You know, are they are they school children like deciding what who should talk to that nasty person over there? Maybe it should be you, maybe it should be me. Oh, no. Let's don't Let's not do it because he's too scary.
I mean, this is ridiculous. I mean, if it takes them this long to decide who can talk to Putin, how long is it gonna take them to decide what they actually discuss, you know, and what the agenda should be and what Europe's position is in any future dialogue with Russia. It's ridiculous. And that that's why I think that war will run on until 2027. You know, Europe have borrowed the money to kind of lend Ukraine another 90,000,000,000, so they're covered until the middle of next year.
They don't really they fail, you know, They don't need to talk to Putin before then. They just give them some breathing room. And they're so slow to agree anything on dialogue with Russia that things would just drag on. I mean, that's you know, I see nothing to suggest otherwise, I'm afraid to say.
Speaker 0: Yeah. This is, like, parody, the having discussions among themselves whether or not to talk to the opponent. I mean, this is diplomacy now. Just a bunch of guys sitting in a room who agrees with each other Yeah. Discussing whether or not to even talk to the other side.
It's the the problem is at some point, you do need the Europeans to be brought in because you Yeah. Sometimes European security architecture without talking to the Europeans.
Speaker 1: But but
Speaker 0: they just seem to exclude themselves, this obsession with ex with isolating Russia. I mean, the whole world now is dealing with Russia, be it the Chinese, Indians, now Yeah. Even The United States. It's just the Indians. So what what is the point here?
I this whole dream in 2022 to isolate Russia internationally, I mean, at some point, you have to accept failure. This is if yeah. Alright. Just a last wider question, though. I was gonna ask about those 800,000 troops as well, but I guess that falls under the yeah.
How they perceive what peace to be. That is 800,000 Ukrainian troops in peacetime. I mean, it's hard to see the Russians agreeing to this as well. But but the wider question was, how do you think Europe is capable now of adjusting to a multipolar world? Because in a multipolar world, The United States have other priorities.
They can't be everywhere, they have to, again, focus on the Western Hemisphere and Asia. Yeah. And the the Europeans, they don't seem to have much that many common interests besides the, you know, the the war in Ukraine now. I mean, what happens when the war comes to an end? You know, how will the Europeans agree on some money that has to be returned to Russia?
What would happen with EU unity? What would they do about United States now seeing this is solved and they can intensify their pivot? I mean, can they can they afford peace? How how how do you think Europe can adjust to multiple world goals? Again, we both live here in Europe.
We would like to see Europe having some success here, but, I I just don't see, any plans.
Speaker 1: Well, I was gonna say exactly the same thing. I mean, I live in Europe a bit large in in The United Kingdom as as part of the bigger kind of concept of of Europe, of course. I mean, anything I say is about the stability of Europe itself. I don't say these things because I want, you know, Russia to benefit. I wish Russia no harm, you know, by the way, but but my thoughts and my proposals are rooted in what would be good for Great Britain and what would be good for, you know, Europe as a whole, including, I suppose, in some respects, you know, Russia too, but that's not my primary concern.
You know, the I mean, on the sort of tactical point of of the 800,000, well, Ukraine said we can't afford that. Is it you know, and in any case, when the war ends, won't they need all their young men to be doing some some sort of productive labor rather than sitting around in barracks polishing their boots, you know, know, waiting for another kind of war? I mean, sure surely, they'll need as many men and women as as possible actually sort of working in their economy to kind of regret again rather than sitting around in uniforms, hey, buy Brussels because Ukraine won't be able to afford to to buy that to pay for that itself. There's absolutely no sign that that Europe wants to pivot to a multipolar world at the moment. It it has become a single issue foreign policy, and that single issue is defeating Russia and it's failing at that.
You know, it's trying to have free trade agreements. They can't even agree those because it's coming up against national sovereignty where certain countries block them, you know, block deals. You know, Europe is paralyzed. Europe is in the state of absolute paralysis, you know, right now. And for its sake, not just for Russia's sake, but for Europe's sake, they need to have a normal relationship with, you know, with Russia.
And it's it's blindingly obvious and and sting them in the face, and yet they can't see it. Part of the problem is, I hate to say this, part of the problem is Zelensky. I think they've overinvested in him as such that, you know, they can't let him go despite all of his kind of failings. I mean, I heard Zelensky in the political interview, I don't know if you saw it, making some bizarre, you know, comment about needing compromise while, you know, Russia have had all the compromise that they need because Putin is not in jail. Well, this is this is not the comment of a serious states person.
This is the comment of somebody who's clinging onto power and will do anything that actually makes people in Brussels smile. You know, he's just a comedian and a joker and a performer, but he's not actually running his country very well. Zelenskyy is running his country apportingly badly. If he really cared about Ukraine, he would agree for the war to end because Ukraine is losing, it's becoming more bankrupt. And in the process, Europe is becoming more bankrupt too, or at least de industrializing and getting into economic decay.
But it's because Europeans continue to kind of humor him as a little kind of pet project. They can't, you know, engage with the fact that actually, you know, Ukraine will be better off without Zelensky. You know, the the that that you know, while Zelensky is in the room saying all these kind of comedic and hostile things about Russia, you know, I see no prospect of of, you know, Europe's coming up with its own ideas on foreign policy because Yurich's foreign policy is driven by Vladimir Zelensky. That's that's how I see it. I mean, that's how it appears.
You know, he he has outsized influence in the process, and unless you kind of break those bonds, unless, you know, the Europeans can actually come up with their own ideas for what their foreign policy should be, blanking out the white noise that comes from bank over, then they are screwed, I'm afraid to say, you know, because they just lack ideas, and they're overcommitted to a fell pod that they can't get out of.
Speaker 0: When this war comes to an end, though, a whole new chapter begins because there there might be some not just collapse in Ukraine, but it's also interesting to see what's gonna happen to the EU because if defeating Russia is the only like you said, that's the only foreign policy there is now, Well, what what direction will it take thereafter? You know? No. It's gonna be quite interesting. But, you know, Zelensky is not the only one making these comments.
Kayakalas also said that Well, no. After, like, a war as a peace agreement should include reducing the size of the Russian army. I mean, this is the losing side seeking to dictate the terms on the winning side. And and she's saying this at the same time as the Germans and the rest are talking about arming themselves to the teeth. Yeah.
Yeah. So it is just
Speaker 1: And you know what make it
Speaker 0: a sense. But everyone has to nod along and say, Of course. Of course. Otherwise, you are disloyal, and you are a Russian asset because the only way you can show patriotism in Europe now is to bang on the same drum that, you know, if it's bad for Russia, it's good for us. This is then this is the whole logic.
It's Yeah. Yeah.
Speaker 1: Yeah. And and you know what? I mean, you know, she's the person that Plitico and and, you know, the Financial Times and The Telegraph and all these kind of mainstream Europeans have, you know, talking all the time on the TV all the time, talking this nonsense because that's what the market will bear and and Russians are not in the room to present their case. So I mean, that that is why, you know, European citizens, you know, are so drugged on the endless propaganda that comes out of her through the mainstream media, and that that is how that is how the system works, you know. She doesn't say this because she thinks it's true.
She's and failing foreign policy. And, actually, people love to hear what she has to say, and that, unfortunately, is a very cynical, but I'm afraid very realistic take on on why, you know, we're in such a dreadful state in Europe right now. People people like her, she's she's not a cause. She's a symptom of the cancer, if you like, you know, that is eating up our internal foreign policy mechanisms.
Speaker 0: Well, if people wanna see how bad things have become in Europe, just tune in and watch this
Speaker 1: Watch Guy Kells.
Speaker 0: Conference. It is just, it's ridiculous. I I mean, it's so beyond absurd, and this is supposed to be the most respectable security conference there is. Yeah.
Speaker 1: Yeah. I mean, you get better foreign policy by going to the Edinburgh Fringe Comedy Festival, quite frankly. I hate to say it, but, I worry that it might be true.
Speaker 0: Mhmm. Well, thank you for taking some time out of your day, and I appreciate your insights, and, keep on writing those articles. So
Speaker 1: Yeah. I was gonna say, Glenn, it should should I don't know if our wife should be worried that we're talking to each other on Valentine's Day, but it's always it's always nice to talk to you.
Speaker 0: Thank you. Yeah. I should get back to the missus. Thank you.
Speaker 1: Me too. Take care. Bye for now. Bye.
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
Jeffrey Sachs: Four Years of War in Ukraine - Hegemony or Peace? https://youtu.be/h7WmEAu87WE https://t.co/kB5RGNh8hQ
Video Transcript AI Summary
Jeffrey Sachs and the host discuss the four-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and reference the 12-year anniversary of the NATO-backed coup in Ukraine. They frame the conflict as humanitarian and strategic disaster, arguing it risks Europe and potentially nuclear escalation. They question why the war persists given high stakes.
Sachs argues the war started from Western delusions in the 1990s that the US could bring Russia into a US-led world and reduce Russia to a secondary power or even fragment it. He cites Zbigniew Brzezinski’s 1990s predictions of a divided Russia as evidence of “triumphalism” and says when Russia resisted Western demands after 2014 and 2022, those resistances were used by Western politicians to justify prolonging the conflict. He condemns Boris Johnson for saying Ukraine could not sign a peace with Russia without threatening Western hegemony, calling the situation “millions of lives” lost over a game of Western dominance. He characterizes European leaders as complicit, noting resistance to NATO enlargement in Europe but eventual acquiescence, and criticizes German leadership (Merkel, Scholz, and Scholz’s successor, Mertz/Merz?—context suggests Olaf Scholz and then Olaf Scholz and Friedrich Merz) for lack of truthful or constructive intervention. He emphasizes that the push for NATO enlargement and the Maidan coup signaled a failure by Europe to prevent war, with specific reference to the 2008 Bucharest Summit (NATO enlargement), the 2014 Maidan coup and the 2015 Minsk agreements, which Sachs claims Germany and France did not enforce. He asserts Merkel initially resisted but capitulated on enlargement, and that Minsk II was treated as a holding period to build Ukraine’s strength for war, a point he attributes to Merkel’s later statements. He argues Germany bears high responsibility as the largest EU member and a central actor in these decisions.
Sachs then discusses what could have prevented the war, arguing that Germany should have counseled peace with Putin and engaged directly with the goal of avoiding escalation. He asserts that Merkel, Merkel’s successors, and the German leadership failed to prevent the conflict, calling for German initiative to seek peace.
The conversation shifts to the possibility of negotiated settlement. The host notes Russia views NATO expansion and Ukraine’s invasion as existential threats, while Ukraine sees an existential threat from the invasion. The host asks what settlements might look like and what role the US and Europe should play. Sachs reiterates Germany as the key actor and calls for direct diplomacy between Germany and Russia to explore peace, suggesting a need for a political settlement and a reconsideration of Ukraine’s status.
Sachs expands the discussion to global order. He references Brzezinski’s The Grand Chessboard, describing how Russia’s shift toward Eurasia and China challenged Western assumptions. He argues the West’s sanctions failed to keep Russia aligned with Europe, pushing Russia toward China and India, and turning the world toward multipolarity. He characterizes the US as a declining hegemon and Europe as demoralized and divided, with BRICS and other regions seeking prosperity through partnerships with China, India, and Russia. He argues that Europe should move away from Russophobia and toward collective security.
The hosts touch on Joe Biden’s 1997 Atlantic Council remarks and Joseph Chamberlain’s imperial rhetoric as examples of misjudgments about global power dynamics. Sachs concludes by underscoring the need for a more realistic approach to the world order to avoid further conflict, and the host agrees to continue the discussion in the future.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Welcome back to the program. We are joined again by professor Jeffrey Sachs to discuss the four year anniversary of Russia invading Ukraine. That was on February 24 in 2022. It's, also, to some extent, the twelve year anniversary of, the NATO backed coup in Ukraine on 02/22/2014, which, well, can be argued triggered this war to begin with. So thank you very much for coming back on the program.
Speaker 1: Sad that we're still talking about this war and that it's still going on after all this time. Really amazing.
Speaker 0: I agree. This is yeah. This war has been just a disaster on all levels. Of course, it's a humanitarian disaster, especially for Ukraine, and it's also been a strategic disaster that is destroying Europe and will continue to take us closer and closer to a possible nuclear war. So given that we have these, yeah, two anniversaries now, why why do you think this war is still going on with so much at stake, so much destruction?
Speaker 1: Well, the starting point is that, The US assumed that it would never get to war. This whole debacle, this whole disaster starts with the ideas in the nineteen nineties that at the end of the Cold War, The US reigned supreme, and it could bring Russia into a a US led world. That was the basic idea. And that, in fact, not only could it bring Russia into a US led world, it would reduce Russia, to a third rate power, maybe divide Russia. Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was the most articulate of all of these delusionists, wrote in the nineteen nineties that perhaps Russia would fall apart into three weekly confederated states, a European Russia, a Siberian Russia, and a Far Eastern Russia.
This was triumphalism. The idea was that The US was unchallenged and unchallengeable, and that, therefore, there wouldn't be war. Russia would exceed to whatever demands The United States made. And when Russia did not exceed to whatever demands The United States made, this was the reason that the war went on. And when Russia proved that it could resist what the United States and Europe thought would be a crushing blow to Russia after 2014 and after 2022.
And Russia resisted that and proved that the Western power was less than was thought, this became in itself for these politicians the necessary reason to fight on. Boris Johnson, is one of the real criminals in all of this, real culprit of this war, said in an interview that he could not let Ukraine sign a peace agreement with Russia in the 2022 because that would be a threat to Western hegemony. So this is children playing a board game. Of course, it's not a board game. It's millions of lives lost.
Its economies crushed. Its opportunities for life squandered at the hands of small group who have been playing what they think is a game of Western hegemony. There have been no stakes in any of this for European or US security. This is not a matter of US or European security. This is a matter of first The US and then European dominance.
The Europeans, I should add, are a little strange in this. The US led them into it. The Europeans knew that this was a bad idea. I know that's the fact that when The US pushed for NATO enlargement to Ukraine, there was a lot of resistance in Europe that this would lead to war. But now that Trump, who is has his own set of delusions, is interested in other delusions, not this one.
The Europeans still can't find an off ramp because they became delusional themselves that, well, if it isn't The United States that's gonna assert Western hegemony, we'll do it ourselves. And so it's a grudge match of of Germany, France, and Britain against Russia that is that's slogging on and which prevents these miserable leaders and miserably unpopular with their own people. I'm speaking of Mertz, Macron, and Starmer from telling the truth that this was a bad idea to begin with and that it should end and that the best thing for Ukraine is Ukrainian neutrality and an end to war. They just can't tell the truth.
Speaker 0: So how can we possibly get a realistic negotiated settlement today? Because I I see the commentary. It ranges between optimism and then, well, full out rejection that it's not possible because the situation is quite complicated. That is Russia obviously sees NATO expansion and especially the incursion into Ukraine as being an existential threat, So it has very strong demands. Ukraine also sees itself as facing an existential threat with the invasion.
And what they we see as the solutions are exactly the opposite. The US seems to hold some keys because it's worried that this conflict now will bog it down in Europe and also push Russia further to China. But well, I don't understand really what the Europeans are doing. As you indicated, it doesn't make much sense at all to con to keep this going. But but what do you see as possible settlements or solutions?
Speaker 1: The real solution here belongs with Germany. Germany is the key. Germany's terrible leadership is the reason why this war broke out and why it continues. It's very poignant to read the memoirs of of Angela Merkel where she describes the point where Germany gave in to The US demands for NATO enlargement in the Bucharest NATO Summit in 2008. On the first day of that summit when George Bush was recklessly pushing NATO to commit to enlarge to Ukraine and Georgia, France and Germany, and I know others, Norway and others, all thought this was a very bad idea.
But and they tried to resist explaining to Bush that this could provoke war, this would provoke a crisis in Europe, and so forth. The United States persisted. This is this this is just an example of The US deep state. In this case, Bush being a very weak president, Cheney being a very dark figure behind him, but really the deep state still pursuing a policy that it had already set more than a decade earlier that, yes, NATO would enlarge, pushing the Europeans to accept that. Merkel resists the first day of the summit, but then gives in on the second day.
That to my mind is the turning point of Europe. She says, salvaged something because we didn't have a literal plan for accession, only the commitment to accession of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO. That didn't make much difference from the Russian point of view, and it didn't make much difference from the politics that was to unfold afterwards. So Merkel, was a very decent person in my view as chancellor, gave in. That was her mistake.
Scholz was hit just impossibly weak and confused. He didn't utter one sentence of truth or sense about any of this during his time as chancellor. And Mertz has been grave disappointment as well because when Mertz came into office as chancellor, he just beat the drums of war from the first moment. He didn't say, well, I'm newly arrived. I'm gonna contact my counterpart, Vladimir Putin, to see whether it's possible that we work something out.
He just said we're heading towards even a bigger war. So German leadership has been terrible. And it's consequential because Germany is really at the center of this story in a lot of ways. Most importantly, in 1990 Right. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, when Germany was still divided in two between the People's Democratic Republic, the GDR in the East, and the and the Federal Republic in the West.
Helmut Kohl was chancellor and wanted to move towards fast reunification. That required the approval of the Soviet Union. And to, obtain that approval, Cole explained to Gorbachev on 02/10/1990, that German unification would not threaten Russian national security because in part, NATO would not move eastward. And that commitment was made by coal to Gorbachev, and it was made repeatedly by Hans Dietrich Enscher, the German foreign minister, publicly, privately, in countless ways. That's the basis of the German reunification.
Mertz should understand this. Germany cheated in a very big way. Of course, it cheated alongside The United States. It was both Germany and The US that in 1993 onward started to push for NATO enlargement. I often talk about The US being the main push for this, and I think it was, but Germany was an enthusiastic NATO enlarger even though Germany was the main, in fact, the overwhelming beneficiary of the commitment that NATO would not move one inch eastward.
This is all well documented. Mertz should know it. Then to bring us to the anniversary of the Maidan coup in which The US did a lot to overthrow a neutral government in Ukraine, we should recall that on 02/21/2014, the German, French, and Polish foreign ministers negotiated an agreement with Yanukovych for an end to the unrest in the Maidan, most much of it stoked by The United States itself, in return for elections later in 2014. Germany was a signatory of this agreement or a party of this agreement. This agreement was also brought to agreement with President Putin and President Obama.
On the next day, the coup leaders stormed the government buildings in Kyiv and overthrew Yanukovych. And at that moment, the western government should have said, we don't accept this coup. Yanukovych is the legally constituted president. He was in Kharkiv. That day, he said, I'm still president.
But Obama immediately recognized the new government who was part of The US deep state plan. Germany went along. Again, this is terrible. Europe failed. Europe had signed an agreement with Yanukovych and then completely within twenty four hours buckled to The United States.
Then Germany cheated again because in 2015, after the war had broken out, the two oblasts in the Donbas, Donetsk and Lugansk, had broken away and declared that they were not following the coup regime in Kyiv. And a war began with the Kyiv coup government attacking the breakaway regions. President Putin helped to orchestrate to what became first the Minsk one and then the Minsk two agreement, more importantly, in 2015. The Minsk two agreement said that the fighting would stop on the basis of political autonomy for the two ethnic Russian and Russian language regions of Lugansk and Donetsk. And the guarantors of that agreement were to be Germany and France.
And we now know by the testimony of both of them that they did not enforce the agreement. They did not pressure Ukraine to follow through as was their responsibility. They, as Merkel later said in a rather shockingly brazen statement, regarded the Minsk two agreement as a holding period, a time for Ukraine to build up its strength for war. I don't know if Merkel meant that at the time in 2015. That's how she explained it in twenty twenty two, twenty twenty three.
But in any event, Germany did not fulfill its role. So to my mind, Germany has the highest responsibility as the largest country in the European Union, as the one that was at the very center of this story from 1990 onward and as the one that has failed in its political responsibility at the crucial moments on the question of NATO enlargement, on the question of the putsch or the coup in Maidan in February 2014, and on the enforcement of the Minsk two agreement. Germany failed repeatedly for Mertz to come into office as chancellor and just declare that Putin cannot be trusted betrays either a basic ignorance of the key facts of the events of the last twenty five years or a brazen disregard of those facts. I hope that it's an ignorance of them. The way that one would solve the question of ignorance is through dialogue.
Mertz should have immediately picked up the phone and called his counterpart and said, I'm newly elected as chancellor of Germany. We have a major responsibility to try to find peace, and I believe that our foreign ministers should meet and discuss what might be done. Maybe we won't reach an agreement, maybe we will, but we should try. Nothing of that sort happened then. I believe that's what should happen immediately.
I assume that after mister Mertz hears interview just now, he will immediately call president Putin and try to find peace.
Speaker 0: I do like your optimism, but it does. Well, if the key is Germany, we may have some problems because one of some of the most dangerous rhetoric comes from Germany now. And, also, as Mertz stated at the Munich Security Conference, he essentially denounced the whole efforts by Orban to talk to Zelensky and Putin. Well, Zelensky is okay to speak with, but you can't talk to Putin. You know, this was immoral, essentially.
So I'm not having too much bet on this, but I I like the wider perspective you take here, though, because the Ukraine war is to a large extent about the collapse of this pan European security architecture. So I think this wider context is important. But at that time, at the beginning at the end of the Cold War, then, when you when there was this ambition to have a common European home, a greater Europe in Moscow, there were a lot of opportunities there not taken. Again, you were there then negotiating negotiating, or advising, sorry, Poland. You advised the Soviet Union under Gorbachev.
You advised Russia under Yeltsin. What is it that they wanted and vis a vis what the Americans wanted? Why why wasn't it possible to essentially reach a mutually acceptable cold post Cold War settlement?
Speaker 1: I began advising in Poland in 1989, and Poland, of course, entered into a coalition government of president Yaroslavsky, who was the, the Soviet backed president with the Solidarity Movement, which was the anti communist movement in 1989 to form a government. And I was very much involved in that and involved in the economics around that. And when it came to the economics, the point was that Poland was broke. It had no foreign exchange reserves. Its currency was collapsing.
There was very high inflation. There were shortages of goods. So as a macroeconomist, I was able to devise a program of stabilization that I recommended to, the Polish government, and to, the European governments. And those recommendations, broadly speaking, were endorsed. And from a practical point of view, Poland was able to end the high inflation, stabilize the currency, and begin after about a year, a process of economic growth that would last for the following thirty years.
So it was a very successful transition from a very, very fraught financial situation. And the tools to do that are rather well known if one studies such crises or has been involved in solving them as I had been. When it came to the Soviet Union, the same situation applied, although on a scale that was much larger. So I recommended a similar package, on a much larger scale. Those recommendations were flatly rejected by the West.
The same kind of economic policy that was working for Poland was turned down by the US government. Twenty five, thirty years later, I read the minutes of the White House meeting in which it was turned down. I was shocked by the flippancy and the brazenness and the ignorance of the participants at that meeting. So there was naturally the element of Machiavellianism and the element of bravado of the winners in the Cold War as they saw it. But there was also, Glenn, just stupidity of people who understood nothing about economic stabilization, understood nothing about what it was that Gorbachev's government needed, and so on.
So the incompetence always needs also to be highlighted in this. Well, it turned out that both for the Soviet case and even after the Soviet Union ended for the Russian case, the West was completely uninterested in even the most routine kind of financial support to end a deep crisis. At the same time, I heard directly from president Gorbachev and from president Yeltsin, how what they wanted was the same as what Poland wanted, an end to the divisions, a united European home. President Yeltsin's favorite word was normal. Russia should be normal.
No more revolutions, no more Bolshevism, no more divisions, no more Cold War, just normal. But The United States wasn't having peace. The US was having hegemony. That's a difference. Peace means you deal with your counterparts with respect and even help in the short term.
Hegemony means you crush your counterparts because your aim is to dominate. And that's what we got instead. That's why NATO enlargement was on the table when Russia was not only no threat, it was saying exactly the opposite. It was asking to join NATO. It was wanting to have a common European security.
There was no threat, but The US wasn't interested in no threat. The US was interested in dominance, and that's what I witnessed at the time.
Speaker 0: Well, I was gonna ask, how how do you think now the Ukraine war has reshaped the global order? Because the world doesn't look well, it looks very different than it did only four years ago.
Speaker 1: One of the interesting chapters in Zbigniew Brzezinski's 1997 book, The Grand Chessboard, asked the question, as Europe and NATO push eastward and surround Russia, what will Russia do? And Brzezinski devotes a chapter to this. And he asks, well, Russia might, agree, buckle in, or Russia might, resist. And could it form an alliance with China, for example, or with Iran? And Brzezinski analyzes all of this, and he declares very confidently, there's no chance that Russia will do anything but accept its European vocation.
Russia has no other option. That proved to be decisively wrong. Russia said, okay. Goodbye. We turn towards Eurasia.
We turn towards China. We which by the way is a great economic fit. Russia and China are very complementary economies as Russia and Europe were, by the way. That was a good fit too. That was good for Germany and good for Russia, that fit.
It was destroyed by the West through its 20 rounds of sanctions and so forth. But Russia said, yeah, we will look in a different direction towards India, towards China, towards Central Asia, towards Western Asia, towards Africa. That's the world that is being built right now. So The US thought, we're the hegemon, we'll run the show. But in fact, what we have is a bully in The United States, still very violent and and very powerful, no doubt, and a vassal Europe utterly confused, demoralized, and divided.
But The US and Europe and Britain and Japan and Korea somewhat and Australia somewhat and New Zealand together constitute about 12% of the world population. Maybe if you're the most expansive, maybe up to 15% of the world population. What is taking shape is a multipolar world that increasingly the other 85% of the world population say, what is this US bullying? What is this US hegemony? Now, we're not past the delusions of The United States.
If you were to ask Donald Trump, is a master delusionist, what is your map of the world? He would say the following. He would say, we own all the Americas. That's the Dunro doctrine. That's that we just own all the Americas.
And we proved that we kidnapped a president in Venezuela. We own all of Europe. We don't really want it. It's pathetic. These people are useless.
But anyway, we own all of Europe. We own all of the Middle East, and we're gonna prove it because we're going to go to war with Iran. We own India because India is afraid of China. And we own half of Southeast Asia and the Pacific, so we're surrounding China. So we're pretty good.
We're still in charge. That's the American delusional view of the world. Quite dangerous. The other view of the world and by the way, Africa I didn't mention because The United States doesn't think about Africa except getting the cobalt. That's all.
And some rare earths. The US has absolutely no attention span for Africa as Africa, only that is a place where there's some minerals that we want. Now, if you look at the world from a different point of view, the BRICS countries would say, well, we're basically half the world. We are Russia, India, China, Brazil, South Africa, now Egypt, Ethiopia, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Indonesia. We don't wanna be bullied by anybody, and we're about half the world population.
The African Union as a whole, that's 55 countries, with almost 20% of the world population. It'll be 25% by mid century. And we don't want US hegemony. And we're real. We're not just a bunch of minerals.
We're real. And of course, the other parts of the world are contested. And Europe once in a while even says, do we just wanna be pathetic vassals of The United States or do we have some history, culture, society, different points of view that we would like? So Europe doesn't quite totally accept its vassalage. And I think the fair way to put things is The United States, in relative terms, doesn't have anything like the authority, the reputation, or the desire for alliances in the rest of the world.
The Western world is a small part of the world. And the vast truth of the 85%, outside of The US, and Europe and a couple of East Asian countries, is they want prosperity. They wanna make good, trade. They wanna advance in technology. And China will be a good partner for them.
India will be a good partner for them. Russia will be a good partner for them. And so this is hardly The US hegemony that Trump and American deep state imagine. That's how I think is a much more accurate view of the world. The faster The United States gets beyond its delusions, I hope it's fast enough to avoid a war in Iran, would be disastrous, the better the whole world will be, including The United States itself.
The faster Europe escapes from its pathological Russophobia and says, you know, we were led down a path that we ourselves chose to walk. It was a mistake. We need to make our continent safe, secure, based on collective security the faster Europe can thrive once again.
Speaker 0: The chapter of Brzezinski, it reminds me of a speech given by Joe Biden at the Atlantic Council back in '97 where he was said that the, yeah, the Russians were worried about NATO expansion and, you know, and they said we might look towards the East to China, and he mocked it and saying, yeah, well, if that doesn't work, you can always work with Iran, and the whole audience just breaks out in the laughter, and, you know, it's the funniest joke. It's That's it. Yeah. It's the inability to predict possible consequences, you know, what seems awfully patriotic. And today, it's a very foolish policy perhaps, which, you know, puts us in a very difficult spot for tomorrow.
Speaker 1: But I recently reread a famous speech of, the arch, imperialist Joseph Chamberlain, the head of the colonial office of Britain that he gave in 1897. And one of the notable points of a completely obnoxious imperialist speech is he says, the British realms extend throughout the world. We are a quarter of the whole world. There is no one that can begin to challenge us in all of the future of history as far as we can see. And a half century later, it was all gone.
And so these predictions, this bravado, this arrogance, this belief you can run the world is the pride before the fall. And that's been America's and Europe's big mistake.
Speaker 0: Well, thank you as always for taking the time. I very much appreciate it, and I know you have a big day ahead of you, so I'll let you go. Thank you.
Speaker 1: Good. We'll we'll talk to you again soon. Take care.
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
Gilbert Doctorow: Attack on Iran Hardens Russia's Stance on Ukraine https://youtu.be/eczyryj1eDU https://t.co/xZzhQuyE27
Video Transcript AI Summary
Gilbert Doktorov and the host discuss how the Iran war is shaping Russia’s strategic thinking, deterrence, diplomacy, and domestic political psychology.
- The central impact in Russia is not economic bets on oil or gas, or European gas demand, but a shift in elite psychology in Moscow. Russians feel they have been jolted by a disaster scenario for their country, prompting a re-evaluation of strategy and leadership. This has driven a more acute public scrutiny of Putin and the feasibility of gradual, negotiated restraint versus decisive action.
- A key theme is the perceived weakness or inconsistency of Western deterrence. Russians note that Trump's actions against Iran showed that American leadership can be unpredictable and capable of abrupt, decisive moves that undermine Russia’s sense of security. This has contributed to a loss of confidence in the long-standing belief that restraint and negotiation would preserve deterrence.
- The discussion emphasizes a perceived “electric shock” in the Russian political class: doubts about the wisdom of a slow, nuanced approach, and concern that Washington might carry out decapitation-like or otherwise aggressive actions if Moscow does not appear capable of credible deterrence. The panel cites examples such as past American strikes and drone activity that highlighted vulnerabilities in Russia’s security posture and raised existential anxieties about Russia’s own durability.
- Some interviewers and analysts describe a growing perception that Russia’s deterrence has been eroded by Western escalation, with NATO posture and Ukrainian military support intensifying pressure. There is fear that restraint by Moscow is interpreted as weakness, pushing Russia toward recalibrating its own posture to reassert deterrence, potentially through more aggressive or rapid actions.
- The conversation notes internal Russian media dynamics and the shifting stance of influential figures. Salovyev’s and Lavrov’s recent critiques of negotiation, the discussion of Sergei Dabkov’s “spirit of Anchorage” remark, and other domestic debates reflect a broader realignment away from pacific, slow negotiations toward a more hardline posture. Alexander Dugin’s criticisms are mentioned as a sign of growing dissent about the current course.
- The broader strategic environment includes concerns about Russia’s relations with China. Russian observers are disappointed that China’s support for Iran did not translate into the expected practical backing; Chinese aid and the efficacy of Chinese weapons are questioned after the Iran-Israel conflict began. This has undermined Russian confidence in China as a reliable partner in countering U.S. pressure.
- The discussion highlights the possibility that Iran’s use of economic and political warfare—such as threatening Hormuz and impacting Gulf economies—could have major global consequences, increasing Europe’s energy insecurity and persisting higher prices, which could influence Western political dynamics and, in turn, Russia’s calculations.
- There is speculation about whether Russia might seek to draw in Iran more deeply or exploit broader regional escalations. The interview notes that the Russians never concluded a mutual defense pact with Iran, viewing Iran’s reluctance as a factor that complicates Russian confidence in Tehran’s reliability. The possibility of Russia assisting Iran more robustly remains uncertain and is framed as a sensitive strategic option.
- The interlocutors stress that the situation is developing into a high-stakes, all-or-nothing dynamic for major powers. Putin’s future decisions, Trump’s political fate, and the Western willingness to escalate further all feed into a fragile balance. The experts warn that escalating to large-scale action becomes a dangerous and destabilizing path for Russia, the United States, Iran, and regional players.
- In closing, both speakers acknowledge the difficult, precarious trajectory ahead. The analyst emphasizes that if Russia does not bolster its deterrence and adapt its strategy, the domestic and international consequences could be severe; the host notes the dangerous incentives created by an all-or-nothing strategic environment and the potential for rapid, unintended escalations.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Welcome back. We are joined by Gilbert Doktorov, a historian and an international affairs analyst, to discuss what how the Iran war is impacting Russia. So thank you for coming back on the program.
Speaker 1: No. It's a pleasure.
Speaker 0: So there there's a lot of discussions about how the Iran war impacts Russia. Some would say that, oh, this is an opportunity for them in terms of the air defenses weaponry being diverted, the international focus being diverted, others point to energy prices. Are those who are critical arguing this is not in this interest would look towards the the, yeah, the instability, the possibility of knocking out Iran, and but if you look at it from a, I guess, different angle, how the Russians view The United States as a negotiator, how Russia looks at the war of attrition, and because some most certainly look towards Iran thinking perhaps we should have restored our deterrence too. How how are you assessing how the Iran war is impacting the discourse within Russia?
Speaker 1: I agree completely with this second set of set of impact that you have described. That is to say, it is not a question of whether the Russians will profit from higher oil prices, whether the Europeans will come begging for gas. These are petty things. The real issue is a change in psychology in elites in Moscow. They're shocked out of their skins.
The what they saw was a disaster scenario for Russia itself, and they it unbuttoned lips. It's been a big contentious issue in the broader commentary community over Mr. Trump, Mr. Putin as the only adult in the room, Mr. Putin, the man who's saving our necks because he doesn't respond violently to provocations and so forth.
There are a lot of people among my peers who view mister Putin as god's gift to humanity. I'm not one of them. This wasn't this is a situation that's developed over time. I took readings over four years, and I have come to conclusions. But that I came to conclusions is not relevant.
That the Russians have come to conclusions, that is very relevant. You know, I worked for a large company called ITT in the 1980s. We had factories all over Europe. And my job as a country manager was to meet with their export managers, technical personnel at the factories at these various locations, and to discuss our strategy in given markets for which I was responsible, which were at that time Yugoslavia and Poland. And I visited Sweden several times a year.
They were selling some very interesting, very high technology radio equipment to Yugoslavian. And I was just among the guys. We would take lunches in the lunchroom, not in executive rooms, and we chatted. And everything was fine. They were happy with life.
They were happy with their country and so forth. And then, Olof Kama was assassinated. And you know what happened? These fellows who found everything thought everything was fine with their country were saying, they finally got the son of a bitch. That is what conformism is all about.
And that is what's that is the switch that's just changed in Russia. Like a switch of a light on and off. People who have their doubts about the wisdom of the go slowly, negotiate a settlement, keep the Americans separate separated from the Europeans, that is all the features of mister Putin's policy have now had an electric shock because they saw where it's all headed. They saw in what Trump has done to to Iran, what Trump can just as easily do to Russia. You know, we all remarked that there was the assassination attempt on Putin going back about a month or so, the last two months now, at his Val D'I residence.
And all of the incoming drones were down. Everybody was happy in the mid light of it. Some people may bite a bit. But I think when they saw what happened to the Atollah, Russians of serious mind stopped making light of it. Mister Putin is not always in Valdai surrounded by the world's best air defense, or nor is he always in the Kremlin.
And so if the Americans want to to do a decapitation strike on Russia with Putin and all of his buddies, they can do it. And that sank in, and Russians got very frightened. And they wondered what the hell is mister Putin doing. When they saw how in three days Trump has has virtually destroyed the senior leadership, military and civilian, the air defenses, a large part of the the critical infrastructure, ports, facilities, and so on. And they asked, what the hell are we doing?
Why isn't Putin doing that to Kyiv and to Lvov and to Dnipro and to all the other cities where there are command and control and policy making centers, which Putin from the start of the special operation said would be targeted if red lines were crossed. Those red lines were crossed, and they were crisscrossed. And you and I have discussed the three components to deterrence, of which probably the least important is military hardware. And the most important is will and readiness to explain to the adversary your determination to use it. That is what's come missing.
Pleasant example, in the evening with Vladimir Solovio two nights ago, it came up in the panel discussion. The panel discussion was completely against the everything that Putin's policies have been. Of everything said except the name Putin, it was not raised. But anyone understood, any mature person understood whom they were talking about. And they said, my god.
How is how are we conducting negotiations with with Witkoff at the same time that American spy planes on the coast of the Black Sea, on the Barents Sea coast, and all along our borders. And we know what these are for. They're for bearing a preemptive strike just like The US has done on Iran. Why don't we shoot them down? Man, we shot down the U-two.
Gary Powers was captured. Why don't we shoot these down? I know you can object that these are in international waters. So what? So if they're one kilometer away from the border, so what?
Who's gonna be able to say that they didn't cross into Russian territory? Nobody. And what's The United States gonna do about it? Nothing. Absolutely nothing.
So while Russians are furious, what is their government doing to protect them? And I think the fist loosened lips. I've never heard a program like the one two days ago, and I probably won't hear one for a while. Because the next day, the same Salvirov started out the twenty minute soliloquy on our president is tireless working for the nation. He's up until three in the morning doing the state's work.
He is like a monk. He is like a saint. I won't go on. You got the idea. And he made reference to the eszlicher in chief, the journalist Zarumin, who has a program called Kremlin Moscow Kremlin Putin, which has been going on for maybe five years and is the most despicable exercise in cult of personality.
And here is Salabrio for suddenly praising him, oh, our wonderful journalist. Of course, it's a protege of Sarubin is a protege of both Kislyov and Salaryov. And the program is awful. It says heads Russia in the absolutely wrong direction. Anyway, this all came out the day before criticism that yesterday, they were licking Putin's toes.
So what's going on? A war was going on in and around the Kremlin. And we had the first tip-off, and you and I discussed this back, I think, in December when Sergei Dabkov, the deputy minister of foreign affairs, had a very stealthy look on his face when he was giving an interview in which he said that the spirit of Anchorage had exhausted itself, that further negotiations were not useful, and that the war would be solved on the battlefield. He was immediately reprimanded. I think it was Peskov came out with some remarks.
A little bit later, Lavrov, his boss, the minister, came out with critical remarks. Well, time passes and and thinking changes. As you know, in the last few weeks, Lavrov himself has been fiercely critical of further negotiations. So there is a war going on. I'm very hopeful that mister Putin will rise to the challenge as a good politician and listen to the best advice of his colleagues and not persist in the policy which is leading Russia to doom.
Now why should you and I care about Russia going to doom? Because it will be our doom also. If Russia fails to exercise its deterrence, Just to one way or another, mister Putin will not be in office forever. And one way or another, whether he's carried out feet first or walks out, someone else will take over who will make up for all this. Again, in the last week, I heard remarks on the same fellow of your program, which I couldn't have imagined with respect to Gorbachev.
They said openly that he was a traitor. Not mistaken, a traitor. And a traitor because he withdrew Russian troops from Germany and Central Europe without getting any concessions in return, without demanding the dissolution of well, he's dissolved the Warsaw Pact, and he should have asked for the dissolution of NATO. He didn't ask for it. I've never heard Gorbachev addressed as a traitor on state television.
He was this last week. That is the fate that mister Putin will have in x days, weeks, months, when, if unless he listens to reason and to the best advice of his serious professional team.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, it's it's hard to deny, though, that the deterrent, of course and we've spoken about this in the past, have has definitely weakened. If you think during the Cold War, it would be completely unthinkable that the Americans or Soviets would attack each other in such a way. There were always some proxy wars that is well, the at least semi proxy. You know, the Soviets assisted the the Vietnamese.
The Americans had, I guess, a much greater role in Afghanistan against the Soviets. But, you know, there were some set rules. Where where does the boundary go between proxy war and direct war? And as I, you know, had a conversation with John Mersheimer, and he kinda made the point to, Glenn, why are calling it a proxy war? We crossed that boundary a long time ago.
This is a direct war now. And I just feel over the the longer such a war goes on, the more the the the rules of proxy war changes. As as we remember from the beginning, sending Abrahams was a bit problematic. We can't really do that. HIMARS, that's not good.
F sixteens, as Biden said, well, that's World War three. And then, you know, we jump forward to now, we see long range strikes into Russia. This is US contractors pulling the trigger, sending US missiles on targets within Russia picked by US intelligence, as you said, with US drones flying along the Black Sea coast picking these targets. And, you know, only recently we had this Munich Security Conference, and I watched a German chancellor sitting there, you know, boasting about how we, and used the word we, have, you know, inflicted the untold costs and the casualties on Russia. He had the Danish prime minister arguing we have to get rid of all the red lines, and we have to start striking deep into Russia.
This is this is rhetoric of war, and, you know, they they justify themselves based on this moral arguments that, well, let's justify this and that. But, you know, in in the real world, this what they're doing is essentially eroding even more of Russia's deterrence. You can openly not just attack them, but then rub it in their face as well, saying we have to hit even harder. And this idea that that Russia's restraint had has emboldened the West, I mean, that's not that's hardly Russian propaganda. You can go through our own media as well, and they will point to, well, why can't we send more weapons?
The Russians had many red lines. They never do anything anyway. So restraint definitely is interpreted as weakness, and that's very bad for our side as well because at some point, the Russians will have to do what the Iranians did. People were so surprised by the Iranians. Why does striking hold American bases?
Well, you you can't just have the Americans bomb them every six months if they don't succeed in regime change. Well, we'll just pull a pull a put a put a pin in it to give it a break. We'll come back in six months and have another go. I mean, if you grant the adversary this amount of escalation control, when you can start a war, what's acceptable targets, when you pull out, when you finish the war, and when we go back again, eventually, you will perish. And I think this is a dangerous lessons which the Russians are being taught that is dangerous to us, that it's time to get their deterrent back.
And the irony, I think, is the way in the in NATO, they keep daydreaming of building opposition to Putin, but the opposition is the those argue, which they've had, by the way, for the past twenty years, that he might be too moderate. He might be too liberal. He have too many too much optimism about the possibility of integrating with the West, you know, especially since 2014. Why why isn't he preparing more for war? NATO's not looking for a settlement.
They're looking to build up a Ukrainian army. This is what his generals were saying. This is what very influential military commentators were saying as well. It's just it seems reckless, but I I don't see any critical commentary. If, again, if it wasn't a critical commentary of this, the incentives being put in Russia, you know, it would be this censored in the West as being pro Russian comments.
But this is something that should terrify us, the fact that Russia sees its deterrent as being squandered, thrown away by being too weak, and now it's almost existential. It's time to rebuild it. And, of course, the the the attacks on Iran I mean, why wouldn't The US or NATO do a decapitation strike against Russia? They might not do anything. I mean, this is it's really weird, or not weird, but absurd that we have gone to this length.
But how do you see, though, the Russians possibly looking now to reassert their their deterrent? Because I see the rhetoric is definitely changing. More and more starts to sound a bit like Dmitry Medvedev, who more or less wants a very hardline approach now towards the West.
Speaker 1: It was devastating critique of Putin's foreign policy, no military policy. It's not a Russian state. Interview with with Justin Politano yesterday, in which we went through many of these issues, was translated into Russian two hours later. It was on route to this doesn't happen by itself. Russia does have fairly close observation of its of its media.
As we as I just said a moment ago, mister Saviov was forced to eat his words, which is a sign, unfortunately, as one reader wrote to me, it's a sign that he's not listening and that he's not ready to make compromises and change direction. Is this more balanced? People who think, oh, Russia has a vertical of power, not wait a minute. What happened to mister Gabor, two of them? He was, oh, arrested.
He could have had a pretty miserable fate if there had not been patriots in Moscow to stare down tanks and to reverse the the removal of the president. Why don't we think that such a thing is possible today and not by bastards, but by real patriots removing a man who is simply not up to the job anymore? Now I'm not giving recommendations to anybody, but to ignore this is would be a failure to perform our risk for our job as analysts, and as people who understand how Russia functions and where at a sign like this, somewhere, I omitted mention of Alexander Dugin. I've never been a great fan of Dugin. I don't think he's a very high quality philosopher, but that's my personal opinion.
A lot of people think a great deal of mister Dugin. He was said at one time that he was a close adviser to president Putin, but that doesn't mean much. A lot of people have been said to be close advisers. Julian is known to the the broad Western world because of the tragedy of his daughter, who four years ago, was assassinated in what was probably an attempt to kill him, but instead killed her. She was an activist journalist, patriotic Russian, and a very fierce critic of Ukraine.
That's incidental. The point is everyone knows who Dugan is after that, and after that, Dugan is untouchable in Russia. Maybe mister Putin can shut up Saloveyov, but he sure as hell cannot shut up Dugin. And Dugin came out with an essay a couple of days ago in which she said the same sort of thing as what I heard us all the other. A devastating critique of everything that Putin is doing with this war.
Oh, the only thing is he did not name Putin specifically, but everyone knows him what he was talking So something is afoot, and I don't believe that Putin can hold on to power if he continues in being stubborn and of failing to do what he must do if Russia is to survive.
Speaker 0: What makes the question of what how do they also view the issue of diplomacy then? Because I think what what appears the past week has proven is that there's no more rules. All rules are out the window. And, and with with Iran, I think, you know, this should have been evident, long long time ago. But and now now the kidnapping of Maduro also kind of puts a lot some of shock waves is that, like, this is now normal to go in and kidnap presidents.
And but but with the Iranians, the the fact that, first, it was the Americans who walked away from the JCPOA, the nuclear deal, but then they had the first surprise attack in June, then a second surprise attack now. And, surely, the Russians must see some parallels because in 2014, you had this the the European government negotiating this unity government in Ukraine, which was supposed to be away for Yanukovych and opposition to you find a compromise. And, again, this was toppled. Then they had Minsk that was just taken advantage of us. Angela Merkel said it was an opportunity to build buy time, to build a Ukrainian army.
You had Istanbul with this the sabotage there. And, of course, now we've seen very open statements by many Western leaders about the long war. And even now, I get the impression The US isn't really looking to end the war anymore. I think they just wanna transfer ownership over to the Europeans, especially the cost. And also the drones, remember in the first that that those who are smuggled into Russia used to attack its nuclear deterrent?
Then the same thing happened to the Iranians during the first surprise attack on them. At at some point, though, I would be if I was advising the Russian government, I would start to be very skeptical of whether or not there's any authenticity here or if if this is good faith diplomacy. It doesn't feel like it anymore. And especially, by the way, they're engaging with other parts of the world. It doesn't seem that there is any diplomacy.
There's no willingness to give any concessions. There's any deal, as you said, they made in Alaska. That whole spirit was yeah. We're just abandoned. They they came back from Alaska saying, well, okay.
There won't be a ceasefire. We're gonna instead address the underlying issues. And then the week after, almost after meeting the Europeans, we're back to the ceasefire. You know, I go back and forth so many times I lose track. But how do you see the appetite for diplomacy now that it's in Moscow, now that it's meeting, I guess, fierce opposition?
Speaker 1: Well, I think the diplomacy is poisoned now for any reasonable, objective, and patriotic Russians. And if mister Putin persists in this, I don't see how he can hold on to go. It is so obvious that the Americans are duplicitous, utterly untrustworthy. And the problem with the Maduro of escapade is it fit into latent hubris of Pete Hegseth and and the Pentagon fellows and a supposed state, Rubio, they were certain that they can do anything now, that they can change reality. And that has been a very dangerous change in American foreign policy.
Mister mister Trump will go with the with the with the flow when it looks like it's flowing in the direction he likes. And so he stopped being a peace president who doesn't have any problem problem being a war president. Now in Russia, the impact of this was devastating, but we've admitted speaking about another dimension too. China. China is nowhere.
Chinese equipment for support supposed to save the necks of the Iranians. What happened to it? My colleagues were military experts who were all speaking glowingly of the Chinese assistance to Iranism the week before the the attack. Oh, the Americans would get battered. That's sort of nonsense.
The first day, America established complete air air control over Iran. So they either there's something wrong with the Chinese equipment doesn't work at all, or something was short in what they supplied, or lord knows what. But I think the Russians view of the Chinese as an important ally in in their contest with America, I think that went down the rat hole after the American strikes on Iran. So that is a very big change. Oh, Putin has relied on some backing from Xi.
Forget it. That's history. That went at the what mister Trump has done in in his attack on Iran has changed everything in the perceptions of the Russians who are their foreign policy establishment. And, well, that will come out, Not today, tomorrow, but in the short term, it will come out. And I think it's will create a tidal wave that mister Putin cannot resist.
Speaker 0: I've seen media reports in Europe that whenever if Russia strikes Ukraine hard with the drones, then the the commenters often, oh, this would anger Trump. Putin may have made a mistake. It's a very strange analysis. I mean, the Americans are deeply engaged in this. The Americans are still attacking Russia.
They're at war with Russia, and yet an American and a Russian strike on the American proxy, oh, well, that we can't do that because it might anger mister Trump. I mean, it's very it's very strange that this is how it's seen. I mean, we're we're it seems that we're very close to a possible direct war, and they they make it sound as if the first objective of Russia should be to make sure that they please Trump. I'm just wondering if the Russians see the same thing that Putin isn't just cautious and pursuing a war of attrition, but that he's also too worried about what Trump might think of him because Trump was playing these games anyways, which which side can bow more to his will. And whoever bows the most, then he will direct this anger in the other direction.
And this way, he gets everyone to essentially, you know, dance according to his tune. But but do do see that this is a key problem, or is it just that the whole war of attrition is becoming a bit grotesque? Because by having a war of attrition where two sides essentially stand toe to toe and pounce each other, it's causing not just the massive casualties in Ukraine, but it's the casualties in Russia are all are are also ramping up. I mean, this can't be popular. This you know, a lot of fine young men are gone.
So how I don't know. It's I I can see why the war of attrition would seem very dark to to to to many in Russia. But is this is it which which of this component? Is it this just a version to this four year long war of attrition, or is it the issue of of being well, essentially starting to bow to Trump too much like the Europeans? Or how do you see it?
Speaker 1: Well, as I said, the biggest trigger here is change of thinking in serious analysts and political class who appear on these talk shows is their understanding of their of Russia's vulnerability and its opening itself to the type of attack that The United States has made on Iran. I heard there are a lot of people, the people who are based in Tehran, who were talking about, oh, not so bad. We we've been really striking at Tel Aviv. Listen. I don't mind an military expert, but I certainly respect Russian military experts who don't have any reason to give a biased account.
There's no favor to be obtained. And when one of the most responsible ones appeared on sixty Minutes two or three days ago and with an ashen face said, the Americans are either the Iranians have lost the war. And he explained why, how they're being everything's being degraded there. And sooner or later, the most many of these caches of missiles will be exhausted. Now and he was saying, I'm not being an apologist for Trump.
I'm just telling you how it is. Now before the our our our viewers get too depressed, let me explain that I don't agree with the overalls the overall conclusions that he reached. Yes. On military bases, sure. Iran has lost the war.
And the same way you answer it around, on a military basis, Russia has won who won the war. And what do you get for that? We know they don't get much in Russia right now, and you and The United States will not get much for having military victory if the Iranians persist in what is their winning their winning hand, which is economic and political warfare. By that, I mean closing the Straits Of Hormuz, subjecting Europe and and other major borders of both natural gas and and petroleum to a cutoff of 20% of global supplies. We've already seen how in Europe the price of natural gas has skyrocketed.
And at the very moment when Europe should start buying for the next season, they're all afraid to do it because the prices are wild. That's just the beginning. We haven't really reached this just a few days into the the closure of Qatar's production and export. And then on petroleum, the same story. They the Iranians are counting on the political defeat of Trump, and I think they've got their hands around something very serious.
In his state of nation's address, Trump boasted about gas gasoline at the at the stations at the pump in The States having to send to $2 or even below per gallon. Well, I think it's $3.50 today, and it's gonna go headed towards $5.06 in a matter of a few weeks. Even though The United States is 8590% self sufficient for petroleum, it isn't enough. Export producers in The States will export to meet the demand for prices that are vastly higher, and there will be shortages which will raise prices in The States. So mister Trump is going to be devastated politically when his words of a week ago turn out to be as stupid.
And Americans are very sensitive to gasoline prices. So that is one aspect of closing the Straits Of Hormuz. The other element is destroying the economies of the Gulf States who have been the hosts to all of these US military bases. The attack on refinery in Saudi Arabia, it wasn't massive. It wasn't hypersonic missile with some drones, but it did the job.
It put it out of action. And it's exactly for reasons like that. The facades had agreed to restore diplomatic relations with Iran. Was it a year ago, a year and a half ago with Chinese brokerage because they wanted to put to to remove themselves from the Yemen civil war. No.
That's Saudi. That's the least of it. We're looking at resources. I'm looking at the whole economy of the area. I was in Dubai.
You've probably been there also. And you know the 80% of all of the international business, which is what all those skyscrapers in Dubai are all about, they're all populated by expats from various places, lot of Brits, a 100,000, 30,000 Brits applied to their government to get the hell out. I've been through periods of change like this, 1998 and the brigade crash in Russia, and I saw how these abrupt and very adverse changes result in dramatic changes of policy at the board level in major corporations. With reason, without reason, even if there could be a recovery in two or three years, the companies in the West that are behind all these lovely offices in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, the rest of it, they're gonna close down. The prices of all that fabulous apartments in Dubai will have in a few weeks, they will crumble because they're all built on, literally, on sand, and that is the point that the Iranians are making.
They are gonna cripple the just with a few drones. They didn't even have to bother with their hypersonic missiles. People were saying, oh, it is why why why are you comp do citing as terrorism the raiming attacks on hotels and office buildings and so on? They're all directed against against CIA and other military people who were in these places. Rush.
That would be valid if they actually killed people. They had broken windows and some fires, and already you got a 130,000 Brits fleeing, heading for the hills. This is what terrorism is all about. It's to change the the psychology of the broad public. They have done it, and they will do it, and mister Trump will be finished.
Speaker 0: Yeah. If the the condemnation of Iran is a bit interesting because the the the attacks they had, it's quite restrained. I mean, if you look at what the Americans are doing with the assistance of the Gulf States indirectly, in terms of the what looks almost like carpet bombing was a bit of an exaggeration of of Tehran, but definitely, these are some massive bombs they're dropping now in populated areas in the middle of Tehran. You know, Iran hasn't done anything like this against its neighbors yet, so this is still a far way they can go up the escalation ladder. But I very much agree this, Gulf Kingdoms, the the lack of, natives, that is the, yeah, the amount of foreign nationals, what this means for the real estate prices, the dependence on oil and energy.
I mean, all of this can be shut down quickly as it has. So if this especially is prolonged, there's gonna be a massive shift there. That is The US closest allies in the region will fall away fall apart. And and, again, the ramifications are difficult to predict. But in in terms of just as a last question, in terms of Russia's more possible direct or indirect support for Iran, What what do you think the Russians are currently doing for the Iranians?
Because the support by the Chinese and the Russians, it seems tepid or risk averse, at least. That is they I'm assuming, they're giving some intelligence. They're probably giving air defenses and some other weapons. But now that the war is spreading as well, I saw a drone allegedly from Iran hit Azerbaijan today. There was some talk of a missile heading towards Turkey, which was intercepted.
Again, I'm not sure what of this is is just to well, who's who's if it's actually Iran or if this is just to widen the coalition. But but how do you see any of these possibilities of possibly drawing in Russia somehow? It didn't took to a greater extent. They of course, they wouldn't fight the Americans, but now that Americans are gonna use Kurds, could the Russians do what they did for Syria in 2015 and help to knock out America's proxies at least? They just there seems to this war of what is the most frightening thing is the amount of possible areas it would escalate, not just in terms of how Russia would would fight the Ukraine from here on on and NATO, but also how it would get engaged in that reach in the Middle Eastern region.
Speaker 1: Alright. And this is bringing up another important dimension of the shock that the that The US attack on Iran has created among foreign policy establishment in Russia. They see Iran's weakness and its failure to conclude the mutual defense pact with Russia, which the Russians wanted. Going back to the '25, Russians wanted it, and the Iranians didn't want it. So the question of the one thing that you can take out of the equation, there's no feeling of guilt or embarrassment in this Russian foreign policy establishment over their failure to provide material assistance to Iran up to now or their unwillingness to do it further on.
Now why do I say that? Because they see in Iran exactly their own problem. That's why this is such a terrible indication of what's wrong with the way Russia is being governed and has been governed in a certain respect, very limited respect, but right now, terribly important respect by Vladimir Putin. That is the longtime tolerance of the Zapotecan, of the Westernizers, of the liberals with a capital l, two of whom are from the standpoint of patriotic Russians, still throttling Russia and holding it back in the war, namely Nabilina, a liberal with a capital l at the helm of the state bank, and the minister of the economy. These are liberals.
And what is the problem with Iran liberals? They didn't the the going back was two years, two and a half years that Iran had a Russia friendly prime minister, Emraisi. And he had an unfortunate helicopter crash. That's not by being naive. That was not an unfortunate helicopter crash.
It was a Mossad m I six assassination. A man who was willing to do a pact with Russia was removed. In his place eventually came in Pazhakian, a weak link, let's be clear about it, and a Zapitnik, a man who was much more interested in doing a deal with The United States and having sanctions lifted than he was in doing a defense part with the Russians and encouraging further American aggression against his country. There are too many. There have been too many.
The Iranians sympathetic to the states and antipathetic to Russia to have let done what was necessary, which is advance defense pact with Russia, was not concluded in December. So the Russians owe the Iranians nothing. They also have a long memory on how Iran crushed the its own its communist party. Nobody forgets. You and I may not have known about it, but I assure you the Russians know about it, And it doesn't make them terribly sympathetic to Iran.
But the fact that Iran refused to conclude a mutual defense pact, that sealed the relationship. So many of us who are waiting I don't say that I wasn't one of them, who are hoping with some optimism that the Russians would step in. No. They didn't, and they had good reason not to. I don't know about the Chinese.
That's a different story. They're the most interested party. They had 15% of their oil supplies coming from Iran. And what have they done? Where were those wonderful military exercises in the sea?
Remember that? That was all of my military colleagues in The States were talking about, oh, yeah. Like this, that they were they were Iran, China, and Russia with their ships taking them stamped up to the American armada. Did it happen? No.
I don't know where they all head of off those ships, but nothing happened. So the Russians have great feeling of being deceived or disillusioned now with China. They have no feeling of regrets about Iran because they didn't want to be helped, but they are in shock over what it all means for themselves and the way their country is being governed.
Speaker 0: Well, I'm wondering if some of this pressure, which might be building on Putin, is is gonna force him to shift a bit because now that we see the that the the the Ukrainians the well, front lines have been weakened. Much of the defensive lines are now behind the Russians. And, again, the weather is getting warmer, and there's much talk about a massive spring offensive coming. I'm wondering, yeah, to what extent this pressure building on Putin to escalate the Ukraine war in a big way might actually, yeah, come forward. That is as a way of all no.
Not not abandoning his position, but at least showing that the war of attrition is not forever. That is this is what is opening now up the opportunity to go more into maneuver warfare or, well, essentially, you know, escalate in a in a very big way to also please some of the people who are now pushing back. But, yeah, it remains to be seen. As I began saying, this is for our opponent, which is Russia here, this is not a message you want to send to it, that your we don't respect your deterrence. And if you if you want us to respect your deterrence, you better, yeah, escalate in a big way.
But I think we've reached that point now as well. So, yeah, unfortunate times, I guess, so hard times coming ahead. But thank you very much. Do have any final thoughts before we wrap up?
Speaker 1: No. I wish you weren't so such a a pessimistic outlook. But I said if we were wrong, it doesn't it doesn't look as bad as everyone as as people think. I I as for mister Trump, I think he looks very bad. I don't see how any way he can survive the November, in which case he will be politically neutered, which is not a bad thing because now he's really with this hubris that we've seen ever after Maduro capture, He really needs to be reigned in.
So things could be worse. I think that one way or another, Russia will firm up its resistance to Western provocations. I hope that mister Putin does this voluntarily.
Speaker 0: Well, that's a problem. Just a final thought one. Yeah. What you never wanna do is put large or great powers in a strategic position where it's all or nothing, where they risk everything, and they feel like they have their back against the wall. That is and I see almost all of these powers now in such a situation.
As you said, Trump, he has a lot to be fair now. If this war doesn't work out, it's it's hard to see him him surviving this. The United States, that is a country, it it can see its entire credibility as a powerful great power with seemingly infinite resources, you know, so it has to win this. Iran also fighting an existential war. It has everything to lose.
It should also then lash out in well, fight with everything it has. And, of course, Russia all sees this as an existential threat now. You know, they they could fear an American decapitation strike. Everyone is put in a situation where they it's essentially all or nothing, and now is the time to either defeat the enemy or we do defeat it ourselves. This is a horribly, very, very dangerous position to be put in.
But no. It's very hard to be optimistic. But I appreciate not the optimism, but your candid analysis. So thank you.
Speaker 1: Well, thanks for hearing hearing me out.
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
Stanislav Krapivnik: The Iran Lesson - Russia Will Retaliate & Deter https://youtu.be/-Rpc7g2Jg5w https://t.co/7ZuZKH2kq2
Video Transcript AI Summary
Glenn: Welcome back. Stanislav Krappivnik, a former US military officer, born in Dolbaz and recently returned, joins us again.
Stanislav: Always a pleasure, Glenn.
Glenn: In the last two days, Russians entered the strategic city of Orekhov in the Saporiyansko region, which may indicate that if this falls, the whole region might begin to collapse. In Slaviansk, the last Donetsk conglomeration, there are real advances that, if successful in circling the region, could mean the entirety of Donbas falls. Is the Russian spring offensive already begun?
Stanislav: It’s hard to say, partly because mud season is ongoing in those areas. The South is still mud-prone; the terrain there is different from Haryakov and Sudirmy, where ground is firmer, forested. In the South, there’s black earth with fewer trees, causing severe mud this time of year. If the melt is fast, flooding can occur; if slow, the ground acts like a sponge and mud persists as water seeps down. Nightly freezes persist while daytime temperatures rise above zero. Weather affects movement and logistics.
He notes that the briefings from the Russian command vary from independent mappers, suggesting either undisclosed advances or battlefield confusion. The Russian high command’s reports and geolocations may not always align with independent assessments. If credible, Russia’s forces from the South may have entered Ariakhov, with two parallel rows advancing toward Ariyakara and a long urban sprawl to the south. There is a gray zone because Ukrainian claims differ from Russian assertions. Ukrainians often withhold confirmations for long periods; e.g., Gudaiipoya/Gulyaporiya discrepancies show how contested reports can be.
Stanislav says it’s not clear that this is a bold, continuous offensive up and down the lines. A big push would require enough armored vehicles, artillery, and aviation, which he has not seen yet, though it could be developing. Ukrainians have conducted desperate counteractions not just to retake territory but to disrupt Russian preparation for a potential spring offensive.
If he were in command, he would launch a big spring offensive, at least partially toward Sumy, which is about 14 kilometers from Kharkiv. Sumy would be a key logistics hub and could cut off Kharkiv from the west, accelerating the fall of the region. He explains that Kharkiv could be surrounded by blowing bridges from the south and encircling through Sumy to the west and the east along the Russian line toward Bianka and the Big Water Reserve. He mentions continuing Russian movement in the north and the city of Kasatirivka, which has been split by a river; all bridges were blown about a month ago, complicating approaches.
North of Slaviansk, the gates of Krasnyomar require closing first. There are contested claims about Yaman, with Russians saying around 50% controlled vs. Ukrainians claiming 10–15%. The central concern is the Russian push in the south, where Yemen sits in a triangle formed by the Oka and the Sri Bianca rivers, and Russian forces are closing in from the north as well. Crossing Yamana is expected to fall; it’s a matter of time, though how long remains uncertain.
Glenn: Ukraine does not withdraw after encirclement. There’s a rational explanation tied to PR wars: if the US and Europeans lose interest in Ukraine, weapons and money dry up, and Zelensky appears addicted to PR victories to keep support. Do you think the war in the headlines affects Western support? How does the Iran conflict influence Ukraine, given weapon and money dynamics?
Stanislav: There’s additional pressure on Western governments from the military and certain military societies not to rush into direct NATO engagement or a large-scale conflict with Iran. He notes Iran’s demonstrated ability to strike American bases and key targets, and that Iran’s actions have shown the US and its allies that American power isn’t unlimited. He argues Iran’s strikes and the broader Middle East conflict complicate Western calculations, as American bases and interests face increased threats.
He asserts that Iran has shown it can strike at American bases and that American casualties would be far higher than reported. He claims Iran’s actions press Western governments to reconsider involvement in the region and to reassess commitments to allies such as the Saudis, who reportedly told American bases to stand down. He also discusses how Russia’s deterrence posture could shift in response to ongoing Iran–US tensions, and suggests that if Russia sees an opportunity to restore deterrence, it might be tempted to push back more forcefully.
Glenn: Russia’s approach to diplomacy with Europe and the US is complex. Macron’s bid to join a Russia–US–Ukraine format could spoil negotiations. Belgium’s stance on Russian assets and broader EU politics complicate any settlement.
Stanislav: He explains distrust in European leadership, questioning whom to trust in Europe. He suggests that a broader reform in European leadership and doctrine is unlikely soon. He notes that among European politicians, there’s disagreement and strategic posturing, with some populist voices but institutional leadership often failing to present a coherent strategy.
Glenn: What about China and Russia’s support for Iran? How might that evolve?
Stanislav: Russia previously explored a mutual defense pact with Iran; the document lacks substance, and real support has been practical, including MiG-29s, Su-30s, and S-400s, along with jamming systems enabling Iran to counter US satellites and missiles. He describes Iran’s military buildup and how Russia’s support has extended to drone technology and air defenses. He predicts Syria could reemerge as a battleground, especially if Iran’s militancy expands and if the US and Israel are drawn into broader conflict. He suggests China may reassess its stance and consider leveraging its position as US capabilities wane, potentially viewing Taiwan’s reunification as a strategic opportunity.
Glenn: Any final thoughts?
Stanislav: He emphasizes the high level of risk and unpredictability in the current international security environment, with multiple actors pursuing aggressive strategies and the potential for rapid shifts in alliances and deterrence calculations. He notes Iran’s broader influence and the risks to regional stability, hinting at a world where war remains a possible, though increasingly costly, option for major powers.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Welcome back. We are joined by Stanislav Krappivnik, a former US military officer, born in Dolbaz and has, since returned. So thank you for coming back on the program.
Speaker 1: Always a pleasure, Glenn.
Speaker 0: So we see only from the last two days that the Russians have entered a strategic city of Orekhov in the Saporese region, which may indicate that if this falls, that the whole region might begin to collapse. And also in Slaviansk, that is the last conglomeration of Donetsk, we see, yeah, some real advances being made, which would then, if then if they succeeded in circling this region, then that would essentially be the entirety of Donbas falling. So do you see the Russian spring offensive have having already begun?
Speaker 1: It's hard to say, partially because it's still a mud season down in those areas. So they're they're still more or less in the South anyway, which is not I was gonna talk about Haryakov and Sudirmy because they have different there's still mud there, it's much more firm ground, forested areas, so it's it's a different terrain. In the South, you got the really lots that's all black earth, and it doesn't have this as many trees to to fix it with the roots. So you get really, really bad mud about this time of year. If it's as fast to melt as what we're having up up here, and it started, to be honest, the temperatures were above zero almost a month ago.
I was checking. So they're still having nightly freezes, during the day, they're already well above zero. So if the snow is free melting off, in these kinds of areas, you wanna have a fast melt. Because if you have a fast melt, you'll have flooding, things like that. But the ground, you know, the ground's a sponge.
It only absorbs so much water. Any excess water, it just sloughs off, and that goes streaming down to the creeks, what have you, and then draining out to the sea. If it's a slow melt and the ground, absorbs its mud, it starts to, suck that down into the, sublayers, and there's more coming, and it's just continuous mud. So it stays muddy a lot longer if it's a slow melt than if it's a really fast melt. Dear you know, Gurusimo I'm I'm thinking I'm butchering his name again.
I'm I'm always bad with names. He the brief that was given by Russian by the Russian command, it in some areas, it varies a lot from what a lot of the independent mappers have shown. So either there's just been a lot of locations that have been I've seen a lot of advances that hasn't been marked off or there's confusion on the battlefield. And considering this is the the Russian high command, you you you tend to on their side because you think they they they should have the right information. There is a there's it's under question.
We'll see what comes up with videos in the next couple days, geolocations, things like that. But if to be believed, then, yes, Russia is already Russian forces from the South have already entered Ariakhov. Up there's two rows, parallel rows that run up to Ariakhov, and there's a long urban sprawl to the south of Ariyakaraway. So you do they may be already in Ariyakara. That's the and you get that you you get that gray zone because on the one side, the the Ukrainian sure sell aren't saying they're there, but the the Russian side is saying they're there.
But there's a very, normally, there's a small difference between the two, but right now, there's a big difference. Of course, Ukrainians also have a tendency of not admitting anything for a month. So sometimes that small difference becomes a really big difference like they did in Gulya Porya, where a month and a half after Gudaiipoya was taken, they're still reporting it as the Russians are besieging the city. The Russians are, like, 10 kilometers past the city. But oh, I'm actually it was probably about six kilometers.
And the western press was just parroting what Kia was saying. So we'll see. Whether or not this is the actual Russian spring offensive, I don't know. That that's something that's again, it hasn't developed boldly enough to be able to call a a big offensive. I mean, as far as a continuous offensive up and down those lines, yes, they're they've been going on for the last two years, steady rolling forward.
Whether this is a big push, you, you know, you would imagine a big push. In this case, we still have to have enough armored vehicles, our artillery and aviation to support it. I have not seen that yet, but it may be. Now we know that the Ukrainians were doing a lot of desperate counter actions, not so much because they could take those areas back. They physically don't have the means to do it, but to disrupt Russian preparation because apparently because they thought that is the location of the big spring offense.
Me personally, if if I was in command, at this point, I would launch the Big Spring offensive, at least partially, towards Sumi. And why towards Sumi? Russia, of course, are about 14 kilometers from Sumi. It's not a big city. It's about a 250,000 in the north, but Sumi is a key logistics hub, and Sumi will cut off the Kharkiv area from the west.
So you would do a a very deep encirclement of Kharkiv, cutting off a lot of supply lines from Kyiv going heading into Kharkiv. So that would do a lot of damage for the Ukrainian defenses in and around Kharkiv and would accelerate the fall of the region. Particular since you can also cut Kharkiv off in the South where the Osiri Bianca runs, if you blow blow the bridges. So you basically have Kharkiv in a tech in a technical in a in a tank technical I can't think of a word right now. Well, you're surrounded.
That's you'd have the city surrounded because you'd blast. You'd you could blow the the bridges heading in to to to Harikka from the South. And if you have a deep encirclement through Sumy, you take it out in the West, and, obviously, in the East, it's it's a Russian line moving steadily forward toward the city of Bianca and Big Water Reserve. And then from the north, you start moving it. There's still Russian movement down.
It's been very heavily contested. It has been bef as it has been, but it's still moving forward. So that I think that for me, I would do that as the big spring offensive, the drop Kyiv out of the map. I mean, sorry, Kyiv Kharkiv out of the map out of the battle map. We'll see, of course.
Konstantinavka, yeah, that's a big fight. And then that's another one of those areas. The Ukrainians are claiming about 15% of the city is in Russian hands. Gerasimov said there was around 60%. So that that's a very big difference.
And Konstantinavka is something that they're heavily contested in, and that's the new Bachmud. It's the latest Bachmud. Let me rephrase that. They're throwing all their forces that they can into it to try to hold it. Again, they the Ukrainians have a bad tendency of, and and it's good for the Russian side, of course, not knowing when the hell to leave the party and and retreat back out.
They they tend to really like getting themselves surrounded and wiped out. And, of course, you know, Hitler gave those same orders. It it leads the the difference is that when Hitler was fighting, he had generals who he kept sacking and returning, but the general, they kept sacking because they just wouldn't follow his orders to stay in a fight to the last man. They'd retreat, do tactical and strategic retreats as needed. But the Ukrainians seem to be doing the best Hitler impersonation they can and standing and fighting everywhere where they should have been retreating if they had any sense.
Thank god for that. Now for the North because that's the South. That's the South, the push. And and Kasatirivko, by the way, has been split in two. It has a the river running down in the middle.
All the bridges have been blown about a month ago. So with the water level up, the water is ice cold. You're not getting across. You're not gonna swim across. It's very hard it's very hard to coordinate between the two halves.
So you've already split the city effectively, and then you can start splitting into smaller portions to take it under siege or invest it. Now in the North where you got Slavinsk, well, to close the the gates of Slavinsk, first, you gotta close the gates on Krasnoyomar. And that that's another that's a third point where there's questionable how much of Yaman is taken, how much of it isn't. Because, again, Gerasimo said about 50%. The Ukrainians are claiming about 10% or 15%.
So, again, you got this big difference, but that's not the most important thing. The important thing is the Russian push in the South Of Yemen. Because Yemen is in this triangle where the Oka falls into the Sri Bianca. So you you you wind up with this triangle like this, and Yemen's right there on the wide high hypothesis. And then the Russian forces are all around it, they've closed off from the north as well.
But what's the danger to Krasnoyman for the Ukrainians is Russia forces have been pushing in the South, and there's only one bridge, one main road left leading up to the Krasnoyman. That's the main logistics road. And that road is already under drone drone attack. Right? The Russian drones can reach it.
So it's already somewhat under Russian control. And if they take that bridge they they need to take it from Missouri because the bridge is blown. Either way, the garrison's not cut off. You're not gonna get across those rivers, especially this time of year. So once that's taken, any pontoon bridges or if they can take the main bridge intact, and you're heading straight into Slade and Skar from the north.
And that's when you really start to close that big culture. So that that seems to be the what the developing situation is in that area. We'll see. I mean, crossing Yamana is gonna fall. I have no doubt about that.
It's just a matter of how long does it take. You know? Do do they surrender? Does it take another week? Well, it will it'll take longer a week.
I'm sure. Unless there's been major movements, and we haven't seen in the geolocations yet, which is a possibility. There's a possibility that's 50% under Russian control. We'll find that out, well, I think within the next day or two.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Mentioned the Ukraine is not withdrawing after they become encircled and the, I guess, the obsession with holding on to territory. And, you know, there is it's it seems irrational, but this this think there's a rational explanation that is what people often dismiss as PR wars. It's more accurately necessary PR wars because if The US and Europeans lose interest in Ukraine, then then essentially the the weapons and money dry up, and then it's all over. So I think Zelensky has become a bit addicted to PR victories, though, which is why he kinda need these things.
And, I guess, on that topic of, you know, Ukraine falling out of the headlines, which is something that obviously angers or worries Zelensky significantly. We we see that whenever something else pops up and Ukraine disappears from the headline, he, you know, he comments on it. He argues the need to bring it back essentially. And, you know, so you can't really well, it looks as if the war in, now the attack on Iran unavoidably will affect the the Ukrainian battlefield. Do do you have any overview in terms of how significant this is?
Because, again, it seems to be weapons, there's money, there's international focus, you know, political support. Everything, you know, has to it comes it has to come at expense, doesn't it?
Speaker 1: Well, there's one more other other point that particular Western commentators aren't too apt to mention. It's the amount of pressure from the military and from certain military society that's now been leveled on the government. Look. You know, the we don't wanna go too fast or we don't wanna hit into NATO because, oh my god, there may be a big war. Iran has shown everybody, including a lot of Russian generals by the way, could smack the Americans around left and right.
You can absorb whatever hits they have. They really can't do that much to you. And this is a nuclear power, so they're definitely not gonna go nuclear because that means there's no America left. So look. You know?
The the point is is if the Iranian if the Iranians can take out 23 American bases and just just systematically destroy them, And American casualties, believe you me, are a hell lot higher than 14 guys killed. That probably multiply at least by 10 to to get something closer to reality, and it's growing, growing fast. And if they do a ground war, it's gonna be just a mass casualty event. We'll see. But the point is is look.
You know, for eighteen days now is it eighteen days? One second. Yep. It's eighteen days. For eighteen days now, the four day Trump war has been a disaster for the Americans.
Their equipment, their bases that they've been built up for thirty years are getting obliterated totally. Some already are. Get videos constantly of big fires and drones just flying all over these bases, taking out American equipment infrastructure and, you know, like, for them, the American military. And the result is what? Not much from the other side.
Yes. They've killed a lot of civilians in Tehran, but Tehran's standing. And that's not something they could do in Russia because US aviation would have one hell of a field day trying to get in. So that's and then then the pressure on the government is why aren't we doing this? When Iran says we're going after Ukrainian I'm sorry.
They're going after Israeli generals and politicians, and soon maybe Ukrainian generals and politicians, The question is, why aren't we doing this? And that's what the question always comes back to the equivalent. Why aren't we doing this? We can do this. We have the capital.
We have more enough capability to do this. Why are we not doing this? So that's something that no western no western pundit wants to talk about. But if Russia takes the gloves finally off, you're gonna see a NATO happening the same thing that you saw in with Iran. Because quite easily, Russia could take out Ryan Metall or Russia could take out the manufacturers of the Flamingo.
It's basically the upgraded v one. Yeah. That that's something that you could drop on a Russia account. There's nothing anybody can do about it except either run away before it hits or die with it. That that's the reality of it.
Russia could very easily take out these manufacturing facilities. And the next question is, do you really wanna go further, or are you gonna back off to the Germans or to the British and so on? I think that would be a shock moment that would cause a lot of these politicians to have to go change their underwear, to be frank about it, because they
Speaker 0: Are you froze?
Speaker 1: You're right. It's okay. Yeah.
Speaker 0: Okay. Oh, you're back. Sorry. You, yeah, you you disappeared for, like, thirty seconds. That's
Speaker 1: Yeah. Okay. So so what was the last thing I said that that got recorded?
Speaker 0: Yeah. That's, yeah, some something that they they don't wanna do. Why does it
Speaker 1: You know, the the the there's massive pressure that's building on the government. Why aren't we doing what Iran can do? And like I said, the you know, Russia can easily take out Ryan Metall or take out the manufacturing of the flamingos. And I think at that point, that would be a very shocking moment to European politicians. They may have to go change their underwear after that because they've gotten very, very comfortable.
They can do whatever they want, evil they want to Russia, sponsor terrorism, do whatever, and the response has only gotta be in Ukraine. See? Yeah. Okay. The Ukrainians will get it for what we do, but we don't have to worry about it.
The moment this all comes home and they suddenly see the smoke pilling piling up from some factory or key manufacturer point in their capital, that suddenly is gonna be a wake up call for a lot of them that, you know, you've overplayed your game. Things have gotten very, very serious. And look. You know, realistically speaking, America is never going to surrender. Even the smallest cities like Oklahoma City or Arkansas City with 200,000 population in exchange for Berlin or in exchange for London or exchange for Paris, Warsaw, or any other European city regardless of size.
It's not gonna happen. That's just the point. It's not gonna happen. And Iran is also demonstrating that very, very clearly.
Speaker 0: I think that's a excellent point, though, in terms of this also changing the calculation in Moscow. Because since the beginning, it always seems that Russia's faced with a dilemma that is, does the blood flow? Does it retaliate and essentially restores deterrent? Or or does it, yeah, let it go and, you know, avoid risking World War three, but but then, of course, the undermining its own deterrence if it's does retaliate. It does it just seems that now the yeah.
The the the ability, Well, not just that the Iranians prove that if you hit back, then that that's the only way of getting the opponents to respect your security. But it's but it also suggests now is would be the opportune time for Russia because because now all all these weapons and money are tied up in the Middle East. So, again, I am not advocating for anything, just to be clear, but but it seems like that that would be part of the calculation here that this is a good time to to restore the deterrence and if we begin to push back. But do you see any indication so far of Moscow going down this line? Because I heard before that this is a bit of a pressure now that, you know, people are looking towards Iran and asking why aren't we doing this?
Why do we keep getting, you know, punched in the face and not hitting back?
Speaker 1: Well, there there are some quick substantial evidence. For example, when the French envoys came in would demanding and asking and demanding that they be part of these negotiations, they were quite literally told to go fuck off in those words. It was the the ending of what they were told. So the diplomatic facade there of trying to be civilized is starting to slip away. It's like, fine.
You know? The the these are the people we're dealing with, which know who they are or what they represent in themselves. So there's no point in being nice to them anymore. They're an ad. Macron and his government is an enemy government.
He tries to do this political ambiguity, which Trump is also trying. I think Trump is more than doing it off the fact that he doesn't want the hell to do. And Macron to some degree too. But, you know, political ambiguity is not what you want in in superpowers and especially countries on nuclear weapons. You want absolute transparency as much as you can and predictability.
Otherwise, the logic of of well, you know, with with America, since America has a first strike doctrine, the logic for any other country that's capable of doing it is the moment you can do a first strike on America, you do a first strike on America. That's that's the problem of having a first strike doctrine. Oh, we'll take you out whenever we feel like it. Well, everybody's now scared that you might actually be stupid enough to do that. So the moment they see an opportunity, it behooves them in the in in, the logic of geopolitics to to exterminate you the moment they can't, because you're, you're the constant threat.
You know, tomorrow may be having internal problems or economic problems or what have you, and you're just gonna strum at the decapitation strike. And since America has displayed, especially under Trump, this fetish for decapitation strikes, well, obviously, if you can do a decapitation strike on the on The US, it behooves you to do a decapitation strike on The US and exterminate Washington or whatever before they can exterminate you. That's the logic that you create because MAD goes away. MAD is no longer there, mutually assured destruction. It's now who gets to push the button first or whose missile can get there before the other guy can make a decision.
That's the problem with having a first strike doctrine, and then being a having a a regime of idiots on one hand and idiots with big grenades and apes with grenades on the other hand as we see in what what they've created in The Middle East where they literally have no idea how to get out of this and save face. There is no way out without with saving face, and I think they're gonna double, triple, quadruple down. So I, you know, I I I did a video where I talked about and and tomorrow, we'll be doing a video with RT. We're gonna be talking about possible ground routes of ground incursion. But as I said, you know, this is a possible route, but you'd have to be a total cretin to go down this route because it's it's it's suicide for whatever army you throw in there.
And then they're not gonna do it. Well, now I'm not so sure they're not gonna do it. They I think they they may actually go down this route. As stupid as insane as it may sound, it'll be suicide for the guys they tossed in there. But, you know, at this point, I mean, this is the president that yesterday said, you know, not only did they scratch because they made it illegal for all American satellite companies to display maps of the Middle East over the last two weeks.
Amazingly, it's not just American satellites up there. Who could have thawing thawed out? None of the Iranians have satellites or the Russians, Chinese, a lot of other countries. So the the images keep coming. But, you know, when Trump goes out there, and and starts talking about, you know, your show we're gonna pull your, broadcasting licenses, because your fake media, because you're showing those those images of burning American tankers or burning American bases, it's all AI.
It's not real. None of it's real. We don't have anything burning. Like, okay. And then the tourists arrive.
Well, please come help me, you know, open the streets of Harwich. It's a very small job. We you know, you can do it. It's a very small job, which begs the next question. Why aren't you doing it?
Oh, because the US Navy said, hell. Oh, no. We're not gonna send our ships in there to die. So here, French. Frenchies.
Deutschers, come over here. And you Chinese tourists, it's gonna be very bad for you if you don't do this. It's like, what what are gonna do? China's getting this oil. Pakistan's getting this oil.
Iranian oil exports have actually gone up 10% as far as that that made me to believe. So yeah. So you you got a regime that has absolutely no plan. You you've got a bunch of psychopathic pseudo heretic preachers in the in the Zionist Christian Zionist movement telling Trump that he's the anointed one, and to go against Trump's word is like going against God's word. I got a video of that one from was it was it Pamela White, I think, last name?
Yeah. The the chief preacher for for Trump, the chief heretic preacher. So, you know, that I mean, these people are insane. They're all certifiably insane. They got an old guy that started suffering from dementia who's got the big guns and who likes to be, you know, he likes to be praised, and that's what they're doing.
They're working to his ego. So this is this is as this is as dysfunctional as you could imagine of the government. And then you got the Israelis. It's the biggest rogue state in probably the last since World War two. And now what do you do with that?
And and you've got these two combined. So it's it's it's a horrible situation we've found ourselves in. And I don't know how to get out of it short of removing both regimes. I ever wish which way anybody wishes to do that.
Speaker 0: Yeah. I saw Trump trying to sell in the intervention to open up the Strait Of Removes like he was selling apartments or something. It was very strange to watch because, you know, countries do have intelligence services. They it's not like, oh, okay then. If you promise us, it will be easy.
I mean, even, yeah, Starmer said he had consult his team, and Trump had a comment like, well, you're the prime minister. You have to consult anyone. It's, like, really trying to push an apartment on someone before talking to, you know, your lawyer or whatever. It's was very strange, to watch. But, sorry.
Go ahead.
Speaker 1: You know, Trump's the the big breakthrough in intelligence and psyops over the last couple days was Trump calling a stormer a weakling and a loser, and then US intelligence is now pushing that Khomeini, the younger Khomeini, is gay. That's your big propaganda push right now. Oh, yeah. Yeah. You guys are desperate.
I mean, that's obvious enough. How do you tell someone you're desperate without telling them you're desperate? You know, just watch the the American response. Everything's great. Everything's blown up, but we can't open the streets of Harmouth for right now.
But maybe later. Oh, and and we'll we'll escort them after the shooting is done. They actually said that. You know? Yes.
We're we escorting them after the shooting's done. So you're in one of those peace again, and nobody's nobody's threatening you. Got it. Got it. It's it's it's funny and hilarious from one side, but it's very dangerous and nerve wracking from the other side because you're literally dealing with deranged individuals up and down that chain of command.
Speaker 0: Well, it was just weird because at some point when the British said they might send some naval assets, you know, to the general region, not to the Strait Of Moose, The Trump said something along the lines that, oh, we don't need your help now. You know, we already won. It's too late. And now, of course, he wants them to come out. It's just they're so much all over the place.
It's very strange to watch the lack of narrative control, management of allies. Yeah. Now shocking. But but before, you mentioned Macron wanting to join this diplomatic effort, or I think it is important to be specific. He wanted to join the trilateral Russia, US, Ukraine format.
And this is kind of problematic because if he joins as a spoiler, it's just gonna be ruin the whole thing. That is the desire to prolong the war. I thought that he might have more success if he would just suggest, you know, let's open bilateral diplomacy because, you know, there wouldn't be nothing to lose. You know, if they if the France and Russia is able to improve relations, that would be good on its own. And, you know, worst case, one creates some divisions within the EU about those who don't want it.
So, you know, it is no lose for Russia. But joining in on the established format when the Europeans have more or less expressed their desire to sabotage it, it's it does make any sense. However, you've seen a wider development of it. The Belgian prime minister said it's time to restore normal diplomatic relations with Russia. This is the same prime minister who didn't wanna steal the Russian assets.
Even president Stavov Finland, you know, who's a real Russophob to, you know, his core, argued at some point, we're gonna have to start speaking with Russia again. Obviously, things aren't going well in the proxy war in Ukraine, but also the Iran war, I think, has really shook them because the, well, the energy they're cut off from, so the the economies will just go south from here on. And, yeah, security wise, the Americans are distracted. They have no weapons to send. They have no ability to escalate or bluff, you know, put in the ultimatums to Russia even if they would want to.
So so it seems Russia is in a stronger position. Do you do you do you see any possibility of any, I guess, what would be the conditions for Russia to open up any negotiations or discussions with the Europeans? Or are there any?
Speaker 1: That is very, very difficult question because let's face reality. Who do you trust in Europe? I mean, especially coming from the French or the Germans. We let's not forget Hollander, who got beaten to the press only by Merkel, to laugh and jump up and down and tell them how they, pulled, Vladimir Vladimir's part of the nose and just bought a bunch of time for Ukraine to build up build up for war with Russia. By the way, this is what they said.
It wasn't just for the Donbas. Already think the Donbas. So how do you trust anything that's coming out of those governments? There are continuations, basically, in one form or another with Mertz and and Macron. I doubt that you can trust anybody.
And the problem is is even these more outlier parties that are now populist parties getting power, like Front National or or alternative for Deutschland. The problem is is their leadership is being groomed into being just another party. And it's you know, as I was talking to a couple of some Germans that I know, they yeah. They said at the grassroots or the the the Gundensland area level, you're still facing AFD that is what it was. But at the federal level, they've been cooped already.
And Front National has been cooped for quite a long time. And you're the ones they were screaming that, yeah. We don't mind sending weapons. Those soldiers, we're gonna get some soldiers. We don't mind sending weapons to, Ukraine.
So what's the difference here? And then you look at Farage. And Farage is, for all intents and purposes, the rebirth of, the conservative party two point o, except he's talking about we don't want immigration. Of course, the conservatives said the same thing, and then you saw what happened in England. You just keep getting flooded even worse under the conservatives.
Everything that else that's coming out of Faraj's mouth is neocon playbook. You know, he's just reading right off the talking points for neocons. So, again, who do you trust in Europe? You can trust people like well, well, the Belgians the reason the Belgians first and foremost, the reason the Belgians didn't wanna take the Russian money is simply because they know what what debt of thieves that they're a part of. And once everybody takes their share and puts it in their pocket, when the whatever it gets to that point, there will be lawsuits against Euroclear, and Russia will take that money out of Euroclear offices all over the world.
It'll bankrupt Euroclear totally. And then it'll come after the Belgian government in lawsuits. And the Belgian government's the only one that's gonna be paying, and Belgium cannot afford $300,000,000,000 or euros. It'll bankrupt the entire country, and you can sell off all the you can sell off the king and queen, and you can sell off all the castles and all the museum parts, and you still will never pay this sum off. And that's the problem.
And they they they were smart enough to realize, yeah, when everybody goes, hey. We're behind you. You know? We're really all behind you. We're really far behind you counting the money we just stole.
So have fun. Good luck. We're we're we're morally behind you. Because the Belgian said, well, let's sign a document that will split the the damages across the board. Nobody signed that document.
Nobody was gonna go for that. No. No. No. You just go ahead and and and we'll we'll we'll we'll we'll morally with you there, but, you know, to the end.
So the it's the EU. Well, what can you say? It's a it's a it's a den of thieves, h one trying to get over on the other one and and climb up the the ladder to be the the the head of the guild of thieves. That but that's what you're looking at. I mean, you're you're not looking exactly at people that have any concept of honor or or respect or loyalty.
You're looking at at cutthroat politics that are unified, but the moment you take away the Russian threat, what are they unified by? Just the lust for power and machinations between each other. I mean, they're you're not talking about something you can build a foundation of a society on or a civilization. There is no civilization idea in Europe, modern Europe, modern in the EU. There's civilization idea in the Eastern Europe called Russia, and those that are now being drawn to it, there's a civilizational idea in the former Austro Hungarian empire, well, for most of it anyways.
But the remainder of Europe, including the Germans and their Middle Middle Europe concept that's been around since the eighteen eighties. There's no there's no civilizational idea anymore. What what do they got to bring to anybody? So this is just you know, it's it's managers. You don't have leaders in Europe.
You have managers and very poor managers with possible good high paying jobs in America after they leave. So I don't know. Europe who do you talk to in Europe? I mean, quite simply, if I'm if I was sitting in a criminal right now, I would ignore everything coming out of Europe except or urban people like Orban and Fitsow who've proven themselves. Maybe Babich, they would have to depend on how much he can prove himself.
But who else do you trust?
Speaker 0: I noticed that in Russia, some of them the the rhetoric over how, you know, the Minsk was, well, was a ruse, that it has has some similarities to the Libyan issue. Because I remember after they fooled the Russians over Libya, Russia took a very different stance over Syria. Now you see after the Minsk and, of course, you could put Istanbul into that same mix, The the distrust now towards any real diplomacy, it's it's quite astonishing, which makes it very, I guess, difficult to find some any settlement. Doesn't mean that settlement can't be done. It just means that the trust component, which is important to make any deal work, is, well, completely absent.
But you mentioned before the whole idea of of the Russians being prepared to take a stronger stance against the Europeans. But how about The United States? Because we've seen some, well, reports in media and some politicians who are outraged because they they alleged that Russia has handed over intelligence to the Iranians in terms of American targets, which seems quite reasonable. I just assumed that would happen. But, you know, no self reflection.
They they they don't seem to recognize they've been doing the same for the past few years. So but nonetheless, when Trump was asked about this, you know, he was kinda dismissive either that they didn't do it or it's just minor stuff like we've done in Ukraine or they think we've done in Ukraine, he said.
Speaker 1: Minor stuff. Ukraine. Yeah. But But what would be your stuff? You try to assassinate the president of Russia.
I don't know. What what what could be more major than that?
Speaker 0: Yeah. But is the are the Russians also willing to push back harder against The United States?
Speaker 1: And I definitely. I think so. And and it the confidence is growing. And even the Chinese who were took a big step back from Iran at the beginning of all this have changed their stance quite a bit too. It's true to have their they had their radar systems there, but Chinese are stay taking a a long step back to see how it's gonna go.
And now they're looking at it and going, oh, that's how it's gonna go. You know, land lease you know when land lease started coming to the the Soviet Union? There's a concept called, you know, success breeds success. Well, in 1942, in January 1942, when the British ambassador to the Soviet Union took a nice little drive up to Klin, which is Northwest of Moscow. Well, back then, it was about a 120 kilometers.
That's about 90 kilometers. Moscow keeps growing. And he came out and got to see what was left of the smoking ruins of a German division that was surrounded and clean and exterminated. And he went back and he telegraphed back to Churchill and to Roosevelt. I think they're gonna win.
And that's what they went. Oh, okay. Okay. We'll back them now. It's the same thing here.
They were us going back and looking at the Iranians and going, I think they're gonna win. They they got pretty damn good chance of winning because all the big bullies come, and he's gonna take everybody out. But, you know, when you're the big bully, once you've established yourself as the big guy in the on the basketball court, you really don't wanna fight anybody because, you know, you can smack around the little guys, but some medium sized or bigger guy, even if you beat him, he's gonna take so much out of you. Everybody starts to lose respect for you or starts to lose fear of you. And this is what we're seeing.
Yeah. You could kill as many Iranian civilians as you want. The Iranians are are clearing the Americans out of the Persian Gulf, and the Iranians aren't breaking. They're just in fact, they're doubling down, and delivering blow after blow. No matter what Trump says, you know, Trump's different positions between breakfast, lunch, brunch, dinner, and midnight snack.
He's you get the whole plethora of what the hell is he talking about today. Oh. But the Iranians are standing around. In fact, the Iranians said, we don't we we're not asking for peace. They flat out said this.
We're not asking for peace. We don't see any reason for peace right now. So we're they're not looking for peace. They're looking for it to punish the Americans and to make it as pain more maximally as painful as possible. They're looking to expose the Americans out of the Persian Gulf, and they're doing a damn good job so far, at least the from direct kinetic.
But they're also pressuring the the Arabs to go, look. You're not getting any help from the yanks. They're not here to protect you. You're the front you're you're there to absorb, you know, our blows for them, but they're not gonna protect you. And that's starting to play a lot on a lot of these Arabs from what I've been told by the sources the Saudis have told the American bases to, you know, go screw yourself.
We're neutral. We're not gonna help you survive the best you can. And that's if that's true, that's a pretty big blow. And as much as we've seen Nancy I'm sorry. Lindsey Graham is screaming and hollering.
I don't know what drugs he was on this time. It's a couple of the videos lately. His his eyes are rolling in the back of his head, and he's it looks like he's either very, very drunk or on something else. But, you know, Lindsey Graham, they're screaming up and down that, yeah, we defended you, and you're not defending us to the Saudis. You have to come.
You're you're sorry. You know? Blah blah blah. Well, it's just that's another sign of that desperation. They take the mask off, and we are trying to strong-arm these countries.
The countries are going, no. Thanks. Bye bye. Have a good life. You know?
What what are gonna be the reactions after this kind of war is over? Well, if things keep going, they've hedged their bets that The USA ain't gonna be isn't gonna be in any position to do anything to them in recalination. That's the position that they're all in. Besides, Trump's got his new play toy. He's gonna go invade Cuba.
That's that's you know? You you know, he's already invaded Greenland kinda. He's tried to well, he he's got a war he can't win, but he's thinking about invading Iran. But, yeah, why worry? We're we're already gonna invade Cuba.
So, I mean, he got his agenda. You know? We we've gotta do so many things before for the bucket list. I guess that's one more thing for the bucket list.
Speaker 0: Since war is always the solution, if one is full of high hubris, sorry, after Venezuela, then, of course, then we have to go to the war. And if one is humiliated as now with Iran, then, well, we have to change the folks and get a victory behind us. You know? Then okay. Well, then there's also war.
But either way, it seems to go towards war. But in terms of, yeah, the pressure tactics and the it seems as if the, you know, that, yeah, that, I guess, perception becomes reality. That is if all these countries in the region thought The US was winning and Iran was on its back foot, then, of course, they would wanna bet on the winning horse. As you said before, that's what countries do. But if you look at this yeah.
From Saudi Arabia to Azerbaijan, all these countries which, most likely had some false flag attacks against him as well, now they're saying, well, we don't really wanna do this after all. That's a good indication of, of where where things are going. And it's, I can see why Russia and China would want to, you know, reduce The US, presence in The Middle East and at least scale them back in places like Iraq. But but also there seems to be a wider message that is if all The Gulf's nations will reach the conclusion that actually being frontline states for The US, you know, will, you know, will not give us security. It will only ensure that bombs will drop on our heads.
You know, this message is going across the world. In East Asia, you have the South Koreans now discussing, well, look what happened. America had some rough times, and they took away all our air defense systems. What would they do for us? And maybe that message Sorry?
Speaker 1: And they did it in the middle of the night.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Just in case they would notice. But now, you know, maybe this message comes across to the Europeans as well. If the Russians would now seek to restore their deterrent and, you know, drop a bomb on some weapons manufacturers in Germany, what would really The US do? It might, you know, even pull out its air defenses.
So it's you know, I can see why they would want why there's a lot to gain from if not the defeat of The US, at least some retreat. So just to say, I guess, the last question is, what do we know so far about the Russian support, or what do you think about it as well as the Chinese support? What are
Speaker 1: they actually doing for Iran? Well, outside Russia shipped in let let let's remember one thing. The that Russia back in 2005 and even 2004, Russia wanted to sign an agreement with, you know, with Iran on the level of Belarus and North Korea, a mutual defense agreement. The Iranian liberals who are in charge at that point refused. The the defensive clause, I think, if I remember correctly, that's fifth fifth section, third paragraph, went down to something along the lines of from from an actual defensive clause that that's in with Belarus and North Korea, a solid defensive clause, We're down to something we will struggle together against mutual regional threats, which means what?
You know? It means absolutely nothing. It's empty air. It's just a a word salad that when you boil away the the extra the the fat off of it, there's nothing there. So it's it's a pointless document.
Russia signed that document and ratified it right off the bat. Iran signed that document the second day it was getting lots of loving from the West because we wanna be loved by the West. So Saudi also wanna be loved by the West. And and when the West was giving it lots of loving is when it finally signed that document, and it's still not much of a document. But what followed afterwards and the liberals in Iran losing power and prestige after that little twelve day war and all the mass murders that the Israelis commenced upon inside of Iran, What came out of that was the Russian aid.
So MiG 20 nines, Su 30 fives, s four hundreds that we've yet to see. They're being husband, and I think they're being husband for whenever the Americans actually get enough gumption up to bring in their b 50 twos. That that'll if I was Iranians, that's what I'd be doing. I'd be husbanding those s four hundreds or waiting for the b 50 twos to start coming in and then take them out of the sky. They're slow, and they're big.
They're that's a hard target to miss. So, additionally, Russia brought in a lot of technology upgrades for propulsion systems, avionics, and jamming. Never mind Russia brought in the jamming systems that blocked the Starlinks and allowed to identify the Iranians and identify where those terminals were. Let's not forget that. So that's jamming equipment.
And a lot of this was for the existing fleet of ballistic missiles and avion and and air assets and for for future, obviously, also. Additionally, targeting. I mean, that's what the Americans say. Oh, they're they're helping and targeting. Well, why wouldn't they?
You've been doing this for four years. What's good for the goose is good for the gander. Oh, but no. It's not. How dare they do this to us?
They're evil. Okay. So what have you been doing for the last four years? I mean, either they're that hypocritical or they're that lacking of self awareness. I'm going with hypocrites.
I'm pretty sure they know what they've been doing. So and they've been high and they've been bragging about it until it gets done to them. And they're like, oh, you can't do that. We're really exceptional people. You can't you can't play.
We we're it's a rules based order. We make the rules. You can't do that. That's in the rules. Well, yes, we can.
Additionally, Russia has been bringing in a lot of its experience with with drones. Speaking of drones, there was a there was a sound bite from Trump that there are no such thing as underwater drones and and seaboard drones because we would have killed them by now. See, it's all artificial intelligence. And the Iranians posted another one of those drive through tunnel moments where it's just it's just going down one tunnel, and there's a bunch of these waterborne drones. It's just Rollos like they're down with airborne drones.
Like, okay. It's all artificial intelligence. Know, if it doesn't fit Trump's agenda or Trump's momentary lapse of sanity. By the way, there's something else to consider in this too. The council if if I remember the name correctly, it it's the Security Council of Iran of Iraq.
It's basically a council of militias of the Shia militias. And what they've said to El Jelani is, you take a step into Lebanon, and we're gonna turn your we're gonna turn Syria into a new battleground. We'll come across en masse and and write few throughout. You know, he's still fighting the Alawits, what what's left of the Kurds and the the Christians and the Shia. So Syria is not a done deal.
And I think once the Americans and the Israelis are either the Israelis are beaten back or they're stuck in a very wide war as it's now started today, a full invasion of Southern Lebanon. The Jelani is gonna find himself with a bit of a problem because those Iraqi Shia militias are are itching to go in for a fight, and Iran is gonna be empowered. I'm sure the Russian military is not gonna sit idly by either. Yep. El Jelani may very, very quickly find himself from being chopper play to playboy to American refugee.
So and and his regime is gonna be a very short lived one. It all depends on how much the Americans are left in the Persian Gulf. If they've been if they've been eradicated out of the Persian Gulf, El Jelani's head is gonna be rolling if he doesn't jump a plane and take off fast enough. So Syria may bounce back as an entity, at least to some degree.
Speaker 0: I've been looking over, like, all the journal articles and all academic work from 2012 and the the this era when there were talks about going to war with Iran. And it's interesting that the main conclusions were always, well, this is just a crazy gamble. It's like a recipe for a prolonged war. There's too many unknown variables. If you go after Iran, then that will spill out in essentially every part of the entire region.
I mean, did this just seems like it was very, very predictable. Of course, what wasn't predictable back then was that they would be fighting a proxy war against Russia, and this also is impacted greatly by this war. So well They're very good. Any last thoughts?
Speaker 1: Yes. The satellite imagery seems to suggest that the Chinese are getting ready to return with open arms one of their provinces. So the only one that isn't part of China yet, if you get my point. This is prime time to to do it. The the Americans are out of missiles.
The Americans are jammed up. The Americans are looking like fools. Hey. It's a good time to and they're pulling all their systems out of everybody else. A good time to go look at Taiwan and go, yeah, baby.
It's time to come home. So whether the Taiwanese want to or not and there's a very large fraction in Taiwan that wants pre reunification with China. So let's let's not forget that. So, yeah, the the Chinese may finally see the green light to make their move. I mean, this is gonna have it's it's having, and it's gonna continue to have ramifications well outside of this battle space that they're presently in.
And that Trump's advisers were either psychotically, heretically religious in that that Christian Zionism heresy. We're gonna bring the end of the world and Armageddon and all that, or they were just so bought by the Israelis that they just threw caution to the wind. You know, whichever it is, I think it's probably a combination of both. They're gonna be reaping that whirlwind for a very long time.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, you know, Joe Kent, the who was appointed by Trump to be the director of the National Counterterrorism Center. He he has resigned now because he opposed the war against Iran. Not only did he say this made no sense because Iran posed no imminent threat to our nation, contradicts Trump, but he also make the point that this only started because of pressure from Israel and Israel lobby. I mean, this is just this is Trump's own guy, so I think this is really going into the history books as one of the great great blunders of The United States.
And, yes, interesting times. So thank you very much for taking the time.
Speaker 1: Absolutely. Absolutely. Oh, always a pleasure. I wish I was better more more or happier topics. Less less more joyous topics, but it is what it is.
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
Alexander Mercouris: Iran War Transforms Ukraine War https://youtu.be/Pp3W7gDJh1Y https://t.co/A2pB6XXm5J
Video Transcript AI Summary
Alexander McCurse and the host discuss the Iran showdown as shifting from regime-change aims to an energy-focused attrition war. McCurse notes that in the last few days Iran has faced extreme attacks—from the South Pars field to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant—and asks how to assess Iran’s retaliation. McCurse argues the Western campaign reflected “extreme frustration and bewilderment in Washington and in Israel,” with initial hopes that Iran’s leadership would fall quickly and a power vacuum would force concessions. Instead, Iran has sustained resistance, complicating Western aims and driving a broader energy-war dynamic that Western powers cannot win, since they “rely, depend on energy,” while Iran, Russia, and potentially China are better positioned to endure.
McCurse explains that the Bushehr attack is significant and consequential: the reactor is largely Russian-built with Russian technicians nearby, and the strike served as a signal to Russia to reduce support and push Iran toward negotiations. He emphasizes that Iran’s response was to strike back, revealing a miscalculation by the West similar to earlier expectations at the war’s start. The result has produced an energy-focused attrition war that, in McCurse’s view, Western powers cannot prevail in.
The host references public figures who downplayed Iran’s threats, including Trump and coverage in outlets like the Wall Street Journal, and asks why Western leaders failed to predict Iran’s capable retaliation. McCurse responds that a trend of overestimating Western willpower and underestimating adversaries’ capabilities has persisted, noting a broader pattern: a belief in near-unlimited Western power, with insufficient attention to adversaries’ true industrial and strategic capacities. He cites examples of North Korea-style simplifications and generalizations about Russia and Iran, and argues that the West has often overlooked Iran’s stable institutions and its willingness to endure in pursuit of its core interests.
They discuss the broader security environment, including how Ukraine’s war mirrors this dynamic. McCurse argues that dialogue and mutual address of security concerns have eroded due to a narrative that frames opponents as fundamentally brittle or ideologically driven. He stresses the importance of acknowledging that Iran can defend itself and that progress toward negotiations requires recognizing the root causes as legitimate concerns, not simply dismissing them as irrational.
Reflecting on Europe, McCurse suggests that the war in Iran is connected to the proxy war with Russia and to Europe’s energy and security policies. He notes sanctions’ potential to unravel as energy dependencies shift, with countries like Indonesia and South Korea seeking Russian energy, and Taiwan needing helium from the Persian Gulf, implying broader economic entanglements that complicate sanctions strategies. He argues that the West’s insistence on a punitive, unilateral approach—while ignoring the need to address root causes—undermines long-term security. He lauds the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as a model that balanced preventing nuclear escalation with Gulf stability, and laments that Western governments reversed post–Cold War understandings, including NATO’s eastward expansion.
The discussion turns to China’s role. McCurse explains that China, the Eurasian colossus, will “buy Russian oil,” provide chips, and support Iran “under the surface” without overtly challenging Western interests, maintaining a cautious but significant involvement. He argues China will avoid a full-on confrontation that escalates US tensions, balancing its interests across Russia, Iran, and the West to preserve security and economic continuity.
Towards the end, they address public sentiment in Europe and the potential fragmentation of pro-war coalitions. McCurse cautions that hardliners still control the narrative, making durable peace unlikely in the near term, though a paradigm shift toward dialogue could emerge if confronted with economic and political reality. He concludes by reiterating that the Iranians view the conflict as forced upon them, while the West has undertaken a war of choice, and that both sides’ calculus will shape the duration and outcome of the crisis.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Welcome back. We are joined today by Alexander McCurse, the host of the very popular The The Ryan Podcast, and he also has his own separate podcast under just the name Alexander McCurse. And both of this channel is where most of us go to get our daily updates and analysis. So thank you very much for taking the time.
Speaker 1: And thank you very much for having me here today on your wonderful channel.
Speaker 0: So over the last few days, we've seen what initially was a regime change war to have turned into what appears to be an an an energy war to exhaust each other. You know, it's only the last few days we saw some very extreme attacks that is from the South Paris field to the the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. How are you assessing this, the attacks on Iran, but also Iran's retaliation?
Speaker 1: Well, I think the explanation is one of extreme frustration and bewilderment in Washington and in Israel. I think when they started this military campaign, three weeks ago, the Americans and the Israelis assumed that it would be over very quickly, that the government in Iran was weak and fragile and would fall very fast, that as soon as the leadership was eliminated, a power vacuum would arise. They did not anticipate a long war, and they did not anticipate that Iran would be able to continue to resist in the way that it has. So in this kind of situation where people find it very difficult to retreat because they've prying themselves up for victory and the political consequences of not achieving that victory would make the victory tantamount to defeat. Victory beat regime change.
They are striking out and they're striking out in a way that it seemed to me was initially intended to put enormous pressure on Iran and some of Iran's friends, notably Russia, to to come to the table and to stop making the kind of big concessions that the Americans and the Israelis needed in order to justify what has happened. So that's why you had the attack on South Pass, which is a massive escalation, and that was why you had the attack on Boucher. Now Boucher, hardly anybody's talking about. Thank you for asking me about it. I think it is enormously important and consequential.
This is, of course, a largely Russian built reactor. There are Russian technicians in the area. As far as I know, nobody was injured and nobody was hurt, but it seems to me that the attack on Bushehr was also a message to the Russians. Reduce your support to Iran. Talk get them to talk to us.
Again, the same miscalculation that we saw at the start of the war featured with this attack instead of the Iranians rushing to negotiate or agree a ceasefire or whatever. What they did was they said if you hit us in that way, we have every potential to do that in return. And of course they did conduct their attacks, and this came as a massive and unexpected shock. And, well, we saw the extraordinary events that took place over the last couple of hours, over the last couple of days, following these attacks on the energy systems that we have seen. An attrition war on energy is a war that The United States, the Western powers cannot win.
They rely, depend on energy. Their adversary, Iran, Russia ultimately, if Russia is in the game, China too, are far better positioned to withstand it.
Speaker 0: Well, we heard all these comments from The United States so that they well, Trump said that no one could ever predict that they would strike the base of all these Gulf states, and he had seemingly well, apparently, the Wall Street Journal, he had also dismissed the idea that that the Iranians would close straight over Moose. I mean, if if you recognize that Iran sees this as an existential threat, all of these responses should have been understood to be the first thing it would do. I mean, many people did predict this as well, you being one of them. So but how how could they get this so wrong? Because it feels this is becoming a common trend.
If you look towards, for example, the Ukraine war, one of the reasons why the Europeans joined in on the proxy war against Russia was because they did think that they would run out of missiles within a few days. We heard this already by March. We we they thought that the the Russian economy could be turned into rubble rubble within the, you know, end of the week, that her whole worldcom world community would turn their backs on them. But the same with Iran. It's their ability to strike back the extent of drones, missiles.
I mean, even though they fought a war against them only back in June, and here we are again, how how what what is is this just about selling the war too hard, or is it the hegemonic hubris? Or how how do you explain this? Because this is dangerous.
Speaker 1: Well, it is incredibly dangerous. I think hegemonic hubris has a great part in this. I think that there continues to be in The United States and to some extent in Europe, an entrenched belief, an embedded belief that, The United States, the West, possesses almost unlimited power, that the mere fact of applying the power itself is sufficient to achieve the desired outcome and that everything in the end comes down to a question of will. If you read the kind of publications that a lot of these people produce and generate who make these decisions, you could see that willpower is a major factor in everything that they think about and do. They focus too much on will, specifically their own will, and not as much as they should on capabilities.
Their own capabilities and even more the capabilities of their adversaries. Now, how this has come about is a massive question because it was not always like this. There was a time during the Cold War when I remember and I'm sure you remember too we used to read very detailed analyses in the West about the state of the Russian oil industry or the state of the Russian machine building industry or things of that kind. Today, we see far less of that. It's caricature, mostly.
Russia is the kleptocracy. Russia is run by oligarchs. There is this huge issue of corruption that Russia is this petro state. The idea that the country has an industrial base is simply never taken seriously and with Iran, I think that has been taken a whole step further. The assumption that the regime there is brittle, that it's unpopular, that it's a house of cards, that all you need to do is blow on it and it will fall and that of course they wouldn't dare close the Strait Of Hormuz because if they did that, they would be undermining their own economic position, which of course contradicts everything else, but I actually saw people who thought that and that the Chinese would never let them do it as if China actually makes the decisions in Tehran.
This has never started but these talking points were out there, they were endlessly repeated and they were assumed to be true.
Speaker 0: Yeah. I don't know. It's like this. I always often make the point that it's during the Cold War, we were allowed to discuss, for example, security concerns of our opponents, which is a necessity if you wanna reduce the security competition and actually create indivisible security and peace. But I think it goes even deeper than this.
It's the ability to even discuss the well, what's happening with our opponents, because I often make the point that, for example, in Russia, that their economy has become quite diversified, they're not that dependent on energy, they made great advancements in developing their own digital ecosystem, they are advancing with technological sovereignty, but if you make these points, it's not as if you're describing what is happening in Russia and the the strengths versus the weaknesses of the opponent. It's it's considered pro Russian because you're talking about their strengths, which means that's a Kremlin talking point. So we essentially banned ourselves from talking about the strength. And the same I noticed was the same with Iran because, you know, Iran, it has stable institutions. It's not just some crazy religious fanatics who's, you know, ruling, you know, through fierce violence, and, you know, when I was in Tehran as well, I noticed that a lot of this repression of women, it's exaggerated.
You see in higher education, there's a lot of women who go on the streets, they're not forced to cover themselves. You see girls in t shirt and jeans without covering their hair. I mean but but if you mentioned it's well, you're kinda talking pro pro regime now because you're defending them, it seems. It's no appetite anymore for for for anything positive or something that's considered to be pro. And but if you can't keep if if as you say, if everything has to be doom and gloom about your opponent, that everything is just a gas station masquerading as country or crazy mullahs wanting to destroy the world, How can you enhance your own security if you can't have an honest assessment of your of the other side?
It's it's quite extraordinary. But I I do wanna ask about, you know, they said that we might be walking to world war, and because these wars, they 're quite connected. That is the Iran war is quite connected to the war now with Russia. So how how do you see, though, this the wider Iran war impacting our proxy war with the Russians?
Speaker 1: Well, I I think the one undermines the other. If you look at the economics of this, we've already seen that The United States has has to relax its sanctions on Russian oil. The reality is that we are now in an energy crisis already in Asia. Indonesia, which was formerly an oil producer and exporter, now has had to approach Russia for help. South Korea is apparently doing the same.
If this go if this drags on, more and more countries in Asia are going to be obliged to do that. And it's not just oil. Again, this is where the whole idea of talking about Russia as a corrupt, kleptocratic, petro state and by the way, I completely agree with your point that we disastrously restricted the terms of debate, that having intelligent debates about the other side became somehow morally and politically unacceptable. But the Russians don't just produce oil, they produce naphtha, they produce fertilizer, they produce helium. The Persian Gulf is a major source of the helium that was used in Taiwan to make the advanced microprocessors, the chips there, which we hear so much about.
There are not many alternative sources of helium gas. So the Taiwanese, if they're going to maintain production, they have to go ultimately to where the helium is made and to the people who are prepared to sell them, sell this, and they may have to go to the Russians. So ultimately, the whole sanctions apparatus that we've created and tried to enforce with very patchy success over the last four years is going to start to break down the longer this crisis continues. It's not just a case of lifting the sanctions for thirty days and then putting them back on again. I mean, even to talk in that way is absurd.
If you're gonna have to lift the sanctions, you are even for a short time, you are fatally undermining the sanctions. And, of course, the connecting thread to these two conflicts is precisely the one that you have been talking about, that they both ultimately derive from this hegemonic surge, this hegemonic impulse, which launched us into a conflict first with Russia and then with Iran without thinking through the consequences.
Speaker 0: The foolishness, though, is it was quite unnecessary if one would have taken into consideration the Russian security concerns. Their their security demands were not outrageous. That is we don't want NATO military infrastructure on our borders. We don't want a secret CIA bases along our borders. A lot a lot of these things could be met.
Kissinger made this point back in 2014. He said, why why are we all talking about the need to defeat Russia? Like, first, we should determine whether or not it's a great power. And if it is, which he thought it was, then our first point should be to discuss where our security concerns can be or interests can be aligned, and where they are not aligned, how do we manage the competition. Instead, it's this assumption that, okay, well, now we're clashing with them.
Now we have to defeat them. It's very primitive, and it's same with Iranians. And so Trump making the point, if we hadn't attacked, Iran had a plan to take over all the Middle East. I mean, where does it's just it's really wild. I mean, you couldn't get any serious expert on The Middle East to sign under such a crazy statement.
But, you know, but but but if we didn't make these statements, we're allowed to talk about Iranian security concerns. We might have noticed that, well, the you know, they did their interest could have been met, but well, they they've proven that they could be met if it's on the nuclear issue. But, otherwise, I think you make a good point with Taiwan, though, that is the markets will go where the money is. We saw the same with the Germans. They shut down the access to Russian gas for their industries.
Now the German industry is packing up, and they're going where their Russian gas went, which is to China. But also, of course, some are going across to The United States. But you can only ignore reality for so long. But but on that, ignoring reality, how how does this affect the diplomatic willingness, you think, in Europe? Because many of them are stubborn, but the Belgian prime minister, he did come out and say that, you know, perhaps we should start talking with Russia.
We're financing a war. We're not even allowed to participate in negotiations, and, you know, maybe now is the time. And he got some sympathies from the or support from the or understanding, I think is the right word, from the Italians. So how how do you see the the possibility of the, I guess, fragmenting some of this pro war attitudes within Europe?
Speaker 1: Well, can I just before you before I answer that, just say that I completely agree with you that what the Russians and the Iranians were wanting was perfectly within our ability, the West's ability to agree to without compromising any of our security interests? On the contrary, we would have strengthened them. We had the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action which was working with Iran, which prevented Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability if that was ever their intention. And, at the same time, we had peace in The Gulf and the Strait Of Hormuz was open and we were in a much better security situation than the one in which we are in now. We had agreements with the Russians at the end of the Cold War that NATO would not be expanded eastward and that NATO infrastructure would not be established in Eastern Europe.
That was a time of peace, that was a time when the Cold War was ending. We went back on all of those agreements, we now have a war in Ukraine, a war which, as we have both discussed, in many places we are now losing. So we again find ourselves in a worse security position than we would have been in if we had just agreed to those proposals, those reasonable proposals, to protect and preserve security that you have just been talking about. And you are absolutely correct. Now everything that we have talked about, all of the problems that we have talked about are about fundamental failures of perception and dialogue, internal dialogue within our own societies, which has propelled us towards these very dangerous confrontations and problems in which we find ourselves in today.
There is a way back, we can negotiate, neither of these two countries wants to conquer the Middle East. It's beyond Iran's capacity to do that. Russia certainly doesn't want to conquer Europe. It's beyond their capacity to do that either. But we have to change the outlook that we have brought to bear in this conflict.
Now I'm not sure whether I've answered your question exactly, but if you want to bring it back, then we can
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, I guess, well, to delve a bit deeper into the
Speaker 1: Yes.
Speaker 0: The the the divisions we might see now within Europe because Exactly.
Speaker 1: Barthes Weber. Barthes Yeah.
Speaker 0: Because, yes, I thought this was one of the, perhaps, advantages of Russia. People say, you know, oil prices are going up. Yeah. The weapons are being diverted to the Middle East. Of course, a lot of these are not these are good things.
It's temporary, though. So I think people are maybe putting a bit too much emphasis on it. But what is interesting, though, is that the the the ability of the Europeans to maintain solidarity around this no diplomacy, send more weapons, you know, Ukraine is winning. It it it seems that this might fragment as a result. And if that fragments, it's gonna be very hard to put it all back together.
Do you do you see this? Because, well, I guess, Wonderlane, Kalas, you know, Mertz, these are diehards. You know, they will they will never change their minds. But but but do you see divisions emerging in this Yeah. You know, in the war war enthusiasm of the European leaders?
Speaker 1: Well, yes, but this is going to take a very long time to work its way through. I mean, Baader De Veyva is important because Belgium obviously hosts the European Union, It hosts NATO. It is a for that reason, if no other, a critically important EU country. And what Bart de Waver is saying is what a lot of European leaders, other European leaders are thinking. He has said this himself and what he is pointing to are the realities.
We cannot defeat the Russians. There's no way we could defeat the Russians with the Americans. We certainly can't defeat them without the Americans, and the Americans are not going to throw themselves back into this conflict, and the economics aren't working in the way that we thought they would either. Now, when somebody has the facts on their side, eventually the facts break through and you will start to see some of these leaders, Giorgio Maloney perhaps in Italy, Sanchez maybe in Spain who have never been perhaps quite as obviously committed to these platforms as the hardliners have been. Gradually maybe they will start to come out and they will start to speak out, at which point we will see fragmentation and division spread, and then we will meet we will see the thing start to move forward.
But unfortunately, this is the problem. The hardliners remain very powerful. They still control the key levers. They still, to a great extent, dominate the narrative. The media is still with them.
And so long as they are there, the other side, the Russians will say to themselves, yes, we're prepared to engage the Europeans in some dialogue. We could see this fragmentation. But can we really be confident in the long term that once things don't stay that once things stabilize, the hardliners won't prevail again just as they did before? So it makes this process probably will happen, but I don't think we will get back to that position that we were in in the early nineteen nineties when we could have built a stable security political architecture in Europe, I don't think we will get to that point for a very long time. Maybe, just possibly, you know, now that somebody at last is talking in that kind of way, we will start to see that essential dialogue, which as you rightly said has been so relentlessly suppressed that dialogue begin.
But as I said, too much damage has been done for too long. Repairing the trust is going to be very difficult.
Speaker 0: Well, it's also this I know there's something you spoke about in the past, that is when the Europeans pushed some economic sanctions on China, the the moral outrage and indignation when the Chinese would respond in kind, that this was somehow the prerogative of of the West. Mhmm. But a lot of this assumption of escalation dominance that the West gets to decide, both in the military front and economics that is, you know, we decided to to to to to to boycott all diplomacy. Until now, of course, Macron says, okay. We might talk to the Russia after all if it's within this format with the the Americans and the Ukrainians, and then they're told, no.
Well, you're not invited by the Russians. So it's the same with cutting ourself off from Russian oil, gas, fertilizers, you know, and now, of course, we have this problem in Middle East, who are talking whether or not we should temporarily allow the Russians to export to us, only to find out that the Russians might not be interested, that they have other markets. Do you do you see something similar happening perhaps with Iran? That is the Iranians, they you you hear some comments that there's no going back the way things were before the before the war, which is why they don't want a ceasefire. They keep talking, they want to yeah.
Address the underlying causes. They want a political settlement. Again, awfully similar language as what we hear from the Russians, you know, an end to this hegemonic dominance, if you will. How how do you see the Iranians playing this? What would they be after?
Speaker 1: I think it's exactly the same as what the Russians are saying, and it it it it follows from the same factors because both the Iranians and the Russians and you, by the way, have chronicled what the Russians have done meticulously in various books you've written. The Russians and the Iranians went very, very far to try to negotiate and negotiate as in good faith, long term settlements with the Europeans and with the Americans. We saw that just recently with the Iranians negotiating with the Americans in Geneva and making apparently very big concessions there. And the Iranians are going to say to themselves, and the Russians have already said to themselves, that this is impossible. We are negotiating with people who take but who never give.
And as soon as we give to them and they take, what always happens is they come back and ask for more. And no negotiation can succeed if it is conducted in that way. So both the Iranians and the Russians, the Iranians with far more passion and far more anger because they're a weaker country, and for them, this is more obviously and directly an existential issue. They are saying, We cannot negotiate unless the root cause is and it's, you know, it's a Russian expression, we haven't seen it from the Iranians yet but we will see it eventually, I'm sure, unless the root causes are addressed and ultimately what they all mean when they talk about root causes, they could identify specific issues, NATO expansion, support for seizures of coups in Ukraine, demands impossible demands for Iran to do away with its entire foreign policy. What the Russians and the Iranians ultimately mean when they talk about root causes is finally an acceptance by the West that they are important societies and nations, and that they must be treated as equals with their concerns properly listened to and addressed.
And going back to your point about the fact that we assume that we can sanction other people, but get astonished and shocked when they do the same to us, We need to get out of that mindset and understand that, yes, we may have our disagreements with the Russians, we may have our disagreements with the Iranians, we may not like a lot of what they do, but ultimately they have a right to be there and we have to negotiate with them and negotiate with them in good faith just as we used to do with the Soviets during the Cold War.
Speaker 0: Yeah. I think it's important point to make about about them always coming back for more in these negotiations because I think that's a key problem of the whole post Cold War era. That is when the Soviet Union, you know, fell apart and the Europeans and Americans decided to create a new Europe without the Russians, they didn't merely offer the Russians a new unfavorable status quo. There was no status quo at all. That is every year, NATO has to move its borders a little bit to the East.
The military infrastructure has to move a bit to the East. The missile defense infrastructure has to move to the East, and the energy transit states should be gradually put into the NATO orbit. It just seems as if there's no forthcoming of any new status quo that is always just this incrementalism pushing and pushing further, which, you know, will at some point compel some balancing. But how do you see, though, this I mean, for you know, if you're gonna look at the large Eurasian powers, how does China view all of this? I mean, is this an opportunity?
Is this something that necessitates deeper involvement from them? Because they expressed some some condemnation that is, for example, the killing of Iranian leaders that this is something you can't do. So how how do you see their calculations in all of this?
Speaker 1: I mean, just just just to say on the incrementalism, you you use you use the expression salami slicing to describe to describe it, and I think that is exactly what we have been engaging in. As I said, we constantly slice the salami and until there is, as far as the Russians and the Iranians are concerned, no salami left. And we just go on doing that. We do it bit by bit by bit by bit, and we always come back for more. Now, as for China, China is in a different position from Russia and Iran.
Speaker 0: It
Speaker 1: operates economically and at a military strategic level at a completely different level. It is today the colossus of Eurasia and will remain so for a long time. And the Chinese have this very complex relationship with The United States, which has served their interests well to preserve and which they are attempting up to now to preserve. But again, one senses increasingly that Chinese attitudes have shifting have been shifting. They've been seeing how the rhetoric in The United States has become increasingly hostile to them, and of course, they're perfectly well aware that there's all sorts of people in The United States who are quite openly talking about the fact that pulverizing Iran and gaining control of its oil is to deprive China of that oil, that that was what a lot of what the Venezuela affair was all about, that to the extent that there's been proposals from the Trump people to try to improve relations with the Russians in some way, it was all ultimately done with no other real purpose than to try to pull the Russians away out of the Chinese orbit.
So I think what the Chinese do, they know this, they see this, they read all about this, they build up their own economy, they build up their own forces, but they will always do just enough just enough to keep their allies on side and to keep them functioning. So they will buy Russian oil. They will provide the Russians with chips, they will sort out any supply issues that the Russians face, they will give diplomatic assistance to the extent that it doesn't cut too obviously against Chinese diplomatic interests. They will do the same with Iran. Again, we don't know exactly what the Chinese are doing with Iran, but there's been rumors about Chinese radars and rumors about Chinese financial assistance.
They'll make sure that it's all there under the surface, but they will do it. They will and they become very skilled at it. And I think the other countries, the Russians, the Iranians probably calculate that it is to their advantage long term to keep it this way, that they don't want the Chinese coming in too obviously, becoming too deeply involved. Not only will that escalate the crisis with The United States, the global crisis involving The United States, but it will also it also means that the Chinese are not there in such a big way that there is in effect a chance that they might take over, that they might take over in Moscow and that they might take over in Tehran, which is the these two countries don't want to see. So I think the Chinese have this actually fairly well calculated and fairly well balanced.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, about the salami tactics, I actually wrote an article, back in November 2021, three months before the Russians went into Ukraine, and I referred to the salami tactics as again, the headline was something along the line of why a war will soon be inevitable because and why why we don't recognize it, because you make these tiny little steps and which makes it difficult for the opponent to retaliate, and for our own public, it would seem very irrational, even unprovoked, if the adversary would take such grand steps. But again, that's built into the whole system that you take the small pieces, and at some point, a pawn has to react, and then it does seem irrational or unprovoked. But, again, I was just making the point, this is why we it is becoming inevitable, even though many people think it's very unlikely. But how do you see then the you you mentioned that the Chinese are measuring the support quite cautiously, the Russians as well.
Do you know do you have any information or, I guess, assumptions about what they're actually doing for the Iranians at this point in time?
Speaker 1: Well, again, everything that we hear is based on information that we're getting from all sorts of sources, which, of course, we don't we're not able to corroborate exactly. But my sense is that the Russians are quite involved. I I I I think that we've seen how the Shahid drones the Iranians have been using Shahid drones fairly effectively. I'm fairly sure that the Iranians have been coached and trained into doing that by the Russians who, of course, have now massive experience of this. The Iranians have also learned how to blend missile strikes with drone strikes, not apparently at all an easy thing to do if it's to be done successfully and well, and again, I think probably the Russians have helped with that as well.
I noticed that this morning, there were pictures of American missile strikes on Iran's Caspian seaports. Now why would the Iranian the Americans be attacking the Caspian seaports? Presumably, something is coming through those ports, and it can only be coming from Russia. There's rumors and pictures of convoys of trucks coming trumbling through from Central Asia. I I think when the full history of this conflict is written, which will probably be quite a long time from now, we will discover that the Russians in particular have been involved in Iran quite a lot.
It was not until the February, for example, that we learned quite how involved the extent of Soviet involvement in Vietnam and that there were Soviet technicians helping the Vietnamese actually in Iran guiding, you know, operating the radars and the air defense missiles and that kind of thing. So I suspect the Russians are quite involved. With the Chinese, it's always more difficult to say. I suspect the Chinese are there too. They're in a better position to provide spare parts, you know, rocket fuel, parts for drones, that kind of thing.
But a lot of this is guesses, and I don't want to imply that I know more than I do.
Speaker 0: Yeah. I I watched those convoys as well coming in from Tajikistan. Yeah. Most of them, well, delivering aid, but I also assume that within all of these trucks, these very long convoys well, it would make sense if there's nothing else besides aid. You you usually, this is a common thing almost in all conflicts when you set up these aid corridors.
This is how weapons, gets through as well, and I assume that's the case this time around.
Speaker 1: It's important to say, though, that aid itself has implications in a war of this kind. I mean, the Iranians are under very, very heavy pressure. They will need foodstuffs. They will need flour. They will need all of the things that come with that, condensed milk to keep things functioning in the cities.
Obviously, Iran is a huge country, it has a huge agricultural base, but even Iran probably needs some of this kind of help and things like fertilizer, for example. All all of these things, they they can be validly classified as humanitarian aid, but for a country that is locked as Iran is in a war of attrition, all of these things count and become important.
Speaker 0: Okay. Well, my my last question was just on the the time aspect, because, again, this is a war where each side is trying to exhaust themselves. When they can't go off for the weapons, one can always attempt to exhaust society by attacking infrastructure, which we've seen The US done, attack, of course, energy infrastructure to go after the economy. But how do you see or would expect the the main challenges to come first? I mean, who would break?
Because The US seems to be exhausting exhausting, well, its weapons at least. Israel, it's unclear how the Israelis are faring. Iran as well, this is taking quite a toll on the Iranians. But even if you go beyond this, the Gulf States, how how long can they hold on? Because a lot of the damages we see to place like Qatar is gonna take years to fix even now.
But if this continues, and even the the Europeans, how how long can you know, we're we're both in Europe. How how long can we hold out now? Because the energy prices are going up. We were already in a pretty bad shape. How how do you see, I guess, the the the time aspect?
Where where are the pressure points for the different, well, contributing parties?
Speaker 1: Well, the the country that is by far the most heavily battered at the moment is Iran. I mean, Iran does not have the level of strike forces that The United States and Israel do, and it's important not to overlook that. I mean, there's been very heavy bombing in Northern Tehran. There's been attacks in all sorts of other parts of Iran. There is huge damage being done to the country and to its economy and to society.
But of course, with the Iranians, this is where the calculus is different. This is a conflict which they feel has been forced on them. In fact, they're talking about it. They're using that expression that it was a forced war. They were attacked in the middle of a negotiation.
They feel that this is an existential conflict, that the alternative is to lose their independence, to become an effect of Western colony again, to see the gains of their revolution, which I suspect quite a lot of people in Iran still support and still want to see preserved, that the gains of their revolution reversed. So they they have that issue of motivation. They are prepared to endure an awful lot of pain in order to keep going. In the West, it's different because for us, for well, for The United States, this is a war of choice. There was nothing that impelled, that required The United States to carry out the attack that it did on the February 28.
In Israel, less so, but Israel cannot conduct this war in the way that it's been doing without The United States. For The United States, it's a war of choice. For all of the rest of us in Europe, in Japan, in South Korea, we are not even involved we weren't even consulted it's not a war of choice for us. It's we're just passengers on this train, if you wish. So given that this is so, our level of endurance is going to be far less than the Iranian, and our tolerance of government action to sustain this war is going to be less as well.
In Iran, they can consider things like rationing, for example, if they are pushed into that kind of position. Rationing in The United States or say in Britain, where it is now being discussed by the way, has a completely different political effect on the population because they will say, Why? What for? What is this all for? So ultimately comes down, it seems to me, to this: how stable politically is Iran?
How strong institutionally is the government? I think what we have seen over the last three weeks is that it is strong institutionally. Given that this is so, it can probably, in fact, plausibly endure a war of attrition longer, much longer than we can in the West, and at some point, as prices rise, as shortages grow, as people come under financial and economic pressure in the West, demands for a political solution are certain to exist. That is the Iranian calculus. That is their strategy.
That is the war they have decided that they must fight, which makes it even more likely, by the way, that they will see it through. And of course, it makes complete sense for them. And as of today, one has to say, it appears to be working.
Speaker 0: Yeah. I think the war of choice is an important component, something that the Americans probably didn't think through properly because when they launched a surprise attack, you know, Trump always emphasizes how important this is to catch them off guard, you know, because it has all material benefits on the on the battlefield that one's able to, well, take one by surprise. But the the problem is then is all wars require some political support and well, from society at large. And I think one of the reasons why the Iranian government holds up so well is because well, what's the public gonna say? They usually when a war takes a heavy toll on society, they would ask, you know, why did you not try to negotiate?
Well or and avoid war. Well, they did. They were in the middle of negotiations. And, you know, why aren't you trying to seek peace harder now and negotiate? Well, this is the second time in in only a span of few months that they attack us, so they will come back and back over and over because they will destroy us.
So this it's very difficult to see what actually the Iranian public wants to ask of their government because they they seem to be completely in the clear. They did everything they could to avoid war, even if they want to get out of war. Now there's no it doesn't seem likely that any negotiations will achieve it. That would just, you know, be another ruse. In contrast with The United States.
People are now asking, as it goes wrong, that's when questions come up, and there, there are good reasons to ask. Why did you do this? What was the plan? Indeed, I think this was Joe Kent's whole point that there was no need to do this. So, you know, if things were going well, he wouldn't have stepped down.
He wouldn't have asked these questions. But no. I think, yeah, a lot of mistake has been mistakes have been done. The war planning, the control over the media narrative. I mean, everything is very, very messy.
But, yeah, do you have any final thoughts?
Speaker 1: Well well, I think you've I think you've an you've made a very a very acute and very excellent point. I mean, for the Iranians, I mean, this is a war forced upon them. If you are going to undertake a war of choice and by the way, I don't think you ever if you have the choice to go for war, should be very very careful. You should always if you choose to go to war, should think it through in advance very very carefully. I'm not advocating that anybody, any government does that undertake a simple war of choice.
But if you do that, if you must do that, then think it through. In The United States, they went into this lightly and frivolously. President Trump talked about a little excursion and here we are.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, with a surprise attack, it also allows allies to have a reason why they wanna sit this one out. That's what the Europeans are saying. Well, we were never told about this. This was taken by surprise.
If you didn't ask us about starting the war, why ask us to come help now? Or you probably saw the comment by Trump to the to the Japanese that saw because he was asked, why well, why why were why weren't our, you know, allies informed? And then he said, well, he wanted to be a surprise. You know, you know all about surprises with Pearl Harbor. I mean, this is how they
Speaker 1: Well, know. Yeah. I mean, absolutely frivolous. But I should say that, I mean, we we shouldn't let off the allies too lightly because anybody watching this situation from the perspective of Europe or Tokyo or wherever should have seen that this was coming, And people like Metz and Macron, they should have been going to Washington and they should have been demanding to know what was going on and saying to the American leaders, Are you really serious about this and have you thought it through and what are your plans and how is this going to affect us? So for them to suddenly say, well, you know, we didn't know anything about this, it's all a surprise, it came out of nowhere, well, I mean, that is nonsense.
And again, them talking in this way and it goes back to, again, other things that you have written about illustrates once again the extent to which in Europe especially, but of course in Japan too, we have completely surrendered the conduct of our policies, statecraft, our foreign policy to the Americans so that we can we we allow ourselves to be surprised in this way.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, as always, thank you. And, yeah, again, I will advise people to go visit the Duran and catch your daily analysis. So thank you very much for taking time.
Speaker 1: Thank you. Thank you very much, Glenn.
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
Gilbert Doctorow: Russia & China Reconsider U.S. Relations Over Iran War https://youtu.be/TJE1OqaKEv8 https://t.co/dLoIKdbNWC
Video Transcript AI Summary
Gilbert Doktorov is asked how the Iran war is reshaping dynamics in the East, especially for Russia and China, and what the broader implications are for global order.
- On Russia’s stance and reaction: Doktorov notes a gap between the Kremlin’s official positions and what “chattering classes” discuss. He observes astonishingly limited reaction from President Putin and his close foreign-policy circle to dramatic developments that could redefine regional and global orders. He contrasts Putin’s cautious, “slow-war” approach with sharper criticisms from other Russian voices (e.g., Salaviyev and Alexander Dugin) who urge moving beyond a gradual strategy. There is a sense within some Russian circles that a more assertive stance may be required, yet official channels show restraint.
- On Iran’s strategic position and alliances: He points out that Iran has withstood intense pressure and maintained the ability to threaten Gulf energy infrastructure and the Strait of Hormuz, thereby sustaining global leverage despite severe attacks. Iran has managed to survive and press the global energy market, calling into question how meaningful Iran’s inclusion in BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is in practice. He notes scant evidence of meaningful Russian or Chinese military or intelligence support to Iran in public accounts, and cites Israeli claims of Russian arms shipments being denied by Moscow.
- On the West’s behavior and international law: The discussion highlights what is described as the United States’ “might makes right” posture and the dismissiveness toward traditional international-law norms, including UN Charter commitments. The panelists contrast American rhetoric about legality with its real-world actions, and discuss how Russia’s and China’s responses have been cautious or critical rather than conciliatory or confrontational.
- On potential military cooperation and bloc dynamics: The conversation explores whether a deeper Russia-China-North Korea alignment could emerge in reaction to US and Israeli actions against Iran. Doktorov mentions that North Korea is viewed as a, “will and determination to act,” supplying munitions such as underwater drones and missiles to Iran, whereas Russia and China are characterized as more talk than action. He argues Moscow benefits from maintaining broad, non-aligned diplomacy, but acknowledges a shift in Russian thinking after recent events toward more decisive posture.
- On Europe and the US-European split: The panel discusses the European Union’s fragility and its leaders’ inconsistent responses to the Iran crisis and to US pressure. They consider European solidarity rhetoric as a cover for avoiding hard choices, with examples including Belgian leadership suggesting normalization with Russia post-conflict. The discussion reflects concern that EU leaders may be forced to confront realignments as Gulf energy supplies and US LNG leverage reshape Europe’s energy security and political calculus.
- On diplomacy and pathways forward: The speakers debate the prospects for diplomacy, including possible three-way or broader security arrangements, and whether Alaska or other meeting points could offer reprieve. They note a public split within Moscow’s foreign-policy establishment about how to proceed, with internal figures pushing for diplomacy and others advocating a stronger balance of power. There is explicit skepticism about the utility of negotiations with Donald Trump and the idea that the war could end on the battlefield rather than through diplomacy.
- On the Ukraine war’s interconnection: The discussion emphasizes that the Iran crisis has global ramifications that feed back into Ukraine, noting that Russia’s current posture and Western responses influence the Ukraine conflict. Doktorov highlights that the depletion of US air defenses observed in the Israel-Iran context affects Ukraine, underscoring the interrelatedness of the two wars and their combined impact on global power dynamics.
- Final takeaway: The dialogue reiterates that the Iran war has a global dimension with the two wars being intimately connected; the Iran conflict reshapes alliances, energy security, and strategic calculations across Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, while signaling a potential reconfiguration of Western alliances and multipolar governance.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Welcome back. We are joined today by Gilbert Doktorov, a historian and international affairs analyst, to discuss how the Iran war is affecting the East and, primarily Russia. So thank you for coming back on.
Speaker 1: Hi. Very good to be with you.
Speaker 0: So we see that this Iran war, it has many dimensions to it, which I assume would would have to be interpreted by the Russians in different ways. So everything from this deceptive diplomacy to the lawlessness of the thing, the brutality of the war in terms of the willingness to escalate, killing government leaders, attacks on critical infrastructure, nuclear power power plants. It could be the goal of weakening Russia and China, but, you know, we also see some US miscalculation, Iranian resilience likely, and, yeah, the possible destruction of the Gulf States if their desalination plants go, and we see a split in the relationship between Americans and Europeans. So, again, much of these are indications that the ramification of this war will not merely be regional, but indeed global. So how do you see this whole, yeah, disaster unfolding in The Middle East impacting and being interpreted by the East and, again, Russia and China primarily?
Speaker 1: Well, I think the first thing I'd like to do was delay a little bit here. Because when we speak about Russia, we speak about president Putin and his and his administration, about his foreign minister, what they're saying. And then there are what the chattering classes are saying. People oh, I mean, the the Moscow establishment is saying as exhibited on their on the talk shows and not only in the talk shows. They are very, very different.
The if you look strictly at at president Putin and his immediate assistance or, luckily, minister of foreign affairs, you see very little reaction, astonishing little reaction from the Kremlin to these dramatic, shocking developments which bear upon the whole of the relate possible relationship with Donald Trump and with the world order in general. Trump's behavior is obscene. It's obnoxious. I don't want to to search for other derogatory words. I think he's reserved for himself a secure place in hell.
But that's my personal opinion. I'm not speaking as an analyst. Speaking as an analyst, what he has done is utterly shocking, utterly disrupts anything resembling the world order, respect for the UN Charter, respect for international law. He has spoken of his being held in check only by his own moral limits, his own take on morality, and not by international or other law. And he's acting according.
The problem is that his morality is bestiality. His behavior, ordinarily, ordinary human standards, is the most awful thing we've seen in a very, very long time. Let me distinguish between what is said and what is dumb. American presidents and their assistants have done some horrible things going back to Nixon and to Kissinger, but they never spoke about it so openly. In your face, if they can do anything and and you'll have to settle with with what we do, This is utterly shocking.
That distinction comes up, of course, in all the talk shows. They make a great deal about it. But we've never witnessed this type of directness, transparency for America's might makes right policy. But at the level of the the Kremlin, it's almost total silence. Of course, they don't dare say anything about mister Trump's showing his his true nature.
They don't say they're going to continue negotiations. They don't say they're gonna take them off. They only note that they are in suspense and that the Americans have requested that. As regards to Iran, we all, many of us in the alternative media had assumed that Iran was bracketed in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS by these two major powers, which provided it with stability, some sense of security, and with good reason to behave in an orderly way and not to be a sponsor of terrorism. Now we see that these two brackets are virtually meaningless.
Both Russia and China, to our knowledge, and I'm very cautious about this because how much our knowledge is valid is difficult to say since all of these things are kept in the dark. But considering the lack of accusations against Russia and China for giving meaningful support to Iran, we can assume that there is no meaningful support to Iran. We heard, oh yes, America was shot, Washington was shot, the Russians could possibly be supplying our military intelligence to Iran. How horrible. That's as much as we saw.
The Israelis said that they yesterday, they blasted out of the water ships that were carrying Russian arms to Iran. Russia was denied that they were carrying any any any weapons or that these even were Russian ships. But aside from that, we don't hear a word about Russian arms being supplied. So what is the meaning of the alliance or the cooperation agreements? What is the meaning of Iran being in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or BRICS?
I would say at this point, zero. Now, I don't mean to be too harsh here because what we all have learned, including the Russians and the Chinese, is that, and of course, what Mr. Trump and his close associates of that, is Iran is pretty capable of looking after its own interests more than anyone suit, without taking into account the 4,000 kilometer two stage missile that was fired at Diego Garcia. Are just within the limits of short and medium range missiles. They have shown a capability of maintaining prioritization of firing, timing of firing, all of the things that come from command and control, which supposedly was utterly destroyed by American and Israeli attacks.
So the Iranians have hold have held on very, very well. Of course, their backup is the Straits Of Hormuz and their ability to cause economic damage to the Middle East and to everyone who was supplied by the Middle East, meaning primarily the Far East and to a lesser extent Europe. This was not to be anticipated. The fair organization could survive such dramatic horrific attacks as they had experienced. But they did.
And therefore, you have to go back and ask the first question. Maybe the Iranians were perfectly justified in not concluding a lot military defensive alliances with Russia or China and keeping their options open. Perhaps I won't I just mentioned it as in passing. But the power of Yuma to survive all of this has been stunning. Their ability to maintain the pressure on the globe and to destroy at will almost all of the production of hydrocarbons in the Middle East, which makes almost irrelevant their power over the Straits Of Hormuz.
If there's no production, then there's nothing for tankers to take through the Straits Of Hormuz. So, either which way you look at it, they are in a commanding position. That was not to be expected. Certainly, the Russians, officially Russians, never expected that Iran could be more powerful by its asymmetric defense in The United States with its direct barbarous attacks on on Iran.
Speaker 0: And given that we see that all the rules are essentially gone, thrown away, and US is so blatant about it as well, that is especially Pete Hegseth, and now this whole rhetoric that, well, following international law, the rules of engagement, this is, you know, political correctness. We will do whatever it takes. Yeah. Essentially, I am dismissing international law. How does this work on the military calculations of the Russians and the Chinese?
Because the US seems very determined to defeat its opponents, and, again, any point to the idea that knocking out the Iranians would also have the purpose of weakening China. So how does this affect the military cooperation? What is the potential of well, is there any talk now of deepening military cooperation between Russia, China, North Korea, or others?
Speaker 1: Alright. Perfectly go back to the very start of this. As I mentioned in in recent interviews and my writings, the American attack, the Israeli attack on Iran shocked the Russian foreign policy establishment out of the skin. They were shocked to the point where they began to realize that the method that the Putin government has been using, the slowly, slowly war of attrition, is not appropriate to the present security environment. And they started speaking openly about it.
This is done on one program of Salaviov to a shocking degree. They all but denounced Putin in every way except his name. The next day, Salaviov hate his words, and we're speaking about our wonderful commander in chief who works tirelessly and free in the morning to look after our welfare. But then there are others who have kept up the pressure. Alexander Dugin, a court philosopher, as he was considered to be, of Putin's Kremlin, came out with at least as harsh a critique of the war management as that one show of did.
And, of course, Dugan is untouchable. After the the brutal murder and assassination of his daughter, he was made a hero and you cannot say a word about him. There he is, on open space on his own website. He has denounced the go slow approach. So there was a change in mentality.
The question is where and when this pressure is applied to the president and with what effect. As to the question that you posed, this was directly discussed, again, on the same program, the same talk show. Miss missus Soloveyov, after this this shocking attack and then recanting his words, he disappeared from television for a week. I thought, my goodness. Looks like press freedom has just evaporated.
No, no, I was quite mistaken. He disappeared from television because he joined a parliamentary delegation from the Douma to their counterparts in Beijing. This is periodical and it was very timely. And the mission, one of the members of that delegation, one of the chairman of the Douma Committee who spoke again on Salerio program, explained that they were keen to engage the Chinese on this very question you've posed. Shouldn't there now be a forged three way defense alliance between Russia, China, and North Korea.
And, of course, the question arises, why North Korea? How can we equate North Korea's power situation with these two these two superpowers, Russia and China. And of course, the really interesting contribution of North Korea is the will and determination to act as opposed to speak. And there is reason to believe even that they are supplying North Koreans are supplying munitions to Iran, namely to name the the item. It is underwater drones, missiles that can destroy aircraft carriers.
This has been supplied by North Korea. Now, if you look at it, we can ask the question, why aren't they supplying them a nuclear box? Or maybe they are. We just we don't know about it. But the point is the North Koreans are not talkers, they doers.
The Chinese and the Russians are just talkers. And that comes out from yesterday's or today's addressed by by by Lavrov commenting on the latest situation in The Middle East. It's just whining. Just whining. Oh, look what's going on.
I'm sorry. This is This is the second most powerful, militarily powerful country in the world, and all they can say is, my goodness, how sad this is. This is a pitiful verbal response to the American running amok in The Middle East. Not to mention, where is the physical response to America's running amok in The Middle East? Just to say, as Dmitry has been saying to everyone who gives him the microphone, boy, this is gonna really upset the world economy.
A brilliant observation, which none of us, of course, could have have made on our own without his intervention. Russia has been holding back and saying nothing. And let let me address why. Don't again, I don't wanna be critical. I want to just be analytical here.
The reason, to my understanding, very plain. Russia has made a strength out of being in talking relations with everybody. When you have a situation as critical as the one present, which could easily advance to World War three and which could easily lead to a global, not recession, but a global depression, it is not a virtue to be talking to everybody, your friend holding hands with everybody. You've got to do something and take some stand, and Russia's not doing that. On the contrary, on Sunday evening.
He was reading. It was so clear. It was a teleprompter. He was reading lines which must have made him very embarrassed, but which were coming from the Kremlin. And the lines were, oh, how sad that that The Gulf States are being are being harmed in this in this conflict.
Well, that is because mister Putin wants to hold everybody's hand and advertise how Russia is vey or his intermediary because it's peaking to all sides. I don't believe that is the proper response to the present dire situation. The notion that Russia sheds tears, which I think are crocodile tears, over the harm done to its competitors, The Gulf States are after all its competitors in supplying hydrocarbons to the world. It's shabby looking. The fact comes out, emerges.
Many other observers have made this point. I didn't weigh in on it, but now I had no choice but to weigh in on it. Putin is leans towards Israel. There's no question about it. And his justification for it is does not stand up to reason.
The justification was, oh, there's 2,000,000 Russian speakers are for our passport holders who live in Israel, and we can't see harm done to them. Well, friends, those are no friends that the Israeli residents, the Israeli passport holders who are dual nationals and have Russian passports also are no friends of Moscow, and anybody who says otherwise is not being serious, including the president of Russia. They are enemies. And just as mister Trubayas was an enemy, just as Naina, Yeltsin is an enemy, and they all get coddled by the president of Russia. I won't say more.
He has every possibility of of changing direction, and I hope he does. But as it is now, Russia's great power status is utterly wasted on resolving a global crisis in The Middle East.
Speaker 0: I was thinking you you mentioned that, of course, the Gulf States are competitors to Russia, especially in the energy markets. But how do you see the other I guess, what benefits could come to Russia? Because this the media often points out that Russia is the big winner in this war. I guess it makes sense to some extent that is energy prices are going up. A lot of its energy competitors are going off the grid.
And the fact that The US had to drop some sanctions on Russia. Once this, you know, solidarity around the sanctions fall apart, it might be difficult to build up. You have weapons being redirected, which would otherwise been used to kill Russians. But I thought the more specific thing, also affects the Chinese, would be the faltering of the alliance systems that is in The Middle East. We see some Gulf states, know, rethinking how wise it is to host all these US bases.
In East Asia, like in South Korea, some must be rethinking, well, how how certain are the security guarantees as The US pulls out all these THAAD and Patriot missiles. And indeed, also in Europe, you see a deepening split between The US and the EU. So do you do you see this being well, to what extent do you see this being benefits, or or or do you see it the same way that these things are happening that is weakening of the alliance systems? Because that seems to be a key component of the hegemonic position. That is if you can divide all the regions of the world into, you know, obedient, independent allies and weakened adversaries.
Speaker 1: Well, I'll that question, which is very important. But first, I wanna turn it around on the alliances that that we in the alternative media had deemed so important in ushering in a new global governance that would be polycentric, multipolar, has been shot to hell. Listening to Russian tele they were speaking now about bricks in terms which none of us could have expected. Listening to their discussion, following what's happened in the last two weeks, they were more or less acknowledging that bricks is worth zero. Zero.
And I'd say that to all of our colleagues. If Russians are saying that, why are they saying that? Saw before that. They saw that The United States had upended BRICS by imposing these 50% sanctions on countries trading Russian oil. And it worked.
India dropped all of its purchases of Russian oil. Well, that was the past. Now that they are saying simply BRICS you know, by the way, BRICS was never intended to be anti American. This is Russian speaking on state television. BRICS was supposed to build an alternative framework that would eventually succeed for the faltering IMF and World Trade Organization, all these other structures dating from the post World War II period, and we'd be a new order.
Now the Russians are not saying that anymore. This explains why a year, I think it was the last meeting of BRICS, maybe it's two years ago, when we all When was the meeting in Kazan? Was October, was it? No. Yeah.
Okay. When we discovered that there wasn't gonna be no alternative to the existing exchanges, currency exchanges. There'd be no BRICS currency. And and this seemed peculiar, but nobody particularly highlighted it. And now it's perfectly clear why, because the Russians understood back then but never said it aloud that BRICS is virtually virtuous.
That has come out of this. And I'd say that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization hasn't come out much better. Although, in its last meeting, it was clear that the Russians and the Chinese were looking to invest more in that as main vector for moving forward new world governance than BRICS, which was falling away in importance. So when we say that the Western organizations, whether it's NATO, the EU, whatever, are being shattered or are opening up hidden fissures and which have great importance for their for their future evolution. I say what we thought were the organizations uniting the East have turned out to be shattered also.
So that creates a still more chaotic situation than any of us could have imagined. Yes, of course, here in Europe, the shattering of the EU is only in the first stage. I cannot imagine how Ursula von der Leyen will survive her statements in the last week that we will not import one gram of Russian gas under the present situation of shortage and spiked prices and high inflation. How can she survive this? Much as they are not pragmatists, all of the leaders of Western Europe are faced with the politically hazardous inflation that is coming.
Speaker 0: How do you make sense of the Europeans here, though? Because this is quite a shock to them. The you know, they just cut themselves off and, you know, celebrated having no more purchases of Russian oil or gas. And then now, of course, they're being cut off from the Middle East as well. And we saw The United States, obviously, seeing now that they are completely dependent on American LNG, which allows Trump to essentially say telling the EU, you will pass this trade deal, this horrible trade deal, which nobody in the EU wanted.
Otherwise, you will not anymore have favorable access to our LNG. So, you know, who could have foreseen this? You cut yourself off from all other suppliers, and then the one supplier you'd now depend completely on has has political leverage. I mean, it's quite, predictable, but still shocking in in some way. But what is happening within the EU?
As you mentioned, the statements from Wunderlying, they they go so far against the national interest of of the member states. How how do you see this playing out? There are exceptions, would say. The Belgian prime minister, especially, I think, is quite impressive in these days of unbearable conformity where everyone falls in line. They always use this expression European solidarity, which is just a poor excuse for rejecting common sense, because one obviously is going down the wrong path, and one is using the slogans of European solidarity as a way of suggesting that all dissent is something negative.
But the Belgian prime minister suggested, you know, minor things, like after this war, we should normalize relations with Russia, which is then criticized for. So how how do you see Europe adjusting to this Iran war? Because that, of course, will also affect its position on the Ukraine war.
Speaker 1: Well, it hasn't adjusted fully. It hasn't even adjusted partially. When you look at the odious behavior and odious statements coming out of Trump, they're in such violation of European values. But the question is how much longer can this hypocrisy hold that this man and this country are the closest allies of Europe? It's in such violation of all their ideals that sooner or later, this has to break.
The question is when and who will lead the way. Now coming back to Bart de Weyrich, I'm very glad that you mentioned him. I've got a personal take on this. I think he's campaigning to become the president of the European Commission. He is in front of the microphone every day.
His NVA is putting up on YouTube his speeches and his answers to questions. He comes to a meeting, as he did a week ago, of the European heads of heads of government, and he passes this, like, 200 journalists who are lined up with their microphones. And he stops here, he stops there, and he stops in the fourth place. He is campaigning to take charge. Now, I don't take with as face value any of his conformist statements.
I think they only he is running the same race as Fizo and Obon, but in a very shrewd way, to upset people, not to guarding his flanks, and avoiding saying anything that will allow his enemies to stick in a dagger and move remove him from from where he wants to go. Therefore, he says that he supports Ukraine a 100%. Therefore, he tells you about his parents and how they took in Ukrainian refugees. Therefore, he says that, yes, we will have normal relations with Russia only after a peace treaty is signed and a peace treaty that is acceptable both to us in Europe and to Ukrainians. From my understanding, that's all hot air.
It is simply defensive, protective while he's going at the things that count. He, after all, did say normalization of relation with Russia. And he, after all, did say he explained himself that if you have a peace treaty, it is a peace treaty, not a scrap of paper. And the peace treaty means that you have resolved all outstanding issues. And after that, you normalize relations, as he said we did after World War II.
We said we start trading normally and everything else. That is a direct contradiction, but we're hearing from all the Russia haters in the EU. They want a peace treaty that is only a truce, and it sets the stage for round two or three, and and that when they will, like, drive Russia out of Europe or be sure that it stays outside of Europe. So he is going in a very different direction, and I'm sure it is it is a campaign he's waging to take over the direction of the EU.
Speaker 0: Yeah. No. That's a good point. And, again, this falls within the whole idea of the Europeans. They they don't even want to enter the war, it seems.
They just want to cease fire, and and nobody really wants to try to find a way of restoring relations as to war. And and as you correctly say, you hear this in the rhetoric over and over again, that is once this is over, we can find some different avenue where we can compete with or fight the Russians on more favorable terms. Even the Ukraine war can't really be put to an end. It's they even say quite openly they need a, you know, a break to breathe, to regroup, to rebuild, but but the fight isn't over. So it's it's I'm I'm missing this from the the discourse, this willingness to take a step back and discuss basic things, like what what actually are the source of peace there?
How do we envision stable, prosperous Europe in the future? Is that one where the largest country in Europe by territory, population, military, economy will be under, you know, constant containment and attempted to be, well, severed from the rest of the continent. Is this a source of stability? Is it gonna be the the Western countries just dominating so much that you Russia has to adjust, or will it be some way of everyone sitting around the same table? There is no discussion of this.
I just hear politics being reduced to cheap slogans of, you know, our values and and Russian aggression. There's And at the end of the day, for all their crocodile tears over Ukraine, if they really wanted to save Ukraine, their first priority they should have is remove it from these front lines of this new geopolitical game. This you can't seriously convince any person that this has benefited Ukraine in any way. But in terms of putting an end to the war, though, how has the Iran war affected the possibility of diplomacy? I would think that the Russians are not very after the deceptive diplomacy with Iran that is first JCPOA, then these two surprise attacks when negotiations were going well.
How does this affect the I mean, do they still talk about Alaska now in Moscow? And what are they talking about in China? Because Xi Jinping was gonna meet Trump next month, but this meeting was postponed.
Speaker 1: Well, I've criticized the the way that that Vladimir Putin has been managing the world. And I have to criticize still more sternly the the position of the Chinese who look like absolute winks. The their stand on Iran is of other incomprehensible given, as I said, their sponsorship of Iran in these two key organizations where China and Russia are both leaders, I mean, both BRICS and in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, it is incomprehensible that they have done nothing of substance to assist Iran. And MFA have been so cautious in their words about Iran. But that's so much for for the Chinese.
I don't know how where this is headed, but it is clear that Europe is gonna change. It is clear that what the position of several people is unsustainable. And it will take a lot of change in the leadership across the continent. But the good start will be cleaning house here in the here in Brussels in the European institutions. I do not see how, as I said, the lady can survive what she has done with her own two hands.
And that will be a good start to cleaning house. But there's a lot more has to change. We'll see whether or not Mr. Orban survives his vote in coming up in the it's got two, three weeks from now since he has been so important in resisting the the machine in Brussels. But I'm sorry.
I think I'm I'm straining from your question. Could you just rephrase it?
Speaker 0: The the possible pathways now for diplomacy.
Speaker 1: Oh, yeah.
Speaker 0: Because the Russians were looking towards Alaska as a way to go, and the the Chinese, I think, were hoping that some relations could be improved with this meeting, which was supposed to take place next month. Because for them, of course, you know, this could be an opportunity if The US is now struggling. Perhaps this they would like to put a pause to this economic war against the Chinese?
Speaker 1: Well, the present situation, of course, is very embarrassing for for president Putin. Going back a little bit more than a month, there was an open public break between his position and the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The opposition within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs started with Sergei Lapkov, who said famously that the initiative, the impulse from Anchorage is gone, that there is no further room for diplomacy. This will be resolved from a field of battle. He was immediately reprimanded.
But then within two, three weeks, we find that his his boss, Sergei Lavrov, is saying the second. All this time, Pieskov, speaking on behalf of of Putin, is saying the opposite. And they appointed Dmitryev, made him very important. And let me let me not mince words. Dmitryev, by my understanding, is an American plant.
He is part of the liberals whom Putin has always coddled in a traditional power play of you tilt to the right, and then you tilt to the left, then tilt back to the right. That is how Gorbachev maintained his power until he fell. And I think there that present head of head of state is playing the same game, which could lead to the same result. The there's a point where you have to stand on one side or the other, and you can't keep on shifting back and forth. And it is time since president Putin invested so much of his political capital in these negotiations.
And if you look at them, you have to be met to believe that anything can be achieved with Donald Trump in negotiations for all the reasons you just gave. Nobody is speaking about it so directly, but it's pretty obvious that this war will end on the battlefield and that mister mister Trump's role is is less is less than nothing. So there you have a big divide in in in Russia, and it remains to be seen when or whether the president will adjust to the new conditions. So far, he hasn't. So far, they're they're quite pleased that that Trump has pulled back and is not pressing new talks with Whitquefan.
But that day will come, and and Putin will have to decide whether or not he's going to continue this farce or not. At the same time, we are well aware what what mister Zerensky said a day ago, that the Russians are preparing or starting a big summer offensive right now is correct. They are. The only thing that was false in mister Zelensky's statement was that it's very costly to the Russians of losing a thousand man a day. As we know, as I've seen for the last four years, every time that Ukrainians open their mouths about Russian losses, they are projecting unto the Russians their own losses.
That the Ukrainians are losing a thousand men a day is entirely believable. The Russians are is not. Nonetheless, the Russians, of course, had losses. But what was insignificant about Zelensky's remarks, which otherwise are not reflected in what Russian state television said telling their audience, is that he was speaking about the use of tanks and of heavy equipment coming back into play. Now, partly, this is seasonal because they have more cover now that the leaves or the trees are coming out.
Spring is underway. But I don't think that explains the whole thing. I think the Russians are simply much more confident that they are able to keep the, what, the Ukrainian drones at bay or counter them one way or another, and they're massing heavy heavy equipment, which they haven't done for close to a year. So that is in preparation of a big a big drive on Komik Torsk and Slovansk, which are now just 18 kilometers an artillery range from from Russian standpoint, after which you've got a clean sweep at the same time looking for the map. As you and I do do, it is shocking that four years of war again, in fifth year in a war that's going on almost as long as World War two, that Russia has only captured, in the last few months, additional 5% of Donetsk Province or 8%.
It's gone from 17% to 25 per sorry. From 25% that was held by Ukrainians down to 18% other than Donetsk, almost. There's until now, their moves, for understandable reasons, have been extremely modest. We will see very soon whether they can make the end run and reach the in in a matter of of weeks and not years. So that that is all in front of us.
Speaker 0: Well, how about just the last question. We've seen on the war development some successes of the Ukrainian offensive, especially down south in the Saporizhzhia region. How how do you make sense of this given that they have lost a lot of access to money and weapons now over the past weeks?
Speaker 1: Because it's 1,200 kilometer long on the front. And if they found a weak spot, whichever the city did, then they're exploiting it. But I wouldn't say that any isolated successes they have and surprises that they make are going to overturn the big picture, which is Russian advance, as I described, against the last two major well, medium importance outposts and highlands of Slavyansk and Kronovatorsk. The the thing that the the Ukrainian success would be surprising only to those among us who have spoken day after day, week after week about Russians having shattered the Ukrainian lines of a their excess efforts and recruitment had been utterly unsuccessful and so forth. We have, as you know, among our our colleagues and among the platforms of of on YouTube, there are many that issue daily the most lurid, the most sensationalist accounts of the war coming to an end with Russian victory, Ukrainian capitulation as if it's a pushover.
It has never been a pushover. The Ukrainians, despite everything, have fought with great valor, which the Russian state television speaks about, but almost none of my colleagues speak about. And I say shame on them because the fact remains that there is fighting spirit in Ukraine. There is the problem that you've highlighted. They are very short on equipment.
And of course, their numbers of soldiers have been significantly depleted. That is undeniable. And it's why, as I say, they can concentrate force in one or two locations. But on the whole 1,200 kilometer line, the Russians have have by far the strategic advantage.
Speaker 0: Well, thank you for taking the time to speak with us. I appreciate it. And, no, I think this is well, it seems like indications that this is taking the shape of a world war when you see that the one conflict is impacting another. I don't think we're quite there yet, but given how large and the global ramifications they are and how these wars from in conflicts from the one in Ukraine to Iran, also impacting The US Chinese rivalry, it does appear to, yeah, take on this global dimensions. Do you have any final thoughts before we wrap up?
Speaker 1: No. I think I agree completely with your summing up words. It has a global dimension. The two are intimately related. And of course, the depletion of American air defenses in the war of Israel against Iran is a major setback for Ukraine.
So just in that very simple terms of equipment available, the two wars are directly interrelated to the disadvantage of Ukraine.
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
Stanislav Krapivnik: Baltic States Attack Russia & Gulf States Collapse https://youtu.be/qirByIpJTMM https://t.co/fTMA0XSdOR
Video Transcript AI Summary
Glenn and Stanislav Krapivnik discuss a string of escalating security and geopolitical crises with a focus on drone incidents, NATO-Russia tensions, and the broader international energy and security implications.
- Baltic drone incidents: Glenn asks about an attack on a key Russian port in the Baltic Sea, noting drones entered from NATO territory through the Baltic States and may have circumvented Belarus. Stanislav explains that two drones hit targets in the Baltics—one at an Estonian power-plant chimney and another at a separate object in Latvia—and suggests dozens of drones may have flown through airspace, possibly from Ukraine via Poland and the Baltics or launched from the pre-Baltics. He argues this is not a one-off event and raises two possibilities: either NATO member states have incompetent security, or they are directly engaged, with the more likely conclusion that the pre-Baltic states are direct participants in the war.
- Deterrence and red lines: The conversation notes that NATO has aimed to pressure Russia economically (targeting energy, shipping, and oil). Glenn asks how these actions affect sentiment and Kremlin incentives. Stanislav counters that Tallinn and other Baltic leadership have crossed red lines, citing past incidents (Estonia drone attack on Skowabur Air Base) and suggesting Estonian actions are part of a broader pattern of Russophobia. He argues that Estonia’s leadership and policies threaten deterrence calculations and calls for accountability, positing that deterrence must be reset against Estonia given the perceived egregious escalations.
- Interconnected conflicts and the Iran-Russia axis: The speakers discuss Sergei Lavrov’s remarks about a potential third world war linked to Iran and Russia. Stanislav asserts that conflicts are becoming highly interconnected, with the West having fomented them through proxies and direct actions. He asserts that Western leaders, whom he characterizes as pursuing broad war aims, are willing to sacrifice lives for geopolitical objectives, and he highlights ongoing cross-border terrorism and sanctions on supply chains. He emphasizes that Russia has long been involved in Iran’s military upgrades and drones, noting that Russian components power Iranian drones. He also points to the potential for China to align with expanding conflict dynamics, suggesting that Russia has already embedded itself in supporting Iran and that a fall of Iran would threaten Russia’s regional borders, especially along the Kazakhstani frontier.
- Energy, fertilizer, and economic shocks: Stanislav draws on his supply-chain experience to describe the cascading effects of war on energy and fertilizer. He explains the logistical challenges of large-scale industrial repair after missile strikes, including the long lead times for steel, valves, and large refinery components, and argues that Europe’s gas and steel supply are constrained. He notes Russia’s restriction on diesel exports and Qatar’s role in fertilizer, highlighting how Europe has become dependent on Russian and Qatari supplies and is now left vulnerable by policy choices. He foresees a multi-year disruption of energy, fertilizer, and food supplies, warning of price spikes and potential starvation in parts of Europe and beyond as planting seasons approach. He highlights that fertilizer production relies on natural gas and that gas-rich regions are facing supply limitations, which would prolong and intensify food insecurity and economic disruption.
- Gulf energy states and strategic calculations: The discussion turns to the Gulf, describing Gulf states as corporate-like entities run by wealthy families. Stanislav speculates on the strategic calculations of states like Qatar and the UAE, including the possibility that political and economic incentives could shape decisions about involvement in broader regional conflict, arms supplies, or island and maritime control. He argues that damage to energy infrastructure, maritime chokepoints, and desalination plants could have devastating regional consequences, potentially forcing costly rebuilding campaigns over several years.
- Military capability and future risks: Stanislav critiques U.S. military capability for large-scale ground campaigns, arguing that the U.S. is not a traditional land-power and that a sustained invasion of Iran would face enormous logistical and manpower challenges. He emphasizes the scale and difficulty of mobilizing, training, and sustaining a large force in conflict terrain, particularly in Iran’s mountainous, fortified landscape. He also discusses the domestic constraints of U.S. recruitment, obesity rates, and the challenges of sustaining a 21st-century volunteer force in a major war.
- Final reflections on leadership and narrative: The conversation closes with a discussion of Trump-era war briefs, characterizing them as short, sensational videos focused on explosions rather than reality, and a broader critique of political leadership and messaging in wartime decision-making. Glenn and Stanislav note the risk that political leaders may oversell battlefield successes and struggle to withdraw from costly, escalating commitments.
In sum, the discussion centers on cross-border drone activity and its implications for NATO-Russia dynamics, the widening economic and energy-security consequences of contemporary conflicts, the deepening Iran-Russia alignment, and the daunting logistical and strategic challenges of any potential military escalation in the Middle East, including Iran.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Welcome back. We are joined by Stanislav Krapivnik, a former US army officer born in Donbas and who has since returned. Thank you for coming back on the program.
Speaker 1: Always a pleasure, Glenn. Always a pleasure. I wanna talk to you about explosions today. Our our piece. Well,
Speaker 0: I appreciate you coming on. I know you had quite a few meetings and interviews today. But I I wanted to, yes, speak with you about US boots on the ground in Iran. But before we get to that, it's worth addressing this attack on this key Russian port on the Baltic Sea, more than thousand kilometers away for a drone to fly from Ukraine even further if it avoids Belarus, which it did. So and yet it appears to have entered from NATO territory through the Baltic States.
How do you make sense of, what has happened? And, well, what do we actually know?
Speaker 1: Well, it didn't appear they did. In fact, two of those drones, one hit a power plant, a chimney of a power plant in, Estonia, and one hit, some other object, in, Latvia. So maybe they flew around from, Ukraine through Poland and the Baltics, or maybe they lifted off from the ball the pre Baltics. I don't know. I'm betting closer they probably lifted off.
Either way, even if they flew through, I mean, this isn't one or two drones. There's about thirty, forty drones that flew through. And this is not the first time. So either a, the Poles and the the Poles and the pre Baltics are absolutely incompetent governments with incompetent security systems that anything could fly through their airspace and they don't give a damn or cannot control it, or b, more likely, they're in on it. They are direct military engagement with Russia at this point.
On unavoidable to come to that conclusion, especially the pre Baltics, but they are they're direct participants in this war.
Speaker 0: Well, we see that over the past few weeks or months, NATO's, well, more or less identified the objective of putting pressure on Russia. In order to do this, they're also very explicit that that is to go after the Russian economy, energy specifically. They're discussing seizing ships, confiscating oil is the new one. But attack from NATO territory, though, how is this affecting the, I guess, the, you know, the sentiments or the the pressure in the against the Kremlin to, I guess, change tactics? Because there seems to be some concern that more and more of well, if it's not red lines, this, you know, this overstepping more and more lines at least of what what what we're not supposed to do.
I mean, there's informal rules in any proxy war of what each side should be doing, and it appears that all rules are essentially tossed overboard.
Speaker 1: Well, this isn't the first time this has happened. Let's be honest about it. Five months ago, in the middle of Estonia, a drone came down, blew up, and Estonians tried to keep it quiet. The inner Internet was still filled with photos that got leaked out of the of the shell crater where the drone hit, and I was carrying a large enough amount of explosives and the remains of that drone. The attack on Skowv Air Base did not come from Ukraine.
It came from 47 kilometers away out of Estonia. I was on evening with Vladimir Soloviov, which is one of the big shows talk shows, political talk shows. And Vladimir himself who is is is big in this is one of the top people in this industry, is out there saying, you know, we need to just we we need to crack the heads of the Estonians just as an example. I say the same thing. There needs to be an example made.
And Estonia has is is to to call it anti Russian or Russophobic, is is, well, that that doesn't even describe half of the psychopathic hatred that drives these people. They are corrupted through and through. Considering Russians are about 50% of their country's population, considering Narva, which is a a 95% Russian city back from the December, if not earlier, is so you can't say these are people that a Soviet Union this is their excuse normally. Oh, these are immigrants from a Soviet Union forced upon us. Well, no.
Actually, you're holding Russian land. Get the hell off of Russian land in that case. As you know, the pre Baltics, if we're gonna go begin with this, there are three absolutely artificial countries that did not exist until 1917. In any form, did they ever exist as nation states. They are an artificial entities created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, first and foremost.
Oh, I'm sorry. The collapse of the Russian empire, first and foremost, and then re created by the collapse of Soviet Union. These if we're gonna be honest about it, the land was purchased from the Swedes after we go after we beat Charles the great in in Poltava. Peter the great destroyed his armies, defeated Sweden, but to make it a little easier to swallow the defeat, he paid for the land that Russia conquered from the Swedes. And that bill, by the way, there's no mention about population, but the land was transferred as a as a piece of real estate in those areas to Russia.
So if we're gonna go down that road, you can live here if you want or you can leave, but the land belongs to Russia by purchase from Sweden if we're gonna go down that route. But Narva as a as a city, is absolutely Russian. It's, from the early Middle Ages. It was founded and created, by Russians so that the that almost 50% of the population of Estonia is treated as best third class noncitizens because they're not allowed to be citizens of any sort, not even a of a second class citizens. They're they carry a great passport.
And now you have the same Nazi entity that has yearly parades for the SS, government sponsor with government administrators coming out and talking about it. The one that arrests anybody that doesn't follow the party line, this police state Nazi entity that is now launching or allowing, to be used as airspace for direct drone attacks, not only on military, but on civilian infrastructure, I think it's time that, the leadership in that country paid the price that they are more than that they have more than earned to pay. And look. And deterrence needs to be set. So I think a country like Estonia is the prime target for deterrence being reset.
Because, you know, what what they're hoping for is no matter what they do, Russia will just hit the Ukrainians. And it's not us. It's some meat down there. They'll just kill off some meat down there, and we'll just be able to do what we want. But sooner or later, that comes home, and I think we're at that point.
And out in the open when the major when the major television or talk show figures and these aren't these aren't lightweight people. These are very serious. One of two major political talk shows. Like I said, I was just on there filming, literally two hours ago. And if, Solagia was flat out saying we we should, you know, paint the walls with Estonia, This is major pressures that's starting to build up to respond and respond.
And I hope Estonians are listening to this because you've gone over every single red line there is. There there is no more red lines. Estonia has earned whatever fate it gets. And the people support that government well, the people that are citizens that are less than half the population of Estonia because most of the young in Estonia have left, and they don't live in Estonia. They haven't lived within Estonia for years.
But the people that are still there are supporting these government entities that are going to bring Estonia to destruction, at least Estonia outside of Narva to destruction. You know, each country chooses its path.
Speaker 0: Yeah. When over the past four years when or even longer when people have made the argument that, well, once Russia's done with Ukraine, it will move on to the Baltic states, I pretty much called it out as paranoia. But given these escalations, it's, you know, it it's almost bound to spread now, this conflict. But, of course, into NATO territory, it's gonna be, yeah, it's gonna be a lot of unknown variables in terms of how the escalations goes from there on, which kinda takes me to a comment which Lavrov made, but he was, of course, looking towards Iran where he suggested that, you know, many experts believe that we're already within a third world war given the links between Iran and Russia. I was wondering what what you make of these comments.
Do you did did how how how intrinsically linked are these conflicts to begin with?
Speaker 1: I think they're gonna become very linked, especially if China kicks off in one way or the other. Look. You know, again, do these conflicts need to be linked? Should these conflicts even exist? No.
The West has done absolutely everything it can to foment these conflicts, has flat out started these conflicts, either indirectly through proxies in Ukraine or directly with an illegal attack and mass murder of civilians in first Iran, now also in Iraq. And before that, I mean, we could just say in Yemen, but that that we could count that as a separate conflict. But that's these conflicts are gonna spread. The West is dead set on war. The politicians, except for a few politicians, Austro Hungarian Empire, formerly.
Maybe in the future, again, some kind of Austro Hungarian confederation that could see that happening. But outside of those countries, the majority of the western leaders are psychopaths. They are the Epstein elites. They are dead set, and they don't really give a damn how many of their people die. The only way that they will give a damn is if they are the targets themselves, but they're not counting on that.
They're counting on the little people dying because the little people don't matter. Just less carbon in the world as they they seem to indicate, but they're dead set on it. They have done everything they can to make sure these conflicts spread, to make sure these conflicts grow. Again, you know, going back to, the preboltics, Russia tolerated a lot out of these people. You you know how many terrorists plots have gone through Estonia trying to smuggle in explosives and icons.
Just recently through Poland, came a truck with with boot insoles with 1.5 grams of explosives in each tied. These are electric boot insoles to warm feet, to go to, both the military and refugees that are in cold areas. I mean, it's just constant constant terrorism that's going across the borders, constant terrorism that that's been sponsored by these people. You know, sooner or later, the patience runs out no matter how patient Moscow has been. And I think the patience in Moscow is act spurred these people on to do more insane, probably sooner now than later because it's been going the the spring's been compressed so hard.
The response is gonna be extremely vicious. The response is gonna be extremely bloody. There's a reason they say, you know there's there's two thing two sayings about Russians. You know, Ivan is slow to get on his feet, when he gets on his feet, blood flows. That's one.
Well, Are you there? Okay. Yes. Sorry. You froze up.
Speaker 0: You froze there for bit.
Speaker 1: Yeah. And the other one is yeah. Yeah. And and the other one is, you know, Russians are slow to get in the saddle, but once they're in on the saddle, they gallop very fast. And this is what we're getting to right now.
I don't you they mistake unwillingness on on a part of Russia to expand the war as weakness. And sooner or later, that unwillingness finally just goes away, and then they suffer. And then they whine. Oh, why is us? Why, oh, why us?
They seem to ignore everything that they do before that. The same thing you hear from the Israelis when they get hit. How why are we getting hit from the Ukrainians who, for eight years, murdered Russians and have continued to murder Russians in a Donbas, and not only the why us? Well, you know, it's it's crybullying. It's a it's a new good term is crybullying.
They bully around until they get smacked and they cry victim. But that that's what we're seeing. Fortunately, that's what we're seeing.
Speaker 0: Yeah. You know, I spoke about that earlier. There seems to be a different approach to escalation on each side that this the NATO likes to do this very small salami tactic, gradual escalations while Russia tends to hold on and just go for massive responses, which often, yeah, on the NATO side results in miscalculation of a of a or even delusion about this escalation dominance, the extent to which they're able to bring up or down the tensions. However, with the in the as the Ukraine war, though, it resulted also in this in the West cutting itself off increasingly from Russian energy. This has put a quite a shock into the international energy markets and the economy, but it seems to be nothing compared to what is coming now given the war in The Middle East.
How are you seeing this? Because even if the war would end today, which it wouldn't, it seems like, the repercussions of old energy, disruptions and, all the disruptions to fertilizers is something that's gonna stick with us for quite some time.
Speaker 1: Yeah. I'm I'm not just a pretty war face. I've actually done supply chain management as a director of supply chain management. I was in Cameron and Halliburton. Halliburton, I was a regional director supply chain manager for Eurasia, and that's wellheads.
That's infrastructure is drilling. It's above ground infrastructure for the two. And then I was also director of supply chain on construction projects for Technomont where we were expanding a new portion of the Moscow refinery to make, you know, e 95, Petro and building one of three phases of, a €15,000,000,000 project, on the gas on the LNG plant in Amur. I think this is Luke Oil's biggest I'm sorry. Gazprom Nift's biggest LNG project or plant anywhere.
So I know the time that it takes to order metal constructions for the girders and different, design. The vessels, you know, just for, expanding the, the process in the refinery. It's a very big refinery to make the e 95 gas or or not gasoline gasoline or petrol. They're at about a 120 vessels. Now most of those vessels were one to three meters long, but we had a couple that were 78 meters long.
Now these are giant construction. We use 78 meter long vessel. Just getting there, the logistics is a pain. We literally have to lift a couple buildings, with big cranes to get the truck. By the way, it it's a ballroom because there's truck added to it to, to get these, these construction moving, and it's all by hand.
And you can see how long it takes just to get that in place. And by the way, they're not only just after the design. They're the they're these giant pipes that have the the different phalange phalanges added onto them and different other sections added onto them. It's all done by hand. Then it has to be tested, which means you put it under pressure with water, then it has to be dried, then it has to be delivered, then it has to be tested again with water and again dried, then eventually lifted up into place.
I mean, 78 meters long. You can understand how big this is. It's almost a, football pitch, in length when you especially when you add the trucks onto it. These this is our operation that took, about seven months, eight months to make. Now why am I saying this?
Because I'm looking at the pictures of the damage from the missiles and the missile strikes just on the Qatari refinery. And I guarantee you, not only but it it not only do you have to clear out the the damaged sections, which are, you know, the only thing you can do. Once one of these, vessels are, punctured, you can't just you you can't just weld them shut. They're no longer gonna hold that pressure. So they go to scrap metal.
You clean it, and you've taken a scrap metal. You have to make new ones. Again, to order. Each one is made to order. They're not mass produced.
Valves can be mass produced to a degree. They are mass produced both for projects and on shelf for sales, but nobody ever figures, you know, on on scope of production that, oh, we're gonna have to rebuild a dozen refineries all at once, rebuild all this other stuff. No. Nobody makes that many kind of valves. That's something else that just obviously is not gonna be in any kind of stock to be able to handle.
So you have to produce just to get steel. Just to understand, just to get steel out of a steel mill on order is usually at about a month and a half or a month or a month and a half process of waiting to get steel out of a that's been either in in forged into big steel ingots that are then gonna be cut up and used for production. Get especially especially if you're doing specialty alloy steels. It'll take even longer because they run-in smaller batches. Right?
This is everything that you should consider. And when you consider on top of that, who's gonna be able to produce this type of equipment? There's only three nations that can produce it in volume. That's Russia, China, and The US. To a smaller volume and sometimes a much smaller volume, you'll have India and Brazil and miniscule amounts and and some other countries.
Europe is out of this picture totally. And I'll tell you why. Because, a, Europe cannot produce steel cheaply. And and right now, Europe can't produce steel, period, because it takes gas. Europe has no more gas.
Here's the here's the quick point. They've lost there's no matter what you pay, there's literally 20% less 25% less natural gas on the market, period. And when people think, you know, what what Trump says or something like drill, baby, drill, yeah, you're right. You should drill more. But here's the the kicker.
To bring a an oil field or a gas field to economic exploitation takes three to five years from the day you start drilling your first wildcat well to figure out where exactly the deposit is to the point where you have enough piping and everything done that you can actually export the product, on a consistent basis is three to five years, also depending where the fields are located and and other issues like that. But, yeah, on average, the the crisis is here, and the crisis is not coming. The crisis here the next the second wave of the tidal wave is coming. That's starvation. That's collapse of society through starvation.
That's coming. That's coming right down by around midsummer when prices for food are gonna skyrocket, if not earlier. Right now, it's fuel. But, I mean but but look what we're looking at. You know?
Just begin with the fuel side. It's planting season right now in Southern Europe. In two weeks, it'll be planting season in Northern Europe. Maybe three weeks if it's suddenly a cold front. But either way, it's it's April's right here.
You know? This is April already coming. What do you need for planting season besides fertilizer? I'm not even going on fertilizer. You need lots of diesel.
When you've got a 100 acres, you're not gonna take your cow or your bull, and you're not gonna go plow a 100 acres. That's a huge amount of land. Small family farms could plow land, a couple a dozen acres, so that you've got hundreds of acres. So the bigger farm, you physically can't do it. You need tractors.
That's how we've got the modern agriculture. You don't have enough people on the farms. Don't have enough farm animals. You don't have enough plows, those types of plows, if you can find those kinds of plows still. So what do you need?
You need diesel. You need relatively cheap diesel in large abundant, which is why Russia, by the way, has a ban on exporting diesel until the end of the planting season somewhere around May, mid May. And it probably lasts longer than that considering the circumstances of the world. So right off the bat, you can't plant as much as you want if you don't have diesel. Sorry, but it doesn't work that way.
And then we get to the fact of the fertilizer. Russia produces 40% of the world's chemical fertilizer. Qatar produced 30% of the world's chemical fertilizer. Guess what Europe doesn't produce on that a single ounce of because gas is too expensive. Potash is too expensive.
Europe no longer produces fertilizer. In fact, America produce enough fertilizer. America last year bought half $1,000,000,000, about $560,000,000 worth of Russian fertilizer. This year, probably closer to 1,000,000,000, all things considered, because the market's much tighter. Europe's not gonna be getting that.
One, because Europe lost Qatar, and two, because Europe, cut itself off from Russia, and three, because Russia, by the way, is not that interested in Europe and doing biz any business with Europe to begin with. The very countries that are pumping, equipment and money and, and psycho mercenaries into Ukraine to kill Russia, the very people whose, politicians nonstop talk about, Russia's evil and we have to destroy Russia. Well, Russia hears that, except now you're looking at an absolute crisis. Food you know, a friend of mine, he's a political professor of politics in Northern Italy. And, you know, four months ago, I was talking to him, and he's telling me the lower class families in Italy, they can't afford to feed themselves on week four.
The money's run out. They don't know. They do they struggle to feed themselves and their families by week four. Now what happens when the food prices skyrocket? You get you get class starvation.
And maybe not a whole nation starving, but the lower classes, the lower middle classes start to starve, literally starve, not just skip meals. But this is a point where, you know, literal starvation. And on top of that, behind that, it's gonna be the third wave, and that's called winter. And there's a good Russian saying, Winter is not beyond the mountains. You know, winter is always a crop.
You know, winter is always on your mind. Spring comes in there. You're getting ready for winter. And when that winter comes and there's no gas, because this is gonna be something that's gonna last a year and a half to two years, in my opinion, just to get the Qatari gas fields up. Oh, and that by the way, I'm sorry.
I've got this tirade I'm I'm I'm pouring out. When I was talking infrastructure plus steel constructions to hang all this on, that's not even talking about wellheads. If the wellheads are damaged now you have the wellhead above the the Christmas or the fountain, depending where you're at, how it's called. That can still be replaced, but that's still the valves are produced and the subcomponents are produced, oftentimes in more massive quantities, but it's individually designed for that. But, okay, you could replace those.
But if the well itself is damaged, you know, if there's pipe that's been broken or pieces have gone down down the the well, they have to be fished out usually using magnets or you burr into them and grab them and pull them out, then you have to put new pipe in. You have to cement that pipe in. That all takes time. If the wellhead is if the well is seriously damaged, you cap the well, and you have to drill a new well. And now we're talking additional months upon months to get all of this done depending on how widespread the damage is.
So quite literally, because I only have the the satellite photos and the high altitude drone photos to go off and on the videos of the the fires, in my opinion, that's a one and a half to two year delay before anything goes up. And then there's question of how much damage has been done to the fertilizer production out of that because a lot of times, by way, they take ammonia out of the gas that comes up with the, the natural gas. But there's another step to this. That's the human step. You have to get workers in.
You have to get high, high quality skilled workers, engineers. A lot of those people aren't gonna come back, because they they don't wanna go back in the possible war zone. Then there's the problem. If the desalination plants are destroyed, they physically aren't gonna come back because you can't they can't survive in that environment without water. And that whole area lives off of those desalination plants.
Qatar and Bahrain, almost a 100% of their drinking water comes from desalination plants. You you start to see that this process, it's got a lot of moving parts, and all of them are now out of whack. So this could be a very long term issue that could last into multiple years, if not, you know, a five, six year problem. And then there's another point to consider, and I I don't know. We'll we'll live and see how this goes.
You gotta consider that a lot of these artificial Gulf Southern Gulf countries, Arabic Gulf countries, they're more akin to a corporation run by one single family than to actual nations of any kind. So the question now becomes for these sheikhs, they've got their trillions out of this, but now they're gonna need those trillions to build rebuild everything. I mean, we're talking massive investments of money, clearing up, rebuilding, depending on how much damage, of course. It's gonna be three, four, five years of investment with no money coming in because there's no gas or there's no oil going out. Are they gonna do this, or are they gonna cut bait and run and sit when whatever country they're in right now with their trillions or billions that they've pulled out of these holdings that they have and just forget about those countries pseudo countries.
So, you know, there's a lot of factors at play. And the fact that the damage is not over, you know, we don't know where this conflict is gonna go next. If the Americans this weekend or, begin next week strike the infrastructure, the energy infrastructure in Iran the way Trump was threatening, it could be about a decade before, anything gets rebuilt, fully rebuilt and up and running. I mean, these are oil fields and gas fields and infrastructure that took thirty, forty years to get to the point where it's at right now, sometimes longer. It could all be destroyed in in a very short period of time.
Yeah. Well, when you refer to the Gulf States you.
Speaker 0: No. Well, when you refer to the Gulf States as, you know, corporations masquerading as nations, it's it's not an exaggeration. If you look at the countries like Qatar, I think it's only 10 to 15% of the population are Qataris. The last 85 to 90% are just foreigners. So it's just oil in a desert and the buildup real estate around it, the buildup at the energy markets.
And the problem is if things start to go south because the people themselves would leave, it makes everything very difficult. And so it's not even the just the technical issues which you referred to, but if the goal now of Iran is to expel the American bases and if the Gulf states are unwilling to decouple from The US, then they will essentially go after the survivability of these states. As you said, there's many ways. If you attack a desalination plant and there's no more water, again, it's a desert. If the workers begin to flee, then then the whole country shuts down.
It just seems that how much of the global economy depends on these, you know, corporate states. It's it's quite incredible. So, but it kind of begs the question as well, though, how how do you see NATO or sorry, Russia linking itself into Iran here? Because I guess the question on many people's mind would be after, you know, having spent the past, years of, well, NATO being using Ukraine as a proxy against Russia, it seems as if Russia could end up in a similar position, that is if it hands over some missiles. I'm not sure if Iran needs it or targeting data.
Did you see the possibility of moving this direction, or does it depend on the extent to which the Europeans get involved in the Iran war?
Speaker 1: Look. Russia's already there. I mean, let's talk let's talk realistically. This isn't a question of whether Russia would give targeting information. It is giving targeting information.
So is China giving target information? And China is now becoming what what you just said doesn't apply to Russia because Russia was already there from day one. The Chinese now are starting to look at the Chinese, they're. I mean, they always were. They're not a military culture.
They never were. They're more of a trader trader culture. They like to trade. They they're not big on military conqueror. They've been conquered many times, and they just assimilated those people and continued business as usual.
But now they're looking and going, they I think the Iranians are gonna win, and success breeds success. And now they're going, well, you know, we could invest. Maybe we could push this forward. Russia's been there from day one. I mean, there was complaints coming in from the second day on Iranian drones where they opened them up, and it's Russian chips powering the the computers on these drones with Cyrillic written in there, the name of the companies, everything.
Russia, the Russian I mean, okay. I'm not gonna say this straight out one way or the other, but it takes a year, a year and a half to train a a MiG 29 or a SU 35 fighter pilot, not four months, not five months. It takes a year to train up an officer to be able to control and command the s 400 control command block. Not, you know, not three, four months. So right off the bat, you you can make your own focus on these things that are being operated.
You know? Everybody is smart enough. I think they can make the conclusions that they need to make. There's Russia supplied Iran with a lot of upgrades in equipment over these six months that made their systems much more lethal. Avionics, propulsion, targeting, heads up displays for legacy aircraft.
They put in jamming systems, modern jamming systems. We've seen and and these are all field tested variants. I mean, Russian missiles have heat flares on them. If you ever look at it, Russian ballistic and cruise missiles have heat flares like on an airplane. So whenever the Ukrainians are trying to shoot them down, they just start shooting off heat flares as they're flying.
So that interesting little sight to see. The first stump, I saw them. Oh, that's an interesting advance. The Guran threes are basically are you know, Zelensky is complaining. Apparently, Russia's production is big enough that they can afford to, you know, ship them to, Iran.
Israel hit, the Caspian Sea where Russia gave it a very stern warning not to try to get in there. Otherwise, there'll be bad consequences for the Israelis because now they're messing with the Russian, Iranian trade, and a good chunk of that trade goes without transponder signals. You you can make you know, you can put two and two together to figure that one out. So Russia's already there. Yes.
Of course, Russia's gonna proxy The US. The prox The US has been proxying Russia for four years and admitted to it. Even though Trump then comes out, oh, it's not our war. Yeah. It is your war.
It is now your war, mister Trump, because you have not you have not divorced yourself from Biden's war for the last year and a half, so it is your reward. Where it goes from here, I don't know. But Russia and Iran I mean, for Russia, the fall of Iran is a existential crisis just a bit less than Ukraine. Because if Iran falls, it opens up absolutely opens up Central Asia and the Caucasus to to import of of NATO and US destabilization, Islamic jihadists, and so on and so on. And then that threatens directly Russia's borders and Russia's integrity, especially along the Kazakhstani border, which is 3,000 kilometers long.
And there's no way in hell Russia's gonna tolerate that. Sorry. We'll fight to the last, you know, Iranian and Russian while we're at it, and The US is not going to win In fact, everybody's waiting for The US now to put ground forces in for the massacre to begin. I mean, the Iranians are flat out said. There was a interview with I I can never remember the guy's name.
The foreign minister of Iran. I don't know if you remember his name. I always forget his name. Yeah. I forgot.
Oh, it's Yeah.
Speaker 0: I I
Speaker 1: I see his face, but, yeah, I'm horrible with names. So no no offense to anybody in Iran. Any and then they said, aren't you worried about how the Americans are coming? They're gonna do ground forces. Like, we're waiting for them.
I mean, this is quite literally that we're waiting for them. Please come to that so we can start destroying you with our hands. You know, this well, not quite literally with their hands or maybe with their hands, but, I mean, they're prepared. They're waiting. It's a fortress.
Iran is a a gigantic it's the biggest fortress in the world. And just look at the map. I would look at relief map of it. If you don't understand that this is a massive fortress, that the US military is absolutely incapable of taking maybe a few islands and then being plugged by drones and missiles non nonstop day and night while casualties mount, sure, they could do that. But anything significant?
Oh, we're gonna march to Tekran. Really? Right. You have you looked at a map where Tekran is located, how many kilometers of mountains you're gonna plan on marching through? Good luck there.
You know, this isn't a Hollywood movie. This is real life. And then I guess just the point. First of all, the logistics strain of the extreme, and The US just physically does not have the capability of doing it. It is not a land power.
It is a sea and air power. It is not a land power. The US army plus marines is about 550,000 men, but that's not combat troops. There's maybe about a 120,000 combat troops, and that's counting the National Guard pulling the reserve. The rest is what we call ash and trash.
It's combat it's it's combat support, which would be intelligence and engineers and military police, and combat service support, which is everything else that a hundred years ago or a hundred and twenty years ago wasn't considered part of the army, but is now. The teamsters, the mechanics, the cooks, the finance guys, the medics. You know? If you look at history books, what changed was if you look at history books and it said, you know, so and so brought an army of a 100,000 men, you figured these are all either pikemen or spearmen or swordsman, whatever, infantry of some kind or or musketeers, cavalry, and artillery or catapults, whatever. It depends on the decade you're or the the century you're looking at, but they were all combat soldiers.
But now what we're calling as an army is not all combat soldiers because each one of these armies came with a long train of civilians, what they were called civilians or contracted civilians. Those were the people bringing in the supplies, fixing the damaged armor, or fixing the damaged musket or a rifle, what have you, because the armies always traveled this big train. By the way, the prostitutes came in there, and their wives came in there to wash their clothes. I mean, the this this whole human train that came Napoleon came with the same thing into into Moscow. Behind his army came a giant train of humanity that did all of the jobs that needed to keep that army in the field.
Now it's all considered it's all called part of the military. It's military jobs. But, again, they're not they're soldiers, but they're not combat soldiers. They they're they have a minimal, if any, training to to do any combat. They go to range once or twice, maybe once or twice practice bayonet tactics, once or twice practice some basic infantry skills.
They don't remember it. They're not good at it. They're not made for that. But this is all part of the US army. So when they say, oh, we have five we have a half a million men, then you don't.
You've got a 100, a 120,000 you can throw into this meat grinder. There's over a million and a half of Iranians waiting for revenge on home turf, and these are actual combat soldiers. Yeah. The rest of society is right behind their back to do all the other jobs that need to be done. I mean, you're out number 10 to one.
They're on defensive, and they're in mountains in prepared defensive positions. I mean, that's a suicide. And for The US to start for The US to start recruitment for it's called good lord. What is it? What was it called?
Just flew out of my head. It's called well, okay. It's it it it's every every man at 18 has to sign up selective service. That's it. For select service, I mean, I I had to sign selective service and register with it.
And what I've been told by people in the know is it's in such bad condition. It's gonna take four or five months just to get it all organized. It's it's computerized, organized, and then start calling people in, and then, you you know, you have to prepare these people. You start getting people in. You have to prepare.
But then you get to the fact that forty percent of Americans are obese. Thirty percent of Americans are fat, but not not morbidly obese. And the thirty percent that slept doesn't mean that they're all physically fit. It's just that their weight category isn't going into fat. You can deal with some of the fat and and, run it off, but that, by the way, takes more time.
The US army last year in 2025, had an obesity or the US military, I won't just say the army, US military, had an obesity rate of somewhere around twenty two, twenty three percent. When I served, I left in 2000 2004, in February 2004, to be more more exact. There wasn't a one percent obesity rate. It wasn't tolerated. But now when your recruitment is down so much as it is because you've sent people six, seven rotations for six, seven years into Iraq, into Afghanistan, and the place on that, you've used your human material up, and that human material went home and said, don't join the military.
It's not worth it. You can't give enough people, so you start dropping the standards. And they drop and drop and drop, and now you have an obesity an obesity rate of twenty three percent, twenty two, twenty three percent. It's insane. So every fourth soldier, if he runs 10, 10 meters, he may collab from a heart attack.
I mean, you look at some of these people. I mean, when they when Trump called up the national guard out of, Texas, it became amply probed because they were all fat. And these were infantrymen, and they were coming out. They were like this big. And you're looking at us, what what the hell is he gonna do?
It's up suck up bullets if something goes sour. He he is a big target. He's not kick combat capable. You look at these guys. Seriously?
Only thing they're combat capable of is taking out a an all you can eat food part. Yeah. Yeah. I may be I may have say mean things, but this is the reality of combat. Combat is mean.
It's it's doesn't mean a thing as a human being could do to another human being is to open up their guts or blast their head all open. But that's what it is. And it is quite literally, if you're not fit, you don't survive. You you may not survive even if you're fit. If there's a massive amount of chance whether that piece of shrapnel comes flying through your head or takes out your buddy's head or just misses you both.
But if you're not fit enough to be able to sustain that kind of pressure, just die off. I mean, that's what it is. That's the reality of it. And this is in the US military at this point. I mean, just to be absolutely brutally honest with it.
And this is the military that Trump, by the way, and not a single general says anything counter because they all want their career afterwards. None of them will ever be held irresponsible. They they want their million dollar careers after their generalships are done when they retire. And these are the people that Trump wants to throw into com into combat against people that want revenge for their dead women and children are fighting in their turf and are a civilization that's lasted five thousand years. Well, you know, I think
Speaker 0: when you call it a suggested. When you call Iran a fortress, I think it's a that's a very good description because people often forget that the country is almost four times the size of Iraq. It's pure mountains and, again, populated by 90,000,000 people, and then you have the sea on the outside just, you know, to make it more difficult to storm the walls. So it's yeah. I think that's why the foreign minister Arakci was making this point that, yes, please do send your troops.
You know, the closer they come, the easier it will be to take them out. But but as The US is sending, you know, a few thousand troops, it begs therefore the question, what exactly are they good for? And Cargilland, it seems, yeah, too problematic, too difficult unless they're sent over from Saudi Arabia. But even then, they're sitting ducks. But but I was thinking that if Trump really wants to open up the Strait or Moose and gamble a lot on this, you also have these islands, especially three islands in near the Strait Of Hormuz.
It's Abu, Musa, and then you have the Greater And Lesser Toum Islands. It's interesting because they've been they're claimed by United Arab United Arab Emirates ever since Iran took them in 1971. So and suddenly now we see The UAE saying, oh, we might step up in the fight against Iran. Given that they're so yeah. I know with with what army, but but where where does this enthusiasm come from?
It just it seems that this might be a trade off if the Americans are promising them these islands back. You know, The US gets control over the Strait Of Hormuzo, more control at least, while UAE gets its old islands back. Again, speculation, but what what do you see otherwise? What what can a few thousand boots on the ground achieve here?
Speaker 1: I don't know. I I think it would they will go after these small islands, but here's the problem. Or or the coastline in northern, the northern coastline in Iran, which in a lot of places is relatively flat, but it runs into mountains not too far up. The problem is whether you're on the islands or the coastline, what's the width of the entire, I'm sorry. What at the at the narrowest point, what's the width?
36 kilometers. You know what goes 50 kilometers? Especially if you have a retranslator drone sitting up there? The FPV drone. You can take a FPV drone with a big battery pack that can carry up to 20 kilograms of explosives.
In other words, a couple RPG rounds strapped to it, and you can go hunting Americans or UAE soldiers on those islands. And you can do this day in and day out, and especially those islands aren't 36 kilometers wide. You could take out any ships going through. First of all, because around the tip, the dredged canal because these waters are not deep. These supertankers cannot go through these water at beaching themselves.
This the dredged canal, which, by the way, has to be maintained and has to be dredged. I'm not quite sure how often they do it, but I gotta consider that. But that dredged canal is 2,700 meters wide, right down the middle. So about 18 kilometers, in right down the at the nearest point. Yeah.
And believe you me, a supertanker is a gigantic target. You put one or two of those out of commission, in the middle of that, they got to be dredged out of there because nothing else is gonna pass. I'm not sure whether an American destroyer can pass into the shallower waters or not. I'm not quite sure how just how shallows were, but the supertankers can't. So right off the bat, you can easily close the gate those gates that way.
But those islands in the North, they're all within fifteen, sixteen kilometers of the mainland or less. They're all within FPV drone range. You could set up, you know, two, three hundred teenagers who've lost their families or lost their brother and sisters and want revenge. Here's VR goggles. You know?
Do a quick course on how to learn the power and control. Half of them probably already know how to control these drones. And here's here's a pair of VR goggles and a dozen drones. Go play hunt the Americans or hunt The UAE. And it becomes one big game, and they could be under every tree under rock, you know, trying to find these guys.
They're all separate separated out, maybe teams of two. Usually, they run-in teams of two. But, like, that's the point is, I mean, you're you're talking, what, an investment of four, five hundred people, and you could have three, four thousand drones flying down or a couple drones for every marine that landed on there. How's how do you get the the wounded off? How do you supply them?
And here's the other thing, m I six, because, you know, it wasn't the Ukrainians. I'll call it what it is. M I six attacked a Russian well, a shadow fleet, if you wanna I don't consider them shadow fleet. In Lloyds of London insured ship off the coast of one of the Aegean Islands using what? And this was, what, about three or four months ago, and they did it using what?
They used FPV drones with RPG rounds attached to them, and they swarmed in there, and they hit, and they damaged, and they set it on fire. Yeah. That could be used on any ship. No American ship will survive a 100 drones flying in in a wave. It's done.
They will get through. At least they you don't need that many to get through, especially with that much explosive power behind every single drone. And once it's damaged enough and burning, what do you do when that Aegis destroyer is on fire with a crew of 350 people. You you know, this is something that could cascade very quickly. So wouldn't they get used?
Probably, that's where they will get used. Will it be a suicide mission? It'll be just as much of a cluster as if they went after and card, maybe even worse. And the Iranians are gonna be with an easy shooting range with everything they have to just keep lobbing into those islands. It's even easier to shoot those islands than Card Island because they're much close to the mountains and the mainland.
So there is no good solution for Trump on land. There's only massive failure and casualties and and a cluster and less massive. And the best thing is not to do it at all. More than likely, he's gonna do it. That's where my opinion now is.
I was hoping not, but he seems dead set on it because he doesn't know how to get out, and his only theory on how to get out of this is to double down and triple down and quadruple down and do stupid down. You know, mister Win Bigley because he wins Bigley. That's what his own words. He wins so big, he wins Bigley. Mister Owen Bigley, is is gonna make, gonna send a lot of men to their deaths.
Gonna leave a lot of, orphan children and widows behind and parents without, their sons and daughters because the moron cannot break and just take the punishment that he's got for doing something stupid like starting this war. Instead, he's gonna just expand it. Unfortunately, I I would like things to be differently, yeah, to go differently. Yeah. But that that's all I think we're facing, unfortunately.
Speaker 0: Yeah. That's the problem with him trying now to fix the narrative by overselling the successes in this war. There's no it makes so much more difficult to walk this one back and, you know, accept, you know, something less than a victory. So
Speaker 1: Well, go Glenn, there was a story that came out, from an inside source just recently came out that said Trump's war briefings. I I pardon my French. I shit you not when I say this. It's a crude it's a it's a crude saying, but it's I think it's very effective for this. First, a little bit of a background.
I remember Tulsi Gabbard was talking about, you know, well, we had to reform these daily security brief for Trump from having no. The standard is here's five, six pages of information. Please read it, mister president. Trump doesn't like to read. So they had to reform the secure the the the national security or the the international security brief down to something that looked like a Fox news break, you know, just little pieces instead of so Trump doesn't have to read something that covers, like, fifteen minutes of watching.
Well, having said that and this is Tulsi admitted to this back about a year ago. Well, what the insider is saying is Trump's war briefs are about three minutes long, and it's strike videos. US army or navy or air force blowing stuff up. Nothing negative. No reality.
I mean, what are you what are you gonna take out of an entire day worth of war in a in a flexible environment in three minutes? We're dealing with a very shallow human being who is not well educated no matter if he finished Ivy League schools. My god. His own mother, there was a there was an interview with her when he was young, obviously. And what she said was, I know my son is an idiot, and he's awkward socially, but he's my son, and god help me.
I love him. And please and and it'll if he goes into politics, it'll be a total disaster. That's quote from his mother in an interview in the New York Times back, what, about forty years ago or so. But, you know, his mother knew him best, obviously. And I've heard this from other people that have known Trump closely, very closely, including being in his entourage in the nineties when they were doing party drugs every couple days and, staying up all night and, doing these wild parties, Atlantic City in New York.
I've talked to these people. I'm friends with one of them. That was a former, navy seal who was in Trump's underage. So, you know, and they all say the same thing. He's not a a deep person.
He's a great marketing person, which is what this is the fall this is why all republics die. Democracy well, democracy is marbled, but republics all die for the same one of the same reasons. Is the it's it's marketing. It's a feel good popularity contest on elections. You don't get the best people.
It's human nature. You get the guy that sells himself better than the other guy. That he may not be he may be as dense as a brick while the other guy's a genius that'll save you. Nah. But he's not as popular.
It's a popularity contest. And then Trump won the popularity contest. He is a marketing guru. It doesn't go much deeper than that, though. And once you get into the White House or into the Kremlin or wherever you're in, whatever place you're in, now you have to start working.
And if all that person has, in this case, Trump and a lot of the EU leaders would see the same thing, is they can campaign well, they can sell themselves well, but there's nothing behind them, no knowledge base, no, sternness, no concept of where they wanna go. You get the message you get.
Speaker 0: Well, his briefing consists of videos showing explosions. It kind of it could explain his confidence. So why things are going better than it is. Anyways, thank you so much for taking the time.
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
Stanislav Krapivnik: Iran Lesson - Will Russia Retaliate Against Estonia? https://youtu.be/o2faaNCDvy4 https://t.co/ikjx1gwGhi
Video Transcript AI Summary
The conversation centers on a view that the United States has failed in its proxy conflicts with Russia and Iran and that power is shifting to a multipolar world led by non-Western states. Stanislav Krapivnik argues that Russia’s pivot away from the West undercuts Western unity and that Europe is increasingly exposed as the West’s policies erode, with Russia becoming a leading anti-Western force for years to come. He frames the shift as not just multipolar but anti-Western in direction, noting that Russia’s stance has turned against the West and that the West’s “genocidal” actions and moral claims have damaged its legitimacy. He also asserts that the West’s actions have helped bring to power leadership in both Russia and Iran who are less amenable to Western influence. He highlights Trump’s regime-change actions as reflecting realignments away from West-facing regimes and notes the long-running Iranian threat as a consequence of Western policy.
Key points covered include:
- The shift from a Western-centered world order to a multipolar order led by non-Western powers, with Russia and Iran resisting U.S. and European influence.
- Russia’s movement away from Western integration toward an anti-Western bloc, and the idea that the West’s moral posture has deteriorated, with calls that Europe’s rulers have failed to uphold moral standards while supporting aggressive actions.
- Iran’s history of being pro-Western but ultimately rejecting Western dominance after regime-change attempts and pro-West leadership were removed; the discussion notes that Iran has demonstrated resilience by countering Western pressure and has weakened American influence in the region by striking American targets and allied interests.
- Ukraine as a proxy conflict, with NATO involvement, and the view that Western leaders are pushing Ukraine into escalating confrontations with Russia. The speaker cites evidence that NATO and U.S. forces are deeply involved, including drone and missile strikes attributed to American planning or directive, and suggests that Europe’s leadership is moving toward broader war, despite public appeals for limited engagement.
- The role of Turkey and the Baltic states: Turkey’s shifting position and its anger over Ukrainian actions; the Baltic states’ treatment of Russian minorities and the geopolitical risk of escalation if Estonia’s airspace is used for drone strikes against Russia, seen as potentially triggering a larger European conflict.
- The argument that Europe’s security architecture is collapsing under its own hubris and dependence on the United States, with accusations that European populations are being molded toward war, militarization, and possibly even mobilization and conscription in several states (Germany, Poland, etc.).
- The claim that deterrence must be reasserted; the speaker argues for making an example of Estonia as a warning to deter further cross-border aggression and to prevent a larger war, asserting that Europe’s leaders are too eager to escalate, risking a broader confrontation with Russia.
- The broader cultural and historical analysis of Europe’s relation to Russia, including Peter the Great’s attempts to connect with Western Europe and Russia’s long-standing pendulum between East and West, with the speaker asserting that today Russia views itself as separate from Europe, forming a distinct civilization and political orientation.
- The potential for a larger war in the near term if European leadership does not adopt a more prudent approach; the speaker warns that Orban’s political fate could accelerate conflict, and emphasizes that Europe must acknowledge deterrence realities or face nuclear risks.
- The closing remarks echo Easter greetings, with the speaker returning to the grim prognosis of European demographic and political trajectories, highlighting a view that Western policy has empowered elites while threatening mass casualties and societal upheaval in Europe.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Welcome back. Today is the 04/11/2026, and we are joined by Stanislav Krapivnik, a former US army officer who was born in Donbas and, well, has returned. So thank you again for coming back on the program.
Speaker 1: Always a pleasure.
Speaker 0: So we see that The United States has now essentially failed in both its proxy war against Russia, but also its war against Iran. And this is happening at a very crucial point in world history as power has shifted from a global hegemony to a multipolar distribution of power in which now two centers of power are, yeah, have resisted the US military. Now not only is it multipolar, but unlike the former multipolar era, this is a multipolarity which is led now by non Western states. I mean, the defeat in Iran and Russia, it really seems to intensify this shift away from a world order organized around the West, obviously. Do I was just wanted to ask first if you see the wars in the context of world order as well.
Speaker 1: Yeah. You know, with with the irony of all of this is is one, Russia has always tried well, has in the past. It's not trying too much right now. Trying to be part of the West. And the West has always been looking down at snows going, you're not good enough.
You you you may look like us, but you're not good enough. And now Russia has in in a very large swing to the to the hell with the West. And and Russia swings that way, the pendulum swings pro West, anti West. And it's very much in the anti West camp that will be there for years, not decades. It's now one of the leaders in the West that's corroding away and collapsing.
And it could have actually been the savior of the West, but, you know, that that's how that goes. The the people you spur today may be the ones that own you tomorrow. So, you know, that's or whose hand you're gonna need to to pull you out to whatever hole you step in tomorrow. Alrighty. Yeah.
That's why you treat others like you wanna be treated yourself. That that that's Christian morals, and the and the West has given up. I know it was a long time ago. It's yeah. Do unto others as you wish for for those and then read a morality lesson while you're at it.
It says you're supporting a genocide left and right, which at least I will give the Europeans the the Western Europeans that they, except for the British who are still doing it anyways, are not supporting the Israeli genocide. At least verbally, they're not supporting genocide. Then, again, of course, Mertz was crying for Netanyahu, I guess, his his love love toy love boy over there that you know, how much Germany has to support the Israelis. But at least the the the are actually growing a backbone of the Italians and and stopped any pretenses of support. Iran the interesting part is, though Iran was never could have never been considered a part of the West, Iran's government was very pro Western.
I mean, let's let's be realistic about And so when Trump said that we changed, I mean, he he's absolutely right. He is absolutely right. He did the generational regime change. The people that were pro West, the people that wanted to make a deal with the West, the people that for forty years did not develop nuclear weapons even though they could. Because by the way, the earliest article I've seen is Jerusalem Post 1986.
Iran is gonna have nuclear weapons in a month. I know it's shocking. In a month. And they've been selling that same hitting that same drum for forty freaking years. Well, the people that that wanted to be close to the West, they're all dead now.
Or most of them are dead now. They're not there's still some people left. The and the West killed them in one form or another. And the West not only did parts of the West kill them, the rest of the West came out sanctimoniously and charged them with aggression for responding to being attacked and people and the leadership being murdered and civilians being butchered, particularly the well, we'll just start off with, of course, the school and the little girls. And if people will come in are the the younger generation, the one that whose psyche was formed in the fighting the American proxy in Iraq that it had invaded Iran, People seem to forget that part.
It wasn't just a border war. Iraq had invaded Iran in a surprise attack. And then that long war, I mean, Khomeini junior there at 17 was an infantryman, volunteered for two years on the front lines watching his friends die. This is what formed their youth and their mentality. It's it's rather ironic that these are the people the West has brought to power in both Russia and in Iran.
So and you're right. And the West has shown its incapability to actually do it. Let me let's let's not celebrate that this is all over. The the you know, as as this American saying goes, it's all over by the dying, and and that's the truth. There's still gonna be a lot of dying left because the conflict in Iran is not over.
We will see if if this pseudo on and off ceasefire lasts out to the end of next week. It does give Trump an out
Speaker 0: from
Speaker 1: his bombastic stupidity. And and, you know, off on a tan well, it's not really off on a tangent. I I had an interview yesterday with Robert Barnes, and he was telling me what he got from his close sources in in the White House. They were close to Vance and other people. He said Vance has been working like a madman to keep Trump under control.
Trump is is off the reservation, which if you don't know what that means, when the Americans put Indians on a reservation, and and part of the peace treaties, which were always broken, all of them were broken, start judging who you're dealing with, well, from the little facts like that. They would provide food for the Indians, so they'd usually provide rotting meat or nothing at all. And it's usually because of corrupt supply side people suppliers. And then when the Indians if the Indians had to go hunt, that was forbidden for them to go hunt, so they really had a choice of either starving or or hunting. But if you go hunt, you've gone off the reservation, which which is where the saying goes, which means you've broken the rules and you've you've, you know, you've gone out somewhere in in the radical areas.
And which, by the way, for the Indians meant the the the American army would come in there and massacre after that. So it's either slow starvation or or or or fight. But in Trump's case, you know, off the reservations means he's he's gone off to La la land, and he's actually started to get desperately and very dangerously insane. So where this goes, I don't I don't know. More likely, there's still gonna be quite a bit of dying left.
There's a lot of dying left in Ukraine. The the the future shield, even if NATO comes in as as a Americans will go in. I mean, it's it would neither were the Turks. In fact, the Turks are now there's now proposals from the Turks to move the Turkish navy and to blockade a desk. They went for you know, there there's a saying of lay with curse, get fleas, and the Turks have definitely got Ukrainian fleas after they supported Ukraine as much as they did it, selling them weapons, building a new ships for them, which are never gonna be delivered now.
And Ukraine responded by attacking a a Turkish tanker in Turkish waters with a drone. I mean, that's that's a slap right into the teeth of Erdogan or more like a spit in his eye. So he can't let that go, and the Turks the the Turks are outraged after everything they've done for the Ukrainians. They they should have known better who they were getting in bed with. Now they have the Ukrainian fleets that they have to deal with, and and the Turks are outraged.
And they're they're just looking that that swing you know, Turkey is probably 60% pro Ukrainian population views versus pro Russian. And now it's it's it's not even 60% pro Russian. It's probably closer to 80% pro Russian after Ukraine's unabashed aggression against Turkey. And and, you know, there there's still and just as another hit to the world markets, you know, is Europe created a Frankenstein monster, and that Frankenstein monster is continuing to pay Europe back. Prices are skyrocketing in energy to the that's declining the European Union even faster.
So what does Zelensky do? Putin declares a thirty hour ceasefire. Zelenskyy more than likely I mean, act you know, not more likely, a 100% through Azerbaijan. Ukrainian drones struck two Russian oil platforms in the Caspian Sea. Granted, there's not much to burn on a platform.
I mean, there there's any they're they're drilling platforms, and any oil that may be coming up is under underneath, and it's going into pipelines to pull out. So you hit something on top. You may hit some kind of fuel canister or something like that, but, you know, there's not much to burn on top of oil platform, realistically speaking. But the fact of the attack, that that has, you know although it has price pressure on in the market only in one direction, which then translates, of course, to boom. It's not gonna stop Russia from getting fuel for for itself and for the Russian military.
It will scare the markets even further, and and it just drives prices up for everyone. It wouldn't by the way, all those idiots in The US or the value signaling to Ukraine and writing, oh, this is great. Well, yeah, you get to pay more. Obviously, it enjoyed bankruptcy even faster.
Speaker 0: You know, when you said, yeah, that the the the Russians were never considered one of the Europeans, it's it's really a you know, it it builds into a wider historical failure in in my view because it was you know, you can go back to Peter the Great three hundred years ago who really wanted to Europeanize Russia, again, not just putting well, of course, some of it was modernizing its industries, becoming a maritime power on the Baltic Sea, but also this cultural revolution just to reshape Russia to be, yeah, more more European. And as you said, it was never accepted, though, by by many of the European states. That is the Russians were still seen as the Asiatics of Europe, the barbarians at the gate of civilization, essentially remaining the other, you know, the East to the West, all of this. But what I found interesting in the nineties was Boris Yeltsin. I mean, for me, he was like the second coming of Peter the Great, except he didn't bring forward a navy or prosperity, but he wanted to, again, just remake Russia as European as possible, but more in the geopolitical sense.
That is, he was rushing so fast to the West that he just ignored all the traditional partners in the East. And, of course, once he threw away alternatives, you know, he wouldn't be rewarded. Now he could be exploited. I kinda look towards this often as what the Americans can do to Europe now. We only have one partner.
They can put any deal on the table. But but I think this is why what has happened now is so significant. It's not just Gorbachev's common European home over the past forty plus years, which has been thrown away or that possibility. It's, you know, Russia's Western centric foreign policy for three hundred years. That is that modernization development kinda meant you had to look to some extent towards the West, but this is now you know, you've all the Russians have all these partners in the East now.
It's very different, and I it just it's it's frustrating as a European because I made the point for the past decades now that Russia in Europe would be a source for revival. That is a powerful Europe, which will have autonomy in contrast to what we did by redividing Europe, by expanding NATO. This is what's gonna make puppets out of us, prosperous, weak, and lacking in security and, of course, being vassals as well. I mean, we should have worked towards having no dividing lines. However, if you try to push that argument in Europe, no one wants to hear it.
All they wanna know and not just since 2014, but just in general, just you have to support the dividing lines because, yeah, no good reason given. And all they wanna know is that you're in the trenches on our side. This is it. The whole aspiration of having ending the dividing lines of Europe is nonissue. But I I wanted to ask, though, the while the war isn't over, as you said, neither in Iran or in Ukraine, we do see that some of the the system of The US hedge money seems to be falling apart.
Because if you wanna hedge money, you have to base it on alliance systems. That is you divide the world into dependent allies and the weakened adversaries. And now that The US is obviously in decline and you see the consequence not just in Ukraine, but also in the Gulf States, you know, the Gulf States are now rethinking, you know, to what extent are we inviting the Americans? Are we secure, or are we vulnerable? They are saying the same thing in East Asia.
I'm hoping we'll have soon have these discussions in Europe because, you know, how much more punishment can we take before we accept reality? But it seems like we still have this dual pressure. On one hand, the European leaders are still angry. They wanted to defeat the Russians so we can restore the political West. At the same time, there's a lot of pressure now.
You have to adjust the reality before it's too late. For example, with the, you know, the the Baltic States example is is a great one. I mean, by attacking Russia through Baltic States territory, you know, this is seen as, oh, now it can break the Russians, bring back the political West, but it's also what would essentially leave Europeans, much like the Gulf States, completely exposed and, you know, the Americans not coming in to save the day. I was wondering, how do you see this? Do you see Europe backing off, or do you see going full ahead, moving towards a direct war with Russia?
Speaker 1: You know, Peter the Great, while I won't say it's not proper to say Peter the Great was trying to get in Europe. Peter the Great was trying to get into Western Europe. We we were getting back into East and we're getting well, we were we are Eastern Europe. No one quite literally, Russia is one fourth of the European continent. People should have forget that, or or subcontinent, depending on how you look at it.
You you you could consider Europe one big peninsula of the Eurasian Continent. But, you know, we we we're getting actively back into parts of other parts of Eastern Europe, which we call the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth, which at that point was made up of almost half of of its territories Russian territory that had been conquered by Lithuania. And Lithuania had become a Russian state because it's 90% Russians. But then with unity with Poland, everything, radically different. In its own time, Lithuania could have been Russia, as opposed to because it it was quite literally competing to become Russia, because most of its population were Russians, and they were Orthodox Christians.
So, yeah, history takes its turns. It looked in a different direction, and and it and it eventually gave up its or lost its empire and subsumed by Poland. But having said that, I mean, Russia Russia was somewhat backwards at that point, but not nearly with the way people think. Let's not forget Russia was one of the earlier one of the countries that was earliest in adaptation of gunpowder weapons. In fact, cannon was something that starting from, Ion Grozny, Ivan the Feared, was very actively developed in Russia, and that helped drive and break the the various Mongol entities.
When they charged in, it helped destroy them at the battle of Malodoy, where, you know, Yan Grosny's army just absolutely exterminated the invading Crimean Kakhanat, which they're called Crimean Tartars now, thanks to the Soviets that renamed everything. But they were Mongols. They were part of the of the Golden Horde, and they had a contingent of Turkish Janissaries. And they were exterminated. There was out of 45, 50,000, I think there was, like, two or 3,000 that were made at home or running.
And this was in large part due to gunpowder weapons that the Russian state was very actively developing, very actively buying up in every direction and fielding in in larger quantities. A lot of western, Central European armies were fielding. So that was a there there was a lot of development. What what Peter the Great was working was not to get into Europe. Like I said, it was get to get accepted, a, by Western Europeans, specifically the Western Europeans, and, b, to get the newer technologies like shipbuilding.
And by the way, the first Russian ship was not in the the first Russian fleet was not made for the Baltics. The first Russian fleet was built in Varunis and floated down into the Black Sea to crush the Turks. In fact, while we're at it, one of the the interesting things was in one of the Russian Turkish wars in the eighteen hundreds, Russia started Russia was the first country in the world to start using the exploding cannonballs. And they they bottled up the Turkish fleet and just exterminate, burned it to the well, I'd say burned it to the ground, but, really, they only burned it to the to the sea. Then the rest sank, and the Western media went absolutely ape shit.
Not pro oh, look. Look. The Russians have beat the Turks, which who we've been supposedly fighting now for, you know, three hundred years. But, oh, oh, those dastardly Russians, they massacred the poor Turks, the poor Turkish fleet. So we see this as a continuation of
Speaker 0: of
Speaker 1: the same propaganda you see right now. When the Western Europeans are fighting the Turks, those dastardly Turks. But when the Russians did it to all of those evil Russians fighting the Turks. So it it's the same thing, and and you're right. It's absolutely the the European the the central and Western Europeans have been very ignorant of of what need they what what's in their own best interest.
The I mean, Russia the only time they look toward Russia is when they need someone to pull their chestnuts out on the fire, as the saying goes. They need Russian blood, and they need Russian gold for something. Say, fight Napoleon or fight whomever else, Frederick DeGraea, his own time, and so on. That's when they started peeling the Russia. And, you know, World War one, Russia was driven by pan Slavicists.
And let's not forget, Slavs are 50% of the Caucasian race, white literate. Slavs are are half the white people in the world. And, unfortunately, very, very disorganized and had been pushed and used by other entities to fight each other for a millennium. It's longer even that millennium. Russia was driven by pan Slavicism and a strong drive of orthodoxy.
In World War two, Russia was driven by the proletariat and work and workers and people working class unite. Today's Russia, in particular, the people are driven by real politics. The last four years, actually, longer if you think Russia from 2014, the Russophobia that's just poured out of every pore in in Europe and the rest of the West has done a lot to sober people in Russia, and that's why the swing, the anti Western swing has gone very, very hard very, very quickly. And that's the West's own fault as as an entity. So, yeah, we we you know, I I'm of the opinion, honestly, that those Ukrainian drones did not fly through Poland and the Baltics.
I'm of the opinion those Ukrainian drones, or maybe better to say Estonian drones, were lifting off from Estonia a lot and and flying into Russia. They they had, you know, about six months ago, five months ago, they had an explosion when these drones blew up in the middle of Estonia, and the Estonians didn't blame Russia for drone warfare. In fact, they tried to hutch it up as much as possible. Video still got out. Photos still got out.
Exact same drone. They hit they hit the ground in the middle of Estonia. Nice little crater there. Chunks of drone in every direction. Airplane style drones.
So this is nothing new, but the, you know, the pressure on the Kremlin to make an example out of Estonia is insane. And when you consider that half the Estonian population is Russian, has been Russian since the September, You know, the it's the city of Narva, which is attached to the new entity called Estonia by the Soviets because there was no Estonia. There was no Latvia. There was a Lithuania, but there's no Estonia in Latvia. These states didn't exist.
They're they were created by the Soviet Union because they were chopping up the Russian map. And they these though the people there obviously were there, they never had states of their own. They have no history of self government. They they were they had a small brief time where they suddenly appeared after the Russian revolution and civil war, and then they disappeared subsumed in the Soviet Union, and there were territories that were added onto them, Narva being one of those. You know, Narva Narva was founded as a as a fortress by the Danish king Vladimir.
So figure out the names. But quite literally, his name was Vladimir. But in December, but that was the fortress. There was a a Russian city there located called Radvek. Rad Radvek.
Someone of that sort. I I gotta look it up to the exact name of it. That was on that location since the September. So that area is, know, the Estonians Russians in Estonia have no rights. They're not second class citizens.
They're noncitizens, period. They get a great passport. They have absolutely no rights. But they're 50% of the population. They were listed as 35, but when you consider they can't leave and the Estonian youth, Sercengan, has been running out of Estonia for the last twenty years and leaving en masse, Even though Estonia keeps counting them as if they lived there, there these are people that come back once, maybe twice a year to go visit their parents.
That's it. Or or and they don't live. They haven't lived there, and they a lot of them can't even speak Estonian. They can't speak Latvia. They don't speak English or German.
So and the Russian population can't go anywhere, so the Russian population is actually as a percentage has gone up quite a bit. Norway is 95% ethnically Russian, and these people have absolutely no rights. Estonia that sponsors SS parades every single year, government sponsored, government people coming over there. Literally, Latvia and Lithuania does the exact same thing. And and now the after this, these attacks, the attention toward White Hell and his Narva, part of Estonia, has gotten very high publicity in Russia.
You know, let let's get our people back. That's the mentality of over these fake Soviet borders that were created by Soviet Union. And it could have been avoided if Russians were just treated normally in Estonia, but then again, for that to happen, you wouldn't have the regime in Estonia that you have today, and it wouldn't be supporting the the Ukrainians that it does now. So the intention is we have to get deterrent back, and Estonia is the easiest candidate as the testing ground on how we get our our deterrent back. I'll make an example of it.
And, no, I don't think Europe is gonna go the rest of well, Europe. The rest of the EU is gonna go march off to war for Estonia, especially all things considered in a moment. But is it a larger war as you had asked previously? I know I didn't answer that. I think there is.
There's gonna be a larger war. Unfortunately, I don't think the European leadership is is gonna get smart enough to avoid this. And if Orban loses these elections tomorrow, I guarantee you that that time schedule just got moved up very, very quickly toward a big war, probably within the next year, two years maximum. That Orban's been one of the, probably one of the biggest breaks on this rush toward let's not have a war with Russia. And and just to understand how insane and stupid these people are, The EU who is practicing or it'll soon be the EU.
The the NATO army will be the EU army because all they have to do is switch patches and put a new patch on. Same people. They were practicing for mass casualties on a big war with Russia, and their projection was they may have to take up to a thousand wounded a day. You people are smoking crack. Ukraine and this is a very limited conflict, and the Russian military is still very limited by the political that by the by the political heads of what it can and cannot do.
Ukraine is suffering around 1,200, 1,500 dead a day and about two thousand wounded a day on a very limited conflict. If this goes into all out war, you know, they one thousand wounded a day, let's try about ten thousand wounded a day. The the European system is nowhere near able to to cope with what what's coming its way. But but we see the militarization going every direction. I mean, when Germans up to age of 42 cannot leave the country without permission from the Ministry of Defense, that's the first big steps of euphemization of Europe.
When when Germany is condemning journalists, they're not quite shooting them yet, but that'll come in time. They'll take them out in the woods and shoot them just like the Ukrainians did, disappear them if there are inconvenient voices just like the Ukrainians did. And then Ukrainians are probably shoot showing them how to do it properly these days because Ukrainian quote advisers are all over the place and training all the right winger or the right and it's not right to say the right wing or the Nazis. Nazis are not right wing. Nazis, national socialism is anything but right wing.
Uh-huh. But all these groups, you know, they're they're being trained by the Ukrainians. They're infiltrated through, and they're being brought in as advisers. So Europe is heading in the same direction. Look.
That Turkish well, he he's German, born in Germany, of Turkish descent. Journalist, I can't I can't remember his name. You know, they they barely got his wife's accounts back open. Because his wife's accounts were closed. He never broke any laws, but he did immorality for the European Union, and they've banned them from being able to buy food, sell buy work, sell use money.
And and unlike, you know, when you excommunicated somebody in in the middle ages, and and once they're excommunicated, if they wanted to leave, by all means, please leave, you're being allowed to leave. You can't leave Germany. He's there to be the the sit there and starve and die slowly as the example to everybody else, to the rest of of the Western Europeans and particularly Germans of what not to do if you don't wanna die slowly and starve and be murdered by your government on on on a slow scale. So the Germans, yeah, the Germans are are are bringing back the draft. They're they're looking like the other countries.
Hey. The the Poles brought back the draft during Easter Easter holidays two years ago so that nobody quite noticed. They woke up post Easter celebrations and, ah, we have a draft. You know? The laws have been passed.
That's nice. And they they do this they're doing the same thing in a lot in a large parts of Europe. So Europe, non Russian, non Belarus Europe, and and hopefully, we can still say after Sunday, non Austro Hungarian Europe is still in a rush to go to war. It's it's it's a suicidal rush, absolutely, but it's a rush to go to war.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, actually, I read in the paper today, this morning, that the Germans had to revert this not leaving the country because it was too much. But in the other areas, of course, they continued to, well, let's say, lose their minds while pushing more more and more more in this direction. I think part of this, I guess, idea of joining the war against Russia is the delusion of escalation control. That is we can join the the war, but we'll do it on our condition.
So we'll we we can still, you know, limit the fight to Ukrainian territory and Russian territory. I just I you know, one of the key lessons from the Iran war should be that one doesn't get to dictate the terms anymore. It's like when Iranian began to attack all the American bases in the region and shut down the Strait Of Hormuz when the Americans more or said, well, that that's not part of the rules. We were planning on, you know, limiting it to, you know, your your territory, and you can maybe strike Israel. I mean, it's this is the delusion of escalation control, and I think this is this is linked to the unipolar moment because if you didn't follow the rules set by The US and Europeans for how the rules war should be fought, you will be crushed as opposed to being little bit crushed.
So I I don't think they appreciate that the rules have changed. You you mentioned this Europe. I I and that's that's a good point. I I I make that mistake myself. And it's interesting that in the only using word Europe to exclude Russia, there was a lot of literature in the academia about this in the nineties that European Union gradually began to refer to itself as Europe, you know, in a wider efforts to push out the Russians, you know, from Europe in the security realm, economic, political, but also conceptually.
So simply, Russia's not the European. This was kind of what what was discussed, and now it's I find myself referring to Europe and Russia as if it's not, you know, the largest country in Europe. But but I I wanted to ask, yeah, about the the Baltic states again, though, because, you know, I remember when they joined both the EU and NATO, in other words, Europe, in 2004, their whole argument was that the Russians should be happy because now they're joining the community of, values. So as they're joining this liberal democratic club, if Russia's worried about the rights of the Russian minorities, well, this is a guarantee. But now it's twenty two years later, they you know, they're the people who are born there, their parents born there, grandparents born there.
Why why can't they still vote? Why can't they get, you know, positions in government? Why, you know, why are why are they second rate citizens? And, you know, it's as if people believe that this was not a geopolitical project. This was actually a community of values.
I I don't think it was deceptive. I think people actually believe this stuff. And
Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah.
Speaker 0: But but, again, I I sorry. I'm getting to my question. No. No. No.
The the war. Again, one of my main takeaways was one of the reasons I think Trump had to back out eventually is because he couldn't didn't have escalation control. He couldn't go up that escalation ladder because the Iranians followed him all the way up. Whatever they did, he wouldn't the the Iranians would mirror it. And I'm thinking to what extent the Russians have taken a page out of this book because they did not do this.
They decided, well, let's just focus on finishing the military operation in Ukraine and not stir up a direct conflict with with NATO. But if now Ukraine will begin to fall apart, I mean, its army at least over the next few months, we see this rhetoric now coming from the British, French, and German that, well, then we have to step in to essentially turn the tide. Well, not using those exact word, but as you said, that they're all now talking about war with Russia. So did you see Russia changing its approach, not just to Ukraine, but to the Europeans as well?
Speaker 1: Yeah. You know, in a and and by the way, in in lot the the excuse the Baltics use for Russian minority is they were Soviet colonists forced foisting on us. They remind that these areas were part of Russia since, Peter the Great defeated, Charles the not so great. And and out of, defeating and taking these territories, he then paid for them. He paid for Russia bought that land.
He didn't buy the people. The people aren't even mentioned in the contract because the people had no rights between sweet the Swedish Empire, which was defeated and the Swedish Empire, quote, sold. But this is the same level of, you know, when America bought the Midwest from or or the the the Southwest from Mexico after American troops were occupying Mexico City. It was very easy to and they they they paid a some ceremonial fee for that, you know, symbolic fee. Well, the excuse for not giving Russian citizenship in these areas had been and and, by the way, Russians Russian intellectuals in those areas were part of the movement for independence back in 1990.
For the reasons not to give them was, oh, they're all Soviet colonists. In Latvia, that's more or less that's more true. I mean, there were people, obviously, Russians that were living there since the empire before them, since the seventeen hundreds. But as Russian land, rush there were two Russian small principalities, Volus, in South in Livonia, but they were been exterminated by the Crusaders back in the out of the October. So after that, yes, the Russian president Livonia was there, but then again, we flew to Estonia, and you see that, you know, Narva, the Russian presence in Narva has been continuous since about before Narva was established, since about the September.
So to call them colonists, you know, they they've only been there for the last thousand years. They're they're they're called colonists, so that doesn't fly very well. So and you're right in that and I've been saying this too. Look. Russia just has to has if we don't wanna be in a nuclear war, I'll say, I'll take the Americans.
The Americans would never sacrifice even the smallest American town or village for London or for Paris or for Berlin or definitely for some Warsaw or, God forbid, some Riga or, you know, any of these other cities. They're not gonna do that. No matter what the Europeans wanna delude themselves into believing. Although, again, see, Russians have started us through. We're not Europeans.
That by the way, that is a swing in Russia. We're not Europeans. We we're not part of that civil we're our own civilization, and we don't even though we we're not gonna call ourselves Europeans anymore. That's a big swing in Russia right now, the Russian psyche. We don't want anything to do with those people.
And that's, by the way, what a lot of European EU businessmen don't seem to understand. They think that once however long this takes, once this conflict is over, they'll just get to walk back in and start working as if nothing happened. No. There a lot of these companies are not welcome. It's gonna take at least a generation, if not to get the the bad taste out of everybody's mouth from from what's gone gone on since to a smaller degree since 2014 and a very big degree since 2022.
And deterrence has to be if deterrence is not reinstalled, we're looking at nuclear war. I mean, that that's sooner related because Europeans are gonna do something stupid. The Europeans have not started talking. And Europeans, again, the EU has started talking about we're gonna arm ourselves, become a nuclear power. Well, you know, when you have a nuclear power next door, somebody wants to become a nuclear power next door who every single day tells you, we're gonna exterminate you.
We're gonna destroy your country. We're gonna break you into 40 different entities. We're gonna do this to you. We're gonna do that to you. Oh, now we're gonna get nuclear weapons.
The pressure on the Kremlin to do something before they get nuclear weapons is gonna be insane. It already is insane. And Iran has played a huge role in that because what do we see in Iran? You're right. Iran has has has has wiped out, I mean, leveled 13 American bases up and down the Persian Gulf, has smacked around American companies and industry in response.
I mean, they don't go after everybody. When they get hit, they they respond to Israeli and American owned companies first and foremost, but happened to be all in particular, American companies all over The Gulf or Southern Gulf. When Iran had 30 universities bombed by the outside of calling the Zionist coalition. I don't know what else is best describing between the Christian and the Jewish Zionists, both heretic cults. They bombed 30 Iranian universities without giving prior warning.
Oh, a little war crime. You know? What's what's a little war crime between the Zionists for breakfast? Iran has bombed all American and Israeli affiliated universities, but they gave them a day warning to get everyone out. That that's the difference between the Iranians and the Zionists.
They they actually gave told everyone, get your people out and keep them at least a kilometer away because we're gonna wipe these buildings out in response. And they've done this continuously. They haven't hit hospitals as opposed to dozens of hospitals hit by the Zionists anywhere they they fought and so on. And and what does what's the message? And I've been repeating this message myself.
I'll admit that straight off on Russian television, and you see and I'm not I'm I'm probably one of the less aggressive ones that have been saying this is flat out. Take the lesson. A US is not gonna go to nuclear war. Europe needs to or the European Union needs to know deterrence, and the only way to do that is you can make an example of something. And Estonia, I think, is the prime example now because whether they are launching these drones out of Estonia, whether it's Ukrainians or Estonians launching a drone, or they're just passing through Estonia, The fact that the Estonians knowingly allow their airspace to be used, they are now part of the war no matter how they look at it.
Really realistically, if they're really flying all the way through, then Poland and Lithuania I mean, Poland and Latvia are part of this war and all stop. But let's just concentrate on Estonia. Estonia is a prime place to make a a very hard smack upside the head and tell everybody this this crap is over. We're gonna treat each one of you as a declaration of war when you do this, and then we're gonna destroy you at a declaration of war. Look at Estonia that's still smoking.
That's it's gonna have to be that way. Otherwise, you risk a much larger war. Sometimes you have to sacrifice a thousand to save a million. Or in this case, from your for the European Union, may be about three to 400,000,000. But, unfortunately, this is this is where it's gotten.
It's gotten the very large part because Russia's policies has been, well, Russia's policy has been incremental, trying to incrementally advance its positions and not do any bold moves because, again, just like the European Union, the West is projecting its own very warped and modern values of Russia. Russia's projecting its own values onto them. That's a bad tendency in humanity is to project your own values and your own position onto others. And Russia's position has been, well, if we if we do too big of a move, we'll scare NATO into a war. Like, no.
You'll scare NATO out of a war. You're doing the exact opposite of what you should be doing. You scare the euro you scare the the NATO or the EUers into here comes the Russian sledgehammer, and they'll be more than happy to talk. If we look at even the the weapons, the heavy weapons, the first heavy weapons, the first tanks that were handed over to Ukraine were handed over from Slovakia. Why Slovakia?
Prefits of Slovakia. Slovakia is small. And if Russia was to strike Slovakia, it's no big deal. But Russia didn't. And they went, okay.
And the rush was on. The doors swung open. The gates swung open, and they started flooding Ukraine with whatever war supplies they could get their hands on. It it did go incrementally, except Russia didn't respond the way it sure responded, and deterrence was was done, at least on that level. A very wrong move.
Russia had symbolically struck Slovakia or the border areas, So next time we're going after Berlin, everybody would gotten the message very, very quickly. Okay. Yeah. Yeah. Sorry.
It's those damn Slovaks. You know, you can't really control Bratislava. They're they're insane. Oh, they will all be peaceful now. At least, you know, more peaceful than for but they didn't.
And I was saying back then, we should strike them. You should strike them absolutely because otherwise things will all go worse, and they've gotten worse. So now we're down to either we have a full on war with the European Union or make an example, They're still hesitant to make an example, which just feeds the war hysteria in in the West because it doesn't see any any backlash to itself. You're right. They think it'll just be in Ukraine.
Every time we escalate, it's just the Ukrainians getting hit in their meat anyways. Who cares how many Ukrainians die? They're not real people anyways. They're not part of the West. They're just proxies.
They can die as as many of them can die as we want. We don't give a damn about those people. That that's the reality of the West. And so far, they've been proven right. All the responses have gone back to Ukraine instead of going back to where it should, at least the the Baltics.
And Iran has shown, you know, what are you afraid of? Look what we've done to the Americans, the Americans. Look what we've done to the American base. Look what we've done to their allies. Are we dead?
Are we in this free? No. And you're a nuclear superpower. And that's the message that is in Russia. That's the message resonating on on even in state television.
The pressure is on in immensely. Strike strike hard and make an example. And it it's the proper thing to do to bring back deterrence. It should have never been deterrence was was lost in a in an attempt to not lose deterrence, in an attempt to not escalate the war, but it was again, Russia is projecting the the Russian leadership projecting Russian values. We don't want a war.
We don't want a big war. We've been pushed into this one on onto the Europe Western Central European leadership, and that was a big mistake.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, I think part of the problem is that the European leaders as well as well as the media deluded themselves because the rhetoric over the past four years has been, well, you know, it's in our every we have a right to enable Ukrainians to defend themselves. And framed like this, I would say, well, that sounds awfully reasonable. You know, the Ukrainians are you know, they're fighting for their homeland. Well, why shouldn't they be helped?
The problem here, though, is that NATO set up the Ukrainians for this. I mean, they they're the one who toppled the government. They're the one armed them, trained them, sabotaged all the different negotiations as well as the 2019 election outcome. So and for a very explicit purpose, seeking to use the Ukrainians to impose a strategic defeat on Russia. So as you said, when you have people like the EU foreign policy chief, Kayakawas, calling for the breakup of Russia as one of the ideal outcomes, you you can't simply lean into this innocent you know, we're just helping the Ukrainians.
Like, this is a war against Russia as well, and the Europeans, I mean, they're participants. I had a talk with John Mersheimer, and I said, well, you know, because we are in a proxy war with Russia. So, Glenn, Glenn, we're way past this. We we are now fighting a direct war. And and I think it's important.
But, I when you say this in Europe, they say, oh, why are you repeating the Russian propaganda? But you have to accept reality as it is. If you delude yourself, you end up doing very foolish things, and the consequence, I think, is about to come. So I I agree with you, though. I think if we end up in a direct war, then a well, not necessarily a great war, but at least a direct clash now between Russia and a NATO country.
It will probably be one of the Baltic states, I guess Estonia is the most likely candidate. Do have any final thoughts before we wrap up?
Speaker 1: Well, you know, the the Baltic States and by way, yes, you're right. This is so far past the war. When the HIMARS appeared, I was saying from day one, these are American soldiers fired at HIMARS. This is American from day from from start to end. Oh, oh, Ukraine is fired.
HIMARS is not Ukraine is fired. It's just Americans fired at HIMARS. It's America fired at HIMARS at Russian infrastructure, civilian infrastructure, killing Russian civilians. And the New York Times back in December December '24, they came out with a big article. You know?
Yeah. It's it's all Americans. You know? Just underlining everything I've been saying. And on the Russian television, they're looking at me like I was, you know, lost my marbles there.
It's like, oh, it's great. It's no. It's American. And the New York Times just confirmed everything, even that the attack on missiles were not something that Zelensky's regime dictatorial regime asked for. It was American generals demanding attackers and using attackers on Russian cities.
Now Lugansk was just recently hit. There was a university hit. There was a school hit. You know? Big surprise there and so on.
This this is nothing new. So this is and Lugansk. No. No. Anybody doesn't know yet that it's my home city, my birth my birth city.
The the the this is this is yeah. You're right. Absolutely. This has gone so far off of proxy into a full fledged war. I mean, NATO staffs are be have been several NATO staffs have been wiped out.
By Russian missiles. Native generals, the, you know, the ones that tend to go off into the into the forest in the middle of the night or into the mountains to go mountain hiking in the middle of the night and then fall off and mysteriously die. Yeah. How else can we write off the the the losses or just don't mention them? So, yeah, they this and this is nothing new.
I mean, when you have military staffs sitting there, foreign military staffs sitting there planning and doing everything but the execution portion of somebody else's war, you're not proxy. You're absolutely fully neck deep in the conflict. Right? There's no other way to look at it. And, again, Americans aren't gonna fight this war.
Absolutely not. They're gonna make money off of this war. You know, I absolute some little wake up for the meat called the the European Union because guess what, gentlemen? Ladies and gentlemen, you are meat. You're the next wave of meat for the Americans to make money off of you.
Like it or not, look at look in the mirror and and and understand you are material that will be used to make a lot of money for Western for Western finance sitting in New York and maybe in London, depending how if the English can not get themselves evolved this time. They did in World War one and World War two. They were trying to make money off and get everybody fighting and got sucked in both times. Maybe this time they won't get sucked in, but the point is the the Central Western Europe is already in this fight. It's only gonna get worse for them.
Look. The Americans are gonna go neutral, but they're gonna feed Europe, and they're gonna continue pushing your Well, the non Russian Europe, they're gonna continue pushing into war with the Russian Europe because they're gonna make money off of this. They've been talking about this since 1998 in the open, not not in a major well, it's like I said, I think the first article I read was in Forbes, if I remember correctly. Yeah. We need another good war.
And the good war was World War two because it got America out of the Great Depression. They were talking already in '98 about it. So if you're talking '98 about it in something like Forbes, means they've been talking about it since the early nineties amongst themselves. You know, it doesn't trickle that fast up. And and, yeah, they've been preparing the the biomaterial called Europeans for a big war for the last twenty years, thirty years actually, and they're planning on making money on it.
America has plenty of equipment that's been mothballed. M one tanks, m one avon tanks, Bradleys of different generations. And they you know, what what do you do with equipment that's been mothballed? Well, you either pay money, chop it off, or you find somebody to sell it to. And and Europe is gonna be the battleground that they're gonna get on there.
And let let's just face reality. For the white race of Europe, it's their it's their Ragnarok. You're not getting out of this alive. Europe white Europeans in most of Europe are turning into a minority as it is, and after this big war are gonna be absolute minorities. They're gonna be a replaced population.
Yeah. I'm gonna drop another very uncomfortable thing to people. When the elites are talking about lowering the human population down to somewhere between half a billion to a billion people, which means exterminating the rest, and the golden billion. And most of the the Europeans thought, oh, we're gonna be part of this golden billion. Europe is gonna be part of that territory.
You're not on the list. You'll be exterminated and replaced, and you already are being exterminated and replaced by other populations that are easier to control. Because the golden billion is only because they're gonna get if it's not a half billion, it's only the people that are gonna get to live. The golden people are gonna be that 1% of the top, and they're gonna have another 20% that's gonna be educated manager and professional class that services their wealth. You gotta have engineers.
You've gotta have military and police and so on. And the bottom 80% is gonna be the serfs on the neo feudal neo feudal technological state or states. Everybody else gets to be dead. So, you know, and then you wonder if the the serfs are gonna be envying the dead before this is all over, consider what their lot of life is gonna be. But Europeans are not gonna be part of this, the average European.
They're going to be wiped out one way or the other, they're to be replaced and mixed with other nationalities that are being actively brought in as replacement. Look, this we didn't know mass migration. Of course, they knew mass migration would do what it does. It's it's it's designed that way. Only an idiot who absolutely is not paying attention to history, is not paying attention to reality, would would think that, okay, let's bring in twenty, thirty million people, You know?
Well, let's bring in 8,000,000 people into England in one big wave of over twenty years, and they're not in the wood that could become the the average key totalling Englishman. Of course, they're not gonna do that. They instantly form long claims. They instantly form separate entities. But because these people are from all over the world and they're in a foreign land, they become ruthless, they're easier to control.
And for societies that are used to be controlled more easily. To get rid of the population, you get the population you want, or some mix, admix, and all you all you gotta do is just look at the reality, you know, posters of we are Europe. One white girl, a Pakistani or an Indian, an Arabic guy, and an African guy. We are Europe. That's the poster.
And then the next poster, defend Germany or defend Europe. It's all white guys. That's the message right there. The people that need to be taken out is the white European male, and then the rest has to take care of itself. And so, you know, wake up or your children won't have a future.
And your own leaders are the ones that are gonna do this to you. I don't know how else to say it.
Speaker 0: Well, on that very dark, Clint. Thank you, Stanislav. And the holy cross today,
Speaker 1: you know, Easter. Yeah. This is warm.
Speaker 0: Well, thank you. And, yeah, still a great weekend so far. Yeah.
Speaker 1: You you too, man. And and happy Easter to everybody. Yeah. Happy Easter.
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
Scott Ritter: Russia Threatens Strike on Finland & Baltic States https://youtu.be/OOLUsj50ZEE https://t.co/pkkglN0EJx
Video Transcript AI Summary
Scott Ritter discusses the widening role of European drones in the Ukraine conflict and the potential Russian response. He argues that Russia is aiming to elevate the conflict this year and may prepare a summer offensive, moving from shadow policy to official action. He contends Europe is acting as an active participant by supplying drones and intelligence to strike Russia’s depth, calling it an act of war and warning that there will be consequences if it continues. He believes a decisive Russian strike could deter Europe and force a reckoning about European military capability and funding, suggesting that a single, devastating blow to the identified target set could end Europe’s ability to support Ukraine’s drone war.
The conversation then moves to potential targets for a Russian strike. Ritter rejects the idea of token “warning strikes,” arguing that Russia should strike decisively to obliterate the targeted systems and demonstrate that it can alter the strategic balance. He posits that a large strike against not only the Baltic states and Finland but also Germany could occur, and contemplates the U.S. response, noting that NATO’s Article 5 may not be triggered since the actions are by individual European nations rather than a collective NATO decision on drones. He predicts that under a Trump administration, the U.S. might withdraw support if Europe provokes a broader conflict, which could hasten NATO’s demise. He asserts that a decisive summer offensive by Russia could bring Donbas under its control and escalate implications for European security and U.S. commitment.
On the Ukraine battlefield, Ritter cites indicators of a spring Russian offensive, with front preparation, control of critical terrain, and attrition of Ukrainian forces through well-planned cause-and-effect operations. He notes Ukraine has exhausted its reserves and that if Russia seizes Sloviansk and Popasna, much of Donbas could fall. He also comments on Hungary’s elections and their impact, dismissing the significance of Hungary’s influence on European or Ukrainian battlefield outcomes, arguing that the €90 billion aid package does not resolve Europe’s structural problems and may not significantly strengthen Ukraine.
Ritter discusses the wider geopolitical consequences, including the Iran situation and its economic impact on Europe, arguing that European energy security has deteriorated and that NATO’s unity is strained. He claims the U.S. is abandoning NATO in practice, and Europe is left with insufficient defense capabilities. He also questions whether the U.S. would sustain a renewed conflict with Iran, arguing the risk of a large-scale war would be economically devastating for both continents and would likely push Europe toward peace negotiations with Russia and Iran.
Regarding China, Ritter contends the U.S. rhetoric on sanctioning Chinese energy flows has had little practical effect, as China continues to source Iranian oil and resist U.S. pressure. He emphasizes that China views energy security as vital to its economy and will respond prudently, maintaining that American posturing has not restricted Chinese energy imports.
Finally, Ritter suggests negotiations continue intermittently with Iran and Russia, with Islamabad’s technical teams working toward a final peace agreement and Trump seeking a narrative of victory through a peace deal. He asserts that Russia may have a strategic window to secure a settlement, with Trump wanting to present himself as pivotal in achieving peace. He concludes that the conflict could be moving toward a Russian advantage as Iran’s war and European economic strain ripple through.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Welcome back. We're joined today by Scott Ritter, a former UN weapons inspector, a US Marine Corps intelligence officer, and an author. So thank you as always for coming back on the program.
Speaker 1: Thank you very much for having me.
Speaker 0: We see now that the Europeans are speaking quite loudly and proudly, I would add, about all the drones they're sending to Ukraine to fight Russia. But at the same time, there's also reports now as, yeah, we all know that some of the drones that have been hitting the Russian Baltic Sea Coast is coming from the Baltic States and or Finland. And we now see that the Russian Defense Ministry, it published this list of European facilities that are now potential targets of Russian strikes as they're producing drones, which are being used to attack Russia. Now I even saw the Russian Security Council secretary Sergei Charguu making the point that Russia has the right for self defense given that these are attacks from European territories. I I was wondering what you make of all of this because is this, you know, hot air, or do you think there is, yeah, that they're actually gonna start to step up the efforts to restore their deterrent?
Speaker 1: I think that Russia is looking to bring it into this conflict this year. I I think they have plans in store for this summer. You know, the Russian approach has always been to avoid escalation and focus on mission accomplishment. That they've allowed so called red lines to be crossed because strategically you would lose more by being seen as over responding. You might mobilize or stiffen support for Ukraine that is otherwise diminishing.
I think this time, however, it's different. We see that what had been done in the shadows is now official policy. We see in Ramstein nations bragging about the role they're playing, that this has become a de facto proxy conflict. And When we speak of drones, you know, we're not talking about the tactical drones on the battlefield, we're talking about drones that are used to carry out strategic strikes in the depth of Russia. This is an unsustainable model for Russia.
I think that the time has come for Russia to step up and make Europe understand there is a price to be paid for irresponsible activity. What Europe is doing, just so everybody understands, is an act of war. It's not it's not that Europe's an innocent party here. They are active participants in a conflict. They are planning these attacks.
These drones that are being produced are being produced knowing that they'll be given to Ukrainians who will then use European provided intelligence to strike Russia's depth. And as I said, I I believe that this is unsustainable model, and I think the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Security Council have made it clear that there will be consequences if this continues. So I think that's where we're at right now.
Speaker 0: Yeah. It's very strange that this is I I made this argument myself because, you know, to be a bit cautious about the path we're going down, but it's almost it's very easily dismissed these days, which is kind of strange because the reason why most of these European states never supplied weapons to to any country in a war would be because that would make the Europeans a participant to the conflict. Yet now we see the involvement as deep as it can be to the point where, yeah, the Ukrainians will play a very minimal role potentially. And yet the whole idea that the Europeans are becoming participants or have become participant is just rejected as Russian propaganda, which is what you say when you wanna make a descent go away. But so it is shocking.
But what do you see being the possible do you see a possible warning strike first against Estonia or Finland, or do you think they will do something larger going after the, you know, key logistic nodes in Germany, for example?
Speaker 1: You know, I'm not one to advise the Russian government on anything. I think warning strikes would be inconsequential and actually, I mean, if you're going to strike a NATO country, or as they say, if you're gonna strike the king, kill the king. I think Russia gets one shot, and it should be a devastating shot that takes out the totality of the target set identified by the Russian Ministry of Defense in a way that completely obliterates the the potential of Europe to carry out their goals, their stated goals, objectives of supplying Ukraine with drones to be used in a proxy manner against Russia's strategic depth. It also sets the signal that, you know, Russia can change the the target deck anytime it wants to, and the outcome will be the same. I think that Europe needs to be put on notice that they're playing in the big boy arena.
You decide to step into the ring with a super heavyweight fighter, and he just knock you out. Because otherwise, this this will just continue to be a war of incrementalism that that will solve nothing. The other thing is by hitting decisive decisively, you you fundamentally define the debate. Now it's a put up or shut up time for Europe, and Europe will find out that they simply cannot go to war with Russia. They're not positioned to go to war with Russia.
They don't have the resources. So then Europe will also have to have a debate about are they going to drop everything in a time of existential economic crisis and rebuild a European army that cannot exist, does not exist, won't exist? You know, The United States is leaving. I don't think The United States will have any sympathy for the Europeans for doing what they did. You know, this is this is fundamentally an act of war that is is is taking place.
And so, you know, the Europeans, I think, are hoping for incrementalism that can lead to drawing The United States back in. You know, the longer you have a debate that's open ended, the more likely bad things are going to happen in terms of outcome. But if you present Europe with, you know, a bloody nose and the fact that your hand is cocked to hit them again and The United States now has to look at this, you make everything very clear with a decisive strike. So, I think the time has come for a decisive strike. I don't think the Russians would be publishing this list, and Sergei Shoja would be saying what he's saying if the Russians weren't prepared for a decisive strike.
Speaker 0: Well, if it would be a large strike, again, not just the Baltic States and Finland, but again, then primarily Germany as well. The the big question is what would the Americans do? So lately, we've seen all these tweets by Trump that, you know, made us a paper tiger. We haven't you know, you didn't do anything for us. We're not gonna be there for you.
Do you think do you think they would just ignore it altogether, or would it be some what would be the response of The United States essentially? Would it be nothing, or would it be going all in? Well, I'm doubting the all in by now, but, essentially, NATO would be over then if they wouldn't do anything. Trump might be fine with that. So do you expect the American reaction to be?
Speaker 1: First of all, this isn't your classic, you know, we were attacked. We were collective defense. This is selective countries in NATO acting in a manner outside of the NATO framework. NATO as an institution has not made a decision to provide drones. It's a German decision.
It's a it's a British decision. It's a, you know, decision by individual nations. And so they legally, it's going to be hard to make the case that Article five is even triggered. But at the end of the day too, The United States knows more than anybody about fool around, find out. And here we have the Europeans fooling around and if Russia makes them find out, I don't see The United States rallying to their cause.
I actually see Donald Trump saying, you brought it upon yourself. This was stupid policy. We told you to seek peace. Instead, you promoted this war and you weren't there when we needed you. We're not gonna come now.
Your honor, I think this is the end of NATO and I think that's another thing that's gonna go into the calculation of Russia is the accelerated death of NATO by launching a strike. Of course, it's a gamble. I mean, who knows how things will happen? Europe may rally and The United States comes back and NATO unifies. But I think all indicators are that that's not going to be the case.
And I think that the Russians are looking for a decisive summer. And the decisive summer will come, I believe, with, you know, offenses in the Donbas region that will bring back the totality of the Donbas plus deeper penetrations. And I think it will be putting NATO on notice or Europe on notice that Russia's done playing games. If they want to you you can only sit there and threaten Russia with war so many times before Russia actually says, okay, let's do it. I think Russia is at the okay, let's do it standpoint.
Especially look, economy is doing quite well right now thanks to the global energy crisis and no matter how this shakes out, Russia now has fixed a lot of their economic problems that might have held the hand of the Russian government before out of fear that a conflict with Europe could trigger an even deeper economic crisis. I don't think Russia is afraid of that right now. I think all conditions are green for Russia to strike, Europe if it continues its policy.
Speaker 0: Well, as all of this is happening, and I think one of the reasons, of course, the the Europeans might be escalating now is that the well, the war isn't going well, and it appears that the spring is offensive of the Russian side is now going or has started. Do you see this as well, or is it too premature?
Speaker 1: Well, I see indications. It's I wouldn't go to Las Vegas and put my my mortgage on on anything at this point in time. But Russia has been, you know, preparing the battlefield if you, you know, follow what's going on. I I follow, you know, a very good Russian journalist who published a Substack page that, you know, provides updates on the battlefield with very good maps and explanation of what the Russians are doing. And what you see, the Russians have been painstakingly setting up the front for a major effort by taking critical terrain, key terrain, cutting lines of communication, and by attriting the Ukrainians, know, luring the Ukrainians into counterattacks, know, having well thought out cause and effect actions, doing something on the assumption Ukrainians would then counterattack and then receiving that counterattack and and and and destroying the Ukrainian force and thereby eliminating reserves.
Ukraine has no reserves now because of these ridiculous counterattacks that they've been undertaking, the Russians have continued to prepare the battlefield for what logically would be an offensive design to no idea why they're banking, but there we go. Slovansk in Penometorsk, the last two big populated areas in Vilnabastin. If that urban belt falls, all of Donbas falls. So I think that's the goal of summer is to bring an end to the issue of the Donbas, meaning that it's no longer a question of Ukraine giving up territory. Russia's gonna take it.
Speaker 0: I got the feeling that the the European enthusiasm about sending more money, weapons, and partaking more and more directly in this war, that part of this was held back by the Hungarians, Orban specifically, blocking a lot of the the military aid, which was supposed to be sent to Ukraine. Now that Orban was defeated, what do you think would be the significance of this? Because it's I think some people might have exaggerated how much of a Europhile the new president is, but sorry, the new prime minister is, but but it still is quite significant that the new leadership of Hungary might define hunger Hungary's national interest somewhat different from what Orban did. Look.
Speaker 1: Who cares? I mean, I I I don't mean to be too but but who cares? So what Europe now is gonna be able to spend €90,000,000,000 on on Ukraine? Where does that money go? You know, is this money going to actually bolster Ukrainian capability?
Are they gonna provide Ukraine with the Patriot air defense systems they Ukraine says they need? Where are the Patriots gonna come from? The United States isn't providing any patriots to Europe. All patriots are being diverted to American use. So I just think that this is a lot of talk.
The reality is on the battlefield and nothing that happened in Hungary is going to impact what's going on in the battlefield. Nothing whatsoever. This is all in, you know, inside baseball, European wannabeism. The fact of the matter is the Hungarian elections don't do anything to resolve the fundamental dysfunction of Europe. I mean, yes, so they can they can pass a $90,000,000,000 aid package, but it doesn't solve France's problems, Germany's problems, England's problems.
These problems still exist. It doesn't bring an end to the economic crisis. It doesn't resolve the energy security issues. The International Energy Agency says that Europe runs out of aviation gas in six weeks. That's right in the middle of summer travel season.
What happens when the entire European aviation industry is grounded? What's that do to the economy? How does Orban affect that? Orban doesn't affect anything, nothing. This is just theater and it's always been theater.
This is dysfunction in the extreme. Europe isn't going to suddenly be united with resolve and going to be able to do things. Still getting that and turning that 90,000,000,000 into something else. You're still dealing with an inherently corrupt Ukrainian government that's falling apart as we speak, fighting amongst themselves. All you do is encourage corruption.
I'm glad they got this resolved because now we get to watch what happens to the €90,000,000,000 and how quickly that disappears and how little impact it has on anything, and then Europe may wake up to the fact that nothing they do is going to turn the situation around in Ukraine.
Speaker 0: Yeah. No. That's a no. That's excellent point. I often hate that myself that is all this money they don't really have, but they have to use it for buying American weapons, which Americans can't sell anymore.
If they're running short before, they have to spend it on the Middle East. And, anyways, key problem in Ukraine appears to be the manpower issue. But the Europeans appear to wanting to help in that area too, that we see chancellor Mertz, well, seemingly agreeing to Zelensky's demands of expelling refugees so they can send them back to Ukraine to fill up the trenches, which is another goes under the label of or banner of a pro Ukrainian policy by it's a has quite extreme what what they're doing. But I wanted to ask how how overall do you think now the the war in Iran has affected the the war in Ukraine? Because besides the weapons being diverted, you know, the Ukraine being taken out of the headlines, are there any other problems or impacts of the war?
Speaker 1: The biggest one's economic. You've already taken a very bad energy security situation in Europe, and you've turned it into an absolute disaster. You know, in order to resolve this, they're gonna have to buy energy that doesn't exist on a on a spot market. They're gonna be gouged. So you're taking a continent that already is knee deep in economic problems, you're making it what deep in economic problems?
And, you know, it it it it's gonna make European industry more dysfunctional. It's gonna create internal political rifts inside an already divided Europe. I think the big thing out of this war for Europe was the economy. The the second thing, of course, is that I think the permanent damage that's been done between United States and Europe, the end of NATO. I think NATO's over.
I I don't think there's any trust between Europe and The United States for any number of reasons. I mean, The United States has not been a trustworthy ally, you know, and The United States created an impossible situation for Europe demanding that they respond to, you know, to to the Iranian cross crisis, a crisis Europe didn't want. But Trump is holding it against them. He's literally the boy who's taking the ball and going home. And I think that's problematic too because now Europe is confronted for the first time with the necessity of having to defend itself.
In the past, there was theoretical discussions about what would happen if The United States walked away. Well, The United States is walking away and Europe knows that. So now they're having the uncomfortable discussion and Europe is realizing they don't have anything. Europe has nothing. There's no army.
There's no defense industry. There's no air force. Without The United States, Europe is literally nothing. Yet they are involved in a proxy war with Russia using drones. I think this is the other big thing is the absolute realization of how little power Europe has from a military standpoint.
Speaker 0: You know, it's I I I don't always understand what what what the strategy is. You would think at the point in time when the Americans are pulling back and essentially, you know, the big, yeah, the big American support behind you goes away, you're you know, you would be a bit more cautious the way you approach other great powers such as Russia, but it doesn't seem to affect the posture, though. They're they're still doing the same as it did before. But on on the topic of Iran, do you think this might be coming to an end now? I think we all watched the well, it's a bit we'll have to take everything Trump says too seriously, but, you know, he seems to think the war is coming to an end.
The, you know, the Iranians did say that the Strait Of Hormuz will are is open, but, you know, the way they defined open is very different from what Trump is describing, which sounds like an unconditional surrender for the Iranians. So what do you think is happening at the at this moment?
Speaker 1: What's happening is exactly what I said is gonna be happening. We have two realities in the world. We have the the real geopolitical reality that is what the ground truth is in Iran. The United States and Israel lost for war. They didn't accomplish any of their objectives.
They hold no leverage over anyone whatsoever. Iran holds all the cards. The US has reached the capacity of its ability to escalate conventionally without crossing into outright war crimes. This is why Donald Trump, you know, chose to, you know, move towards a ceasefire. A ceasefire that Iran didn't want, but was pressured into accepting because of China, who is suffering economically from this conflict.
So, you know, you have the the Iranian reality, then you have the American reality, which is fairly centered on Donald Trump's ego. This is a political problem for Donald Trump. This isn't a national security problem for The United States. We're not trying to, you know, solve a giant international foreign policy crisis. We're trying to solve a domestic political crisis for the president because he entered a war he said he would never enter and he lost.
He can't admit he lost. So now what has been happening, I said that negotiations that took place almost a week ago almost succeeded in having a final treaty. But politically, Trump couldn't accept this because to accept that treaty on the during the timing and the conditions put forward would mean that The United States is acknowledging defeat. So Trump scuttled this agreement and then went on a week of posturing. And that posturing was designed to create the perception of American power that America is compelling Iran to do things.
But what Iran is doing are things that were already agreed to in the in the Islam revolt memorandum of understanding that was almost signed, but Trump killed it. There's this is just game. This is act of political theater. What we see the president doing is trying to create the impression that without his decisive intervention, without his massive blockade, without his threats, none of this would be happening. This is all happening because of him.
And the Iranians are just basically concluding the agreement. I think there's too many people that take a look at what's happening and and accept Trump's statements at face value. The the reality is nothing his statements say conform to reality to to what's actually going on. The Strait Of Hormuz isn't open. Strait Of Hormuz has been selectively open.
The Iranians are in control. They dictate what passes through, how it passes through, and what things are charged. You know, Trump can claim that, you know, he's the one responsible, but the bottom line is it's the Strait Of Hormuz is opened under terms that are acceptable to Iran, terms that Iran put on the table. The other thing I wanna remind people is while all this theater is going on, there are technical teams in Islamabad that have been at work ever since these negotiations began, finalizing, clarifying the, you know, the the technical details of what will be an eventual peace treaty. But I again, in unless something very bad happens politically to Donald Trump, he can't go on with this war.
It's a political it's politically devastating for him. The American economy will suffer and, you know, we know in elections, it's the economy stupid. And so, you know, Trump has no choice but to find peace. He's just finding it use in his own little weird Trumpian way where he has to convince a portion of the American public that he's playing five d chess and that he he's a genius and that everything he does is brilliant and none of this outcome would have happened without his intervention. Meanwhile, the Iranians just deal with reality.
Speaker 0: Yeah. I noticed the way this has been reported on, you see a clear split that is what can now almost be described as the MAGA cult. They they see this confirming it as a massive victory, but it is a good point. I mean, he he keeps lying over and over again, and yet we should somehow take everything at face value. It it doesn't really make much sense.
But if The United States under Trump now decides that they will go back to essentially, yeah, total war, at least, yeah, this full intensive war with Iran, how how long can The US go on now? Because, from what I understand, there's been a lot of flights into the region over the ceasefire. A lot of the stocks have been replenished. How much well, what is the fighting power and versus the restraint on how long The US can keep this going?
Speaker 1: Well, you know, there's a saying that's attributed to Albert Einstein. I don't know if it's actually him or not, but the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different outcome. The United States lost the war. Remember, they started with all the precision guided strike weapons they wanted, all the defense capabilities they had and they got beat. So you're telling me they've restocked the same capabilities that they just got beat on.
And so what are they going to do differently this time? Their target deck is totally diminished. Anything of value was struck. Anything of retained value has been evacuated. They don't have a target deck.
So they're just gonna blow up buildings to blow up buildings, which is what they were doing near the end of this conflict to begin with. So that's not victory. They can't more they bomb, the stronger the regime gets. There's no regime change there. And Iran has shown that these underground missile cities are pretty much invulnerable and that they continue to launch missiles and there's nothing United States can do to prevent that.
And remember, while The United States has been replenishing, so too have the Iranians. They've been building more missiles, more missiles, more missiles. They've been repairing. And so we're just gonna start where we left off with Iran inflicting huge damage on US bases on nations that support The United States, on Israel. And then in the end of The United States, confronted with the fact that its normal strike packages don't cause any change in the Iranian behavior.
We'll threaten to strike energy targets. And and then the rest of the Arab world will step in and say, you you can't because then they'll strike us and it's all over. We lose everything. And, you know, the Saudis aren't happy about this. Nobody I think The United Arab Emirates might be the only country that's happy about what The US is doing, but that's because they have no choice.
They're facing their own existential crisis. So I I I just I can't imagine Trump doing this because this would be the war that cements the fact that he lost. There will be no recovery from this. Our economy, the global economy, will collapse. Again, I just want to ask people to think what happens when all European airlines shut down.
It's not about tourism, people. That's how things are moved. That's how commerce is done. Trade is done. And if you're shutting down that, remember, as goes aviation fuel, so goes diesel fuel.
So, you're going to be seeing a reduction in the ability of trucks to transport. It's the end of the European economy. The European economy will not function. And the same thing is going to happen to The United States. So, Trump can't continue this disastrous model in perpetuity.
Iran literally holds all the cards. So, Trump has to be smart enough to know that the lies that Pete Hegseth told him in the first phase are still lies today. Nothing's changed to suddenly make it the truth. This is why I think that you're seeing Trump be so aggressive because remember, half the play here is Trump's ability to convince a significant portion of the American audience that you know, he was this decisive player here, that without him, we wouldn't have a peaceful outcome. And so there's this theater taking place right now.
Speaker 0: Yeah. I think it went on social media, wrote something along those lines. If he wasn't president now, the world would be ripped apart or something along these lines, which is usually the kind of thing you hear from an arsonist masquerading as a fireman. But but one other area that way all of this could spread the war further would be the Chinese aspect because it seems that the blockade on Iran, to some extent, at least, is aimed to target China given that they are, well, overwhelmingly so, the main importer of Iranian oil. And we also heard some comments from an American senator and also Besant that, yeah, the Chinese shouldn't get oil, and, yeah, this was kind of part of the objective.
But also threats of sanctioning Chinese banks for trading with Iran, it looks whether or not this was initially an objective or if it's just becoming a, yeah, a side effect, it nonetheless seems to be intensifying or worsening relations between The US and China as well. Not the best move probably given the problems, they're facing already with Russia and Iran. But, do you think this is contained, or do you how do you expect the Chinese to respond to this if the blockade continues?
Speaker 1: Well, first of all, we need to understand that this oil this issue of oil and energy security for China is a very sensitive one because, basically, this war has exposed the soft underbelly of the Chinese economy, which is sustainable supply of of energy. You know, Iran the lack the the the cutting of Iranian oil to China is significant. There hasn't been replacements found. China needs this energy. And this now has caused a different stance.
The Chinese have been quite articulate in saying, do not challenge the dragon on issues of sovereignty. You know, Besson can say what he wants. They can sanction banks. They have to be careful because China's loaded for bear. And, you know, there's a lot of cards China can play economically now that this has become an existential issue because, you know, in the past, China went to avoid, you know, you know, you know, causing economic difficulties on the periphery of a of a larger well functioning Chinese economy.
But left unaddressed, the issue of energy security could, you know, cause great harm to the Chinese economy. So I don't think the Chinese are messing around. First of all, how many Chinese tankers has The United States turned around? The answer is none. You know, so I I think, again, this is rhetoric on the part of United States.
I think the impact is zero. I don't think we've stopped one Chinese flagged vessel nor do I think we are gonna stop any Chinese flagged vessels because there is no legal justification for this. And and China has been very strict. You know, The United Arab Emirates sent a team, high level delegation to to meet with the Chinese and they started to lecture the Chinese about Iran and the need to cut back support and they were cut off. And the Chinese foreign ministry said, you don't get to tell the dragon what to do with its, you know, with its foreign relations.
We do what we want to do when we want. We've been friends, but, you know, not friends enough that you get to tell us what to do. And and this is the Chinese approach right now. So I I think, again, Scott Bessen first of all, you have to understand we don't have a well thought out plan. If we did, we would have executed it upfront.
This is a plan that's being made up as it goes along, you know, and again, it's designed to shape perception, not reality. The perception is that the president put China in its place. The reality is the president's words and American action haven't impacted this at all. China continues to get a flow of energy from Iran, and The United States hasn't been able to stop that.
Speaker 0: If this is compelling, China to take a more forceful stand in international in international system, that's quite a horrible achievement to be made given that for decades now, they they kinda had us as key strategy not to create too many waves, not to raise their voice too much in inter international system in order not to, you know, invoke any great power rivalry. But if they're put in a situation like this where they're now, you know, forced to take some action, I mean, this is a, yeah, this is a disaster if one wanted a benign China. Just my last question, though, is about the you know, behind all the bluster, I mean, all these statements by Trump, we they were gonna they're gonna give up all of their uranium enrich uranium studies, Iranians, and we're gonna give them nothing back. They're not gonna get any money, nothing. I mean, behind all this it doesn't make much sense.
So behind all this, is there any negotiations going on which gives you any reason for optimism either with Iran or Russia for that sake, or is diplomacy you know, does it seem dead at this point?
Speaker 1: Well, we know for a fact that the peace talks in Islamabad never ended. JD Vanson, Whitcoff, and Kushner went home. The the senior Iranian delegation went home, but both sides left a number of technical experts who are continuing to work out, you know, to finalize the Islamabad memorandum of understanding as a final deal. And so, you know, think there's a I I think there's a deal here. I think we're going to see a deal.
I I think, you know, Donald Trump just has to create the perception that he that this deal wouldn't have happened without his without his decisive intervention.
Speaker 0: Well, that would be often his, you know, his crazy comments. They seem irrational, but it could be a rational move if if it's in an an expectation of a deal being made because if he thinks a deal is gonna be made, the one of the biggest constraint would be to sell a defeat to The US the American public because, you know, he, as I said before, he's got a midterm coming up. But if if he can do enough, you know, chest beating and, you know, strong man poses before the the the the peace deal, then perhaps he will this will help him sell a defeat as a victory. So it maybe he knows what he's doing. I get the impression often that he's a bit all over the place and getting more erratic, but I'm hoping I'm wrong.
But, yeah, how about the Russian issue then? Because we haven't really heard much more of the negotiations. I mean, there's still talks, but I get the impression from Moscow that they're not putting much weight into this anymore, that they don't really think it's gonna move to anywhere significant.
Speaker 1: I I think I mean, again, this this is this is analysis done in a vacuum because there's as you said, there's not much data out there to put your hands on. My feeling is that Donald Trump has given the Russians a blank check and has said, do what you need to do to get to where you need to get. And we you know, the window is not gonna be open forever, but, you know, I think Trump has said you you have, you know, this year, and you have until the November election or right before the November election to to turn what Trump wants, I believe, is a Ukrainian peace deal that he can present to the American people before the midterm elections. So he can now become the peace this is his whole theme right now. My dissonance of intervention leads to world peace.
And I you know, he keeps talking out, you know, we have overseen the greatest reset of the world, etcetera. I I think that Trump has a completely hands off posture on Ukraine and is basically giving the Russians an open door to do whatever they need to do to get this thing wrapped up so that come, you know, August, the there won't be a discussion about Ukraine giving up territory because Russia will have taken it. And I think you'll see a more fundamentally weakened in chest and chasing Ukraine and Europe. Again, I I think a Russia a decisive Russian strike against Europe would be extraordinarily demoralizing for Europe and and could help push Europe into accepting the necessity of a peace treaty. So that's what I think is happening right now.
I think Trump wants Trump needs this war to come to an end politically and this is all about politics. This is all about the politics of Donald Trump. I think he's basically giving the Russians just telling the Russians, we're not interfering. You do what you need to do. And then if the results get to where we can bring you know, what we hope you do is, you know, create the results that you'll make many of the Ukrainian objections moot, and then we can finalize it.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, it appears that it might be more coming to an end now in in Ukraine that is well not it can still go on for many months, but I don't think it's gonna be possible to you know, it seems like the bench is almost shifting in Russia's favor. So it's gonna be impossible to turn this around, especially after the consequences of the Iran war. So Yep. It still surprises me that none of the Europeans are picking up the phone to call the Kremlin and at least start to talk about, you know, possible solutions.
But, yeah, here we are. Anyways, thank you very much for taking time. Well, thank you very much for having me.
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
Brian Berletic: U.S. Is Grooming Europe for War with Russia https://youtu.be/Ef0sHx33C-g https://t.co/3YxFUaAZtw
Video Transcript AI Summary
In this conversation, Brian Berletic, a former US Marine and political analyst, discusses how the United States pursues a pattern of strategic sequencing that targets rivals one by one, often using negotiation or peace as delaying tactics or outsourcing parts of conflict to allies. He connects this to a broader framework outlined in a 2019 Rand Corporation paper and to a speech by Elbridge Colby, the US undersecretary of war for policy, arguing that the US aims to keep Ukraine’s war ongoing by shifting more responsibility and escalation to Europe, thereby pressuring Russia while also targeting Iran and, ultimately, China.
Berletic frames Pete Hegseth’s early-2025 pivot as Europe taking over a proxy war against Russia and Ukraine, with Europe increasing defense spending and doubling down on Ukraine support. He says this demonstrates a natural progression where Europe becomes the frontline in the proxy conflict, while the US maintains involvement through its command in Germany and intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities. He asserts that the US is fighting Russia through Ukraine and Europe, and that there was never an intention to defeat Russia outright in this phase; instead, the aim was to create multiple dilemmas for Russia, Iran, and China as described in the Rand paper. He notes that the US sought to destroy Russia’s energy exports to Europe and replace them with LNG from the US, turning peacetime relationships into wartime dependencies.
The host pushes back on the idea that evidence is ignored, highlighting how public discourse often promotes the Ukraine war as beneficial for the US, while the real dynamic is a shift toward European engagement and energy decoupling from Russia. Berletic reiterates that Europe’s energy dependence on the US mirrors how Europe was cut off from Russia through war, paralleling Asia’s potential energy realignment. He points to the Nord Stream destruction as part of a long-running strategy to subordinate Europe to US interests and to enable a broader energy strategy that pressures Asia similarly. He claims that US corporate and political influence in Europe, including the EU’s governance and non-democratic manipulation of information spaces, results in a system where national sovereignty is eroded in favor of a US-led foreign policy.
They discuss elite capture, where a handful of individuals in European Union leadership and other allied governments operate for US interests, often through think tanks and institutions like the New York Times’ reporting on CIA involvement in Ukraine’s internal security apparatus. Berletic argues this results in client regimes and a lack of true national sovereignty, making European and East Asian leadership more pliant to US strategic aims. He notes that the EU’s approach—treating opposition as a temporary obstacle to be overcome—has facilitated centralized power and an ever-tightening foreign policy framework that undermines independent decision-making.
On China, Berletic argues that US actions against Iran are also aimed at Asia, cutting energy flows and pressuring regional states to depend on US energy. He points to LNG projects prepared in advance of conflict with Russia, designed to be economically viable only if energy flows can be constrained, and he describes a broader energy-dominance framework aimed at surrounding China with US-backed energy dependencies. He asserts there is a coordinated plan to surround China with hostile proxies and to leverage energy as strategic leverage, transforming countries like Vietnam, Japan, and South Korea into instruments of US policy.
The discussion then touches on what happens if allies resist this burden-sharing, suggesting that truly independent leadership in Europe or East Asia would reject the arrangement as unsustainable. Berletic argues that diplomacy is not dead, but multipolarism—led by Russia, China, and Iran—offers a path away from US-led hegemony, albeit with ongoing conflict and upheaval. He closes by emphasizing the importance of alternatives to Western media narratives and the need for multipolarism to reduce war and promote a more equitable global order.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Welcome back. We are joined today by Brian Berletic, a former US marine, political analyst, author, and also host of the new Atlas, and I will leave a link to his podcast in, the description. Thank you very much for coming back on.
Speaker 1: Thank you so much for having me back on.
Speaker 0: So you often make the argument that The US pursues strategic sequencing that is more or less a staged approach to how it confronts rival powers, so essentially seeking to take on one at a time. And for for this reason, when The US engages in negotiation or peace, you make the point that it's essentially delaying tactics, just setting it up for a later time, or at times, it can also include a different division of labor that is to outsource some of the war to allies. And, well, I thought about you when I was reading the this recent speech by Elbridge Colby, The US undersecretary of war for policy, in which he makes it, well, I would say unmistakably clear that The US is not seeking to put an end to the Ukraine war. Rather, it's outsourcing it to the Europeans who should continue to fight and escalate. I I was wondering how did you make sense of this speech?
Speaker 1: It's just a update of the division of labor that US secretary of defense Pete Hegseff announced, at the very beginning of 2025, almost as soon as the Trump administration came into office. He talked about how The US needed to pivot elsewhere, now we know, to Iran and ultimately onward towards China. And he said Europe is going to take over, basically feed itself next into this proxy war taking place against Russia and Ukraine. That is exactly what Europe did. He told Europe they are going to spend more on defense, and they have.
And he told them they're going to double down on their support for Ukraine, and they have done that as well. And we're watching the natural progression of of all of this take shape into Europe itself throwing itself into this proxy war against Russia itself. It's dangerous, very concerning. The rhetoric coming out of Russia knowing and seeing this taking shape themselves is very, very concerning. And, unfortunately, that's that's what this was always going to end up being anyway.
And I and I distinctively remember warning people that didn't matter who you voted for in 2024, this is exactly what was going to happen. The whole reason The US was fighting this war against Russia and Ukraine in the first place, and it is a US war on on Russia simply being fought through Ukraine. Again, go back to the 2019 Rand Corporation paper extending Russia. The whole purpose of this is to create one of many dilemmas for Russia. They're doing a similar strategy toward Iran and ultimately China.
Create all of these dilemmas and extend Russia as much as possible. It was never their intention to overwhelm and defeat Russia with just this war against Russia and Ukraine. It was just one of many policy options that were in that policy paper that have since been implemented. And one of the things they were talking about was destroying Russia's energy exports to to Europe and how The US was going to ramp up LNG exports to Europe. At time, it made no sense because Europe still had access to plenty plentiful, reliable, cheap Russian energy.
And they said even in the paper, they said, in peacetime, this has a very low likelihood of succeeding, except it has succeeded. And do you know how they managed to make it succeed? They took peacetime, and they simply turned it into wartime. And the only way this policy of keeping Europe dependent on American energy and off of Russian energy and extending and undermining Russia is by keeping the war going. So there was never any intention at all ever of The US wanting to make peace with Russia, and this is the exact same reason why the US has absolutely no interest in making peace with Iran.
Because, ultimately, all of this against Russia and Iran is meant to target not just China, but also Asia. And I would I would argue that the war on Iran and disrupting all energy coming from the Middle East and disrupting not just China's supply of energy from the Middle East, but all of Asia's supply of energy from the Middle East. This is simply The US doing to Asia what it has already done to Europe. They cut Europe off from Russia, from from energy through war, and now they're using war to cut Asia off from energy from The Middle East.
Speaker 0: You know, it's a I guess what's very frustrating about this whole thing is that all the evidence is there, yet there seems to be this very deliberate desire to just live in our own fake little world, the way it's being sold, essentially. As, you know, you can look towards the people who discussed the the benefit of the Ukraine war, from Graham, McConnell, Kellogg, Romney. You know, the list is long where they make the point that this is gonna be a good war. We can fight with Ukrainians. We don't have to waste our own soldiers, and using Ukraine to knock out Russia, we can focus on the Chinese instead.
It can be said in the open, but again, it's not a world which these people are comfortable living in with. So they essentially ignore it. And the same with what you said with decoupling Europe from Russia in terms of energy. This is a disaster for Europe, but, you know, they said this long in advance, all the strategic documents, Nordstrom is a bad thing. Then, of course, just as they said they would, they knock out Nord Stream, and then, you know, they can sell all the stories.
Yeah. It's a Russian playbook. Obviously, Russia destroys its own infrastructure. We we repeat it. Even when it's exposed, then we say, okay.
Well, I guess Russia didn't do anyways. We will embrace any ridiculous story as opposed to face reality. So it's yeah. It's it's it's quite weird that this is actually real. But but it seems if now not if.
It seems kind of obvious that the goal is to outsource the war to the Europeans, which will essentially make the Europeans into the new Ukrainians. And these escalations, they worry me, though, because primarily well, the main two things is the massive drone program, which is done very, very openly, and it's becoming very hard for Russia not to respond to this and making matters much worse. We know now that the attacks are coming out of NATO territory, that is out of European states, then the Finland and the Baltic states. All of this is happening while The US is pulling back and handing this war to the Europeans, which seem to be very eager to take over. I mean, do you think the Europeans are being set up for war?
Speaker 1: Yes. Absolutely. And I I would say the Americans are backing away in in the sense of absolving themselves of responsibility, but they're very much still involved in the war. The The US command is still in Germany overseeing the entire war. All of these drone strikes deep inside Russian territory, again, according to the New York Times itself and and as is obvious to to all of us who know, the the intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance capabilities required to do this effectively.
It had it had to always have been The US. They admit it was the the CIA and the US military overseeing this drone program striking deep inside Russian territory. Not only that, but also the maritime drone attacks taking place all around the globe targeting tankers carrying Russian energy exports. So The US is still very much deeply involved and overseeing this entirely, but they're absolving themselves of responsibility, and they're they're putting the Europeans out there in the front. And and also, as you mentioned, getting the Europeans ready to to be the next proxy into the breach as Ukraine slowly crumbles.
I think you will you will watch a very gradual incremental salami slice approach, having the Europeans just get a little bit more involved. There was a a a little bit of a scare where people thought maybe British warplanes were trying to intercept Russian drones over Ukraine, but they might they might just have floated that story out there just to test test the waters a little bit, and they might actually start doing things like that to incrementally get Europe more and more deeply involved. They're already utterly involved in in the war. The US is fighting Russia through Europe just as much as they're fighting it through Ukraine in in many ways. We we know that European weapons are going into Ukraine.
And as you mentioned, the drone production, we we knew this wasn't really all taking place inside Ukraine at all. All of these weapons, missiles, even tanks that that they say Ukraine is is making, they're not making any of those. It's all being built all across Europe, in The United States, in in other US proxy territories, and then it's simply being as finely assembled in Ukraine, and that's how they just can say it was made in Ukraine. And so it's it's a whole process has been taking shape for for years, the the whole course of this proxy war. And, unfortunately, it does look like Europe is going to end up in almost indirect conflict with Russia.
And people will say, why is Europe doing this? Because this doesn't serve their interests at all. But this is the danger and the power of American political capture over these countries. They they control the information space. They control the political space.
US corporations are working in tandem with some of the largest European interests, but American interests are are actually dominant even in in Europe in many cases. And so this is this is why this is happening. And this is the same reason why we watched the the Persian Gulf Arab states go along with the the US war of aggression against Iran. This is why we're going to watch countries like Japan, South Korea, The Philippines. They'll go along with US escalation vis a vis China.
Even though their largest trade partner import and export is China, they'll go along with it because their governments are politically captured. And, ultimately, those handful of individuals this is this is how elite elite capture works. Those handful of of individuals work for US interests at the expense of their own country's interests. They are their position is owed to The US, and they do everything on behalf of The United States.
Speaker 0: This incrementalism, it's really yeah. It is very subtle because you don't notice it from day to day, but given, you know, this war has been going on, at least since the Russians invaded more than four years now, the rhetoric and openness, it is quite evident what happened. For example, in this country, in in Norway, when the Russians invaded, we had a prime minister who made it very clear that under no circumstance would we send weapons to a war in to a country at war. Now, of course, four years later, it's not a single member of parliament who opposes sending weapon, not a single member of parliament suggests that we should even talk to the Russians. While today, I looked in the paper, and I see a headline that Norwegian drones will kill Russians.
This is it. So there's no more pretense. You know, the hatred is already out there. The the intention is there, and it's you know, it would be an have been unthinkable to have this kind of language and positions only four years ago, but it's it's this incrementalism. He builds up all the centers being wiped away, and it's yeah.
It's quite it's kind of frightening when you see, yeah, the the the this shift and how the public just walks along and follows this. But I wanted to ask about this concept you just brought up, the elite capture, because if you live in Europe, you tend to get the impression that a lot of this political leadership, they, well, they weren't they were trained, if you will, very closely with The United States. Sometimes their loyalties are also not very clear. I mean, this is not shouldn't be controversial to see to say that Europe has a denationalized political leadership, very much influenced by The United States. But how how do you see the The US the the Europeans?
What what kind of instruments are there for this elite capture?
Speaker 1: I think the European Union itself played a central role in all of this. The European Union was essentially a a layer of bureaucracy. The US draped over Continental Europe and smothered inter individual national sovereignty. And and we can see how Europe systematically searches for, hunts down, and eradicates any any sense of national interests within the entire European Union. And I I I can't remember what the referendum was for, but it was maybe Ireland being part of the European Union or something like that.
And and there's many, many examples of this. I'm I'm sure you could provide several as as well-being in Europe, where they have the referendum. It doesn't go the way they want it, so they just hit the information space for a a year or two, and then they do it again and again and again and again until information space has been sufficiently manipulated, and they get the results that they want. Except that's not that's not actual self determination. That's using the the illusion of democracy and self determination to manipulate and control people and to to channel them in a direction that is actually objectively contrary to their own best interests.
And having all of these European countries collectively placed under the European Union and subjected to a collective foreign policy that is detrimental to all of Europe's best interests and each individual member state's best interests? How how is that is objectively against the best interests of big business in Europe, the ordinary people across Europe, all kinds of of, groups of people, big and small, all across the continent. And you can see how it has harmed Europe, over and we could just talk about the last you know, since 2014, actually. And before 2014, I actually thought there was a good chance that Europe would work its way out from under US, subordination because they were they were building the Nord Stream pipelines. They were working closely with Russia and with China, and I thought for sure that they were going to to make it.
But then, again, The US provoked war, and under war, you have you have so many options to manipulate people emotionally, politically, economically, in terms of military power, and that's exactly what they did. They used the conflict they created with Russia in Ukraine to upset that process that was taking place, to cut Europe off from Russia, and also to begin the same process of cutting off, Europe from cooperation with China. And so all of their alternatives were removed. The US literally just blew up Nord Stream, and and then through the the persistence of this war with Russia, they've forced Europe to cut all energy incrementally off from from Russia. And so this is what has fully and completely subordinated Europe to The United States.
And so primarily the European Union, there's a lot of institutions and programs The US runs in Europe very similar to the National Endowment for Democracy, by parallel or adjacent organizations and institutions, both American government programs and private corporate foundations, and they've just chipped away at it. Like you say, it happened so slowly. People really didn't notice it until it was too late, and they've already accumulated this huge amount of power over Europe, and there's really nothing Europeans can do now to organize against it, unfortunately.
Speaker 0: Well, the EU is has a very interesting history. It has a tendency of looking at opposition as a temporary speed bump to over be overcome. That is well, for example, the EU constitution they wanted to have back in 2005. Two of the few countries who had a referendum on it, France and Netherlands, said no. So then they sat down and think, okay.
How can we overcome this opposition? Okay. Let's reframe it as a treaty instead. So they made it into the Lisbon treaty, essentially rewrote it and just packed it in as a treaty so there wouldn't have to be a referendum. But then, of course, the Irish still needed a referendum, and they also voted no.
And then they had a, you know, a campaign to, well, reeducate them, enough pressure, and they made them vote again the following year, And then they got it right. And, yeah, this is how it advances. And they've all this way of reassuring that, you know, as the EU, you know, takes on this power, you know, they're still gonna have a a unanimous decision making, these kind of things, but now you see Wunderland say, well, we can't have this this mix as a hostage to unable to make decision. We have to be able to defend ourselves. So so now, of course, they're gonna centralize more and more power, something that's causing, yeah, quite a lot of tension.
So it is it's becoming a very well, I would put it as an ugly project, but I'll probably get in trouble for calling the EU an ugly project now. But this is what it's become. However, the the when whenever you look at how The United States is trying to put Russia on hold that is handed over to the to the Europeans, it's obviously because, well, they they couldn't defeat Russia, and The United States has other objectives. The main adversary of The United States, the mere peer main peer rival would be China then. How do you see China fitting into this wider sequencing logic?
Because, you know, they they seem to be deprioritized at this moment. The The US is still in Europe. They're still fighting Iran. We're not seeing that much pressure against China at the moment.
Speaker 1: I would argue that the The US war of aggression against Iran is actually a direct move against not just China, but even US allies, I would call them proxies in Asia. And if you look at the the energy exports from the entire region, not just from Iran to China, because Iran was basically exporting almost all of their energy to China, that that has been reduced, mainly through The US blockade. The US is is lying. They're not they're not controlling all shipping in and out of Iran, but they are turning back some of those ships, and that and a lot of those ships are bringing hydrocarbons to China. But the problem is the whole conflict, and this was they knew this was everyone knew this was going to happen if the US attacked Iran.
They knew they would close the Strait Of Hormuz. They they knew Iran would retaliate. Whatever you hit inside Iran, they were going to hit in any country hosting US troops, which is practically every country in the region. And that's that's what happened, and it reduced, gas production and then, therefore, exports and also oil exports. And it got so bad that there are countries now here in Asia, countries like Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, that are buying more gas now from The United States than they are from The Middle East, and this is unprecedented because they got virtually all of their energy from The Middle East.
Some of these countries, 90% or more of their energy came from The Middle East. Now they're buying it from The United States. And just like The US did to Europe, vis a vis Russia, they had all of these LNG export projects that they were building that people said, why are you building this? There's no way you're going to compete with steady, reliable, cheap gas from The Middle East, except The US always knew that we're getting these ready for a reason. Just like we were getting, LNG export projects ready for Europe for a reason before it was economically viable, We we were getting them online and ready because we knew we always knew we were going to start a war with Russia and Ukraine, and we were going to force Europe off energy from Russia, and we would have the solution already there in the process of coming online.
And they are doing the exact same thing. So I stumbled across this Alaska LNG project, run by Glenfarm, and that that's exactly what it is. They've been working on it for years, and it it makes no economic sense. And if you look at presentations from, like, last year, 2025, the they were sitting there basically pleading with the audience. Yes.
This makes economic sense. They mentioned contested waterways many, many times because they said if Asia is getting energy from us in Alaska, it's it's like a virtual pipeline. There's no way anyone can touch it. And there's so many other contested waterways that aren't very safe out there, but but they didn't say that, well, it will be The US and its war of aggression against Iran next year that ends up closing those waterways and making this otherwise unviable project suddenly viable. So it it it was a it was a definite premeditated conspiracy.
They are doing exactly to Asia what they have done to Europe. And, of course, how does this affect China? First of all, they're they're deliberately cutting China off from energy from the Middle East. That was like, half of their imports, of energy were coming from the Middle East. But then now they're forcing countries in Asia, not just US proxies like Japan, South Korea, The Philippine, but even countries like Vietnam to place themselves under energy dependence on The US.
And that gives The US extraordinary control and and leverage over these countries strategically, politically, to to basically transform them into what The US has already transformed Europe vis a vis Russia. They can transform these countries in Asia into battering rams, all aims at China. So it will accelerate that process that was already underway. And and what they're doing is essentially surrounding China with hostile nations that are dependent on The US for energy really have no other option. You know?
So people could blame Vietnam for buying energy from The US, but what was their alternative? It's it's mainly cooking gas at this point. Not buy it and then just leave tens of millions of people without cooking gas. It it really wasn't an option. So The US got got a lot of countries in Asia exactly where The US wanted them, and they had the solution already in the works and ready to take advantage of it.
There's a there's literally a a national council of energy dominance created by the US government for this specific purpose, and it has transcended. It's not president Trump doing this. This began all the way under the by Obama administration, and it has been incrementally advanced every single administration since then. And, The US will have Russia and China in a situation where they're surrounded by hostile US proxies, and The US will be chipping away at Russia and China themselves. Just like The US is just outright attacking Russia with these drones, they will begin a process of of doing something similar with China, almost almost certainly.
Mean, this is what they're openly preparing to do.
Speaker 0: Yeah. No. It's sometimes you wonder why the different leaders don't appreciate what's happening because on one hand, the the Trump is talking about how he wants the Ukraine war to come to an end because, you know, he's so appalled by all the killing and, you know, even though The US is still up to its eyeballs in terms of how it's involved. But at the same time, I saw The US only yesterday was The US secretary of energy, Chris Wright. He was in Croatia.
He's, you know, promoting Trump's peace pipeline peace yeah. Trump's peace pipeline framework in which he advocated how all these countries who have always been dependent on Russia for energy, well, that's a horrible position to be in. So they would all be liberated now, and they would have now American energy. And, again, it's, yeah, it's very in your face, but at the same time, it it also begs the question, well, the only reason why they would go for more expensive, and I would say less reliable American energy, would be because the war is going on. So, you know, to what extent can they afford to actually let the war die out?
I mean, towards the end of the Cold War, Gorbachev, you know, he made a point to the to the Americans that is if, know, we put an end to the Cold War, we we also have to recognize and and manage what this means for the power structures because the whole alliance systems, which put Washington, Moscow in a, I guess, a very powerful position, have become dependent on war. So if we end the Cold War, we also have to keep our hawks in mind that we have to walk away from some of this. But it does look like The US is prepared in any ways to walk away from this war. It's just shocking that the, yeah, the the European leaders don't don't seem to mind that they're just gonna be deindustrialized and be put in a situation of perpetual conflict with, you know, the world's largest nuclear power. It's yeah.
No. It's hard to see why. But but what do you see being the possibility, though, of keeping this Iranian thing going on long enough? Because in Europe, you could hand over the war to the Europeans. Fine.
They seem more than willing to throw away their economies and send their sons and daughters to die. But in the Middle East, you know, you can't hand over the war to the Gulf States. First of all, they don't have the capability, but also they they're not willing to fight either. How long can The United States keep in The keep itself in this position? Because it's bleeding out as well in terms of ammunition.
Speaker 1: Well, at the level that they were expending munitions from from the beginning of this most recent phase, because, again, The US has been on and off at at war with Iran since the end of the Biden administration, actually. People remember Israel as behalf of The US attacks Iran in late twenty twenty four. At that at that level of munition expenditure, there's no way they could continue sustaining it. But, of course, there's a ceasefire right now. Except, ceasefire or no ceasefire, the amount of energy coming out of the region and and going to Asia has been has been strangled, it has been reduced significantly.
I I would I would surmise that if energy does start flowing through, whether it's from Iran or first from some other states in the region, The US will just start it again for a week or two weeks, strike at maybe Karg Island, have Iran retaliate against energy production in the Persian Gulf Arab states, and reduce all of that capacity again and and thus reduce exports out of the region. So, again, The US has been building these otherwise completely irrational LNG export projects to Asia. The only way they make economic sense is if this war with Iran continues, And it doesn't have to continue at the pace The US was was pursuing it in the beginning. They just got it going. They did this initial damage.
Some people are saying it might take a year or more for some of the damage to be repaired in terms of of energy production and exports in in some of the Persian Gulf states. So all they have to do is maintain that and just keep the flow of energy under threat and reduced while they make this transition. We remember that the transition from Russian energy to American energy is in terms of Europe, that's still actually taking place. They had they still haven't completely cut themselves off from Russian energy. So it's a process that's gonna stretch over a couple of years.
The US wants to accelerate this as quickly as possible, but there's also a limit to how fast they can speed through this. They don't want to do it overnight because it would be too obvious. That's number one. Number two, it might it might create so much instability that nations might say, oh, look. Enough is enough.
We just you know, no matter how much we benefit from US policy, this is going to just literally just destroy our country, which it's going to do anyway, but these these people need to be kept in the delusion that somehow they're they're going to benefit by by cooperating with The US through every part of this. And that that includes the Persian Gulf Arab states, proxies of The US hosting US troops. And no matter what they say publicly, they're benefiting from this relationship, and they feel they're so far insulated from the worst consequences of it. I'm sure The US made all sorts of assurances to them, to their European proxies, that somehow down the road, this will all be better for them. That's what convinces them to go through these very, very difficult times.
That and the fact that, ultimately, if everything goes completely wrong, they have the financial means to just leave and go somewhere else and leave everyone in their country behind. I mean, that's that's ultimately what will happen to the Ukrainian population. Their their US proxy leadership could just leave and go somewhere else if everything went totally, catastrophic. And so that that's unfortunately where we're at, which means there won't be peace in Europe. There will not be peace in The Middle East, and this conflict is eventually going to migrate its way directly to Asia.
If you're here in Asia, of course, you see The US trying to encourage The Philippines to become more more militant towards China over these could they're like World War two rusted out shipwrecks that they're fighting over. It makes no sense at all, But the the Filipinos are doing it because The US told them to, because they're politically captured by The US. So that's why they're picking a fight with their largest import and export trade partner. And Japan, we see them becoming increasingly militarized. I was just watching a a senate hearing where they were celebrating how how bold Japan has become, how they're going to start exporting weapons.
They're making US Patriot missiles and exporting them back to The US. It's it's surreal, but it is actually happening. And considering the direction everything in Europe went and everything in The Middle East, the direction that has gone, I don't know why people would not expect and just assume it's going to continue in that direction here in Asia.
Speaker 0: Well, yeah, Romano Prodi, the former Italian prime minister and also former president of the European Commission, he made the prediction that at some point, Russian gas will come will start to be sent again to Europe, but only once the Americans have taken control of the pipeline infrastructure, that is to be able to get their cuts. So it's I think people, they do behind all this rhetoric of, you know, Russia did it or people on the sailboat. I mean, all of this stuff is all the nonsense. I think, you know, some people know what's happening, but as you said, there's no way of breaking out of this either. We also don't see that the connectivity connectivity between many of these Eurasian powers, it's also increasingly by land.
I mean, both the Chinese as well as the Russians have a very, you know, heavy land based infrastructure connecting with with Iran, be it road, rail, energy. How how do you see this fitting into the wider calculations of The United States to, I guess, disconnect Iran as a, you know, very strategic piece of real estate.
Speaker 1: Well, that's true. The the Belt and Road Initiative is is one massive Chinese project that stretches across Eurasia, and even beyond that, the massive reserves that China built up. I mean, this is all evidence that China knew this day was coming, and they invested heavily in preparing for it. Russia as well. I I remember, again, before 2014, I was wondering, you know, why why is Russia building its military up in the way that it was?
Because it it seems excessive at the time. But, of course, they could see all of this coming, and they were preparing for it. Iran has been doing the exact same thing. The the mosaic defense that I spoke about at the very beginning of the conflict, which almost certainly helped them prevail through at least this phase of the war, That was something that they had been preparing for years, the ballistic missile program. And as you mentioned, there's these linkages between Iran, Russia, and China overland.
I don't think that they're sufficient enough for, say, Iran to export energy to to China to replace what they were doing by sea. I mean, just transporting by sea is so much easier than, say, by rail. If there was a pipeline, that would be a different story, but there is no pipeline, not that I know of. So they prepared for this. The question is, did they prepare enough for this?
And what can, say, Russia, China, and Iran together do to, say, help the nations in in Asia that are now being forced to pick between no energy at all or placing themselves, under US energy dependence, which is a horrible place to be because they're not just going to sell you gas as an extra cost. As as expensive as it will be, there's always an additional cost of a political exchange that needs to be done The US will expect, and and they will use that energy as leverage. That's the whole reason they set this up. This is the leverage that they have over Europe, whether Europeans were agreeable to what they were telling them or not, and it will be the same case for Asia. So we have to kinda wait and see what's how this all works out.
I I know that Russia, Iran, and and China prepared for many, many years, decades in some cases, for this eventuality, but I'm not exactly sure how much they can do for, say, the rest of the multipolar world. The US is is pretty much trying to destabilize, strangle, and knock over and leave Russia, China, and Iran isolated and alone. I don't know I don't know what they can do. We have to I I have to look into it more.
Speaker 0: Regarding just as a last question, about this division of labor as you define it, what happens if these strategic allies, do not want to play this role or take on this burden? Because, I guess, one of the lessons from the Gulf States is, you know, what is the benefit for us? We host all this American bases, and it doesn't give us security. Instead, it it will crush us. And, you know, I'm assuming or hoping that one day the Europeans will come to the same realization that, you know, why why did we accept, you know, being frontline states for The United States as opposed to finding a common security architecture with the Russians as, you know, we initially agreed in the early nineties, you know, which would have prevented all of these conflicts and wars.
And if, of course, then East Asia as well, I mean, why to what extent? So what happens? So if these allies, be it Philippines or or any others, Japan, realize that this is not a great division of labor, that is they will be destroyed in in order to, you know, contain or weaken an adversary of The United States. Because I I keep making the point why I don't understand why the Ukrainians will continue to fight. You know, they could have gotten a good deal anytime over the past well, better deal, at least, was looking now over the past twelve years.
Every day, the deal will get much, much worse, and, you know, The US isn't there to help them. I'm just what what happens? At some point, surely, the allies must recognize that this, I guess, burden sharing is hardly equal.
Speaker 1: You you're absolutely right. If Europe, and that includes Ukraine or these countries in East Asia, Japan, South Korea, especially, if they had independent leadership, sovereign leadership, of course, they would say this arrangement makes absolutely no sense. The US is a liability. It's it's not going to protect us. Protect us from what?
What war would would South Korea be having with either North Korea or China when their China is their their largest trade partner, imports and exports. Why why would China wanna go to war with these countries that they're doing business with? And the same goes for Ukraine. Russia had no intentions of going to war with Ukraine before 2014. They Ukraine's one one of its largest trade partners at that time was Russia, And the only way this was flipped upside down was because of political capture by The US.
They got the independent sovereign leadership, however imperfect it was. People could argue how how well that that government worked for the Ukrainian people, but they scooped it out, and they replaced it with a handpicked client regime. And then they built up a whole structure around it to make sure that client regime stayed in power. Again, back to the New York Times admitting that the CIA took over all of their internal security apparatus. That means that no matter how the Ukrainians feel about it, US is going to be able to keep their handpicked client regime in power in Ukraine.
Unfortunately, they they seem to have the ability to do that through the European Union all across the rest of Europe, also in Japan and South Korea. It doesn't matter who the Japanese people or South Korean people vote for. They always get an obedient proxy, to The US. And so when you're faced with that sort of situation, unfortunately, there is no way out. This is why Ukraine is being consumed by this proxy war.
You you you said it perfectly. It makes no sense for Ukraine to continue. They had so many possible ways to get out of this, and they haven't. It's completely irrational, and it can only be the result of being politically captured. And an irrational handpicked client regime put in place serving US interests at the expense of Ukraine, Same goes for Europe.
Same goes for East Asia. And I I honestly don't know what the solution is. I mean, obviously, the people inside these countries need to try to find a way to organize against this. But it's just it's just so hard when your information space is under American control, your political space is under American control, and in many cases, US troops are literally occupying your country. South Korea, Japan, The Philippines host US troops.
Europe, I'm I'm sure you know, hosts thousands and thousands of US troops in in many countries across Europe. And so it's it's an empire. And so how do you fight an empire when you're inside and underneath the empire? It's very difficult. So there's no good answer to to that.
There's no appealing answer to that question. I guess it comes down to people dissatisfied with this working together with multipolarism to undermine the power The US uses to capture and control these countries and try to reverse it and try to help one country after another out from under US subordination. And we got we gotta hope that that that can work, and we have to try to work towards that.
Speaker 0: Well, let me squeeze in one last last question. That is well, if that's the allies, what about the opponents? Because it appears that whatever, you know, goodwill or enthusiasm there was about the Trump administration, that has faded away. And, you know, I remember I was at the Valdai meeting where the the Russian president attends as well when Trump was reelected, and, you know, there there there was, you know, some genuine optimism that I think, you know, that they thought this is someone we could work with, you know, get an end to this century of hostility between US and Russia. I mean, rationally, why do we have you know, what what are really our conflicting interests, especially now that the world becoming more multipolar?
And, you know, they they many believed in the rhetoric. I yeah. Again, I want to focus on past tense. I think this has all gone away, but that's kind of my point. It appears that many are waking up now to this strategic sequencing.
And, well, most of America's adversary, if you see the Iranians, you know, after two negotiations where they were where it was said they were close to deals before they had this surprise attack, And now, of course, after two of these, yeah, fake negotiations, they now had the negotiations in Islamabad, which were also well, I would put it frame it as a hoax. It doesn't seem very serious in any way. All The US has committed itself to the starting point of the Iranian 10 plan. It was thrown out the next day, so it it doesn't mean anything. And the same with the Russians.
They saw seven years of nonsense over the Minsk peace agreement, the Istanbul agreement was sabotaged by The US and UK, and now, you know, Trump has been just pulling them along all of you know, these are not serious negotiations anymore. And I think the Chinese will also come to this realization, if they haven't already, that The US isn't looking for a way to harmonize interest and manage competition. They're looking to knock out their rival. So what what does this mean? Do you think diplomacy is just dead?
Are we heading towards world war? How do you see this?
Speaker 1: Well, people have to understand that the the whole reason there was no change with the incoming Trump administration is because presidents are in charge of nothing. Congress is in charge of nothing. It is the unelected corporate financier monopolies inside The United States that are running everything, that are benefiting from everything, a $1,500,000,000,000 defense budget. That is the arms industry benefiting from that. Big oil is benefiting from these projects that they proposed, got approved by the US government under Obama, Trump, Biden, the the current Trump administration, projects that made absolutely no financial sense at all until wars of aggression were fought by The US to make them viable.
So when you have interests like that, we're driven by perpetual power and profit and ultimately global domination. You you cannot deal with a country like this, with diplomacy in the the way we we think about diplomacy. You there's there's nothing you can say to to it's like trying to negotiate with a virus that's eating your body alive. You you need to identify how it works and how to displace it, from the global body and push it back to a more proportional role with within the the the the global network of nations. And that's what that's what multipolarism basically is.
That's what is driving it. It is displacing US led unipolar hegemony. It is offering alternatives, not just in terms of how countries interact with one another, but corporations, goods and services that countries can get access to without fueling the corporate financier interests that are driving US, foreign and domestic policy. And so this is this is what's going to have to happen. People are going to have to forget about you know, The US will never accommodate anyone anywhere at any time.
They will never accept, you know, being a part of of the multipolar world. They want global domination. So as long as that's their obsession, multipolarism has to be resolute in displacing them from around the globe. Because everywhere you don't, just like a virus inside your body, if it's in that part of the body, it's going to to eat it away, and eventually, every everyone will get sick and die. And as, you know, as those with viruses, they end up killing their hosts in the process.
And that's what global empire has always done, has become unsustainable, and it itself ends up collapsing. And and so this is this is why multipolarism is so necessary. This is why that that is the solution. And I think I think Russia, China, many other countries have always understood this. They use diplomacy as a way of trying to make this transition from US led hegemony to a multipolar world as painless as is possible, that as you can see, there's still tremendous death and destruction and instability caused through this process.
We could only hope that it continues transitioning in the right direction, and it minimizes the death and destruction caused by by US aggression. I I still think it's too little at this point. Yeah.
Speaker 0: Well, you once told me that to understand what The US is doing, don't listen to the words coming out of their mouths in Washington look at the policy papers, which have been funded by the arms industry through the think tanks they fund. And, yeah, sadly, that appears to be very, very, very true. And, yeah, it's I just think we're moving into a very dangerous area now that, essentially, the the vessels of The US is now signing up to be to go all in as frontline states while the adversaries have now become you know, have woken up to know that there are there is no diplomacy anymore. There's only delaying inevitable war. So it's, yeah, it's not a great position to be in.
Anyways, thank you so much for taking time. Do have any final thoughts before or final words before we wrap up?
Speaker 1: No. I just you know, a lot of people feel depressed when they hear these type of conclusions. But, again, multipolarism is a real thing. Everyone on every level, big and small, can invest in, and that's it's our only hope, and it's what we have to try to do. And even you and I, creating alternatives to Western media, basically Western propaganda.
We try to offer an alternative to what, US special interests are trying to force people to listen to and believe. This all, I think, does make a difference, and we all have to, in our own way, continue trying as what what else can we do? And as always, thank you so much for having me on.
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
Gilbert Doctorow: European Naval Blockade on Russia? Europe-Russia War Coming https://youtu.be/JTfjvDET6iA https://t.co/mqmHJATTJj
Video Transcript AI Summary
Gilbert Doktorov discusses volume two of his war diaries, noting that volume three will likely come out between six and eight weeks from the time of the interview, depending on production in Arizona. He argues that 2024 was a period of transition from a Special Military Operation (SMO) to a war with the West, encompassing the United States and Europe, and accompanied by a new Russian nuclear doctrine published in November. This doctrine lowered the threshold for Russian use of nuclear weapons against those supplying long-range weapons to Ukraine, reflecting a shift from threats centered on ICBMs to concerns about medium-range missiles, particularly those deployed by the United States and Germany.
Key events shaping this shift include long-range missiles such as Taurus missiles discussed by German air force leaders in March 2024, which Russia intercepted and published; the intent to use Taurus missiles to destroy the Kerch Bridge; and the broader implications of Western missile supply for Russian security. Putin’s interview with Tadel Zerubian in St. Petersburg helped assemble these pieces into a new strategic framework. Doktorov asserts that these developments culminated in a revised nuclear doctrine in 2024, changing how Russia perceives its strategic threats and the potential use of nuclear force.
Doktorov notes personal changes in 2024, with daily interviews becoming a routine and a shift toward integrating breaking news into analysis. He emphasizes that volume two includes many references and links to these interviews, though not full transcripts to avoid ballooning the volume. He contrasts volume two with volume one, asserting volume two’s emphasis on ongoing discussions rather than simple interviews.
In 2025, the focus of his commentary shifted to negotiations: are negotiations real and substantial, or just hot air? This became a driving theme for volume two, while 2025 is also identified as the year of Trump, which altered how issues on the battlefield were interpreted and evaluated.
The host then frames the current context (2026) as NATO’s overt involvement, with surveillance drones over Russia’s Black Sea coast and predictable strikes, plus attacks on the Baltic coast near Saint Petersburg. He asks how long this can continue given Kremlin pressures and potential escalatory responses. Doktorov argues that Putin is not Russia itself in a monolithic, democratic sense, but a political actor with elections approaching and with a circle of advisers who range from liberal to conservative. He critiques the tendency to treat Putin as the sole arbiter of Russia, urging the use of the same analytic techniques applied to France or the United States to understand Russia’s internal dynamics and the legitimacy of its governance.
Regarding deterrence and potential Russian responses, Doktorov rejects the notion of necessary plausible deniability for Russia. He contends that Russia could respond by targeting military assets in the Baltics or German outposts, arguing there is no reason to apologize for asserting rights in Eurasia. He cites Sergei Karaganov as a proponent of taking decisive action and suggests Russia has both the capability and the will to counter Western actions. The discussion covers the German chancellor Merz’s push for European military leadership versus von der Leyen’s leadership in Brussels, the risk of Germany attempting to dominate Europe militarily, and the broader implications for Europe’s cohesion and future projections.
The conversation turns to the United States’ role, with Trump’s stance on NATO funding and defense commitments questioned. Doktorov suggests Europe should not expect U.S. military rescue if provoked by Russia, given U.S. demands for European defense spending. They discuss a UK-led group forming a naval alliance against Russia, while considering the possibility of a naval blockade and Russia’s willingness to defend its shadow fleet.
Finally, they touch on Europe’s broader global stance, including threats of sanctions against Israel for grain purchases from Russia, and EU attempts to influence energy markets and East Asia. Doktorov argues that Europe has become ideologically driven and increasingly irrelevant as a geopolitical power, warning that European leadership’s irrational policies, censorship, and centralized power undermine credibility.
In closing, Doktorov predicts that the war will eventually end without U.S. reconciliation, with Russia achieving its minimal objectives along the Dnieper and Nederseh, and he suggests a five-year horizon for Europe and the United States to catch up before a decisive confrontation. The host and Doktorov acknowledge the escalating danger and the potential for a major conflict unless a dramatic shift occurs.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Welcome back. We are joined by Gilbert Doktorov, a historian and international affairs analyst. Thank you for coming back on the program. It's been a while.
Speaker 1: My pleasure.
Speaker 0: So you recently published volume two of your war diaries. This is as I understand, I haven't gotten to read it, the whole thing, but this is largely about the period when the Russia Ukraine war evidently switched from being simply a war between Ukraine and Russia to becoming more obvious European Russian proxy war. I was wondering, yeah, if you could say something about your new book and that period.
Speaker 1: Alright. Well, I'll I'll use the plural here because volume three twenty twenty five will probably come out between six and eight weeks from now depending on the speed of the production company in Arizona that is doing the layout. 2024 was, as you say, and as I described in the book, was a period of transition from an SMO, from the Special Military Operation concept, to a war with the West, collective West, not just with Europe, but with The United States, and with a new nuclear doctrine by Rashud, came out in 2024, which was the culmination of warnings to the West that have been started as early as March and April of that year as a result of the actions on the ground, as a result particularly of the new threats to Russian security coming from Europe and also from The United States in the form of long range missiles, which were being put up by the Germans. Already medium well, let's say, 300 kilometer range missiles. I've been supplied by the British and the French under a well, it's a common missile scalp in French.
And what's the shadow of the I forget exactly what it was. It was the British the British Storm Shadow. These have been supplied and had been more or less neutralized by the Russians. They learned how to handle them. But longer range missiles were on offer from The United States and from Germany in particular.
It's Taurus missile. And as early as March 2024, when there was intercepted and published by the Russians, the conversations between top level air force people in Germany discussing how they could get around this the chancellor Scholz's prohibition on supplying such weapons to to Ukraine. And that be that that conversation with intent to use the the Taurus missile to destroy the Kerch Bridge, which was the iconic achievement of engineering, bringing together the Mainland Of Russia and the Crimean Peninsula. So that was scandalous, and it tipped off a wave of rethinking in Russia over what their security threats were. Ultimately, in the in the revised nuclear strategy, came out in November, it was all put together, pieces which came out from March through September when when president Putin had a very important interview with Tadel Zerubian who was on the streets of Petersburg just off of the Palace Square.
Principles were set out piece by piece and all culminated in a nuclear doctrine, which seriously lowered the the threshold of for Russian use of nuclear weapons against those who were equipping or or equipping Ukraine with long range weapons, long range missiles, and the sources of production. That was a very and also the the whole notion of what the nuclear threat was or the strategic threat to Russia changed from having been based for decades on ICBMs, intercontinental ballistic missiles, which were the key issue in the in the SOFT treaty of the strategic arms limitation treaties. Now the Russians saw as the biggest strategic threat to themselves medium range missiles that that The United States had already agreed under Biden to place in Germany during this current year in 2027. So they were they adopted their or read they they they readvised their strategic doctrines around this new reality. So that was the that is what I see is the key point, which makes the what I'm describing 2026, sorry, 2025 different from the preceding volume one, which was 2223.
Also, of course, my own life changed during '24 when I started doing almost daily interviews. The Indians were the first to bring me into that very, very frequent review of breaking news and which compelled me to get my mind around issues which otherwise I might have ignored from week to week. That was the case in in my volume one. There were breach there were there were periods which I was not covering in a daily or even weekly sense, which in 2024 I was necessarily because I was being invited to, as I say, get my mind around some some some issues before the general news came out from the West because I was dealing with a a broadcaster who had access to to what was being said or stated before it reached the general public. And I also, in that volume two, put in a lot of references, a lot of links to many of these interviews.
It's because I didn't burden it too much with the transcripts because I don't know what then the whole volume would balloon it out. But a few I did give just so people have a taste for what these discussions, like the one that we're having now, are like. And I call them discussions rather than interviews because in in this case, and in one or two other cases, the the invitee, the holder of the platform, once you are, engages in in a in a in a discussion. So this is the the feature of 20 of volume two. Volume three will be different from the one one by Yongle.
I won't go on about it. But 19 sorry. 2025 was the year of Trump. And the whole attention, the whole nature of of what I was covering changed from what's going on in the battlefield or how it's being evaluated by other commentators to how we evaluate the course of negotiations. Are they real, substantial?
Are they just hot air? So those issues became the driving force of all commentary in 2025. Oh, there you have it.
Speaker 0: Well, if you forward two years on to 2026, we see now that the the involvement of NATO countries in this war is well, it's very overt now. If we look at this whole process over the past four plus years as being this incrementalism or salami tactics, now we see it being quite blatant. For example, yesterday, we saw NATO surveillance drones monitoring Russia's Black Sea coast, and then this morning, very predictably, the strikes are coming in. And we we also see similar these attacks that is attacks on the Baltic Sea coast in Russia, around Saint Petersburg. This is also seems, very likely or one one could say even more with greater certainty, almost certainly an attack coming out of the Baltic States.
I mean, this is how long do you think this can go on? Because from what I understand, the pressure is building up in the Kremlin not to simply allow this kind of escalation control on the side of the Europeans that they can simply launch attacks on Russia and pretend it's Ukraine, and Russia can't do anything in return?
Speaker 1: Well, we spend a lot of time these days talking about mister Trump and about midterm elections and how his handling of the or or his look for a for an off ramp to the war on Iran that he and Israel launched, how that is modified according to the political calculus of the November elections. Strangely, we don't apply the same kind of logic or analytic approach to mister Putin. We behave as we we deal with him as if, well, he is the whole of Russia. That's that's been going on for for two decades. There's only one man whom you you want to listen to in Russia, and that is mister mister Putin.
And we don't consider him as living in a democratic country, which he is. There are all kinds of deformations in democracy as we as I know in the big neighbor to my to my west in France where the president is, in effect, a king. But we don't we only talk about that occasionally. Here in in in Russia, yes, mister mister Putin. It is a political animal, and he also has elections, by the way.
Not his personal presidential election, but he has, like mister like mister Trump, he faces parliamentary elections. And in the case of Russia, they have to take place before the September 26. And so there is it's not just you and me and and the Western observers who remark on these dramatic and destructive attacks on Russian refineries and other critical infrastructure, which are enabled by the by The United States and European intelligence on a daily basis, providing the targeting information necessary. Not where the target is located, that's pretty obvious, but how you get to it because these drones, they don't fly at several kilometers heights, they fly just at very low levels, and they can smash into electric electric power lines and all kinds of obstacles on the way if they aren't properly guided. So that critical information has been provided from the West.
No. The Russians a lot of Russians are enraged by this. And while I agree completely with peers who are saying, oh, look how popular Putin is with the sev it is now 70 rating, down from 80, but that really doesn't make much difference. But they're not talking about the party politics in Russia. They're not talking about the collapse of support for United Russia, which was traditionally, going back decades, 30% of the electorate versus about 20% or 18 of the electorate for Communist Party and maybe 12% of the electorate had been for Zhornowsky's part of the ultra right.
Now they've dropped from 30% to 20%, which means I mean, to my to my understanding, they're very close neck and neck with the communists. And from 20%, it's pretty hard to stretch yourself over to 51% even if you're playing electoral games with how you how you designate the the winners in electoral districts by the party party lists or by candidate names. So the the elections in September are not a foregone conclusion to get to a backing of mister Putin's policies. On the contrary, they will be highly contested in the seagull whips. So as I say, we have to apply we have to apply to Russia the same analytic techniques that we use in examining what's going on in France and what's going on in The States.
But for some strange reason, those of us who all admire mister Putin's Russian refuse to recognize that this is democracy.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, it's how do you think, though, if, essentially, this pressure builds up so much that Russia has to find a way of responding? How how do you think this could, you know, I guess, manifest itself? Because I've heard talks now about Russia invading the Baltic States. This seems very unlikely.
I'm not sure what they would exactly do there. It it seems more likely that Russia might be moving towards something similar, what the Europeans are doing, this kind of strikes on Russia with a plausible deniability. But, of course, the Russians don't have a proxy state to to attack from. So how do you think the the Russians might approach this if if they decide to step over this line and begin to attack in a way that it you know, they know where the attack comes from, but, again, plausible deniability?
Speaker 1: I don't see a reason for plausible deniability. What what they would be counterattacking is by every international measure, it causes belly. When the Estonians and the Latvians and Lithuanians permit Ukrainian drones to fly over their territory and attack the Russian Baltic ports, you go to war over that. So I don't see why they they have to look for a proxy or an excuse If they want to be a world power, which they want to be, but not a global power in the sense of being able to project their military might around the globe, but at least in their region, at least in Eurasia, then there is no reason to be apologetic. In fact, there's a demand that you just assert your rights, as you and I have discussed, and as you as a theoretician in this domain of deterrence, have made very clear, either you use it or you lose it.
And there are many people in the start of of course, the the bad boy of Russian geopolitical thinking is Sergei Karaganov. And going back two and a half years, he he made it very plain that Russia has to do something. And he just he's expanded on that in his most recent published statements. But always at the cutting edge that Russia cannot just take this trespassing on its red lines idly or jawbone about it or respond in ways that are utterly inadequate to the level of damage that's been done to them. And so invade the Baltics?
Why? No reason whatsoever. Nothing to be gained and a lot to be lost. Just attack the military assets in the Baltics, including, by the way, the German military outpost. I think it's in Lithuania.
They've got several several thousand people there. Oh, blow them up. That'll be a good signal, and it's completely within international law. Now if you want to say, well, well, isn't this the path to World War three? I fall back on on a colleague in a in a very small minority of of commentators, and that is Paul Craig Roberts, who's been saying but saying at least to you before I've I've joined part of his argumentation that this type of turning the other cheek is is leading us in exactly the opposite direction that you would think prudence takes you.
It is leading us to either a a violent an overthrow of the existent powers that be within the Kremlin and a violent a violent counterstrike that could really be World War three, or mister Putin himself follows the the advice of everyone around him now or of many people around him now and doesn't just jawbone, but actually uses military action against NATO countries in a very selective and legally justified way.
Speaker 0: Well, I think that's a good point. People often view this the retaliation as being dangerous because it does push us towards World War three, which I guess isn't wrong, but it's also that dilemma, the the failure to uphold one's deterrence. I mean, I've when I listen to the media and the politicians across Europe, the the the logic is somehow that, well, if if anyone thinks that Russia has any right to retaliate, then, you know, then they're spreading Russian propaganda. But this is a very dangerous self delusion, this idea that we can continue to attack Russia and somehow they would never respond. I mean, this kind of rejecting that Russia should have any deterrence, it's it's taking us down this very strange path.
And I'm glad you mentioned Germany because they seem to be, to a large extent, at the forefront of this new strange mentality where well, essentially, it's a social the the reality is a social construction in which, you know, if we say that Russia has the right to retaliate, then it has. So as long as we all pretend that this is completely legitimate, we're just helping Ukraine, there's no reason to be concerned about the Russian retaliation. I mean, it's it's good for deluding our own public, but we're not deluding the Russians. They they know what's happening. So how how do you see German Germany playing into this?
Because, you know, chancellor BlackRock Mertz, he continues to plummet in the polls, of course, but but the policies nonetheless continue as they do across Europe. That is, you know, Mertz has this dream about building the largest military in Europe. He's quite open about the desire to escalate the war against Russia. He oversees his deindustrializing economy. He wants to purge the political opposition as, you know, said he plummets.
Where would you think that this is heading for the Germans?
Speaker 1: Well, in Russian folk wisdom, you have this image of a couple in the bed, and each one is trying to pull a blanket over himself. Now, actually, there are three people in this bed, and each of these three or three groups, they're trying to pull a bank blanket to themselves and leave the others exposed. Miss chancellor Mats, as is, as you say, he's laying claim to being the military leader of Europe based on the industrial military industrial potential of Germany and its population, of course, with the 80 what is the eighty, eighty five million? I've lost track. Million people, which is one of the most populous countries in in Europe.
And, of course, the the best manufacturing industry until the Chinese more or less destroyed the German auto industry. And he is making claims. At the same time, he's laying claims, is working against another German whom his party helped to put into position as the president of the European Commission, Vandelayen. And he has publicly disputed her rights both to run the military of Europe and to run the legislation of Europe as it affects businesses and and the economy. This is a public spat spat that came out of the book last week, and von der Leyen had to go to Germany and and try to make peace with with Merits, but they she can't make peace with him because they're both aspiring to top leadership positions in Europe.
And he has a much more powerful position than she does. So hers is bureaucratically created, and this is by election in in the most powerful country in in in the continent. So there there you have two parties that are that are trying to pull pull the blanket over. So so it's because I say that because she had, several weeks ago, been a very strong local advocate for a response to to NATO's being diminished or or shriveling with The United States withdrawal from Europe. She responded by by a clarity and call to all of European Union members and Serpentina NATO members to join in a United Europe army, which, of course, she would head.
And after all, she can make reference to various service as the minister of defense of Germany before coming to Brussels. Well, that didn't fly with a lot of people in Europe. Now mister chancellor Merzys attempted to pull the blank to him has been equivocal in the ways that it's received. The French have said yes and no. There's the big dispute over the the this jet jet fighter project, which the Germans and the French had coauthored and now is very great doubt.
And the but generally speaking, the French and the British are very quietly trying to pull the blanket to themselves because nobody there wants to see a Germany that runs Europe, not just politically as Germany has since the days of of chancellor Merkel, but militarily, which is the pretension of Pistorius, the minister of defense today, and and of and of his boss, Mertz. And what you would get as a result of this is Hitler's dream come true. So there people do have a memory. They know what World War two was fought about, which was largely to prevent just what mister Mertz has advocated.
Speaker 0: Well, one of the another issue is, probably, I guess, this Trump split with Mertz with Mertz. Obviously, the two men don't like each other very much, but we saw that Trump no. Sorry. Mertz was trying to make himself Europe's front man in in Washington with the war in Iran. That is, he went to Washington.
He positioned himself very much as being the number one supporter of Trump. This is when he thought that the war against Iran would go well. Now, of course, he's he sees that the war isn't going well, so he, you know, he goes where the wind is blowing, and he's now criticizing Trump. And as a result, we now see Trump threatening to draw down US forces in Germany. Given this split that's emerging, let's say Russia now sees this this attack on itself by obviously, by the Europeans to be untenable, and it decides to strike.
Well, for example, some German arms industry, if not logistics, as well as targets in the Baltic States. How likely do you think it would be that The United States would, I guess, come to the rescue of the Europeans now?
Speaker 1: Well, the the American rescue effort has been in doubt ever since Trump came back into into office. He made scathing comments about about NATO, not quite as open as Macron had done a couple of years earlier saying NATO is brain dead, but close to that. So the he's also made it clear that without a 5% budgeting of of European NATO members for NATO for defense, United States would not abide would not honor its obligations under the NATO treaty of one for all and all for one. And so I think I don't I think it is reasonable to say that Europeans should have no expectation of Trump coming to their aid if they by provocations and by giving Russia legally valid casus belli, as they are doing now, find themselves in the direct war with Russia. And Europe now is totally disorganized in terms of defense principles, objectives.
And the only thing that unite that unites all of Europe is the lack of the technologically advanced armaments, both defensive and offensive, to to last for more than a few days in a war with Russia.
Speaker 0: Well, the most recent news now, of course, is The United Kingdom leading group of 10 European countries who are gonna create a naval alliance against Russia. The language they use is meant to sound defensive, so they're gonna contain Russia's Russia at sea, but this, of course, comes at the backdrop of the threats being made with well, from the Americans to invade Kaliningrad. You heard we've seen also the targeting of Russian vessels either by boarding or piracy, however one wants to frame it, of what's referred to as Russia or Russia's shadow fleet, but also we see direct attacks on Russian civilian vessels as well under the guise of it being the European sorry, being the Ukrainians. But given that this is now being set up, we we it's kinda obvious the direction this is gonna head. They're gonna seemingly well, do a little bit like what Americans did with Venezuela or Cuba or now with Iran.
This is starting to look like a naval blockade, which is an act of war. Some would say that the Russians invited this on themselves given that they didn't uphold their deterrence in any other area. But do do you think this is, like, a more of a PR stunt, or do you think they're actually moving ahead with this?
Speaker 1: As long as the current Russian leadership backs off each time that Europe, NATO, United States advance, this will continue. However, I don't believe they can back off much longer. The issues that you and I are discussing are being discussed publicly in in Russian social media, and it's not at all flattering to the current leadership of the country. So either mister Putin and his colleagues will change policy and strike back. And they did a little hint when they had the Russian naval vessel accompanying two shadow fleet tankers through the Strait through the English Channel.
They were giving indications they're ready to defend their shadow fleet with naval force. The issue, coming, is that Russia has all the military wherewithal to sink everything that NATO could throw at There is they're joking that there are more missiles in Kaliningrad than there are people in Kaliningrad. So the it's all there. The question is where is the will to use it? And mister Putin has been very poor in performance of that, But I don't think this can continue much longer.
His colleagues are getting more assertive. The public is getting more assertive. And it it doesn't look good if he were to stay long with this turning the other cheek. I think he he he will have to change his policy or someone will replace him.
Speaker 0: I see that the spokesperson, Peskov, was making the point that if the Europeans try to put what is essentially then a blockade on naval blockade on Russia, then they would put an entire a naval blockade on the all of the European Union. Again, I'm not sure if it's blowing hot there or exactly what this would entail, but, obviously, the know, they also locked themselves into position. Once you begin to utter this rhetoric and nothing would happen, you know, this would be a further disaster for your deterrent, and they would there would be even more pressure to come back hard later in terms of, you know, restoring this. So it's again, it seems very, very dangerous what is being done. I I did wanna ask, though, about how you see the Europeans also pushing this on the rest of the world.
The European Union, they threatened the possible sanctions we see now against Israel for buying grain from Russia. So everything that was done in Gaza, attack on Iran, Lebanon, all of this was well, not just looked other way, but also had some support from the European Union. But now, of course, buying stolen grain from Russia, this is where they drew the line. And it's interesting the wider context because we now see that the EU also putting some pressure on East Asia not to buy Russian oil as, well, energy markets are coming under squeeze. Do you I mean, do you see the EU being able to push this, or is this just posturing?
Speaker 1: Well, just posturing would mean that they are consciously aware that there's nothing behind these threats. I don't think it's just posturing. I think they they are making these statements, assertions because they correspond to their deep beliefs. And it corresponds to their deep beliefs because they are not politicians. They are ideologists.
Politicians are people who look for practical solutions. The European Union has stopped looking for practical solutions for at least twenty years, not just last week. And it's coming at it's breaking at the seams. I couldn't believe last week when I turned on your news, and I heard a debate, actually something resembling a debate, over the harmful effects of European legislation, regulations concerning building construction, housing construction in Europe, which affects Holland. And The Netherlands was saying, these spokesmen for the last one saying, this is terrible.
It makes the cost of new housing exorbitant. People can't afford it, and we are not building enough new lodgings to meet demands. There was an open space, but we all know, every one of us who have I bought and sold property two years ago and had to fill out 50 pages of description, technical descriptions of the buy sold and what I bought, where ten years ago, it was like three pages, when I had to have performance of an energy of the or a proof, which cost a thousand euros. Some some someone came to my new apartment to confirm that the electricity works properly. All of this rubbish, which affects everyone that buys and sells and bills in Europe, is finally coming out on Euronews, and who's behind that?
Well, not just Madame Van der Leyen. It's the whole silly European parliament. They're ideologists, And the whole green movement, which took control simply because it was an essential partner for a coalition of the European People's Party, which the European People's Party held its strength in the last parliamentary elections for Europe. But its colleagues, the socialists, lost. And so to maintain Madame Fond du Leigne in power, they had to do a deal with the Greens.
The results of all this are that Europe is cracking at the scenes in every which way, not just at the military defense issue. But the military defense issue, it's the most irrational. From Kalos's statements, what you have said, are indicative of the utter insanity of the people who are running Europe today, telling Southeast Asia not to buy Russian oil when there's no alternative, when 90% of the oil of several of those countries was coming from the Middle East and now is blocked. And she's saying, oh, don't buy Russian oil. It makes Europe totally irrelevant as a geopolitical player, totally irrelevant.
They will laugh in the face of Europe. The Japanese laughed in the face of the new prime minister, laughed in Donald Trump's face when he told her not to buy Russian oil. And she said the German the Japanese economy could not do without it. So let's talk about something else. These attempts to to play a global power when you don't have the wherewithal and when you really don't know what you're talking about, which is the case of Kalos most of the time, make a mockery of Europe.
Speaker 0: Just no. I couldn't agree more than what you're saying about the irrationality and growing irrelevance and the and the ideologues. That is the policies now of of Europe. They can't defend this in any rational way, which is, I think, also why this increasingly well, irrational foreign policy is always complemented with growing censorship and, yeah, centralization of power. But, yeah, my last question, though, is just about the the changing relationship now between The United States and Russia because I think you you, much like myself, was somewhat optimistic in the larger parts of 2025 about the possibility of The US and Russia toning down or producing some of these great power tensions, which, again, risks taking us to, well, World War three essentially.
But now it looks like the Russians are also starting to give up on this idea that Trump can actually deliver on any of the things that he said. And, well, in the in the context of this, we see, of course, the foreign minister of Iran, Arakci, coming to Russia, meeting with Putin, and this apparently didn't go down well with Trump. I I was wondering how do you read the situation?
Speaker 1: Well, I'd like to use a scalpel, go a little bit where you get where Russia stands. Mister Keskov is is the spokesman for mister Putin. But there there are around him. Around Putin, there are liberals and there are conservatives. The liberals are a very small minority general because they're the holdovers from the Yeltsin years.
Now, mister Vishakov, who went to the great lengths to describe to the public the one and a half hour long telephone conversation between Putin and and Trump, which was initiated by Trump two days ago, if he's a liberal, and he and mister Kharkonov would be at one of his throats. Let's be clear about this. Mister Dmitryev, who is Putin's emissary to many of the talks with the Americans, hey, he's a liberal. He is an American asset, to be very precise about it. He worked for many years with American corporations.
His English is fluent. His knowledge of American business culture is terrific, which is why he was chosen to be a counterpart to to Trump's emissaries, Kushner and and Witkoff, but he's not a strong defender of Russia's interests. So you've got in the circle of Virginia, you've got people who are aggressive, and you have people who are very turn the other cheek and very hopeful of a reconciliation from The United States, just as you have division of such people in Iran, which is why they never concluded in December 2024 just after put Trump had been elected. They didn't conclude an agreement with with Russia on military alliance. So these in these countries, you've got you've got pro Westerners and anti Westerners.
The anti Westerners now are, I think, in majority in circle around around the Putin, But there are very important people like Ushakov, who is a close adviser to Vladimir Putin and was an ambassador in The States. So he knows the issues very well, but he's politically on the other side for accommodation. I don't see an accommodation in The United States as being a reality. Despite all of the talk of Ushakov and of Pieskov in the last day, how wonderful this one and a half hour conversation is, The United States, as you said at the beginning, is still providing critical and military intelligence, enabling the devastating effects on Russian oil refineries and critical energy infrastructure. So the two nations are, the traditional terms of diplomacy, at war and everything but name.
And to think that they will have a reconciliation or there are such big deals business that Dmitryev is talking about all the time is, to my appraisal, nonsense. I believe this war will end without any help from mister Trump. It'll end because the Russians will achieve their minimal objectives of reaching the Dnieper and taking Nederseh, and that will be enough. And and the rest of the world will have to live with that. So I I believe there will be an end to this war.
I don't expect to have 10 volumes of of war diaries. I think that the current volume four, which is now at a 115 pages, maybe will go to a 100 250, and we'll be cut off by what I just described.
Speaker 0: Yeah. It's hard to see this going on for, yeah, at least that much more that much longer. But it appears that we reached this breaking point, though, where it's not possible for Russia anymore not to respond to the Europeans. And, again, there's so much happening at the same time. On one hand, you see the The US stepping back and leaving this to the Europeans.
You see Ukraine beginning to falter on the front lines. And at this point in time, when the Europeans do not have this Ukrainian shield behind them and the big Americans standing behind them, this is the point in time where they decide to really step up and go essentially make it very obvious that this is a direct war on Russia. And while this is happening, them putting themselves in the crosshairs of Russia, we see on the Russian side all this pressure on Putin. We see the essentially, the lessons taken from Iran that they should have retaliated and gone up the escalation ladder as opposed to just allow the West to dictate to go up and down as they please without Russia following them. So it looks as if we're heading into a war now now.
I know, yeah, this is not not getting any headlines, but it in the media at the moment, but this is at least how I see it, though, that a major war is coming unless something dramatic happens to change the situation. I was wondering, yeah, do you have any final thoughts before we wrap up?
Speaker 1: No. I agree with you. The only thing that is to is to be discussed in in in weeks ahead is how this war will play out, how long it will last. I'm predicting like a week because that's about the extent of European munitions, and using conventional weapons. The thing that's bizarre about it all is that every all the announcements that are made, two two two thousand twenty nine is kind of the target date for the war.
That's when they say the Russians will attack, but, actually, the the obvious inverse is meant when they will attack Russia. And so it's all it's all out there at the moment when Russia still has the window of opportunity that enables Putin in February 2022 to make to initiate his special military operation. He knew that after 2018, he had a ten year advantage on The United States and probably still bigger advantage in strategic weapons against Europe. And so he went in. And that still holds, although it's diminishing.
We're now five almost five years into this war. And and so the, I'd say, five years remain before Europe and America will have caught up to the necessary stage to wage war with with with Russia effectively. This is a time for Russia to finish it up and finish off Europe. They have the capability. They have the will.
Speaker 0: Well, like I said, disaster pending. So, no, it's it's so depressing to see the irresponsibility of the politicians, and I will put the media in the same class as they all seem to insist the moral thing to do is put some blindfolds on and march towards the cliff. But, yeah, here we are. Anyways, thank you for taking time off today and to speak with us, and have a good one.
Speaker 1: Well, thanks for the invitation, Glenn.
@Glenn_Diesen - Glenn Diesen
Seyed M. Marandi: Return to All-Out War - What Happens Now https://youtu.be/obDEtGXH7rY https://t.co/k56O9c3p8V
Video Transcript AI Summary
Glenn (Speaker 0) and Seyed Mohamed Marandi discuss the posturing and developments in the Iran–US confrontation around May 2026, focusing on the Strait of Hormuz, regional dynamics, and potential war trajectories.
- Glenn notes that the United States had announced it would break open the Strait of Hormuz and that conflicting reports followed, seeking clarity on whether the conflict was moving toward all-out war.
- Seyed Marandi says the situation is moving toward all-out war. He explains that the Americans initiated a new stage by attempting to carry out an operation to take ships out of the Strait of Hormuz, which did not succeed; instead, civilian boats were destroyed, and there were no military boats involved according to Iran. Iran is not using its military boats in these circumstances; it is using missiles as warnings, to avoid initiating a full war.
- He states the Americans bombed boats carrying goods, resulting in five civilian deaths, citing news reports but noting Western media often follows the official narrative. Iran issued a statement blaming the Americans regarding Emirati targets being struck, though he acknowledges it could be read as either an American action or as American fault for the Emirati strikes.
- Marandi asserts the operation was a failure for the United States: the Strait of Hormuz was not opened, and the Emiratis suffered damage. He describes the Emirates as an ally of the Israeli regime, noting its distancing from other Arab states, leaving OPEC, and paying for social media campaigns to shape public perception. He observes worldwide street sentiment toward Iran is largely supportive, except among Wahhabi/Salafi groups aligned with intelligence agencies and those who historically opposed Iran.
- He contends that the global economy is entering a crisis phase: high oil and energy prices and rising food costs are the “fever,” with supply chains at risk of collapse and the global economy vulnerable to interruptions in any single link. He argues Iran’s economy is a “resistance economy” under siege for decades, while other global economies are more interlinked and fragile.
- On troop movements and targets, Marandi says large US troop numbers and equipment have been deployed in the region, with many ground troops potentially based in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Emirates; air refueling and other assets involve Saudi Arabia, the Israeli regime, and Qatar.
- Glenn asks why the UAE is disproportionately aggressive toward Iran compared with Saudi Arabia or Qatar. Marandi explains the UAE’s alignment with Israel, its departure from OPEC, and the perception that striking Emirati targets amounts to striking Israeli targets.
- They discuss predictability of Iran’s strategy: Marandi has long warned Iran would disrupt oil and gas production; he notes Iranian officials have historically warned about the Strait of Hormuz. He criticizes Western analyses of Iran’s capabilities as underestimating Tehran’s military and strategic sophistication, while Western narratives have repeatedly expected Iran to collapse in various wars, which Iran has repeatedly resisted.
- On the potential course of a renewed war, Marandi outlines two broad scenarios: a short, intense clash with limited strikes on non-critical infrastructure could provoke a strong Iranian response, including missiles at Israel and allied targets; a more extensive war targeting Iran’s critical infrastructure, such as power plants and bridges, could devastate Persian Gulf countries and precipitate a global economic downturn. He emphasizes that Iran has historically avoided targeting civilians, but warns that destruction of critical infrastructure could force populations to flee.
- Regarding escalation and timing, Marandi argues the Americans misjudged Iran’s resolve and that Tehran has rebuilt assets and developed new capabilities since ceasefire discussions. He suggests Trump’s aim may have been to probe whether Iran would capitulate or escalate, a calculation he believes underestimated Iran’s preparedness.
- He predicts that the scale and duration of escalation will hinge on American choices: the Red Sea’s closure and Gulf actions depend on how far the United States escalates, what targets are attacked, and how long the strikes last. In general, he contends that the world economy’s vulnerability will intensify with any extended or severe conflict, particularly if critical infrastructure is targeted.
- In closing, Glenn and Marandi acknowledge the peril of the situation, with Marandi urging awareness of the broader implications, including regional stability and global economic impacts, and both hoping for a path away from further escalation.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Welcome back. Today is Tuesday, 05/05/2026, and we are joined by Seyed Mohamed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran's nuclear negotiation team. Thank you for coming back on. We see that a lot of things have happened over the past twenty four hours. Yesterday, The United States had already announced in advance that it would break open the Strait Of Hormuz.
And throughout the day, we got many conflicting reports about what was actually happening. So I'm hoping now that things are settling, it's yeah. We have more clear overview what actually has been happening. Are we returning to an all out war, or how are you reading the situation?
Speaker 1: I think that as things stand, we are moving towards all out war. What happened basically was that the Americans, for whatever reason, initiated a new stage in this war, by attempting to carry out, excuse me, to carry out an operation to, take ships out of the Strait Of Hormuz or through the Strait Of Hormuz, and it didn't work. What they did do was they destroyed, civilian boats. And, they claimed that they destroyed, military boats, but there were no military boats. Iran doesn't.
Is not using its military boats under these circumstances. Right now, Iran only uses excuse me. Iran only uses, its, missile systems and older missile systems for now against The United States. The missiles that the Iranians have fired at The US ships for the time being are warning shots. Doesn't want to initiate a a war.
So it fires warning shots so that the Americans on these naval vessels get nervous, and they see that Iran is serious and pulled back. What the Americans did, though, was that they bombed the boats that were carrying goods. I think five people were killed, all civilians from the news reports that are coming out. But, of course, Western media is not going to go with that. They'll always go with the the official narrative.
Just like whenever they bomb Beirut, they call them Hezbollah targets or Hezbollah stronghold. Here, they'll go with whatever the American government says. But, the Iranians put out a statement with regards to The Emirates blaming it on the Americans. Now you could read it both ways, that somehow the Americans did it or that it's the Americans' fault that, that the Emirati targets were struck. But in any case, I think that, I don't think that the Americans did it.
So I I think that, basically, yesterday didn't turn out well for The United States. The Emirates, which is the the representative of the Israeli regime in in the Persian Gulf, it is an ally of the regime. It is even distancing itself from other Arab countries. And if you if if people go and look at on social media, which is not very representative, because pro, because pro Arab regime, social media is very active. A lot of money is spent by Arab regimes on social media, and people can go to jail for social media as well.
And Qatar, Saudi Arabia, The Emirates, they pay a lot of money for social media. But even despite all that, in social media and and on the streets from what I'm hearing, people are supporting Iran when it strikes these countries, except for the Wahhabis and the Salafis, which were always funded by intelligence agencies, ISIS, Al Qaeda. These were all tools of The United States and its regional proxies. Those quarters are always attack Iran and and support whoever is on the other side, but a strong majority of people on the streets throughout the world, they're with Iran against these regimes. And among these regimes, the most despised of them all is The United Arab Emirates because it is openly allied aligned to the Israeli regime.
We hear that Israeli troops are in the country, assisting The Emirates. And, and also, The Emirates, have been even distancing itself. They've left OPEC. They've left the organization for Arab oil producing countries. So I think by straw when by, hitting Emirati targets, that that's basically being seen as hitting Israeli targets in in today's environment.
So I think this was all a failure. The Americans failed to get ships through. They murdered a handful of ordinary Iranians, who were taking moving cargo on a boat, or a couple of boats. Not quite sure. I think two boats.
And, we are where we were the day before yesterday. The only difference is that the global economic crisis is growing. The belief is that within a week or two, the crisis is going to, reach new proportions. Until now, it's, until now where it's like a a cancer a patient or someone who's severely ill and, only show sign of signs of, signs of illness, like a fever. So the high oil prices and the and the and the the high, energy prices in general and the the the rise in the cost of food and this sort of thing which people are seeing, this is the this is the fever.
But, what we are going to start seeing in the days ahead is the, supply chains beginning to collapse, and then the economy itself is going to the global economy is going to be severely disrupted, especially since, in today's world, they are so interlinked. Unlike the Iranian economy, which has been under siege for decades and which is a sort of resistance economy in itself, the global economy is extremely vulnerable because you in those supply chains, if one piece of the supply chain, is, is broken, then the whole supply chain basically becomes useless. So nothing has changed. We're on the verge of war. The Americans have brought in large numbers of troops and equipment for those troops.
Most of those planes, from my understanding, that we've seen come back and forth, go back and forth in in the region from The United States or from US bases in Europe and elsewhere. The focus was on bringing equipment for land offenses, and their troops are, from my understanding, mostly based, those land troops, are based in Kuwait, The Bahrain, and The Emirates. That's where, they're they prepared. But, of course, the air force, US planes and refueling planes, Saudi Arabia, the Israeli regime, and, of course, Qatar. All of them are involved.
But, apparently, from what I'm hearing, the ground troops are, focused, and, most of them are are in these countries.
Speaker 0: Yeah. I was planning to ask, why Iran was hitting The United Arab Emirates, well, let's say disproportionately compared to the other Gulf states, but but but I guess they have been at the forefront against against Iran. That is a bit perplexing to know why why The United Arab Emirates is seemingly so gung ho on war with Iran. It as opposed to, well, Qatar or Saudi Arabia or others. I I did wanna ask, though, how you expect the the war to go this time around?
Because last time, when the forty day war began, there was a big surprise that Iran decided to go quickly up that escalation ladder with The United States that is straight shut down the Strait Of Hormuz and go after The US bases. Do you think this escalation, this time around will be even, I guess, more intense, or do you think The US will try to keep it will manage it? Because it appears that Americans have a hard time doing this high intensity warfare over a longer period of time simply by lack of ammunition?
Speaker 1: Well, first of all, the there was no I mean, there shouldn't have been surprise, and I know that you you weren't surprised. But I, for one, have been saying that Iran will knock out oil and gas production, for at at around a decade, I suppose. In fact, I remember the first time I said this, it went quite viral. Well, one of the first times that I said it went quite viral, it was on press TV. It went it it went viral in the Arab countries in the Persian Gulf, a lot of the people friends of mine in these countries, who are these acquaintances, friends and acquaintances, contacted me and said, why did you say this?
And I said, well, it's a fact. Your the bases are there, and you and you will be complicit, and that's what Iran will do. So and Iran has been talking about the Strait Of Homewood. I mean, it's not as if I have some, you know, brilliant military mind or I it's the Iranians have been saying this. If they just listen to what Iranian senior military officials have been saying over the years, they would have known this that this would happen.
It doesn't take any, special mental capabilities or, access to intelligence. But the Americans, in in that exceptionalist perspective, that exceptionalist, worldview, that is their biggest problem, I think, because they all because they underestimate everyone else. Everyone else is inferior, less intelligent, less sophisticated, less capable. I remember for years, Western media would ridicule Iranian missiles, and, they would say you know, they would they would make fun of them as and that's basically not because they had any knowledge that these were inferior missiles, but because they had to be inferior, because they were Iranian. You know, they're the mad Mullah, you know, and the the the the medieval Iranians and and that sort of nonsense that they've been saying, you know, for for decades now.
So they I think they probably knew what the Iranians were saying, but they just ignored it and said, well, that's just rhetoric coming from Tehran. As soon as we fire a shot, they'll fold. I I I think that what it's difficult to say what will happen because you're right. The Americans are short of, ammunition. But, also, we are not far from the complete how should I put it?
The, you know, the complete annihilation of of, the oil and energy supplies from the Persian Gulf region. We during the last war, a lot of damage was done. A you know, they the Americans like to say you know, you heard the Americans say how Iranian oil wells are about to blow up or Trump said that, which is nonsense. I mean, the Iranians have been used to, the sanctions being imposed and maximum pressure sanctions and then having to cut exports and increase them again. So Iran knows how to play with its oil production, especially since most of Iran's oil production is consumed at home.
So it can maneuver. It can decrease production from one well, increase it at another. But the countries and the other countries in the Persian Gulf don't have that experience. They've just been because they're part of The US led global economic order, they've just been producing oil for decades, and, you know, it's never occurred to them that they could have such problems. Their oil production has, in many cases, almost been comp I mean, almost completely and gas production have have almost been completely shut down, and that does enormous damage.
So you have enormous damage to the installations. You have enormous damage to many of their oil and gas wells. And, and then, of course, you have all these ships that are stuck and some of them increasingly being hit. You know, every few days, a couple of ships are hit. I mean, the more there are ships that are damaged or destroyed, the worse it becomes when the strait is finally opened.
So if another war starts, then I think, we won't have any more oil and gas exported to the world for a very long time, and that means global global economic depression. But even if, let's say, it's a short war, even if it's, let's say, a short war because you're right. The Americans don't have the sort of ammunition that they need. And there's also another element here too, Glenn, and we've discussed this before. And I'm not an a military expert.
I fought as a volunteer during the war. But you have there you you we and I both have friends in the military who we've been on their shows online or with them online, and they they agree with what I say, and I mean former American military. And that is that we are in the month of May. And by the end of the month of May, it's going to get very hot and humid in the Arabian Peninsula. And so it's going to be much harder for American troops to be able to function easily under such an environment.
But, also, if there is war and then Trump does go after Iranian infrastructure again, yesterday, he spoke about wiping out Iranian nation. I mean, these are it's mind boggling what Americans and Europeans can say, and no one in the media will be outraged. Not a single journalist will tweet in outrage or anything like that. Just like the daily slaughter that we see in Lebanon, it's not just not even mentioned in the Western media or the daily killings in Gaza, and no one even talks about it. It's it's you know, we we're living in a very, in very disturbing times, at least when one looks at at the Western elites.
But, if there is war and then they start striking Iranian critical infrastructure, Iran will definitely strike back at the Israeli regime, but also at these regimes. And the the weather in these countries is it would become intolerable. People would not be able to survive there. They'd have to leave immediately, and so that would and then it would not be much different from US troops for US troops. So just like in in Russia, or the Soviet Union and back in the day, winter, was a general of its own to help the Russians fight their wars.
The summer would be very helpful to the Iranian side. So the window of opportunity for the Americans close you know, it's become smaller, and and they do have a shortage of ammunition. So I I find it a bit difficult to imagine that the Americans are going to to go for a long war. And so it'll probably be short and intense, and the Iranians have said they're going to be very intense. And you know one thing, Glenn, that the Americans should appreciate, and that is that whenever the Iranians say that we're more prepared than before, they don't lie.
The Iranians don't lie about these things. True promise two was very different from true true promise one. Both were sort of, trial runs. They were practice runs. Then true promise three, saw during the twelve day war that Iran was they won that war despite the fact that, they were hit hard on day one, but they won.
And then the the thirty nine days of fighting, they won, hands down. No no doubt about it. And then the siege. I mean, if the siege was so effective, the Americans wouldn't be provoking Iran right now. All they have to do is if they I mean, if them if right now, the Americans are carrying out siege warfare.
So there's still war. This is not peace. This is an act of war. But if they're really succeeding, then all they have to do is just stop talking, lay back, and wait. But the reality is that as the time is on Iran's side, and they know it, the global economy is collapsing.
It's or it's moving towards collapse very swiftly, and the Iranians will tolerate this. If that wasn't the case, we wouldn't have this new operation. Trump wouldn't have begun a new stage in the conflict. The only reason he's doing that is because siege warfare is not working. And I so I think that's another sign of desperation.
But the problem is that the more the Americans wait, the closer we come we get to the cliff. And whether he carries out an operation or not, it makes it even worse because we're so much closer to to the cliff. So I would imagine that if he if he starts a war because of the heat, because of the shortage of ammunition, and because of the harsh Iranian response, it may not last that long. But it's not going to solve any problems because, ultimately, the crisis is because of the Strait Of Hormuz. And we saw that in his operation, he failed.
He he chain nothing changed in the Strait Of Hormuz. It just showed that Iran is in full control. And the Emirates were badly damaged. I mean, the damage done to the Emirati the remainder of the Emirati oil exports under these circumstances where there's such a huge shortage was enormous, and also it tells us what could easily happen to Saudi, the remainder of Saudi oil exports which go to the Red Sea if there's a new conflict.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Now on that topic of the way the media has been talking down the Iranian military capabilities, this is such a common theme, though, this, yeah, this self delusion, if you will. And there's a book I would recommend to viewers that is a holocaust survivor, Victor Klemperer. He wrote a book on the language of the third Reich, and he was making the point when you have one side seeing itself as being superior superior, it often manifests itself in this duality where they had complete contempt for the Jews that were inferior, but at the same time, they would be threatening civilization itself. And you see with Iran, this superior inferiority ref reference.
It's always the, you know, the backwardness, which is always assumed that that they don't they can't make a drone or that works or missiles. At the same time, Iran is an overwhelming threat to the entire world. And, you know, so we have to fight, and it's only a lack of will. If one fights, the whole thing will fall apart. And they do the same with Russia, by the way.
It's a gas station masquerading as a country, but it's also a threat to all of civilization. But so we have to fight, and if we do, it will fall over fairly quick because, again, they're weak. Same with China. They you know, the only reason why they have a good technology is because they stole it from us, but, you know, they're they're massive threats. So if we just put some screws on in terms of, tightening the screws on, economic war, then surely they will fall apart.
And then, time and time again, they're always surprised when, oh, well, I guess it it's not like this. And and this is, I think, something inherited from, you know, not just the past thirty years of unipolarity, but five centuries of western dominance that they it can't help but to fuel some self delusion, and they often end up with these two views, both duty and authority that is both weak, but also, yeah, a massive threat. So it's it's an interesting yeah, thing to look into. You you mentioned something interesting, though. That is, you know, the Americans were saying that the blockade on Iran was working.
That's what politicians and journalists were reassuring everyone every day. But yet, even though they said it was working, it was suffocating Iran, The US decided to return to war, which which doesn't really have a good plan for. It seems to be an indication that perhaps this was not true, that the blockade was working. But but what do you think the purpose is? Because they, you know, they know that they can't break it open, I guess.
Was it to probe Iran, see if Iran would stand down? It's just it's hard to see because also The US was the one who really wanted the negotiations to get the ceasefire in place. We know this because they agreed to Iran's 10 plan. So how do we yeah. How do you make sense of this?
Because they finally got their ceasefire. They learned that if they start fighting, they might not, be able to choose how the war ends or when it gets to end, and yet they decide to go back into this.
Speaker 1: You know, Glenn, I think he goes back again to what you just said, that this is not these narrative buildings are not just not just about the last thirty years. They are the result of five hundred years of empire. So even when their actions lead to results that are unexpected because their predictions are based on that, sense of superiority and that and this alleged backwardness and stupidity and ignorance and, inferiority of the other or the Iranians in particular, and probably the Iranians more than anyone else, even when that happens, it doesn't it doesn't change their mentality. So for example, their expectation was that Iran would collapse in the twelve day war. And Western embassies in in Tehran reacted in in such a manner.
It was clear that they were expecting collapse, like, in two days. And when Iran came out on top, that didn't change the mentality. So they were surprised. But then when the the the new war, the Ramadan war, the thirty nine days of fighting began, they again expected Iran to collapse. And even friends of mine in different parts of the world who I've been in communication with, they all say that, you know, they're how surprised they are and how surprised others were that Iran performed so well and Hezbollah also how extraordinarily well they both performed.
So you would think that, okay. Well, then they're these are going to bring about new realistic calculations, but they don't. So when the ceasefire began, then the Americans said, well, now the Iranians, you know, they're broken, and they they're they're on the ropes. And so all we have to do is just keep threatening them with renewed conflict as if they were not the ones who were seeking the ceasefire in the first place. Because after a few days, they were constantly sending messages.
Apparently, after three or four days, Wittkopf was sending messages. But after ten days, I know you, they were officially sending messages. And the Iranians ignored them till, like, thirty day, 34, 35, or something like that when the Americans sent that 15 plan plan, and Iran rejected it. And then Iran gave its own plan, 10 plan, and Trump accepted it as a framework for negotiations as you alluded to earlier. And so they were the ones who wanted the ceasefire.
They were the ones who had to accept Iran's terms for the framework, and Trump was attacked because of that. But then again, they go back into that old mentality that, you know, they're on the ropes. They're in I saw this clip from this this so called Iran expert. Some I don't want to name him. He's not even worthy of, naming.
But he was saying, like, the Iranians are desperate. They're trying to train dolphins to attack American ships. I think you tweeted it too, but I did as well. I don't know if I saw yours and I did it. I don't recall.
But it's like it's like a, you know, completely these are utterly unserious people. But these are the people who, who they listen to in Washington, and not just the Trump regime. The Obama regime, the Biden regime, the Bush regime. You know, these are these are, like, the the experts. Like, okay.
I mean, this is a Soviet thing, by the way. You know this better than I, that, you know, the training dolphins to aspire to do whatever. I remember when I was young, I I heard that it'd you know, I heard about the the Soviets training dolphins to do whatever. But, you know, it's a complete joke, but they he he's trying to imply that Iran is desperate. Iran and because there's a vested interest in this as well, not only because of this orientalist mindset and the supremacist mindset or the Zionist mindset, you know, where the the master race and the rest of us are subhuman, but also because they're so deeply invested in this.
All these people who are funded to talk about Iran, they've been that's what they've been saying all their lives. They're not going to suddenly reverse course and say, oh, actually, the Iranians are very smart. They're very good. They're very sophisticated. Their state, their constitution works so well.
Their leader is murdered in in a time of war by the superpower, and yet they they're not going to say that. They're going to continue to say somehow, continue repeat the same narrative, but justify it to with, you know, with evidence here from here and there. So nothing has really changed. Again, this is all speculation on my behalf to to get to the answer that of to your question. So I think that during the ceasefire period and after The United States did this brilliant because they were saying how brilliant it is, the the the siege on the Iran Iranian ports.
Well, first, it was a siege on the whole Persian Gulf, and then they thought, well, that's not smart. So they went and said this is on Iranian ports. So it just shows how brilliant they are. And then, well, they said, oh, this is great. This is brilliant.
I mean, you know, first of all, it's utterly stupid because if if you wanted to do this, you should have done it when you started the war on day one, not now. So the Strait Of Hormuz has was closed, basically, to everyone but Iran for fifty days or so. And, and remember, they were saying that we're we're they removed sanctions from Iranian oil and they said, look. We are smart. We are well, this is actually to the detriment of Iran.
And so so Iran was selling its oil for fifty days at a very high price and before they struck Iranian petrochemicals, petrochemicals, and and all that. So Iran was the only side making a lot of money. Well, you should have done that on day one because right now, Iran has a lot of money. They've, and they've also sold all their oil that was on the seas and so have the Russians, by the way, but Iran had a lot more. And that that's another indication of how bad the situation is because Iran no longer has any Iran had almost 200,000,000 barrels on the sea, And the Russians had substantial amounts, not as much, but I don't know how much it was, but all that's gone.
It's finished. So the the markets are tightening and tightening. But, but in any case, if they if they wanted to be I mean and the Iranians were prepared for that. The Iranians thought that the Americans are going to impose a siege on the Persian Gulf from day one. So they already had plans to start doing trade from Pakistan and doing trade from these other countries and trying to find markets in neighboring countries for their oil and and so on and so forth.
But the Americans did the opposite. So in any case, they finally, after fifty some days, began this their brilliant siege, they weren't thinking that the global economy is heading for the you know, it's it's it's it's only it's head it's already rushing to. They're already pushing the global economy towards a cliff, and now all they're going to do is push it faster. And so I think they thought that, well, we'll impose the siege, And the Iranians, they're desperate, and they need a way out, and, they're not like us, and they they can't continue. Again, the same narrative, the same mentality.
So the war, Iran's abilities during the thirty nine days, all of that will go. They'll they'll start listening to their, Iran experts saying they're desperate at home. The economic situation is horrible. I don't know. Maybe, like, if, let's say, next week or somewhere, 50 people gather somewhere saying, we we need jobs.
They'll they'll focus on that and say, look. The the regime is about to collapse. You know, that sort of thing. And then, they will, they'll just continue down the same path. So I think what Trump did was that he was this is my guess.
This is sorry for that long rambling introduction. I think he was see he wanted to see if the Iranians would react and or whether the Iranians would be intimidated and allow them to do this, because it doesn't make sense for me to view it in any other way. I'm I mean, nothing has changed to make it possible for the Americans just to go in and have these ships leave. The Iranian military is prepared. Since the ceasefire, they've been working day and night to be to re rebuild them their assets and also to develop new capabilities.
So the only thing that comes to my mind is that he was he and his people thought that Iran is scared, that Iran doesn't want war. So maybe if we go and, you know, and say we're taking out these ships, the mere Iranians would calculate and say that it's not a good idea to stand in their way and to and to hit back and prevent them from doing this. And, of course, the opposite happened. This is how I see it. Now maybe in a few days, you're going to get some report from some American newspaper saying that this was just some other a new stupid idea by Hexeth or or something like that, and there'll be a a different explanation.
But that's all that's the only thing I can think of, that they were hoping that, oh, Iran is tired, Iran is worn out, and Iran is scared, and they just they're desperate to have this over. So now we'll just move in, have those ships come out, and they won't dare hit us. Something like that.
Speaker 0: You might probably well, you're probably correct on this that this was just Trump trying to do some probing to see if, Iran would let it pass because, once hostilities broke out, it seemed that Trump was careful about calling it a breach of ceasefire, and, he tried to minimize, you know, the talk down, how severe what actually happened was. You know, this is what you would expect for someone who's probing and then trying to walk it back as opposed to Lindsey Graham and Israelis who are now yelling at the top of their lungs that, you know, they are this is a breach, you know, now we will have to go back to war. So it it could be, but again, I try not to listen too much to what Trump is actually saying, but but you might be onto something there. It is, yeah, the expert class you referred to. It is interesting because, you know, I I always told my students, I was teaching at this department of policing intelligence and counterterrorism, that you should never hate your enemies because or your opponents because you can't have any serious analysis once you hate them.
And the problem, I think, is often a common theme I noticed in the West now is that we almost it's obligatory to hate opponents, whether it's the Iranians, the Russians, the Chinese. And I think this is how the expert class is formed. They are loyal to narratives, and, that's why they're brought back as experts because they help to maintain and manage the narrative. But, again, it is obligatory to hate the opponent, though. This is a very important part of the narrative that they are evil and weak.
But, yeah, again, I think this is a reason why all the analysis and thus the policies deriving from it are so horrible. Just my last question, though, is if if if you would make any, you know, predictions. I know most people do not care for it, but if we do return now to an all out war, the how what do you expect to happen this time around? Do you think the Red Sea will be closed off quick? Would the The UAE get more involved?
I mean, what do you expect to what might happen if we go down that path?
Speaker 1: Well, The UAE is not important. It's there's not much much it can do. There's nothing it can contribute to, like, The US, war, effort. It's hard to say. It depends on how long the war lasts and how much the Americans will escalate.
So for example, Iran has, from my understanding, Iran has the cape capability to sink US naval ships, and the at at a pretty long range. That's what I heard from someone who is pretty credible a couple of weeks ago. But the Iranians never did that because they they apparent they have this this plan which which is linked to the escalation ladder. So it depends on how high up the escalation ladder the Americans go. The Red Sea, its closure has a lot to do again with how far up the escalation ladder the Americans go or even an assault from Yemen into Saudi Arabia.
The same is true in Iraq. The Iraqi capabilities go far further than, what they did, even though they were very active, during the war, the Iraqi resistance. But the the the amount of the increase in their offensive actions depends on the escalation. And so I think a lot will depend on what the Americans do, how intense the strikes will be, how long lasting they will be, and what the targets are. If the Americans because it's possible, and I'm just, again, speculating.
If the Americans go for, like, a two, three days attack or a short attack, and then they want to say, okay. Now we've won. We we finish them off, and we really hit them hard. And they don't hit, anything like critical infrastructure, then that will cause further damage. Iran will strike back, hit back hard, bomb, strike miss fire a lot of missiles at Israel and the Israeli regime and US targets and, targets inside these countries.
But that's one you know, that would be more limited. If The United States, though, starts striking Iran's, electrical power plants as they've threatened and bridges, then I think I think that's the end of the countries in the Persian Gulf region. I've been saying this for for since the beginning of the war, that that would be be the end. And I've been telling people in these countries, that, you know, as a citizen, that they should be prepared to leave if that's what's going to happen. And but, you know, one thing I'd like to add, Glenn, is that Iran has been very careful about civilian targets.
We had 3,400 or so people murdered by the Americans and Israelis and with the complicity of these Arab regimes, including Jordan. If you look at the numbers in the Persian Gulf, the number of people who were who died as a result of Iran strikes, and you we saw how much damage they did from Kuwait to The Emirates. Like, 20 people died or less than 20 people. So Iran has always been very careful not to target civilians. But the only way to prevent the Americans to to make them refrain from trying to wipe us out or take us back to the stone age or make our civilization disappear is the threat of retaliation.
And I'm sure you you definitely recall that when they struck Iran's South Pars gas field, the Iranians hit back very hard at Qatar and The Emirates. And then Trump put out that truth social post saying, I didn't know about this. The Israeli Netanyahu is not going to do this anymore. Why? Because Iran said, if you escalate, we're going to escalate too.
We're we're going to respond, and we're going to hit even harder. And so if they go after Iran's critical infrastructure, then Iran is going to go after critical infrastructure in Israel, but also in these regimes at a time when it's winter and where the world is complete, is very dependent and hoping for all this to end so that they could have energy from the Persian Gulf region. So if if their electric electrical power plants are hit, and they have just a few. Iran's electrical power plants are, like, spread out across the country. They have, like, eighty, ninety power plants.
There are only a handful in the Persian Gulf, and they're very large. So all Iran has to do is is hit them. There's no electricity. No. Gas and oil installations, they can strike those.
And at with one blow, they can take Qatar back twenty years. But, if they take out the electrical power plants, then everyone will leave. They will be very, very hot and humid, and American soldiers will have to leave. So that would be a different scenario. And that would mean that, that that that we are definitely going to head for a global depression, not recession, a global depression for years.
But if it's short, it's still going to make things worse because negotiations and a real ceasefire, that is only going to be set back further. And time is not on the side of the Americans. If it was, as we discussed earlier, they wouldn't have started this Trump wouldn't have started this new operation. He would just have said, okay. Let's sit back and wait till the Iranians fall apart as they were supposed to do at the beginning of the twelve day war and at the beginning of this war, and, then we'll just move on to something else and then go and kill the Cubans and slaughter the Cuban people, which is next on the list.
Hopefully hopefully and this is the hope in Iran. This is what Iranians are saying. The thing, hopefully, that we'll be able to weaken Americans so badly that they'll no longer be able to go after the Cubans and that the Venezuelans will get back, get their country back. But in any case, I think it all depends on the scale of escalation, the length of the escalation. And for me, that's impossible to assess because Trump is just Trump.
He's, you know, the Netanyahu and the Zionists want a long and brutal war. I think probably him he does not want more war. So it may be that he goes down their road. It may be that he goes somewhere in the middle, some short term war, especially, as I said, because of the heat and all that. But then it depends.
Is is it going to be intense or not intense? And the fact that Trump said that this wasn't a breach of the ceasefire, even though if it was a breach, it was and it was. It was him he that breached the ceasefire. But to the very fact that he played this down, I don't want to read too much into it, but whatever it whatever for whatever reason he said that, it does show that he is worried.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, I have a bit different expectations about Cuba, though. I think that after a humiliating defeat against Iran, The US or Trump especially then would have to score a victory. So I I don't think Iran's victory necessarily would be good for Cuba. I think, yeah, that The US would not be more measured, I think, than they would only have to, I guess, yeah, yeah, find another victory.
Anyways, thank you very much for taking the time so early in the day to speak with me, and, yeah, please stay safe over there. And I hope, yeah, this war won't spin out of control.
Speaker 1: Well, thank you, Glenn. It's always a pleasure, always an honor, and hopefully, whether it's in our region or in The Caribbean or Caribbean or elsewhere, people have see better days ahead.