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General Harald Kuyat discusses the origins, dynamics, and potential endgame of the Ukraine war, emphasizing that the conflict is the product of long-term political developments beginning after the Cold War rather than a single moment. He points to early post-Cold War efforts to integrate Russia into a more stable European security order, noting Bush’s Mainz speech in May 1989, which aimed to reassure Soviet security interests and propose confidence-building measures such as open skies and CSCE expansion. As NATO expanded in the 1990s, Russia sought a buffer zone to manage crises near former Warsaw Pact states and the Baltic region, a concept reflected in the NATO-Russia Founding Act. The crucial mistake, in his view, was suspending this mechanism, a move that has contributed to today’s tensions.
Kuyat highlights turning points in the 2000s: the ABM Treaty’s termination in 2001, the INF Treaty’s withdrawal, and the Open Skies Treaty’s departure; the 2008 Bucharest summit, where Ukraine and Georgia were pressured for NATO membership, a move that foreshadowed later crises. He notes warnings about red lines and Crimea’s annexation followed those developments. He contends that the war could have been avoided or ended earlier if 2021-2022 draft treaties and Istanbul negotiations had been pursued seriously, and argues that Europeans bore responsibility for not advancing peace proposals during those moments.
Regarding current U.S. policy, Kuyat asserts that he believes former President Trump’s effort to end the fighting is sincere, aiming to end killings and seek peace for historical recognition. He says Europeans failed to end the war with their own proposals over the past four years, and that military victory over Russia was never feasible. He stresses that the goal must be to end the conflict and suffering as early as possible, not to secure a decisive military victory. He recalls that negotiations could have progressed if Europe had embraced negotiations instead of prolonging the conflict.
On the prospects for peace, Kuyat discusses concessions and security guarantees, including Ukraine’s neutrality and the possible deployment of NATO-country troops in a manner framed as reassurance rather than combat troops. He notes that both sides must be willing to make concessions and that negotiations must begin soon to avoid a military decision by Russia. He recalls a 2023/2024 proposal for negotiated peace with a small group, which he believes deserves consideration, and emphasizes that a lasting settlement would require mutual security guarantees and a mechanism for enforcement.
Regarding Russia’s objectives, Kuyat states that Russia seeks to avoid NATO proximity to its borders and maintain a buffer zone; it views Donetsk and Luhansk as regions with Russian-speaking populations and as independent states should they be recognized, potentially under UN trusteeship. He suggests Russia might accept recognizing these regions as independent rather than reincorporating them into Ukraine, while Ukraine would withdraw from parts of Donetsk, and Russia would maintain access to its land corridor to Crimea. He notes that a peace settlement would require both sides to concede and that the European approach should also offer security guarantees for Russia and acknowledge Russia’s interests. He acknowledges that Russia’s goal includes a regime change objective, which complicates negotiations, and stresses that any durable peace must involve direct talks, possibly with American mentorship, and must include a long-term security framework.
On European strategy, Kuyat argues Europe should strengthen its own security, reduce overreliance on the United States, and build a balanced, Europe-centered NATO pillar while maintaining the indivisibility of allied security. He warns against a perpetual European commitment to Ukraine’s reconstruction beyond what the United States is willing to support, and urges Europe to act more confidently for its own security interests. He also warns that without timely negotiations, the conflict could spread beyond four regions and threaten critical Black Sea access, potentially tying Ukraine’s fate to broader regional security concerns.
In conclusion, Kuyat reiterates the need for an eventual peace order that includes direct talks with Russia, robust UN monitoring for any demilitarized zones, and a framework that ensures long-term normalization of Russia–Ukraine relations, while Europe strengthens its own security posture within a renewed European security order.