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The speaker discusses the issue of bleed through on ballots and its potential impact on voting. They mention that if the bubbles on the ballot bleed through, it can cause an overvote or result in voting for a different candidate than intended. They refer to a newsletter from Maricopa County stating that they use VoteSecure paper, which is thick and has a special coating to prevent bleed through. However, the speaker points out that they have observed bleed through on actual ballots, which raises concerns. They mention the need for further analysis to determine the extent of the impact on votes. The second speaker seeks clarification and confirms that Maricopa County's newsletter stated they only use secure paper that does not allow bleed through. The first speaker affirms this and adds that paper experts have confirmed the thickness of the paper should prevent bleed through, but they have observed thin paper stock being used on Election Day.

Linda McLaughlin and her colleagues present a data-focused argument alleging election fraud in Georgia, supported by multiple data analyses and demonstrations. - Linda McLaughlin introduces the data integrity group and states that data is numerical and non-partisan; she aims to remedy a lack of presented data in the discussion. - Dave Labou, a lead data scientist, explains that their analysis across precincts, counties, and the state identified over 40 data points of negative voting or vote switching across candidates totaling over 200,000 votes. Separately, machine learning algorithms used for anomaly detection in fraud detection flagged over 500 precincts with over 1,000,000 corresponding votes showing suspicious activity. He emphasizes that the process is scientific and not tied to political affiliations. - Labou uses a banking analogy to illustrate data integrity concerns: in hypothetical online banking, deposits or withdrawals being redirected or split would indicate fraudulent activity. He applies this concept to voting data, arguing that the voting system data aligns with the Secretary of State data used to certify results, yet exhibits patterns akin to transfers and reallocation not authorized by voters. - He states that the data are publicly available but require advanced programming to extract, parse, and join datasets. Their independent team has made all analysis, programs, and data public to allow replication and has produced videos to translate the analysis for broader understanding. - A key claim is that receiving over 90% in a precinct is a marker for fraud; in Fulton County, more than 150 precincts voted 90% or more for Biden, and in the statewide race (decided by less than 13,000 votes), these 150 Fulton precincts accounted for 152,000 Biden votes, described as a clear indicator of suspicious or fraudulent activity. - Labou and team present a series of visuals and explanations indicating explicit vote count switching, e.g., in Dodge County, where Trump’s votes appear to be subtracted while Biden’s counts increase in tandem with county updates, leading to a shift in totals that would not appear in state totals due to timing of updates. - They reference adjudication as the review of ballots flagged during scanning, noting that only ballots with a contest causing questions about how the computer reads them are adjudicated. - In DeKalb County, they assert it is statistically impossible for nine out of ten voters to vote for Biden in 94 precincts. - They describe a data flow in Fulton County: poll pad check-in, ballot image saved on the machine, SD cards transported to drop-off locations, escorted to a warehouse, run through Democracy Suite, exported to a Dominion server, and inserted into a SQL Server database before transmission to the Secretary of State and data aggregators. - A critical point is the vulnerability within the county update data-entry process: the square box detailing data-entry options in the election software allows updating vote batches, projecting batches, and generating new or temporary batches that can be injected directly into the tally; these options can be validated and published, enabling potential manipulation before server upload. - They pose questions about validation: whether two observers from both parties were present during SD card transmissions and drop-off transmissions, and whether there is a public log of exchanges at drop-off points. They challenge why elected officials have not pursued these questions about voting integrity. - Labou notes the process is machine-to-machine and, by design, should not decrement sums; any decrement requires a robust explanation, and their data suggest negative drops are inconsistent with normal sequential processes. Speaker 2 clarifies the data sources (CITL election night data and Edison/New York Times data) and asserts that the process from poll pads to secretary of state is machine-driven, with no human entry of totals, thereby removing human entry error as an explanation for observed negative changes. Speaker 4 adds emphasis on the validation and potential vulnerabilities in the software options used for election administration, underscoring the need for transparency and inquiry into the electoral process.

People come in from what I can sell consider well heeled, and say, well, you know, I know if I send it down there, you figure out where it was. Well, what we could be. I think I was from, a legal standpoint. If it, like, legally has to be attached to it. Or if you just need to be with it so you know which tapes came from which precinct and belong to which return sheet. I think it's a combination of both but legally you have to have it. The issues that we had when we did the reconciliation is that we were to reconcile the number of people voted with the yellow books and then with the return to balance. I mean, we haven't even talked about reconciling the used and unused balance and I presume that's something we can do down the road but it would it was it was not easy and these poor people came in there and they were sweating bullets because they all thought they were going to weapon cuffs. It's it has to be stressed that that tape has to be attached.

There are concerns about duplicate ballots in the audit. The speaker mentions that there should be a lower count due to duplicates, but they are not seeing any reference to duplicates in the forms. Speaker 1 explains that duplicate ballots are created when the original ballot is damaged and cannot be processed. These duplicates should have a matching 6-digit serial number with the original damaged ballot, but they cannot find the matching originals. Speaker 2 confirms this, stating that they are finding duplicate ballots without corresponding serial numbers on the damaged originals. They are struggling to match the duplicated ballots with the missing originals.

Speaker 0 mentions the possibility of printing out something. Speaker 1 asks if there is an explanation for the uncounted votes. Speaker 2 clarifies that there is no concrete explanation for why those votes were not counted by the machine in the first place. Speaker 1 confirms that they don't know why the votes didn't get scanned. Speaker 2 asks if the Dominion Tech guys have figured out the reason, but Speaker 0 says they are not allowed to comment. Speaker 1 believes it wasn't a memory card issue. Speaker 2 asks if memory cards can be ruled out, and Speaker 1 agrees. Speaker 0 suggests it may be human error, but they don't have evidence to confirm it. Speaker 2 questions if it could be a software issue, but Speaker 0 refuses to speculate. Speaker 2 acknowledges the lack of a definite answer.

Clark County Technical employees independently found votes appearing and disappearing at night. They were only allowed a visual inspection of a USB drive, not a forensic examination.

During the Arizona audit, Maricopa County made it clear that signature verification was off-limits. However, it's easy to understand why they didn't want us to examine the signatures because, in reality, they don't match.

A leaked audio recording reveals Delaware County lawyer Tom Gallagher discussing with election officials the inability to reconcile the 2020 vote due to missing election materials. Gallagher mentions that people with connections asked them to locate missing materials. The discussion includes the legal requirements for attaching tapes to ballots to ensure proper precinct identification. Participants describe difficulties reconciling voter numbers with old books and return balances, and they express concern about balancing used and unused ballots. Election workers feared potential jail time. Additionally, sources allege a video shows Gallagher and James Zieglehoffer discarding paper tapes before a scheduled deposition in active litigation, which is illegal.

The speaker points out several issues with the handling of numbers in the election. The numbers were not stored securely in a sealed bag but in a red canvas bag without a lock. Moreover, they were mixed together, which is against the law. The speaker also accuses Mr. Clark of keeping the media sticks instead of handing them over to Mr. Zach. The speaker advises checking with Mr. Clark as he may still have them. These actions are in violation of the law of Mississippi.

The arrival of paper at the factory is important because it should match what was sent out or greater. Discrepancies could indicate extra ballots. The high-end machines used for printing have clickers that record the exact number of ballots produced. If the clicker count doesn't match what was printed, mailed, or destroyed, there's a problem. The entire process is documented with date and time stamps, employee stamps, and paperwork. When ballots are mailed out, there are records of names, time stamps, date stamps, and financial remittance. The same applies when they are returned or put into drop boxes. Each step has a paper trail with names, dates, and timestamps. However, when all this information is reviewed, it doesn't add up.

In the exchange, concerns are raised about mail-in ballots in Allegheny and Philadelphia counties and how they were counted. Speaker 0 notes that ballots were counted without observers, citing 682,770 ballots observed and asking about the 1,823,148 mailed-out ballots, contrasted with a final count showing 2,589,242 mail-in ballots. The core question is: what explains the roughly 700,000 mail-in ballots that “appeared from nowhere”? Speaker 1 responds that their cyber team uses white-hat hacking techniques to gather publicly available information from the secretary of state’s website, which has been updated as late as 11:16 this morning with provisional and mail-in ballots, though those numbers continue to change. He adds that the 2,500,000 figure is no longer on the website, and it has “just been taken off.” There is no annotation explaining why. Speaker 2 then describes an on-the-ground observation: a deputy sheriff, a senior law enforcement officer, was seen not being observed and walking in with baggies, with USBs being inserted into machines. The witness claims to have personally witnessed this 24 times, with additional witnesses including Democrat poll watchers. They were told by an attorney that every election leaves a couple of USB cards in the voting machines to be brought back by the warehouse manager, but this account is contradicted by law enforcement and other officials. The witness states that 47 USB cards are missing and “they’re nowhere to be found,” and that 32 to 30 cards uploaded were not present in the live vote update. The witness demanded timely live upload of vote results, which showed 50,000 votes; they assert those votes were for Vice President Biden, though they note that identifying who those votes were for should not matter to a computer scientist. Speaker 1 emphasizes that forensic evidence from the computers was not obtained: the procedure would involve turning off the computer, imaging the drive with BitLocker, under law enforcement observation, which would take about an hour for five machines. This forensic imaging was never performed, despite objections three weeks earlier. They later learned that virtually all chain-of-custody logs, yellow sheets, and forensic records in Delaware County were gone; a signing party attempted to recreate the logs with poll workers but was unsuccessful in recovering them all. The discussion concludes with a claim that there are 100,000 to 120,000 ballots, both mail-in and USB, in question, and that there is no remedy or “cure” within the local charter for certifying a presidential vote, leaving the speaker asserting that nobody could certify the vote in good conscience.

The discussion centers on completing an audit of ballots to obtain a count and address concerns about the precinct. The participants emphasize that without counts, they cannot move forward. They insist that the audit piece must be completed first, not an investigation, so that a number of ballots can be established and the overall tally can proceed. Key points raised: - The need to finish the audit to determine how many ballots are in the ballot can, and to move forward with the numbers. “We need to move forward with the audit so we can get the numbers, so we can see how many ballots are here.” - A concern has been raised about the precinct, including the issue of multiple ballots with the very same signature. The team discusses handling this by counting the ballots and later addressing the concern, rather than delaying the process. “we will separate out and count those and add those in. We're there going to be an asterisk saying these ballots have the same.” - There is tension between continuing the presidential race audit and addressing potential irregularities. The instruction given is to complete the audit portion first and then review any issues. “the process right now is for you to put them in the piles where they belong and for the presidential vote and count the presidential votes… finish the presidential race audit, not separate them out, and then we'll move forward from there.” - The officials acknowledge the underlying concern about the precinct and previous issues with county ballots, but reiterate that, at this moment, the priority is to obtain a count and finish the audit. “We understand that there may be possibly an issue with this precinct. We understand that. But what I need for you to do right now is to finish the audit process.” - They clarify that the current activity is not an investigation, and that the aim is to produce a number for how many ballots were in the can when counting began, enabling progress based on the audit results. “This is not an investigation right now… not an investigation, not counting… what I need you to do is complete the audit so we can get a number.” In sum, the participants are focused on completing the ballot-count audit to establish a definitive tally, while acknowledging concerns about signatures and precinct irregularities, and planning to address those concerns after the audit yields a numeric result for the presidential ballots. The priority repeatedly stated is to finish the audit to obtain a count, then proceed with any further review.

Last week, Miss Walker asked Mr. Zach about the whereabouts of the media sticks. He repeatedly claimed not to know where they were. Miss Walker urged him to find them. Eventually, on Friday afternoon, Mr. Zach located the media sticks. Surprisingly, they were not in his office vault but with election commissioner Mr. Clark. When asked about the source of the media sticks, Mr. Clark did not provide an answer. He argued that he had the right to be involved in the election, despite the law stating that the items should be kept in Mr. Zach's vault.

The speaker witnessed someone using correction tape inside a tabulator machine, which caused the ballots to get jammed. The tape was placed back in the machine after being peeled off. The speaker explained that if a ballot goes through the machine with the tape on it, the machine won't read anything, and the user can override it. The speaker also mentioned that the ballots had no numbers at the top, but they assumed the machine wouldn't read them and the user could manually input the ticket type. The person operating the machine repeatedly put the same set of 27 ballots in instead of separating them, resulting in an inaccurate count. The speaker explained that the machine doesn't have a way to detect if the same ballot has been inserted multiple times, as the sensor and reader are covered.

The discussion centers on moving forward with a ballot audit to obtain a count, despite concerns about a particular precinct. Speaker 0 emphasizes that without counts, progress is impossible and asserts that this moment is not the time for an investigation into the precinct. The goal is to complete the audit to determine how many ballots are present. Speaker 1 asks for clarification about whether there is additional focus or findings beyond the current audit. Speaker 0 reiterates the need to proceed with the audit and produce a tally of ballots, indicating that delaying is not an option at this point. A key point arises about how to handle multiple ballots that show the same signature. Speaker 0 and Speaker 2 acknowledge the concern and discuss that while the primary process is to complete the audit, there will be a method to account for these potentially problematic ballots. Speaker 2 suggests that an asterisk can be added to indicate that certain ballots share the same signature, and that those ballots will be separated out and counted in the work. Speaker 0 continues to stress that the precinct’s concerns are understood, but the immediate instruction is to finish the audit portion, not to conduct an investigation or to engage in counting beyond the audit. The immediate task is to produce a number for how many ballots were present at the start of counting and then proceed from there. Speaker 2 confirms that a number will be produced, though there is an acknowledgment that there may be questions about the validity of some ballots. Speaker 0 clarifies that the current process requires ballots to be put into the correct files and that presidential votes must be counted, while not engaging in separate, non-audit counting at this stage. Throughout, Speaker 0 reiterates the need to complete the audit portion first, to obtain the count, and then address any subsequent concerns or issues, including potential validity questions. The conversation closes with an acknowledgment that there may be issues with the precinct and that, once the audit is completed, they can move forward with the results while addressing the concerns that have been raised.

- The discussion centers on ballot processing in Maricopa County, with several shipments arriving after the initial belief that counting was near completion. Speaker 0 notes that the Wednesday before the Friday they quit voting, and ten days before they quit tabulating, more truckloads of ballots came in, leading to the question: “how can you not know how many ballots are still out there?” - Speaker 1 asks for clarification: “They thought they were done.” The conversation confirms multiple times that those running the counting rooms believed they were almost done, or would be done, on Wednesday morning, then Thursday morning, then Friday morning, and the process extended into the next week. - Trucks bringing ballots arrived on the third, fourth, and fifth days, continuing throughout the last week. The last day mentioned is the tenth, with ballots still arriving. The company involved is Runback, described as doing high-speed scanning and printing of duplications and military ballots. There was no observer presence at Runback, and Speaker 0 indicates she had not been called to work there; she does not know exactly what Runback was doing (printing vs. scanning). - It is stated that all high-speed scanning occurs at Runback, and the ballots go to Runback. There is uncertainty about off-site scanning and whether Dominion equipment was involved. Speaker 0 clarifies: “They were duplications, the ballots that wouldn’t read through the tabulation machines. They were ballots that came in from military and overseas.” The number of additional sources for ballots beyond military/overseas is unknown, and Speaker 0 suggests this is a question for county employees to explain. - About the counting process: Speaker 0 confirms that the ballots went through tabulation machines and that adjudication work took place for those late arrivals. They observed the ballots being processed, but did not know the exact totals for certain days. - Daily volumes are described. Speaker 0 estimates: one day a shift might handle 90,000 ballots, and some days had similar volumes across three shifts; other days had fewer. There were days when as few as 15,000 ballots were processed. The “back door” arrivals are contrasted with the front door, with Speaker 0 noting that all back door ballots were received through back entries, not the front door. The remaining ballots in the latter part of the period continued to come in and be tabulated, with ongoing full-time shifts through the eighth, ninth, and tenth days. - The episode concludes with Speaker 1 seeking further explanation, and Speaker 0 indicating that some of the details were not fully known and that a county employee should clarify where the incoming ballots came from during the latter part of the period.

In Downtown Detroit at the TCF Center, a video discussion describes what a caller says happened during ballot processing. The account asserts that after precincts had counted ballots and were ready to close, three vehicles—a van, a Chrysler 300, and a Ferrari—arrived at about 4:00 a.m. with a claimed 130,000 ballots. The claim is that every one of these ballots were Biden ballots that had not been delivered to the precinct before its cutoff, constituting a “big irregularity” and suggesting voter fraud. The speakers say this is being contested by the president in a lawsuit for Michigan, with people who allegedly witnessed the event. Speaker 1 adds that back rooms at the facility enabled cars to drive in through a garage door, and that ballots appeared between 10:30 p.m. and 3:30 a.m. Approximately 38,000 ballots were said to have arrived in that window, with a reported count of 61 ballots described as being in USPS boxes. The boxes were not necessarily USPS-delivered; a white van with the city clerk’s emblem appeared to be delivering them, bearing the name Janice Winfrey and related tagline. The implication is that ballots arrived in an unverified, potentially improper manner. Speaker 2 notes possible additional vehicles present at the time and mentions that a mini panel truck with Detroit Elections Bureau regalia and a vehicle ID number was observed, with other people recording license plate information. The lack of verifiable chain of custody is emphasized: there was no confirmed Republican/Democrat presence during transfer, and seals on ballots were not verified. The speaker contrasts this with a suburbs experience where ballots were methodically processed, sealed, and tracked, implying Detroit’s process lacked similar controls. Speaker 3 explains that Gateway Pundit obtained video of the event after a delay, and that local media personnel claimed the event did not occur. The video shows an escort car and a lead car delivering items inside the facility, with the escort car reportedly from Pennsylvania and possibly a rental. The Michigan group, Patty’s group, counted drop-box ballots and reported about 1,340 to 1,400 ballots dropped in Detroit over the last two days. In contrast, after the shutdown, officials allegedly claimed 16,000 ballots were dropped in, with the question of where those additional ballots originated. Speaker 4 reinforces the Michigan group’s tally of roughly 1,340–1,400 ballots from drop boxes in Detroit in the adjacent period and points to the discrepancy between that count and the 16,000 ballots later cited, noting the eight-hour gap after the official closing time and the two separate deliveries to the TCF Center. The overarching claim is that these events indicate irregularities in ballot handling and raise questions about the source and legitimacy of the large ballot influx.

Speaker 0 mentions the possibility of printing out something. Speaker 1 asks about the reason for the uncounted votes. Speaker 2 clarifies that there is no concrete explanation for why those votes were not counted by the machine. Speaker 1 confirms that they don't know why the votes didn't get scanned. Speaker 2 asks if the Dominion Tech guys have figured out the reason, but Speaker 0 says they are not allowed to comment. Speaker 2 points out that it hasn't been confirmed if it was a memory card issue. Speaker 1 agrees and suggests it could be human error. Speaker 0 says the ballots didn't transfer over correctly, but they don't have a definite answer yet. Speaker 2 asks if it could be a software issue, but Speaker 0 refuses to speculate. They conclude that they don't have a pinpointed answer at the moment.

The speaker asks if the person is aware that the outer envelope of a ballot must have the date, time, and signature of the town clerk. The person admits they were not aware. The speaker then asks if the person instructed their absentee ballot moderator about this rule, to which the person responds that they went over the manual but did not specifically mention the signature requirement. The speaker shows an example of an envelope without a signature and asks if it should have been counted. The person objects, but the speaker clarifies that they were in charge of counting the ballots. The person admits they did not discuss the signature requirement with the moderator. The speaker asks if the person's office ever checked for the clerk's signature on the envelopes, to which the person says it never came up in their training.

The speaker describes observing absentee/mail-in ballots and recording details from the ballots. They wrote down the ballot numbers and the last names of the person named on each ballot. The ballots appeared to be in sequence, which, according to the speaker, should not happen with mail-in ballots, since mail-in ballots come in at different times and numbers. The speaker recalls that when they noticed the numbers were almost next to each other—one in the middle, then another—they became suspicious. The speaker asked the supervisor about this, noting there was not even a date on the envelopes. The envelopes were marked November 2020, but there was no second number or other identifying date visible. When the speaker inquired about the date on a specific envelope, the response was hostile: the supervisors became angry and told them they were not letting them do their job and that the speaker was disturbing them. To avoid being kicked out, the speaker and the others in the room chose not to challenge the process further, since they did not want to be removed and there were only a few people present. The speaker also observed that the sequence of ballot numbers all originated from the same area—Guarded Street in Downtown Detroit. The ballots’ signatures looked alike, and none of the envelopes had dates stamped on them. The envelopes appeared to be missing a second or third date, or any date, and none of the ballots were appearing in the voting system. Additionally, the speaker notes that these ballots were being entered manually, and they asserted that none of these details would be present in the poll book or the system. The overall implication is that there was irregularity in the handling of these absentee ballots, with sequential numbers, indistinct dates, signatures resembling each other, and manual entry outside the expected process, raising concerns about whether the ballots were being processed consistent with standard procedures.

Speaker 0 notes that there were at least more than two of your direct employees and one indirect at the TCF center, up to nine, though no names are provided to avoid threats; they request clarification on each person’s responsibilities and roles during the process. Speaker 1 states backups were created by Tina Peters, Mesa County, Colorado county clerk. They are receiving information across the country that Dominion reps were going in under the guise of trusted build maintenance and wiping records. Under one dash 12 dash 69, those records by law have to be preserved. They caution not to blame staff, explaining a knee-jerk reaction by Dominion in Michigan to convince clerk staff they must have done something wrong. When discussing county liability, they emphasize listening to Mr. Lindbergh’s expert opinion. Speaker 0 asks about Ethernet access for adjudicators and tabulators in the TCF Center. Speaker 2 responds that the devices are not connected to the Internet; they are designed to be completely standalone and connected locally in a local area network separate from the Internet. Speaker 3 explains the vehicle for transmission from the ICP is a cellular modem, which can be configured in a VPN; Chicago and Cook County work with Verizon to secure that network, implying the same capabilities are available elsewhere. They note that multiple wireless chipsets/modems are supported, depending on jurisdiction preferences and network compatibility. Speaker 4 adds that some jurisdictions use a 3G modem (GSM) but can support multiple modem varieties, including latest 4G/5G standards. They confirm applicability across different networks (Verizon, AT&T, Sprint). They mention transmitting from the ICP in Mongolia, indicating no network limitations. In Puerto Rico, three vendors are used (Claro, AT&T, and T-Mobile) due to incomplete island coverage. Speaker 0 asks again about Ethernet setup to join the LAN. Speaker 5 paraphrases a claim that Dominion could fix the problem, implying Dominion can communicate with the device. Speaker 6 explains, by analogy to Apple remote support, that permission was given to take over the device to reprogram it from Adams Park to SSO 2 A and B at West Balding Drive Elementary. Speaker 7 shares observations from the TCF Center on the third and fourth, noting irregularities on election day. Randy Bishop, who owns radio stations and is IT-savvy, showed him high-speed scanners and tabulators with Ethernet lines running out of the tabulators, all bundled together and connected to routers and a main computer, which he says are connected to the Internet and that such connectivity is illegal and should not happen because it opens them to hacking. Speaker 2 reiterates that the computers in the local area network are connected via an RJ45 connector.

I was surprised to learn that there was no signature verification done for the ballots. I questioned how ballots without signatures were handled, and the response was they were just sent back out. This made me uncomfortable certifying the results.

The speaker asks if the person is aware that the outer envelope of a ballot must have the date, time, and signature of the town clerk. The person admits they were not aware of this. The speaker then questions if the person instructed the absentee ballot moderator about this rule, to which the person says they did not. The speaker shows examples of envelopes with and without the clerk's signature, and asks if the one without should have been counted. The person agrees that it should not have been counted. The speaker asks if the person ever checked for the clerk's signature on envelopes, and the person says it never came up in their training.

The speaker emphasizes the importance of looking beyond what is shown on TV or in generic reports about elections. They explain that these are just interpretations and not official counts, making it difficult to prosecute any wrongdoing. To truly address the issue, one must delve into the intricate details of the process. The speaker mentions that they have only mentioned about half of the auditable touch points involved in elections, with many more unknown to the general public. These touch points are all documented with date and time stamps, similar to the 2,000 murals mentioned earlier.

The discussion covered the importance of tape attachment to election materials. Speaker 0 recounts that well-heeled individuals insisted on knowing exactly where a van was going and what it contained, indicating concerns about tracking the contents and destination. Speaker 1 adds that legally the tape must be attached to indicate which tapes came from which precinct and belong to which return sheet, and whether it needs to be attached depends on legal requirements. The two speakers agree that there is a combination of legal necessity and practical need for proper labeling. The main reconciliation challenge described is aligning the number of people voted with the yellow books and with the return to balance. Speaker 0 mentions that reconciling the used and unused balance is something that could be addressed later, but it is not easy. Both speakers emphasize the stress on those handling the process, noting that “these poor people” came in sweating bullets because they feared they were going to weapon cuffs. The need to attach the tape is stressed as a crucial requirement.