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Ukraine has biological research facilities that concern us. We are worried that Russian forces may try to control them. Therefore, we are collaborating with Ukraine on how to prevent Russian forces from gaining control of any of the research materials if they get close.

The discussion centers on U.S. involvement in biological research in Ukraine amidst accusations from Russia. A U.S. official claimed that any biological or chemical weapon incidents would be attributed to Russia, which has been accused of using disinformation tactics. The conversation reveals that the U.S. has funded biological laboratories in Ukraine, which study dangerous pathogens. Despite denials from U.S. officials about developing biological weapons, there are concerns about the security of these materials in a conflict zone. The Chinese government has called for inspections of these facilities, highlighting international concerns about biological safety. The need for transparency and accountability regarding U.S. actions in Ukraine is emphasized, as the situation remains precarious.

In Ukraine, there were military biological programs experimenting with deadly pathogens like coronavirus, anthrax, cholera, and African pig plague. They are now trying to hide the evidence, but we believe they were creating components for a biological weapon. This poses a direct threat to Russia's safety. Ukraine and their US supporters rejected these claims, but their actions were bold and brazen.

We used to have a sophisticated biological weapons program from World War 2 to the sixties, which ended in 1969. Many records of the program were destroyed, but some are resurfacing. Our offensive weapons program was massive and advanced, but not well-known by most people.

Ray McGovern recounts a long, inside view of U.S.–Soviet/Russian arms control and how it shaped or hindered security over decades, tying personal experience to broader strategic lessons. - Continuity and historical perspective. McGovern notes that, after decades in the CIA, he has witnessed both continuity and change in U.S. strategy across eras and administrations. He emphasizes that serious arms control and verification work has often depended on skilled, principled diplomacy even amid bureaucratic friction and political constraints. - Early arms-control work and verification. As chief of the Soviet Foreign Policy Branch in the CIA during the SALT era, he helped support Kissinger and Nixon while recognizing that the Russians faced pressure from both arms racing and concerns about China’s progress. He recalls briefing the Moscow delegation and the importance of verification: “Trust but verify.” He describes witnessing the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty negotiations and the process of uncovering Russian cheating (a radar at Krasnoyarsk later identified as ABM-related). The experience reinforced the value of independent verification mechanisms. - Personal anecdotes about diplomacy and decision-making. McGovern shares instances illustrating how diplomacy operated in practice: Kissinger touring Moscow covertly to broker deals; ambassador Beam's reaction in Helsinki; the sense that a president’s trusted aides could push forward arms-control progress even amid Senate resistance. He stresses the role of credible, informed analysis about the Soviet Union and Gorbachev, and the way that genuine engagement with Moscow helped reduce tensions at key moments (e.g., the late-1970s/early-1980s path toward detente and arms control). - Key treaties and turning points. He highlights several milestones: - ABM Treaty (1972): limiting ABM sites to two, then one, to preserve deterrence stability; verification challenges and the Russians’ willingness to negotiate under pressure. - Reykjavik and the late-1980s era: Reagan’s willingness to pursue arms-control breakthroughs; the shift that helped lead to meaningful reductions. - INF Treaty (1991/1992 onward) and its later withdrawal under Trump: the collapse of a pillar of strategic stability and its consequences for future arms control. - New START (2011): described as “really good” in limiting offensive missiles; its expiry topic is central to the current security calculation. Putin’s public suggestion to extend the treaty for another year, conditional on U.S. reciprocity, is noted; Trump’s stance is portrayed as uncertain or inconsistent. - The broader security architecture and indivisible security. McGovern stresses that “there is no security without mutual security” and points to the OSCE concept of indivisible security—no country should increase its security at the expense of others. He argues that NATO expansion and security dynamics in Europe have undermined mutual security and contributed to the current fragility in the security architecture. - Ukraine, NATO, and the stakes of perception. He contends that Moscow viewed NATO expansion and Ukraine’s trajectory as threats to its core security interests, contributing to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. He argues that Americans are often not educated about mutual security principles, which fuels misperceptions and escalatory dynamics. - Putin as a cautious actor and the risk of leadership reliability. McGovern describes Putin as a cautious statesman who aims to protect Russia’s core interests and avoid existential risk. He suggests Putin is calculating the reliability of U.S. leadership, especially under Trump, whose unpredictability complicates trust and predictability in negotiations. He notes Trump’s perceived narcissism and the possibility that Trump’s motivations in pursuing a peace process could be mixed with personal prestige or political gain. - Current and near-term outlook. The discussion touches on the likelihood of renewed arms-control leverage if U.S. and Russian leaders can agree on Ukraine-related constraints and verify compliance. It also notes that the broader trend—toward weaker, inconsistent adherence to treaties and a perceived decline in diplomacy—risks fueling a renewed arms race and greater instability. - Closing sentiment. McGovern underscores that genuine arms-control diplomacy, mutual restraint, and credible verification are essential for reducing the security dilemma that drives dangerous competition. He frames Putin as a potential hinge for stabilizing relations if U.S. leadership can articulate and sustain a credible, reciprocal security posture. Overall, the dialogue weaves historical memory with current geopolitics, stressing that lasting security rests on mutual restraint, verifiable agreements, and a shared understanding of indivisible security—even as political winds shift and alliances realign.

The discussion centers on gain-of-function (GoF) research, its regulation, and the motivations behind it. The first speaker notes the administration’s goal to end GoF research and asks where that stands. The second speaker says progress has been made, and the White House is working on a formal policy. He then defines the issue in stages: what GoF research is, why someone would do it, and how to regulate it to prevent dangerous projects that could catastrophically harm human populations. He clarifies that GoF research is not inherently bad, but dangerous GoF research is. He gives an insulin example: creating bacteria to produce insulin is a legitimate GoF that benefits diabetics. In contrast, taking a virus from bat caves, bringing it to a lab in a densely populated city with weak biosafety, and manipulating it to be more transmissible among humans is a dangerous GoF that should not be supported. The administration’s policy aims to prevent such dangerous work entirely, and the President signed an executive order in April or May endorsing this policy. Next, he discusses implementation: how to create incentives to ensure this research does not recur. He explains that the utopian idea behind such research was to prevent all pandemics by collecting viruses from wild places, testing their potential to infect humans by increasing their pathogenicity, and then preparing countermeasures in advance (vaccines, antivirals) and stockpiling them, even though those countermeasures would not have been tested against humans yet. If a virus did leap to humans, the foreseen countermeasures might prove ineffective because evolution is unpredictable. This “triage” approach—identifying pathogens most likely to leap and preemptively preparing against them—was the rationale for dangerous GoF work, a rationale he characterizes as flawed. He notes that many scientists considered this an effort to do bioweapons research under the guise of safety and defense. The work is dual-use. The U.S. is a signatory to the Biological Weapons Convention and does not conduct offensive bio-weapons research, but other countries might. The discussion highlights that the GoF research discussed during the pandemic can backfire and may not align with true biodefense, since countermeasures might not match whatever pathogen actually emerges. The speaker concludes that this agenda—pursuing GoF to prevent pandemics—has drawn substantial support from parts of the Western world and other countries for about two and a half decades, but he implies it is not deserving of continuation.

President Richard Nixon announced in 1969 that the United States would renounce the use of deadly biological weapons, but few Americans knew that the country had been operating a secret bioweapons program for over 25 years. Born out of fear during World War II, the program conducted extensive research and experiments, even using human subjects. The British and Japanese also had their own bioweapons programs, with the Japanese conducting horrific experiments on thousands of people. The US program, fueled by the Cold War, conducted tests on American cities and human subjects, proving the feasibility of biological warfare. However, concerns over the uncontrollable nature of these weapons and the mounting political pressure led to the program's eventual end in 1969.

Four days ago, I wouldn't have believed the Biden administration was funding secret biolabs in Ukraine, but Under Secretary of State Nuland confirmed their existence during a Senate hearing. Despite fact-checks dismissing it as Russian disinformation, these labs are real, and Nuland expressed concern about their contents falling into Russian hands. The Russian Defense Ministry claimed the labs were developing military biological programs with US funding, possibly involving deadly pathogens like plague and anthrax. The US embassy in Ukraine has a web page explaining that American and Ukrainian scientists have worked on a whole bunch of different experiments like this. The US government is downplaying the situation, with the Pentagon calling Russian accusations "absurd."

I hide my face due to my job. For almost a year, my team has gathered evidence on secret US labs in Ukraine, suspected by the Russian interior ministry of testing biological weapons. When the Ukrainian army retreated, we tried but failed to remove all materials. Investigators found evidence of deadly viruses and patient test paperwork in the abandoned lab. We don't know how many centers have been established in Ukraine over the past eight years, but the Russian military has found signs of them in most liberated major settlements. Many people worldwide are trying to find out who created this bioweapons factory network, how long it has operated, where, and how many deaths it's responsible for.

You don't need a secret lab or a massive complex to create bioweapons. Unlike nuclear weapons, biological weapons can be developed discreetly, blending in with legitimate activities like vaccine production. This dual-use nature makes it difficult to detect a biological weapons program.

We know that approximately 40-plus laboratories directly worked with the Pentagon. More than a dozen have ceased operation, likely due to our influence. Some were relocated to other territories and continued their activities. I cannot say that the biological program in Ukraine has been completely shut down. There's a misconception about what military biological research entails. It's not like the infamous Japanese Unit 731. It's much simpler in some ways and more complex in others, involving advanced research and artificial intelligence. These so-called garage laboratories have kits that can synthesize viruses. All of this is integrated into a single information system, ultimately controlled by the same entities, whether it's the Pentagon or other organizations.

To create a defensive program against bioterrorism, the speaker consulted with unconventional sources. These included former U.S. bioweapons experts from decades ago, international figures from countries like the U.K., and defectors from the Soviet Union. The speaker learned from these experts to inform the development of a multi-billion dollar program.

The military industrial complex often evokes images of soldiers in combat, but it encompasses much more. In light of recent global events, previously taboo topics, including government secrecy around bio labs, have gained attention. One notable example is Project 112, authorized in 1962 under Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. This project involved extensive testing of biological and chemical agents, including VX nerve gas, Sarin, and E. Coli, across various locations. The aim was to explore controlled temporary incapacitation as a military strategy. The government denied Project 112's existence until 2000, raising concerns about the safety of military personnel involved, many of whom were unaware of the risks. The project reflects a troubling reality where governments that condemn bioweapons may simultaneously engage in their development, leaving the public unaware of the potential dangers lurking in their midst.

Ukraine has biological research facilities that they are concerned Russian forces may try to gain control of. They are working with Ukraine to prevent any research materials from falling into Russian hands. Russian propaganda groups are spreading information about a Ukrainian plot to release biological weapons, but there is no doubt in the speaker's mind that if there is an incident, it would be the Russians behind it. The Russians have a history of blaming others for their own plans.

Министерство обороны Российской Федерации продолжает исследовать военно-биологическую деятельность США на Украине и в других регионах. Обращалось внимание на перенос незавершенных украинских проектов в постсоветские страны и Юго-Восточную Азию. В настоящее время особый интерес вызывает Африка, которую США рассматривают как источник опасных инфекций и площадку для медицинских экспериментов. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation continues to investigate the military-biological activities of the United States in Ukraine and other regions. Attention has been drawn to the transfer of unfinished Ukrainian projects to post-Soviet countries and Southeast Asia. Currently, Africa has become a focal point, viewed by the U.S. as a source of dangerous pathogens and a testing ground for medical experiments.

Speaker 0 argues that parasites have become a problem because they have been weaponized. They reference a Nobel Prize-winning finding showing that a certain parasite could produce stomach cancer in rats, and that a different parasite produced this effect in Japan. They note these results only worked in animals that ate a high-sugar diet or were vaccinated, not in healthy animals. They then connect this to twentieth-century American policy: vaccination began with troops during World War I and continued in the military, then expanded to schoolchildren after World War II. The speaker predicts that vaccines at school would eventually affect broader segments of the population, not just children, and claims that vaccines have the effect of making people more susceptible to parasites, including those that cause cancer, not just toxoplasmosis. Regarding diet, the speaker mentions the food pyramid of the twentieth century, pointing out that the bottom consisted of carbohydrates, implying a link to susceptibility. The speaker then discusses bioweapons policy: in 1971, Nixon declared an end to the United States bioweapons offensive program and signed a treaty (they mention a 1978 figure, implying a multinational agreement). They claim that, despite this treaty, the Soviet Union and others violated it, and that perhaps everyone violated it. They assert that, at the same time the treaty was signed, Fort Detrick was converted from a bioweapons lab to be part of the National Cancer Institute. They compare this to Nazi Germany, stating that they hid bioweapons under cancer research, and claim that the United States did something similar. The transcription ends with emphatic agreement.

Ukraine has biological research facilities that are at risk of being seized by Russian troops. We are collaborating with Ukraine to ensure that these research materials do not fall into Russian hands as they advance.

The Defense Ministry has validated initial allegations with undeniable proof. Over 2,000 documents were analyzed during a Special Military Operation, confirming military biological projects in Ukraine. Officials involved in organizing military biological research in the United States and Ukraine were identified.

Ukraine has biological research facilities that they are concerned Russian forces may try to gain control of. They are working with Ukraine to prevent any research materials from falling into Russian hands. Russian propaganda groups are spreading information about a Ukrainian plot to release biological weapons, but there is no doubt in the speaker's mind that if there is an incident or attack, it would be the Russians behind it. The speaker believes it is a classic Russian technique to blame others for what they plan to do themselves.

Ukraine has biological research facilities that we are concerned Russian forces may try to control. We are collaborating with the Ukrainians to secure these research materials and prevent them from falling into Russian hands.

In the early nineties, Soviet defectors revealed the BioPreparat program to the West, causing concern. A senior Soviet official defector later wrote a book detailing the program's exotic experiments, including genetic composite weapons. Initially dismissed as implausible, advancements in genetic engineering now make bioengineered weapons a credible possibility.

Scott Ritter and the interviewer discuss the looming end of the New START treaty and the broader implications for global arms control, stability, and security. - The New START treaty, described by Ritter as the remaining nuclear arms control framework, expires, and without a moratorium on deployed caps or a new treaty, the risk of nuclear war between the United States and Russia, and also with China, could rise significantly. Ritter calls this “earth ending significant” and says the six-decade arms-control legacy would be at risk if no replacement is negotiated. - Ritter emphasizes that New START has provided a framework of stability through on-site inspections, data exchange, and verifiable limits. He notes that the treaty’s value rests on confidence that numbers are correct, which requires robust verification, something he argues was compromised by the lack of inspections in the last two years and by political gamesmanship during negotiations. Rose Gutermiller’s warning about needing a confidence baseline for a potential one-year moratorium is highlighted. - The historical arc of arms control is traced from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the ABM treaty, which Ritter says was foundational because it established the concept of mutually assured destruction. He argues that many subsequent arms-control efforts, including START and particularly INF, were intertwined with the ABM framework and mutual deterrence. The INF treaty is highlighted as the occasion where Ritter was the first ground-based weapons inspector in the Soviet Union, underscoring the value of on-site verification. - Ritter recounts how START was negotiated amid a collapsing Soviet Union, and how post-Soviet realities (nuclear weapons in former Soviet states under Russian control) affected negotiations. He contends that Soviet/Russian leaders perceived START as potentially “bullying” and that Western confidence in Russian strategic deterrence diminished after the end of the Cold War, which contributed to tensions over missile defenses and strategic postures. - The dialogue reviews the evolution of U.S.-Russian relations and how perceptions of threat or weakness influenced policy. Ritter recalls that Russian leadership warned of consequences when the ABM treaty was abandoned and that fear and respect shaped early arms-control cooperation. He asserts that American arrogance toward Russia, including dismissive attitudes toward Russian concerns about missile defenses, harmed trust and contributed to instability. - The involvement of China is treated as a separate but connected issue. China’s position, as outlined in its white paper, is not seeking an arms race and endorses a “no first use” policy, but argues that the United States and Russia must first resolve their bilateral arms-control arrangements before China would join in a broader framework. China argues for all parties to reduce numbers, while insisting China should not be treated as a mere subset of a U.S.-Russia framework. - Ritter asserts that the current U.S. approach to modernization and expansion of strategic forces could precipitate a three-way arms race (U.S., Russia, China) and notes a planned shift in U.S. posture, including potential reactivation of underground testing and revamping warhead delivery systems. He argues that if the process proceeds, other nations might follow with their own nuclear programs, eroding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework and undermining decades of nonproliferation efforts. - He contrasts the current situation with past arms-control muscle memory. He laments the loss of experienced negotiators and Russian area expertise, arguing that today’s policymakers and some academics treat arms control as transactional or overly adversarial rather than as a reciprocal, trust-based process. He claims there is a shortage of genuine arms-control specialists and describes a culture in which the media and academia have overlooked or mischaracterized Russia’s behavior, often blaming Moscow for cheating when, in his view, the problem lies with Western overreach and a lack of mutual understanding. - The conversation ends on a bleak note: without renewed treaties, verification, and mutual recognition of security concerns, the world could regress to a “Wild West” dynamic of proliferation and competition, with Europe’s security umbrella eroded and a broader risk of renewed testing, modernization, and potential conflict. Overall, the discussion frames the expiry of New START as a pivotal moment with potentially catastrophic consequences for strategic stability, arguing for renewed arms-control engagement, better verification, and a recognition of the intertwined histories and motivations of the United States, Russia, and China.

Ukraine possesses biological research facilities that are currently a cause for concern. There is a possibility that Russian troops may attempt to gain control of these facilities. To prevent any research materials from falling into Russian hands, we are collaborating with Ukraine on strategies to safeguard them.