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There is an old joke that goes God created war so that Americans would learn geography. In 2026, they seem to be learning it the hard way. They’ve discovered that 10,900 kilometers from Washington DC lies the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most critical choke point, a narrow strip of water between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman that stretches 167 kilometers in length, narrows to just 34 kilometers at its tightest point, and carries roughly 30,000 vessels a year. Around a fifth of the world’s traded oil and LNG flows through this corridor on normal days. Most of that oil heads to Asia, but oil prices don’t respect geography. They’re set globally. So when West Asia sneezes, fuel prices spike everywhere. Oil is only the start. Over 30% of global ammonia trade, nearly half of urea, and 20% of diammonium phosphate, key fertilizer inputs, move through this same choke point, along with about half the world’s sulfur for metal processing. If the sulfur didn’t arrive, the factory was shut down. It didn’t arrive because of the war and because the Strait of Hormuz was closed. Unlike oil, these can’t be rerouted. There are no pipelines for ammonia or urea. If Hormuz closes, the nitrogen supply chain doesn’t slow. It stops. And since synthetic nitrogen fertilizers support roughly 48% of the global population, missing the mid April application window in the Northern Hemisphere means lower yields by September. Major importers like India, Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and many African countries would quickly face fertilizer shortages, leading to higher food prices, inflation, and a widespread food security crisis affecting billions. 85% of Brazil’s fertilizer is imported. And under these conditions, we can only bring part of the land under cultivation. Meanwhile, about a third of the world’s helium, critical for semiconductors and MRIs, passes through these strait. So does nearly 10% of global aluminum and a significant share of Persian Gulf produced plastics. Even the Persian Gulf states themselves are exposed. This passage is their food lifeline. The biggest one, Saudi Arabia, imports over 80% of its food. The smallest one, Qatar, 85%. If the strait stays closed for another month or two, the food situation here is gonna get really critical. If anyone thinks the so called first world would be immune, the reality says otherwise. Since the war began, Brent crude has swung from $73 to nearly $120 at one point, adding about €500,000,000 per day in EU energy costs. In late April, the IEA warned Europe may have only six weeks of jet fuel left as West Asian imports falter. Prices have surged past $1,500 per ton. The IEA calls this “the greatest energy crisis in history.” By April 22, Lufthansa had canceled 20,000 flights with more disruptions and price hikes expected. In Germany, the industrial heart of Europe, 78.6% of firms report uncertainty about their future, rising to 87.7% in manufacturing and over 90% in chemicals, rubber, and plastics. The US isn’t insulated either. Gas prices jumped more than $1 per gallon in just six weeks, surpassing $4.10, the highest level since 2022, while the Hormuz shock fuels inflation. They said the consumer price index rose 0.9% in March, almost 1% in just one month. I haven’t seen a jump like that in years. Meanwhile, a Reuters/Ipsos poll put Trump’s approval rating at 36%, its lowest since his return to office. Forty-eight hours into the Iran war, marine insurers began canceling war risk coverage in the Persian Gulf. By March 5, commercial insurance had effectively vanished. No insurance means no shipping. No shipping means no trade. This isn’t a new insight. Back in 1507, Portuguese admiral Alfonso de Albuquerque understood that Whoever controls this choke point controls the flow between India and the Mediterranean. And by extension, global trade itself. So far, the largest empire in history finds itself with remarkably little to say against one of the oldest. Perhaps this time, the Americans picked the wrong country to learn geography.

Jiang Shuichin argues that rapid shifts in international power generally become highly disruptive and destabilizing, often coinciding with major world-order changes after major wars or state collapses. He says the Iran war could have wider ramifications beyond the Strait of Hormuz and the region, potentially dragging the broader world into escalating conflict. He explains that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has long been a major driver of the global economy by selling oil cheaply in US dollars and recycling revenue into the US economy. If GCC states were removed from the global economy, he says it would have “tremendous consequences.” He claims that within “a month or two” the world could run out of strategic fuel reserves, grounding airplanes. He also links the conflict to global food supply, stating that the Tigray War provides one third of the world’s fertilizer, and that during the global growing season widespread famine could occur within “five months” or “six months,” especially in Africa. On the Middle East’s reorientation, he argues that Iran can control the Strait of Hormuz de facto, collect tolls, and de facto use it to reconstruct its economy, industrialize, and build stronger trade relations with China and Russia. He says the US imposed a naval blockade to embargo Iranian oil exports to China, but that enforcement is difficult due to the Indian Ocean’s scale and US resource limitations. He asserts that the UAE is “most desperate for war” after losing control of trade through the region’s shipping and finance hub. He adds that Saudi Arabia faces long-term threat dynamics because Iranian influence and proxies affect both Hormuz/Straight security and the Red Sea. He claims Israel wants the war to continue to advance the “Greater Israel” project and warns it has discussed attacking Turkey and Egypt next. He frames the region as a “powder keg,” arguing it is hard for the status quo to persist and predicting possible future breakout regional hostilities, including possible US airstrikes against Tehran and possible Israeli false-flag escalation modeled on the Gulf of Tonkin incident. He suggests the status quo could last “the next three to five months,” arguing Trump would avoid being seen as a loser and might pursue a tentative agreement before shifting attention elsewhere. He presents Cuba as a potential “next global flash point,” arguing the US embargo blocks Cuba from accessing fuel, food, and water, and that Raúl Castro could be indicted, recalling a prior pattern involving Maduro and special forces. He says Russia is heavily invested in Cuba and that both Russia and China are trying to support it. He predicts the Middle East conflict could expand to other flashpoints worldwide, including the possibility of tensions involving North Korea and South Korea, and he claims the war in Europe will also escalate. In discussing Russia’s Ukraine war trajectory, he references an attack on a student dormitory in Luhansk that reportedly killed at least six students and says Putin promised swift retaliation, framing this as potential movement from a “special military operation” toward declaring war and switching to “total war.” He then argues that European elites are trapped in a self-reinforcing fantasy that Ukraine is winning, describing domestic and institutional dynamics that prevent acknowledgment of losses and sustain continued war support. Regarding China’s and Russia’s roles, he says Iranian Foreign Minister Araki visited both Russia and China and claims Putin told him Russia is supportive of the Iranian people and views the US and Israel as aggressors. He says if Iran faces difficulties, Russia would reinforce Iran through the Caspian Sea and describes Russia’s response to GCC complaints about Iran. He contrasts China’s approach as neutral and mediation-focused, arguing China seeks peace and ceasefire so the world can return to global trade and that China refuses a clear stance. He also claims China might sign an agreement with the US to buy more LNG to compensate for lost Middle East LNG, especially Qatar. He describes negotiations between the US and Iran as having “three sticking points.” The uranium issue, he says, could allow compromise through allowing international inspectors while keeping uranium. The Strait of Hormuz control, he says, is core to Iranian security and not something Iran would give up. The third sticking point is Lebanon and the requirement that any peace treaty with the US also applies to Lebanon, including Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. He argues that Israel’s offensive in Lebanon makes lasting peace unlikely and suggests any settlement with Iran would be tentative and could resume within “at most six months.” He argues the US cannot retreat from the Iran war because US financing needs depend on the world continuing to buy US Treasuries and because continuous bombardment is limited by depleted munitions stocks after earlier sustained airstrikes. He states that to “fight this war effectively” the US would need ground troops, which he says would require a national draft and also a chain of events to justify the invasion, including a need for “justification” to rally Americans and create broader economic chaos that would make the invasion acceptable. On Israel’s “Greater Israel” project, he argues that Lebanon is part of the project and that even if the US and Iran reach tentative terms, Israel’s long-term objective would continue, preventing permanent peace. He also claims the Zionist lobby has significant political sway in the US and cites campaign spending aimed at defeating a Republican congressman to warn others. He further argues that conflict models in Europe and Asia are tied to a broader US grand strategy: shifting global conflict to sustain debt and delay economic constraints. He says the US would aim to retreat geographically while still financing and arming partners to prolong wars. For East Asia, he claims the US might allow Japan and South Korea to handle more while American forces and allied structures support containment dynamics. Finally, he argues that Taiwan’s status quo is not sustainable and points to a “grand bargain” after Trump’s China visit. He says Western reporting frames the visit as unproductive, while Chinese media and experts view it as a breakthrough that could end the trade war. He claims the bargain could involve US access to China’s financial market and China opposing Taiwan independence, with the US pausing or blocking a weapons shipment to Taiwan and considering onshoring semiconductors. He states he expects Taiwan to be a future flashpoint only near-term at minimum and argues the next major flashpoint could be North Korea rather than Taiwan. He closes by describing a Western “legitimacy crisis,” attributing it to demographic crisis, financialization, and moral decay, and arguing it will lead to a decline of Western society. He also argues immigration debates are framed as purely pro-immigrant versus racist, while culture and cultural cohesion are not addressed.

In this discussion, Zhang Shuay Shin and Speaker 1 analyze the evolving U.S.-Iran confrontation through the lens of global power dynamics, the petrodollar, and the shifting balance among major powers. - The war is framed as primarily about preserving the petrodollar. Speaker 1 argues the United States, burdened by enormous debt, seeks to maintain the dollar’s dominance by controlling energy trade through naval power and strategic choke points. The belief is that the U.S. can weaponize the dollar against rivals, as seen when it froze Russian assets and then moved to stabilize oil markets. BRICS and others are moving toward alternatives, including a gold corridor, challenging the petrodollar’s centrality. The aim is to keep Europe and East Asia dependent on U.S. energy, reinforcing American hegemony, even as historical hubris risks a global backlash turning growing powers against Washington. - The sequence of escalation over six weeks is outlined: after the American attack on Tehran and the Iranian move to close the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. eased sanctions on Russian and Iranian oil to maintain global stability, according to Treasury statements. Escalations targeted civilian infrastructure and strategic chokepoints, with discussions of striking GCC energy infrastructure and desalination plants. A U.S. threat to “bomb Iran back to the stone age” was countered by Iran proposing a ten-point framework—encompassing uranium enrichment rights, lifting sanctions, and security guarantees for Iran and its proxies. The Americans reportedly suggested the framework was workable, but negotiations in Islamabad stalled when U.S. officials did not engage seriously. - The broader objective is posited as not simply a tactical war but a strategic move to ensure U.S. imperial supremacy by shaping energy flows. Speaker 1 speculates Trump’s motive centers on keeping the petrodollar intact, potentially forcing China and other partners to buy energy with dollars. Iran’s willingness to negotiate in Islamabad is linked to pressure from China amid China’s economic strains, particularly as energy needs and Belt and Road investments create vulnerabilities for China if Middle East energy becomes unreliable. - The proposed naval blockade is discussed as difficult to implement directly against Iran due to ballistic missiles; instead, the plan may aim to choke off alternative routes like the Strait of Malacca, leveraging trusted regional partners and allies. Iran could respond via the Red Sea (Bab al-Mandab) or other leverage, including the Houthis, challenging Western control of energy corridors. The overarching aim would be to force a global energy reorientation toward North America, though it risks long-term hostility toward the United States. - The roles of great powers are analyzed: the U.S. strategy is described as exploiting Middle East disruption to preserve the petrodollar, with short-term gains but long-term risks of a broader alliance against U.S. hegemony. Europe and Asia are pressured to adapt, with China’s energy needs especially salient as sanctions tighten Middle East supply. Russia is identified as the principal challenger to U.S. maritime hegemony, while China remains economically entangled, facing strategic incentives to cooperate with the United States if required by economic pressures. - The dialogue considers NATO and Europe, arguing that the real contest is between globalists and nationalists in the United States, with Trump viewed as an agent of empire who may threaten the existing globalist framework. The speakers discuss whether this competition will redefine alliances, the future of NATO, and the possibility that a more Eurasian-led order could emerge if Western powers fail to maintain their maritime advantages. - Finally, Russia’s role is emphasized: Moscow is seen as the key counterweight capable of challenging American maritime dominance, with the war in Iran serving, in part, to counter Russian actions in Ukraine and to incentivize alignment with Russia, China, and Iran against U.S. leadership over the next two decades.

John Mersheimer argues that the war against Iran is not proceeding as the United States hoped and that there is no plausible off-ramp or decisive pathway to victory. He contends that Washington cannot narrate a decisive end to the conflict the way it could have against Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, because the war has not produced a decisive Iranian collapse. Instead, Iran has an incentive to convert the fight into a protracted war of attrition and possesses the means to do so, including a broad set of missiles and drones and the ability to retaliate across the region. The result, he says, is a stalemate in which Iran would drive a hard bargain to secure sanctions relief or other concessions, and escalation by the U.S. and Israel will simply provoke Iran to escalate further. On why Iran will not settle on American terms, Mersheimer emphasizes that Iran has a strong hand and time on its side. He notes that the more time passes, the more desperate the U.S. will be to settle, which strengthens Iran’s position. He argues that even heavy bombardment would not compel Iran to quit; rather, Iran could strike back against Gulf states, Israel, and American assets with significant effect. The Gulf States are particularly vulnerable due to a small number of petroleum sites, short-range missiles, drones, and, crucially, desalination plants that provide most of their fresh water. He cites Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman as heavily dependent on desalination, implying that destroying such infrastructure would have catastrophic humanitarian and economic consequences. Iran could also target energy infrastructure, and even if the Strait of Hormuz remains open, widespread damage to Gulf energy infrastructure would devastate the regional and global economy. He warns that Israel could suffer increasing Iranian pressure as time goes on, especially as interceptors become depleted. Regarding energy and the Strait of Hormuz, Mersheimer stresses that 20% of the world’s oil and gas passes through the Persian Gulf, making the energy dimension the war’s most consequential aspect. He argues that opening the Strait of Hormuz would be exceedingly difficult, and destroying desalination and petroleum infrastructure in the Gulf States would negate any advantage of keeping the straits open. He suggests that escalation without a viable endgame will have grave economic repercussions for the world, pushing the U.S. toward a coerced end that would not be a victory. Mersheimer contends that strategic bombing or air power alone cannot win such wars. He contrasts World War II and Korea/Vietnam with the present, where there are no boots on the ground and no clear path to victory via air power alone. He notes that the deterrent value of air power is limited, and a regime change strategy is notoriously difficult without ground forces. He argues that the decapitation strategy and ongoing escalations are unlikely to produce a decisive American/Israeli victory, and could instead lead to a stalemate or American concession under economic strain. On leadership and credibility, Mersheimer critiques U.S. leadership, particularly President Trump, for ignoring warning from generals and the National Intelligence Council that regime change was unlikely to succeed. He cites General James Mattis-era warnings that there was no viable military option and notes the pre-war intelligence that suggested limited prospects for quick regime change. He points to Trump’s sometimes contradictory and inaccurate statements about Iranian capabilities, including claims that Iran possessed Tomahawk missiles and that U.S. strikes had erased Iran’s nuclear capability. He argues that such statements undermine U.S. credibility, though he distinguishes between outright lies and genuine mistaken beliefs by leaders. The discussion also covers Russia’s involvement, with Russia believed to be providing intelligence to Iran and possibly supplying matériel and oil if needed. Mersheimer asserts that the war benefits Russia strategically: it diverts U.S. resources from Europe and Ukraine, potentially worsens Ukraine’s trajectory, and could raise global energy prices that benefit Russian revenue. He suggests that Russia, and possibly China, have strong incentives to aid Iran to counter American power. Europe’s role is analyzed as largely symbolic or marginal in determining the war’s outcome. Mersheimer argues that European elites are aligned with the U.S., prioritizing NATO continuity and the maintenance of American military presence, despite the damaging consequences for Europe. He suggests a radical approach for Europe: adopt a hardball stance toward the U.S., diversify its economic and strategic relations (including with China, Russia, and India), and resist being economically manipulated or coerced by Washington. He emphasizes that Europe’s interests would be better served by reducing overreliance on the United States and pursuing a more balanced set of strategic partners. Towards the end, the hosts revisit the idea that leaders lie and that liberal democracies tend to rely more on public persuasion and propaganda, with Trump’s statements illustrating the complexities of truth in international politics. The conversation ends with a reflection on whether Europe should recalibrate its posture toward the United States and broaden its strategic hedges to protect its own interests, rather than assuming continued U.S. leadership in a costly and protracted confrontation with Iran.

Mike Adams presents an analysis of what he calls the oil emergency of 2026 and 2027, building on work by Chris Martinson, Mike Rothman, and Rick Ruhl. He asserts there has never been a true oil glut; instead, an oil emergency is unfolding. Key points: - The Strait of Hormuz has seen a dramatic drop in tanker traffic and oil passing through. What would normally be about 16–20 million barrels per day of crude and refined products is now substantially reduced, with estimates of declines ranging from 80% to 90% in some assessments. This missing oil compounds daily, meaning ongoing shortages will worsen over time. - The situation extends beyond crude to natural gas, urea, fertilizer, helium, and sulfur, all of which are “missing from the world stage.” There is no instant recovery from these losses. - Public messaging and price manipulation: Trump administration officials are accused of artificially depressing spot oil prices to keep gasoline affordable, enabling continued consumption. The United States is allegedly selling its strategic petroleum reserves at these artificially low prices to foreign buyers, draining reserves while prices stay low. - Strategic petroleum reserves and responses: SPR use is described as a perversion of its purpose, which is to supply oil in times of war if American supplies are cut off. As reserves decline, the ability to stabilize prices through SPR releases is limited. - Price trajectory: A rigorous analysis suggests oil could rise to $180–$200 per barrel within months, potentially by the fourth quarter of the year. This projection is linked to a global oil shortage, rising prices, and constrained capital liquidity. - Capital liquidity constraints: Sustainable capital is necessary to fund oil exploration, farming, and infrastructure expansion. With rising capital costs (e.g., 30-year Treasuries above 6%, 10-year near 5%), financing for maintaining and expanding oil production becomes harder, reducing the ability to respond to shortages. - Production decline and maintenance: Typical oil wells lose about 5% of output per year if not maintained. Current capex is heavily focused on maintaining existing fields rather than expanding production, and higher costs impede maintenance, accelerating declines. Shale wells, in particular, can lose about 74% of initial production in the first year. - Middle East and regional disruption: If oil wells in the Middle East are shut down, temporary or permanent losses of 20–30% can occur. Reopening wells may yield variable results, with some wells recovering less than before. The war has damaged export infrastructure across the region, including in the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, and potential further US strikes could worsen the situation. - Global impact: The loss of Persian Gulf throughput, plus strikes on Russian oil infrastructure and other disruptions, represents a global attack on oil supply. An “air pocket” in supply could persist for months, possibly years, as infrastructure repairs take years (gas trains in Qatar, for example, may take three to five years). - U.S. and global demand dynamics: The United States is a major crude importer; reduced supply will push up prices and tighten diesel supplies, which are critical for the economy. Diesel shortages would severely impact transportation and energy-intensive sectors. - Demand and potential implosions: The trajectory of oil prices depends on the duration of the war in the Middle East and on global economic conditions. A longer war could precipitate a global depression and widespread famine by 2027, though die-off scenarios may affect demand in complex ways. - Market signals and advice: The speaker cautions that price signals alone are insufficient without supply stability. He emphasizes the risk of counterparty failure in financial systems and suggests physical gold and silver as a hedge against monetary instability (though he notes he is not providing personalized financial advice). He discusses the importance of preparedness. In summary, Adams outlines an ongoing oil shortage driven by reduced Strait of Hormuz throughput, war-related infrastructure damage, and capital constraints, arguing that shortages and price pressures will intensify through 2026 and into 2027, with potential for severe global economic and humanitarian consequences if the situation deteriorates further.

The speaker argues that Iran studied the wars of the last two decades and concluded that you can win by not losing. To preserve leadership, Iran has kept a core leadership alive, and the leadership has been strengthened by the strikes faced. There is a belief that there is currently a lot of support inside Iran for the regime, more than a few months ago when support appeared weaker. The speaker notes Iran’s impressive capability to manufacture and disperse ballistic missiles and drones. They point to the Strait of Hormuz as a narrow chokepoint that Iran can exploit by intermittently deploying drones, ballistic missiles, and mines to disrupt world energy flows. Iran is using this leverage while allowing oil to move through the Straits, and they are leveraging relations with China and other world powers to keep oil flows open, suggesting a strategic use of economic diplomacy. The claim is that Iran is deliberately signaling that oil can pass through but that the regime is willing to complicate that flow when it serves their aims. Politically, Iran is portrayed as knowing that a protracted war would not be popular globally, so they have found a steady-state: they can continue striking targets in the Middle East and make life uncomfortable for GCC countries. This ongoing pressure is seen as something they can sustain while external support for them remains, though the speaker expects that support to erode over time. The speaker also highlights a fissure in relations with Saudi Arabia, describing growing fractures that complicate the ability of the United States to project power against Iran. Saudi Arabia’s cooperation is deemed key for countering Iran, and the rifts undermine that dynamic. Overall, the speaker concludes that, from their perspective, there are few downsides for Iran in continuing the war. They believe Iran can maintain their efforts with minimal exertion and continue the conflict far longer than the United States and its allies can sustain, thereby preserving and potentially strengthening Iran’s position over an extended period.

Larry Johnson discusses with Glenn about the Iran conflict, focusing on narrative control, economic warfare, and the feasibility of different strategic options. Key points across the conversation: - The reality vs. narrative: Johnson argues that the current sea of propaganda makes it hard to unpack reality, especially the claim that the U.S. blockade can cripple Iran. He contends the blockade is impractical in multiple ways and that political theater surrounds ship seizures. - Blockade viability and limitations: - Iran’s oil trading: Iran loads oil and ships it within 75 miles of its coast; the U.S. Navy will not approach closer than about 200 miles. Iran can threaten ships with short-range missiles, cruise missiles, and drones if the U.S. comes closer. - Moving beyond Iranian waters: If Iran uses a convoy of 20 tankers 75–100 miles off its coast into the Indian Ocean, the U.S. lacks enough ships to stop and seize every vessel; seizing ships requires keeping ships tied to port, reducing impact. - Imports and border routes: Iran can bring in goods via routes into Bandar Abbas and Chabahar and through Pakistan; Pakistan reportedly has six different routes into Iran. This dilutes the blockade’s effectiveness and undermines the “total cut-off” narrative championed by supporters of economic warfare. - Statements from Trump and Iran’s response: Johnson notes Trump’s statements about Iran’s leadership being chaotic and the possibility of lifting the blockade as a potential setup for a different narrative. He emphasizes that Iran’s leadership, according to his sources, remains cohesive and prepared. - Iranian leadership and past experience: Johnson highlights that Iran’s top leaders (Pazeshkin, Oraci, Golubov, and IRGC figures) were shaped by combat and share a history of fighting a US-funded adversary. This background, he argues, makes them better prepared to handle current threats than some US figures. - U.S. domestic political dynamics: The discussion touches on U.S. politicalConstraints and the difficulty of selling any deal domestically, particularly given lobbying (APAC, etc.) and internal political risks for those who sign a controversial agreement. - Russian role and diplomacy: - Araki’s weekend actions: Araki starts in Pakistan with a hardline Iranian position (rejecting a U.S. return to talks unless the blockade ends and uranium enrichment remains within a treaty framework), then moves to Oman to coordinate Hormuz management, then to Russia for talks with Putin and Lavrov, and finally back to Pakistan to relay messages. - Putin’s support: Putin publicly backs Iran, signaling readiness to coordinate, with Russia providing security guarantees potentially akin to its North Korea approach. Russia also offers intelligence and technical assistance to Iran’s military and economy, signaling a broader strategic alignment against Western sanctions. - BRICS and sanctions: Russia and China are moving away from enforcing Western-style sanctions on Iran, signaling a pivot to economic integration (including currency diversification and gold). This shifts Iran’s position relative to Western pressure. - Economic and strategic implications: - Rare earth supply and missiles: Johnson notes that the U.S. cannot easily replenish precision missiles (Patriot, THAAD, Tomahawk) because critical rare earth minerals (like samarium, neodymium, dysprosium) are controlled by China, which withholds them as leverage. - Energy diplomacy and China: Iran’s oil shipments to China and the risk to Western interests in East Asia complicate U.S. aims. Johnson argues China can keep receiving oil via convoys, limiting U.S. ability to fully disrupt Iranian trade. - Strait of Hormuz and strategic leverage: Iran’s stance suggests it can pressure Gulf states and deter foreign bases if it secures a more favorable arrangement, potentially using Hormuz as leverage in global trade and currency arrangements. - Possible paths forward and timing: - The discussion questions how long the economic warfare can persist and what would cause either side to blink. Johnson suggests that if Iran’s economy doesn’t collapse in the anticipated three weeks, the U.S. will face a choice between declaring victory or pursuing a more protracted negotiation. - There is skepticism about a decisive, lasting American victory; Johnson emphasizes that there is no viable ground option, and air and maritime options face significant constraints. - Historical lessons and perspective: The hosts draw parallels to past U.S. conflicts and emphasize learning from history (e.g., not underestimating adversaries, recognizing costs of war) and suggest that current leadership may be underestimating Iran’s resolve and capability. The conversation concludes with reflections on the need for informed diplomacy and the value of historical insights from figures like ambassador Jack Matlock, acknowledging that strategic miscalculations have repeated patterns across eras.

Larry Johnson and the host discuss the rapid developments around Iran and the wider regional implications, challenging the narrative of visible damage and highlighting inconsistencies in Western reporting. Key points about Israel, Iran, and propaganda: - Johnson argues Israel’s situation may be worse than Tehran’s, noting that Iran seeks to destroy Israeli infrastructure while Israel aims to project resilience through propaganda, including social media controls. He cites a video on sonar21.com showing what he sees as the ineffectiveness of Israeli and US air defenses in Israel, with four missiles impacting Tel Aviv and across the horizon. - There are reports of significant pushback in Israel: divisions between police and military, shortages of food, inadequate shelters, and protests. Johnson says Western propaganda claiming Israel is unscathed is contradicted by these reports. - Johnson suggests Israel is attempting to broaden the conflict with Iran through false flag attacks (oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, and incidents in Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Cyprus) to draw NATO into a broader confrontation, but asserts Iran has been effective in debunking these false flags. Weapons, logistics, and supply constraints: - A major theme is American and allied weapon shortages and the sustainability of a prolonged campaign against Iran. Johnson and Speaker 1 discuss limits in Patriot and THAAD stocks, and the difficulty of sustaining Tomahawk production due to rare earth minerals controlled by China. - Patriot missiles: production data show a ramp-up from 2015-2020 (approximately 1,800 units total) to higher annual outputs since 2020 (about 550 per year, plus 620 in 2025). Ukraine reportedly exhausted its 974 Patriot missiles. - THAAD missiles are even less abundant (about 79 produced per year; each costs around $12-13 million), with a small overall stockpile. This implies a limited capacity to sustain long campaigns. - The discussion notes that the United States’ missile inventories are not as unlimited as sometimes claimed; logistics and manufacturing limits are real constraints, and resupply for long conflicts would be challenging. - The availability of Tomahawk missiles depends on rare earths from China, adding another constraint beyond factory capacity and labor. Ground force considerations and regional dynamics: - There is skepticism about any credible prospect of American boots on the ground in Iran. The Kurds, if mobilized, would face severe logistical and operational challenges in Iran’s rugged western border, making sustained insurgencies unlikely to impact Iranian politics. Early reports indicate Kurdish infiltrations were quickly repelled by Iranian forces. - Russia’s transfer of 28 attack helicopters to Iran is discussed as part of a broader assessment of Iranian military readiness. Iran has shot down several US air platforms (including multiple F-15s) in the past few days, reinforcing a perception of Iranian resilience. - Johnson notes that the West’s strategy to portray Iran as weak has backfired, strengthening internal Iranian unity and resolve, particularly after the February 28 and earlier June incidents. Regional and global reactions: - The war’s geographic expansion, including the submarine incident near Sri Lanka and broader Gulf security concerns, risks drawing in more regional actors and complicating alliances. - The Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar) rely heavily on US protection and expat labor, and there is growing concern about the United States’ ability to guarantee security. Johnson argues this could erode Western credibility and investment in the region. - The strait of Hormuz is pivotal; Iran’s potential control could disrupt global oil flows, with cascading economic effects. Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure may be shielded by alternative pipelines, but LNG exporters like Qatar would suffer significant downtime. - The broader strategic picture suggests a shift away from US-dominant security arrangements in the Gulf, with Turkey coordinating with Iran, and Gulf states re-evaluating security guarantees and economic dependence on the United States. Outlook and possible endings: - Johnson forecasts a prolonged attritional conflict, with the United States unlikely to break Iran’s defenses without a substantial and sustained shift in strategy. He argues that air power alone fails to achieve regime change and notes historical examples across Iraq, Serbia, and Vietnam where air campaigns did not produce the desired political outcomes. - He predicts an endgame in which Iran could leverage the Strait of Hormuz to negotiate terms that reduce sanctions in exchange for reopening traffic, but only if Washington concedes to major concessions (including ending military bases in Saudi Arabia and Qatar). - He warns this crisis could accelerate regional instability and potentially erode the United States’ credibility, with domestic political repercussions and potential shifts in both US and European political alignments. Final thoughts: - The discussion emphasizes the mismatch between optimistic Western narratives and the practical limits of militaries, economies, and logistics in sustaining a longer confrontation with Iran. - The speakers stress that a straightforward, decisive victory seems unlikely; instead, the conflict risks deepening regional instability, economic disruption, and lasting strategic realignments in the Middle East.

John Mearsheimer and Glenn discuss the trajectory of the United States’ foreign policy under Donald Trump, focusing on the shift from an anticipated pivot to Asia and a reduction of “forever wars” to the current Iran confrontation and its global implications. - Initial optimism about Trump: Glenn notes a widespread belief that Trump could break with established narratives, recognize the post–Cold War power distribution, pivot to the Western Hemisphere and East Asia, end the “forever wars,” and move away from Europe and the Middle East. Mearsheimer agrees there was early optimism on Judging Freedom that Trump would reduce militarized policy and possibly shut down the Ukraine–Russia war, unlike other presidents. - Drift into Iran and the current quagmire: The conversation then centers on how Trump’s approach to Iran evolved. Mearsheimer argues Trump often vacillates between claims of victory and deep desperation, and he characterizes Trump’s current stance as demanding “unconditional surrender” from Iran, with a 15-point plan that looks like capitulation. He describes Trump as sometimes declaring a “great victory” and other times recognizing the need for an exit strategy but being unable to find one. - The escalation ladder and strategic danger: A core point is that the United States and its allies initially sought a quick, decisive victory using shock and awe to topple the regime, but the effort has become a protracted war in which Iran holds many cards. Iran can threaten the global economy and Gulf state stability, undermine oil infrastructure, and harm Israel. The lack of a credible exit ramp for Trump, combined with the risk of escalation, creates catastrophic potential for the world economy and energy security. - Economic and strategic leverage for Iran: The discussion emphasizes that Iran can disrupt global markets via the Strait of Hormuz, potentially shut down the Red Sea with Houthis participation, and target Gulf desalination and energy infrastructure. The U.S. should maintain oil flow to avoid devastating economic consequences; sanctions on Iran and Russia were strategically relaxed to keep oil moving. The longer the war drags on, the more leverage Iran gains, especially as Trump’s options to harm Iran’s energy sector shrink due to the global economy’s needs. - Exit possibilities and the limits of escalation: Glenn asks how Trump might avoid the iceberg of economic catastrophe. Mearsheimer contends that a deal on Iran’s terms would entail acknowledging Iranian victory and a humiliating US defeat, which is politically challenging—especially given Israeli opposition and the lobby. The Iranians have incentive to string out negotiations, knowing they could extract concessions as time passes and as U.S. desperation grows. - Ground forces and military options: The possibility of a U.S. ground invasion is deemed impractical. Mearsheimer highlights that Desert Storm and the 2003 invasion involved hundreds of thousands of troops; proposed plans for “a few thousand” light infantry would be unable to secure strategic objectives or prevent Iranian counterattacks across the Gulf, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf, with Iran capable of inflicting significant damage on bases and ships. The discussion stresses that even small-scale operations could provoke heavy Iranian defense and strategic backlash. - European and NATO dynamics: The Europeans are portrayed as reluctant to sign onto a risky campaign in support of U.S. objectives, and the episode warns that a broader economic crisis could alter European alignment. The potential breaching of NATO unity and the risk of diminished transatlantic trust are underscored, with Trump’s stance framed as blaming Europeans for strategic failures. - Israel and the lobby: The influence of the Israel lobby and its potential consequences if the war deteriorates are discussed. Mearsheimer notes the danger of rising antisemitism if the war goes catastrophically wrong and Israel’s role in pressuring continued conflict. He also observes that a future shift in U.S. strategy could, in extreme circumstances, diverge from traditional Israeli priorities if the global economy is at stake. - Deep state and decision-making: The final exchange centers on the role of expertise and institutions. Mearsheimer argues that Trump’s distrust of the deep state and reliance on a small circle (Kushner, Whitkoff, Lindsey Graham, media figures) deprived him of necessary strategic deliberation. He contends that a robust deep-state apparatus provides essential expertise for complex wars, offering a counterpoint to Trump’s preferred approach. He contends the deep state was not fully consulted, and that reliance on a limited network contributed to the strategic miscalculations. - Concluding tone: Both acknowledge the grave, uncertain state of affairs and the high risk of escalation and miscalculation. They express a desire for an optimistic resolution but emphasize that the current trajectory is precarious, with signs pointing toward a dangerous escalation that could have wide-ranging geopolitical and economic consequences. They close with a note of concern about the potential for rash actions and the importance of considering responsible exits and credible diplomatic channels.

Ashwin Rutansi hosts New Order, examining how India and the global South are calculating in a world of competing financial and geopolitical systems. He notes Ramanujan’s death in 1920 in Tamil Nadu and asks if there is a shift toward a multipolar order or a recalibration of power. Tehran remains the epicenter of geopolitical upheaval, with Trump-Netanyahu wars on Iran and Lebanon affecting civilians. India’s strategic moves unfold on multiple fronts: Defense Minister Rajnath Singh travels to Germany for defense cooperation with the Indian Navy, including potential submarine deals valued around $12 billion; India and China engage at Delhi-Shanghai Cooperation Organization meetings; with Russia, India negotiates S-400 missile deliveries and Pantsir anti-drone systems, plus a Moscow-Delhi Arctic access deal. The program highlights energy costs and humanitarian costs of conflict, noting the UN estimate that Iran-related funding could have saved 87,000,000 lives if redirected to aid rather than conflict, while in India alone 354,000,000 may be pushed into poverty. Zara Klahn will later field audience questions. Jim Rickards, best-selling author and former financial war games adviser to the Pentagon, joins from New Hampshire. He asserts a grave danger: the Strait of Hormuz is closed, which matters because 20% of the world’s oil and a high share of LNG transit there. He explains that while some vessels pass Iran’s choke point, the US Navy often stops them, either by seizure or missiles, making bypassing the blockade unlikely in the near term. He describes a “floating pipeline” during the crisis: ships traveled from the Persian Gulf to destinations such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and India; as refineries begin to feel the impact three weeks to two months in, the world will face energy shortages and fertilizer disruptions due to nitrate imports, threatening planting seasons and potential mass hunger. He notes that the blockage’s continuation will worsen the situation, since turning refinery operations back on is a slow process. Regarding Indian and Chinese responses, Rickards states they’re not yet pivoting aggressively due to limited power to alter the bottlenecks. He says China is in a vulnerable position; the US has built a military alliance with Indonesia controlling the Strait of Malacca, and Washington intends to interdict Iranian vessels regardless of Iran’s actions. He characterizes a US-Russia duopoly that diverts oil away from the Persian Gulf, while Russia benefits from sanctions evasion and managed reserves. He disputes the idea that the petrodollar is collapsing, calling it “petrodollar 2.0” and arguing that the dollar remains strong as a reserve currency, though China and others may seek dollars through Treasury securities rather than dump them. Rickards explains China’s sale of treasuries does not signal de-dollarization but a need for cash to support its currency and banks, given dollar dependencies. He emphasizes that BRICS has a currency in gold and has developed the New Development Bank and a contingent reserve fund, but the crucial factor for a global reserve currency is a robust bond market and settlement infrastructure, which he argues China does not yet have. He discusses India’s position, noting India’s balance with Russia and the US, and its continued dollar-based oil purchases, while noting yuan’s limited liquidity and India’s access to dollars. The program moves to an audience Q&A with Zara Khan. Questions touch on whether Trump seeks to break BRICS, the impact of BRICS success on ordinary people, whether BRICS currency could be gold-backed, and why non-aligned regions are quiet. Khan notes that a BRICS currency would likely involve gold and infrastructure rather than a simple currency switch. She emphasizes gold as a potential anchor and cautions that BRICS’ progress is gradual, with gold holdings being a notable strength for India and Russia. The host invites further questions and signs off, asking listeners if the U.S. war on Iran could mark the beginning of the end of the petrodollar.

In this discussion with Glenn, Professor John Mearsheimer analyzes the U.S. handling of the Iran war under Trump, the role of Israel and the lobby, and the broader implications for the international system as power shifts from unipolar to multipolar. Key points on U.S. strategy and diplomacy - Trump’s approach is a unique form of diplomacy: he pursued a ceasefire grounded in Iran’s 10-point plan as a starting point for negotiations, then moved to a blockade of Iranian ports and allowed escalation elsewhere. The aim, according to the speakers, was to gain breathing space to rearm and regroup, and to press Iran into concessions. - The absence of a viable military option: there is no credible American military path to victory in the Iran war. Escalation would be Iranian-dominant, and further escalation would damage the world economy, creating political and economic consequences domestically and internationally. - The administration’s diplomacy is hampered by incompetence, notably in Ukraine-Russia diplomacy, which erodes confidence in negotiating with Iran as well. The Israeli lobby adds pressure to avoid a peace that acknowledges Iran’s gains. - Four goals in the war, from an Israeli perspective, are regime change, eliminating Iran’s nuclear enrichment, destroying long-range missiles, and stopping Iranian support for Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Israel and its lobby view the situation as existential and push for continued pressure unless Iran is decisively defeated. From the U.S. perspective, this means consensus among allies is fragile and often subordinated to domestic and lobby pressures. The strategic logic of the blockade and escalation - The blockade is not a war-winning instrument. The naval option is constrained by ship counts, wear on assets, potential Chinese escorts, and reciprocal Iranian actions (Iran already captured ships in retaliation). Iran’s tolerance for pain is high, and the blockade is not a reliable lever to force compliance. - Air power failed to defeat Iran, confirming that the war cannot be won through bombing alone. Ground invasion is unlikely due to limited American combat troops, political will, and public tolerance for casualties. Consequently, the U.S. has turned to naval coercion via the Strait of Hormuz and global oil interdictions, but this too is unlikely to compel a definitive Iranian capitulation. - A ceasefire is seen as essential to halt the fighting and begin negotiations; however, the ceasefire has not achieved meaningful negotiations because the blockade remains in place, and Iran has demanded its end as a condition to return to talks. Possible Iranian responses and risk dynamics - If the United States were to resume massive bombing, Iran could launch a “Goderdammerung” response—shutting down the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, attacking energy infrastructure and desalination plants, and wrecking the world economy. This would imply a broader regional and global calamity, with Iran threatening to pull down others with it. - The Iranians are expected to leverage the Strait of Hormuz and toll revenues, and to press for sanctions relief and ongoing control of the Strait as bargaining chips. The blockade may inflict pain, but Iran has shown a high capacity to tolerate it, making the naval option unlikely to deliver victory. Europe, diplomacy, and the evolving alliance system - Elbridge Colby’s remarks suggest Europe should take primary responsibility for conventional and Ukraine support, reflecting U.S. weapon stock depletion and a shift toward East Asia as the priority theater. This signals a “buck-passing” of security obligations and a withdrawal of the United States from Europe at the conventional level. - The Colby framework implies the U.S. is reorienting away from Europe and toward East Asia, potentially weakening NATO cohesion as American weapons support diminishes. This could push Europe to diversify security arrangements and rely less on U.S. guarantees. - There is a broader pattern of “divorcing” from allies: as the Gulf, Europe, and Ukraine face continued pressures, the alliance system frays. The U.S. may seek to offload security burdens, while Russia and China adapt by intensifying their own strategic ties and exploiting the rifts within Western alliances. The multipolar world and regional flashpoints - The discussion emphasizes that the world has moved from a post–Cold War unipolar moment to a multipolar system, with East Asia (China) as the primary U.S. strategic focus, but with persistent, volatile conflicts in Europe (Russia-Ukraine) and the Middle East (Israel-Iran, and allied networks like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis). - The speakers stress the interconnections among conflicts: resolving Israel-Iran involves Hezbollah and Hamas; resolving Ukraine involves European commitments and American supplies; and the evolving alliance structures—where the U.S. may reduce its conventional footprint in Europe—could heighten tensions or provoke Russian reactions. Final reflections - The conversation closes by acknowledging the plastic, uncertain moment in world politics: many possible futures depend on diplomacy, leadership choices, and how quickly new equilibria are formed among emerging great powers. The two speakers stress that avoiding a major conflagration will require careful diplomacy, recognition of interlinked flashpoints, and a willingness to rethink traditional alliance structures in a multipolar world.

Chas Freeman, a former US assistant secretary of defense, and Glenn discuss the current state of diplomacy and security in West Asia, broader great-power dynamics, and Lebanon, Iran, and the Strait of Hormuz. Freeman argues that West Asia shows an ongoing, long-running unraveling, with a core issue being whether the United States still understands diplomacy or relies on inexperienced envoys and “the cronies or the son-in-law” rather than seasoned diplomats. He asserts that the Iranians understand diplomacy and seized an opportunity when the Strait of Hormuz was opened under Iranian-controlled conditions, which could have set the stage for a long-term management arrangement for the strait. Instead, the Trump administration’s response—doubling down on the blockade—led Iran to retract its opening, returning to essential closure and increasing pressure on global economies, including higher gasoline prices for American consumers. Freeman contends the credibility of Iran in this context is greater than that of the United States, and he speculates that the blockade may have been a pretext for a military action that did not materialize. Freeman notes several shifting tactical realities: the U.S. blockade has drawn down the global oil market, and oil markets have changed with India paying Iranian oil in Chinese yuan, suggesting a potential move away from the petrodollar. He observes that a substantial portion of the US Navy is in the Arabian Sea or Gulf of Oman conducting the blockade, with deteriorating shipboard conditions. Iran, by contrast, appears better positioned in a war of attrition, with stored missiles and the ability to resume bombardment if needed. He mentions that Iran has oil to export and can sell it, highlighting the strategic geography beyond Hormuz. On Gulf states, Freeman says Saudi Arabia does not approve the blockade and has been in touch with Tehran; Saudi Arabia is the GCC’s best-positioned state but remains under pressure. The UAE is caught between blocs, Oman is relatively exempt, while Saudi Arabia acts as a conduit for Kuwait and Qatar. Iran has threatened to call on Ansar al-Law/Houthis to close the Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea if needed. Even with an open strait and sailing ships, the global oil shock remains likely, and a broader energy realignment could benefit Russia and Venezuela, with Venezuela not yet seeing a substantial production rise. Freeman emphasizes that if the Strait of Hormuz is opened as a mere tactical victory for the U.S., it would be hard to argue for a comprehensive peace process in the region. Freeman asserts that Iran’s strategy emphasizes regime consolidation rather than collapse, with its missiles and energy reserves enabling continued pressure. He argues that China has a different position: China defends the UN Charter and the international system and benefits from a global, multinodal order. China seeks to preserve access to the Persian Gulf and aligns with Pakistan as an intermediary, while developing a broader regional strategy that can facilitate a Belt and Road integration, including energy routes and LNG imports. He notes that China is seen by regional actors as a defender of international law and a stabilizing interlocutor, contrasting with US actions that undermine the rule of law domestically and internationally. China is also doubling down on Central Asia routes and the Power of Siberia gas pipeline, with the possibility of energy swaps from Iran. On Lebanon, Freeman describes an illegitimate Lebanese government aligned with Israel’s objectives and Hezbollah’s resistance to coercive measures. He views Israel’s strategy as destroying Hezbollah’s military and political influence in southern Lebanon, blowing bridges and imposing a Gaza-like model in Lebanon. He predicts a recurrence of a phony ceasefire with Israel continuing its operations, potentially triggering a new confrontation with the United States and Netanyahu’s government, unless the Trump administration capitulates to Israeli priorities. He frames Iran as achieving a regional peace objective through a comprehensive, region-wide approach, rather than mere truces. Regarding diplomacy and negotiations, Freeman criticizes “fantasy foreign policy” driven by media narratives rather than real negotiations. He argues that the Islamabad meeting with Iran’s delegation was not a true negotiation, and the American side lacked expert staff and real leverage. He contrasts this with Iran’s delegation, which arrived with hundreds of knowledgeable participants and full authority. He notes that the overall approach has been amateur, with no binding documents or real settlement. Freeman closes with reflections on historical U.S. grand strategy, noting the United States’ tradition of exporting its values, but arguing that today’s approach is inconsistent with the rule of law, international diplomacy, and lasting peace. He contends that the current trend favors Iran in the Gulf struggle and that China remains a stabilizing, influential actor amid US and Israeli actions.

Professor Robert Pape warned on X that within ten days parts of the global economy will start running short of critical goods, based on thirty years studying economic sanctions and blockades. He said this would bring not just higher prices but shortages, and that markets are not ready for this. The Kobelisi letter stated the world is experiencing its biggest energy crisis in history with 600,000,000 barrels of lost oil supply, US gas prices up 47% since December, and inflation approaching 4% in a path similar to the 1970s. The discussion then touched on Iran’s war potentially returning to open conflict. The United States seized an Iranian-flagged cargo ship, which Larry Johnson described as piracy and an act of war aimed at clearing the Strait of Hormuz; Tehran called it armed piracy and promised a response. JD Vance was headed to Islamabad for talks, though Iranian officials said they had not agreed to anything. Fox’s Tel Aviv correspondent relayed that Trump told him they would blow up everything in Iran if they didn’t come to the table, saying the deal would reopen the Strait of Hormuz and prevent Iran from possessing highly enriched uranium. Professor Pape, director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats at the University of Chicago and author of Escalation Trap on Substack, joined the program. He referenced his April 12 post predicting shortages within forty-five to sixty days and described three stages: Stage one, the first ~45 days with price increases; Stage two (40–60 days) with shortages emerging; Stage three (day 60–90) with worsening shortages and then contraction, beginning around May 31. He explained that shortages would escalate into reduced production of commodities, fewer airline seats, and broader disruptions across supply chains. Pape detailed the implications for air travel and energy: jet fuel shortages could cause European and global aviation reductions, with Europe’s ~110,000,000 monthly air passengers dropping to potentially 80 million or fewer as fuel becomes scarce; cargo, mail, and just-in-time deliveries would be affected, and overall product availability would contract. He argued that 20% of the world’s oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz and that Iran’s potential shutdown and the U.S. response would complicate efforts to keep that oil flowing. He emphasized that the contraction would begin even as oil access becomes more difficult and other nations (including the U.S.) struggle to secure energy. The conversation then shifted to China. Pape noted that in China, the impact on GDP could be modest (about 1%), but the U.S. could be drawn into a larger conflict that could benefit China. He observed China’s preparation for energy independence: stockpiling oil, relying on solar, nuclear, and coal, and maintaining a robust energy strategy even during tensions with the U.S. He suggested that tariffs and conflicts did not significantly disrupt China’s planning, which could lead to China gaining relative advantage as the U.S. faces a widening energy and economic crisis. There was discussion about the United States’ energy independence. Pape stated he has long advocated energy independence since 2005, but warned that the broader picture involves debt, energy policy, and strategic choices that could threaten American leadership. He stressed the need for a concrete five-year plan to navigate the crisis without harming the economy in the short term and cautioned against escalating war in Iran. In addressing the everyday impact, the speakers considered who would be hardest hit: the poorest, and particularly non-college-educated white working-class voters, who had experienced the largest deterioration in income since 1990. The conversation included proposals to mitigate consumer pain, such as targeted economic measures for working Americans affected by rising gas prices, potentially including tax considerations or subsidies for those whose jobs require fuel, while avoiding broad handouts. Pape reiterated that his Escalation Trap Substack presents a framework based on twenty-one years of modeling the bombing of Iran and indicates that the stages he predicted are unfolding faster than anticipated, with a focus on concrete policy options that could be enacted by May 1. He emphasized that his analysis centers on consequences for ordinary people and urged practical policy steps to address the crisis.

Steven Schwartz describes oil-price reactions as being driven by physical shipping realities—tankers, insurance, logistics, refinery buying behavior, and regional supply dislocations—rather than political headlines about diplomacy or ceasefires. He argues that during the conflict beginning in late February, futures markets reacted sharply but did not fully reflect the persistent physical disruption, producing a “bifurcated market” where the “political price” (NYMEX WTI/ICE Brent front-month levels reacting to Trump-linked headlines) diverges from the “real market” reflected in physical conditions. He explains that Atlantic Basin markets (including Dubai and Oman and also NYMEX Brent-linked delivery dynamics) saw a more muted response early because the Atlantic Basin was not short of oil, while panic concentrated among Asian refiners relying on crude held up by Strait of Hormuz constraints, creating a sharp blowout in the physical market. He cites a probabilistic worst-case scenario of $238/bbl but says sustained $200+ oil would crush demand and the global economy. He emphasizes that sustained high levels were not explained by a simple headline escalation but by how physical constraints altered where barrels could be supplied and at what delivered cost. Schwartz links Western market dynamics to Russia-related policy changes and strategic inventory releases: he states Europe lost transit of about 70 vessels carrying oil, petroleum products, petrochemicals, and natural gas, and that sanction relief for Russia and releases of strategic petroleum reserves in Europe and the United States helped quell panic by adding supply into a period of weakest seasonal demand (late winter/early spring), before shifting toward June’s summer peak demand. He outlines mitigation mechanisms that affect flows even while the Strait remains constrained: increased loading and routing through the Red Sea and bypass corridors (including Saudi export capacity via an east-west pipeline avoiding the Strait, and Abu Dhabi pipeline capacity bypassing the Strait). He also states the United States became the globe’s marginal producer and that global tanker flows shifted heavily toward US Gulf Coast export markets (Houston and Corpus Christi) to access US barrels, with other Western Hemisphere producers such as Guyana and Brazil stepping up. He stresses these changes do not replace the roughly 15 million barrels/day he claims have gone missing due to Strait closure. On whether markets believe Trump’s claims that an Iran deal is only days away, Schwartz argues weakness in oil is “nonsensical” given the ongoing physical loss of supply and insists the market has not reacted appropriately as June demand approaches. He says jawboning headlines can move the prompt/futures surface, but physical shortages and costs show the risk remains. He characterizes tankers as a leading indicator: charter rates, insurance, and bunker/fuel costs are “major variable costs” that must be reflected in delivered crude economics. He rejects the idea that the Strait itself will be the enduring bottleneck and instead argues the nuclear program is the core driver. He describes Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capability alongside its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism as an underlying structural reason the negotiation is not simply about maritime access. He argues Iran’s leverage comes from its ability to create a chokehold, but he predicts this leverage will diminish as infrastructure bypasses expand and alternative supply regions increase investment. He points to the UAE leaving OPEC and expanding a pipeline that bypasses Hormuz, and he also describes Saudi Arabia increasing its desert-crossing pipeline capacity to the Red Sea. He further forecasts greater investment in Eastern Africa, continued Western and West Africa production, and more output in South America (Guyana and Brazil) and the United States. When asked at what point headlines stop being “headline risk” and start becoming market reality, Schwartz says traders should watch spreads, forward curves, and backwardation geometry. He describes backwardation as a “healthy market” pattern due to the premium to own spot supply, but he says current forward structure reflects not just convenience yield but supply-cutoff risk, with large differentials between near-term and later delivery (he cites roughly $20–$25/bbl). He says he wants to see regression toward normalized spreads and a less steep risk premium slope before concluding a durable resolution is forming. Schwartz also argues the financial blockade effect operates through insurance economics: insurance rates at Lloyd’s and elsewhere react immediately, and “one attack” can drive further re-pricing. He says mine-laying or physical obstruction threats matter but the key mechanism is insurance and the knock-on costs embedded into every shipping charter. He adds that without clarity permitting safe transit, premiums can “queer the economic” viability of trades even if crude originates at a favorable price. In response to reports (unconfirmed) about an aircraft arriving in Tehran carrying speculation of cash payments related to frozen Iranian funds, Schwartz says the futures market is the venue for speculation about future supply/demand. He describes recent spot weakness (WTI spot cited around $85.95, having previously peaked near $97) and notes a rally likely tied to headlines such as an American Apache helicopter being downed and potential US response. He then focuses on the broader pattern of shifting regional alignments, citing signals around the UAE (bombing impacts, resuming flights to Israel, Israeli air defense presence in the UAE reported, and UAE’s OPEC exit) as evidence of an underlying shift that could be influencing what the market is pricing. Overall, Schwartz concludes that substantial risks have been sacrificed over months and that it does not make sense—based on the physical and structural indicators he highlights—that markets should revert quickly to the pre-conflict status quo. He ends by emphasizing uncertainty and that outcomes remain to be seen.

Mario and the Professor discuss the scale and spread of the current oil and energy shock and its broad economic and geopolitical ripple effects. - Severity and scope: The Professor calls the crisis “pretty catastrophic,” possibly the biggest oil crisis experienced, potentially surpassing the 1970s shocks. He notes a gap between Washington rhetoric and underlying economic reality and emphasizes the war’s effects beyond oil, including fertilizer and helium, all of which pass through the Strait of Hormuz or related chokepoints. - U.S. economic backdrop (before the war): The Professor provides a pre-war table: - U.S. GDP growth in 2024 was 2.3%, 2025 about the same after a dip in 2024 to 2.2%. - Jobs: 2024 added 2.2 million; 2025 added 185,000, with tariffs contributing to a manufacturing job loss of 108,000. - Productivity declined from 3% to 2.1% in 2025. - He argues the U.S. economy was already slowing and that the war exacerbates existing weaknesses rather than creating a boom. - Immediate physical and downstream effects: - The closure of the Strait of Hormuz affects more than oil: up to 20% of world oil, a third of fertilizer, and helium used in chip manufacturing (notably in Taiwan) pass through the strait. - The closure’s ripple effects include fertilizer shortages and higher prices (fertilizer up about 50%), and broader supply chain dislocations as related infrastructure and inventories (oil, fertilizers, helium) become depleted and must be rebuilt. - Relative impact by region: The U.S. is more insulated from physical shocks than many others, but financial markets (stocks and bonds) are hit, with higher interest rates and a rising 10- and 30-year bond yield. Europe and Asia face larger direct physical disruptions; India, Taiwan, and others bear notable hits due to fertilizer and helium supply constraints. - Global energy and political dynamics: - The U.S. remains a net importer of oil, though it is a net exporter of petroleum products; fertilizer reliance and pricing reflect broader global constraints. - The professor highlights the political costs: protectionism (tariffs), militarism (increased defense spending and involvement), and interventionism (policy actions). He notes polling is negative on these directions, suggesting policy headwinds for the administration. - The escalation and motivations for war: - A theory discussed is that the war was driven by a belief in decapitating Iran’s leadership to force regime change, a strategy the professor says many experts have warned against. He cites New York Times reporting that Mossad and Netanyahu supported decapitation, but that former Mossad leadership and U.S. intelligence warned it would not work; the escalation suggests a divergence between theory and outcome. - He acknowledges another view that controlling Hormuz could economically benefit the U.S., but ranks it as a lesser driver than regime-change objectives. - Possible outcomes and scenarios: - If the Houthis control the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and the Beber/Mendeb is blocked, the consequences would intensify; the professor describes a “freeway turned into a toll road” scenario in Hormuz and greater disruption in the Gulf, including potential attacks on desalination plants. - The economic signaling would likely worsen: downward revisions to growth, higher import prices, and increased financial market strain; a prolonged closure would intensify these effects. - The escalation ladder and endgame: - The professor warns that escalating with boots on the ground would favor Iran and could trigger widespread disruption of Gulf infrastructure, desalination, and regional stability. He suggests Russia would be a clear beneficiary in such a scenario. - He concludes with a stark warning: if Hormuz and the Beber/Mendeb remain closed, and desalination and critical infrastructure are attacked, the situation could resemble or exceed the scale of the 2008 financial crisis—“look like a birthday party” compared with what could unfold. - Overall takeaway: The crisis is multi-faceted, with immediate physical shortages (oil, fertilizer, helium) and cascading financial and political costs. The duration and depth depend on how long chokepoints stay closed and whether escalation occurs, with the potential for severe global economic and geopolitical consequences.

First speaker: Iran doesn’t really need to attack American ships or force the strait to open because it could actually be advantageous for the strait to remain closed. There are floating oil reserves and cargo ships in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea that Iran could rely on. In fact, Iran has a substantial stockpile: 160,000,000 barrels of Iranian crude already floating at sea, outside the Persian Gulf, past the Strait of Hormuz into the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. That amount could fuel a country like Germany for over two months, and most of it is headed to Chinese independent refiners. Exports remain high, and the blockade is real, even if the timing is late. Do you agree that Iran is prepped for this day? Second speaker: I do agree. I think this is not harming the Iranians as much as it is harming the United States and the rest of the world. First speaker: What is Trump’s thought process? He has spoken with secretary Besant and other advisers, so he’s already sought advice. What alternative could work in Trump’s favor? Second speaker: Whenever the first round of negotiations ended, the president believed that his style of brinksmanship would produce immediate capitulation and agreement by the Iranians. The Iranians have never negotiated like that. Even the first treaty in the late 2000s took a long time to negotiate, not one and done. This administration wants short-term gains, and that isn’t possible with the Iranians. In the short term, the Iranians are in the driver’s seat. Negotiating and diplomacy are very difficult work; you don’t bully your way through. There is no unconditional surrender. There is none of that except in the president’s mind, unfortunately.

Speaker 0: Nearly two weeks into this conflict, the official story is cracking, and the number of Americans wounded is slowly coming out. Yesterday, we reported based on our sources that the number of American wounded was at least one hundred and thirty seven. After our report ran, the Pentagon has now publicly acknowledged about one hundred and forty wounded. That confirms our sources on this. So why did it take a little news show like ours to report this information? Why wasn't Fox News reporting this information? The Pentagon I know it's really weird. Why is the mainstream media silent on this? The Pentagon finally comes out and actually admits to this. Speaker 1: Reuters comes out and reports this. Exclusive. As many as one hundred and fifty US troops wounded so far in Iran war. They just published this today, this morning. March 10. That's remarkable. Exclusive. Just curious how that's an exclusive when we reported it yesterday. Yesterday. Whatever. Hey, Reuters. Bite me. Anyway, this war is clearly not winding down no matter what the messaging says. President Trump is saying the war could end very soon. But Iran says talks with The United States are off the table for now. Tehran is prepared to keep striking as long as it takes. And they're vowing an eye for an eye. So what is an eye for an eye actually mean? Does it mean you hey, you killed our leader. We kill yours? Does it mean, hey, you killed all these girls who were the daughters of members of the the Iranian Navy at a girls school, do we also do that to you? Like, what is actually does that look like? Speaker 0: Does it mean we took out your water infrastructures or you took out ours? So we do that. Right. Your gas infrastructure, civilian infrastructure, that's that's a war crime. But we did it. Your oil infrastructure, we do that. Like, what exactly does that look like? Meanwhile, the Strait Of Hormuz is getting worse by the minute. US intelligence tracking Iranian mine laying threats now as Gulf energy infrastructure there is taking a major hit with about 1,900,000 barrels per day of refining capacity across Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and The UAE. All down. CBS now says shipping through the Strait Of Hormuz has ground to a virtual halt. Nothing getting through. That's of just a few minutes ago. And Israel's hammering Beirut's southern suburbs and Lebanon. So they've essentially invaded Lebanon. Speaker 2: And then there's the neocon political class in Washington saying the quiet part out loud. Senator Lindsey Graham is now openly talking about, you know, going back to South Carolina to tell the sons and daughters in South Carolina, you know, you gotta send your loved ones to the Middle East. That's what I'm doing here in South Carolina. I gotta tell them to go fight in the Middle East, and he's calling on other Middle East countries that have been sitting on the fence that we've supported over the years as allies. Get off the fence. Go bomb Iran. Help out with Iran. And, oh, by the way, Spain, we're pissed off at you because you don't want us using your air bases or airspace to bomb Iran. Listen. Speaker 0: To our allies step up, get our air bases out of Spain. They're not reliable. Move all those airplanes to a country that would let us use them when we're threatened by a regime like Iran. To our friends in Spain, man, you have lost your way. I don't wanna do business with you anymore. I want our air bases our air bases out of Spain into a country that will let us use them. To our Arab friends, I've tried to help you construct a new Mideast. You need to up your game here. I can't go to South Carolina and say we're fighting and you won't publicly fight. What you're doing behind the scenes, that has to stop. The double dealing of the Arab world when it comes to this stuff needs to end. I go back to South Carolina. I'm asking them to send their sons and daughters over to the Mideast. What I want you to do in The Mideast to our friends in Saudi Arabia and other places, step forward and say this is my fight too. I join America. I'm publicly involved in bringing this regime down. If you don't, you're making a great mistake, and you're gonna cut off the ability to have a better relationship with The United States. I say this as a friend. Speaker 1: Ugh. He's an odious friend. Speaker 0: Say this as a friend. Speaker 3: With friends pick up a gun and go fight yourself, you coward. Yeah. I freaking hate that. But you're calling so, like, bluntly for somebody else to go die for his stupid cause. Speaker 0: Yeah. Speaker 1: I am so curious about this. I mean, he's a liar. But how many people in South Carolina are really walking up to him and saying, who are we gonna get to fight with us? Who are we gonna get to fight Iran? Worried about this. My son can go, but who's going with him? Let's make some war playdates. Who does that? Speaker 0: Larry Johnson is a former CIA analyst, NRA gun trainer, and, he's been looking at all of this and doing some incredible writing over at his website, Sonar twenty one. Larry, thank you for joining us. Great to see you back on the show. Speaker 4: Hi, guys. Good to see you. Speaker 0: So I wanna talk about the American war wounded first because Mhmm. I know that this is, near and dear to your heart and, of course, something that you've been watching, closely. And the lies, of course, that are coming out about this. Again, I spoke to sources over the past forty eight hours that were telling us here at Redacted about 137 Americans wounded. Then the Pentagon comes out and then confirms about a hundred and forty. So right pretty much right on the nose. And does that number sound low to you? Or does that sound about right? Speaker 4: That sounds a little low. So on March 4, let's go to Germany. Stuttgart, just North West of Germany, there is a hospital called Landstuhl Regional Medical Center. Landstuhl's primary mission is to handle American war wounded. On March 4, they issued a memo telling all the pregnant women that were about to give birth that, sorry, don't come here. We're not birthing any more babies. We gotta focus on our main mission. So that was the first clue that there was there were a lot of casualties inbound. I know, without mentioning his name, somebody who was involved dealing with the combat casualties during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and he dealt with the personnel at Lunstul. And he called someone up and said, can't say anything, but there's a lot of casualties. Then 13 miles to the east of Landstuhl is an army base called Kaiserslautern. Kaiserslautern and the Stars and Stripes issued for that base had an appeal, a blood drive appeal. Hey. We need lots of people to show up and donate blood. So those that was on March 5. So I wrote about this March 6. So I wrote about this four days ago, that, yeah, we had a lot more casualties, and there are more coming, because Iran's not gonna stop. You know, right now, we're getting signals that the Trump administration is reaching out, trying, oh, hey, let's talk, let's talk cease fire. Iran's having none of it. They've been betrayed twice by Donald Trump and his group of clowns. Speaker 0: Right. Speaker 4: You know? And and so they're not ready to say no. No. They've got the world, by the testicles is the polite way of saying it, withholding the Strait Of Hormuz. They've shut down the movement of not only oil, liquid natural gas. They're the supplier of about 25%, 25 to 30% of the world's liquid natural gas, and, about 30%, 30 to 35% of the world's urea, which is used for fertilizer. Now, that may not I just learned that that may not be as important as I once thought it was because most of it comes out of Oman. Oman, you don't have to worry about things going through the Strait Of Hormuz. But on oil and liquid natural gas, huge. 94% of The Philippines depended upon the flow of gas, both liquid and the petroleum oil, out of the Persian Gulf. India, 80%. Japan, South Korea. So this is gonna have a major impact on certain economies in the world. Now there there I I I've said this ironically. I I think Vladimir Putin's sitting there going, maybe Donald Trump really does like me, because what he's done is he's making Russia rich again in a way I mean, they're getting, you know, they were selling they were forced to sell their oil previously under sanctions at, like, $55 a barrel. Now they're getting $88.90 dollars a barrel. Well, and they just opened it up to India. I mean, that story over the past forty eight hours, like, so they The United States has eased its restriction on Russian oil flowing to India. I mean, talk about an absolute disaster. Speaker 4: Well, yeah. And remember what had happened there is India was playing a double game too. You know, bricks India is the I in bricks, and Iran is the new I in bricks. And so what was India doing? Well, India was pretending to play along with The United States, but then going to Russia and saying, hey, Russia. Yeah. We'll buy we'll buy your oil, but we needed a discount because we're going against the sanctions, and we need to cover ourselves. So Russia said, okay. As a BRICS partner, we'll let you have for $55 barrel. So they got a discount. So now when all of a sudden the the the oil tap is turned off, including the liquid natural gas, India goes running back to Russia. Now remember, on, February 25-26, India was in Israel buttering up the rear end of BB, Net, and Yahoo, kissing rear end all they could. Oh, man. It was a love fest. We're partners with Israel. And then Israel attacks their BRICS partner. And what does India say? Nothing. Zero. They don't say a thing about the murdered girls. So now all of a sudden, the oil's turned off. It's nine days now with no oil coming out of there for India. They go running back to Russia. Hey, buddy. Let's let's get back together. And Russia says, sure. That's great. But it's gonna cost you $89 now a barrel. No more friends and family program. Gonna get market conditions. Speaker 0: We've had many journalist friends that have had their bank accounts shut down. We were literally in the middle of an interview with a great journalist from the gray zone who found out that his banking was just shut down. Literally, in the middle of an interview, he got a message that his banking was shut down. Well, Rumble Wallet prevents that, because Rumble can't even touch it. No one can touch it. Rumble Wallet lets you control your money, not a bank, not a government, not a tech company, not even Rumble can touch it. It's yours, only yours, yours to protect your future and your family. You can buy and save digital assets like Bitcoin, Tether Gold, and now the new USA USA app USAT, which is Tether's US regulated stablecoin all in one place. Tether Gold is real gold on the blockchain with ownership of physical gold bars, and USAT keeps your money steady against inflation. No banks needed. It's not only a wallet to buy and save, but it also allows you to support your favorite creators by easily tipping them if you want with the click of a button. There'll be no fees when you tip our channel or others, and we actually receive the tip instantly unlike other platforms where we have to wait for payouts. So support our show today and other creators by clicking the tip button on our Rumble channel. Speaker 1: Now I wanna ask you about president Trump responding to CBS News reports that there may be mines in the Strait Of Hormuz. That doesn't make a ton of sense. He says we have no indication that they did, but they better not. But they are picking and choosing who gets to go through, and their allies can go through. So why would they mine their allies? What do we make of this? Do we need to respond to this at all? Speaker 4: Yeah. I don't think they've done it yet. But let's recall the last time Iran mined the Persian Gulf. They didn't mine the Strait Of Hormuz. They mined farther up. It was 1987, 1988. Why did they do that? Well, in September 1980, when Jimmy Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski were still in office, The United States encouraged a guy named Saddam Hussein, don't know if you've ever heard of him, but they encouraged Saddam Hussein to launch a war against Iran. And then Ronald Reagan comes in with Donald Rumsfeld and Cap Weinberger, and by 1983 had provided chemical weapons, or the precursors that Iraq needed to build chemical weapons, and Iraq started using chemical weapons against Iran in 1983 and continued to do it in '84, 85, 86. During that entire time, Iran never retaliated with chemical weapons. They were not going because they saw it as an act against God. They were serious about the religion. So 'eighty seven, 'eighty eight, they start dropping mines there in the Persian Gulf. Well, at that time, they didn't have all these missiles, so the United States Navy, a Navy SEAL, a good friend of mine, set up what was called the Hercules barge, and he had a Navy SEAL unit with him, and they fought off attacks by Iranian gunboats. He had some Little Bird helicopters from the one sixtieth, the special operations wing of the Air Force. And but we ended up disrupting the Iranian plan to mine The Gulf back then. Well, we couldn't do that today. We do not have that capability because Iran would blow us out of the water with drones and with missiles. You as we've seen, it's been happening over the last ten days. So United States would be in a real pickle. Speaker 1: And especially given the rhetoric of US war hawks in power for three decades. Like Yeah. Yes. They kind of had to prepare all of this time. Did we think that they weren't paying attention when we said it to the world? Speaker 4: Well, when we're writing our own press clippings and then reading them, there is a tendency to say, god, I am great. Can you see this? How good we are? And so they really believed that our air def the Patriot air defense systems and the THAAD systems would be they they could shut down the Iranian missiles and drones. And what they discovered was, nope. They didn't work. And they worked at an even lower level than the you know, Pentagon kept foul. We're shooting down 90%.

Syed Mohamed Marandi discusses the collapse of the Islamabad negotiations and the wider implications of the current U.S.-Iran confrontation. - On what happened in Islamabad: Iran participated despite low expectations, aiming to show willingness to resolve the crisis if Americans are reasonable and to ensure the world sees Iran’s efforts. The Iranians believed the United States lacked will to make progress. During talks there was some progress on various issues, but near the end the United States shifted to a hard line on the nuclear program and the status of the Strait of Hormuz. Vance claimed Iran wanted to build a nuclear weapon, a claim Marandi notes was contradicted by former counterintelligence official Joe Kent’s resignation letter. Netanyahu reportedly maintains direct influence, with Vance reporting to Netanyahu daily, which Iran views as undermining an agreement. Netanyahu’s insistence on control and “being the boss” is presented as a central obstacle to any deal. The ceasefire in Lebanon was touted as failing, with Netanyahu and Trump accused of conspiring to wreck it, and Iran’s actions after the ceasefire aligned with this view. The Iranian delegation flew back by land after the flight to Tehran was diverted, reflecting the perceived danger and the Washington Post piece calling for the murder of negotiators. Iran’s approach is framed as attempting to resolve the problem while signaling willingness to negotiate if U.S. policy becomes reasonable. - On the blockade and its consequences: The U.S. blockade on Iranian ports has just begun and will likely worsen the global economic crisis, pushing more countries to oppose the United States. China is angry as Washington dictates terms against oil and trade in the region. The blockade could be used to strangle China’s energy supplies, creating a double-edged impact by simultaneously worsening the global crisis and pressuring U.S. allies. Iran says it may respond by striking ships in the Red Sea and blocking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Oman if the blockade continues. Iran notes it has substantial financial resilience from oil sales at higher prices without middlemen, with about 100 million barrels left to sell after selling half of its declared oil stock, and it views energy shortages as likely to trigger broader economic disruption, including shortages of helium, LNG, and fertilizers. - On war readiness and possible outcomes: Iran anticipates a major assault and is preparing defenses and offensive capabilities. Iran argues negotiations were not taken seriously by the United States and believes the U.S. is buying time. Iran would view victories as having the United States back down, preserving Iran’s rights, and protecting its regional allies, with a long-term ceasefire. Iran contends it should control the Strait of Hormuz to prevent future aggression and seeks compensation for damages caused by the conflict, emphasizing sovereignty over Hormuz and peace for Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, and Yemen. Iran states that if the U.S. and its regional proxies strike, Iran would respond by targeting energy and infrastructure in the Persian Gulf. - On broader geopolitical shifts and regional dynamics: Marandi argues the current crisis accelerates a move toward a multipolar world, with the United States’ hegemonic position eroding. The UAE is portrayed as pushing for war, while other Gulf states are increasingly wary. He predicts a possible land invasion of Iran, but emphasizes Iran’s long-term preparedness and resilience. Weather and terrain are cited as factors likely to complicate a potential U.S. invasion, particularly in the hot summer conditions of the region. - On potential definitions of “victory”: Iran’s victory would involve U.S. backing down, Iran preserving its rights, a long-term ceasefire, and sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. A broader victory would see the end of supremacism in Palestine and the end of genocidal actions in Lebanon, with peace across the region as a key objective. The discussion ends with the notion that a shift toward an American focus on its republic, rather than empire, would benefit global stability.

- The discussion opens with trying to map a post-war world, considering both a quick end to the war and a prolonged one, with a focus on US–China relations, US allies, Iran, and the broader region. A participant notes a broader battle between a China–Russia–Iran alignment and the Western alliance, including financial systems. - A major regional shift is already underway: by 2000, the top banks were dominated by Japanese and European players; by 2025, China dominates the top four banks. The speaker argues that power is moving from Western banks to China, and that countries with US-dollar-denominated debt are converting debt into renminbi because it’s cheaper. - In the last week, Russia and China signaled to Iran a push to revisit the Gulf security architecture. Putin spoke to Iraq about Gulf security; Wang Yi did the same. The implied shift is toward a Gulf security framework less dependent on US protection. - The current Gulf security model is described as US bases guaranteeing protection from Iran, coupled with a demand that recipient states buy US Treasuries and military equipment. The speakers argue this model left Gulf states vulnerable and exposed as US defense systems failed to prevent Iranian attacks in the recent episode. - Saudi Arabia and Qatar (and to a lesser extent the UAE) are discussed as potentially moving away from the United States toward Russia and China. A Pakistani ISI general reportedly said Saudi and Qatari leaders are breaking from the US; one NBC report cited Trump canceling Project Freedom due to Saudi resistance to air operations from Prince Saud Air Base. The implication is a Persian Gulf broadly shifting into the Russian–Chinese sphere, potentially altering Gulf financial flows away from the US dollar toward gold and the yuan. - An opposing view, aired by another economist, suggests the US will strengthen its deterrence in the Gulf, with UAE as an indicator. The counterpoint argues that the Gulf countries previously supported Iran’s adversaries, including indirect funding for attacks on Iran, implying US deterrence remains necessary. - The conversation emphasizes the gulf’s deterrence history: Iran has largely avoided offensive military action in the Gulf against the region, while Gulf states have relied on US protection. The lack of a robust Chinese or Russian security guarantee in the region is highlighted as a real risk to Gulf security calculations. - There is a debate about whether US military power remains credible. One participant argues the US has not won a major war since World War II, with recent actions described as limited or draw outcomes; another contends that US protection remains essential despite past failures, given Iran’s capabilities and history. - Military-strategy discussions cover the feasibility of a ground invasion vs. airstrike-only approaches. The speakers outline logistical challenges (water, supply lines, mountainous terrain) and the scale of forces needed (potentially large, multi-month training and buildup) to degrade Iran’s missile and drone capabilities. Arguments are made that holding the Strait of Hormuz would be difficult if Iran can still launch missiles and drones from interior positions. - The strategic importance of Gulf exports is quantified: Gulf oil about 32% of world supply; LNG around 20% (centered on Qatar and the Gulf), urea and sulfur for agriculture and industry (urea ~36%; sulfur for refining and semiconductors), and helium from Qatar at about 33%. Keeping the Gulf open is framed as essential to global energy, inflation, and agriculture. - A possible pathway to open the Hormuz is proposed: Iran could offer broad access to global markets except for countries allied with Israel or those that attacked Iran; Iran would leverage this to restart global flows, particularly to Asia. The idea is that a near-term crisis could force a negotiated settlement with Iran. - The timeline mentions a forthcoming peace negotiation in Beijing next week, with skepticism about it proceeding smoothly. If negotiations occur, Trump would not likely receive a warm reception due to recent sanctions and US actions against China; China has signaled resolve against US sanctions, instructing its companies not to acquiesce to pressure. - Overall, the dialogue frames the war as a potential catalyst for a broader realignment: power shifting toward China and Russia, a Gulf region hedging its security through new alliances, and the global economy recalibrating around yuan- and gold-based financial flows, with the Strait of Hormuz remaining a central strategic chokepoint.

The Strait of Hormuz is extremely important: about 20 to 25% of the world’s petroleum passes through it, roughly a third of the world’s fertilizer comes through the strait, and about 10 to 12% of the world’s aluminum also moves via this route. If the war continues and the strait becomes really closed (it isn’t completely closed right now), Iranian ships carrying oil go through the strait. The United States is permitting Iranian oil to enter the oil market for the same reason it removes sanctions on Russian oil: President Trump wants to ensure there is as much oil in the international market as possible so that oil prices stay down. So oil continues to come out of the Gulf, and most of it is Iranian oil. If the strait were shut off, there would be very significant effects on the international economy. Even if it isn’t shut, oil prices are expected to creep up, which would increase pressure on President Trump to try to open the strait. But there is no way to open the strait, and the fact that President Trump is asking for help in that mission shows that the mighty US Navy, the mightiest naval force on the planet, cannot open the strait by itself. This indicates the level of trouble we’re in. Moving forward, it looks like the Iranians have a very powerful hand to play.

Glenn (Speaker 0) and John Mersheimer (Speaker 1) discuss the Iran war and its trajectory. Mersheimer asserts the war is not going well for the United States and that President Trump cannot find an off ramp because there is no plausible endgame or decisive victory against Iran. He notes that if Iran can turn the conflict into a protracted war of attrition, it has incentives and means to do so, including a strong bargaining position to demand sanctions relief or reparations. He argues the United States and Israel are not the sole drivers; Iran has a say, and there is no credible story about ending the war on American terms. Mersheimer cautions that even heavy bombardment or “today being the day of the heaviest bombardment” would not necessarily compel Iran to quit. He suggests Tehran will respond by escalating, potentially striking Gulf States and Israel with missiles and drones, given Iran’s capability with accurate drones and ballistic missiles in a target-rich environment. He emphasizes Iran’s incentive to avoid a settlement that yields no gains for Tehran while seeking concessions or relief from sanctions as time passes, increasing American pressure to settle. He warns that if international economic effects worsen, the United States may push for an end to the war, but that would constitute conceding to the Iranians rather than achieving victory. Glenn asks about escalation dominance, noting Iran’s potential vulnerability of Gulf desalination and energy infrastructure. Mersheimer confirms Gulf desalination plants are a critical vulnerability (Riyadh’s desalination plant servicing 90% of Riyadh’s water; Kuwait 90%; Oman 76%; Saudi water about 70%; desalination is essential). He reiterates that Iran can target desalination alongside petroleum infrastructure to cripple Gulf States and that such actions would also affect Israel and the wider economy. He asserts Iran has the option to damage the Gulf States and thus impact the world economy, making escalation unlikely to yield a favorable US-Israeli outcome. The energy dimension is central: 20% of the world’s oil and gas comes from the Persian Gulf. The Straits of Hormuz are unlikely to be opened easily, and destroying Gulf States’ infrastructure would make that moot anyway. He explains that even if Hormuz were open, damaged Gulf States would not export oil, and American naval escorting would be impractical due to vulnerability. He observes that the Iranians’ options threaten the international economy, and the United States’ off ramp is not readily available. Mersheimer provides a historical perspective on air power: strategic bombing cannot win wars alone, as seen in World War II and later conflicts. He notes that the present campaign lacks boots on the ground, relying on air power, but history shows air power alone is insufficient to achieve regime change or decisive victory against formidable adversaries like Iran. He argues that the decapitation strategy, followed by escalation, is unlikely to succeed and that the literature on air wars and sanctions supports this. They discuss previous warnings within the administration: General James Mattis (General Keane) and the National Intelligence Council warned before the war that regime change and quick victory were unlikely. Mersheimer highlights that only 20% of Americans supported the war initially, with 80% skeptical or opposed. He attributes some of the current predicament to Trump and Netanyahu's insistence on a quick victory, arguing that Netanyahu has pushed for a regime-change approach that failed. The conversation turns to Russia and China. Mersheimer contends that Russia benefits from the war by diverting US resources and relations away from Europe and Ukraine, strengthening Russia’s own strategic position. He suggests Russia may be aiding Iran with intelligence and possibly with weapons or energy, as well as improving its image in Iran. He asserts that this war distracts the US from Ukraine, harming Ukrainian efforts and potentially strengthening Russia economically by boosting demand for Russian oil and gas if Gulf supply is constrained. Europe’s position is examined. Mersheimer claims the European Union’s support is largely rhetorical; Europe’s elites fear a US departure from Europe and want to preserve NATO. He argues Europe’s interests will be largely ignored in a US-dominated conflict, with Macron’s stance portrayed as exaggerated power. He suggests Europe is hurt by the war and that their leverage over the United States is limited unless they diversify away from exclusive dependence on the US. In closing, Glenn and John reflect on leadership and propaganda. Mersheimer reiterates that leaders lie in international politics, with democracies more prone to lying to their publics than autocracies, and notes that Trump’s statements—such as Iran possessing Tomahawk missiles or the nuclear capability being erased—are examples of implausible or untruthful claims. He emphasizes the rational strategic thinking of Iranian and Russian leaders, but critiques the American leadership’s strategic understanding. The discussion concludes with reflections on Europe’s potential hardball approach toward the United States, and the need for diversification in European strategy to counter American leverage. The interview ends with appreciation for the exchange and a shared wish that the subject were less depressing.

The US may want the Strait of Hormuz blocked because it would hurt China and Europe. Europe relies on the Strait for 18% of its oil and 15% of its LNG after shifting away from Russia due to sanctions. A blockade would leave the US as Europe's only option. China relies on the Strait for nearly 50% of its oil and 12% of its LNG, but has alternatives like Russia, pipelines, land routes, and long-term deals. Therefore, Europe would suffer more than China from a blockade. The US purportedly wants this because Europe would lose its independence and become fully dependent on the US.

Glenn: Welcome back. We’re joined again by Seyyed Mohamed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and a former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. There’s talk in the US of seizing Kharg Island, which would handle 80–90% of Iran’s oil shipments, effectively a nuclear option to shut down Iran’s economy. What would be Iran’s likely response if the US pursued this path? Marandi: It would be a major problem to access the island because the US would have to fly over Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf. Iran would retaliate if Iranian territory were occupied, taking the war toward a major escalation. The regimes hosting the island would have to pay a heavy price, far greater than now. For the United States, the island is well protected, with Iranian assets on the shore supporting the islanders, and it’s farther from the US Navy and closer to Iran’s shore. But more importantly, such an aggression would be futile: it would not change the Persian Gulf trade through Hormuz, which Iran has effectively controlled by requiring permission to pass. An invasion or occupation would lead to fierce combat and punishment of the regimes that enabled it—Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar—desert-based states with oil and gas but little water. If the US succeeds in taking the island, Iran’s retaliation would involve destroying assets of the cooperating countries. Long-term, Hormuz could be effectively closed, with upstream infrastructure damaged and no oil or gas able to move, making a later reopening contingent on a peace agreement. The operation would be logistically, militarily, and economically disastrous for global markets. Glenn: There are reports Iran is mining Hormuz. Do you know anything about that operation? Marandi: Iran hasn’t mined Hormuz, the Persian Gulf, or the Indian Ocean. The Iranian navy capable of wartime actions is largely in underground tunnels and includes speedboats, surface-to-sea missiles, and a network of underground bases. Iran has not moved to mine the Gulf. It does not want escalation. Iran has always negotiated; US claims that Iran wanted nuclear weapons at the negotiating table are rejected by Iran, the fatwa, and IAEA history. If negotiations had failed, the US invasion would be unjustified. Doha and Qatar are prepared to restart gas facilities and allow oil to flow if peace returns. If the US escalates to destroy key infrastructure, Iran will retaliate, and Iran can hurt US assets and its proxies more than the US can hurt Iran, with long-term global energy consequences. Iran has been striking bases in the region and says it is prepared to continue until after the midterm elections. Glenn: The US energy secretary says the US Navy is studying options to escort tankers through Hormuz. What are the main challenges? Marandi: It would be virtually impossible. Iran’s navy is largely underground, with mines, surface-to-sea missiles, and drones capable of targeting Hormuz from Iran. If open war begins, Iran would retaliate against regimes hosting US bases. Even if Hormuz were opened temporarily, without oil, gas, tankers, or production, there would be no purpose, and energy prices would spike permanently. The US would likely be forced to accept Iran’s terms for peace to allow oil to flow. Glenn: Trump has spoken of further destruction if needed, but says he’s run out of targets. What do you expect from the American side? Marandi: The US is already targeting nonmilitary sites and civilian targets in Iran. They slaughter civilians, including families and children, with premeditation. They could intensify attacks on oil, gas, electricity infrastructure, which would invite Iran to retaliate. Iran’s society is united, with people on the streets despite the bombardments. If the US destroys infrastructure, Iran would respond, but Iran does not want escalation; it would be catastrophic for the global economy. The media in the West is controlled, and there is little outrage at threats to destroy Iran. Glenn: Israeli and American aims now—what’s at stake, and how end this? Marandi: Since the Gaza genocide and Lebanon escalation, Zionism is increasingly viewed as evil, and public opinion against Zionism is growing in the US. The destruction of Israel’s credibility is the greatest defeat, not battlefield losses. End this war now would be prudent; as Iran strikes back, global sympathy for Iran grows and the empire weakens. If Israel were to use a nuclear weapon, that would be catastrophic and could prompt broader proliferation. Glenn: Any chance Iran could retaliate against Britain or European states? Marandi: Europe and the US will have diminished presence in the region; bases would be forced to leave. He notes the possibility of false-flag attacks in the West and asserts Zionist manipulation as a risk, but emphasizes Iran’s determination to defend sovereignty and support for Palestinians and others. Glenn: Just a final note—Iran had three negotiations, not two, including the JCPOA. Thank you for joining. Marandi: Thank you.

The speaker discusses why many experts warn of famine and fuel shortages in the United States later this summer, noting that while he has previously focused on global famine vulnerabilities (Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia), he has adopted a more optimistic outlook for the U.S. because he does not want to dwell on doom scenarios and believes many listeners are already prepared. He acknowledges that credible voices like Michael Youn or Chris Martenson warn of worsening conditions, and explains that he is considering the possibility that the Strait of Hormuz could remain closed for months, which would shape outcomes. He cites professor Jiang’s view that the war with Iran could persist for many years because the United States seeks hegemonic global dominance and petrodollar control, with strategic choke points including the Strait of Hormuz, Panama Canal, Suez Canal, Strait of Gibraltar, and Strait of Malacca. He argues that Iran cannot surrender control of the Strait, and that Russia and China also oppose U.S. defeats of Iran, making a quick resolution unlikely. If Iran maintains control of the Strait, the U.S. could lose its dominant currency position; if Iran yields, Iran risks becoming a lesser power in a multipolar world. Holding the Strait could give Iran control over roughly 20–25% of the world’s oil and a significant share of natural gas and helium, reinforcing why major powers view the conflict as high-stakes and prolonged. Given this framework, he says prolonged Strait closure would likely extend oil, fertilizer, and gas shortages, and thus affect the United States. He notes that the U.S. imports millions of barrels of oil daily, even as it exports petroleum products; heavy crude is needed to feed U.S. refineries, which are configured for heavier oil. If a global supply collapse of the heavy crude occurs, there would be severe shortages of diesel, kerosene, jet fuel, etc., despite domestic production. He suggests that even with possible adjustments (e.g., sourcing heavier crude from countries like Venezuela, which would require time and investment), oil prices could spike dramatically, with some analysts predicting $180–$200 per barrel later in the year, and higher prices into 2027 depending on severity. High oil prices would cascade through the economy: transportation costs would rise, airlines and travel would suffer, new car and RV sales would drop, and food prices would rise. He explains that freight costs (FedEx/UPS surcharges) would affect ecommerce, home construction would slow due to higher costs, and overall economic pain would intensify into recession or depression. On the agricultural side, he emphasizes that although the U.S. is a major breadbasket, fertilizer shortages matter because fertilizer production relies on natural gas via the Haber-Bosch process. If natural gas-based fertilizers become scarce or expensive, crop yields would fall nonlinearly; a 25% increase in fertilizer prices could cause food prices to rise much more than 25%. He warns that many Americans—especially those with limited savings and discretionary income—would struggle with higher food costs, necessitating dietary shifts toward cheaper staples like legumes (peas, beans) and crops that tolerate lower fertilizer input. He illustrates this with historical references to pioneer cooking and the concept of preserving calories (such as using bacon grease) and to potential shifts to a more frugal food culture (e.g., pea porridge, potatoes, black-eyed peas) if shortages persist. He cautions that the described scenario depends on an extended Hormuz closure into June–August and beyond; the longer it lasts, the worse the food and energy security situation would become. He frames food security as a form of wealth in America and encourages stockpiling or preparing through self-reliance measures, including growing food and diversifying crops, to mitigate potential shortages. Speaker 1’s closing line promotes a stock-up product from Health Ranger Store.

Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst, joins the program to discuss the dramatic developments in the war against Iran. The conversation centers on the strike on Karg Island, the strategic choke point for Iran’s oil exports, and the broader implications of escalating U.S. actions. - Karg Island and the oil threat: The host notes that Karg Island handles 90% of Iran’s oil exports and asks why Trump isn’t targeting this area. Johnson argues the attack on Karg Island makes little strategic sense and points out that Iran has five oil terminals; destroying one would not end Iran’s potential revenue. He emphasizes that the U.S. bombed the runway of the major airport on the island, which he says remains irrelevant to Iran’s overall capacity to generate revenue. He notes the runway damage would not support U.S. objectives for invading the island, given runway length constraints (6,000 feet measured vs. need for 3,500–3,700 feet for certain aircraft) and the limited air force in Iran. Johnson asserts that Iran has indicated it would retaliate against oil terminals and Gulf neighbors if oil resources or energy infrastructure are attacked. - Economic and strategic consequences of closing the Strait of Hormuz: Johnson states that the action effectively shut the Strait of Hormuz, cutting off 20% of the world’s oil supply, 25% of global LNG, and 35% of the world’s urea for fertilizer. He explains fertilizer’s criticality to global agriculture and notes that rising gas and diesel prices in the United States would impact consumer costs, given many Americans live paycheck to paycheck. He suggests the price hikes contribute to inflationary pressure and could trigger a global recession, especially since Persian Gulf countries are pivotal energy suppliers. He also points out that the U.S. cannot easily reopen Hormuz without unacceptable losses and that Iran has prepared for contingencies for thirty years, with robust defenses including tunnels and coastal fortifications. - Military feasibility and strategy: The discussion covers the impracticality of a U.S. ground invasion of Iran, given the size of Iran’s army and the modern battlefield’s drone and missile threats. Johnson notes the U.S. Army and Marine numbers, the logistical challenges of sustaining an amphibious or airborne assault, and the vulnerability of American ships and troops to drones and missiles. He highlights that a mass deployment would be highly costly and dangerous, with historical evidence showing air power alone cannot win wars. The hosts discuss limited U.S. options and the possible futility of attempts to seize or occupy Iran’s territory. - Internal U.S. decision-making and DC dynamics: The program mentions a split inside Washington between anti-war voices and those pressing toward Tehran, with leaks suggesting that top officials warned Trump about major obstacles and potential losses. Johnson cites a leak from the National Intelligence Council indicating regime change in Tehran is unlikely, even with significant U.S. effort. He asserts the Pentagon’s credibility has been questioned after disputed reports (e.g., the KC-135 shootdown) and notes that Trump’s advisors who counsel restraint are being sidelined. - Iranian retaliation and targets: The discussion covers Iran’s targeting of air defenses and critical infrastructure, including radars at embassies and bases in the region, and the destruction of five Saudi air refueling tankers, which Trump later dismissed as fake news. Johnson says Iran aims to degrade Israel economically and militarily, while carefully avoiding mass civilian casualties in some instances. He observes Iran’s restraint in striking desalination plants, which would have caused a humanitarian catastrophe, suggesting a deliberate choice to keep certain targets within bounds. - Global realignments and the role of Russia, China, and India: The conversation touches on broader geopolitical shifts. Johnson argues that Russia and China are offering alternatives to the dollar-dominated order, strengthening ties with Gulf states and BRICS members. He suggests Gulf allies may be considering decoupling from U.S. security guarantees, seeking to diversify away from the petrodollar system. The discussion includes India’s position, noting Modi’s visit to Israel and India’s balancing act amid U.S. pressure and Iran relations; Iran’s ultimatum to allow passage for flag vessels and its diplomacy toward India is highlighted as a measured approach, even as India’s stance has attracted scrutiny. - Israel, casualties, and the broader landscape: The speakers discuss Israeli casualties and infrastructure under sustained Iranian strikes, noting limited information from within Israel due to media constraints and possible censorship. Johnson presents a game-theory view: if Israel threatens a nuclear option, Iran might be compelled to develop a nuclear capability as a deterrent, altering calculations for both Israel and the United States. - Terrorism narrative and historical context: The speakers challenge the U.S. portrayal of Iran as the world’s top sponsor of terrorism, arguing that ISIS and the Taliban have caused far more deaths in recent years, and that Iran’s responses to threats have historically prioritized restraint. They emphasize Iran’s chemical weapons restraint during the Iran-Iraq war, contrasting it with U.S. and Iraqi actions in the 1980s. - Final reflections: The discussion emphasizes the cascade effects of the conflict, including potential impacts on Taiwan’s energy and semiconductor production, multiplied by China’s leverage, and Russia’s increasing global influence. Johnson warns that the war’s end will likely be achieved through shifting alignments and economic realignments rather than a conventional battlefield victory, with the goal of U.S. withdrawal from the region as part of any settlement. The conversation closes with mutual thanks and a reaffirmation of ongoing analysis of these evolving dynamics.