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In this conversation, Professor Glenn Diesen discusses his critical view of current Western and NATO policies, the treatment of contrarian analysis, and the evolving security dynamics in Europe, with a focus on Norway and the Nordic region. - On academic freedom and public discourse: Diesen explains that challenging the mainstream view is met with terms like “Putin Verster,” suggesting that understanding an opponent is seen as taking their side. He argues this suppresses discussion of security concerns and inhibits analysis on how to avoid or end conflicts. He notes that those who were right about Russia and NATO developments are often marginalized in the mainstream narrative. - Norway’s shift in security posture: In Norway, a move away from Cold War-era restraint toward greater alignment with the United States is described. Diesen notes that Norway previously avoided foreign bases on its soil, hosting limited Arctic activity and practicing deterrence without provoking the Soviet Union. He asserts this has changed, with Norway now granting access to American bases across the country, particularly in the Arctic, to confront Russia. He points out that Norway historically did not send weapons to countries at war, a policy that has shifted since the Ukraine conflict. - The Ukraine war and arms policy: Diesen contrasts the pre-2022 stance of “diplomacy first” with the current reality in which Norwegian leaders and parliament have largely supported arming Ukraine. He recounts his own attempt to run for parliament on a platform advocating diplomacy rather than weapon supplies, and he highlights that the current consensus—across almost all parties—favors weapons support, with perceived little room for alternative approaches. - Sweden and Finland in NATO and Nordic implications: The joining of Sweden and Finland to NATO is discussed as a response to fear of Russia after the Ukraine invasion. Diesen argues the public was initially hesitant in both countries, and argues that the narrative framing of Russia as an existential threat influenced rapid NATO accession once public opinion shifted. He suggests this shift was prepared in advance by Western powers, with media and political networks supporting pro-NATO positions. - Arctic geostrategy and regional stakes: The rapporteur explains that the Arctic and Baltic regions are central to Western containment of Russia. With Finland and Sweden in NATO and Norway militarized, the potential to block Russian access to key maritime corridors is emphasized. Diesen warns that expanding military leverage against Russia under a “more security through greater weapons” logic is flawed, predicting that Russia would respond forcefully if provoked. He stresses that the notion of Russia capitulating under increased pressure is unrealistic. - Denmark and Greenland scenarios: The discussion shifts to Denmark’s Greenland, noting President Trump’s interest in the territory. Diesen outlines possible US strategies: threaten force but favor negotiated settlements, offer financial incentives to Denmark to cede Greenland, or stage a sequence of steps (including a potential secession in Greenland) to facilitate absorption by the US. He suggests that the US might prefer a negotiated outcome over direct military action to avoid broad European backlash. - Europe’s strategic dependency and future: The European tendency to lean on the United States for security and economics is highlighted as a vulnerability. Diesen argues Europe has become heavily dependent—politically, economically, and militarily—and that this dependency limits Europe’s bargaining power in disputes over Greenland and other strategic issues. He proposes rethinking Europe’s security architecture towards inclusivity and dialogue with Russia, rather than a divides-based approach that feeds security competition. - A call for inclusive security architecture: Concluding, Diesen advocates reviving an inclusive European security framework based on indivisible security and open dialogue with Russia. He argues that NATO expansion and an exclusive security structure since the 1990s eroded the possibility of a cooperative European security order and that Europe should rethink its approach to reduce tensions and dependence on the United States. The interview ends with Diesen promoting his channel and noting translations into German, inviting further discussion on these themes.

In the short term, admitting the Baltic states to NATO could cause significant concern in US-Russian relations. The speaker believes this move could provoke a strong reaction from Russia, although not necessarily a military one. They also mention the idea of Europe becoming "NATOized" like Finland. English Translation: Admitting the Baltic states to NATO could cause concern in US-Russian relations, potentially leading to a strong reaction from Russia. The speaker also mentions the concept of Europe becoming "NATOized" like Finland.

I met with Putin before or after becoming president, and we discussed NATO potentially fracturing. He seemed excited about the idea of causing problems for NATO.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss immigration in Europe, arguing that Poland has done a good job by “allowing nobody in,” and that “most European nations, they're decaying.” They say leaders in Europe are “a little freaked out by” the posture and imply that Europe is destroying its own countries. They suggest that if this continues, Europe will become weak and no longer be strong allies; their ideological shifts will reflect the change in the people entering the countries. Speaker 0 expresses concern about London and Paris, calling the Mayor of London “a disaster” and stating he has “a totally different ideology of what he's supposed to have,” noting he gets elected because many people have come in and vote for him. He adds, “I hate what's happened to London, and I hate what's happened to Paris.” Speaker 2 asks whether Speaker 0 intends a message of tough love to our allies to push reforms or if many allies are simply weak and not worth aligning with. Speaker 0 responds that they are “weak,” and that they want to be politically correct, and “they don't know what to do,” including in trade, which he describes as “a little bit dangerous.” He reiterates that Europe’s political correctness makes them weak. Speaker 0 indicates that there should be people removal for those who entered the country illegally: “think they should get the people out that came into the country illegally.” Speaker 2 then asks about NATO. Speaker 0 brings up Sweden as an example: “Sweden was known as the safest country in Europe, one of the safest countries in the world. Now it's known as a very unsafe well, pretty unsafe country. It's not even believable. It's a whole different country. Sweden.”

The speaker states that the concept of a neutral Ukraine is no longer relevant. They believe that Ukraine should become a member of NATO to ensure its security.

Speaker 0 notes that Trump used the Davos stage to demand Greenland back, warning allies to back off or face massive tariffs, calling Greenland “a piece of ice.” Speaker 1 says the goal is a piece of ice for world protection; the U.S. could have kept the land but chose not to, giving Greenland a choice to say yes and be appreciated or no and be remembered. Greenland is reportedly protesting in the streets, saying “hands off our country.” Speaker 0 adds that Trump has struck a deal framing a future agreement on Greenland and the Arctic, posted on Truth Social, stating that based on a productive meeting with the Secretary General of NATO, Marruta, a framework for a future deal with respect to Greenland and the Arctic has been formed, and that tariffs scheduled for February 1 will not be imposed. Speaker 2 challenges the claim, noting NATO doesn’t own Greenland, and questions whether Marruta can make such a deal. Speaker 0 continues the exchange, joking about not wanting a Met Gala, and suggests the post hints at the U.S. taking control of Canada as well because of Arctic interests. Canadian Prime Minister Carney responds by saying Canada will invoke Article 5 and support NATO to protect Denmark, with Denmark also unwilling to cede sovereignty following the framework. Speaker 2 adds that two people are deciding the fate of Greenland, and another participant begins to speak. Speaker 0 provides population context, saying about 57,000 people live in Greenland. Speaker 0 then mentions Putin’s response, quoting a brief remark that he’s “kinda behind this idea.” Speaker 2 notes Ravasi’s commentary and asks for a referendum, which Speaker 3 says would give Greenlanders a semblance of deciding for themselves, though it’s unclear how such a referendum would impact broader strategic interests. Speakers turn to Ralph Schulhammer, who is in Austria, to assess European reaction. Speaker 3 says Trump’s rhetoric in Davos was “very Trumpian” but contained carrots as well as sticks: he highlighted ancestry, support for a strong Europe, concerns about migration and energy policy, and suggested that Europe must strengthen itself to be a true partner; otherwise, the U.S. may retreat. The discussion acknowledges sentiment that Europe’s elites tend to frame issues as global rather than addressing national needs, with Speaker 3 arguing that policy-wise there can be shared interests, but communication strategy differed from Trump’s approach. The panel considers whether Greenland’s referendum would matter, noting that many peoples pursue autonomy but that Greenland’s outcome would not necessarily alter large strategic interests. They discuss historical precedents of land acquisitions and acknowledge the Greenland dispute sits at the intersection of Arctic strategic interests and great-power competition, including China and Russia’s activity in the region. Speaker 3 emphasizes that the future of Europe should be anchored in defending European territory and citizens, not only global agendas, and critiques the perception that Europe should always prioritize global issues over internal concerns. In closing, Speaker 0 references Macron’s overture to meet in Paris, noting Trump’s remark that Macron won’t be in power much longer. Ralph Schulhammer is thanked for his insights, with recognition of his Hammertime podcast.

Larry Johnson and the host discuss the current trajectory of U.S. policy under Donald Trump and its implications for international law, NATO, and the global balance of power, with frequent emphasis on Greenland as a flashpoint. - They suggest Trump is making a case for peace through overwhelming strength and unpredictability, implying that international law is seen by him as a restraint US power. Johnson argues that Trump’s stance includes threats and pressure aimed at annexing Greenland, and he questions whether this represents a genuine peace strategy or a coercive strategy that disregards international norms. - Johnson catalogs a sequence of Trump-era actions and rhetoric: Donald Trump “launched the coup against the Iranian government,” was involved in discussions with Zelensky, helped Ukraine, and then “kidnapped Nicolas Maduro,” followed by an escalation that included the suggestion of a military attack on Iran. He says Trump has “declared openly” that he does not recognize or respect international law, describing it as “useless. It’s whatever he thinks is right and what needs to be done.” - The conversation notes that Trump’s position has been reflected by close aides and allies, including Steven Miller, Marco Rubio, and Scott Bessette. Johnson claims this broad endorsement signals a shift in how major powers might view the U.S. and its approach to international law, with Putin, Xi, Macron, and others watching closely. - They argue this marks a breakdown of the international system: “a complete breakdown of the international system,” with NATO potentially coming apart as the U.S. claims a threat to Greenland from China or Russia and insists that NATO is unnecessary to protect it. The debate frames Europe as being in a toxic relationship with the United States, dependent on U.S. security guarantees, while the U.S. acts with unilateralism. - The European response is discussed in detail. The host describes European leaders as having “ Stockholm syndrome” and being overly dependent on Washington. The letter to Norway’s prime minister by Trump is cited as an astonishing admission that peace is subordinate to U.S. self-interest. The question is raised whether NATO is dying as a result. - They compare the evolution of international law to historical developments: Magna Carta is invoked as a symbol of limiting rulers, and Westphalia is discussed as a starting point for the balance-of-power system. The hosts consider whether modern international law is viable in a multipolar world, where power is distributed and no single hegemon can enforce norms as unilaterally as in the past. - They discuss the economic dimension of the shift away from U.S. hegemony. The U.S. dollar’s status as the global reserve currency is challenged as BRICS-plus and other nations move toward alternative payment systems, gold, and silver reserves. Johnson notes that the lifting of sanctions on Russia and the broader shift away from dollar-dominated finance are undermining U.S. financial hegemony. He highlights that Russia and China are increasing gold and silver holdings, with a particular emphasis on silver moving to new highs, suggesting a widening gap in global finance. - The Trump administration’s tariff strategy is discussed as another instrument that could provoke a financial crisis: Johnson cites reports of European threats to retaliate with massive tariffs against the U.S. and references the potential for a broader financial shock as gold and silver prices rise and as countries reduce their purchases of U.S. Treasuries. - The discussion examines Greenland specifically: the claim that the U.S. wants Greenland for access to rare earth minerals, Arctic access, and strategic bases. Johnson disputes the rare-earth rationale, pointing out U.S. processing limits and comparing Arctic capabilities—Russia has multiple nuclear-powered icebreakers. He characterizes Trump’s Greenland gambit as a personal vanity project that could set off broader strategic consequences. - They touch on the role of European defense commitments, with German and other European responses to defend Greenland described as inconsequential or symbolic, and a suggestion that Europe might respond more seriously by hedging against U.S. influence, though current incentives make a real break difficult. - A broader warning emerges: the possibility of a new world order emerging from multipolarity, with the United States weakened economically and politically. They foresee a period of adjustment in which European countries may reorient toward Russia or China, while the United States pursues a more fragmented and confrontational stance. - The conversation ends with mutual concerns about the trajectory toward potential geopolitical conflict and a call to watch the evolving relationship between the major powers, the role of international law, and the coming economic shifts as the global system transitions from unipolar to multipolar.

War is coming to the Arctic Circle, with Greenland seen as part of a broader clash for the world’s most important trade route. Russia and China have already laid claim to large portions; the United States now seeks in. The discussion notes the growing competition over the Arctic, Iran, and Europe as flashpoints. Trump is calling for a Pentagon budget increase from 1.0 trillion to 1.5 trillion for 2027. He tweeted that after negotiations, the military budget should be 1.5 trillion “in the very troubled and dangerous times,” and suggested capping CEO compensation in defense contracts at 5 million per year. Following the tweet, Lockheed Martin stock jumped, as did other defense contractors. Glenn Greenwald is cited, saying the Pentagon fails its audit for the seventh consecutive year and questions how hundreds of billions of dollars move around, then notes a preference to increase budgets from 850 billion to 1.0 trillion to 1.5 trillion. Tucker Carlson is quoted suggesting war is coming and that Trump may know something others do not. Speaker 1 frames the budget increase as the kind of funding a country anticipates a global or regional war would have, calling it a “war budget,” not a peacekeeping one, and suggests we’re moving toward a big war. Speaker 0 adds that a large-scale attack against Iran is likely before the end of the year, and questions what will happen in the Arctic Circle. The panel introduces Ben Freeman, author of The Trillion Dollar War Machine, who joins to discuss. Freeman’s point is that the president justifies a larger foreign war budget by pointing to money generated abroad, including oil resources in places like Venezuela. The panel agrees the implication is that the military is “paying for itself” through conquest, and a speaker notes this echoes imperial patterns. Another participant emphasizes that China’s military budget is about a third to a quarter of the U.S. budget, but China has triple the personnel, arguing that quantity does not necessarily equal capability and that the U.S. remains the strongest military force. There is a claim that the current budget primarily funds contractors, not service members, veterans, or families; defense contractors’ revenues largely come from U.S. government contracts, and this is reflected in stock surges when large budgets are announced. The discussion cites a statistic that about 54% of the defense budget goes to Pentagon contractors, and notes a contrast: one in four military families faces food insecurity despite the existing trillion-dollar budget. The panel argues that perpetual war is used to justify the size of the budget, not merely to address threats, but to keep the defense industry tidal-wanked into profits. They discuss whether diplomacy with Russia could be a more effective path, and acknowledge a shift in U.S. policy rhetoric compared to earlier promises to avoid endless wars. There is mention that the Senate voted to limit presidential actions in Venezuela; the president defends war powers as constitutional, while critics point to campaigns that promised restraint on war. Ben Freeman promotes his book, The Trillion Dollar War Machine, noting its availability in hardback, Kindle, and audiobooks, and the discussion ends with praise for the book and thanks to Freeman.

The speaker discusses the idea of Russia joining NATO and relates it to recently declassified documents. He reads a 1954 note from the Soviet government to NATO member countries, stating: "Relying on the unchanging principles of our peaceful foreign policy and striving to reduce tension in international relations, the Soviet government expresses readiness to consider jointly with interested governments the question of the USSR's participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." He then presents the response to that proposal: “There is no need to underline the utterly unrealistic nature of such a proposal.” The speaker recalls an earlier moment, about a year prior, when, in response to the question about Russia possibly joining NATO, he said, “why not?” He notes that former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, while traveling in Europe, responded that this is not being discussed now. The core discussion is framed around understanding whether NATO is a military organization and whether Russia would be welcome there. The speaker suggests that NATO is indeed a military organization and questions whether Russia would be wanted there. He asserts that NATO “is moving toward our borders,” and he ascribes to this movement a purpose or inevitability that shapes Russia’s position on the issue. In summarizing the underlying basis of the Russian position, the speaker emphasizes the perception that NATO’s character as a military alliance and its movements toward Russia’s borders inform a strategic stance against expanding membership to include Russia. He contrasts the historical openness expressed in 1954 with the contemporary response that such a proposal is not realistic, and with current statements from Western officials indicating that Russia’s accession is not under consideration. The narrative ties together declassified archival material, a past provocative-appearing suggestion, and present-day geopolitical calculations about NATO’s reach and military posture near Russia.

In 2021, President Putin sent a draft treaty to NATO, asking them to promise not to enlarge NATO and remove military infrastructure in allied countries that joined since 1997. NATO rejected this, leading Putin to invade Ukraine. However, the opposite happened as NATO increased its presence in the eastern part of the Alliance. Finland has joined NATO and Sweden will soon become a member, which is beneficial for the Nordic countries and NATO. Putin's attempt to prevent NATO enlargement has resulted in the opposite outcome.

There's debate over expanding NATO to Central European countries like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Russia is against further expansion, warning of a potential "cold peace." While the US hasn't set a date, the understanding is that expansion will happen eventually. The issue isn't *if*, but *when*. Germany primarily advocates for expansion within NATO. While keeping the option open, expansion should only proceed if there's a real threat. The focus should be on encouraging Russia to cooperate peacefully. It's also more important for Eastern European countries to join the European Union for economic benefits. Expanding NATO to protect borders that aren't currently threatened doesn't make sense. Creating a buffer zone in Central Europe could lead to renewed tensions between Russia and Germany. We should aim for friendly relations with Russia.

NATO's response to the use of Sarin gas in Syria raises questions about their actions if such an attack were to occur on European soil. Will they intervene or remain passive? And if they do intervene, how far are they willing to go? The possibility of a direct confrontation with Vladimir Putin looms.

What does "revisionist Russia" mean? It suggests a desire to return to the Soviet Union's former glory. Secretary Hagel mentioned Russia's army being on NATO's doorstep. Some argue this is due to NATO's eastward expansion, but that perspective isn't universally accepted. NATO's expansion is seen as beneficial, not a threat. While NATO is a defensive alliance, Russia's military movements, including actions in Ukraine, are viewed as aggressive. The expansion of NATO doesn't imply hostility; it's about security. The focus should be on Russia's actions that destabilize neighboring countries, rather than blaming NATO for its proximity to Russia.

We are strengthening our political relationship with the NATO Ukraine Council, working together to make decisions. Ukraine will become a member of NATO, it's just a matter of time. NATO will support Ukraine for security reasons as we prepare for that day.

Gilbert Doktorov and the host discuss the evolving, multi-layered negotiations surrounding the Ukraine war, stressing that talks involve more than Ukraine and Russia, extending to US-Russia dynamics and broader European and global interests. - They note that trilateral talks among Ukraine, Russia, and the US have begun, with the first phase completed. The conversation emphasizes that the US-Russia dimension is crucial because the conflict is viewed as a proxy war between NATO and Russia, and that “the US toppled the government in Ukraine” with intelligence support, military planning, weapons, and targets coordinated through backchannels. The implication is that any durable settlement would require some deal between the US and Russia to de-escalate the proxy confrontation. - On US-Russia relations, Speaker 1 identifies several dimensions: renewal or non-renewal of New START, and the functioning of embassies, as negative signs, but points to positive changes elsewhere. He highlights Kislyov’s Sunday night program remarks, noting Russia’s proposal to contribute $1,000,000,000 to become a permanent board member using frozen US assets (total US assets frozen around $5 billion in equivalent value). He mentions that Trump was asked about using frozen assets and reportedly declined, but the implication is that Moscow views this as a potential lever. Kislyov also notes that the additional $4,000,000,000 in frozen assets would be allocated to reconstruction in Palestine, and that Russia’s participation on the board would influence regional diplomacy, including with Palestinians and Israelis. - The discussion suggests that the absence of official diplomacy (e.g., embassies) does not necessarily indicate a lack of progress, arguing that backchannels between Putin and Trump are functioning well. The speakers discuss the broader context of Russia’s strategic posture, including alleged advancements in space-based and other new military capabilities that are not fully captured by New START, and the sense from Moscow that the US is preparing a space-based missile system that would enable first strikes, a point the Russians emphasize in public discourse. - On Ukraine, Zelensky’s stance is described as uncompromising: Ukraine will not cede territory and will demand security guarantees, which could undermine a neutral status. The dialogue suggests Zelensky is using a posture of firmness to buy time for negotiations, with Ukrainian leadership potentially exchanging assurances for a broader settlement that could include regime change and financial support for reconstruction. - The potential for compromise is discussed in terms of strategic timing and leverage. The Russians’ primary interest is regime change, and there could be an understanding with Trump about a democratic replacement in Ukraine, possibly replacing Zelensky with a pro-Russian administration under conditions tied to substantial monetary reparations for reconstruction. The timing and mechanism, including potential referenda or buyouts, are considered critical elements that could determine the settlement’s architecture. - The European role is analyzed as increasingly fraught. Europe’s diplomatic engagement has been limited, but Moscow is open to leveraging European assets in a peace process. Lavrov’s stated position that talks with Ursula von der Leyen’s European Commission leadership are unlikely, and the broader fragmentation within Europe (France, Germany, Finland, the EU leadership) are highlighted as complicating factors. There is speculation about European figures who could bridge talks, such as Finland’s Stubb, though there is skepticism about Kalas’s leadership within the EU. - The speakers speculate that Davos and Trump’s stance have reshaped European perceptions of US leadership, with European elites increasingly questioning the reliability of US-backed security guarantees. The conversation closes with an expectation that the year 2025 will be dominated by Trump as a central variable in resolving global issues, and that Moscow remains optimistic about achieving a settlement with Washington while signaling a tougher stance toward Ukraine if needed. Overall, the discussion portrays a complex, interwoven set of negotiations across US-Russia, Ukraine-Russia, and European dynamics, with backchannels, asset controls, potential regime-change considerations, and timing as key levers for reaching any settlement.

Speaker 0 states he wanted Ukraine, not Russia, to join NATO. He felt Ukraine needed to be in the EU and NATO. Speaker 1 brings up that Secretary of State Baker primed Gorbachev in the early nineties not to expand NATO. Speaker 0 responds that times change and the United States must be flexible and adjust to the times, which is why there is strong support for Speaker 1's country now. Speaker 1 says it doesn't matter what Baker primed Gorbachev with in the past, and that we have to see what is going on now.

- War is coming to the Arctic. The discussion notes that attention is focused on the Arctic, with General Mike Flynn and others echoing this concern. Medvedev publicly floated a referendum inviting 55,000 Greenland residents to vote to join Russia, and Greenland’s prime minister Jens Fredrick Nielsen stated that if faced with a choice, Denmark (NATO and the EU) would be chosen over the United States. - General Mike Flynn’s view: He emphasizes that the Arctic is a strategically critical region due to its resources and the potential for major power competition. He explains that there are treaties between the United States (and Denmark) dating back to 1951, which would need to be reconsidered or broken in the event of major shifts. He recounts the historical Bluey programs in Greenland during World War II, which supported naval facilities, communications, weather stations, and airfields to defeat Nazi Germany, illustrating Greenland’s ongoing strategic importance. - Arctic geography and assets: Flynn highlights Russia’s large icebreaker fleet (about 50–60, including nuclear-powered ones) versus the United States’ aging, non-nuclear icebreakers (about four). He notes that icebreakers enable passage and influence strategic transit routes, and that Russia’s investments in icebreakers reflect its need to operate in Arctic waters, where the United States lacks similar capabilities. He asserts the Arctic’s significance for resources and for transit of those resources, underlining why the region is pivotal in geostrategic terms. - Broader strategic framing: Flynn argues that the focus on the Middle East has been excessive and costly—citing Afghanistan and Iraq expenditures and outcomes—and contends that Greenland and the Arctic are central to a wider strategic picture. He says the Arctic hinges on geography and timing, including the Greenland Strait and the Denmark Straits, and stresses that Greenland’s status matters beyond its fisheries or natural resources. - The Iran and Venezuela threads, and the Pacific as the overlooked front: The discussion connects Greenland to a broader frame in which China’s rise (and BRICS) is a constant factor. Flynn suggests a shift toward viewing policy as a problem of economic containment, aimed at slowing China’s and Russia’s strategic ascendance, including in the Pacific. He warns of the risk of threats or actions that could provoke responses domestically. - Intelligence and policy execution concerns: Flynn questions the current state of U.S. intelligence capabilities, arguing that CIA collection may be weaker than commonly portrayed and urging tougher scrutiny of intelligence claims that inform presidential decisions. He stresses the importance of direct accountability and asks for clear objectives, timelines, and consequences if goals aren’t met for multiple theaters (Venezuela, Eastern Europe, Greenland, the Indo-Pacific). - Domestic and governance issues: The conversation includes concerns about corruption and “the rot” inside the U.S. government, asserting that domestic reform is necessary. Flynn emphasizes the need to fix homeland capabilities, including energy security and infrastructure, and to ensure the United States remains strong economically and militarily. - Operational considerations and caution about escalation: Flynn warns that the “response now” may come at home rather than in a regional theater, given that adversaries can reach the United States more easily. He cautions against drifting into war due to misaligned messaging and the risk of overextension. - President and strategy: The speakers discuss the potential political pressure on President Trump regarding foreign policy, urging transparent articulation of objectives for Venezuela, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Greenland, and the Indo-Pacific, along with a plan to “unask” or withdraw if goals are not achieved. They stress prioritizing American interests and domestic resilience. - Final notes: The conversation ends with a call for focusing on practical, America-first issues—gas prices, inflation, and the cost of living—while acknowledging the broader strategic stakes in Greenland, the Arctic, and global power dynamics.

Admitting the Baltic states to NATO could cause significant tension in US-Russian relations, potentially leading to a hostile reaction from Russia. This move could tip the balance and escalate the situation, despite the Baltic states' readiness for admission.

In 2021, President Putin sent a draft treaty to NATO, asking them to promise not to enlarge NATO and remove military infrastructure from allies that joined since 1997. NATO rejected this, leading to Putin's invasion of Ukraine. However, the opposite happened as NATO increased its presence in the eastern part of the Alliance. Finland has joined NATO and Sweden will soon become a member, benefiting the Nordic countries and NATO. Putin's attempt to prevent NATO enlargement has resulted in the exact opposite outcome.

Ukraine has officially applied for NATO membership, and the question is whether NATO is ready to consider their application. NATO states that every democracy in Europe has the right to apply for membership, and they respect Ukraine's right to choose its own security arrangements. However, the decision on membership needs to be taken by all 30 Allies through consensus. Currently, NATO's main focus is providing immediate support to Ukraine in defending itself against the Russian invasion.

President Putin sent a draft treaty to NATO in 2021, asking for a promise not to expand NATO and to remove military infrastructure from countries that joined since 1997. NATO rejected this, so Putin invaded Ukraine to prevent further NATO expansion. However, the opposite happened. NATO now has a stronger presence in Eastern Europe, and Finland has joined the alliance with Sweden soon to follow. This is beneficial for the Nordic countries and NATO, showing that Putin's actions had the opposite effect.

If Russia invades Ukraine, Nord Stream 2 will be canceled. The speaker assures that they will find a way to stop the project, even though Germany currently controls it.

In the short term, admitting the Baltic states to NATO could cause significant tension in US-Russian relations. This move might provoke a strong and hostile reaction from Russia, potentially tipping the balance towards conflict. The speaker believes that this decision could have serious consequences.

Europe is the cradle of Western civilization, and the cultural and religious bonds between it and the U.S. will last beyond political disagreements. However, Europe is at risk of civilizational suicide. Many European countries are unable or unwilling to control their borders, but they are starting to push back, which is good. They are also starting to limit the free speech of their own citizens, even as those citizens protest against border issues. Europe needs to respect its own people and sovereignty, something America can't do for them. If a country like Germany takes in millions of immigrants who are culturally incompatible, Germany will have killed itself. The speaker loves Germany and wants it to thrive.