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"I'm not interested in being a heel clicking, cork sniffing ambassador." No regime change. No more boots on the ground. "There is no plan b. Plan b is chaos and a return to worse than what the Assad regime was." "The issue isn't the weapons. The issue is the utilization of the weapons." We must "empower LAP. Give them more resources, give them more people, give them more training, and give them more money." "America first, and everybody gather their own crowd around them, and let's figure out how we put them back together." "I trust him. I believe him. I'm certain that his objectives today are aligned with our objectives." "There are three and a half million in Turkiye. We have a million and a half in Jordan. You have a million and a half in Lebanon." There are "22,000,000 diaspora Lebanese outside of Lebanon." "The buffer zone of economic prosperity for the South is the answer." "Sovereignty is not that. Sovereignty is the heart and soul of the people." Hezbollah is "becoming less and less influenced by Iran, or what I would like to say is, like, less of an Iranian proxy and more of a Lebanese political party." The issue is "dialogue." The US "removed the bounty on the Syrian president when he became president not long after."

We're going to cut off the funding streams to Iran. We can't continue to have a hundred hostages, including Israelis and Americans, held captive by Hamas and Hezbollah, who are essentially mercenaries of Iran. America needs to recognize the importance of our alliance with Israel, ensure the safe return of all Israeli hostages, and reaffirm our unwavering support for Israel as our top ally.

We will stop the flow of funds to Iran. We won't have a hundred hostages, including Israelis and Americans, held by Hamas and Hezbollah, who are essentially Iranian mercenaries. America needs to recognize the importance of Israel, secure the release of Israeli hostages, and reaffirm our support for Israel as our top ally.

Professor Jeffrey Sachs discusses the Israel-Iran conflict, the risk of nuclear escalation, and a pathway to end the war. He clarifies that David Sacks is not related to him and was speaking as a Trump adviser, advocating that Trump declare victory and stop the conflict to avoid deeper disaster. Sachs outlines the economic and strategic dangers: the Strait of Hormuz could be closed, 400 million barrels released from reserves would cover only about twenty days of normal oil flow, and ongoing tit-for-tat strikes are destroying energy infrastructure, increasing global calamity risk. Sachs recounts the five-step framework he and Sybil Ferris proposed to end the conflict, which he attributes to a need to recognize all security interests and to reduce aggression against Iran. He emphasizes that the US and Israel’s escalation harms Israel, the US, Iran, and regional stability. The five steps are: 1) Stop brazen, illegal armed aggression against Iran and recognize Iran’s security interests, noting that Iran does not want a nuclear weapon and had adhered to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) until the US ripped it up in 2018. Iran reportedly wants negotiated oversight under UN scrutiny, and the plan’s collapse is linked to broader regional violence. 2) Acknowledge Iran’s desire not to develop nuclear weapons and acknowledge the JCPOA’s original framework, highlighting that Iran’s leadership signaled a preference for negotiation under international inspection, contrary to the perception that Tehran seeks to acquire a weapon. 3) Open the Strait of Hormuz through Gulf Cooperation Council states and Iran, with Gulf states reasserting sovereignty over military bases on their soil and pledging that bases will not be used for aggression against Iran. The Gulf states and Iran should negotiate bilaterally to ensure open trade routes, with regional solidarity in backing this approach. 4) Return Israel to its 06/04/1967 borders, creating a Palestinian state in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem on internationally recognized borders. Sachs argues this addresses the root cause of continual conflict and links it to Netanyahu’s policy of denying a Palestinian state and pursuing broader regional control. 5) Establish a state of Palestine within the UN (as the 194th member) so that Hamas, Hezbollah, and other militant groups are disarmed, with disarmament supported by the regional consensus and the UN Security Council, contingent on Palestinian statehood. Sachs asserts that what blocks peace is a coalition of Israeli supremacism, Israeli apartheid, and US support for aggressive actions. He references the Likud ideology and the historical “clean break” doctrine, noting that the US veto in the UN Security Council has repeatedly blocked recognition of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Speaker 0 adds a discussion on indivisible security versus hegemonic peace, arguing that true security must be indivisible and that hegemonic peace—enforcing dominance—has led to the current crises in both the Middle East and Ukraine. Sachs agrees that the delusion of overwhelming force undermines security and highlights parallel dynamics in Taiwan and Russia. Finally, they address why Iran was underestimated: the U.S. has pursued a self-created reality approach, leading to improvisation and escalation without a coherent planning process. Sachs criticizes the American security establishment for improvisation, lack of careful analysis, and dependence on a hegemonic approach, suggesting that this mindset increases the risk of miscalculation and escalation. The conversation ends with acknowledging the late hour in Kuala Lumpur and expressing thanks.

Speaker 1 clarifies that they never said they would cut military aid to Israel. They believe that if the US-Israel relationship becomes so strong that Israel no longer needs aid, it would be a mark of success. They emphasize viewing the relationship as a friendship, not just a transaction. Speaker 1 aims to lead Israel into a new version of the Abraham Accords, involving countries like Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. They also stress the importance of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear capabilities. Speaker 1 prefers speaking authentically, even if others distort their words.

The speaker outlines a vision for a post-Islamic Republic Iran, arguing that the Iran people associate with terrorism, extremism, and poverty is a misperception, and that a free Iran will be peaceful, flourishing, and different from the current regime. The speaker asserts that after the fall of the Islamic Republic, Iran’s security and foreign policy will change fundamentally: the nuclear military program will end, support for terrorist groups will cease immediately, and Iran will work with regional and global partners to confront terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, and extremist Islamism. Iran will act as a friend and stabilizing force in the region and as a responsible partner in global security. In diplomacy, relations with the United States will be normalized and the friendship with America and its people will be restored. The State of Israel will be recognized immediately. The speaker envisions expanding the Abraham Accords into the Cyrus Accords, bringing together a free Iran, Israel, and the Arab world, framed by mutual recognition, sovereignty, and national interest. In energy, Iran is described as possessing some of the largest oil and gas reserves in the world and will become a reliable energy supplier to the free world. Policymaking will be transparent, with Iran’s actions described as responsible and prices as predictable. On governance, Iran will adopt and enforce international standards, confront money laundering, and dismantle organized corruption. Public institutions will answer to the people. In the economy, Iran is portrayed as one of the world’s last great untapped markets, with a educated, modern population and a diaspora connected to the world. A democratic Iran will open its economy to trade, investment, and innovation, and Iran will seek to invest in the world, replacing isolation with opportunity. The speaker emphasizes that this is not an abstract vision but a practical one grounded in national interest, stability, and cooperation, and calls for the international community and the Iranian people to stand with this change. The fall of the Islamic Republic and the establishment of a secular democratic government in Iran are presented as restoring dignity to the Iranian people and benefiting the region and the world. A free Iran is described as a force for peace, prosperity, and partnership.

Wanna get on to Ukraine. But, given that Israel is signaling it doesn't like the, Al Qaeda operative, Jelani in Damascus, and we know Tulsi Gabbard is something of an expert on Syria because she exposed the lies and the, phony war in Syria when The United States was supporting the ISIS and Al Qaeda rebels there. How do you and Trump has been very brave arguably saying, he's not gonna, start sending loads of money like Britain is to Tchelani. There's still thousands of American troops, though, in Syria. What is American Syrian policy Syria policy? America's policy towards Syria is basically Israel's policy. And what The United States was bent on doing was wrecking Syria and keeping it wrecked. That's the Israeli objective here. This is what the Israelis wanna do with Iran. They don't simply wanna do away with Iran's nuclear capability. They surely do wanna do that, but they wanna wreck Iran. They wanna turn Iran into Syria. And what the Israelis are doing in Syria is going to great lengths to make sure that Syria remains, a dysfunctional state. They don't want Syria to become, a formidable adversary. They want it to remain broken. And, of course, The United States will support the Israelis in that regard. So, of course, the Israelis are not gonna allow the Americans to give huge amounts of aid to Jalani so that he can produce a viable Syrian state because that's not Israeli policy. Just look at what they're doing in Iran. I mean, excuse me, what they're doing in Lebanon. It's a similar situation.

A senator supports regime change in Iran via popular uprising, not military force, aiming for a leader who is friendly to the U.S. He identifies as a "non-interventionist hawk," prioritizing U.S. national security interests. He opposed the Iraq War and intervention in Syria, but views Iran differently due to its anti-American stance and nuclear ambitions. The senator believes supporting Israel is in America's interest, citing intelligence sharing and a commonality of enemies. He acknowledges Israel likely spies on the U.S., but considers it acceptable. He defends APEC, stating it lobbies for a strong U.S.-Israeli relationship, not for the Israeli government. He claims Iran is actively trying to murder Donald Trump and has hired hitmen, but does not support military action, deeming their efforts ineffective. He believes stopping Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons is crucial, even if it requires military action. He criticizes the Biden administration's handling of the Ukraine war and advocates for a focus on America's interests.

Speaker 0 asserts that removing the Soviet Union and its chief proxy, the PLO, would cause international terrorism to collapse. Speaker 1 argues for regime change as a strategic goal: removing Saddam’s regime would have enormous positive reverberations in the region, and there is interest in regime change in Iran as well. The question is not whether Iraq’s regime should be taken out, but when. It is not a question of whether to seek regime change in Iran, but how to achieve it. He also asks whether there are other nations the United States should consider launching preemptive attacks against, answering yes: Iraq and Iran are competing to be the first to acquire nuclear weapons, and Libya is also attempting to rapidly build an atomic bomb capability. He identifies three nations in focus: Iraq, Iran, and Libya. Speaker 2 emphasizes a unified front: they are together to stop Iran’s march of conquest, subjugation, and terror, and asserts that no matter one’s political stance, you stand with Israel.

Netanyahu wants to fight Iran to remain in office indefinitely. The speaker hopes Trump, or anyone, will defuse the situation. The U.S. needs to convince Middle Eastern allies of its support, but undeclared wars victimizing civilians are not a good solution. The speaker believes Iran must be stopped from obtaining nuclear weapons, something they tried to do with some success. However, the speaker is against the constant killing of civilians who cannot defend themselves and "just want a chance to live."

An Israeli official stated that a plan to take out the supreme leader of Iran was rejected by the U.S. President over concerns of escalating the conflict. The official believes that removing the supreme leader would end the conflict, not escalate it, claiming Iran spreads terrorism, sabotage, and subversion throughout the Middle East and is bringing the world to the brink of nuclear war. According to the official, Israel is preventing a horrific war and bringing peace to the Middle East. They believe that defanging Iran will allow for new heights in the Middle East, expanding the Abraham Accords, trade, tourism, and communication between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The official stated that the U.S. has provided tremendous help, including American pilots shooting down drones, THAAD batteries in Israel, and Aegis ships.

Host: Welcome back. We’re joined by Larry Johnson, a former CI analyst, to discuss what looks like a war with Iran coming sooner rather than later. The world is watching as the US mobilizes more military assets to the region. How should we read this? Is this preparation for war, or a show of strength during negotiations? Larry Johnson: I hoped it was intimidation, but people I trust in national security say this is far more serious. It’s described as one of two things: either a reprise of Midnight Hammer, when US and Iran coordinated two raids into northern Iran, or they’re preparing for an Israeli attack and to back Israel. It’s not just to force concessions at the negotiating table; it’s a warning indicator. Steve Bryan, a former undersecretary of defense, reacted emotionally to US–Iran negotiations, arguing that Iran is using a rope-a-dope strategy. This pressure toward attacking Iran is enormous, and Netanyahu’s visit suggests coordination. The issue has moved beyond nuclear weapons to ballistic missiles and support for Hamas and Hezbollah. The rhetoric around Hamas and Hezbollah is, in my view, a red herring; Israeli claims don’t match the facts. Trump is under heavy pressure from the Zionist lobby to act, and I think a violence outbreak in the next two weeks is plausible, though I hope I’m wrong. Host: The debate you referenced about motives is revealing. If the goal is to destabilize or create chaos to justify action, which past interventions show that hasn’t produced sustainable stability. If the aim is negotiation leverage, what can be achieved now? It seems the US insists on tying any nuclear deal to Iran abandoning its allies and deterrence. Johnson: Iran has built a formidable arsenal: 18 types of ballistic missiles, a recently reportedly successful intercontinental ballistic missile test, five types of cruise missiles, and over 15 types of drones. They’ve learned from decades of conflict with the US and see themselves as at war with the United States. The US narrative of Iran as the aggressor clashes with historical US actions that damaged Iran’s economy and civilian life. Iran’s patience has been tested; they’ve drawn a line in the sand and are prepared to defend themselves, retaliating massively if attacked. They now have support from China and Russia, including advanced radar and air defense, with Chinese and Russian ships headed to the Arabian Sea for a joint exercise. If conflict escalates, Iran could retaliate across the region, with regional actors potentially joining in. Host: You mentioned the tactical realities of the region. The US has deployed many F-35s to the region, including land-based F-35s for SEAD. There are reports of a large US presence in Armenia, and Iran’s potential to strike Haifa or Tel Aviv if attacked. The geopolitical picture is complex, with Russia and China providing support to Iran. The US carrier fleet in the Gulf would face Iranian, Russian, and Chinese air defenses and missiles, including hypersonics. The question is whether the US can sustain a prolonged, scalable war against Iran. Johnson: The US’s sea-based strength is being tested. In the Red Sea, the US faced difficulties against the Houthis with two carriers and a robust air-defense screen; in the current scenario, Iran’s capabilities—air defenses, missiles, drones, and support from Russia and China—make a quick, decisive victory unlikely. Moreover, Israel’s own readiness for a broader war is uncertain; Netanyahu’s visit to the US could signal coordination, but Israeli media note that they may join only if Iran is on the back foot. There’s concern about intelligence reliability: Mossad assets that aided last year’s operations in Iran may be compromised, while Iran benefits from new radar and integrated air defenses. Host: Regional reactions could be pivotal. Iran has contingency plans against regional targets, and Armenia/Azerbaijan might be used as launch pads. Saudi Arabia and Qatar may sit this out if possible, while Iraq has aligned with Iran. The broader question is whether diplomacy can prevail, or whether the cycle of treating conflicts with force will continue. There’s a critique of Western policy: the idea that Iran wants to destroy the US is simplistic, and the region’s dynamics are far more nuanced. Johnson: Iran’s potential to escalate, regional dynamics, and great-power backing mean this could be more than a localized conflict. The overarching point is that there are limits to military power; politics and diplomacy remain essential, and the West’s current posture underestimates the complexity of Iran’s deterrence and regional links. Host: Thanks, Larry. I’ll link to Sonar 21 for more of your writings.

The discussion centers on the fragile peace deal and the ongoing conflict with Hamas, with emphasis on Hamas’ true nature, disarmament, hostage issues, humanitarian aid, and regional dynamics including Lebanon and Iran. - Hamas remains a terrorist organization. The interlocutor states that Hamas has not changed its stripe and is using the ceasefire to reassert control in Gaza through mass executions of those opposed or suspected of working with Israel, while attempting to rebuild its strength. The plan, in partnership with Netanyahu, is to disarm Hamas, dismantle its terror infrastructure, and build Gaza into something different, a top priority under the Trump plan. - The peace deal is a work in progress. Neither Israel, the United States, nor other actors expect Hamas to act in good faith. The discussion emphasizes that if Hamas does not disarm, it will be eradicated, a statement framed as a serious US commitment reflecting the nature of the war and regional determination to end Hamas as a threat. - The 20-stage plan and pathway forward. The plan provides a pathway to end Hamas as a regime and terror army in Gaza and to prevent Gaza from threatening Israel going forward. The goal is to disarm Hamas, dismantle its infrastructure, and transform Gaza into a stable, peaceful entity, though it remains a “work in progress.” - Hostages and displaced persons. A central issue is the status of hostages: Hamas holds 13 of the 28 people Hamas allegedly murdered and held, with 18 returned so far, and 25 originally cited in discussions (the transcript mentions 28 total murdered and 18 returned, with 13 still in Hamas control). The speaker argues that Hamas knows the whereabouts of several more hostages and should deliver them; the claim is that some hostages who were said to be unlocated could be found even if debris removal is slow. The Red Cross and humanitarian organizations say recovering bodies will be a massive, decades-long challenge, but the speakers argue that locating hostages does not require full debris removal. Aid and humanitarian access are discussed, including a suspension of aid after the killing of Israeli soldiers that was brief and then reinstated; aid trucks are allowed through to humanitarian zones controlled by Israel in Gaza, with concerns about Hamas siphoning aid for its own purposes. - Aid leakage and Hamas control of aid. The speakers contend that Hamas stole or redirected up to 95% of aid in Gaza prior to the ceasefire, using it to fund its war against Israel. They argue that UN agencies operating in Gaza are often under Hamas influence, whether willingly or unwillingly, and thus aid distribution has been compromised when Hamas governs. - Hamas’ current behavior in Gaza and security concerns. Hamas is described as reasserting control by mass executions and intimidation; there is concern about how much control they exert over the areas they govern and the potential for continued war if they disarm remains unactioned. The discussion stresses that the longer Hamas can control areas, the more they can pursue their war. - Trump–Kushner–Witkoff diplomatic leverage. The discussion credits President Trump’s diplomacy with changing Hamas’s calculus. The Qatar strike that nearly targeted Hamas negotiators is acknowledged as a turning point; Kushner and Witkoff claimed that Hamas wanted peace when engaged directly in Egypt, and that the strike on Qatar frightened Hamas into reconsidering its position. The interlocutor suggests that palace diplomacy, allied pressure in the Arab and Islamic world, and the military pressure on Gaza City converged to push Hamas toward releasing hostages and engaging with the peace process. - Israel’s regional strategy and deterrence. The speaker emphasizes that Israel must be able to defend itself and maintain power in the region. The Abraham Accords are cited as a success, with normalization continuing because partners recognize Israel’s stability and the advantages of cooperation. The Palestinian statehood question is reframed as a broader test of Palestinian willingness to accept Israel’s existence; the speaker notes parliamentary support in Israel opposing a Palestinian state and argues that Palestinian society must change its stance toward recognizing a Jewish state. - Lebanon and Hezbollah. Optimism is tempered by caution. In Lebanon, there is some movement toward demilitarization, with the Lebanese army involved and Hezbollah’s power being re-evaluated. The speaker stresses that even if conflict ends, Israel will remain vigilant and prepared to prevent a rebuilt Hezbollah threat along the border, citing past upheavals and the need to protect border towns like Kiryat Shmona. - Iran and the wider threat. Iran’s missile program and its nuclear ambitions are described as two cancers threatening Israel: missiles capable of delivering heavy payloads and a nuclear program. The strategic aim is to prevent Iran from creating a “ring of fire” around Israel (Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, Yemen, Iraq) and to prevent metastasis of Iran’s influence from spreading. - Global sentiment and demonization. The speaker acknowledges growing global antisemitism and demonization of Israel post-October 7, but argues that Israel’s demonstrated ability to defend itself strengthens its position and that support should endure as the conflict recedes from prominence. The Palestinian leadership’s stance and the broader regional dynamics remain central to whether a two-state solution can emerge, with a tempered expectation that the peace plan will proceed step by step.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the possibility of striking Iran to eliminate its nuclear program and the broader implications of regime change. - Speaker 0 acknowledges arguments that Israel has wanted to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, and that American involvement with B-52s and large bombs might be needed to finish the job. He notes the idea of a strike that proceeds quickly with minimal American casualties, under a Trump-era frame that Iran will not get a nuclear bomb. - He observes a shift among Washington’s neoconservative and Republican circles from opposing Iran’s nuclear capability to opposing Ayatollah rule itself, suggesting a subtle change in objectives while maintaining the theme of intervention. He concedes cautious support if Trump executes it prudently, but warns of a “switcheroo” toward regime change rather than purely disabling the nuclear program. - Speaker 0 criticizes the record of neocons on foreign policy (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, the Arab Spring) and argues that the entire Middle East bears their failures. He emphasizes a potential regime-change drive and questions what would come after removing the Ayatollah, including possible US troop deployments and financial support for a new regime. - He highlights the size of Iran (about 92,000,000 people, two and a half times the size of Texas) and warns that regime change could trigger a bloody civil war and a large refugee crisis, possibly drawing tens or hundreds of thousands of deaths and destabilizing Europe. - Speaker 1 presents a more vocal stance: he would like to see the regime fall and leaves to the president the timing and method, insisting that if the nuclear program isn’t eliminated now, “we’ll all regret it” and urging to “be all in” to help Israel finish the job. - In cuts 3:43, Speaker 1 argues that removing the Ayatollah’s regime would be beneficial because staying in power would continue to threaten Israel, foment terrorism, and pursue a bomb; he characterizes the regime as aiming to destroy Jews and Sunni Islam, calling them “fanatical religious Nazis.” - Speaker 0 responds that such a forceful call for regime change is immature, shallow, and reckless, warning that certainty about outcomes in foreign interventions is impossible. He asserts that the first rule of foreign policy is humility, noting that prior interventions led to prolonged conflict and mass displacement. He cautions against beating the drums for regime change in another Middle Eastern country, especially the largest, and reiterates that the issue is not simply removing the nuclear program but opposing Western-led regime change. - The discussion frames a tension between supporting efforts to deny Iran a nuclear weapon and resisting Western-led regime change, with a strong emphasis on potential humanitarian and geopolitical consequences. The speakers reference public opinion (citing 86% of Americans not wanting Iran to have a bomb) and critique interventions as historically destabilizing.

Netanyahu wants to fight Iran to remain in office indefinitely. The speaker hopes Trump, or anyone, will defuse the situation. The U.S. needs to convince Middle Eastern allies of its support, but undeclared wars victimizing civilians are not a good solution. The speaker believes Iran must be stopped from acquiring nuclear weapons, something they previously attempted to do successfully. However, this does not require constant killing of civilians who cannot defend themselves and simply want to live.

Ambassador recounts two intractable conflicts—Ukraine and the Middle East—and says fate and destiny led him here. He notes that the region’s wars are decades in the making: "centuries of tribal rivalries" and no established nation-states, so peace requires "foundation stones" rather than quick fixes. He describes a tough path in Syria: Assad’s rise, hundreds of foreign fighters, sanctions, and the need to lift sanctions to create prosperity; "no plan b" and "plan b is chaos." On Lebanon and Israel, he stresses "the issue isn’t the weapons. The issue is the utilization of the weapons" and advocates a negotiated "buffer zone of economic prosperity for the South," backed by the U.S. and donors, with an empowered Lebanese Armed Forces. He envisions Hezbollah as a Lebanese political actor, not only an Iranian proxy, and stresses dialogue over lines. He calls for trust, dialogue, and a regional tapestry of economic integration.

The speaker argues that there has been an “unbelievable success in by, degrading Iran,” moving Iran from a first-rate power to a second- or third-rate power. Iran is described as “throwing their weight all over the place” and “exporting terrorism,” not only across the Middle East but also to Venezuela, where they are “in cahoots with the Maduro regime.” The claim extends to Iran exporting terrorism to America and to the American hemisphere, and to Hamas and Iran’s proxies attempting to get their guys into the United States. The speaker asserts that Hamas and Iran’s proxies are a threat not only to the United States but to Israel and to “all America’s allies in The Middle East,” and to America itself.

“Off the machinery that feeds money into Iran.” The speaker advocates stopping the flow of money to Iran. “We will no longer have a 100 hostages still in captivity, Israeli and American and otherwise, by Hamas and Iran's Hezbollah mercenary forces.” “We need America to wake up and prioritize Israel and bring home Israelis and make sure we stand by our number one ally in” The speaker urges the United States to prioritize Israel and secure the return of Israelis, reaffirming support for its top ally. The statements call for halting funding to Iran, freeing hostages, and ensuring unwavering US backing for Israel.

Scott Horton introduces Joe Kent, formerly of the 75th Rangers and then the CIA’s Special Activities Division, who fought in the terror wars and later headed the Counterterrorism Center before resigning from the Trump administration over the war in Iran. Kent describes his background and why he came on the show, noting that he resigned over policy rather than personal animus, and emphasizes that his focus is on Iran policy and its intersection with Israeli interests. Kent asserts that the war with Iran was largely driven by the Israeli agenda and timeline. He points to statements from Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the President, and the Speaker of the House claiming the attack was launched because they knew Israel would attack as well, arguing that this indicates Israel was driving U.S. policy and that the United States should not be bound to an Israeli timeline or to an outcome that serves Israeli objectives. He recounts his time at NCTC and in the White House, describing an ecosystem that included media figures, think tanks, and high-ranking Israeli officials, which he says influenced U.S. policy and reduced the president’s decision-making space, particularly concerning Iran’s red lines on enrichment. Kent explains his concern that the push for a hard line against Iran’s enrichment was an Israeli-led framing that equated any enrichment with a nuclear weapons program. He describes an alleged “Goldilocks methodology” by which Iran could enrich but not weaponize, a position the Israelis reportedly used to rally U.S. policymakers toward war. He argues that the Israelis wanted to remove any space for a negotiated deal and sought regime change, leveraging the U.S. military to accomplish that goal. He emphasizes that the war was not the first option and that a more pragmatic, slower approach could have yielded a deal if U.S. policymakers allowed it. In discussing the question of who was pressuring whom, Kent says the Israelis were trying to force a scenario where Iran’s red line would be seen as unacceptable, thereby pushing the United States toward war. He notes that Trump’s willingness to negotiate existed but was constrained by Israeli pressure and media echo chambers, and that the war’s timing undermined any potential for a peaceful settlement. He asserts that, if the president had space to negotiate, a deal might have been possible, but the Israelis’ push to force conflict narrowed that space. Kent also addresses the question of how the war affected American strategic interests, arguing that the United States should restrain Israel and align policy with broader American interests in the region, rather than facilitate regime change or allow broader chaos. He contends that an ongoing U.S.-Israel alignment over militarized actions in the Middle East risks destabilizing the region, jeopardizing energy security, and undermining U.S. partners in the Gulf and Europe. Regarding the Iraq war and Iran, Kent asserts that the Israeli lobby pressured for war in 2002-2003 and had broader influence in Syria and elsewhere, but he also acknowledges the complex mix of neoconservatives and various factions. He describes how, after the Iraq war, Iranian-backed Shiite militias and U.S. policy intersected with Iranian influence and regional dynamics, noting that many Iraqi Shias fought against Iran while others aligned with Tehran, and asserting that mishandling these dynamics contributed to instability. Kent discusses the handling of Iranian EFPs (explosively formed penetrators) and argues that Iran shaped many of the tactics, while local Iraqi groups adapted them. He emphasizes that the broader narrative around Iranian responsibility for attacks in Iraq should be tempered by on-the-ground complexities, including Iraqi dynamics and the role of other actors like Lebanese Hezbollah and al-Qaeda. The conversation turns to the question of whether there were Iranian assassination plots against President Trump, with Kent acknowledging a real threat after Soleimani’s killing but emphasizing that the most serious plan was not clearly linked to a large-scale operation; rather, one individual, Asif Mershand, was recruited by Iran and monitored by the FBI. Kent cautions that allegations of broader Iranian plots should be scrutinized, and he notes ongoing questions about linkage and DHS investigations. Throughout, Kent reiterates his core conclusion: the essential policy misstep was allowing Israeli leadership to drive U.S. policy on Iran, and a successful path forward would require restraining Israel and pursuing a negotiated deal with Iran under conditions that preserve American strategic interests, with a clear off-ramp and space for diplomacy. He endorses the notion that President Trump could secure a deal if given the political room to reset the dynamic with Israel and to recalibrate U.S. commitments in the region.

The Iranian revolution understands its aim is not simply national. It's about the expulsion of The United States from the region. There's no security for Iranians without this expulsion of imperialists from the region, which then it also necessitates the defeat of Zionism. And if you study each and every step of the way, the imperialists offered Hezbollah and Iran always an entry into the order if they abandoned and abdicated the Palestinian cause, if they abandoned this issue. But there's a reason why this is not. First, obviously solidarity with the Palestinians on a range of grounds, but also clearly the Iranian project around restoring sovereignty is not quite possible without the defeat of imperialism and Zionism.

Glenn and Chas Freeman discuss the rapidly evolving Iran-Israel-Gulf crisis sparked by Donald Trump’s 48-hour threat to “open the Strait of Hormuz” and destroy Iran’s energy infrastructure, and the apparent push-and-pull over whether talks are actually taking place. - Trump’s maneuvering: Freeman notes Trump appears to be trying to walk back the threat, arguing there were “two days of good productive discussions,” while Iranian Foreign Minister says there have been no talks. Freeman emphasizes that diplomacy remains indispensable, even as Trump’s posture leans toward coercive tactics. - The wider pattern: Freeman argues the region’s dynamics have driven Israel and Iran toward force, with diplomacy sidelined. He contends Washington’s challenge now is the price of energy (gas at the pump) and domestic political concerns rather than allied welfare. The Strait of Hormuz currently operates as a toll booth: many countries can pass if they have the license and pay. - Escalation and responses: There is a recurring cycle of Israeli and American escalation met by Iranian counter-escalation (e.g., Iranian missiles fired near Dimona in response to Natanz, and Iran listing targets including Ras Al Khair desalination plant in Saudi Arabia). Iran’s stated willingness to devastate Gulf desalination capacity signals a readiness to impose extreme costs. - International diplomacy and actors: Freeman highlights quiet diplomacy behind the scenes with China, India, Japan, Turkey, and behind-the-scenes talks by Italy and France with Iran. He notes European leaders’ unease and questions whether Europe will push more assertively, with Spain showing some potential for distancing from US and a possible NATO rethink. He argues the Atlantic alliance’s conceptual basis has eroded, risking a shift from a defensive to an offensive posture in Europe, and suggests the Gulf states may gradually distance from the United States while privately leveraging Israel’s tech and security advantages. - The Gulf Arab position: Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states remain publicly tied to the United States but fear becoming casualties in a miscalculated conflict. Freeman posits that long-term strategists in Saudi Arabia recognize the need to reduce threat through diplomacy with Iran and diversify defense dependencies (including growing Chinese weapons collaboration) as U.S. security guarantees wane. - The question of a negotiated settlement: Freeman suggests two ingredients for any settlement: a regional security architecture and a credible path for a phased American withdrawal from the Gulf. He cites Iran’s proposals (e.g., postwar regional management, toll-sharing for Hormuz) and Iran’s openness to multilateral diplomacy through bodies like the OIC, coupled with Gulf-Arab cooperation. He acknowledges Washington’s current lack of credible diplomacy and worries about whether negotiators on both sides can imagine a stable framework that preserves balance without American military primacy. - Iran’s strategic posture: Freeman argues Iran is not deterred by American or Israeli pressure and may pursue a broader missile and nuclear-capable capability build, particularly after leadership changes. He notes Iranian restraint has lessened since the late supreme leader’s era, and Iran continues missile and drone activity despite escalation. He also references possible false-flag concerns and Israel’s assassination campaigns against potential Iranian interlocutors as obstacles to diplomacy. - U.S. strategy and domestic politics: Freeman observes Trump’s incentives are mixed—gas prices at home influence his political prospects, and MAGA backers are increasingly unhappy with the war. He suggests Trump’s earlier “maximum pressure” approach is counterproductive: power without purpose, and tactics without a coherent strategy. He implies a negotiated solution is preferable to ongoing low-intensity conflict, but notes it would require both sides to accept a recalibrated security arrangement rather than total capitulation. - Saudi perspective and future: Freeman notes Saudi Arabia’s desire to link more closely with the United States in the short term while also seeking greater strategic autonomy—building domestic military production and reducing sole dependence on U.S. security guarantees. He warns that public alignment with Israel in any confrontation is politically untenable for Gulf publics. - Outlook: Freeman closes by acknowledging the difficulty of predicting Trump’s behavior, the credibility issues around interlocutors like Stephen Witkoff, and the urgent need for diplomacy. He emphasizes the indispensability of diplomacy and suggests that a pathway toward a new regional security architecture, with reduced U.S. troop presence and coordinated Hormuz governance, would be a constructive turn if pursued by capable diplomats.