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Charles (Speaker 0) and Mario (Speaker 1) discuss a wide range of intelligence topics, personal history, and contemporary covert operations, emphasizing experiences from the CIA and reflections on global security dynamics. Charles begins by outlining his background: growing up on a farm in Ohio, enlisting in the Navy as a law enforcement specialist at 17, studying East Asian languages and Mandarin, and eventually learning Persian. He joined the CIA in July 2001 as an operations officer, spending most of his career in the Middle East with stints in Europe and Asia, and leaving the CIA in 2019. Afterward, he worked at Tesla to set up an insider threat program and manage global information security investigations. He notes extensive experience with China, Russia, Israel, France, and South Korea, and emphasizes the prevalence of intellectual property theft and proprietary-systems concerns in the private sector, including the role of motivated individuals and cross-border actors seeking to commercialize advanced technology. The conversation turns to leadership targeting and decapitation concepts. Charles references how the Iraq War began with an attempted decapitation strike at Saddam, asking whether removing a center of gravity leadership could end a conflict decisively and whether that would be humane. He discusses Iran as a persistent factor across the region, arguing that Iran’s meddling contributed to problems in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, and that without Iranian involvement, upheaval might be less intense, though turmoil remains possible. Mario expresses fascination with intelligence capabilities, particularly related to Iran, Lebanon, Hezbollah, and Maduro, and asks about Charles’s CIA background and roles. Charles explains that his work involved recruiting individuals with access to foreign governments to commit espionage and provide secret information—“human operations.” He emphasizes the dramatic realism of espionage as two people engaging in a life-changing conversation, rather than high-action TV tropes. They discuss border crossings and the reality of intelligence work. Charles notes that the hardest border crossings were often returning to the United States, when travel appearances didn’t match and documents or identities could be scrutinized. He stresses the difference between romanticized espionage and the real tension of crossing borders with non-legitimate materials, relying on confidence, charisma, and interaction under stress. On private-sector and national-security crossover, Charles highlights the complexity of cyber threats and corporate espionage. He describes a Tesla case involving a Russian criminal organization attempting to install malware, with FBI involvement and the arrest of a Russian national. He explains that in cyber threats, the distinction between government-sponsored and private actors is often blurred, with organized crime sometimes acting as proxies for larger state agendas. He notes that entrepreneurial actors seek to accelerate development by acquiring others’ material, not building entire systems from scratch. He also comments on the blurry boundary between nation-states and private actors in tech espionage and the difficulty of attributing responsibility. The Mossad’s capabilities are analyzed in depth. Charles argues Mossad excels by focusing on high-impact targets within a narrow geopolitical scope (Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Iraq) and by strong locational intelligence—understanding where leaders live, work, and their access points. He emphasizes Mossad’s willingness to act decisively, using surrogates and superior technology for surveillance. He mentions the head of Mossad and a quote from his book about ubiquitous surveillance through devices like phones and watches. He notes the “pager operation” against Hezbollah as a case study in supply-chain manipulation and the use of compromised intermediaries, and he cautions that modern operations involve cyber manipulation and near-constant information-flow considerations. Both discuss real-world operations, including the 2010 Dubai operation targeting a Hamas logistics figure, and general lessons about operational security, noting that some details cannot be disclosed publicly. They reflect on the “gentleman’s rules of the game,” acknowledging that lethal operations and leadership-targeting can be controversial and legally complex; they discuss how different regimes and leaders are perceived and targeted. The Maduro operation is revisited. Charles describes gathering information through satellites, drones (including covert, stealth, and micro-drones), and human intelligence; he stresses determining a target’s pattern of life, where a leader lives, sleeps, moves, whom they meet, and what they eat. He notes that insider sources and the right informants are critical, and he discusses the balance between opportunities created by regime instability and the risk of compromised sources. He emphasizes that in times of turmoil, there is opportunistic recruitment, as some individuals see few options other than cooperating with outside powers. Privacy is a recurring theme. Charles asserts that privacy is not dead but requires effort to protect. He compares privacy to fitness, arguing that modern technologies make it easy to be public, but steps can be taken to reduce attack surfaces, including privacy consulting, careful metadata handling, and secure, layered security (physical security and cyber measures). He uses anecdotes about Strava revealing location data and a submarine commander whose Strava activity was linked to his demise, illustrating how personal data can reveal sensitive information. Towards the end, Mario and Charles discuss strategic ambiguity and unpredictability in political leadership, including Trump’s posture and international signaling. They touch on the potential paths for Iran if regime change occurs, debating the likelihood and consequences of upheaval, the role of Western policy, and how regional dynamics might shift if the mullahs and IRGC structures are altered. The conversation ends with mutual appreciation for the complexity of global security issues and the rapid pace of geopolitical change.

- New footage from Tel Aviv is shown, including videos outside windows of what sources say they are seeing, with a claim that Fox News is not covering this damage in Tel Aviv. The discussion centers on the reality of buildings being hit near City Hall, and questions why it isn’t being widely covered by Fox News. - The conversation shifts to missile stocks and interceptors. A comment references Keith Kellogg on Fox News discussing a Wall Street Journal report about running out of interceptor missiles within four to five weeks, and a claim that there is no problem because orders were placed and allies could supply missiles. The speaker notes that UAE reportedly has about a week left of interceptor missiles and says missiles from Iran are getting through “like a sieve.” - It is argued that the U.S. has a limited stockpile because many missiles have been transferred to Israel and Ukraine over the past years, leaving the U.S. inventory low. The claim is made that continuing the war with depleted missiles would heighten national security risk and vulnerability globally. - The transcript discusses potential international responses. The speaker contends that Europe’s mobilization rhetoric (France, Greece) should not be expected to deter Iran, noting that Greece does not have a major army and that NATO-funded contingents are involved rather than independent power. The assertion is made that Iran’s strikes in Tel Aviv, Tehran, Qom, and other cities show that Iran believes it can strike back effectively, signaling a preference to fight the United States and Israel rather than submit again. - The central point is that the conflict is described as 100% about missiles and air-defense missiles, not ground forces. The speaker argues Iran likely has enough offensive missiles to prolong the conflict for months, possibly longer than U.S. capacity to sustain it, especially with Hormuz potentially shut or partially shut, which could hurt the western economy. - Admiral James Stavridis is cited by Speaker 0, noting that as the U.S. and Israel expend hundreds of precision weapons, the focus should shift to logistics and stockpiles. The discussion emphasizes the need for inventory clarity, planning, and alignment between political objectives and military capabilities. - Speaker 1 asserts that the planning should have assessed inventories, timeframes, and whether the means match the objectives. The argument states that risking all resources without sufficient offensive or defensive capacity is a dangerous gamble, suggesting the current course could be a “huge blunder.” - The conversation touches on General Dan Kane, who reportedly told the president two weeks earlier that there were not enough ammunition and it would not be pretty to win. A reference is made to Trump’s Truth Social claiming Kane’s assessment was incorrect, with talk of whether Kane did or did not say the president’s characterization was accurate. The claim is made that there are concerns about integrity and whether senior leaders would publicly contradict the administration’s framing if necessary. - A follow-up question is raised about whether admitting a ground invasion would imply insufficient missiles to sustain the mission, with Speaker 1 acknowledging that admitting ground troops would signal a lack of missiles for sustained action. - The segment then shifts to a sponsorship note about depression treatment options, promoting Ataybekli and its lead program BPL-003 (a nasal spray psychedelic-based therapy) developed for treatment-resistant depression, with background on the company, its investors, and the roadmap toward Phase 3 in 2026. It emphasizes the potential for faster, more scalable treatment sessions and invites viewers to learn more at a website, with disclaimers about not providing medical or financial advice.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor discusses the likelihood and dynamics of a potential new war involving Iran, the Middle East, and broader great-power competition. - On a possible Iran strike: MacGregor says there will be a resumption of the war, though he cannot predict timing. He cites Western attempts to destabilize Iran (Mossad, CIA, MI6-backed unrest) and argues Iran is more cohesive now than it was forty years ago, with demonstrations representing a small minority and not a broad collapse of support for the government. He contends that those who want to destroy Iran or empower Israel believe the regime can be toppled with Western support and Israeli action, but he asserts that such a regime change is unlikely and that Iran will respond forcefully if attacked. He notes that current deployments are heavy on airpower with limited naval presence, and he suggests Israel’s broader goals (Gaza, Lebanon, Syria) will not be achievable without addressing Iran. - Regional actors and incentives: Netanyahu’s regional aims require confronting Iran, and Turkish involvement with the Kurds could influence the balance. He describes a recent Kurdish incursion into northern Iran that Iran suppressed, aided by Turkish coordination. He frames BRICS as militarizing in reaction to Western actions, including in Venezuela, Russia, and Ukraine, and says disrupting the Persian Gulf oil flow would harm China, prompting cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkey against Iran to undermine the One Belt, One Road project. He also argues that BRICS countries—Russia, China, India—will not easily align with U.S. plans if Washington proceeds toward war. - Russian and Chinese calculations: On Russia and China, MacGregor says they have supplied Iran with military tech and missile/radar capabilities and helped counteract efforts to disrupt Iran with Starlink. He believes many Iranians still oppose regime collapse and that a broader war would risk escalation with Russia and China backing Iran. He cites Moscow’s withdrawal of Russian personnel from Israel and the sense in Moscow that Trump is unreliable, leading Russia to hedge against U.S. actions. He notes Russians are concerned about Europe and envision potential conflicts with Europe, while he questions U.S. strategy and end states. - No first-use and nuclear considerations: MacGregor discusses the idea of no-first-use (NNU) as a potential framework to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation, suggesting a multilateral agreement among the major nuclear powers (US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, Britain, France). He posits that such an agreement could advance diplomacy, including on Korea, and reduce the likelihood of Armageddon. He mentions that Trump could leverage such a stance, though he notes Trump’s tendency to pursue more aggressive policies in other areas. - Europe and NATO: He argues Europe is unprepared for renewed large-scale conflict and has disarmed substantially over decades. He criticizes Britain and France for rhetoric and capability gaps and suggests the United States is fatigued with European demands, though he doubts Europe could sustain a conflict against Russia. - Venezuela and domestic budget: He emphasizes the futility of long wars in certain contexts (Venezuela) and the mismatch between spending and real capability gains. He references the defense budget as largely consumed by fixed costs like veterans’ medical care and pensions, arguing that simply increasing the budget does not guarantee meaningful strategic gains. He notes the role of special operations as valuable but not decisive in major wars. - Concluding view: MacGregor reiterates that war in the region is likely, with many overlapping alarms and uncertainties about timing, leadership decisions, and the risk of escalation. He stresses that both Russia and China have stakes in the outcome and that the Middle East conflict could influence global alignments and deterrence dynamics. He closes by underscoring the potential importance of no-first-use diplomacy and broader nuclear risk reduction as a path forward.

Speaker 0 introduces a “hidden operation theory” about the F-15 down and the rescue, describing it as a conspiracy theory that has emerged. The claim is that US special forces were already on the ground inside Iran when the F-15 was shot down, with the rescue location near the Isfahan nuclear site. The theory suggests the ground operation’s objective could have been to target nuclear material or uranium, and that the F-15’s role may have been to sanitize airspace to facilitate the ground operation. The theory posits the F-15 was shot down by Iran, the ground operation was exposed, and the extraction became urgent, turning a ground operation into a rescue because it went sideways. The official US version is that the operation was a combat search and rescue (CSAR) to recover the downed pilot, with heavy fire during extraction and no comment on covert operations. The question is why big aircraft were used to remove one pilot. Speaker 1 (Sameer Joshi) acknowledges there are missing pieces but remains focused on CSAR as the main interpretation of the first few days. He notes on the first day: one C-130, one MC-130, and two Blackhawks (HH-60s) were sent; one pilot was recovered. The WSO was in communicado for about 24 hours, planning and hiding, and his message confounded observers. The C-130s and tankers fed the mission; jamming and electronic warfare were employed to discourage Iranian regrouping. The US would have faced opposition on the ground; the field selected was a former Iranian agricultural airfield where two MH-130s landed. The Delta or C-6 aircraft provided support, creating a perimeter while smaller roving patrol helicopters watched for threats. The combination of Reapers and fighters (A-10s, F-15Es) supported a plausible, well-planned operation. The US would have faced ground-fire but proceeded to recover the WSO and pilot, with details still undisclosed. Once resources were committed and the operation appeared successful, CENTCOM framed it as an audacious mission with a visible payoff in the pilot’s return. He believes this is the likely scenario and notes there may be other theories, but focuses on the ongoing operation’s positive outcome. Speaker 0 agrees, noting that covert operations may prevent full disclosure and that the discussion is warranted given war aims and endgame questions. Abhijit (Speaker 2) is introduced to comment on the C-130s being stuck in the mud. He explains skepticism: there may have been another ceasefire operation, but the area’s terrain (high altitude around 6,000 feet) and dust are relevant. He references a historical parallel to 1979/1980 hostage rescues in which CH-53 Stallions were grounded by dust storms. He argues the US “never makes the same mistake twice” and doubts the dust-in-fuel explanation for the two downed helicopters, noting the precision planning typical of American operations (geologists, site surveys). He cites the Abbottabad raid as another example and questions the plausibility of both helicopters going down in the same way. He concludes he is not buying the dust explanation and emphasizes the need for granular, well-planned execution. Speaker 0 thanks Sameer and Abhijit for their insights, acknowledging the balance between the mission’s audacity and the questions it raises, and notes the discussion is valuable for understanding what is being dealt with.

Robert O’Neill and the interviewer discuss the Maduro operation in Venezuela and the Bin Laden raid, comparing the two missions, the forces involved, and the broader implications for U.S. military capabilities and geopolitics. - The Maduro operation differed sharply from the Bin Laden raid in scope and risk. The Maduro mission involved an army base in Venezuela (their Pentagon) and a target in a house with a safe room. Chinese and Russian involvement and the presence of advanced air defenses complicated planning. The operation used a “gorilla package” with about 150 aircraft, whereas the Bin Laden raid used fewer assets and was characterized by a tighter ground package. The Maduro operation allowed for no-kill options and contingencies, but still entailed high risk; the Bin Laden raid was described as a one-way mission with a different risk profile. - The Maduro mission emphasized rapid execution, with the aim of capturing the president, his wife, and returning them to the United States within about 24 hours. The discussion highlights a distinction between kill options under the Venezuela operation and capture-focused goals for Maduro. - In contrast, the Bin Laden mission involved a ground assault with SEAL Team Six and an intense, fast breach. The initial breach attempts faced a crash of a helicopter, forcing adjustments, but the team proceeded to clear the house, enter the target, and locate Bin Laden. O’Neill described the movement through the compound as methodical: “If the guy in front of me went left, I went right,” continuing until Bin Laden was found and killed. - On the day of Bin Laden’s death, there were no casualties among U.S. operators on the ground; the operation produced an extensive recovery of material, including external hard drives, computers, disks, opium, and other items. The raid revealed Bin Laden was “running the whole thing from Pakistan,” raising questions about ISI knowledge and cross-border links. - The two tier-one units, Delta Force and SEAL Team Six, are both elite but have different primary focuses and traditions. Delta Force is described as older, largely Army-based, with emphasis on hostage rescue on land or in aircraft, and a selection that allows entry for those who prove themselves. SEAL Team Six is portrayed as capable across domains but with primary strength on maritime operations (e.g., the Captain Phillips raid). The discussion notes that both units share high standards for counterterrorism and special operations, and both have strong track records. - Operational differences in training and approach are highlighted. Delta’s emphasis on close-quarters battle and air operations is compared with SEAL Team Six’s maritime emphasis, yet both units are said to perform similar work in practice. Admiral William McRaven is credited with supporting and enabling SEAL Team Six and Delta to operate successfully during the Bin Laden and Maduro operations. The guest emphasizes that both teams perform with high effectiveness, noting the pilots as “unsung heroes” for their precise timing and reliability (plus or minus seconds). - The interview touches on the conditions and contingencies of planning: compartmentalization is discussed, with a preference for sharing enough information with operators on target to perform effectively, while preserving sensitive intelligence to prevent leaks. The Maduro operation allegedly involved strong inside information from Venezuelan sources, with a broader strategy that included leveraging internal actors who might seek power. - Leaks and doxxing are a recurring theme. The hosts discuss the ethics and consequences of releasing names or details about operators involved in these missions. Seth Harp’s reporting on the Maduro raid and the doxxing debate is discussed; the guest argues that doxxing can endanger families and operational security, while also acknowledging the journalist’s desire to be first. - The role of the helicopters and the risk of enemy fire are addressed. A Chinook helicopter was hit during Maduro, but did not crash; the squad subsequently extracted, illustrating the danger and resilience of mission planning. The Bin Laden raid included a helicopter crash incident that required a quick, adaptive response from the team. - The interviewee comments on geopolitical ramifications and future targets. The possibility of Iran being next is discussed; the guest argues that operations against Iran could be possible but would require careful political and strategic consideration and public messaging. The discussion also touches on perceptions of Russia and China, containment strategies, and the importance of democratic governance versus autocratic models in global affairs. - Final reflections include the evolution of the next generation of operators. The guest expresses optimism about the Gen Z cohorts in special operations, emphasizing merit-based selection, resilience, and morale. He concludes with gratitude for the teams involved and notes the personal impact of these operations on his life and career.

Stanislav (Speaker 1) and Speaker 0 engage in a wide-ranging, combative analysis of the Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict and broader geopolitical implications. Key points and claims are as follows: - On Iran’s military activity: The volume of Iranian drone and rocket attacks has dropped by about 95% in the last few days, but Iran’s strategic goals appear to be advancing. The Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and Iran has not fallen from power, suggesting a durable regime in Iran despite reduced attack tempo. Israel is said to be taking a pounding with strikes on Haifa refinery, electrical plants, and other targets, while Iran is pursuing a long-haul campaign rather than a rapid blitz. - Terminology and legitimacy: Stanislav objects to labeling Iran’s leadership as a “regime,” arguing it’s a derogatory term and positing that the regime is a theocracy that is comparatively stable under pressure. He notes that air campaigns have never toppled governments and argues that people rally around governments when their families are being harmed, especially within Shia culture. - Information and truth in war: Both sides are accused of misrepresenting losses and capabilities; the Pentagon’s numbers on drones and rockets are treated with skepticism. There is emphasis on the difficulty of verifying battle damage in real time, and the reality that “the first sacrifice of any war is truth” in war reporting. - Military capabilities and constraints: Stanislav emphasizes that the U.S. and Israel have suffered damage to critical infrastructure, and the U.S. faces munitions shortages. He cites the first six days of conflict as consuming thousands of missiles (3,600 missiles across defensive and offensive systems). He argues U.S. industrial/munitions capacity is strained, with missiles being produced in small quantities and largely by hand, constraining rapid replacement. - Iran’s defense and offense: Iran is portrayed as possessing underground “missile cities” and being able to move and launch missiles from concealed locations. The use of decoy aircraft and other decoys is noted, complicating target acquisition. Iran is described as capable of sustaining a long campaign, with continued missile production and hidden launch capability, including launchers that can be moved and re-deployed quickly. - Sensor/shooter network: The discussion mentions a new U.S.-reported capability described as a “sensor shooter network” that uses satellites to spot a missile launcher as it emerges, relaying coordinates to fighters such as F-35s to intercept before launch. This is framed as making missile launches harder for Iran and easier to strike launchers for Israel and the U.S. - Strait of Hormuz as the central objective: The primary objective for Iran, per Speaker 0, is to close the Strait of Hormuz for as long as possible and disrupt Gulf states, with closing the strait potentially forcing an American exit due to economic pressure. Attacks that target Israel are framed as secondary (“bonus”) relative to the Hormuz objective. - Ground warfare and invasions: Both speakers argue that a U.S. or allied ground invasion of Iran would entail massive casualties and potential domestic political backlash, making it a less likely option. The difficulty of projecting power through Iran’s mountainous terrain and the risk of a popular uprising are highlighted. - Regime durability and external support: Iran’s government is described as a theocracy with deep cultural unity, making political collapse unlikely. Russia and China are discussed as critical backers: Russia provides MiG-29s, SU-35s, S-400s, and jamming capabilities, while China provides satellite connections and political cover, and both nations see Iran as an existential interest—Russia especially, given Central Asia and the Caucasus. Iran is portrayed as having backing from Russia and China that would prevent a wholesale collapse. - U.S. allies and credibility: The U.S. is portrayed as depleting its ability to defend Gulf allies, with discussions of allied air-defense systems being diverted elsewhere (to Israel) and questions about long-term U.S. willingness or capacity to sustain a commitment in the Gulf. - Ukraine comparison and broader geopolitics: The dialogue touches on Ukraine, NATO, and the differential treatment of Ukraine versus Iran, noting perceived manipulation by Western actors and the difficulty of achieving durable peace through negotiations when proxies and local actors have entrenched interests. Zelensky and Kyiv’s internal politics are referenced to illustrate broader critique of Western interventions. - Potential off-ramps and negotiations: There is debate about whether a political settlement could be engineered that would preserve the Iranian regime while offering concessions (e.g., limitations on ballistic missiles or nuclear ambitions) and provide Trump with a way to claim a diplomatic win. Stanislav suggests the unpredictable nature of the current leadership and that an off-ramp may be difficult to secure; Speaker 0 contends that a pragmatic, deal-oriented path could exist if a credible intermediary or concessions are arranged, perhaps involving a different leadership or mediator. - Final reflections on strategy and endurance: Stanislav stresses that drones, missiles, and human ground forces all have limits, and argues that real military victory rarely comes from air campaigns alone; the fundamental test remains whether ground forces can secure and hold territory. Speaker 0 adds that the regime’s resilience in Iran and the long-term strategic calculus—especially regarding Hormuz, energy, and allied alliances—will shape the conflict’s trajectory in the coming weeks. Both acknowledge the enormous complexities and the high stakes for regional and global stability.

In the discussion, Speaker 1 argues that Iran’s objective is simply to survive; their strategy is to continue lobbing missiles, launching drones, and striking back as the U.S. approaches within Iran’s vicinity. He contends Iran has maintained command and control, dispersed forces, and possesses a large and enduring supply of missiles and drones, so the minimal victory for Iran is to endure the conflict. When asked what the U.S. should do to win, Speaker 1 criticizes bombastic rhetoric about U.S. superiority and questions the efficacy of regime change through bombing. He suggests that killing the supreme leader backfires by galvanizing the population and Shiites worldwide, noting Iran’s developed succession mechanisms that compensate for leadership losses. He argues that attempts to destroy Iran or disintegrate its society are misguided and that, if the U.S. pushes toward such aims, it may trigger greater confrontation with China and Russia. He also implies mixed signals from U.S. leadership, contrasting expectations under Biden with actual actions, and contemplates a similar pattern under Trump. Speaker 2 adds that President Trump could claim success by neutralizing key figures like the Ayatollah, but suggests that Israel’s preferences are driving U.S. policy, implying limited autonomy for America. He notes the risk of being drawn back into conflict and emphasizes uncertainty about public perception as the war continues. He remarks on the presence of pro-war voices and social media pushback, interpreting it as a sign that the audience may be “over the target.” Speaker 0 seeks a military assessment of the current state: the Iranian capacity, the Israeli position, and American casualty figures. Speaker 1 assesses Israel as internally distressed: internal unrest, exhausted armed forces, and a large exodus of citizens; he predicts Israel faces an ominous future and foresees Israel possibly deteriorating before Iran. He describes Israel’s use of mercenaries and acknowledges substantial damage on both sides, with Netanyahu’s visibility limited. In the broader Persian Gulf, Speaker 1 states that deterrence has failed among regional powers such as the Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The United States is perceived as hampered by a long logistical footprint; uncertainty about missile stocks and intercepts persists, but Speaker 1 asserts that Iran can sustain war for a long time and that bombing alone will not compel Iranian capitulation. He foresees intensified U.S. troop and firepower deployment, including three carrier battle groups over the next two weeks, to replace the current forces. Overall, the conversation centers on Iran’s resilience, the limited likelihood that bombing will force regime change, the risk of broader great-power involvement, and growing weariness and strategic complications for all sides, with Iran poised to endure and possibly prevail in the long term.

The speaker credits teamwork between industry, academia, and government for success, specifically mentioning Palantir and individuals Julie and Aaron. He spent 40 years in the army, starting as an infantry officer before becoming a logistician, which he considers a lucky and validating move. He notes that data wasn't always prevalent or easily obtainable, recalling a time in Somalia when the Pentagon called him for equipment status amidst a firefight. He contrasts that with Operation Warp Speed, where he had access to all necessary information, emphasizing its crucial importance.

The speaker emphasizes that to understand the situation, we should consider what Jack Keane is saying. We have one aircraft carrier strike group, plus land-based air power and a lot of air defense missiles on the ground, and a lot of air power there, but there are no ground troops. Don Rumsfeld had about 300,000 total ground troops at his disposal, and we went in on the ground and defeated the regime in about a month. There was a profound amount of air power, much more air power than exists in The Gulf right now, and altogether there was a lot more air power then, yet we still underestimated them. We defeated them militarily in about a month, but then an insurgency rose up afterward because you can’t kill everybody, which is what happened. Jack Keane, Dan Raisin Cain, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—the man Trump has talked about—are highlighted as significant military leaders. The question is how many ground troops does he have available? Nada. And you are talking about destroying the civilian and military leadership the way Don Rumsfeld successfully did. He did...

Dmitry Sims junior hosts lieutenant general Abty Alaudinov, hero of Russia, hero of the Chechen Republic, hero of the Donetsk People’s Republic, commander of the Akhmet Special Forces, and deputy head of the main military political directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The conversation centers on the current phase of the conflict, Russia’s strategy, the role of Western support, and comparisons with Israeli actions in Gaza and other theaters. Key points and claims: - Russia’s combat capability and strategy - Alaudinov states that “overall, all troops of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Defense are engaged in active offensive operations across all sectors where we’re positioned,” with the most intense fighting around Pokrovsk, seen as the key point to break through to operational space. He notes progress in sectors where the Ahmad (Akhmet) special forces operate and emphasizes a broader offensive plan while maintaining an “active defense” to engage the entire front line and stretch the enemy’s resources. - He asserts that “only Russia is advancing” along the 1,000-kilometer line of contact and attributes slower offensive tempo to preserving personnel and avoiding a sharp breakthrough that could trigger NATO involvement. He argues the primary damage comes from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on both sides, and contends a rapid thrust would yield enormous losses. - Perceived signs of enemy strain - The speaker describes Ukraine as gradually crumbling under pressure, with Pokrovsk, Kupiansk, and the surrounding agglomeration “gradually falling apart.” He claims Russia liberates one or two settlements daily and that NATO support—drones and equipment—has not changed the overall dynamics; Ukraine cannot hold the front despite the influx of foreign weapons. - Western/NATO support - Alaudinov asserts that NATO testing is ongoing on Ukraine with drones, weapons, electronic warfare, etc., and that Trump’s shifting rhetoric does not reduce the flow of weapons or support. He contends that American support persists even as political statements change, and he notes deep American-NATO involvement via think tanks, satellites, and arms supplies that reach the front. - Drones and the changing nature of war - He emphasizes drones as the central element of modern warfare, while not negating the continued relevance of artillery and tanks. He argues: “a tank worth millions of dollars can be destroyed by a drone that costs $500,” and stresses the need to compete economically in war, deploying cheaper, effective unmanned systems to exhaust the enemy’s resources. - He claims Russia has a layered drone system for deep reconnaissance and strike with various warhead levels, ranges, and maneuverability, enabling operations from closest to farthest sectors and allowing “all targets” to be hit today. He asserts Russia is ahead of NATO in unmanned aviation. - Mobilization and tactics - Refuting Western depictions of “meat assaults,” he notes Russia conducted only one mobilization (300,000) and has continued advancing, while Ukraine has mobilized for years and still struggles. He attributes Ukraine’s resilience to nationalist formations behind mobilized troops, and he suggests that without NATO support, Ukraine would not sustain the front for many days. - Mercenaries and comparisons to Israeli actions - He characterizes Western mercenaries as having arrived with false expectations and being killed off in large numbers; Ukrainians are described as having strong spirit, but NATO soldiers lack endurance in the same way. Israeli mercenaries are described as capable in some contexts but not decisive against Russia. - On Gaza and the Israeli army, Alaudinov accuses Israel of “a fascist state” with tactics that spare no one, arguing Russia fights only those who fight with weapons and does not target women, children, or elders. He contrasts this with alleged Israeli actions in Gaza, saying Israel has no tactics and destroys civilians. - Nuclear considerations and doctrine - He asserts Russia is a nuclear power with substantial combat experience and advances in missiles like Zircon that could sink carriers, arguing NATO did not account for Russia’s capabilities when initiating the conflict. He presents a broader critique of Western policy and the so-called “deep state,” alleging far-reaching political dynamics involving Israel, Epstein, and compromise among Western leadership. - Closing perspective - The discussion closes with the host thanking Alaudinov for the detailed analysis of the operation and broader geopolitical commentary, including views on Israel, Gaza, Iran, and U.S. roles.

When gangs began attacking, they killed 87 people in three days, which is equivalent to 5,000 murders in the US in three days. During the attacks, the speaker was in a meeting at 3 or 4 AM, trying to figure out what to do. Gangs can attack anyone to create terror, even their own family members. The state can only target 70,000 gang members, while the gangs have 6,000,000 possible targets. The gangs were intertwined with the population, killing randomly. The speaker said they were facing an impossible mission, so they prayed for wisdom to win the war and for civilian casualties to be as low as possible. They had no civilian casualties.