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The government funded gain of function research from 2014 to '16, but it continued in Wuhan without approval from the committee. In 2017, the funding was resumed, but the Wuhan research was not reviewed by the committee. When questioned, Fauci claimed that his experts said it wasn't gain of function, but there was no discussion or paperwork. The person in charge of the safety committee only reviewed three studies in four years, and this research was exempted from their scrutiny. It could only have been done with Fauci's permission. We haven't found the paperwork yet, but it's likely that Fauci allowed the research in Wuhan without the safety committee's oversight.

The discussion centers on gain-of-function (GoF) research, its regulation, and the motivations behind it. The first speaker notes the administration’s goal to end GoF research and asks where that stands. The second speaker says progress has been made, and the White House is working on a formal policy. He then defines the issue in stages: what GoF research is, why someone would do it, and how to regulate it to prevent dangerous projects that could catastrophically harm human populations. He clarifies that GoF research is not inherently bad, but dangerous GoF research is. He gives an insulin example: creating bacteria to produce insulin is a legitimate GoF that benefits diabetics. In contrast, taking a virus from bat caves, bringing it to a lab in a densely populated city with weak biosafety, and manipulating it to be more transmissible among humans is a dangerous GoF that should not be supported. The administration’s policy aims to prevent such dangerous work entirely, and the President signed an executive order in April or May endorsing this policy. Next, he discusses implementation: how to create incentives to ensure this research does not recur. He explains that the utopian idea behind such research was to prevent all pandemics by collecting viruses from wild places, testing their potential to infect humans by increasing their pathogenicity, and then preparing countermeasures in advance (vaccines, antivirals) and stockpiling them, even though those countermeasures would not have been tested against humans yet. If a virus did leap to humans, the foreseen countermeasures might prove ineffective because evolution is unpredictable. This “triage” approach—identifying pathogens most likely to leap and preemptively preparing against them—was the rationale for dangerous GoF work, a rationale he characterizes as flawed. He notes that many scientists considered this an effort to do bioweapons research under the guise of safety and defense. The work is dual-use. The U.S. is a signatory to the Biological Weapons Convention and does not conduct offensive bio-weapons research, but other countries might. The discussion highlights that the GoF research discussed during the pandemic can backfire and may not align with true biodefense, since countermeasures might not match whatever pathogen actually emerges. The speaker concludes that this agenda—pursuing GoF to prevent pandemics—has drawn substantial support from parts of the Western world and other countries for about two and a half decades, but he implies it is not deserving of continuation.

We focus on research not related to Department of Defense or UsamGrid. Our committee includes diverse disciplines, not just HHS employees, to ensure a thorough review. Proposals are primarily from NIH, sometimes NSF.

Universities rely on four main sources of federal funding: federal student loans, federal research funding, tax exemptions for operations, and tax exemptions for endowments. If these funding sources were withdrawn, many universities would face bankruptcy. The accreditation process for universities, controlled by existing institutions through nonprofit accreditation bureaus, restricts new universities from accessing federal student loans. This creates a government-supported cartel that hinders innovation and progress. To improve the system, a complete overhaul is necessary, allowing failing institutions to collapse and new ones to emerge. The current system is stagnant and unable to be fixed in its present form.

You don't need a secret lab or a massive complex to create bioweapons. Unlike nuclear weapons, biological weapons can be developed discreetly, blending in with legitimate activities like vaccine production. This dual-use nature makes it difficult to detect a biological weapons program.

NIH did fund research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology through ECHO Health, depending on how you define gain of function research. If you refer to the broader term, then yes, it was funded. This type of research occurs in many labs across the country and is not regulated because it does not pose any threat or harm.

The US should take the lead in setting international standards for research on dangerous pathogens like coronaviruses. Without clear guidelines, other countries may conduct risky research. Standards should include biosafety records, experience with pathogens, training, awareness, facilities, and a national policy framework.

Many journal policies were created during a time of biosecurity focus, neglecting population-level biosafety concerns. Transparency in the approval process is important, with the public having a right to know. If openness leads to disapproval, it raises questions about why approval was granted in secret.

In 2014, a gain of function moratorium was implemented in the US due to lab accidents. Despite this, gain of function research continued in China with funding from Dr. Fauci. The NIH lifted the moratorium in 2017 without proper consultation. There are concerns that US-funded research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology may have led to the COVID-19 pandemic. Dr. Ebright believes that lapses in oversight of this research could have caused the pandemic and may lead to future ones.

Speaker 0 asks if anyone on the vaccine committee has received money from vaccine manufacturers. Speaker 1 responds by saying that according to regulations, individuals who receive royalties are not obligated to disclose them, even on their financial statements, as per the Bayh Dole Act.

We need to focus on funding as the central thread running through the discussions. The speakers discuss private money as a partial source, but highlight a broader funding landscape that includes black budgets, academic budgets, and private interests. - The dialogue identifies funding or lack thereof as the common denominator, with questions about available money and private investment, including whether angel investors are involved. - Speaker 1 explains the banking and funding landscape: black budgets are well funded; academic budgets are nonexistent because they’re considered acceptable to be so; and there are random billionaires who fund anti-gravity or fringe projects because they want recognition beyond their primary business. They mention several examples of private funders: - The church’s fried chicken billionaire funded the Hathaway Lab. - Robert Bigelow, associated with Bigelow Aerospace, is another billionaire funder. - There are other anonymous or less well-known funders who support such projects. - The core problem identified is consistent: money is the barrier, not technology or talent. The project team has observed government and academic research, noting that funding is the persistent obstacle. - To address this, Speaker 1 describes building an institute that pools money from these hobbyist billionaires into a large, stable pot. The goal is a safe, well-funded sandbox for bright people to pursue research without being affected by government budget cycles, tenure concerns, or a single investor’s changing interest or withdrawal. - This institute would select promising projects to fund, creating a new vehicle for financing this type of research. The idea is to avoid overreliance on a single wealthy patron and to maintain stability. - The conversation touches on the strategic value of private funding in the “black world” versus an open, illuminated world, noting that the illuminated world can be a spawning ground for ideas that may eventually benefit broader programs. There is a suggestion that it’s not in the black world’s interest to keep everything completely closed, given potential cross-pollination of ideas. There is mention of Griffin’s position and his connection to DARPA and UAH, implying overlapping influence or interest. - The speakers reflect on whether NASA is still a research organization, and discuss the risk to innovators who fear disappearing when working in public or private sectors. - Speaker 1 notes that ether in space is claimed by some, and expresses interest in talking to more people who hold similar views. - A concluding thread from Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 reiterates the tension between public and private funding, the need for stable, diverse funding sources, and the ongoing interest in discussions about ether and related space phenomena.

I want to collaborate with Congress to ensure appropriate regulation of any risky research. The NIH should not engage in research that could potentially cause a pandemic, and I am committed to working with Congress to prevent such occurrences. Transparency is crucial for building trust. If confirmed, I pledge to lead the NIH as a scientific organization committed to openness. As a citizen, I've noticed that Freedom of Information Act requests from the NIH were often heavily redacted during the pandemic. To foster trust, we must be transparent. If confirmed as the NIH leader, I fully commit to ensuring that the American people have access to all NIH activities with limited obfuscation, which has unfortunately characterized the NIH's interactions with the public.

Our research is increasingly limited to PPI and US government-funded projects, which are now a smaller portion of biotech funding. The biotech landscape is more complex now. The private sector may not follow our oversight recommendations if they don't receive US government funding.

The gold standard in scientific research requires replication, which is currently lacking at the NIH. At least 20% of NIH budgets should be allocated to replication studies, and all science should be published with raw data and peer reviews. A notable example is a 20-year-old NIH study on amyloid and Alzheimer's, which incorrectly claimed amyloid plaques were the cause. This led to the cessation of alternative hypotheses and resulted in 800 studies based on a fraudulent premise, wasting two decades in the search for a cure. It's crucial to eliminate outdated practices and ensure transparency and replicability in scientific research.

Did USAID fund coronavirus research in Wuhan, China? We did not fund gain of function research. The PREDICT program, which ended in 2019, did have grants that may have gone to the Wuhan Institute of Virology. I have requested records from the PREDICT program to understand the funding and research conducted, but USAID has not provided these documents. Despite multiple requests and a letter from 25 senators, we have received no information. We want to know about any grants related to coronaviruses, especially those that could have led to COVID-19. The lack of transparency raises suspicions about what information is being withheld. We seek clarity on all research proposals related to coronaviruses funded by the U.S. government.

Texas A and M's associate head of graduate chemistry quietly resigned last spring and then resurfaced in a leadership role at a Chinese government funded lab, which a research security specialist says is a failure of basic oversight. The specialist, Alan Phelps, traced years of deep ties between Doctor Lei Fong and Chinese institutions, including extensive travel, a visiting post at a defense linked university, and a Texas A and M patent he licensed to a Chinese company he co founded. Phelps also documented that Fong held sensitive U. S. Federal grants and reviewed American research proposals, giving him insider access to cutting edge, taxpayer funded work. Phelps argues that combination of sensitive access, foreign appointments, and Chinese commercial entrants should have triggered alarms long before Fong left College Station. He calls Texas A and M's handling of the case a systemic institutional failure to enforce required research security standards and monitor foreign collaborations on basic research. Texas lawmakers recently created a higher education research security council, but Phelps warns that unless universities actually scrutinize their own faculty, hostile regimes will keep treating American campuses as soft targets. To read more about this story, go to texasscorecard.com.

Neither think tank has hired outside experts to review FEMA's algorithm for setting new rates. FEMA refuses to share the algorithm, raising questions about who owns it. The lack of transparency is concerning, as even Congress has been denied access. Blind trust in the federal government is risky.

We had a study on highway threats that was classified but got denied last minute because it wouldn't pass the New York Times test. Public affairs thought it could be misinterpreted as offensive bioweapons work. Despite its potential to help biosecurity, it was shelved. Most government work, even classified, is transparent.

Universities receive funding from four main sources. First, federal student loans, which amount to trillions and are growing faster than inflation. Second, federal research funding, where universities often take up to 70% of grants for central use. Third, tax exemptions at the operating level, based on their nonprofit status. Fourth, tax exemptions for endowments, which serve as financial buffers. Analyzing these sources reveals that if federal and state funding were removed, many universities would face bankruptcy, highlighting the need for a potential rebuild of their financial structures.

NIH funded research at Wuhan Institute of Virology through ECHO Health, including gain of function research. This type of research is common in labs nationwide and is not regulated because it is deemed harmless.

Speaker 0 asks if anyone on the vaccine committee has received money from vaccine manufacturers. Speaker 1 tries to answer but is interrupted. Speaker 1 explains that according to regulations, people who receive royalties are not required to disclose them, even under the Bayh Dole Act.

People leaving universities with advanced degrees only trust peer-reviewed papers, stifling new scientific insights. Breakthroughs often come from outside the mainstream, not the center of a profession. This narrow view of science is blocking progress and may lead to self-destruction.

The speaker claims research funding has not been cut, but indirect funding to institutions has been targeted. According to the speaker, the administration wants to cut indirect funding, meaning more money goes to researchers. The speaker says the guidance from Bobby Kennedy and the Trump administration empowers frontline researchers and disempowers government bureaucrats. The speaker states that more money will flow to researchers, not university or government bureaucrats, and no services have been cut. The speaker says there's an attack on bureaucracy, citing Harvard getting $0.70 on the dollar for bureaucracy, not research. Cutting indirect costs gets more money to researchers. The speaker claims the administration is focused on empowering researchers, getting money to scientists, and asking them to do bold research on why people are getting sick.

Speaker 0 asked if research beyond HHS-funded work is included in the review process. Speaker 1 mentioned that currently, it focuses on HHS-funded work. Speaker 0 inquired about expanding the scope to include agencies like DARPA. Speaker 1 explained that such agencies typically don't engage in the type of work being reviewed, but suggested a further discussion offline.

My understanding of the PC30 framework is that it focuses on a small number of viruses with both pathogenicity and transmissibility. However, there are discrepancies in the criteria used, leading to unintended studies being included. More refinement may be needed to ensure accurate submissions. The definition on paper may not always align with real-world practices.