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The government funded gain of function research from 2014 to '16, but it continued in Wuhan without approval from the committee. In 2017, the funding was resumed, but the Wuhan research was not reviewed by the committee. When questioned, Fauci claimed that his experts said it wasn't gain of function, but there was no discussion or paperwork. The person in charge of the safety committee only reviewed three studies in four years, and this research was exempted from their scrutiny. It could only have been done with Fauci's permission. We haven't found the paperwork yet, but it's likely that Fauci allowed the research in Wuhan without the safety committee's oversight.

We focus on research not related to Department of Defense or UsamGrid. Our committee includes diverse disciplines, not just HHS employees, to ensure a thorough review. Proposals are primarily from NIH, sometimes NSF.

Universities rely on four main sources of federal funding: federal student loans, federal research funding, tax exemptions for operations, and tax exemptions for endowments. If these funding sources were withdrawn, many universities would face bankruptcy. The accreditation process for universities, controlled by existing institutions through nonprofit accreditation bureaus, restricts new universities from accessing federal student loans. This creates a government-supported cartel that hinders innovation and progress. To improve the system, a complete overhaul is necessary, allowing failing institutions to collapse and new ones to emerge. The current system is stagnant and unable to be fixed in its present form.

NIH did fund research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology through ECHO Health, depending on how you define gain of function research. If you refer to the broader term, then yes, it was funded. This type of research occurs in many labs across the country and is not regulated because it does not pose any threat or harm.

The US should take the lead in setting international standards for research on dangerous pathogens like coronaviruses. Without clear guidelines, other countries may conduct risky research. Standards should include biosafety records, experience with pathogens, training, awareness, facilities, and a national policy framework.

These individuals, referred to as government cutouts, are not traditional academics but rather work closely with the government. The head of the Election Integrity Partnership (EIP) consortium, which includes Stanford University, UW, Graphica, and the Atlantic Council, openly admitted that EIP was created to fill the gaps in government capabilities. They were given a $3 million government grant to continue their censorship work for the 2022 midterms and 2024 election. All four entities in the EIP consortium receive funding from the federal government, and there is a revolving door between government and academia, with individuals moving between positions. This close relationship and funding from the government raise questions about their independence and objectivity.

The U.S. intelligence community has officially opened an investigation into more than 120 U.S. taxpayer-funded biological laboratories operating overseas, including 40 in Ukraine. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard says the probe aims to identify where the labs are located, what pathogens they contain, and what research is being conducted. Gabbard has previously accused officials of misleading the public about the existence and scope of U.S.-backed bio labs overseas, including claims tying the issue to the Biden administration and figures such as Anthony Fauci. The discussion references claims made during the Biden administration by Victoria Nuland, who admitted bio labs are in Ukraine and funded by the United States but said they were only for defensive research, while dismissing accusations as Russian disinformation. Questions are raised about claims of Russian findings, including reported COVID vaccine samples in labs during Russia’s takeover of territory, and claims of AIDS research on Ukrainian military personnel. Senator asks Ukraine-specific questions about chemical or biological weapons and whether there is doubt that any biological or chemical incident in Ukraine would be carried out by Russians. Ukraine is described as having biological research facilities, with concern that Russian troops may seek control of research materials, and statements that efforts are underway with Ukrainians to prevent research materials from falling into Russian hands. The exchange asserts that Russian propaganda blames Ukrainians for plots involving biological weapons and coordination with NATO, and that it is “classic Russian technique to blame on the other guy what they’re planning to do themselves.” Doctor Merrill Nass, a biological warfare epidemiologist and author, says it is notable that the government acknowledges such facilities, including about 40 in Ukraine and over 100 elsewhere, and adds that many countries have studied biological weapons agents, treatments, and vaccines since at least World War II. Nass argues that the law prohibits developing biological weapons and references the Biological Weapons Convention, noting that the treaty has no enforcement mechanism, and that there is no way to send teams to investigate other countries’ labs. He suggests there have been roadblocks to obtaining details, and that labs outside the United States reduce oversight. The conversation also discusses the idea of incentives and loopholes: Nass states that the U.S. has no legal control over private labs and that, in the U.S., it is possible to build high-containment laboratories and have scientists create whatever they like without a prohibition. Nass describes historical U.S. development and stockpiling of biological weapons agents, mentions evasion of antibiotics and vaccines, and argues that international restrictions do not prevent potential development efforts elsewhere. Nass says that specific biological weapon use is not known to have occurred within the United States except that “the potential exception of COVID,” asserting the SARS-CoV-2 vaccine should never have been developed “the way it was developed for COVID” because it included “the most toxic, problematic parts” of the virus. He also recalls work as a consultant to the Cuban Ministry of Health in 1993 regarding illness attributed to cyanide poisoning, describes reports that the CIA sent African swine fever virus to Cuba through Panama to dissidents, and notes that Cuba reportedly had to kill half a million pigs due to that outbreak. When asked whether researchers can be controlled and whether answers will emerge about roughly 120 labs, Nass says accountability and oversight are limited, citing a senate hearing where senators said the intelligence community is not under anyone’s control and is not accountable. He adds that if answers cannot be obtained in the U.S., they would not likely be obtained in other countries. Nass argues that lab-produced viruses could be distinguished from naturally occurring ones by analyzing genomes, describing prior work on reconstructing an epidemic and claiming that attention to whether viral genomes are natural or unnatural will enable future differentiation. He notes that he believes the risk of severe consequences reduces the likelihood of use. The segment ends with plans to bring Nass back as the investigation unfolds.

Many journal policies were created during a time of biosecurity focus, neglecting population-level biosafety concerns. Transparency in the approval process is important, with the public having a right to know. If openness leads to disapproval, it raises questions about why approval was granted in secret.

The transcript explains ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations), a strict set of US rules created in 1976 under the Arms Export Control Act to protect advanced American military technology. It describes the central principle as requiring US government written permission for others to “touch it, see it, or even be in a position where they could theoretically access it.” ITAR is managed by the US State Department, and the transcript states that violations can lead to major fines, prison, and cites examples including a person named Chi Mak who served 24 years. A key point is ITAR’s “strict liability”: unlike most laws that require proof of intent, ITAR does not. The transcript claims that ignorance or good faith provides no legal protection and that even “theoretical access” can be enough for a violation. It also emphasizes that ITAR coverage extends beyond hardware to includes documents such as schematics and maintenance guidelines; for example, the transcript says the F-35 maintenance manual is included, not just the aircraft itself. Canada is described as having a special privileged position under ITAR since 1954, rooted in a defence production sharing relationship that the transcript says created a specific exemption referenced as “22 CFR section 1.26.5” (the “Canadian exemption”). The transcript claims this allows most American military technology to flow to Canada without requiring individual export licenses, and argues that this exemption underpins the Canadian Armed Forces: virtually all CAF equipment, systems, and platforms contain American military technology. It also states the exemption is conditional, applying to Canadian nationals and permanent residents who do not have ties to countries the US considers threats (such as China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, etc.). The transcript then describes what Canada is doing to address personnel shortages: in 2022 it opened CAF recruitment to permanent residents, and in 2026 it launched a dedicated immigration pathway targeting skilled foreign military recruitment members (including pilots, cyber specialists, and technical trades). It claims that roughly one in five new CAF recruits are now permanent residents (about 1,400 people in about the last year). It states that while NATO-origin recruits are preferred, the program extends broadly to recognized foreign militaries, including countries that are not US allies. It further claims recruits may begin basic training on “reliability status” with full security clearances processed afterward—meaning foreign nationals enter operational environments before clearance is fully resolved. The discussion argues this creates risk under ITAR, particularly because permanent residents are being recruited from abroad. Night vision is highlighted via an example: the transcript says a company (IT&T) was fined $100 million for exporting night vision technology to China, and it reiterates that under strict liability intent does not matter. A personal anecdote is included about a posting to Ottawa in 2017 requiring an above top secret security clearance, where the person said they were not allowed in a building for almost a year. The transcript connects this to broader concerns that, if ITAR access restrictions apply, Canada would need to segregate personnel to prevent unauthorized presence around ITAR-covered equipment or documentation, including encrypted communications involving both Canadian and American components. Participants speculate about why the issue is happening quickly (contrasting a claimed 3-month recruitment process with a described 1.5–2-year process for the speaker as a Canadian national) and whether immigration processes were not adequately questioned. It also contrasts Canada’s approach with US practice, noting that the US reportedly has about 40,000 non-US citizens on active duty, and argues that the difference is whether each individual is controlled for access to ITAR-covered technology by the US. Finally, the transcript concludes that if US restrictions were tightened, it claims Canadian operations would be severely impacted, because much of Canadian training, deployments, and operational support is described as enabled by the US.

In 2014, a gain of function moratorium was implemented in the US due to lab accidents. Despite this, gain of function research continued in China with funding from Dr. Fauci. The NIH lifted the moratorium in 2017 without proper consultation. There are concerns that US-funded research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology may have led to the COVID-19 pandemic. Dr. Ebright believes that lapses in oversight of this research could have caused the pandemic and may lead to future ones.

Speaker 0 asks if anyone on the vaccine committee has received money from vaccine manufacturers. Speaker 1 responds by saying that according to regulations, individuals who receive royalties are not obligated to disclose them, even on their financial statements, as per the Bayh Dole Act.

We need to focus on funding as the central thread running through the discussions. The speakers discuss private money as a partial source, but highlight a broader funding landscape that includes black budgets, academic budgets, and private interests. - The dialogue identifies funding or lack thereof as the common denominator, with questions about available money and private investment, including whether angel investors are involved. - Speaker 1 explains the banking and funding landscape: black budgets are well funded; academic budgets are nonexistent because they’re considered acceptable to be so; and there are random billionaires who fund anti-gravity or fringe projects because they want recognition beyond their primary business. They mention several examples of private funders: - The church’s fried chicken billionaire funded the Hathaway Lab. - Robert Bigelow, associated with Bigelow Aerospace, is another billionaire funder. - There are other anonymous or less well-known funders who support such projects. - The core problem identified is consistent: money is the barrier, not technology or talent. The project team has observed government and academic research, noting that funding is the persistent obstacle. - To address this, Speaker 1 describes building an institute that pools money from these hobbyist billionaires into a large, stable pot. The goal is a safe, well-funded sandbox for bright people to pursue research without being affected by government budget cycles, tenure concerns, or a single investor’s changing interest or withdrawal. - This institute would select promising projects to fund, creating a new vehicle for financing this type of research. The idea is to avoid overreliance on a single wealthy patron and to maintain stability. - The conversation touches on the strategic value of private funding in the “black world” versus an open, illuminated world, noting that the illuminated world can be a spawning ground for ideas that may eventually benefit broader programs. There is a suggestion that it’s not in the black world’s interest to keep everything completely closed, given potential cross-pollination of ideas. There is mention of Griffin’s position and his connection to DARPA and UAH, implying overlapping influence or interest. - The speakers reflect on whether NASA is still a research organization, and discuss the risk to innovators who fear disappearing when working in public or private sectors. - Speaker 1 notes that ether in space is claimed by some, and expresses interest in talking to more people who hold similar views. - A concluding thread from Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 reiterates the tension between public and private funding, the need for stable, diverse funding sources, and the ongoing interest in discussions about ether and related space phenomena.

I want to collaborate with Congress to ensure appropriate regulation of any risky research. The NIH should not engage in research that could potentially cause a pandemic, and I am committed to working with Congress to prevent such occurrences. Transparency is crucial for building trust. If confirmed, I pledge to lead the NIH as a scientific organization committed to openness. As a citizen, I've noticed that Freedom of Information Act requests from the NIH were often heavily redacted during the pandemic. To foster trust, we must be transparent. If confirmed as the NIH leader, I fully commit to ensuring that the American people have access to all NIH activities with limited obfuscation, which has unfortunately characterized the NIH's interactions with the public.

Our research is increasingly limited to PPI and US government-funded projects, which are now a smaller portion of biotech funding. The biotech landscape is more complex now. The private sector may not follow our oversight recommendations if they don't receive US government funding.

The gold standard in scientific research requires replication, which is currently lacking at the NIH. At least 20% of NIH budgets should be allocated to replication studies, and all science should be published with raw data and peer reviews. A notable example is a 20-year-old NIH study on amyloid and Alzheimer's, which incorrectly claimed amyloid plaques were the cause. This led to the cessation of alternative hypotheses and resulted in 800 studies based on a fraudulent premise, wasting two decades in the search for a cure. It's crucial to eliminate outdated practices and ensure transparency and replicability in scientific research.

Texas A and M's associate head of graduate chemistry quietly resigned last spring and then resurfaced in a leadership role at a Chinese government funded lab, which a research security specialist says is a failure of basic oversight. The specialist, Alan Phelps, traced years of deep ties between Doctor Lei Fong and Chinese institutions, including extensive travel, a visiting post at a defense linked university, and a Texas A and M patent he licensed to a Chinese company he co founded. Phelps also documented that Fong held sensitive U. S. Federal grants and reviewed American research proposals, giving him insider access to cutting edge, taxpayer funded work. Phelps argues that combination of sensitive access, foreign appointments, and Chinese commercial entrants should have triggered alarms long before Fong left College Station. He calls Texas A and M's handling of the case a systemic institutional failure to enforce required research security standards and monitor foreign collaborations on basic research. Texas lawmakers recently created a higher education research security council, but Phelps warns that unless universities actually scrutinize their own faculty, hostile regimes will keep treating American campuses as soft targets. To read more about this story, go to texasscorecard.com.

Neither think tank has hired outside experts to review FEMA's algorithm for setting new rates. FEMA refuses to share the algorithm, raising questions about who owns it. The lack of transparency is concerning, as even Congress has been denied access. Blind trust in the federal government is risky.

We had a study on highway threats that was classified but got denied last minute because it wouldn't pass the New York Times test. Public affairs thought it could be misinterpreted as offensive bioweapons work. Despite its potential to help biosecurity, it was shelved. Most government work, even classified, is transparent.

Universities receive funding from four main sources. First, federal student loans, which amount to trillions and are growing faster than inflation. Second, federal research funding, where universities often take up to 70% of grants for central use. Third, tax exemptions at the operating level, based on their nonprofit status. Fourth, tax exemptions for endowments, which serve as financial buffers. Analyzing these sources reveals that if federal and state funding were removed, many universities would face bankruptcy, highlighting the need for a potential rebuild of their financial structures.

NIH funded research at Wuhan Institute of Virology through ECHO Health, including gain of function research. This type of research is common in labs nationwide and is not regulated because it is deemed harmless.

Speaker 0 asks if anyone on the vaccine committee has received money from vaccine manufacturers. Speaker 1 tries to answer but is interrupted. Speaker 1 explains that according to regulations, people who receive royalties are not required to disclose them, even under the Bayh Dole Act.

People leaving universities with advanced degrees only trust peer-reviewed papers, stifling new scientific insights. Breakthroughs often come from outside the mainstream, not the center of a profession. This narrow view of science is blocking progress and may lead to self-destruction.

The speaker claims research funding has not been cut, but indirect funding to institutions has been targeted. According to the speaker, the administration wants to cut indirect funding, meaning more money goes to researchers. The speaker says the guidance from Bobby Kennedy and the Trump administration empowers frontline researchers and disempowers government bureaucrats. The speaker states that more money will flow to researchers, not university or government bureaucrats, and no services have been cut. The speaker says there's an attack on bureaucracy, citing Harvard getting $0.70 on the dollar for bureaucracy, not research. Cutting indirect costs gets more money to researchers. The speaker claims the administration is focused on empowering researchers, getting money to scientists, and asking them to do bold research on why people are getting sick.

Speaker 0 asked if research beyond HHS-funded work is included in the review process. Speaker 1 mentioned that currently, it focuses on HHS-funded work. Speaker 0 inquired about expanding the scope to include agencies like DARPA. Speaker 1 explained that such agencies typically don't engage in the type of work being reviewed, but suggested a further discussion offline.

My understanding of the PC30 framework is that it focuses on a small number of viruses with both pathogenicity and transmissibility. However, there are discrepancies in the criteria used, leading to unintended studies being included. More refinement may be needed to ensure accurate submissions. The definition on paper may not always align with real-world practices.