reSee.it - Related Video Feed

- Tucker Carlson released a video addressing the war with Iran, arguing he was among the few who warned Washington weeks before the conflict began and that President Trump did not heed that warning. The discussion notes Tucker’s appearance in Washington with Trump and mentions supporters like JD Vance and Tulsi Gabbard. - Carlson’s framework for analyzing a major war is introduced as four questions: 1) Why did this happen? 2) What was the point of it? 3) Where does it go from here? 4) How do we respond? - On why this war happened, the speakers assert a simple answer: this happened because Israel wanted it to happen. The conflict is characterized as Israel’s war, not primarily for U.S. national security objectives, and not about weapons of mass destruction. The argument is made that the decision to engage was driven by Israel, with Benjamin Netanyahu demanding U.S. military action and pressuring the U.S. through multiple White House visits. - The speakers contend that many generals warned against the war due to insufficient military capacity, but those warnings were reportedly ignored as officials lied about capability and duration of a potential conflict. They claim there was no credible plan for replacing Iran’s government after a potential topple, highlighting concerns about Iran’s size, diversity, and the risk of regional chaos. - The discussion suggests a history of manipulation and misinformation, citing a 2002 exchange where Netanyahu allegedly pushed for regime change in Iran and noting Dennis Kucinich’s account that Netanyahu said the Americans had to do it. They argue this war is the culmination of a long-term strategy backed by Netanyahu. - On what the point of the war would be for Israel, the speakers say the objective is regional hegemony. Israel seeks to determine regional outcomes with minimal constraints, aiming to decapitate Iran to allow broader actions in the Middle East, including potential expansionist goals. They argue Iran’s nuclear program was used as a pretext, though they contend Iran was not imminently close to a nuclear weapon. - The role of regional players is examined, including the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman—and their strategic importance as energy producers and regional influencers. The speakers claim Israel and the U.S. sought to weaken or destabilize these Gulf states to reduce their capacity to counter Israel’s regional dominance and to push the U.S. out of the Middle East. - It is asserted that Netanyahu’s strategy would involve reducing American involvement, thereby weakening U.S. credibility as a security partner in the region. The claim is that the Gulf states have been left more vulnerable, with missile threats and disrupted energy infrastructure, and that Israel’s actions are designed to force the U.S. to withdraw from the region. - The speakers argue that Europe stands to suffer as well, notably through potential refugee inflows and disruptions to LNG supplies from Qatar; Europe’s energy security and economy could be adversely affected. - The discussion notes alleged Israeli actions in the Gulf, including reports of Mossad activity and bombings in Qatar and Saudi Arabia, though it is presented as part of a broader narrative about destabilization and its costs. - The potential consequences outlined include cascading chaos in Iran, refugee crises in Europe, and a weakened United States as an ally in the Middle East. The speakers predict long-term strategic losses for Europe, the Gulf states, and the U.S. - The discussion concludes with a warning that, if Israel achieves its aims to decapitate Iran, the region could destabilize further, potentially triggering broader geopolitical shifts. A final reference is made to Naftali Bennett portraying Turkey as the new threat, illustrating ongoing great-power competition in the region. - The overall message emphasizes truthfulness in reporting, critiques of media narratives, and the view that Western audiences have been propagandized into seeing Middle East conflicts as moral battles rather than power dynamics between competing states.

Glenn: Welcome back. We’re joined by professor Syed Mohammed Marandi, from Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. Thank you for coming back. Marandi: Hi, Glenn. Thank you. It shows how much I like your show because I went through a lot of trouble to get online. Glenn: I appreciate it. Regarding the riots in Iran, Tehran included, it seems every time there’s a buildup to regime change or invasion, the script follows a pattern: first destabilize with sanctions and an information war, then build on public grievances and instigate violent protests. You announce the intention to help locals in their aspirations for freedom, with rhetoric reduced to a binary: either you don’t care about the protesters or you support sanctions or intervention. After a coup or invasion, the US and its allies have a zero-sum geopolitical interest and power interest, not altruism. The result, from the Arab Spring onward, is that the country to be liberated is destroyed. Iranian protests are an internal issue, but once international, geopolitics intrudes. How do you assess the situation on the ground in Tehran, domestic grievances, and the geopolitical component? Marandi: Western media and think tanks periodically declare Iran on the verge of collapse, but the state has popular support and a strong constitutional adherence. Currency suddenly fell—perhaps 30–50% in a brief period—and was managed from abroad, with pressure from the US and Western allies on currency-exchange places. Peaceful protests in Tehran and other cities followed mainly by business people whose shops were threatened by rising prices; if the currency isn’t stabilized, they’d go out of business. Protests continued into day two, with larger crowds in some cities. Then infiltration occurred: small, well-disciplined groups began to riot. Over the past days, over 100 officers were murdered, some beheaded or burned alive, some police faces smashed. A nurse in a clinic was burned alive in the top floor; ambulances and fire engines were burned; a Red Crescent worker was killed. Western media claims “protesters” and ignores footage. Across the country today, demonstrations in support of the Islamic Republic and the constitution were large—city by city like Isfahan, Tabriz, Ahvaz, Mashhad, Tehran. The crowd in Tehran was among the largest ever. Despite rioters, millions showed up in demonstrations across the country. The Iranian state’s media is outspent by a global Persian-language media empire in the West, with billions spent on online campaigns, bot armies, and networks. Yet millions demonstrated in support of the state. People can see the footage themselves. The internet was shut down to coordinate rioters across groups including ISIS-related elements, monarchists, and Kurdish groups. The rioters’ coordination collapsed when the internet went down. The regime’s supporters remain, and demonstrations in Tehran and across Iran show broad, diverse perspectives, all affirming support for the constitution and the state. Glenn: I’ve seen pro-government marches here as well; they’re huge, though not always covered in Europe. Marandi: There’s a narrative control to label the government illegitimate to topple it. The rhetoric claims Iranians are freedom-loving, yet those who claim to support them have bombs and blood. Pompeo’s tweet suggesting Mossad agents among protesters, and Mossad’s Persian-language statements, indicate foreign interference. The internet blackout aimed to prevent coordination among rioters; footage shows violent acts—two men burned in a mosque, a nurse burned in a clinic, ambulances and public buses destroyed. The “millions on the streets” claim is contradicted by the actuality of coordination via foreign paymasters. Glenn: Trump claimed Iran had fallen and would negotiate; is this about a new nuclear deal, stalled or about missiles and Iran’s regional support? What are Washington’s aims? Marandi: No one contacted him; his claim about the second-largest city falling is baseless. His ignorance shows inchoate knowledge of ground realities. Trump’s past statements about surrendering Iran suggest aims aligned with the Israeli regime’s goals: a broken West Asia and North Africa, fragmentation of states, and meddling across the region. Erdogan’s miscalculation—allying with Israel and Qatar—empowered Israeli policy at the expense of Turkey, Syria, Egypt, and Iran. The “woman, life, freedom” protests were initially fueled by Western narratives; BBC Persian and other outlets spread misinformation about Massa Amini, which was later corrected, but the cycle repeats. The West uses propaganda to push riots; Iran’s endurance of sanctions and propaganda demonstrates broad legitimacy for the Islamic Republic even amid external pressure. The demonstrations today show support for the state, the constitution, and Iran’s policies while denouncing the US, the Israeli regime, and their supporters. AOC’s stance and Trump’s stance reflect a uniparty tendency toward empire preservation. Glenn: Regarding potential war, Lindsey Graham floated strikes; how likely is war? Marandi: The currency manipulation aimed to justify instability for war. The CIA, Mossad, and others would seek to justify strikes, but Iran is prepared for war. If the US attacks, Iran may strike back; the population that stood with the state could unite in the face of aggression. Iran’s capabilities include underground drone and missile bases, short- to medium-range missiles, more easily moved than long-range missiles. Iran could devastate US installations if attacked. If war occurs, Iran could retaliate in the Persian Gulf and beyond, potentially impacting global economies. If the US begins, Iran could respond decisively, targeting American interests abroad and in the region. The Zionists allegedly favor war for their regional aims, regardless of Western consequences. Glenn: Professor Malandy, thank you for traveling and for the discussion. Marandi: Always a pleasure, Glenn.

- The discussion frames Iranian capabilities as the current biggest threat to the US Navy, noting that Iran’s position is now stronger, with significant new efforts in the last six months supported by China and Russia. The guest emphasizes that Iranian capabilities today are far more lethal than in 2020 and that Iran has benefited from Chinese and Russian involvement, including help with integrated air defenses. - On the protests in Iran, the guest contends that Mossad, with CIA and MI6, joined the efforts to provoke the regime into a brutal crackdown, aiming to trigger a stronger US response. He argues the protests were legitimate at their core (economic grievances and reformist aims) and that the attempt to exploit them for regime change failed. He explains that, after discovering 40,000 starlight terminals used to orchestrate regime-change efforts, the intelligence community judged the operation a failure, and President Trump was advised that a broader, more forceful campaign would be required, potentially including more firepower and assets. - Regarding Russia and China’s responses to potential regime collapse in Iran, the guest asserts that Russia would intervene only if the regime seemed in danger of collapsing, and China would respond similarly, considering strategic and financial consequences. - In the Maduro Venezuela operation, the guest recounts paying off many actors to enable the abduction of Maduro and his wife, noting air defenses largely stood down due to bribes, with one battery reportedly firing and damaging a helicopter. He suggests the operation accomplished regime alteration but not a change in leadership style, since the new president reportedly will not take instructions from Washington. He speculates that continued oil income from the captured Venezuelan oil could influence outcomes, and he notes skepticism about the profitability of Venezuelan drilling for major oil corporations, who may turn to private or mercenary groups. - The “secret weapon” comment (the discombobulator) is described as an exaggeration; the guest hints at undisclosed capabilities but declines further public discussion, citing high clearance and Pentagon confidentiality. - On Iran’s protests and possible US strikes, the guest reiterates that the initial protests were economically driven and that the Mossad-CIA-MI6 effort to provoke a harsher regime response stalled, leading to the decision for a larger potential strike. He outlines a plan for a prolonged air campaign with multiple carriers and a heavy emphasis on air power over naval action, suggesting a Kosovo-like approach with extensive air sorties to degrade Iran’s air and missile defenses, using surface ships as needed but relying on air power for sustained damage. He notes that the air campaign would require time and additional assets, possibly two to three more carrier groups, and would hinge on the ability to degrade defenses to enable broader bombing operations. - When discussing Iranian capabilities against the US Navy, the guest says Iran’s current capabilities are more dangerous, with Iran receiving about 500 missiles from China and improved Russian integrated air defenses. He notes concern about long-range missiles capable of reaching US bases and questions whether Iran’s Orion missiles could reach Diego Garcia. He asserts that Russian help could be more for deterrence or limited military support rather than supplying exotic missiles like Reshnik, and that the Chinese missiles could threaten ships at sea. - On the US mobilization (Lincoln, submarines, aircraft, drones, HIMARS, Patriot/THAAD), the guest says the response is a time-buying effort to pressure negotiations, with more assets likely and ongoing dialogue with Iran. He suggests the US may pursue enriched uranium settlements, acknowledging Netanyahu’s and Trump’s positions, while noting Iran’s insistence that missile development is not negotiable and that JCPOA prospects are unlikely. - About Iran’s possible escalation strategies, the guest analyzes several options: drone swarms could threaten bases; sea mines in the Strait of Hormuz would be a last resort but remain a hazard; a swarm of boats and diesel submarines pose challenges but are not existential threats to carriers; and long-range missiles (including those supplied by China) could target US bases or ships. He emphasizes that the navy can defend against many of these threats but highlights the difficulty of countering missiles and the threat submarines pose in shallow gulf waters. - On Russia and China’s potential responses if the regime falls: Russia would likely intervene militarily or economically to prevent regime disintegration, while China could leverage financial power (including debt leverage) and maintain strategic flexibility. The Turkish role is described as a wild card; Turkey could be motivated to counter Israeli hegemony in the region, potentially drawing NATO into conflict, despite NATO’s current limited capacity. - Finally, the guest touches on broader geopolitical implications: he suggests Europe is drifting towards greater autonomy from the US, NATO’s effectiveness is questionable, and the regime’s fall could trigger wider regional instability. He argues Taiwan is a separate, less feasible target for conflict, given distance and economic stakes, and calls for more cautious rhetoric regarding Taiwan. He closes by noting that Ukraine’s fate and Europe’s stance will influence how the US and its allies manage any Iran escalation.

Speaker 0: This was a long planned operation. We went in there, and this was timed when president Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu met at Mar A Lago on the December 28. That's when this was all done, and it was intentional thing. We crashed their economy. We debased their currency so that then they they crashed in the banks, took their dollars as I understand it for the intent purpose of crashing their making their their real worth nothing. And so that means people can't buy enough food. They can't pay their bills, all those kinds of things. That was our express intent and desire and operation. And he even said so that the people would rise up and protest. And then when they did, then we had according to Mike Pompeo, he said he said that the at least the Mossad was actually on the ground there. You may have seen, this this post he made. Happy New Year to every Iranian in the streets. Also, every Mossad agent walking beside them. He said on our next post that evening. So he's flat out saying it is. Apparently, Israeli press openly admitted the same thing. So you can imagine that possibly m I six, the CIA, I can't imagine that that Mossad would have been doing this by themselves, especially when you see Bessen talking about how our economic, coercion was at work there. I'm sure that we were also on the street. You know, you've seen that 40,000 Starlink satellite terminals were were discovered. So we had been sending in arms, weapons, ammunition, intel communications devices, etcetera, Mossad agents, probably CIMS six, all trying to stir this up.

- The discussion reassesses how the Iran-focused conflict has progressed since it began, contrasting current dynamics with earlier expectations about an exit ramp or rapid change in Iran. - Speaker 1 argues that it was unlikely Trump would off-ramp; instead, major mistakes were made in understanding Iran and the war’s nature. He attributes false assurances to Israel’s Mossad, notably David Barnea, who allegedly pressed Washington that Iran was on the verge of a revolution and that a “house of cards” would collapse after a short spark. - He outlines three U.S. attempts at decapitation-style moves: 1) June 13: the first decapitation strike, 2) January: protests hoped to topple the government by destabilizing the rial and bazaars, 3) February 24: another decapitation strike targeting the supreme leader and others. He cites Israeli press as saying these were intelligence errors and that there is no sign of Iran’s collapse. - Israeli public sentiment, per the Hebrew press, is shifting from earlier regime-change aims to pressing Trump to take “Cargilland” (i.e., a new approach or frontline) as the key to the future, implying a pivot in expectations from Israel. - Trump is described as still seeking an exit ramp, motivated by looming midterm elections and an improving political position, but his chances depend on actions within weeks. Iran has rejected his ceasefire proposals, echoing past patterns where Western talks (notably Wittkopf and Kushner) talked of ceasefires without addressing Iranian demands or broader regional security architecture. - The speaker notes a recurring pattern: repeated ceasefire discussions that don’t resolve phase two or underlying security concerns, with Iran consistently saying no to proposed ceasefires or terms. - The situation is set against a broader political backdrop: Netanyahu’s government has reportedly given up on regime change and is considering boots on the ground, with a focus on whether Trump can sustain casualties. - Military developments cited include: - An expeditionary military unit expected to arrive soon, two MEUs, and the 82nd Airborne Division, with staging locations uncertain (Jordan or elsewhere). - The war widening rapidly and becoming more dangerous in the region. - Regional reactions and potential escalations include: - U.S. airstrikes on Iraqi forces prompting Iraqi factions, including Ashad al-Hashabi, to threaten attacks on the U.S. and Iran. - Reports of Iraqi troops massing near Kuwait, raising concerns of a broader sectarian conflict. - The Houthis (and Hezbollah) indicating willingness to join if attacks escalate, with both already signaling involvement on the periphery. - The overall trajectory described suggests a move toward a wider, sectarian conflict involving Iraq, Iran-aligned groups, and regional actors, with ongoing disagreements over ceasefires and strategic aims.

The discussion centers on whether Israel is driving a war against Iran and how the United States fits into that effort, with conflicting reporting from major outlets and a mosaic of intelligence interpretations. - The hosts outline two competing major-news stories. The New York Times reports that Netanyahu has asked Trump not to bomb Iran, arguing Israel is not prepared to withstand Iran’s retaliation. The Washington Post had reported a few weeks earlier that Israel sent a delegation to Russia to assure Iran that Israel does not intend to strike first, while Netanyahu in Washington was pressing Trump to strike Iran. The implication is that Israel is trying to avoid being seen as the aggressor while hoping the U.S. acts, effectively using the United States to carry out escalation. - The Post’s framing suggests Israel wants to escalate tensions but avoid the perception of initiating the conflict; Iran, according to the Post, responded positively to Israeli outreach but remains wary that the US could still carry out attacks as part of a joint campaign. - Iran’s perspective: they are wary and believe the U.S. and Israel are not to be trusted, even as they respond to outreach. There is a suggestion that Iran, with Russia and China, is prepared to counter, and that Tehran is not fully aligned with Western narratives about Iran as a terrorist state. - Larry Johnson (Speaker 2), a former CIA intelligence officer, joins to break down the behind-the-scenes dynamics. He references an alleged economic operation around Trump’s meeting with Zelensky that targeted Iran’s currency, triggering protests and destabilization, allegedly orchestrated with CIA/Mossad involvement. He lists various actors (Kurds, the MEK, Beluchis) and claims they were directed to inflame unrest, with the aim of manufacturing chaos to enable a military strike that could be stopped or degraded by outside intervention. He argues the plan failed as Iran’s security forces countered and electronic warfare helped by Russia and China blocked the destabilization. - Johnson emphasizes a broader geopolitical balance: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey told the United States they would not permit overflight for strikes; Russia and China bolster Iran, raising the cost and risk of Western action. He notes that 45% of global oil passes through the Persian Gulf and that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz, which would massively impact oil prices and global economies, benefiting Russia. - On the potential next moves, the panel discusses whether Israel might consider nuclear options if faced with existential threats, and they acknowledge the difficulty of countering hypersonic missiles with current defenses. They reference reports of an earthquake or saber-rattling related to Dimona and mention that some in Israel fear escalation could be imminent, but there is no consensus on what comes next. - The conversation also touches on U.S. political voices, including Lindsey Graham’s reaction to Arab involvement, and questions whether there is any mainstream American call to accommodate Iran rather than confront it. Overall, the dialogue presents a complex, multi-layered picture: Israel seeking US-led action while trying to avoid direct attribution as aggressor; Iran resisting Western pressure but positioning to counter with support from Russia and China; and a regional and global economic dimension that could amplify or deter conflict depending on strategic choices and alliance dynamics.

The day starts with the 10 Iranian plan being accepted by President Donald Trump as the basis for negotiation. JD Vance was headed to Islamabad to lead the American negotiating team, with former leaders persona non grata toward Iran. The speaker notes this contrasted with what happened the last time Iran negotiated with Kushner and Witkoff. Lebanon was in a ceasefire on paper, written by the prime minister of Pakistan, whose efforts were praised. If the 10-point plan was the basis for negotiation, this represented a major victory for the Islamic Republic, a point echoed in a Moscow conference addressed by the Iranian ambassador in those terms. But by sunset, the situation “appeared to have gone to hell in a handcart.” Just before going on air, Tehran’s air defenses were engaged with what were said to be American bombers, implying the ceasefire didn’t even last twelve hours. The Islamabad negotiation is now in grave doubt. In an RT interview, the question was asked whether Iran had really won as claimed. The response asserts that the greatest superpower cannot achieve its objectives and thus has lost; if the U.S. “definitely lost,” then Iran has won. Iran is described as a global south emerging country under sanctions for forty-seven years, surviving two nuclear superpowers (regional and global). The speaker contrasts Trump’s regime-change talk for Iran with Afghanistan’s experience, noting the U.S. spent a trillion dollars to remove the Taliban only for the Taliban to return to power as the U.S. withdrew. There is a claim of “replacing one Khamenei with a second Khamenei,” with the son being less moderate than the father, and referencing the dead father, mother, wife, and children from the initial American attack. The speaker recounts an attack on a 169-schoolgirl incident near Bandar Abbas, asking listeners to imagine daughters or granddaughters incinerated in an instant, and labels it a day of infamy akin to Pearl Harbor. Iran was allegedly negotiating with “the sneak attackers,” with thousands of Iranian civilians killed, mosques and churches destroyed, and even a synagogue destroyed; the speaker notes having filmed a synagogue outside of which there are “100 synagogues in Iran,” with Jews in Iran and a million Christians having an honored place in the Islamic Republic. The claim is that these acts occurred while the United States and Israel bombed, killed front-rank commanders, and destroyed the leader of the Iranian revolution, achieving nothing. The speaker contrasts Trump’s harsh rhetoric against Obama over the JCPOA with Trump’s support for a 10-point plan that supposedly is less restrictive than the JCPOA, including allowing Iran to charge a toll on every tanker through the Strait of Hormuz, potentially earning about a hundred billion dollars per year in perpetuity, and criticizing Obama for returning Iran’s own money. Trump is said to claim Lebanon was included in the ceasefire, but the plan and the prime minister of Pakistan say Lebanon is included; nonetheless, Israel launches a frenzy of violence on Lebanon, including bombing a funeral, with a death toll rising. The speech notes Israeli attacks on Beirut, and describes a seventy-two-hour bombardment and the Arab League’s response, with the UAE allegedly attacking two Iranian islands eight hours after the ceasefire, threatening a broader war between Iran and the UAE. The Strait of Hormuz is claimed closed again, despite Trump’s boast of unblocking it, and oil prices are cited at $144 per barrel, with implications for Russia, Europe, and Asia if prices surge. The speaker asks where this is heading and reflects that, while exultant in the morning, the evening leaves doubt about resolution. The commentary concludes that this is a global crisis bigger than past financial crashes, and introduces Professor Syed Muhammad Marandi as the guest to explain further after a break.

Mario: Daniel, after decades of diplomacy, the Middle East is now at war. Early on you suggested Hormuz and economic leverage; as the conflict evolved, US ground invasion talk, targeted Iranian leadership, and new developments—like JD Vance’s reaction to US intel and Israel striking energy infrastructure in Iran—have shaped concerns that Israel wields outsized influence. Broad question: how did we get here and why? Daniel: There’s a long history of American and Israeli influence in play. There is American agency and a geopolitical logic tying chokepoints like Hormuz to broader aims, such as reasserting US primacy vis-à-vis China. But this doesn’t fully explain how the last 10 yards into war were crossed. Netanyahu’s long effort to shape a strategic environment culminated when he found a president open to using American power in the region. Israel’s strategy appears to be to assert greater regional dominion by leveraging US military power and creating dependencies with Gulf states. Netanyahu reportedly offered the president an actionable plan, including on-the-ground assets, to decapitate Iran’s leadership and spark a broader upheaval, which helped push the White House toward a twelve-day war in June. Israel also presented a narrative of rapid US escalation to secure its aims, while the American interagency process—though deteriorated in recent years—had to interpret unusually aggressive, yet selective, Israeli intelligence and objectives. The result is a complex dynamic where US rhetoric and decisions are deeply entangled with Israeli designs for regional hegemony, an outcome that was not broadly anticipated by many regional partners. Mario: If the US administration had not fully understood Israel’s project, how did this come to pass? And how does Mossad factor in? Daniel: Israel has tremendous access to influence over an American administration through lobbying, media echo chambers, and political finance, which Netanyahu exploited to drive a course toward major confrontation with Iran. Before Trump’s term, Netanyahu was nervous about a president who could pivot against allies; he devised a strategy that culminated in Operation Midnight Hammer and subsequent US-Israeli collaboration, reinforced by the possibility of rapid decapitation of Iran’s leadership. There are reports (and debates) about Mossad presenting on-the-ground assets and the possibility of instigating a street revolution in Iran, which may not have been fully believed by Washington but was persuasive enough to shape policy. The question remains how much of Israeli intelligence makes it to Trump and his inner circle, especially given concerns about cognitive ability and decision-making in the White House at that time. Netanyahu’s aim, according to Daniel, was not simply to topple Iran but to maximize Israel’s regional leverage by using American power while reducing other regional peers’ influence. Mario: What about Gulf states and broader regional realignments? How did the Gulf respond, and what does this mean for their security calculus? Daniel: The Gulf states face a stark dilemma. They fear Iran's retaliatory capabilities but also distrust America’s consistency and question whether US support will be cost-effective. Iran’s strikes into the Gulf have forced Gulf capitals to reassess their reliance on US protection and Israel’s influence, particularly given Israel’s aggressive posture and expanded regional footprint—Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza—with potential implications for the Gulf’s own security and economic interests. Some Gulf actors worry about over-dependence on American security assurances while Israel intensifies operational reach. The GCC’s calculus is shifting: they confront a choice between continuing alignment with the US-Israel bloc or seeking more independent security arrangements. The possibility of a broader Gulf-Israel axis, or at least closer coordination, is tempered by concerns over long-term regional stability, public opinion, and the risk of escalation. Mario: How has this affected perceptions of Iran, Israel, and the broader regional order? Has the Gulf’s stance shifted? Daniel: The region’s balance has been unsettled. Iran’s actions have damaged Gulf trust in its neighbors’ security guarantees, while Israel’s aggressive posture and reliance on US power have complicated Gulf states’ calculations. Turkey’s role is pivotal as it balances concerns about Iran and Israel, while also watching how the region realigns. The possibility of a future where Iran’s power is weakened is weighed against the risk of destabilization and long-term security costs. Negotiations between the US, Iran, and regional actors—stoked by Turkish diplomacy and shifting Gulf positions—are ongoing, with Turkey signaling that diplomacy remains important, even as Gulf states reassess their security dependencies. Mario: What about Lebanon and Hezbollah, and the potential for broader spillover? Daniel: Lebanon faces severe consequences: displacement, civilian harm, and a domestic political paralysis that complicates relations with Israel. Hezbollah remains a factor, with ongoing tensions in Lebanon and the South. Israel’s goal of establishing security-control in Lebanon risks reigniting long-standing conflicts, while Lebanon’s government seeks a balance that could prevent further escalation, if possible. The broader picture is that Israel’s approach—driven by a perceived need to neutralize Iran and all potential threats—could provoke wider regional blowback, complicating already fragile domestic politics across the Levant. Mario: Final thoughts as the war unfolds? Daniel: Israel’s strategic ambitions appear to extend beyond countering Iran to shaping a broader order in which it remains the dominant regional power, aided by US military leverage. Gulf states face a difficult reorientation, reassessing longstanding alliances in light of perceptions of US reliability. The coming months will reveal whether regional actors can recalibrate toward diplomatic resolutions or wind up in a deeper, more protracted conflict. The question remains whether a political path could replace military escalation, and whether external powers can deter further aggression and stabilize the region without allowing a broader conflagration.

Jeffrey Sachs and Glenn discuss the threat environment around Iran amid Trump-era tensions. - Observed mobilization: The United States has a massive military build-up in the region; allied transports appear en route to the Middle East. The impression, from Tehran’s view, is that an attack seems unavoidable, with Israel and Washington seemingly seeking regime change. - Threat framing and regime change: Sachs says Israel has pursued over thirty years to overthrow the Iranian government, with the United States broadly acting in lockstep with Israel. He notes that last summer’s effort aimed at regime change did not succeed, and that a carrier task group is now moving toward Iran, signaling imminent attack. He asserts that “the goal here has never been negotiation.” - JCPOA history and negotiations: A nuclear deal, JCPOA, was reached and ratified by UN Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). Trump ripped it up in his first term. Sachs argues there has never been genuine readiness by the United States or Israel for a negotiated settlement; when negotiations occurred, Israel resisted, and the attack on Iran two days before scheduled U.S.–Iran negotiations in June 2025 is cited as proof that the goal is regime change, not diplomacy. - Hybrid warfare and tactics: The plan is described as a regime change operation carried out through hybrid warfare—cyber, street unrest, economic strangulation, bombing, assassinations. Trump is characterized as blustering to pressure Iran to comply with demands that would amount to dismantling the regime. - UN Charter and legality: Sachs invokes UN Charter Article 2(4), stating that all members shall refrain from threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, and argues the current posture is a gross violation of the charter. - Venezuela comparison and propaganda accusation: He likens the current stance to the coercive U.S. approach seen in Venezuela, accusing the United States of invasion, kidnapping, oil seizures, and confiscation of oil profits, with Trump claiming the money goes to him. He alleges similar propaganda is present in major media regarding Iran, including misrepresentation of economic collapse as a sign of Iranian misgovernment. - Economic statecraft and its effects: Scott Bessent, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, is cited as stating that sanctions aimed to “collapse” Iran’s currency and provoke mass unrest, enabling a political outcome favorable to U.S. aims. Sachs claims sanctions caused a December economic collapse, bank failures, currency issues, and imports shortages, driving people into the streets. - Marketed outcomes and media treatment: Bessent is accused of describing a “positive” outcome from destabilization, with mainstream media avoiding coverage of this stance. The claim is that weaponized finance is a tactic to destabilize Iran without conventional warfare. - Containment risk and nuclear considerations: Sachs warns that if the situation deteriorates, Iran could decide to dash for nuclear weapons, particularly if existential threats mount. He emphasizes that a broader regional war could involve many countries and risk nuclear escalation, making prevention imperative. He argues the UN Security Council should convene immediately to stop escalation. - Prospects for Europe and regional actors: He criticizes European leaders for not resisting aggression, noting skepticism about who would oppose U.S. aggression. He suggests some regional players (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Turkey) may not want a wider war, but questions whether they can prevent it given U.S. leadership and Israeli influence. - Final note: Sachs calls for a strong, principled international response to prevent an explosion in a highly volatile region, urging opposition to unilateral threats and actions.

Speaker 0 describes concerns from June 2005 that Israel wasn’t preparing to attack Iran anytime soon, and that there was hurry to roll out a sequence of events as planned. The sequence described starts with Israel attacking Iran, with retaliation by either Iran or China after Iran is struck with a nuclear weapon. This leads to a limited nuclear exchange in the Middle East, followed by a ceasefire. He heard this being planned in the meeting and says it is being choreographed, “like the script for a movie.” In this rollout of the scenario, as the world looks on with horror, people will demand from their governments heavy controls over travel, over communication, over people who meet, and over people who protest in the streets. They want to prevent crazy bombers in airplanes and in shopping malls. Because people will be driven into fear, they will request, demand, and insist on heavy controls from their governments, which will be justified. This is where the martial law situation in Western countries is intended to come about. The speaker emphasizes that this is just the start of a much bigger and pretty horrifying story.

The host notes the ceasefire appears to be over after Israel scuttled Trump’s plans for a two-week peace; the Wall Street Journal reports that Netanyahu was furious he wasn’t included in the peace plan discussions. The host says Israel wasn’t formally part of Iran negotiations and was unhappy it learned a deal was finalized late and wasn’t consulted, according to mediators and a promoter familiar with the matter. Speaker 1 interjects apologetically, then remarks that online narrative suggests that if you say Israel led the US into this war, you’re antisemitic, which they call antisemitic, and speculate that they’re all antisemitic. Speaker 0 describes Israel as throwing a tantrum “like a toddler” after the peace plan’s collapse and launching massive airstrikes on residential buildings in southern Lebanon, supposedly with no military purpose. Speaker 2 counters that civilians are involved and mentions tunnels under the area. Speaker 0 notes these attacks also targeted Iranian and Chinese Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure, calling it a direct attack on China, and claims at least 250 people were killed in these attacks on civilian apartment complexes in southern Lebanon. Speaker 1 adds that bombs continue to hit Beirut, with images described as horrific; there are 256 confirmed deaths at that point. Israel is also ramping up attacks in Gaza and the West Bank, which some warned would happen once the ceasefire was announced. Speaker 3 states that Netanyahu says the ceasefire with the US and Iran “is cute, but it doesn’t really have much to do with Israel,” and that Israel will keep fighting whenever they want, noting that two weeks were announced but not the end of the world. Acknowledgment follows that “we were not surprised in the last moment.” Calls for Netanyahu’s resignation in Israel rise. Iran announces it will close the Strait of Hormuz; the Trump administration says water will open but contradicts Fox News reporting that tankers have been stopped due to the ceasefire breach. Fox News reports raise concerns about whether the plan is credible. Speaker 4 mentions that Iran’s parliament says the ceasefire is violated in three ways: noncompliance with the ceasefire in Lebanon (civilians being slaughtered), violation of Iranian airspace, and denial of Iran’s right to enrichment; Iran insists uranium enrichment remains part of the deal, while the Trump administration claims they will not enrich uranium. Speaker 5 adds that Iran’s ability to fund and support proxies has been reduced, claiming Iran can no longer distribute weapons to proxies and will not be able to acquire nuclear weapons; prior to the operation, Iran was expanding its short-range ballistic missile arsenal and its navy, which posed an imminent threat to US assets and regional allies. The host counters that June had claimed “done enriching uranium,” but Iran says they will do whatever they want, having “won the war.” Speaker 6 asks how one eliminates a proxy’s ability to distribute weapons if the weapons and proxy networks already exist. Speaker 1 notes the points are contentious and shifts to a discussion with Ryan Grimm from Dropside News. The host, Speaker 0, asks Grimm to weigh in on the 10-point plan circulated as Trump’s plan, which Grimm says is not a formal document and not necessarily accurate; a “collection of different proposals” from Iran that was “collected into a single proposal” and later claimed to be new when presented as a new 10-point plan. Grimm describes the process as inconsistent and says the administration’s narrative has become convoluted. A segment follows about a centenarian, Maria Morea (born 1907, died 2024 at 117), whose gut microbiome showed diverse beneficial bacteria; studies of long-lived people show similar patterns, suggesting longevity relates to daily habits and gut health. The sponsor pitch for kimchi capsules is included, noting it provides gut-beneficial bacteria with Brightcore’s product, offering a discount. Speaker 0 returns to the ceasefire discussions, arguing that Israel’s actions indicate it does not want peace. Grimm expands, saying Israel is in a worse position than before and aims to push north into Lebanon and perhaps target maritime resources; Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz would elevate its regional status, with Belt and Road targets implying a significant structural shift. The host questions whether Trump would abandon Netanyahu if necessary and whether Trump would throw Netanyahu under the bus to stop the war. Grimm suggests Trump may prefer an out to avoid broader conflict, while noting the political stakes in the US and international responses. The discussion then revisits how Netanyahu allegedly sold the war to Trump and cabinet members, with New York Times reporting that the aim was to kill leaders, blunt Iran’s power, and potentially replace the Iranian government, while acknowledging that the initial strikes did not achieve regime change and that Iran’s ballistic missiles and proxies have been affected by the conflict. The segment closes with a humorous analogy to a Broadway line about a fully armed battalion.

Saeed Mohamed Marandi explains that Iranians view current events as an extension of the twelve-day war, where Israel and the Trump administration allegedly collaborated to undermine Iran and failed. He cites US Treasury remarks at Davos about manipulating Iranian currency to provoke protests, which he says led to peaceful demonstrations followed by highly trained groups that caused destruction and police casualties. He asserts that Israel claimed responsibility, with Mossad statements and Channel 14 reporting that weapons brought into Iran caused police deaths, and he notes Western media glossed over these facts. He argues this campaign aimed to push Trump toward confrontation with Iran, while messaging about Iran’s nuclear program and regional alliances shifted over time. Iran’s response, he says, has been that any attack will be treated as all-out war with an overwhelming Iranian retaliation. He contends Trump is boxed in: a larger strike would provoke a massive Iranian response across the region, affecting oil and gas flows through the Persian Gulf and potentially collapsing the global economy. He suggests the “smart” outcome would be to back off and end peacefully, potentially declaring victory without concessions, as Trump did in Yemen, though he believes Iran will not accept any deal that compromises sovereignty or core capabilities. Marandi lays out Iran’s view of the regional and strategic landscape: Iran’s counterstrike would target US interests across the region, not just bases, and would involve allies in Iraq, Yemen, and other areas. He argues the Persian Gulf is highly vulnerable because regional regimes hosting US bases are complicit, and a war would disrupt global energy supplies. He asserts Iran’s capabilities are primarily directed at the United States, given US threats since the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions, and that Iran has strengthened missiles and drones, along with air defenses. He contends Israel is vulnerable, and the aim of some in the US political circle is to sacrifice US interests for Israeli interests. He asserts that Iran’s real objective is to prevent a repeat of the “sword over Iran”—to avoid six-month cycles of provocations—and to end the possibility of ongoing CIA-backed unrest being used as pretext for further strikes. On the possibility of negotiation, Marandi says Iran will not give up nuclear enrichment, missile capabilities, or regional alliances. He notes there was a JCPOA, but Iran would not accept a repeat of that deal; any future agreement would need to be better for Iran. A deal could be discussed about the nuclear program, but not one that cedes sovereignty or enrichment rights. He suggests Trump could try to retreat by declaring victory or offering a hollow concession, but Iran is ready for all-out war if attacked. He emphasizes that if the US backs down, it would be a major defeat for Washington; if it engages in war, it would be a world tragedy and the US would be defeated, with global implications. He argues Iran’s stance is clear: they will respond massively to any attack, and the only viable path for the US would be to walk away and pretend it gained something it did not. Glenn notes that regional allies feel exposed as world power shifts toward multipolarity, and asks about whether Iran would treat this as an existential threat and how it would fight. Marandi responds that Iran views the objective as balkanization, supported by Israeli interests, and that Iran would confront attempts to seize control of the country. He reiterates that Iran will not compromise sovereignty or support for Palestine, and that a conflict would be devastating for the world, with Iran prepared to fight to defend its existence.

In the conversation, Syed Mohammed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, addresses multiple interwoven geopolitical issues, centering on Iran, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and the broader strategic rivalry with the United States and its allies. Syria and ISIS release - Marandi asserts that the Damascus regime, described as al-Qaeda/ISIS-aligned factions, would not tolerate Kurdish forces backed by the United States. He notes prior violence against Alawites, Christians, and Druze as context for the current disturbing images from Syria. - He argues the United States is not a reliable partner for its allies, pointing to past episodes such as Obama’s refusal to support Arbil when ISIS threatened the Kurdish government, and Soleimani’s rapid military response to save the city. - He states that ISIS prisoners have been released in Syria, implying that thousands of ISIS members are now free and could destabilize Syria and possibly Iraq. He emphasizes that both Jolani (an ISIS-linked figure) and the Kurdish groups in northeast Syria are allied to the United States, making it unclear who released the prisoners but suggesting that those actors are aligned with the U.S. - The broader implication is that the release increases instability in Syria and potentially across the region. Border security and spillover fears - The discussion turns to Iraq’s border with Syria, with Marandi weighing whether U.S.-backed jihadist forces might spill into Iraq or Lebanon. He suggests a likelihood that ISIS/Al-Qaeda remnants could be used to pressure Lebanon and Iraq to prevent closer Iranian influence. - He notes that Iran’s potential responses could include its missile and drone capabilities, should security worsen on a front involving its allies in Lebanon and Iraq; however, Iran currently refrains from large-scale involvement in Syria but would consider action if threats to Iran or its allies escalate. Regime change, fragmentation, and U.S.-Israel aims - The conversation shifts to Iran post-riots, with questions about U.S./Israel strategies for regime change. Marandi contends the plan is to destabilize and fragment Iran, not to establish a unified post-regime scenario. - He cites alleged Israeli and Western involvement in organizing riots as evidence of a broader conspiracy to create chaos and justify military action. He claims Mossad and other intelligence agencies were on the ground, and public statements from former CIA officials acknowledged Israeli involvement. - He describes the riot phase as highly organized, with foreign funding (including Bitcoin), online recruitment, and careful targeting of police and infrastructure. He portrays the protests as initially legitimate grievances that devolved into violent chaos fueled by external coordination, with widespread destruction and deaths, including the killing of police officers. - In contrast, he highlights large pro-government demonstrations, especially a national day of demonstrations that he says showed widespread popular support for the Islamic Republic and condemnation of rioters. He points to extensive media coverage highlighting peaceful protests, while arguing that the riot narrative dominated Western coverage. Internal Iranian dynamics and public opinion - Marandi emphasizes the fragmentation among Iranian opposition groups: MEK, monarchists, Takfiri remnants near the Pakistan border, and Kurdish separatists, all of whom he asserts lack credible popular support. - He argues that even if the regime were at risk, fragmentation would prevent any single faction from stabilizing the country post-regime change. He suggests this aligns with his view of broader Israeli aims to weaken and fragment Iran and neighboring states, as seen in Syria and Iraq. Military capability and deterrence - He asserts Iran’s substantial missile and drone capabilities and asserts that Iran could defend allies in Lebanon and Iraq if needed. He notes Iran’s long-term preparedness against U.S. threats, including underground bases and extensive drone/missile stocks. - He contends that if war occurred, it would have wide regional and global economic consequences, potentially destabilizing oil markets and prompting broader geopolitical upheaval. He argues that U.S. restraint may be influenced by the risk of a global economic meltdown. Russia, China, and Starlink - Regarding technological assistance for countering communications, he mentions rumors of Russian or Chinese involvement in aiding Iran's internet disruption and Starlink-related issues, acknowledging uncertainty but highlighting a growing trilateral closeness among Iran, Russia, and China in the face of U.S. pressure. media narratives and leadership - He criticizes Western media for portraying protests as peaceful, while Israeli claims and cyber/disinformation around the events are presented as demonstrations of foreign involvement. He maintains that internal Iranian unity—visible in large-scale demonstrations—contrasts with the portrayal of a fractured nation. - He closes by suggesting that while some European leaders may align with U.S. policies, the overall strategic outlook remains uncertain, with a warning that Trump’s approach could escalate tensions rather than yield stability.

An Israeli official stated that a plan to take out the supreme leader of Iran was rejected by the U.S. President over concerns of escalating the conflict. The official believes that removing the supreme leader would end the conflict, not escalate it, claiming Iran spreads terrorism, sabotage, and subversion throughout the Middle East and is bringing the world to the brink of nuclear war. According to the official, Israel is preventing a horrific war and bringing peace to the Middle East. They believe that defanging Iran will allow for new heights in the Middle East, expanding the Abraham Accords, trade, tourism, and communication between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The official stated that the U.S. has provided tremendous help, including American pilots shooting down drones, THAAD batteries in Israel, and Aegis ships.

Iranians took to the streets in January to demand an end to the Islamic Republic’s rule, but they were met with bullets. The crackdown that followed killed tens of thousands, with the true toll unknown. As protests grew, the regime pushed a familiar claim that the demonstrations were not spontaneous but engineered by foreign intelligence services, notably the Mossad and the CIA. New analysis from the Network Contagion Research Institute (NCRI) shows how this foreign-coup narrative was built, amplified, and circulated online, transforming a domestic uprising into the appearance of a foreign conspiracy. The process, according to NCRI, was not organic but deliberate: first, regime-aligned media framed protests as foreign sabotage; second, online influencers across political camps adopted and propagated that claim; third, engagement surged, often surpassing official state media; and finally, Iranian officials cited the online discourse as validation. The narrative then traveled outward and returned with legitimacy. NCRI identified high-engagement voices across diverse political spectrums who converged on the same conclusion about Iran: different politics, one narrative. Among the notable accounts involved were Nick Fuentes, pro-Kremlin amplifier Megatron Ron, Network Node, Atom Media, progressive commentator Omar Badar, gray zone journalists including Aaron Mate and Max Blumenthal, and Iranian regime-aligned commentator Mohammed Manadi. One year and a half earlier, an essay described as Homine’s Soft Power in America discussed the influence the regime had created in academia, media, and cyber actors who operate in a coordinated and diffused manner, sowing doubt about casualty numbers and who is responsible for killings. Two provocative posts acted as catalysts: a Farsi-language Mossad account and former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Both posts were rapidly weaponized as proof that the protests were foreign-backed. The largest engagement surge occurred after January 8, precisely as protests expanded and the crackdown intensified, with the same language and accusations repeated across networks. As violence unfolded inside Iran, a second online operation shifted blame away from events on the ground. The regime deployed “attribution warfare,” reframing a domestic uprising as foreign aggression, thereby blurring moral clarity and weakening international response. In modern information warfare, control over who gets blamed may matter as much as control over the streets.

Alastair Crook discusses with the host the evolving US strategy toward Iran, the credibility of Iran’s deterrence, the role of Israel and Gulf states, and what is known about Iran’s domestic unrest. - Trump’s strategy toward Iran has shifted. Initially, he sought a big, quick victory with minimal entanglement, including a possible attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June and assistance from Israel to identify a gap to exploit. Crook says Trump hoped for a toppling of the Iranian leadership via a “Maduro-style” operation that could be quickly achieved with outside support. Over time, outcomes did not align with those hopes, and the plan became far more complicated. - The naval armada near Iran was intended as a pressure point but, from the Pentagon’s view, is more of a liability. The armada is loaded with Tomahawk missiles rather than air defense missiles; estimates suggest 300-350 Tomahawks among two destroyers and one carrier. Iran has countermeasures: anti-ship missiles along the coast, submarines (including mini-submarines) with anti-ship missiles, and fast attack craft. Drones threaten the fleet, and the air defense burden would be high if a drone swarm attacked. Hormuz could be shut by Iran in the event of war, a long-term strategic lever that Iran has signaled. - Iran’s deterrence has matured: any attack by Israel or the US could trigger full-scale war and Hormuz closure. Symbolic exchanges were proposed by intermediaries (an empty IRGC building and an attack on a US base), but Iran rejected such symbolic moves, insisting on a broader, sustained response if attacked. - Israel’s posture and constraints: Israel has told the US it does not view the nuclear issue as the sole determinant, but instead urges action to destroy Iran’s ballistic missile system and deter future threats. Netanyahu, meeting with Whitlock, indicated opposition to any nuclear deal if the US does not secure certain Israeli demands, warning that without Israeli endorsement, a US deal would fail. Israel insists on conditions that make a broader deal nonviable for the US. - The Arabs’ restraint: Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, do not want direct involvement in an attack on Iran, including airspace use or refueling. Several factors influence their position: fear of Iranian retaliation, concerns about broader regional instability, and shifts in regional alignments. Saudi Arabia has grown more anti-Israel, viewing Israel as destabilizing and expressing concerns about the region’s security order. There is also a fear that a major war could trigger an Arab Spring-like upheaval in Gulf monarchies. - Iran’s internal unrest: The insurrection in Iran involved trained insurgents (MEK operatives trained by the Americans in Armenia and Kurds trained in Northeastern Syria) and some Baluch participants. Corridors through Turkey and Kurdish groups facilitated their entry into Kermanshah Province. The strategy aimed at creating chaos to provoke a Western intervention, with reports that attackers were paid (roughly $5-$10) to inflame violence, burn buildings, attack ambulances, and kill. The Iranian government reports nearly 3,000 killed during the protests, with about 150 more unidentified; the majority of casualties were security forces due to exchange of fire. The narrative contrasts with outside accounts, noting the opposition did not lead to defections from key state institutions, and Israeli intelligence assessment reportedly concluded the unrest did not threaten the regime’s collapse. - Regional and great-power dynamics: Russia and China have signaled opposition to letting Iran be pressured by the United States, with discussions in Russia about offering a nuclear umbrella or naval support for Iran, though official policies are unclear.Originally planned joint exercises near Hormuz were paused; there are ongoing considerations of Chinese/Russian involvement that would complicate US options. A Chinese-Russian naval presence near Iran could limit US maneuvering. A recent drone shot down by the USS Lincoln reflects continued attempts at signaling and potential negotiation. - Overall assessment: Trump faces a dilemma between projecting strength and avoiding a costly escalation, with Israeli opposition complicating any potential US move. The US cannot easily sustain pressure without risking market turmoil and broad regional and great-power entanglements. The likely trajectory involves continued “negotiations about negotiations” rather than immediate, decisive action, while Iran’s deterrence and regional recalibrations constrain what any use of force might achieve.

Mario and the Professor discuss the scale and spread of the current oil and energy shock and its broad economic and geopolitical ripple effects. - Severity and scope: The Professor calls the crisis “pretty catastrophic,” possibly the biggest oil crisis experienced, potentially surpassing the 1970s shocks. He notes a gap between Washington rhetoric and underlying economic reality and emphasizes the war’s effects beyond oil, including fertilizer and helium, all of which pass through the Strait of Hormuz or related chokepoints. - U.S. economic backdrop (before the war): The Professor provides a pre-war table: - U.S. GDP growth in 2024 was 2.3%, 2025 about the same after a dip in 2024 to 2.2%. - Jobs: 2024 added 2.2 million; 2025 added 185,000, with tariffs contributing to a manufacturing job loss of 108,000. - Productivity declined from 3% to 2.1% in 2025. - He argues the U.S. economy was already slowing and that the war exacerbates existing weaknesses rather than creating a boom. - Immediate physical and downstream effects: - The closure of the Strait of Hormuz affects more than oil: up to 20% of world oil, a third of fertilizer, and helium used in chip manufacturing (notably in Taiwan) pass through the strait. - The closure’s ripple effects include fertilizer shortages and higher prices (fertilizer up about 50%), and broader supply chain dislocations as related infrastructure and inventories (oil, fertilizers, helium) become depleted and must be rebuilt. - Relative impact by region: The U.S. is more insulated from physical shocks than many others, but financial markets (stocks and bonds) are hit, with higher interest rates and a rising 10- and 30-year bond yield. Europe and Asia face larger direct physical disruptions; India, Taiwan, and others bear notable hits due to fertilizer and helium supply constraints. - Global energy and political dynamics: - The U.S. remains a net importer of oil, though it is a net exporter of petroleum products; fertilizer reliance and pricing reflect broader global constraints. - The professor highlights the political costs: protectionism (tariffs), militarism (increased defense spending and involvement), and interventionism (policy actions). He notes polling is negative on these directions, suggesting policy headwinds for the administration. - The escalation and motivations for war: - A theory discussed is that the war was driven by a belief in decapitating Iran’s leadership to force regime change, a strategy the professor says many experts have warned against. He cites New York Times reporting that Mossad and Netanyahu supported decapitation, but that former Mossad leadership and U.S. intelligence warned it would not work; the escalation suggests a divergence between theory and outcome. - He acknowledges another view that controlling Hormuz could economically benefit the U.S., but ranks it as a lesser driver than regime-change objectives. - Possible outcomes and scenarios: - If the Houthis control the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and the Beber/Mendeb is blocked, the consequences would intensify; the professor describes a “freeway turned into a toll road” scenario in Hormuz and greater disruption in the Gulf, including potential attacks on desalination plants. - The economic signaling would likely worsen: downward revisions to growth, higher import prices, and increased financial market strain; a prolonged closure would intensify these effects. - The escalation ladder and endgame: - The professor warns that escalating with boots on the ground would favor Iran and could trigger widespread disruption of Gulf infrastructure, desalination, and regional stability. He suggests Russia would be a clear beneficiary in such a scenario. - He concludes with a stark warning: if Hormuz and the Beber/Mendeb remain closed, and desalination and critical infrastructure are attacked, the situation could resemble or exceed the scale of the 2008 financial crisis—“look like a birthday party” compared with what could unfold. - Overall takeaway: The crisis is multi-faceted, with immediate physical shortages (oil, fertilizer, helium) and cascading financial and political costs. The duration and depth depend on how long chokepoints stay closed and whether escalation occurs, with the potential for severe global economic and geopolitical consequences.

The discussion covers Iran, its regional threats, and potential US actions, along with broader geopolitical implications. - Iranian capabilities and external support: The on-hand capabilities are said to be far more lethal and the Iranian position stronger, with enormous recent investment by Iran, notably with Chinese and Russian involvement over the last six months. Russia is aiding integrated air defenses and China has reportedly provided missiles; the exact mix and ranges are not fully disclosed. The panelists expect Iranian air and missile defenses to work much better with Russian and Chinese assistance this time. - Protests in Iran and US strike calculations: The protests were described as legitimate initially, driven by economic distress, with two groups present: reform-minded and more conservative elements. The Mossad, with CIA and MI6, allegedly joined to provoke brutality by the regime, aiming to push it toward a brutal crackdown and to exploit the protests as a regime-change opportunity. It was claimed that 40,000 starlight terminals were smuggled in to orchestrate protests but were discovered and eliminated, marking the operation as a failure. Consequently, strikes were deemed impractical unless more firepower and longer duration were available, leading to a predicted extended air campaign rather than a quick strike. - Maduro kidnapping and Venezuela: The operation involved paying off those in the way and exploiting air defenses; one air-defense battery fired, hitting a helicopter but not bringing it down. The new president in Venezuela reportedly refuses to take instructions from Washington, raising questions about regime-change outcomes. There is speculation about continued income from oil captured and sold illegally, and about who will protect Venezuelan oil interests as drilling resumes, including potential mercenaries and maverick oil groups. The oil leadership reportedly lacks interest in going down there unless it is highly profitable. - Secret weapon discussions: The “discombobulator” and other secret weapons mentioned by Trump are described as exaggerated; the speaker notes there are weapons kept secret for dire circumstances but declines to elaborate beyond public knowledge, given high-level clearance. - Iran-focused air campaign planning: The US would rely on a prolonged air campaign, potentially comparable to the Kosovo campaign in 1999, avoiding nuclear weapons and using extensive air power with support from bases in Europe and the region. The Navy would be complemented by the Air Force with a long campaign, while the Navy would need replenishment and time to rearm. - Missile and weapon capabilities: Iran’s capabilities have evolved, aided by Chinese missiles (allegedly hundreds) and Russian support. The range of missiles questions whether they can reach Diego Garcia, with concerns about more capable missiles hitting US bases in the region. Russia’s supply of Reshnik missiles (hypersonic, multiple warheads) is viewed as unlikely; the focus is on Iranian missiles that can threaten ships and bases in the Middle East. - US force posture and diplomacy: The force buildup (aircraft, submarines, drones, THAAD, Patriot) signals a “play for time” strategy while pursuing negotiations, including enriched uranium discussions. There is debate about what agreement might be possible on enriched uranium and JCPOA-related issues; Iran reportedly rejects several Netanyahu/Trump demand points, including missile constraints as a non-starter. - Russia, China, and Turkey as wild cards: Russia would likely intervene militarily only if Iran’s regime faces collapse; China would likely use economic means and some political leverage. Turkey is seen as a wild card; it could join a regional confrontation and potentially align against Israel or the US, with NATO’s response viewed as uncertain and largely lacking a unified, decisive stance. - Nuclear arms and START: The May suspension of START is mentioned; Russia claims willingness to extend, while the US has not responded, raising concerns about unconstrained Russian nuclear activity if treaties lapse. - Ukraine and Taiwan implications: European nerves and NATO dynamics are evolving; the Europeans are portrayed as vacillating between opposing and challenging Trump-era policies, with NATO potentially facing existential questions. A strike on Iran could shift focus away from Ukraine and Taiwan, empowering adversaries, or strengthen deterrence depending on actions and diplomacy. The speaker suggests that, pragmatically, Taiwan poses a far more difficult strategic challenge and that escalation there would be highly unrewarding, potentially increasing China’s incentives to avoid direct conflict.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and Glenn discuss the current strategic picture across Ukraine, the Russia–China–Iran axis, and the broader Western political environment. On Russia and Ukraine: - MacGregor notes a major “Cauldron battles” situation in Southeastern Ukraine, with remaining Ukrainian forces being encircled and largely annihilated by precision strike weapons, and a Russian swarm anticipated to complete the encirclement. - He identifies two focal points of Russian activity: Odessa (where Russian special operations are reportedly active at night, Odessa largely undefended with air defenses degraded) and Kharkov, with ongoing pressure toward Kyiv. He emphasizes that none of these alone solves the core problem of removing Zelenskyy’s government in Kyiv, which he describes as a facade Europeans seek to preserve. - Russia has increased its force size, adding reservists and training new draftees; options for Moscow appear to be Odessa, Kharkov, and Kyiv. Putin is watching Western European political developments to gauge timing, potentially waiting for Western government changes to move decisively. - MacGregor argues NATO is effectively irrelevant to Russia’s calculus and asserts the United States does not want a war with Russia over Ukraine, giving Moscow more freedom of action than Western audiences realize. On Russia–China relations and Europe: - Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are pursuing a bilateral strategy to mutually reinforce military and economic capabilities, forming a large continental fortress against the United States. The two powers seek to strengthen ties as they view the U.S. as increasingly belligerent. - MacGregor contends that European leaders, including Starmer, Macron, and Metz, are aligned with globalist and financial elites (referencing ties to BlackRock and others) and that personal relationships between leaders are not meaningful in the international arena; strategic interests drive policy. - He argues that many European elites’ rhetoric about Russia serves to deflect from domestic vulnerabilities and to mobilize anti-Russian sentiment as political cover. On the Middle East and Iran: - The talk about Iran is framed as not serious; MacGregor describes a plan to escalate toward regime change in Iran, driven by U.S., Israeli, and allied intelligence communities, despite Iranian resistance and regional risk. - He claims Mossad, MI6, and CIA influenced President Trump regarding Iran’s fragility, while Iran’s internal protests (economic grievances) were legitimate and quickly mischaracterized as attempts to overthrow the government. He asserts Chinese and Russian assistance helped Iran counter covert efforts, including providing satellite imagery and assisting integrated air and missile defenses. - The declared Western goal is to destroy Iran as a nation-state, with the Iranian leadership prepared to respond with full use of capabilities if attacked. He suggests a potential air and missile campaign could target the regime and strategic hubs, with the United States likely relying on high-altitude precision strikes and long-range missiles, while questioning the effectiveness and survivability of U.S. platforms like B-52s against Iranian defenses. - China and Russia are depicted as unlikely to allow Iran to be pulverized; they could intervene if Iran is near disintegration, possibly through non-nuclear actions such as a collision at sea, leveraging their submarine capabilities and influence. On European political legitimacy and future: - MacGregor connects the Epstein-related discourse in Europe to a broader critique of ruling elites, comparing the potential for political upheaval to late-18th-century France. He argues that as publics grow disillusioned with elites, there could be a crisis of political legitimacy and a shift toward more realistic leadership, with potential upheaval in Britain, France, and Germany. On Putin and future moves: - He suggests Putin views the possibility of reconciliation with Washington as unlikely, having reached somber conclusions about the prospects for meaningful agreement. He predicts Russia will act on its terms, potentially advancing toward the Dnieper River, Odessa, and perhaps Kyiv, while noting Russia does not intend to govern Western Ukraine long-term. He emphasizes that events will unfold on Russian terms, with European irrelevance in the decision-making process fading as Moscow executes its plans.

Bazaarists and ordinary citizens gathered to peacefully protest over rising costs and economic hardship, described as the direct result of America’s economic terrorism and unlawful sanctions designed to suffocate Iran. The demonstrations were presented as legitimate, constitutional, and recognized by Iran’s leadership, with authorities pledging to listen. Cities were quiet, police unarmed, and protesters marched peacefully until an operation was triggered. The Twelve Days War begins anew. American and Israeli officials admitted Mossad’s heavy involvement. Thousands of Starlink terminals were smuggled in and handed to terrorist cells inside Iran. These cells moved quickly, infiltrated crowds, and turned protest squares into killing fields. Civilians and law enforcement were slaughtered in gruesome, ISIS-like fashion. Eyewitnesses reported armed operatives issuing commands, moving with discipline, and some disguising themselves as police. Fake checkpoints appeared; civilians were stopped and executed at close range. Violence escalated as officers were ambushed, lynched, mutilated, burned alive, and severed heads were mounted on car roofs; bodies were dragged through streets in grotesque spectacles designed to terrify. The terror spread across capital and many cities, with drive-by shootings spraying bullets into crowds and at protesters and bystanders alike, each killing calculated to fracture society, with precious lives lost to foreign bullets rather than Iran’s law enforcement. The people described as totally unarmed. Public institutions were attacked—hospitals, banks, mosques, fire trucks, ambulances, and buses full of passengers were set ablaze, crippling essential services. The violence was described as the work of trained operatives, including beheadings, mutilations, coordinated arson, and synchronized executions. It was characterized as not spontaneous protest but organized terror, with tactics mirroring ISIS and Al Qaeda. Public executions, impersonation of authorities, symbolic destruction, and indiscriminate killing were said to follow the same doctrine and playbook. It was alleged this was not unprecedented, citing Syria and Libya as examples where terrorist cells infiltrated protests to escalate violence and fracture societies. Alongside the violence, a media war was launched: Western mainstream media outlets were accused of bias that blamed killings on the government, while executions by terrorists were blamed on security forces, and victims of terror recast as casualties of state repression. Social media influencers were reportedly paid generously to amplify distortion, demonizing Iran and paving the way for foreign intervention. Cyberattacks targeted infrastructure, networks were crippled, and the government was forced to shut down the Internet to protect citizens and disrupt terrorist communications. Yet the operation was said to fail miserably. Calm was restored, and millions marched in support of the state. Now the United States and the Israeli regime stand poised to launch a new war to engineer regional collapse. But Iran, described as the oldest continuous civilization on Earth, has survived millennia and will stand tall again, stronger and more prosperous, determined to decide its own destiny. The biggest foreign intelligence and terror operation in Iran is claimed to have failed.

Speaker 1: Well, this is a big question that everybody wants to know. And I think not just the direct actors in The United States, Iran, I will even throw Israel into that sentence as well, but the entire region of the Middle East and also the world because the risk of any major conflict that's breaking out between The US and Iran is most certainly going to spill over even beyond the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. That's because the Iranians have said that they'll regard any attack. This will be the second unprovoked attack by the Trump administration against Iran. But the Iranians said they'll regard any attack by The US also as an attack by Israel and vice versa. So both Israel and The US military targets in the region are going to be hit by Iranian missiles if Trump goes through with what he's been threatening, which is he's going to bomb Iran. And the problem with this, Mike, is that he keeps giving a different reason. There's no, so it's not that Iran has attacked The United States. It's that, well, first, it was the peaceful protesters that were being, you know, supposedly massacred. If you believe any of these US based NGOs that claim to be Iranian human rights organizations, first, was like 2,000, then 3,000. An hour later, it's five. Two hours later, it's 30,000. Suddenly, like a day later, it's 50,000. Then next thing you know, they're saying there's a genocide happening in Tehran. The Mullahs are genociding their own people. Of course, none of this is even remotely true, and this was one of the biggest propaganda campaigns that was being driven by Israel, by Israeli media interests, by, all these agencies that are hiring these influencers to basically shill for, pretty much any issue you can imagine. And, I know of some of these agencies, and of course, they're doing kind of what they call Hezbollah propaganda on behalf of Israel, but some of these same people were also pushing the vaccine, believe it or not, couple of years ago. And then some of them moved on to, you know, promote the war in Ukraine or the proxy war and, big up Zelensky and so forth.

John Stubtack outlines a four-part regime-change playbook shearing Iran from the U.S.-Israeli perspective: 1) sanctions to wreck the economy and provoke public misery; 2) foment and fuel massive protests, with evidence cited of Mossad involvement and public statements by Trump and Pompeo supporting U.S. participation; 3) a massive disinformation campaign to sell to the West that protests are internally generated and that the regime is finished; 4) U.S. and likely Israeli military intervention to finish off the regime and topple it. He argues that, in Iran, phase four has not occurred and the protests have diminished significantly since their peak a week earlier. A Jerusalem Post December 29 article is cited as indicating Mossad’s deep involvement, and Trump and Pompeo are portrayed as openly backing the regime-change effort. There are other signals discussed: 40,000 Starlink terminals supplied to protesters after Iran shut down the Internet; Qatar and India issuing warnings to their citizens to leave the region; and an Israeli plane movement described as signaling preparation for potential action. Speaker 1 (Danny) and Speaker 2 (Lindsey Graham) are referenced to illustrate mainstream political support for regime change and the belief that the plan is underway, with Graham saying it would be the biggest change in the Middle East in a thousand years if successful. Pompeo is shown as publicly celebrating Mossad agents “beside them.” Stubtack downplays Graham’s credibility but emphasizes Pompeo’s statements as the more consequential evidence. In discussing current capabilities and risks, Stubtack notes that American combat power in the region has diminished since June 2025, though the U.S. could still strike. He emphasizes that Iranian ballistic missiles, which became more effective later in the June 12-day war, could overwhelm defenses, and that Iran has threatened retaliation against both Israel and U.S. bases. He highlights three key deterrents: Iran shutting down the Straits of Hormuz, the limited ability of U.S. and Israeli defenses to stop Iranian missiles from hitting Israel, and the question of what military action would actually achieve—arguing that past strikes would likely rally the Iranian population and fail to produce regime change. Stubtack contends the four-point plan has failed in practice, making continued military action a cockamamie idea. He suggests the real aim for the United States and Israel is to wreck Iran and break it apart, similar to their approach in Syria, rather than to foster liberal democracy. He argues the Israelis are committed to eradicating serious threats to their existence, and that the United States and Israel operate as a tag team in the region. On diplomacy, Stubtack posits that a negotiated deal could be possible—resembling the JCPOA in preventing Iran from weaponizing its enrichment program and allowing for improved relations with both Israel and the United States—though he stresses Iran would not abandon enrichment entirely and would resist giving up nuclear capabilities completely. He notes that even with diplomacy, Iran and Israel might still have tensions, but a workable modus vivendi could exist. Looking ahead five years, Stubtack predicts the regime will likely remain in place in Iran, Israel will likely be more hawkish, and the United States will stay closely aligned with Israel. He suggests Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah will persist as threats, and questions whether Iran will acquire nuclear weapons—arguing that if Iran had them earlier, U.S. and Israeli pressure might have been different. He leaves open the possibility of diplomacy but remains skeptical of a peaceful, full resolution in the near term.

The speaker claims there was a joint CIA-Mossad operation that began on December 28 during Volodymyr Zelensky’s meeting with Donald Trump, and twenty-four hours before Trump sat down with Benjamin Netanyahu. The intelligence agencies allegedly devised a plan to crash the Iranian currency to ignite protests against the government. The speaker asserts that this was not organic, citing George Soros as having done something similar to the UK a few years earlier, implying that the intelligence community with the backing of the US Treasury could do it to Iran as well. It is claimed that the Western narrative portrayed the protests as spontaneous and rooted in opposition to the regime, while the speaker asserts that prepositioned Starlink terminals, arranged through Elon Musk, were used to support the protests. These terminals, the speaker says, did not appear spontaneously; they were purchased through the intelligence community and distributed through intelligence networks to individuals inside Iran, including Kurds, the Mujahideen al Khal, Baluchis, Azeris, and others, who were opposed to the government. These actors allegedly received weapons, ammunition, and money, and coordinated attacks that continued until about late last Thursday or early Friday morning Iran time. According to the speaker, Russia’s electronic warfare helped disrupt the protests by tracking down and disrupting the Internet and shutting down the Starlink system, which eliminated the protesters’ ability to organize and coordinate. Iranian security services then moved in and began taking down protesters. The speaker asserts that all of this was planned to coincide with certain events, and implies that if the disruption had not occurred last Friday, it would have culminated on Tuesday with a US military strike believed to have brought about a collapse of the government, with stories that the MOLAs (mullahs) were going to flee to Moscow. The disruption, the speaker says, prevented the strike, and Trump reportedly called off the attack. The speaker concludes that the United States intends to strike Iran, and that the attack is expected to take place later in February or March.

The conversation centers on Iran’s current crisis and the likelihood, timing, and aims of potential U.S. and Israeli actions against Iran. The speakers discuss whether protests inside Iran are driving any attack plans or if those plans were made beforehand, and what the objectives might be if war occurs. Key points and claims, preserved as stated: - The Iranian regime is described as facing its worst crisis since 1979, with reports of thousands dead, and questions about whether the U.S. and possibly Israel will strike Iran, and what their objectives would be (regime change vs installing a new leader under the supreme leader). - The interviewer introduces Trita Parsi, noting his nuanced, non-dual position and his personal history of fleeing Iran around the revolution. - The analysts discuss whether a war plan against Iran existed before the protests; Speaker 1 (Parsi) argues the plan was made prior to the protests and that the protests did not cause the decision. He says the Israelis intended to provoke the U.S. into war, but the sequence shifted so the United States would lead with Israel in a supporting role. He notes Netanyahu’s unusual quiet and suggests a deliberate effort to present this as Trump’s war, not Israel’s, though he believes the plan originated in Washington in late December at the White House. - The protests are said to be organic and not instigated from abroad, with possible slight slowing of plans due to the protests. The rationale for striking Iran initially emphasized Israeli concerns about Iranian missile capabilities and their potential rebuilding of missiles and, ambiguously, nuclear ambitions; there was no credible media evidence presented to support new nuclear development claims, according to Speaker 1. - The justification for an attack is viewed as a pretext tied to “unfinished business,” with the broader aim of addressing Iran’s missile program and perceived threats, rather than the protests alone. The discussion notes that pro-Iran regime factions in the U.S. may find protests more persuasive among centrist Democrats, but less so among MAGA or core Trump supporters. - The origins of the protests are described as organic, driven by currency collapse and sanctions, which Speaker 1 connects to decades of sanctions and the economic crisis in Iran. He states sanctions were designed to produce desperation to create a window for outside intervention, though he emphasizes this does not mean the protests are purely externally driven. - The role of sanctions is elaborated: Pompeo’s “maximum pressure” statement is cited as intentional to create conditions for regime change, with Speaker 0 highlighting the destruction of Iran’s economy as a method to weaken the regime and empower opposition. Speaker 1 agrees the sanctions contributed to economic distress but stresses that the protests’ roots are broader than the economy alone. - The discussion considers whether the protests could be used to justify external action and whether a regional or global backlash could ensue, including refugee flows and regional instability affecting Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and GCC states. It’s noted that the U.S. and some regional actors would prefer to avoid a total collapse of Iran, while Israel would welcome greater upheaval if it constrains Iranian capabilities. - The question of a power vacuum inside Iran is addressed. Speaker 1 argues there is no obvious internal opposition strong enough to quickly replace the regime; MeK is excluded as a coalition partner in current Iran opposition movements. The Pahlavi (Reza Pallavi) faction is discussed as a possible figurehead outside Iran, with debate about his domestic support. The MEK is described as outside any coalition due to its history. - Pallavi’s potential role: Speaker 1 suggests Pallavi has gained closer ties with Israel and some pro-Israel circles in Washington, but emphasizes that domestic support inside Iran remains uncertain and difficult to gauge. Pallavi says he would seek a democratically elected leader if the regime falls; Speaker 1 cautions that words alone are insufficient without proven ability to secure loyalty from security forces and to persuade key societal sectors. - The Shah’s legacy and comparison: The Shah’s regime is described as highly repressive but comparatively more open socially and economically, though with a discredited political system. The current regime disperses power within a more complex system where the supreme leader is central but not incomparable to past autocrats. - The potential for separatism and regional spillover is discussed, including Kurdish separatism in western Iran. Speaker 1 clarifies that the Kurdish group is not part of the protests but a separate element taking advantage of the situation; the risk of civil war if the state collapses is acknowledged as a nightmare scenario. - The possibility of a Maduro-like approach (managed transition through elite elements) is considered. While channels of communication exist, Speaker 1 doubts the same dynamics as Venezuela; Iran lacks internal continuity in the security establishment, making a similar path unlikely. - Military retaliation dynamics are examined: Iran’s response to limited U.S. strikes could be symbolic or broader, including potential strikes on U.S. bases in the region. The possibility that Israel would push the United States to target Iran’s military capabilities rather than just decapitation is discussed, with notes about potential after-effects and regional reactions. - The 12-day war context and Iran’s current military capabilities: There is debate about whether Iran’s military could be a greater threat to U.S. bases than previously believed and about how easily Iranian missile launches could be located and neutralized. - The closing forecast: The likely trajectory depends on the next few days. A limited, negotiated strike could lead to negotiations and a transformed regime with lifted sanctions, perhaps avoiding a wholesale regime change; a more aggressive or decapitating approach could provoke substantial instability and regional repercussions. The conversation ends with a personal note of concern for Parsi’s family in Iran. - Final reflection: The interview ends with expressions of concern for family safety and a mutual appreciation for the discussion.

Speaker 0 describes the events as “a classic regime change color revolution destabilization operation.” He asserts that “the military strike was being prepared in advance,” and that “the violence that they carried out” was carried out by “agent provocateurs managed and inserted by US and Israeli intelligence,” with British intelligence also involved. He adds that “when it comes to Iran, The United States and Britain are hand in hand since the first coup in Iran, which was a US British operation.” He further claims that Iranians who supported the shah “fled to The US, to Europe, to Canada, where they've set themselves up,” and that “nearly all of whom are quite wealthy,” consisting of monarchists who have been “looked after very well by the US government.” He says the US regards them as a “fifth column that they can deploy during times like this.” The speaker extends the accusation to other conflicts, stating that the US keeps “Syrian fifth column, an Afghan, an Iraqi, a Libyan fifth column,” and that wherever there’s a war, “The US and the British, the Canadians, they keep them in residence, and they use them either to create the future political class that they'll then parachute in.” He describes this as part of “the neocolonial system.” He concedes that “it didn't work out, but it was ugly.” Regarding information warfare, he criticizes the mainstream media, politicians, and “these so called influencers,” describing their misinformation and propaganda campaign as “even uglier.” He emphasizes that “this is not the first go around,” claiming they have “been doing this perpetually for years,” with the aim of creating unrest and instability and momentum. He explains a sequence they allegedly seek: if they can obtain momentum, it is followed by “a military strike, and then a decapitation of the leadership, and then regime change, hopefully.” He concludes that “so it didn't work out.”