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Россия поддерживает инициативу Председателя Си Цзиньпина и заинтересована приступить к конкретному обсуждению предложений наших китайских друзей. И думается, что именно ШОС могла бы взять на себя лидирующую роль в формировании в мире более справедливой и равноправной системы глобального управления, основанной на примате международного права и ключевых положениях Устава ООН, быть подлинно сбалансированной и учитывать интересы широкого круга стран, гарантируя возможности для их устойчивого развития и безопасности. Russia supports the initiative of Chairman Xi Jinping and is interested in beginning concrete discussions of the proposals expressed by our Chinese friends. It is thought that the SCO could take a leading role in forming a more just and equal system of global governance, based on the primacy of international law and the key provisions of the UN Charter, truly balanced and taking into account the interests of a broad circle of countries, and guaranteeing opportunities for their sustainable development and security.

The authority and the influence of this group is rising with every year. And BRICS is now one of the key groups, key organizations in the world, and our voice is heard loudly across the international arena.

Russian and Belarusian leaders agreed to approve decisive steps to deepen integration in socio-economic and humanitarian spheres. They marked eightieth anniversaries of the Leningrad blockade’s lifting, Belarus’s liberation, and the victory in the Great Patriotic War, and moved their work to Petersburg. They highlighted 28 union programs unifying law and economy, rising mutual trade (up almost 9.5%) nearing $43 billion, and over $4 billion of Russian investment with about 2,400 Russian companies in Belarus. The Belarusian nuclear power plant (completed 2023) and a cosmonaut training for the ISS were cited. A new Union State strategy through 2035 focuses on technological sovereignty and import substitution, alongside foreign-policy coordination through 2026 and a push for a multipolar world with equal security. The agenda includes 15 items, a planned Oktyabrskaya Railway upgrade, and the Vidybsk Forum in June.

"We should advocate for an equal and orderly, multipolar world, and a universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization, and make the global governance system more just and equitable." Leaders from across The Middle East and Asia gathered in a huge building, 'they boast that they represent nearly 50% of the world's population.' The enduring image was of three of the world's largest countries—Russia, China, and India—looking cordial, with Putin and Modi 'sharing a laugh with the Chinese leader on the sidelines, really almost literally rubbing shoulders.' Modi's first trip to China in seven years. As the summit wrapped up, the gathering signaled 'a time of global uncertainty,' with calls for some kind of newer, fairer system of government. They criticized 'a world order that's been dominated too much by The US since the collapse of the Soviet Union.'

Our meeting allowed a comprehensive review of the entire gamut of India Russia bilateral relations. We believe that the relations between India and Russia have been among the steadiest of the major relationships in the world after the second world war. We reaffirmed our shared ambition to expand bilateral trade in a balanced and sustainable manner, by increasing India's exports to Russia. This requires swiftly addressing non tariff barriers and regulatory impediments. Enhancing Indian exports to Russia and sectors like pharmaceuticals, agriculture, and textiles will certainly help to correct the current imbalance. Steps to ensure long term supply of fertilizers was also taken up. The two the opening of two new Indian consulates in Kazan and Ekaterinburg need to be fast tracked. On global and multilateral cooperation, we reaffirmed our shared commitment to reform of global governance. On regional issues, we discussed developments in Ukraine, West Asia, Middle East, Afghanistan.

Yesterday, I addressed the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, emphasizing the importance of significantly reducing our country's accumulated net emissions by 2050 in the context of social and economic development. I also mentioned considering preferential treatment for foreign entities. It is crucial to highlight that Russia is genuinely interested in enhancing international cooperation.

Ashwin Rutansi hosts Going Underground from Dubai, discussing the World Government Summit in the UAE, which brought together 6,000 attendees, 35 heads of state, ministers, and leaders from civil society, academia, and business. The conversation centers on BRICS, its role on the world stage, and tensions in the region amid US naval activity in the Gulf. Victoria Panova, head of BRICS Expert Council (Russia), vice director of HSE University, and Sherpa of the G20 advisory group for Russia, shares her impressions and analysis. Panova’s first impression of the summit is the remarkable diversity and high level of organization, with attendees from various paths of life and countries, creating a vibrant environment for dialogue. She notes the forum’s focus on AI and technological challenges, even as regional security concerns linger behind the scenes due to US carrier presence and broader tensions in the region. She observes dual-use nature of AI and weapons and questions why security issues are not more openly addressed, pointing to the UN Security Council’s blockages and the existence of a “peace council” that is not fully formed. Discussing BRICS members and expansion, Panova explains that UAE and Iran are among the newer members and emphasizes BRICS’ need to demonstrate capacity during “count times.” She outlines the original six invited countries and the current mix of members, partners, and invited states, noting Argentina’s initial interest and its later hesitation. The question of why Saudi Arabia is not a full member while UAE and Iran are is explained in terms of historical invitations, internal Brazilian debates, and consensus-based BRICS governance, which requires broad agreement rather than unilateral action. Panova highlights the New Development Bank (NDB) as BRICS’ key financial instrument, distinguished by its lack of Western member states and absence of political conditionalities, although she acknowledges its current smaller scale and ongoing need for growth. Dilma Rousseff is noted as head of the NDB, with Putin’s influence cited in ensuring continuity of leadership. The discussion touches on Venezuela’s BRICS status, Maduro’s kidnapping incident, and the Brazilian veto influenced by internal Brazilian opinions and Mato Grosso considerations, with the BRICS civil council issuing a declaration in support of Maduro, though BRICS itself remains constrained by consensus requirements. On global order and currency systems, Panova argues that BRICS aims to reduce dependence on the dollar, noting that non-dollar trade is already significant (e.g., Brazil-China trade where 48% is non-dollar, Russia-India trade using rubles and renminbi). She emphasizes that while the dirham in Dubai is pegged to the dollar, BRICS members seek to diversify payment systems and currencies, including potential BRICS digital currency discussions at the sherpa level, with the first sherpa meeting in February to set detailed priorities. The dialogue also considers Donald Trump’s impact on BRICS. Panova suggests Trump’s stance against BRICS aligns with de-dollarization efforts and the pursuit of independent payment systems, although she acknowledges that Trump has used sanctions as bargaining leverage and that BRICS seeks to strengthen collective action rather than rely on any single country. The interview closes with expectations for India-hosted sherpas and the lead-up to the BRICS leaders’ summit, underscoring BRICS’ evolving role as a potential counterweight to Western-dominated institutions. Overall, the discussion emphasizes BRICS’ pursuit of financial autonomy, diversified currencies, and enhanced global influence through structured diplomacy, expansion, and alternative development financing, set against ongoing regional security complexities and Western geopolitical pressures.

Мы уделяем большое внимание увеличению доли национальных валют в торговле и инвестициях, а также разработке безопасных и надёжных финансовых инструментов и механизмов взаимных расчётов. Важной ролью в укреплении межгосударственных связей является налаживание гуманитарных контактов. We place great emphasis on increasing the share of national currencies in trade and investments, as well as on developing safe and reliable financial instruments and mutual settlement mechanisms. A key role in strengthening intergovernmental relations is played by the establishment of humanitarian contacts.

На Валдайском клубе обсуждался “Полицентричный мир: инструкция по применению”. Участники подчеркивали открытое, динамичное внешнеполитическое пространство и необходимость договорённостей, которые устраивают все стороны. Формирование “мирового большинства” через BRICS, SCO и региональные объединения подчёркивает, что решения требуют учёта интересов всех и отказа от односторонности. Россия заявляет, что “запреты не работают” и что безопасность — это “неделимость”. Вопросы Украины, ближнего Востока и угроз со стороны Запада требуют региональных решений и диалога. Россия готова к сотрудничеству с США и Китаем и считает, что полицентризм определяет будущее глобального порядка. "Policentrc world: instructions for use" was the topic at Valdai. Participants stressed an open, dynamic international space and the need for agreements that satisfy all sides. The rise of the "world majority" through BRICS, SCO, and regional unions shows that decisions require accounting for all interests and avoiding one-sidedness. Russia argues that "sanctions don't work" and that security is "indivisible." Ukraine, the Middle East, and Western pressure demand regional, negotiated solutions and dialogue. Russia is ready to work with the US and China, and believes that multipolarity will shape a sustainable global order through broad cooperation rather than coercion.

The discussion centers on India’s position in 2025 amid a shifting international order and U.S. efforts to recalibrate a multipolar world. - The year 2025 is characterized as eventful for India, with the country under pressure to choose a path in a world where power is more distributed. The conversation opens with a framing of the U.S. adjusting to multipolarity, the return of Trump, and various global tensions, noting that India’s role has received relatively less attention. - Speaker 1 reflects that 2025 was not a good year for India. At the start of the year, India expected to remain a fulcrum of U.S. policy to contain China and to shuttle between powers, maintaining a growing trade relationship with China while navigating U.S. pressures. The Trump presidency disrupted this balance. India perceived U.S. interference in its domestic politics, including alleged U.S. fingerprints in color revolutions in Bangladesh and Nepal, and a perception that U.S. entities like the National Endowment for Democracy were involved. The 50% trade tariff on India by the U.S. shocked New Delhi, and Trump’s public and private statements criticizing India complicated the relationship. - The discussion notes India’s sensitivity to becoming overly dependent on the U.S. for strategic protection against China, given Modi’s emphasis on Indian sovereignty and self-reliance. Modi’s perceived humility toward Trump, followed by a cooling of the relationship after Trump’s tariff threats, created a crisis of confidence in the U.S.-India alignment. Modi’s personal interactions with Trump—such as a cordial birthday exchange followed by threats of 100% tariffs on India—were seen as signaling mixed signals from Washington. - India’s options in 2025 include: (1) retrenchment and continuing to seek a balancing act between the U.S., China, and Russia; (2) charting an independent course by strengthening ties within BRICS and the Global South; or (3) aligning more with the U.S. with the hope of future U.S. policy shifts. The economic reality complicates choices: while India’s exports did reasonably well despite tariffs and some FDI, opening Indian dairy and agriculture to the U.S. market would threaten farmers’ livelihoods, potentially destabilizing an electorate sensitive to domestic issues. - There is a broader point about Washington’s approach: demand loyalty from regions and countries while using tariffs and pressure to shape alignment, and Trump’s approach is described as a fear-and-intimidation strategy toward the Global South. - On the China-India axis, the speakers discuss how China’s rise and India’s size create a power disparity that makes simple dominance difficult for either side. India’s strategy involves leveraging BRICS and other forums (including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SCO) to expand multipolar governance and reduce dependence on a single power center. The interlocutors emphasize that BRICS operates by consensus and is not a vetoed UN-style body; thus, it offers a platform where major powers can cooperate without a single dominant voice. - The potential paths for India include growing within BRICS and the Global South, seeking mutual economic advantages, and developing a strategy that reduces vulnerability to U.S. coercion. One line of thought suggests using digital tools to help Indian small and medium-sized enterprises access global markets, and building coalitions using shared developmental and financial needs to negotiate better terms in global trade, similar to how an OPEC-like approach could coordinate commodity pricing for the Global South. - The conversation also touches on border and regional issues: a historical context where Russia resolved border tensions with China via settlements that altered the balance of power; the suggestion that India and China could adopt joint administrative arrangements for disputed border zones to reduce conflict risk and foster cooperation, though this requires careful handling to avoid loss of face for either side. - The role of China is described as patient and multipolar-friendly, seeking to buy more from India and to cultivate mutual trade, while recognizing India’s internal challenges, such as power reliability and structural issues like caste and crony capitalism, which affect India’s ability to produce and export higher-value goods. - The broader takeaway is a vision of a more integrated multipolar Eurasia, where India’s leadership within BRICS/SC0 and its ability to create innovative economic arrangements—such as “resource bourses” or shared supply chains—could alter the balance of power and reduce dependency on U.S. policy dynamics. There is an emphasis on avoiding a new Cold War by fostering dialogue and joint governance mechanisms that include China, India, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, and other Global South actors. - The speakers close with a cautious optimism: 2026 could be better if nations learn to push back against coercive power, redefine security around development and governance rather than force, and pursue multipolar institutions that preserve autonomy while enabling peaceful competition. The expectation is that seeds of hope exist within these analyses, even as the present year has been challenging.

The discussion touches on the IMF, the World Bank, and BRICS institutions. The speaker notes they did not manage to meet Kristalina Georgieva, the IMF managing director, or Ajay Banga, the World Bank president, and questions the World Bank and IMF’s importance relative to BRICS. The point is made that the NDB’s rise alongside BRICS is precisely because the World Bank and IMF are not performing their tasks, and that BRICS also has substantial work to do. When the NDB was launched, it was described as complementary to the World Bank, a New to World Development Bank of BRICS—“New,” emphasizing national rather than a single nation identity. In addition, the contingency reserve arrangement (CRA) is discussed as an instrument to be similar to the IMF, intended to provide bailout support during financial problems. The speaker mentions that several experts have conducted seven tests of the CRA so far, all successful, but it has not moved into practical use. There is a claim from experts that the BRICS CRA should have come to the rescue of Argentina, which allegedly faced pressures from IMF policies that eroded the country further. This is presented as a key aspect of the discussion. A reference is made to John Perkins, described as the IMF whistleblower, who has discussed how the NDB would not operate as a “torture, bad cop, good cop” system alongside the IMF and World Bank, which allegedly historically used death squads to destroy livelihoods in the global South. The speaker echoes that sentiment by stating, “the NDB is not gonna be anything like a torture, bad cop, good cop system with the IMF and World Bank using death squads to destroy the livelihoods of millions of people in the global South, which is the record of the IMF and World Bank.” The claim emphasizes the NDB’s potential divergence from that pattern. The NDB is described as still too small, with much work remaining. Its biggest achievement cited is that it is the only transnational international bank without any Western country as a member; it includes only BRICS members. It is noted that NDB membership is not equal to BRICS membership; it is a commercial bank that operates within the financial system established by the Bretton Woods Institutions, but it does not impose the political conditionalities that have been said to ruin lives. Dilma Rousseff is identified as the head of the NDB, and it is clarified that she “was president of Brazil.” The discussion notes that this is her second term, which was, in fact, suggested by Vladimir Putin to continue in order to avoid divergences that might arise, with Putin suggesting that Dilma continue her duties.

The speakers discuss the idea of a common currency for the BRICS countries, led by China and Russia and potentially backed by gold. They question the realism of Sergei Glasyev's optimism about Russia becoming the third financial power after China and India. However, they emphasize that the BRICS countries are not looking to create a separate economic bloc but rather seek reforms within existing global organizations like the World Health Organization, World Trade Organization, and IMF. They also mention Russia's oil exports to India and the potential impact of a gold-backed BRICS currency on the average person, suggesting it may not have much significance.

In this discussion, the guests analyze the implications of a United States military attack on Venezuela and its broader impact on Latin America, Asia, and the evolving world order. The Chilean ambassador to BRICS describes the event as a historic milestone: it is “the first time we have seen a US military attack on the South American mainland,” differing from past interventions in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. He notes that at a Saturday press conference, President Trump warned Colombia and Mexico that they might be next, and Secretary of State Rubio warned Cuba to watch out. This is presented as potentially the beginning of a larger shift, not an isolated incident like the 1989 invasion of Panama. The ambassador points to Trump’s 2025 national security doctrine, which places the Western Hemisphere at the center of US strategy, marking a significant departure from Bush’s focus on the Middle East and Obama’s pivot to Asia. He argues the motive is not humanitarian or stabilizing Latin America, but subjugation, resource extraction, and domination of governments in the region, a stance he characterizes as an attempt to reassert empire in the Western Hemisphere. On the macro level, the discussion addresses Latin America’s changing economic architecture, including a shift from the United States as the primary trading partner to China as a dominant partner for many countries. The US response, including the Venezuelan action, is framed as a mercantilist impulse to secure resources and influence, rather than a pro-democracy or pro-human rights initiative. The conversation emphasizes that the region’s instability is intertwined with oil, minerals, and strategic resources, and that the US move may be more about controlling these assets than about leaders’ legitimacy. The speakers then examine regional dynamics within Latin America. The region is fragmented, with SELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) weak and unable to unify a response. Some governments—Argentina, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Costa Rica—have openly sided with the US, while others are more cautious about Maduro’s leadership. The ambassador reiterates that Maduro’s regime was unpopular domestically due to authoritarianism and incompetence, yet the US action targets Venezuela’s oil and sovereignty more than Maduro’s personal legitimacy. He suggests that anti-American sentiment could grow across the region, regardless of specific governments. A key theme is the emergence of BRICS as a counterweight to US hegemony. The ambassador notes that Trump has attacked BRICS members—South Africa, Brazil, and India—through trade measures and visa policies, highlighting BRICS’ rise with the New Development Bank and expanding membership (including Indonesia). He argues that BRICS represents a shift toward a multipolar world where the Global South seeks to diversify dependencies and leverage different centers of power. He differentiates BRICS from the Global South, describing BRICS as a forum aligned with Global South demands, while acknowledging that neither China nor Russia are part of the traditional Global South, though China and India are influential within BRICS. The conversation argues for active nonalignment as a guiding principle for the Global South in a multipolar order. The ambassador cites examples like Brazil under Lula who resisted US pressure, and contrasts European concessions in trade deals (e.g., the EU-US golf-course agreement) with the need for greater strategic autonomy. He asserts that Europe’s capitulation has weakened its economic and political independence, while Latin America must avoid overreliance on the US and diversify with China and other partners. He argues that the long-term consequences of US military actions could be counterproductive, weakening US standing and strengthening China’s position by eroding a sense of predictable community in the Americas. In closing, the ambassador emphasizes that the Maduro-led Venezuela episode underscores the rise of Asia, the relative decline and fragmentation of the West, and the importance of multipolarity for smaller and medium-sized states. He reiterates the value of active nonalignment as a compass for Latin America, Africa, and Asia in navigating a turbulent, power-shifting world. He and the host note that the discussion will extend to the ambassador’s work on active nonalignment and BRICS, with a link to his writings provided.

We would be ready to offer our American partners, including administrative, governmental structures, and companies, to work together. We have far more resources of this kind than Ukraine. Russia is a leader in reserves of these rare and rare earth metals, located in the north in Murmansk, in the Caucasus in Kabardino-Balkaria, in the Far East, in the Irkutsk region, in Yakutia, and in Tyva. These are capital-intensive investment projects. We would be happy to work with any foreign partners, including American ones, and on new territories as well. We are ready to involve foreign partners in our newly acquired historical territories, which have been returned to the Russian Federation, as there are certain reserves there too. We are ready to collaborate with our partners, including American ones.

Energy demands are growing, and that includes the Chinese economy, which is still one of the locomotives of global economic development, over 5% growth. And we're seeing increased demand for energy resources. There is objective demand, there are concrete capabilities and supply capacities. We finally have a consensus among the parties that had been engaged in the talks, and it's not charity from either side. We're talking about mutually beneficial agreements based on market principles. And the energy prices involved are shaped not based on the prices of today, but rather on a specific formula that is calculated based on objective factors and market considerations. Gazprom is a leading company. It's now expanding to new markets. We'll have a 50,000,000,000 from Mongolia. Now we have 38. And all in all, it will be over 100,000,000,000 cubic meters of

Ironically, it’s happening organically outside of BRICS anyway. For example, Enbridge and Brazil trade with China 48% in non-dollar terms. Russia–China trade is 95% in rubles and renminbi. Russia also trades with India similarly. BRICS is not driving this alone; these are individual developments. BRICS, a bit more than a decade ago, was the first to implement a framework agreement between them to move toward using national currencies more. It was still a time of less turbulence in the international scene, and the move was not for each country at once but addressed different pockets of activity. China, at that point, not only advanced this BRICS framework agreement but also struck agreements with 22 countries outside BRICS to use the renminbi. Russia did not abandon the dollar; it started using its own currency and other currencies as well. The aim was not to be against the dollar but to avoid being ordered by others about what they should or should not do. This shift occurred before Trump, though Trump contributed to the trend as well; the speaker notes they cannot simply blame Biden. The era of dollar and SWIFT being used as a weapon began to become explicit. The claim is that the dollar was promoted as a public good available to everyone no matter what happened, and then that expectation was broken. Russia has faced the most sanctions, over 20,000 in total, and the speaker suggests there may be more to come. There is large pressure from the US on each country. The UAE is mentioned as being cautious about moving too far, but each BRICS member now understands that this could be turned against them as well. That awareness is driving the direction toward greater use of national currencies and non-dollar transactions.

BRICS will continue to expand and may announce a new currency or trading system to counteract the American-led system. BRICS doesn't have to replace the dollar, it just has to threaten it, as finance is based on confidence. Putin will maintain a close relationship with China; he needs China to remain neutral so Russia can pressure the American empire. Over the next few years, the Ukraine war will continue without expanding. Iran will take the initiative against the United States. North Korea will become more belligerent, forcing America to focus on East Asia. The relationship between Putin and Xi Jinping will strengthen.

India will decide its own relationships with other countries, including Russia, China, and the United States. India's relationship with China is growing stronger. India is not required to halt its relationship with China because of Donald Trump or close ties with the U.S. government. The world is multipolar, not bipolar, and it is not "America first and everybody else last."

The speaker discusses the expansion of the BRICS group, which now includes Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. They argue that the BRICS countries are becoming increasingly influential in the global economy, with a larger share of global GDP and oil production compared to the G7. The speaker also highlights the strategic trade routes controlled by BRICS and their goal of settling trades in local currencies to bypass the US dollar. They emphasize that BRICS aims for economic sovereignty and independence from the US, particularly due to the weaponization of the dollar. The speaker acknowledges that there are challenges to overcome, but believes recent events have motivated BRICS to take action.

The speaker emphasizes the importance of close economic partnership among BRICS countries to advance trade, investment, and cooperation. They claim joint BRICS efforts expedite social and economic growth and ensure sustainable development, improving prosperity and living standards. The speaker states the BRICS aggregate GDP amounts to over $60 trillion USD. They further claim its overall share in the global GDP strongly exceeds that of the G7 and continues to grow.

Tomorrow, the BRICS summit begins in South Africa, marking a significant moment in the shift of global power. The agenda includes discussions on currency, trade, military cooperation, AI, microchips, and infrastructure. The BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) are poised to dominate the global economy, with Goldman Sachs predicting their dominance by 2050. The United States, Britain, and Germany are notably absent from the summit. The focus is on reducing reliance on the US dollar as a reserve currency, with a gold-backed currency being introduced. Additionally, BRICS aims to lead in AI, with China already declaring its ambition to become the global leader by 2030.

We will discuss the entry of new countries and I believe that if they comply with the established rules, we will accept their entry. Our president, Luiz Inácio Lourenço, has traveled to Saudi Arabia and I support the idea of having our own currency for trade between countries. Why does Brazil need the dollar to trade with China or Argentina? We can use our own currencies. Additionally, I think the BRICS Bank should be more effective and generous than the IMF. The bank exists to help save countries, not to establish them, which is what the IMF often does.

The speaker discusses various points from the BRICS meeting. They mention their support for the open and fair multilateral trading system, as well as a strong global financial safety net centered around the IMF. They also condemn terrorism in all its forms, but the speaker suggests that terrorism is often used as a tool by certain leaders to create problems and justify measures. They mention examples such as the Moscow bombings in 2001 and the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, suggesting involvement by the CIA and British intelligence. The speaker finds it interesting that the BRICS leaders believe in the threat of terrorism despite its alleged manipulation. They briefly mention the Bataclan incident but don't elaborate.

Professor Wang Wen discusses China’s de Americanization as a strategic response to shifts in global power and U.S. policy, not as an outright anti-American project. He outlines six fields of de Americanization that have evolved over seven to eight years: de Americanization of trade, de Americanization of finance, de Americanization of security, demarization of IT knowledge, demarization of high-tech, and demarization of education. He argues the strategy was not China’s initiative but was forced by the United States. Key motivations and timeline - Since China’s reform and opening, China sought a friendly relationship with the U.S., inviting American investment, expanding trade, and learning from American management and financial markets. By 2002–2016, about 20% of China’s trade depended on the United States. The U.S. containment policy, including the Trump administration’s trade war, Huawei actions, and sanctions on Chinese firms, prompted China to respond with countermeasures and adjustments. - A 2022 New York Times piece, cited by Wang, notes that Chinese people have awakened about U.S. hypocrisy and the dangers of relying on the United States. He even states that Trump’s actions educated Chinese perspectives on necessary countermeasures to defend core interests, framing de Americanization as a protective response rather than hostility. Global and economic consequences - Diversification of trade: since the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative, China has deepened cooperation with the Global South. Trade with Russia, Central Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia has grown faster than with the United States. Five years ago, China–Russia trade was just over $100 billion; now it’s around $250 billion and could exceed $300 billion in five years. China–Latin America trade has surpassed $500 billion and may overtake the China–U.S. trade in the next five years. The U.S.–China trade volume is around $500 billion this year. - The result is a more balanced and secure global trade structure, with the U.S. remaining important but declining in China’s overall trade landscape. China views its “international price revolution” as raising the quality and affordability of goods for the Global South, such as EVs and solar energy products, enabling developing countries to access better products at similar prices. - The U.S. trade war is seen as less successful from China’s perspective because America’s share of China’s trade has fallen from about 20% to roughly 9%. Financial and monetary dimensions - In finance, China has faced over 2,000 U.S. sanctions on Chinese firms in the past seven years, which has spurred dedollarization and efforts to reform international payment systems. Wang argues that dollar hegemony harms the global system and predicts dedollarization and RMB internationalization will expand, with the dollar’s dominance continuing to wane by 2035 as more countries reduce dependence on U.S. currency. Technological rivalry - China’s rise as a technology power is framed as a normal, market-based competition. The U.S. should not weaponize financial or policy instruments to curb China’s development, nor should it fear fair competition. He notes that many foundational technologies (papermaking, the compass, gunpowder) originated in China, and today China builds on existing technologies, including AI and high-speed rail, while denying accusations of coercive theft. - The future of tech competition could benefit humanity if managed rationally, with multiple centers of innovation rather than a single hegemon. The U.S. concern about losing its lead is framed as a driver of misallocations and “malinvestments” in AI funding. Education and culture - Education is a key battleground in de Americanization. China aims to shift from dependence on U.S.-dominated knowledge systems to a normal, China-centered educational ecosystem with autonomous textbooks and disciplinary systems. Many Chinese students studied abroad, especially in the U.S., but a growing number now stay home or return after training. Wang highlights that more than 30% of Silicon Valley AI scientists hold undergraduate degrees from China, illustrating the reverse brain drain benefiting China. - The aim is not decoupling but a normal relationship with the U.S.—one in which China maintains its own knowledge system while continuing constructive cooperation where appropriate. Concluding metaphor - Wang uses the “normal neighbors” metaphor: the U.S. and China should avoid military conflict and embrace a functional, non-dependence-oriented, neighborly relationship rather than an unbalanced marriage, recognizing that diversification and multipolarity can strengthen global resilience. He also warns against color revolutions and NGO-driven civil-society manipulation, advocating for a Japan-like, balanced approach to democracy and civil society that respects national contexts.