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Россия поддерживает инициативу Председателя Си Цзиньпина и заинтересована приступить к конкретному обсуждению предложений наших китайских друзей. И думается, что именно ШОС могла бы взять на себя лидирующую роль в формировании в мире более справедливой и равноправной системы глобального управления, основанной на примате международного права и ключевых положениях Устава ООН, быть подлинно сбалансированной и учитывать интересы широкого круга стран, гарантируя возможности для их устойчивого развития и безопасности. Russia supports the initiative of Chairman Xi Jinping and is interested in beginning concrete discussions of the proposals expressed by our Chinese friends. It is thought that the SCO could take a leading role in forming a more just and equal system of global governance, based on the primacy of international law and the key provisions of the UN Charter, truly balanced and taking into account the interests of a broad circle of countries, and guaranteeing opportunities for their sustainable development and security.

The authority and the influence of this group is rising with every year. And BRICS is now one of the key groups, key organizations in the world, and our voice is heard loudly across the international arena.

Russian and Belarusian leaders agreed to approve decisive steps to deepen integration in socio-economic and humanitarian spheres. They marked eightieth anniversaries of the Leningrad blockade’s lifting, Belarus’s liberation, and the victory in the Great Patriotic War, and moved their work to Petersburg. They highlighted 28 union programs unifying law and economy, rising mutual trade (up almost 9.5%) nearing $43 billion, and over $4 billion of Russian investment with about 2,400 Russian companies in Belarus. The Belarusian nuclear power plant (completed 2023) and a cosmonaut training for the ISS were cited. A new Union State strategy through 2035 focuses on technological sovereignty and import substitution, alongside foreign-policy coordination through 2026 and a push for a multipolar world with equal security. The agenda includes 15 items, a planned Oktyabrskaya Railway upgrade, and the Vidybsk Forum in June.

"We should advocate for an equal and orderly, multipolar world, and a universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization, and make the global governance system more just and equitable." Leaders from across The Middle East and Asia gathered in a huge building, 'they boast that they represent nearly 50% of the world's population.' The enduring image was of three of the world's largest countries—Russia, China, and India—looking cordial, with Putin and Modi 'sharing a laugh with the Chinese leader on the sidelines, really almost literally rubbing shoulders.' Modi's first trip to China in seven years. As the summit wrapped up, the gathering signaled 'a time of global uncertainty,' with calls for some kind of newer, fairer system of government. They criticized 'a world order that's been dominated too much by The US since the collapse of the Soviet Union.'

Our meeting allowed a comprehensive review of the entire gamut of India Russia bilateral relations. We believe that the relations between India and Russia have been among the steadiest of the major relationships in the world after the second world war. We reaffirmed our shared ambition to expand bilateral trade in a balanced and sustainable manner, by increasing India's exports to Russia. This requires swiftly addressing non tariff barriers and regulatory impediments. Enhancing Indian exports to Russia and sectors like pharmaceuticals, agriculture, and textiles will certainly help to correct the current imbalance. Steps to ensure long term supply of fertilizers was also taken up. The two the opening of two new Indian consulates in Kazan and Ekaterinburg need to be fast tracked. On global and multilateral cooperation, we reaffirmed our shared commitment to reform of global governance. On regional issues, we discussed developments in Ukraine, West Asia, Middle East, Afghanistan.

Yesterday, I addressed the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, emphasizing the importance of significantly reducing our country's accumulated net emissions by 2050 in the context of social and economic development. I also mentioned considering preferential treatment for foreign entities. It is crucial to highlight that Russia is genuinely interested in enhancing international cooperation.

Ashwin Rutansi hosts Going Underground from Dubai, discussing the World Government Summit in the UAE, which brought together 6,000 attendees, 35 heads of state, ministers, and leaders from civil society, academia, and business. The conversation centers on BRICS, its role on the world stage, and tensions in the region amid US naval activity in the Gulf. Victoria Panova, head of BRICS Expert Council (Russia), vice director of HSE University, and Sherpa of the G20 advisory group for Russia, shares her impressions and analysis. Panova’s first impression of the summit is the remarkable diversity and high level of organization, with attendees from various paths of life and countries, creating a vibrant environment for dialogue. She notes the forum’s focus on AI and technological challenges, even as regional security concerns linger behind the scenes due to US carrier presence and broader tensions in the region. She observes dual-use nature of AI and weapons and questions why security issues are not more openly addressed, pointing to the UN Security Council’s blockages and the existence of a “peace council” that is not fully formed. Discussing BRICS members and expansion, Panova explains that UAE and Iran are among the newer members and emphasizes BRICS’ need to demonstrate capacity during “count times.” She outlines the original six invited countries and the current mix of members, partners, and invited states, noting Argentina’s initial interest and its later hesitation. The question of why Saudi Arabia is not a full member while UAE and Iran are is explained in terms of historical invitations, internal Brazilian debates, and consensus-based BRICS governance, which requires broad agreement rather than unilateral action. Panova highlights the New Development Bank (NDB) as BRICS’ key financial instrument, distinguished by its lack of Western member states and absence of political conditionalities, although she acknowledges its current smaller scale and ongoing need for growth. Dilma Rousseff is noted as head of the NDB, with Putin’s influence cited in ensuring continuity of leadership. The discussion touches on Venezuela’s BRICS status, Maduro’s kidnapping incident, and the Brazilian veto influenced by internal Brazilian opinions and Mato Grosso considerations, with the BRICS civil council issuing a declaration in support of Maduro, though BRICS itself remains constrained by consensus requirements. On global order and currency systems, Panova argues that BRICS aims to reduce dependence on the dollar, noting that non-dollar trade is already significant (e.g., Brazil-China trade where 48% is non-dollar, Russia-India trade using rubles and renminbi). She emphasizes that while the dirham in Dubai is pegged to the dollar, BRICS members seek to diversify payment systems and currencies, including potential BRICS digital currency discussions at the sherpa level, with the first sherpa meeting in February to set detailed priorities. The dialogue also considers Donald Trump’s impact on BRICS. Panova suggests Trump’s stance against BRICS aligns with de-dollarization efforts and the pursuit of independent payment systems, although she acknowledges that Trump has used sanctions as bargaining leverage and that BRICS seeks to strengthen collective action rather than rely on any single country. The interview closes with expectations for India-hosted sherpas and the lead-up to the BRICS leaders’ summit, underscoring BRICS’ evolving role as a potential counterweight to Western-dominated institutions. Overall, the discussion emphasizes BRICS’ pursuit of financial autonomy, diversified currencies, and enhanced global influence through structured diplomacy, expansion, and alternative development financing, set against ongoing regional security complexities and Western geopolitical pressures.

Мы уделяем большое внимание увеличению доли национальных валют в торговле и инвестициях, а также разработке безопасных и надёжных финансовых инструментов и механизмов взаимных расчётов. Важной ролью в укреплении межгосударственных связей является налаживание гуманитарных контактов. We place great emphasis on increasing the share of national currencies in trade and investments, as well as on developing safe and reliable financial instruments and mutual settlement mechanisms. A key role in strengthening intergovernmental relations is played by the establishment of humanitarian contacts.

На Валдайском клубе обсуждался “Полицентричный мир: инструкция по применению”. Участники подчеркивали открытое, динамичное внешнеполитическое пространство и необходимость договорённостей, которые устраивают все стороны. Формирование “мирового большинства” через BRICS, SCO и региональные объединения подчёркивает, что решения требуют учёта интересов всех и отказа от односторонности. Россия заявляет, что “запреты не работают” и что безопасность — это “неделимость”. Вопросы Украины, ближнего Востока и угроз со стороны Запада требуют региональных решений и диалога. Россия готова к сотрудничеству с США и Китаем и считает, что полицентризм определяет будущее глобального порядка. "Policentrc world: instructions for use" was the topic at Valdai. Participants stressed an open, dynamic international space and the need for agreements that satisfy all sides. The rise of the "world majority" through BRICS, SCO, and regional unions shows that decisions require accounting for all interests and avoiding one-sidedness. Russia argues that "sanctions don't work" and that security is "indivisible." Ukraine, the Middle East, and Western pressure demand regional, negotiated solutions and dialogue. Russia is ready to work with the US and China, and believes that multipolarity will shape a sustainable global order through broad cooperation rather than coercion.

The discussion centers on India’s position in 2025 amid a shifting international order and U.S. efforts to recalibrate a multipolar world. - The year 2025 is characterized as eventful for India, with the country under pressure to choose a path in a world where power is more distributed. The conversation opens with a framing of the U.S. adjusting to multipolarity, the return of Trump, and various global tensions, noting that India’s role has received relatively less attention. - Speaker 1 reflects that 2025 was not a good year for India. At the start of the year, India expected to remain a fulcrum of U.S. policy to contain China and to shuttle between powers, maintaining a growing trade relationship with China while navigating U.S. pressures. The Trump presidency disrupted this balance. India perceived U.S. interference in its domestic politics, including alleged U.S. fingerprints in color revolutions in Bangladesh and Nepal, and a perception that U.S. entities like the National Endowment for Democracy were involved. The 50% trade tariff on India by the U.S. shocked New Delhi, and Trump’s public and private statements criticizing India complicated the relationship. - The discussion notes India’s sensitivity to becoming overly dependent on the U.S. for strategic protection against China, given Modi’s emphasis on Indian sovereignty and self-reliance. Modi’s perceived humility toward Trump, followed by a cooling of the relationship after Trump’s tariff threats, created a crisis of confidence in the U.S.-India alignment. Modi’s personal interactions with Trump—such as a cordial birthday exchange followed by threats of 100% tariffs on India—were seen as signaling mixed signals from Washington. - India’s options in 2025 include: (1) retrenchment and continuing to seek a balancing act between the U.S., China, and Russia; (2) charting an independent course by strengthening ties within BRICS and the Global South; or (3) aligning more with the U.S. with the hope of future U.S. policy shifts. The economic reality complicates choices: while India’s exports did reasonably well despite tariffs and some FDI, opening Indian dairy and agriculture to the U.S. market would threaten farmers’ livelihoods, potentially destabilizing an electorate sensitive to domestic issues. - There is a broader point about Washington’s approach: demand loyalty from regions and countries while using tariffs and pressure to shape alignment, and Trump’s approach is described as a fear-and-intimidation strategy toward the Global South. - On the China-India axis, the speakers discuss how China’s rise and India’s size create a power disparity that makes simple dominance difficult for either side. India’s strategy involves leveraging BRICS and other forums (including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SCO) to expand multipolar governance and reduce dependence on a single power center. The interlocutors emphasize that BRICS operates by consensus and is not a vetoed UN-style body; thus, it offers a platform where major powers can cooperate without a single dominant voice. - The potential paths for India include growing within BRICS and the Global South, seeking mutual economic advantages, and developing a strategy that reduces vulnerability to U.S. coercion. One line of thought suggests using digital tools to help Indian small and medium-sized enterprises access global markets, and building coalitions using shared developmental and financial needs to negotiate better terms in global trade, similar to how an OPEC-like approach could coordinate commodity pricing for the Global South. - The conversation also touches on border and regional issues: a historical context where Russia resolved border tensions with China via settlements that altered the balance of power; the suggestion that India and China could adopt joint administrative arrangements for disputed border zones to reduce conflict risk and foster cooperation, though this requires careful handling to avoid loss of face for either side. - The role of China is described as patient and multipolar-friendly, seeking to buy more from India and to cultivate mutual trade, while recognizing India’s internal challenges, such as power reliability and structural issues like caste and crony capitalism, which affect India’s ability to produce and export higher-value goods. - The broader takeaway is a vision of a more integrated multipolar Eurasia, where India’s leadership within BRICS/SC0 and its ability to create innovative economic arrangements—such as “resource bourses” or shared supply chains—could alter the balance of power and reduce dependency on U.S. policy dynamics. There is an emphasis on avoiding a new Cold War by fostering dialogue and joint governance mechanisms that include China, India, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, and other Global South actors. - The speakers close with a cautious optimism: 2026 could be better if nations learn to push back against coercive power, redefine security around development and governance rather than force, and pursue multipolar institutions that preserve autonomy while enabling peaceful competition. The expectation is that seeds of hope exist within these analyses, even as the present year has been challenging.

Ajit Doval, China’s Wang Yi, Russia’s Shoigu, Iran’s Nizamapur, and other security officials, including representatives from the United States, met in India’s capital at China-Russia-Iran and U.S. engagement in the same building to discuss the future of global security. Wang Yi told Doval on the record that China supports India in fulfilling its responsibilities as BRICS chair, with Ali Mohammed Hamad al-Shamsi also present. Modi met separately with an Iranian Supreme National Security Council official, with direct communication between Delhi and Tehran as Modi had been invited to attend the state funeral of Ali Khamenei, killed in February. The transcript also notes Pazheshkin’s first foreign trip since the Epstein War began, with a flight to Pakistan where he embraced Shehbaz Sharif on the tarmac and thanked him for brokering a memorandum of understanding. The program characterizes the overall picture from Delhi to Islamabad as “simultaneity,” with rivals in the same rooms and crises unfolding on the same timeline. Commodore Uday Bhaskar says the BRICS forum has become a very important platform for India, with India currently chairing and the National Security Advisors meeting concluding alongside a BRICS energy ministers meeting in Gurugram. He contrasts BRICS with “disarray” in other credible global platforms, arguing BRICS has emerged as a relatively credible and objective platform bringing major global issues to the table. He explains why public announcements emphasized counter-terrorism and related issues rather than criticizing the United States: BRICS arrived at a consensus not to make statements critical of the United States regarding recent events in West Asia, with divergent views prompting focus on “second tier” security concerns such as terrorism and related issues. A second public focus was new technologies, AI, and impacts on internal security and stability. He adds that decisions and statements were linked to preparations for India’s September BRICS summit, with private discussions taking place, including meetings Modi held with officials in Delhi. On U.S. actions described in the transcript as economic warfare and missile attacks killing Indian seafarers, Bhaskar says India internalized the need to discuss difficult issues in private rather than on public platforms despite active social media by both Trump and Modi. He describes anger in India after the seafarers’ deaths but says the issue was raised through foreign minister-level diplomacy and then by Modi meeting Trump. He also references a previous turbulence in bilateral relations after an Operation Sindur conclusion described as framed by Trump. The discussion then focuses on Iran and Pakistan as intermediaries. Bhaskar says Pakistan has emerged as an accepted mediator for stops between the United States and Iran, and that optics and signals—including Modi’s Israel visit two days before the start of the APIC’s theory—tilted India more toward the United States and Israel at that point. He says the India-Iran relationship was affected by U.S. actions including torpedoing an Iranian ship returning toward Vishakhapatnam. Despite this, he states India has not given up on Chabahar, calling it a very important project and strategic investment, even if it has been on the back burner due to U.S. sanctions on Iran. When asked about sanctions, Bhaskar says India did an assessment of cost and benefit regarding maintaining the relationship with the United States and that India was willing to go along with U.S. recommendations on Iran, reducing oil imports from Iran in particular, which led to slowing Chabahar-related efforts. He says BRICS security discussions dwelled on Ukraine and West Asia and noted existing multilateral platforms are not working, implying BRICS could offer an alternative, possibly at the September summit. He adds that India would pick up relations with Tehran due to geography, Iran’s role as a neighbor and hydrocarbons supplier, and expectations about Iran rebuilding infrastructure over the next two or three years, though he characterizes U.S.-Iran arrangements as fragile and the situation as wait-and-watch. The transcript also covers defense and regional security. Bhaskar says BRICS has expanded beyond the original four, with the UAE and other countries joining, and he describes strengthening India-UAE ties, including Indian officers training UAE personnel. He discusses the BrahMos as a joint India-Russia success story and says countries like the UAE view it as an option, reflecting India’s credibility as a military partner. On U.S. strategic posture, he interprets changes like dropping “Indo” from the Indo-Pacific command as domestic and symbolic moves tied to U.S. political priorities and different approach to the Quad, while insisting name changes would not alter geography or operational deployment if required. In viewer questions, the program raises issues of India-UAE trade growth outpacing UAE-U.S. trade and argues the U.S. can enable disallowance via sanctions mechanisms, reputation-damaging efforts, and threats such as asset freezes and halting of arms sales. It also discusses whether controlling the Indian Ocean would require aircraft carriers, contrasting carrier-centric control with sensor networks, underwater drones, and distributed underwater systems, suggesting carrier-based warfare could be obsolete. The segment ends with a viewer-mediated question: whether BRICS should have a maritime security agenda given disruption in West Asian sea lanes, with responses requested on X at neworder_underscore_TV, and a promise to continue tracking shifting global power next Sunday.

The discussion touches on the IMF, the World Bank, and BRICS institutions. The speaker notes they did not manage to meet Kristalina Georgieva, the IMF managing director, or Ajay Banga, the World Bank president, and questions the World Bank and IMF’s importance relative to BRICS. The point is made that the NDB’s rise alongside BRICS is precisely because the World Bank and IMF are not performing their tasks, and that BRICS also has substantial work to do. When the NDB was launched, it was described as complementary to the World Bank, a New to World Development Bank of BRICS—“New,” emphasizing national rather than a single nation identity. In addition, the contingency reserve arrangement (CRA) is discussed as an instrument to be similar to the IMF, intended to provide bailout support during financial problems. The speaker mentions that several experts have conducted seven tests of the CRA so far, all successful, but it has not moved into practical use. There is a claim from experts that the BRICS CRA should have come to the rescue of Argentina, which allegedly faced pressures from IMF policies that eroded the country further. This is presented as a key aspect of the discussion. A reference is made to John Perkins, described as the IMF whistleblower, who has discussed how the NDB would not operate as a “torture, bad cop, good cop” system alongside the IMF and World Bank, which allegedly historically used death squads to destroy livelihoods in the global South. The speaker echoes that sentiment by stating, “the NDB is not gonna be anything like a torture, bad cop, good cop system with the IMF and World Bank using death squads to destroy the livelihoods of millions of people in the global South, which is the record of the IMF and World Bank.” The claim emphasizes the NDB’s potential divergence from that pattern. The NDB is described as still too small, with much work remaining. Its biggest achievement cited is that it is the only transnational international bank without any Western country as a member; it includes only BRICS members. It is noted that NDB membership is not equal to BRICS membership; it is a commercial bank that operates within the financial system established by the Bretton Woods Institutions, but it does not impose the political conditionalities that have been said to ruin lives. Dilma Rousseff is identified as the head of the NDB, and it is clarified that she “was president of Brazil.” The discussion notes that this is her second term, which was, in fact, suggested by Vladimir Putin to continue in order to avoid divergences that might arise, with Putin suggesting that Dilma continue her duties.

The speakers discuss the idea of a common currency for the BRICS countries, led by China and Russia and potentially backed by gold. They question the realism of Sergei Glasyev's optimism about Russia becoming the third financial power after China and India. However, they emphasize that the BRICS countries are not looking to create a separate economic bloc but rather seek reforms within existing global organizations like the World Health Organization, World Trade Organization, and IMF. They also mention Russia's oil exports to India and the potential impact of a gold-backed BRICS currency on the average person, suggesting it may not have much significance.

In this discussion, the guests analyze the implications of a United States military attack on Venezuela and its broader impact on Latin America, Asia, and the evolving world order. The Chilean ambassador to BRICS describes the event as a historic milestone: it is “the first time we have seen a US military attack on the South American mainland,” differing from past interventions in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. He notes that at a Saturday press conference, President Trump warned Colombia and Mexico that they might be next, and Secretary of State Rubio warned Cuba to watch out. This is presented as potentially the beginning of a larger shift, not an isolated incident like the 1989 invasion of Panama. The ambassador points to Trump’s 2025 national security doctrine, which places the Western Hemisphere at the center of US strategy, marking a significant departure from Bush’s focus on the Middle East and Obama’s pivot to Asia. He argues the motive is not humanitarian or stabilizing Latin America, but subjugation, resource extraction, and domination of governments in the region, a stance he characterizes as an attempt to reassert empire in the Western Hemisphere. On the macro level, the discussion addresses Latin America’s changing economic architecture, including a shift from the United States as the primary trading partner to China as a dominant partner for many countries. The US response, including the Venezuelan action, is framed as a mercantilist impulse to secure resources and influence, rather than a pro-democracy or pro-human rights initiative. The conversation emphasizes that the region’s instability is intertwined with oil, minerals, and strategic resources, and that the US move may be more about controlling these assets than about leaders’ legitimacy. The speakers then examine regional dynamics within Latin America. The region is fragmented, with SELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) weak and unable to unify a response. Some governments—Argentina, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Costa Rica—have openly sided with the US, while others are more cautious about Maduro’s leadership. The ambassador reiterates that Maduro’s regime was unpopular domestically due to authoritarianism and incompetence, yet the US action targets Venezuela’s oil and sovereignty more than Maduro’s personal legitimacy. He suggests that anti-American sentiment could grow across the region, regardless of specific governments. A key theme is the emergence of BRICS as a counterweight to US hegemony. The ambassador notes that Trump has attacked BRICS members—South Africa, Brazil, and India—through trade measures and visa policies, highlighting BRICS’ rise with the New Development Bank and expanding membership (including Indonesia). He argues that BRICS represents a shift toward a multipolar world where the Global South seeks to diversify dependencies and leverage different centers of power. He differentiates BRICS from the Global South, describing BRICS as a forum aligned with Global South demands, while acknowledging that neither China nor Russia are part of the traditional Global South, though China and India are influential within BRICS. The conversation argues for active nonalignment as a guiding principle for the Global South in a multipolar order. The ambassador cites examples like Brazil under Lula who resisted US pressure, and contrasts European concessions in trade deals (e.g., the EU-US golf-course agreement) with the need for greater strategic autonomy. He asserts that Europe’s capitulation has weakened its economic and political independence, while Latin America must avoid overreliance on the US and diversify with China and other partners. He argues that the long-term consequences of US military actions could be counterproductive, weakening US standing and strengthening China’s position by eroding a sense of predictable community in the Americas. In closing, the ambassador emphasizes that the Maduro-led Venezuela episode underscores the rise of Asia, the relative decline and fragmentation of the West, and the importance of multipolarity for smaller and medium-sized states. He reiterates the value of active nonalignment as a compass for Latin America, Africa, and Asia in navigating a turbulent, power-shifting world. He and the host note that the discussion will extend to the ambassador’s work on active nonalignment and BRICS, with a link to his writings provided.

Energy demands are growing, and that includes the Chinese economy, which is still one of the locomotives of global economic development, over 5% growth. And we're seeing increased demand for energy resources. There is objective demand, there are concrete capabilities and supply capacities. We finally have a consensus among the parties that had been engaged in the talks, and it's not charity from either side. We're talking about mutually beneficial agreements based on market principles. And the energy prices involved are shaped not based on the prices of today, but rather on a specific formula that is calculated based on objective factors and market considerations. Gazprom is a leading company. It's now expanding to new markets. We'll have a 50,000,000,000 from Mongolia. Now we have 38. And all in all, it will be over 100,000,000,000 cubic meters of

Ironically, it’s happening organically outside of BRICS anyway. For example, Enbridge and Brazil trade with China 48% in non-dollar terms. Russia–China trade is 95% in rubles and renminbi. Russia also trades with India similarly. BRICS is not driving this alone; these are individual developments. BRICS, a bit more than a decade ago, was the first to implement a framework agreement between them to move toward using national currencies more. It was still a time of less turbulence in the international scene, and the move was not for each country at once but addressed different pockets of activity. China, at that point, not only advanced this BRICS framework agreement but also struck agreements with 22 countries outside BRICS to use the renminbi. Russia did not abandon the dollar; it started using its own currency and other currencies as well. The aim was not to be against the dollar but to avoid being ordered by others about what they should or should not do. This shift occurred before Trump, though Trump contributed to the trend as well; the speaker notes they cannot simply blame Biden. The era of dollar and SWIFT being used as a weapon began to become explicit. The claim is that the dollar was promoted as a public good available to everyone no matter what happened, and then that expectation was broken. Russia has faced the most sanctions, over 20,000 in total, and the speaker suggests there may be more to come. There is large pressure from the US on each country. The UAE is mentioned as being cautious about moving too far, but each BRICS member now understands that this could be turned against them as well. That awareness is driving the direction toward greater use of national currencies and non-dollar transactions.

Afshin Rattansi introduces New Order as broadcasting worldwide, including to RT India, focusing on how India and its allies are reshaping the 21st-century geopolitical landscape. The show references reports of a first high-level face-to-face security meeting between the UAE and Iran since the “Epstein War” began against Iran. It also discusses the G7 meeting, branding it “Genocide 7,” and notes that the G7 is hosting India’s longest-serving Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Rattansi turns to Moscow for foreign policy scholar Dr. Andrey Kortunov of the Valdai Discussion Club, asking how to characterize India–Russia relations given that Modi has defied U.S. threats about buying oil from Russia, has connections with Iran, and this week India summoned a U.S. diplomat over “US Navy blockade violence” off the coast of Oman. Dr. Kortunov says the period is important for India’s transition into a “global actor” rather than a regional power, and argues India must now be responsible for “the reproduction of global commons,” requiring an independent foreign policy strategy and responsibility for the emerging global order. He describes India–Russia relations as one of the few major-power relationships that remains stable and predictable amid global instability, emphasizing trust and continuity despite divergences on specific issues. He states that Russia can rely on India and India can rely on Russia. On the Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Support Agreement (RELOS), Dr. Kortunov calls it a rapid and significant development. He says both sides agreed to provide each other access to military infrastructure, expanding mutual outreach. He adds that India could be permanently present in the Arctic region while Russia could gain access to the Indian Ocean, framing this as symbolic and strategically tied to diversifying communication routes and extending presence in remote Eurasian regions. Rattansi raises U.S. concerns and reactions, and Dr. Kortunov argues the United States still views India as a junior partner that will serve U.S. interests in confrontation with China, aiming to break India–Russia ties. He says India is too big to be “hijacked,” and expects India to maintain relations with Russia and Iran even while developing ties with the United States for technology and investment. The discussion then addresses India summoning a U.S. diplomat over an attack on an Indian tanker in the Strait of Hormuz and asks how long India can sustain this while remaining friends with Iran. Dr. Kortunov says the limits of U.S. power matter more than India’s choices. He references Trump granting waivers allowing Russian oil to reach global markets and India to buy Russian oil without secondary sanctions threats, and says it may take time for the U.S. to formally recognize limitations. On future oil waivers, the discussion notes an expiration date of June 17, and it is argued that even without renewed waivers, Russia’s oil would still reach end users due to the global oil market, with the U.S. able to complicate exports but not stop them. On the Quad, Dr. Kortunov frames it primarily as a “China problem,” arguing Russia has little to do with it “at least for the time being.” He says Quad is not an alliance and that its development depends on New Delhi, particularly if India prioritizes cooperation in technologies or logistics. He adds that “Quad II,” involving West Indian Ocean countries, could be shaped by similar limits. After returning to BRICS, Dr. Kortunov says the Trump administration is portrayed as obsessed with BRICS because Trump believes it is anti-American, while Dr. Kortunov argues BRICS is a non-Western group that can offer views on the emerging world order and global financial and trade rules. He says BRICS is diverse and difficult to reach consensus within, giving the example of US–Iran conflict, where both the Islamic Republic of Iran and the UAE are members and are reported to be in talks. He argues Gulf security cannot remain stable without involving Iran, making an “Arab NATO” that contains and deters Iran “not a very promising option.” Rattansi asks about the Russia–Ukraine war and why it has not ended, with Dr. Kortunov saying the dynamic suggests a goal of saving lives and achieving a steady advance in Donbas, while Western support and complications such as Ukrainian drone attacks must be considered. He says both sides believe time benefits them and notes difficulty seeing flexibility from either side. He also responds to claims about the Russian economy, saying similar predictions have been made since the conflict began and that he does not expect immediate collapse, describing “spectacular resilience” and “adaptivity.” The conversation ends with Zahra Khan fielding viewer questions. One asks whether India is changing global politics or playing better; Zahra Khan cites India’s GDP and growth and claims India’s actions—such as summoning U.S. diplomats—demonstrate strategic power. Another asks about Emirates and “shuddering US imperialism,” with discussion connecting UAE–India trade and the UAE’s position within BRICS and as a Shanghai Cooperation Organization dialogue partner. The segment concludes with a viewer question: whether the Ukraine proxy war will end in 2026.

India will decide its own relationships with other countries, including Russia, China, and the United States. India's relationship with China is growing stronger. India is not required to halt its relationship with China because of Donald Trump or close ties with the U.S. government. The world is multipolar, not bipolar, and it is not "America first and everybody else last."

The speaker discusses the expansion of the BRICS group, which now includes Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. They argue that the BRICS countries are becoming increasingly influential in the global economy, with a larger share of global GDP and oil production compared to the G7. The speaker also highlights the strategic trade routes controlled by BRICS and their goal of settling trades in local currencies to bypass the US dollar. They emphasize that BRICS aims for economic sovereignty and independence from the US, particularly due to the weaponization of the dollar. The speaker acknowledges that there are challenges to overcome, but believes recent events have motivated BRICS to take action.

The speaker emphasizes the importance of close economic partnership among BRICS countries to advance trade, investment, and cooperation. They claim joint BRICS efforts expedite social and economic growth and ensure sustainable development, improving prosperity and living standards. The speaker states the BRICS aggregate GDP amounts to over $60 trillion USD. They further claim its overall share in the global GDP strongly exceeds that of the G7 and continues to grow.

Pepe Escobar and Glenn discuss the Iran situation amid escalating US-Israeli pressure and Iran’s response. Key points: - Iran as “the holy grail” in US policy: Iran has long been seen as the ultimate target within a broader project that includes Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran, with the goal of reshaping West Asia and advancing a Greater Israel concept. The project dates back to at least the nineties, with frameworks like the Project for the New American Century and Clean Break cited as influencing DC thinking. - War planning and messaging: The war was described as planned for decades, with Iran identified as the likely target when other measures failed. The Trump administration reportedly pressed forward, and the “barbarian baboon in the White House” metaphor is used to underscore perceived Zionist influence and financial beneficiaries around the war. - Domestic US-financial dynamics: The war’s perceived profitability for insiders is highlighted, naming Jared Kushner, Ivanka Trump, Steve Lutnick, and others as profiting from related moves. The discussion emphasizes that financial markets (bond yields, gold, oil) influence US decisions, with high bond yields constraining US action. - Iranian strategic posture: Iran’s leaders reportedly signaled that there are no conversations with the US at the moment, and that a deal is impossible given the lists of demands from both sides. The Iranians have shifted from defense to offense, with missiles and drones increasingly employed. - Iranian deterrence and capabilities: The talk notes Iran’s use of missiles such as the Khorramshahr 4 and Fateh-2, with added emphasis on underground missile cities in the Sistan Baluchistan region and near the Afghan border. Iran’s deterrence is described as decentralized and mosaic, enabling precise targeting and escalation control. The Iranian approach includes limiting attacks to dual-use civilian infrastructure in Israel while avoiding civilianTargeted attacks in Iran, and threatening Dimona if Natanz is bombed. - Israeli and Iranian targeting: Iran has begun to attack civilian dual-use infrastructure in Israel and is targeting Haifa refineries and military installations near Ben Gurion Airport, while Israel continues to strike near Natanz and other Iranian sites. The balance of escalation is framed as a deterrence dynamic, with both sides escalating in different ways. - International alignment and support: Russia and China are described as backing Iran diplomatically and with intelligence support, including satellite intel and the movement of Iranian Shahids between Russia and Iran. The three BRICS actors—Russia, China, and Iran—are cited as central to a multipolar Eurasian integration project, with BRICS described as currently comatose or nonfunctional due to internal divisions and external pressures (e.g., UAE and India’s actions). - BRICS and SCO status: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization released a weak statement; BRICS is portrayed as having internal problems, with India’s actions, especially in relation to Iran, criticized as betrayals from many countries. Russia and China are positioned as active backers of Iran, while BRICS’s future is uncertain. - Iran’s regional strategy and neighbors: The discussion covers Azerbaijan, Turkey, and India’s roles. Azerbaijan could be drawn into potential conflicts, with Iran warning that involvement could bring severe consequences. Turkey is described as hedging and pursuing its own strategy; Erdogan’s stance is viewed as unreliable. India’s involvement is criticized for inviting Iran to participate in naval exercises and later backing away from condemning US actions against Iran, while still seeking to preserve a Middle East corridor aligned with energy and transport routes. - Long-term outlook: Iran is portrayed as fighting for the global South with Russia and China, challenging Western-dominated orders. The potential for a postwar settlement remains remote, given the Iranians’ demands (no more US bases in West Asia, reparations, no sanctions). Mediation is considered unlikely unless Russia intervenes as a mediator. The conversation concludes with the view that Iran’s resistance, continuity through leadership like the IRGC, and soft-power appeal have changed global perceptions, while the broader Eurasian integration project remains dependent on Iran, Russia, and China. - Closing note: The participants reflect on the costs and uncertainty of the conflict, noting that ending the crisis will require navigating deep geopolitical fault lines, including Azerbaijan and the broader energy architecture of Eurasia.

Tomorrow, the BRICS summit begins in South Africa, marking a significant moment in the shift of global power. The agenda includes discussions on currency, trade, military cooperation, AI, microchips, and infrastructure. The BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) are poised to dominate the global economy, with Goldman Sachs predicting their dominance by 2050. The United States, Britain, and Germany are notably absent from the summit. The focus is on reducing reliance on the US dollar as a reserve currency, with a gold-backed currency being introduced. Additionally, BRICS aims to lead in AI, with China already declaring its ambition to become the global leader by 2030.

We will discuss the entry of new countries and I believe that if they comply with the established rules, we will accept their entry. Our president, Luiz Inácio Lourenço, has traveled to Saudi Arabia and I support the idea of having our own currency for trade between countries. Why does Brazil need the dollar to trade with China or Argentina? We can use our own currencies. Additionally, I think the BRICS Bank should be more effective and generous than the IMF. The bank exists to help save countries, not to establish them, which is what the IMF often does.

Professor Wang Wen discusses China’s de Americanization as a strategic response to shifts in global power and U.S. policy, not as an outright anti-American project. He outlines six fields of de Americanization that have evolved over seven to eight years: de Americanization of trade, de Americanization of finance, de Americanization of security, demarization of IT knowledge, demarization of high-tech, and demarization of education. He argues the strategy was not China’s initiative but was forced by the United States. Key motivations and timeline - Since China’s reform and opening, China sought a friendly relationship with the U.S., inviting American investment, expanding trade, and learning from American management and financial markets. By 2002–2016, about 20% of China’s trade depended on the United States. The U.S. containment policy, including the Trump administration’s trade war, Huawei actions, and sanctions on Chinese firms, prompted China to respond with countermeasures and adjustments. - A 2022 New York Times piece, cited by Wang, notes that Chinese people have awakened about U.S. hypocrisy and the dangers of relying on the United States. He even states that Trump’s actions educated Chinese perspectives on necessary countermeasures to defend core interests, framing de Americanization as a protective response rather than hostility. Global and economic consequences - Diversification of trade: since the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative, China has deepened cooperation with the Global South. Trade with Russia, Central Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia has grown faster than with the United States. Five years ago, China–Russia trade was just over $100 billion; now it’s around $250 billion and could exceed $300 billion in five years. China–Latin America trade has surpassed $500 billion and may overtake the China–U.S. trade in the next five years. The U.S.–China trade volume is around $500 billion this year. - The result is a more balanced and secure global trade structure, with the U.S. remaining important but declining in China’s overall trade landscape. China views its “international price revolution” as raising the quality and affordability of goods for the Global South, such as EVs and solar energy products, enabling developing countries to access better products at similar prices. - The U.S. trade war is seen as less successful from China’s perspective because America’s share of China’s trade has fallen from about 20% to roughly 9%. Financial and monetary dimensions - In finance, China has faced over 2,000 U.S. sanctions on Chinese firms in the past seven years, which has spurred dedollarization and efforts to reform international payment systems. Wang argues that dollar hegemony harms the global system and predicts dedollarization and RMB internationalization will expand, with the dollar’s dominance continuing to wane by 2035 as more countries reduce dependence on U.S. currency. Technological rivalry - China’s rise as a technology power is framed as a normal, market-based competition. The U.S. should not weaponize financial or policy instruments to curb China’s development, nor should it fear fair competition. He notes that many foundational technologies (papermaking, the compass, gunpowder) originated in China, and today China builds on existing technologies, including AI and high-speed rail, while denying accusations of coercive theft. - The future of tech competition could benefit humanity if managed rationally, with multiple centers of innovation rather than a single hegemon. The U.S. concern about losing its lead is framed as a driver of misallocations and “malinvestments” in AI funding. Education and culture - Education is a key battleground in de Americanization. China aims to shift from dependence on U.S.-dominated knowledge systems to a normal, China-centered educational ecosystem with autonomous textbooks and disciplinary systems. Many Chinese students studied abroad, especially in the U.S., but a growing number now stay home or return after training. Wang highlights that more than 30% of Silicon Valley AI scientists hold undergraduate degrees from China, illustrating the reverse brain drain benefiting China. - The aim is not decoupling but a normal relationship with the U.S.—one in which China maintains its own knowledge system while continuing constructive cooperation where appropriate. Concluding metaphor - Wang uses the “normal neighbors” metaphor: the U.S. and China should avoid military conflict and embrace a functional, non-dependence-oriented, neighborly relationship rather than an unbalanced marriage, recognizing that diversification and multipolarity can strengthen global resilience. He also warns against color revolutions and NGO-driven civil-society manipulation, advocating for a Japan-like, balanced approach to democracy and civil society that respects national contexts.