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Nikolay Petro and Gwen were discussing the Munich Security Conference and the broader shift in global order. The core theme is the destruction or breakdown of the post–Cold War order as the world moves toward multipolarity, with the United States and Europe following diverging paths. - The transition to multipolarity is described as chaos and a vacuum of strategic thinking. From a European perspective, this is an unwanted transition into something unfamiliar, while the US debates a more pragmatic approach that may bypass traditional institutions to position itself favorably. The multipolar world would be more democratic, with more voices in actual discussion of each nation’s needs and contributions, in contrast to the hegemonic, rules-based order. - The concept of multipolarity presumes multiple poles of interest. Nations at the top of the old order feel uncomfortable; they had a lead dog (the United States) and knew where they were going. Now the lead dog may be wandering, and the rest are lost. There’s a push to engage voices from the global South, or the global majority, though the term “global South” is viewed as imprecise. - At Munich, Kaia Kallas and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (Mertz) urged order to avoid chaos. Kallas favored restoring or preserving the structures of the past, arguing the European Union should reconnect with the US and dominate collectively as the political West. Mertz used aggressive language, saying Germany’s army must be the most powerful in Europe and that the war in Ukraine will end only when Russia is exhausted economically and militarily; he argued Europe imposed unheard-of losses on Russia. - In response, the US role in Munich was anticipated to feature Marco Rubio as the delegation head, signaling a security-focused agenda rather than deep internal European discourse. The discussion suggested the US may push a strategy of returning to or reshaping a hegemonic order, pressuring Europe to align with American priorities, and highlighting that the old order is over. - There is a perception of internal German political dynamics: the rise of the anti-establishment party (IFD) could challenge the current SPD/CSU coalition, potentially altering the German stance on Russia and Europe’s strategy toward Moscow. The possibility exists that internal German shifts could counter aggressive German policy toward Russia. - In Europe, there is a tension between those who want to sacrifice more national autonomy to please the US and those who advocate diversifying ties to avoid total dependence on Washington. In practice, EU policy has often mirrored US priorities, thereby delaying a truly autonomous European strategy. - The EU’s foreign policy structure remains weak due to political diversity among member states, the need for cooperation with national governments, and resistance to surrendering power to Brussels. There is no cohesive grand strategy within the EU, making it hard to present a unified vision in a multipolar world. The EU’s reliance on crisis-driven centralization contrasts with those internal contradictions. - Ukraine’s war exposed tensions in Europe’s cohesion. Initially, there was a rallying effect and unified front against Russia, aided by US support, aiming for a rapid Russian defeat. Now the EU’s rhetoric shifts toward seeking a ceasefire and preserving what remains of Ukraine, labeling victory in terms of saving Ukraine rather than expelling Russia. EU funding for Ukraine—about €90 billion over two years—may be insufficient, with Ukraine claiming higher needs. - The discussion suggested that European leadership’s view of Russia and Putin is unstable: some European circles believe Russia could collapse economically, while others see Russia’s leadership as capable of countermeasures. Reports of France reestablishing high-level political contacts with Russia were noted as part of this flux. - The conversation contrasted backward-looking US/EU visions with a forward-looking multipolar vision promoted by BRICS, especially Russia, which could be more promising due to its forward outlook. The EU, dominated by internal divisions, struggles to articulate an autonomous multipolar path, while the United States appears intent on reviving its dominant position and reshaping the international order, sometimes in ways that delay the shift to multipolarity. - Overall, the speakers highlighted a shared but backward-looking orientation between the EU and the US, versus a forward-looking, multipolar alternative; they also underscored the strategic vacuum, internal European divisions, and the continuing tug-of-war between attempting to restore past structures and embracing a new global arrangement.

Ashwin Rutansi hosts New Order from a global vantage on how the West Asia conflict and its disruption to energy routes are reshaping the India-led global South. He notes the Trump-Netanyahu war in Iran and its ripple effects: thousands killed, over a million displaced, and billions impoverished by higher energy and commodity prices as supply lines through the Strait of Hormuz tighten. He highlights India’s external affairs minister Jaishankar visiting the UAE to stress the urgency for New Delhi as it navigates a multipolar world. The program then centers on the attack on the oil tanker Safe Sea Vishnu on March 11 in Iraqi waters, carrying around 50,000 tons of oil. Doctor Anjan (the speaker) describes it as a calibrated, inside-territorial-water attack, not just a drone or missile strike. He notes a speedboat mapped the attack beforehand, the operation conducted on an unmanned vessel, and the possible involvement or at least facilitation by the host country. He emphasizes there was no reported activity from Iraq’s coast guards after the incident, and he urges investigations by international bodies including the UN, IMO, and guardian maritime bodies. He explicitly states there was no indication of targeting based on UN or World Food Program associations, but attributes motive to a US-national ultimate beneficiary owner. Anjan explains the wider shipping crisis: about 800 ships are stuck in the Strait of Hormuz, with roughly 16,000 crew members affected, potentially including around 8,000 Indian seafarers. He questions IMO’s effectiveness as “guardian of the maritime industry,” asking who is protecting the more than 16,000 civilians at sea and why a robust response from international bodies has not materialized. He contrasts the ceasefire with ongoing threats and warns of food and water shortages for crews if peace remains elusive. He challenges why the UN’s leadership and IMO have not mobilized more forcefully and suggests a broader South- and BRICS-led approach to maritime security. In discussing geopolitics and logistics, Anjan mentions Bandar Abbas and Chabahar Port as strategically significant for energy and regional trade. He notes US and Israeli strikes on these hubs and acknowledges India’s historic plans to develop Chabahar, which have slowed recently, raising questions about reactivation and peace-building roles. He argues that the entire Global South could benefit from activated regional corridors, and he suggests BRICS could contribute—by strengthening IMO authority and pursuing practical, multi-lateral security measures to safeguard navigation and prevent humanitarian crises at sea. He also critiques the WTO and western-dominated mechanisms, implying that Beijing and Moscow’s stance on global trade norms is complex and that BRICS could offer alternative pathways for peacemaking and economic resilience. During the break, Zara Khan fields audience questions. They touch on Turkey’s likely role, China and Russia’s stance toward WTO norms and Western hegemony, BRICS’ centrality in peacemaking, and Pakistan’s active role despite not being a BRICS member. The discussion returns to the broader question: how shipping, energy security, and global governance will evolve in this “new order,” and what Delhi’s BRICS agenda should emphasize as India chairs BRICS. The show closes inviting feedback on whether rising living costs from the war will spur political upheaval worldwide.

The discussion centers on India’s position in 2025 amid a shifting international order and U.S. efforts to recalibrate a multipolar world. - The year 2025 is characterized as eventful for India, with the country under pressure to choose a path in a world where power is more distributed. The conversation opens with a framing of the U.S. adjusting to multipolarity, the return of Trump, and various global tensions, noting that India’s role has received relatively less attention. - Speaker 1 reflects that 2025 was not a good year for India. At the start of the year, India expected to remain a fulcrum of U.S. policy to contain China and to shuttle between powers, maintaining a growing trade relationship with China while navigating U.S. pressures. The Trump presidency disrupted this balance. India perceived U.S. interference in its domestic politics, including alleged U.S. fingerprints in color revolutions in Bangladesh and Nepal, and a perception that U.S. entities like the National Endowment for Democracy were involved. The 50% trade tariff on India by the U.S. shocked New Delhi, and Trump’s public and private statements criticizing India complicated the relationship. - The discussion notes India’s sensitivity to becoming overly dependent on the U.S. for strategic protection against China, given Modi’s emphasis on Indian sovereignty and self-reliance. Modi’s perceived humility toward Trump, followed by a cooling of the relationship after Trump’s tariff threats, created a crisis of confidence in the U.S.-India alignment. Modi’s personal interactions with Trump—such as a cordial birthday exchange followed by threats of 100% tariffs on India—were seen as signaling mixed signals from Washington. - India’s options in 2025 include: (1) retrenchment and continuing to seek a balancing act between the U.S., China, and Russia; (2) charting an independent course by strengthening ties within BRICS and the Global South; or (3) aligning more with the U.S. with the hope of future U.S. policy shifts. The economic reality complicates choices: while India’s exports did reasonably well despite tariffs and some FDI, opening Indian dairy and agriculture to the U.S. market would threaten farmers’ livelihoods, potentially destabilizing an electorate sensitive to domestic issues. - There is a broader point about Washington’s approach: demand loyalty from regions and countries while using tariffs and pressure to shape alignment, and Trump’s approach is described as a fear-and-intimidation strategy toward the Global South. - On the China-India axis, the speakers discuss how China’s rise and India’s size create a power disparity that makes simple dominance difficult for either side. India’s strategy involves leveraging BRICS and other forums (including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SCO) to expand multipolar governance and reduce dependence on a single power center. The interlocutors emphasize that BRICS operates by consensus and is not a vetoed UN-style body; thus, it offers a platform where major powers can cooperate without a single dominant voice. - The potential paths for India include growing within BRICS and the Global South, seeking mutual economic advantages, and developing a strategy that reduces vulnerability to U.S. coercion. One line of thought suggests using digital tools to help Indian small and medium-sized enterprises access global markets, and building coalitions using shared developmental and financial needs to negotiate better terms in global trade, similar to how an OPEC-like approach could coordinate commodity pricing for the Global South. - The conversation also touches on border and regional issues: a historical context where Russia resolved border tensions with China via settlements that altered the balance of power; the suggestion that India and China could adopt joint administrative arrangements for disputed border zones to reduce conflict risk and foster cooperation, though this requires careful handling to avoid loss of face for either side. - The role of China is described as patient and multipolar-friendly, seeking to buy more from India and to cultivate mutual trade, while recognizing India’s internal challenges, such as power reliability and structural issues like caste and crony capitalism, which affect India’s ability to produce and export higher-value goods. - The broader takeaway is a vision of a more integrated multipolar Eurasia, where India’s leadership within BRICS/SC0 and its ability to create innovative economic arrangements—such as “resource bourses” or shared supply chains—could alter the balance of power and reduce dependency on U.S. policy dynamics. There is an emphasis on avoiding a new Cold War by fostering dialogue and joint governance mechanisms that include China, India, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, and other Global South actors. - The speakers close with a cautious optimism: 2026 could be better if nations learn to push back against coercive power, redefine security around development and governance rather than force, and pursue multipolar institutions that preserve autonomy while enabling peaceful competition. The expectation is that seeds of hope exist within these analyses, even as the present year has been challenging.

Ashwin Rutansi hosts New Order, examining how India and the global South are calculating in a world of competing financial and geopolitical systems. He notes Ramanujan’s death in 1920 in Tamil Nadu and asks if there is a shift toward a multipolar order or a recalibration of power. Tehran remains the epicenter of geopolitical upheaval, with Trump-Netanyahu wars on Iran and Lebanon affecting civilians. India’s strategic moves unfold on multiple fronts: Defense Minister Rajnath Singh travels to Germany for defense cooperation with the Indian Navy, including potential submarine deals valued around $12 billion; India and China engage at Delhi-Shanghai Cooperation Organization meetings; with Russia, India negotiates S-400 missile deliveries and Pantsir anti-drone systems, plus a Moscow-Delhi Arctic access deal. The program highlights energy costs and humanitarian costs of conflict, noting the UN estimate that Iran-related funding could have saved 87,000,000 lives if redirected to aid rather than conflict, while in India alone 354,000,000 may be pushed into poverty. Zara Klahn will later field audience questions. Jim Rickards, best-selling author and former financial war games adviser to the Pentagon, joins from New Hampshire. He asserts a grave danger: the Strait of Hormuz is closed, which matters because 20% of the world’s oil and a high share of LNG transit there. He explains that while some vessels pass Iran’s choke point, the US Navy often stops them, either by seizure or missiles, making bypassing the blockade unlikely in the near term. He describes a “floating pipeline” during the crisis: ships traveled from the Persian Gulf to destinations such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and India; as refineries begin to feel the impact three weeks to two months in, the world will face energy shortages and fertilizer disruptions due to nitrate imports, threatening planting seasons and potential mass hunger. He notes that the blockage’s continuation will worsen the situation, since turning refinery operations back on is a slow process. Regarding Indian and Chinese responses, Rickards states they’re not yet pivoting aggressively due to limited power to alter the bottlenecks. He says China is in a vulnerable position; the US has built a military alliance with Indonesia controlling the Strait of Malacca, and Washington intends to interdict Iranian vessels regardless of Iran’s actions. He characterizes a US-Russia duopoly that diverts oil away from the Persian Gulf, while Russia benefits from sanctions evasion and managed reserves. He disputes the idea that the petrodollar is collapsing, calling it “petrodollar 2.0” and arguing that the dollar remains strong as a reserve currency, though China and others may seek dollars through Treasury securities rather than dump them. Rickards explains China’s sale of treasuries does not signal de-dollarization but a need for cash to support its currency and banks, given dollar dependencies. He emphasizes that BRICS has a currency in gold and has developed the New Development Bank and a contingent reserve fund, but the crucial factor for a global reserve currency is a robust bond market and settlement infrastructure, which he argues China does not yet have. He discusses India’s position, noting India’s balance with Russia and the US, and its continued dollar-based oil purchases, while noting yuan’s limited liquidity and India’s access to dollars. The program moves to an audience Q&A with Zara Khan. Questions touch on whether Trump seeks to break BRICS, the impact of BRICS success on ordinary people, whether BRICS currency could be gold-backed, and why non-aligned regions are quiet. Khan notes that a BRICS currency would likely involve gold and infrastructure rather than a simple currency switch. She emphasizes gold as a potential anchor and cautions that BRICS’ progress is gradual, with gold holdings being a notable strength for India and Russia. The host invites further questions and signs off, asking listeners if the U.S. war on Iran could mark the beginning of the end of the petrodollar.

Ajit Doval, China’s Wang Yi, Russia’s Shoigu, Iran’s Nizamapur, and other security officials, including representatives from the United States, met in India’s capital at China-Russia-Iran and U.S. engagement in the same building to discuss the future of global security. Wang Yi told Doval on the record that China supports India in fulfilling its responsibilities as BRICS chair, with Ali Mohammed Hamad al-Shamsi also present. Modi met separately with an Iranian Supreme National Security Council official, with direct communication between Delhi and Tehran as Modi had been invited to attend the state funeral of Ali Khamenei, killed in February. The transcript also notes Pazheshkin’s first foreign trip since the Epstein War began, with a flight to Pakistan where he embraced Shehbaz Sharif on the tarmac and thanked him for brokering a memorandum of understanding. The program characterizes the overall picture from Delhi to Islamabad as “simultaneity,” with rivals in the same rooms and crises unfolding on the same timeline. Commodore Uday Bhaskar says the BRICS forum has become a very important platform for India, with India currently chairing and the National Security Advisors meeting concluding alongside a BRICS energy ministers meeting in Gurugram. He contrasts BRICS with “disarray” in other credible global platforms, arguing BRICS has emerged as a relatively credible and objective platform bringing major global issues to the table. He explains why public announcements emphasized counter-terrorism and related issues rather than criticizing the United States: BRICS arrived at a consensus not to make statements critical of the United States regarding recent events in West Asia, with divergent views prompting focus on “second tier” security concerns such as terrorism and related issues. A second public focus was new technologies, AI, and impacts on internal security and stability. He adds that decisions and statements were linked to preparations for India’s September BRICS summit, with private discussions taking place, including meetings Modi held with officials in Delhi. On U.S. actions described in the transcript as economic warfare and missile attacks killing Indian seafarers, Bhaskar says India internalized the need to discuss difficult issues in private rather than on public platforms despite active social media by both Trump and Modi. He describes anger in India after the seafarers’ deaths but says the issue was raised through foreign minister-level diplomacy and then by Modi meeting Trump. He also references a previous turbulence in bilateral relations after an Operation Sindur conclusion described as framed by Trump. The discussion then focuses on Iran and Pakistan as intermediaries. Bhaskar says Pakistan has emerged as an accepted mediator for stops between the United States and Iran, and that optics and signals—including Modi’s Israel visit two days before the start of the APIC’s theory—tilted India more toward the United States and Israel at that point. He says the India-Iran relationship was affected by U.S. actions including torpedoing an Iranian ship returning toward Vishakhapatnam. Despite this, he states India has not given up on Chabahar, calling it a very important project and strategic investment, even if it has been on the back burner due to U.S. sanctions on Iran. When asked about sanctions, Bhaskar says India did an assessment of cost and benefit regarding maintaining the relationship with the United States and that India was willing to go along with U.S. recommendations on Iran, reducing oil imports from Iran in particular, which led to slowing Chabahar-related efforts. He says BRICS security discussions dwelled on Ukraine and West Asia and noted existing multilateral platforms are not working, implying BRICS could offer an alternative, possibly at the September summit. He adds that India would pick up relations with Tehran due to geography, Iran’s role as a neighbor and hydrocarbons supplier, and expectations about Iran rebuilding infrastructure over the next two or three years, though he characterizes U.S.-Iran arrangements as fragile and the situation as wait-and-watch. The transcript also covers defense and regional security. Bhaskar says BRICS has expanded beyond the original four, with the UAE and other countries joining, and he describes strengthening India-UAE ties, including Indian officers training UAE personnel. He discusses the BrahMos as a joint India-Russia success story and says countries like the UAE view it as an option, reflecting India’s credibility as a military partner. On U.S. strategic posture, he interprets changes like dropping “Indo” from the Indo-Pacific command as domestic and symbolic moves tied to U.S. political priorities and different approach to the Quad, while insisting name changes would not alter geography or operational deployment if required. In viewer questions, the program raises issues of India-UAE trade growth outpacing UAE-U.S. trade and argues the U.S. can enable disallowance via sanctions mechanisms, reputation-damaging efforts, and threats such as asset freezes and halting of arms sales. It also discusses whether controlling the Indian Ocean would require aircraft carriers, contrasting carrier-centric control with sensor networks, underwater drones, and distributed underwater systems, suggesting carrier-based warfare could be obsolete. The segment ends with a viewer-mediated question: whether BRICS should have a maritime security agenda given disruption in West Asian sea lanes, with responses requested on X at neworder_underscore_TV, and a promise to continue tracking shifting global power next Sunday.

The BRICS countries are implementing large scale initiatives in the area of nuclear energy and aviation, new materials and IT industry, robotics engineering, and artificial intelligence. Certainly, particular attention is being paid to strengthening connection within the BRICS block. Their mutual goods turnover of our countries has already exceeded 1,000,000,000,000 U. S. Dollars and continues to grow. All of that are elements of the global platform for growth. They are founded on the key principles of BRICS, that is primarily consensus, parity, accounting for the interest of one another. Russia welcomes all of its partners to make their contribution to shaping new global growth model.

Mario asked Pepe Escobar for his take on the state of affairs, focusing on Venezuela and Iran, in the wake of dramatic developments including the alleged attack on Maduro-era Venezuela and broader upheavals in Iran, Russia, and beyond. Pepe frames Venezuela as a desperate move connected to the demise of the petrodollar, with multiple overlapping headlines and actors maneuvering for advantage in a test of national security and regional influence. He says the United States has claimed Venezuela as “my backyard,” and questions whether Washington is prepared to back a fifth-column government in Venezuela or to overhaul the Venezuelan oil industry to serve American interests. He argues that reconstituting Venezuela’s energy sector to produce about 3 million barrels per day would require five years and roughly $183 billion in investment, and notes that American CEOs are not willing to spend that much without total investment guarantees. He suggests the White House lacked a coherent, forward-looking strategy for reorganizing Venezuela’s oil industry and that the ego of neoconservatism drove actions that lacked feasibility. On the leadership dynamics, Pepe notes that Delcy Rodríguez, a seasoned Chavista negotiator and daughter of a revolutionary killed by the CIA, leads a government that prioritizes Venezuela’s interests over U.S. interests. He mentions that Maduro’s security head, previously said to be linked to the operation, was demoted rather than arrested, indicating an intelligence and political calculus aimed at explaining the leadership in a way domestic audiences can accept. He emphasizes that the regime remains, with Padrino López and other core figures still in place, and that the “regime change” dream from Trump’s team did not materialize as hoped. He suggests the regime change narrative was limited to a “mini Netflix special with full of special effects.” Pepe shifts to the broader regional and global context, noting that Venezuela’s crisis intersects with Brazil’s Lula, BRICS dynamics, and US foreign policy. He asserts that Delcy Rodríguez’s negotiating skills could help Venezuela if the sanctions were lifted, and stresses the importance of popular support for her—reportedly over 90% of Venezuelans backing her. He argues that Latin American sentiment strongly rejects external interference, pointing to regional uproar over U.S. actions in Venezuela. He also discusses how Brazil’s stance within BRICS and Lula’s position affect Venezuela’s prospects for integration into BRICS, including Lula’s veto in BRICS discussions that blocked Venezuela from becoming a BRICS member. Turning to the broader geopolitics, Pepe argues that the strategic landscape is dominated by three major players: Iran, Russia, and China. He explains that, unlike the United States, Russia and China respond to actions with measured, long-term strategies and emphasize concrete acts over rhetoric. He points to NATO attacks on Russia’s nuclear triad site and the Novgorod residence as pivotal events, arguing that Russia’s response is framed by a long-term calculus rather than immediate negotiations. He notes that China seeks to move global trade toward the yuan rather than the dollar, framing this as a de facto removal of dollar dominance rather than a formal currency replacement. He emphasizes that Iran is maneuvering under severe sanctions, with protests driven largely by economic grievances but potentially hijacked by foreign actors as seen in color-revolution playbooks, and that Iran’s leadership stresses long-term resilience and partnerships with Russia and China. Pepe cautions that the Iran and Venezuela situations show a broader pattern: sanctions and mismanagement combine to create fragility, while external actors press their own strategic agendas. He warns that the instability in Iran and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war create a dangerous, volatile environment, with the potential for a prolonged European and global conflict if escalation continues. He concludes with a bleak assessment for the near term, suggesting that the war in Ukraine could extend for years and that Europe faces mounting economic strain as it bears the costs of ongoing conflict. In sum, Pepe Escobar portrays Venezuela as a case where sanctions, strategic miscalculations, and competing powers intersect, while Iran, Russia, and China pursue longer-term, multilayered strategies that complicate Western-led attempts at regime change or coercive diplomacy.

The discussion touches on the IMF, the World Bank, and BRICS institutions. The speaker notes they did not manage to meet Kristalina Georgieva, the IMF managing director, or Ajay Banga, the World Bank president, and questions the World Bank and IMF’s importance relative to BRICS. The point is made that the NDB’s rise alongside BRICS is precisely because the World Bank and IMF are not performing their tasks, and that BRICS also has substantial work to do. When the NDB was launched, it was described as complementary to the World Bank, a New to World Development Bank of BRICS—“New,” emphasizing national rather than a single nation identity. In addition, the contingency reserve arrangement (CRA) is discussed as an instrument to be similar to the IMF, intended to provide bailout support during financial problems. The speaker mentions that several experts have conducted seven tests of the CRA so far, all successful, but it has not moved into practical use. There is a claim from experts that the BRICS CRA should have come to the rescue of Argentina, which allegedly faced pressures from IMF policies that eroded the country further. This is presented as a key aspect of the discussion. A reference is made to John Perkins, described as the IMF whistleblower, who has discussed how the NDB would not operate as a “torture, bad cop, good cop” system alongside the IMF and World Bank, which allegedly historically used death squads to destroy livelihoods in the global South. The speaker echoes that sentiment by stating, “the NDB is not gonna be anything like a torture, bad cop, good cop system with the IMF and World Bank using death squads to destroy the livelihoods of millions of people in the global South, which is the record of the IMF and World Bank.” The claim emphasizes the NDB’s potential divergence from that pattern. The NDB is described as still too small, with much work remaining. Its biggest achievement cited is that it is the only transnational international bank without any Western country as a member; it includes only BRICS members. It is noted that NDB membership is not equal to BRICS membership; it is a commercial bank that operates within the financial system established by the Bretton Woods Institutions, but it does not impose the political conditionalities that have been said to ruin lives. Dilma Rousseff is identified as the head of the NDB, and it is clarified that she “was president of Brazil.” The discussion notes that this is her second term, which was, in fact, suggested by Vladimir Putin to continue in order to avoid divergences that might arise, with Putin suggesting that Dilma continue her duties.

Ashwin Rifansi discusses New Order’s focus on how India and its allies sit at the center of a shifting global order, noting that the West Asia conflict involving Trump, Netanyahu, Iran, and Lebanon has repeatedly broken ceasefires and that Pakistan publicly thanked Trump for de-escalation efforts before its consulate in Peshawar was shut down as the US deemed the location too dangerous. New Delhi is about to host the BRICS foreign ministers meeting, with Iran likely sending its deputy foreign minister. India’s chair aims to balance Gulf energy ties with a broader multi-aligned strategy, positioning it as the broker able to keep competing sides in the same room. The last BRICS meeting failed to reach consensus; this time the stakes are higher, divisions sharper, and billions hinge on deli decisions. The question posed is whether this emergent order can hold together or reconcile internal contradictions. Professor Richard Wolff, a prominent economist, joins to discuss who pays for the Trump–Netanyahu war. Wolff identifies the cost as ultimately borne by a combination of American taxpayers and the global community that finances the war through borrowing. He says the government relies more on borrowed money than on taxes, noting that an explicit tax burden on American families would be politically unsustainable, while the bill is effectively deferred to future generations. He points out that parts of the global South are lending to the US to finance the war, citing that Japan is the largest creditor to the United States, with China as the second-largest, while the US remains the world’s largest debtor. Wolff explains that the crisis of supply lines stems from long-standing corporate decisions since the 1970s to relocate manufacturing abroad for profitability, particularly to China. He argues politicians—including Trump—present the narrative as if foreigners (China, India, Brazil) forced these changes, thereby portraying the US as a victim rather than the perpetrator. This framing disguises the revenue gains American capital reaped from overseas production, which in turn produced long supply lines as goods must travel back to markets. The discussion emphasizes the strategic political use of this narrative to manage domestic anger at lost jobs and wages. The conversation then turns to potential futures for supply chains and localized production. Wolff suggests that global factors push toward localization and diversification of production within the United States and BRICS countries, with the Hormuz Strait being a model for potential disruptions elsewhere (e.g., the Malacca Strait). He predicts a major, long-term reorganization of where production happens and how the global economy is organized, arguing the conflict could catalyze a renaissance of regionalized or localized production, even if not immediately after the current war. On the political economy side, Wolff notes that Trump’s political support is shrinking outside the extreme right and the business elite who benefit from his tax policies and fossil-fuel ties. He warns that if the Iran confrontation undermines Trump’s ability to assert U.S. power, oligarchic support could wane, threatening his presidency. Wolff also forecasts that the defense budget under discussion—proposed to rise from about $900 billion to $1.5 trillion—would far outpace any social program cuts, intensifying pressure on workers who are already relying on food stamps and other supports. The discussion touches on the global South’s response to a declining U.S. empire, including potential non-dollar settlements and the challenges of unwinding dollar-denominated debt. Wolff notes the dollar is weaker but remains central; the process toward a multi-currency system is gradual. He observes that global South students are increasingly looking elsewhere for education and investment, signaling a broader trend away from the United States as a safe or dominant hub for capital. The program closes with questions about the Quad and ASEAN’s roles, and whether India should stay in the Quad. Wolff’s perspective frames a dynamic, multi-polar trajectory as BRICS and other blocs potentially gain influence in the face of U.S. decline. The show teases a future discussion with Khan about how viewers can engage with these questions.

In this discussion, the guests analyze the implications of a United States military attack on Venezuela and its broader impact on Latin America, Asia, and the evolving world order. The Chilean ambassador to BRICS describes the event as a historic milestone: it is “the first time we have seen a US military attack on the South American mainland,” differing from past interventions in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. He notes that at a Saturday press conference, President Trump warned Colombia and Mexico that they might be next, and Secretary of State Rubio warned Cuba to watch out. This is presented as potentially the beginning of a larger shift, not an isolated incident like the 1989 invasion of Panama. The ambassador points to Trump’s 2025 national security doctrine, which places the Western Hemisphere at the center of US strategy, marking a significant departure from Bush’s focus on the Middle East and Obama’s pivot to Asia. He argues the motive is not humanitarian or stabilizing Latin America, but subjugation, resource extraction, and domination of governments in the region, a stance he characterizes as an attempt to reassert empire in the Western Hemisphere. On the macro level, the discussion addresses Latin America’s changing economic architecture, including a shift from the United States as the primary trading partner to China as a dominant partner for many countries. The US response, including the Venezuelan action, is framed as a mercantilist impulse to secure resources and influence, rather than a pro-democracy or pro-human rights initiative. The conversation emphasizes that the region’s instability is intertwined with oil, minerals, and strategic resources, and that the US move may be more about controlling these assets than about leaders’ legitimacy. The speakers then examine regional dynamics within Latin America. The region is fragmented, with SELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) weak and unable to unify a response. Some governments—Argentina, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Costa Rica—have openly sided with the US, while others are more cautious about Maduro’s leadership. The ambassador reiterates that Maduro’s regime was unpopular domestically due to authoritarianism and incompetence, yet the US action targets Venezuela’s oil and sovereignty more than Maduro’s personal legitimacy. He suggests that anti-American sentiment could grow across the region, regardless of specific governments. A key theme is the emergence of BRICS as a counterweight to US hegemony. The ambassador notes that Trump has attacked BRICS members—South Africa, Brazil, and India—through trade measures and visa policies, highlighting BRICS’ rise with the New Development Bank and expanding membership (including Indonesia). He argues that BRICS represents a shift toward a multipolar world where the Global South seeks to diversify dependencies and leverage different centers of power. He differentiates BRICS from the Global South, describing BRICS as a forum aligned with Global South demands, while acknowledging that neither China nor Russia are part of the traditional Global South, though China and India are influential within BRICS. The conversation argues for active nonalignment as a guiding principle for the Global South in a multipolar order. The ambassador cites examples like Brazil under Lula who resisted US pressure, and contrasts European concessions in trade deals (e.g., the EU-US golf-course agreement) with the need for greater strategic autonomy. He asserts that Europe’s capitulation has weakened its economic and political independence, while Latin America must avoid overreliance on the US and diversify with China and other partners. He argues that the long-term consequences of US military actions could be counterproductive, weakening US standing and strengthening China’s position by eroding a sense of predictable community in the Americas. In closing, the ambassador emphasizes that the Maduro-led Venezuela episode underscores the rise of Asia, the relative decline and fragmentation of the West, and the importance of multipolarity for smaller and medium-sized states. He reiterates the value of active nonalignment as a compass for Latin America, Africa, and Asia in navigating a turbulent, power-shifting world. He and the host note that the discussion will extend to the ambassador’s work on active nonalignment and BRICS, with a link to his writings provided.

Ashwin Rutansi introduces New Order, a global show tracing how India and its allies sit at the center of a transformation in world history. The program aims to explore partnerships, shifting alliances, and how structural changes ripple from global powers to streets, villages, markets, and boardrooms. The show promises to examine diplomatic architecture, networks of power, money flows, and levers of influence, presenting a fundamental reordering rather than mere turbulence. Zara Khan will join later to field viewer questions. Guest: John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago professor and coauthor of The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy. The discussion opens with the recent incident of Iran firing missiles at an F-35 and what it implies given anticipated US and allied arms purchases. Mearsheimer notes that aircraft over adversary territory face real risks from surface-to-air missiles and air defenses, even if the US and Israel have degraded Iran’s defenses. He suggests this is a factor behind why the US and Israel refrain from flying over Iran. Geopolitical framing: Who benefits from the ongoing war (in Iran) at the time of the interview? Mearsheimer identifies two clear winners: Russia and China. Russia benefits from sanctions relief on oil and gas pushed by Trump-era policies, and the war diverts munitions away from Ukraine, aiding Russia in its position. China gains as US credibility in foreign policy deteriorates, increasing its influence in the Middle East and globally as nations worry about an unreliable US, with Europe showing signs of leaning toward China. India’s position is discussed as a potential loser in this new order. The discussion asserts that India’s relations with Israel and Iran, and its ties to both the US and the Gulf, place it in a precarious position. The possibility of a summit or peace conference is deemed unlikely to solve inflation, gas prices, fertilizer costs, or Indian food production challenges; the war is characterized as bad news for India, as reflected in Indian media. On US policy and the Israel lobby: Mearsheimer contends that the Israel lobby has significant influence over US foreign policy and that its role in dragging the United States into wars, including Iraq in 2003, was central. He notes with some irony that the lobby’s power is increasingly in the open, referencing Joe Kent’s statements and public figures like Tucker Carlson and Bernie Sanders endorsing similar criticisms. He points to Francesca Albanese, UN official on Palestinian territories, describing the Israeli actions in Gaza as genocidal, and notes the lobby’s efforts to undermine her career. Policy advice for the Global South, focusing on India: Mearsheimer argues that India should maintain distance from excessive US alignment to avoid heavy leverage over Indian policy. He suggests speaking up against US policy when it harms national interests but avoiding becoming overly dependent on the United States. He cites examples such as Indonesia where maintaining friendly ties with China while balancing US relations would be prudent. He warns that excessive closeness to the US invites sanctions and pain, whereas diversifying partnerships could reduce vulnerability. BRICS and multipolarity: The war could benefit BRICS and the Global South, with Russia and China gaining, while some BRICS members like India and possibly Indonesia could suffer. The conflict may prompt a strategic rethinking of US ties, encouraging greater independence from Washington. The discussion also touches on Europe’s economic strain and NATO’s perceived setback if Russia prevails in Ukraine, describing a “double whammy” for European leadership from the Gulf conflict alongside Ukraine. End of interview: The program teases future exploration of the Israel lobby’s influence and the potential for a broader discussion on the end of the Israel lobby era, followed by viewer questions. Zara Khan presents questions from the audience, including whether the broader humanity will gain a say on the world stage and how the Iran war might differ from Vietnam and Afghanistan, emphasizing asymmetrical warfare and the risk of ground involvement. The show signs off, inviting viewers to follow and watch future episodes.

Larry Johnson and Glenn discuss the shifting dynamics of the US dollar, the international financial system, and the rise of competing powers. - Johnson recalls the 1965 term exorbitant privilege describing the US dollar’s reserve-currency advantages. In 1971, the US closed the gold window, ending fixed gold value for the dollar; the dollar later became backed by “our promise,” enabling the petrodollar system as oil purchases were conducted in dollars. The dollar’s dominance rested on predictability, a stable legal system, and non-abusive use of the dollar as an economic tool rather than a political weapon. - Trump-era sanctions expanded broadly, impacting friends and adversaries alike, and BRICS nations began moving away from the dollar. Russia’s disconnection from SWIFT after its 2022 actions is noted as a turning point that encouraged the BRICS’ development of alternative financial infrastructure, including China’s cross-border interbank payment system (CIPS). This shift accelerates the decline of the dollar’s dominance. - Nations like Russia and China (and India, Brazil) are unloading US Treasuries and increasing gold and silver holdings. This is tied to concerns about the dollar’s reliability and the reduced faith in paper promises. The BRICS countries reportedly plan a currency tied to gold, with components of their reserves backing individual BRICS currencies, signaling a structural move away from the dollar. - The paper-gold issue is central: for every ounce of real gold, there is a range of 20-to-1 to 100-to-1 in paper gold. This disparity can undermine trust in the paper promise and create a run on physical gold. The price gap between New York (lower) and Shanghai (higher) for gold demonstrates a market dislocation and growing demand for physical metal. - Glenn emphasizes that a unipolar dollar system allows the US to run large deficits via inflation, which acts as a hidden tax on global dollar holders. Weaponizing the dollar through sanctions challenges trust and accelerates decoupling, prompting other nations to seek alternatives to reduce exposure. - Johnson argues that the US is confronting a historic realignment: the Bretton Woods order is dissolving, the dollar’s international dominance is waning, and sanctions and coercive policies are provoking pushback. He highlights Japan as a major remaining dollar treasuries holder that is now offloading, further increasing dollar supply and depressing its value. - The geopolitical implications are significant. Johnson warns that potential US actions against Iran—given their strategic position and the Gulf oil supply—could trigger a severe global disruption, including a price surge in oil. He notes that such actions would complicate global stability and magnify inflationary pressures. - The discussion also covers NATO’s cohesion, Western attempts to shape global alignments, and how rapidly shifting leverage could undermine existing alliances. Johnson suggests that Russia’s strategic gains in the war in Ukraine, combined with Western missteps, may prompt a rapid reevaluation of settlements and borders, while also noting that Russia’s position has hardened. - On Venezuela, Johnson argues that the stated pretexts (drug trafficking, oil control) were questionable and points to economic motives, including revenue opportunities for political allies like Paul Singer, and to Greenland’s strategic interests as possible motivators for US actions. - Looking ahead, Johnson predicts hyperinflation for the United States as the dollar loses value globally, while gold and silver retain value. He asserts that the ruble and yuan may hold value better, and that a mass shift toward de-dollarization is likely to continue, potentially culminating in a new multipolar financial order. - Both speakers agree that trust and predictability are crucial; the current trajectory—threats, sanctions, and unilateral actions—undermines trust and accelerates the move toward alternative currencies and stronger physical-commodity holdings. The overall tone is that a pivotal, watershed moment is unfolding in the global monetary system.

Ironically, it’s happening organically outside of BRICS anyway. For example, Enbridge and Brazil trade with China 48% in non-dollar terms. Russia–China trade is 95% in rubles and renminbi. Russia also trades with India similarly. BRICS is not driving this alone; these are individual developments. BRICS, a bit more than a decade ago, was the first to implement a framework agreement between them to move toward using national currencies more. It was still a time of less turbulence in the international scene, and the move was not for each country at once but addressed different pockets of activity. China, at that point, not only advanced this BRICS framework agreement but also struck agreements with 22 countries outside BRICS to use the renminbi. Russia did not abandon the dollar; it started using its own currency and other currencies as well. The aim was not to be against the dollar but to avoid being ordered by others about what they should or should not do. This shift occurred before Trump, though Trump contributed to the trend as well; the speaker notes they cannot simply blame Biden. The era of dollar and SWIFT being used as a weapon began to become explicit. The claim is that the dollar was promoted as a public good available to everyone no matter what happened, and then that expectation was broken. Russia has faced the most sanctions, over 20,000 in total, and the speaker suggests there may be more to come. There is large pressure from the US on each country. The UAE is mentioned as being cautious about moving too far, but each BRICS member now understands that this could be turned against them as well. That awareness is driving the direction toward greater use of national currencies and non-dollar transactions.

Ashton Rutansi introduces New Order’s first season finale, arguing that India and its allies sit at the center of a wider transformation in world history as conflicts and geopolitical pressure spread beyond West Asia. Rutansi describes the BRICS foreign ministers meeting in Delhi under India’s 2026 chairmanship, with senior officials from the UAE, China, Russia, and Iran in attendance. He also links India’s diplomacy—Prime Minister Modi touring the UAE and Europe—with the need to balance energy security, trade stability, Western partnerships, and global South leadership. Rutansi frames the situation as sensitive due to Iran’s demands for stronger BRICS political backing against US and Israeli violations of the UN Charter, amid Saudi Arabia and the UAE attempting to avoid direct confrontation. Rutansi interviews international relations scholar Professor Richard Sakwa. Asked whether a unipolar order is ending in real time, Sakwa says the unipolar model has been on its way out and is giving way to unilateralism in the United States, producing what he calls the “twilight” of the Atlantic/Political West. He argues that multipolarity is only a symptom and that the alternative model aligns with UN norms, international law, and the post-1945 international system, which he says the Political West challenged while it still held power. On global war, Sakwa says the Russo-Ukrainian war has become a Russo-European war and Europe is experiencing “war fever,” comparing the language to the atmosphere before World War I. He says commentators argue the West is in the thick of it, but that “we’re only in the foothills,” and that the global South has more balanced talk. Rutansi highlights European resistance to diplomacy and questions the impact of weapons and sanctions. Sakwa says the EU is adopting its twentieth sanctions package and working on a twenty-first, noting they are running out of “things to sanction” but “digging and digging their heels in.” He adds that US sanctions under Trump after an Alaska meeting in August 2025 affected Russian oil exports and deeply impacted India, while sanctions dependence persists. Sakwa responds that many countries, including China, can withstand tariffs and sanctions; he contrasts China’s scale with India’s vulnerability given reliance on imported oil, including from the Gulf. He notes Russia’s survival under heavy sanctions while taking a “very heavy toll.” On whether India exemplifies successful multipolar power, Sakwa is skeptical of the term multipolarity and argues the UN Charter system and postwar decolonization have matured into a “multiplex world,” where many states—including middle powers such as Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, the Philippines, Indonesia, and others—refuse being “bossed around” by a traditional hegemon. He emphasizes that international organizations and corporations also function as quasi-state actors, and he argues Western arrogance about being hegemonic has not matured. Rutansi raises criticism that the UN has struggled to act during a Gaza genocide and discusses an alleged UN leadership role of Annalena Baerbock. Sakwa calls the UN’s crisis its most desperate stage since 1945, argues that the solution is to double down to support the UN rather than dismiss it, and says India should be an essential permanent member. He also suggests resetting elements of the UN system by adding Brazil, India, and other countries—especially Africa—as permanent Security Council members. Later, Sakwa discusses NATO and US participation, saying the United States has historically retained autonomy and that Trump has left dozens of international organizations, including UN agencies such as the World Health Organization. Sakwa says the US “go[es] it alone,” meeting China as equals and that US-India relations have faced the most difficult period in decades amid sanctions and threats. Rutansi asks about whether human rights “weaponization” will continue, including references to freedom of expression in Western Europe and Sakwa’s detention at Heathrow on June 13, 2025. Sakwa says he was detained under the 2019 Counterterrorism Act and that refusing to answer or saying “no comment” could be taken as indicating guilt, allowing arrest. He describes questioning as a “fishing expedition,” says his views are open to debate, and says the case later went quiet. Sakwa argues that Western Europe exhibits groupthink, permanent war, militarism, remilitarization, and “profound Russophobia,” and he says global South countries increasingly treat US and European actions with contempt. He also argues secondary sanctions are irresponsible and illegal, and that attempts to defend international law by undermining it create double standards. The show then shifts to viewer questions via Zara Khan (Azarakan). One asks how to stop the US and Israel from mass killings; Khan and Rutansi respond by identifying complicit states and supply chain links, including countries Rutansi lists as providing Israeli weaponry, warplane components, and related support. Another asks what alternative security architectures India should prioritize in the Indian Ocean if it exits the Quad; Rutansi says India could expand cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, strengthen a Russia-India-China format (RIC) as a possible “new quad,” and consider strengthening the North South transit corridor involving India, Russia, and Iran. Rutansi closes by asking viewers: how India and the global South should deal with Western Europe’s war fever against Russia.

BRICS will continue to expand and may announce a new currency or trading system to counteract the American-led system. BRICS doesn't have to replace the dollar, it just has to threaten it, as finance is based on confidence. Putin will maintain a close relationship with China; he needs China to remain neutral so Russia can pressure the American empire. Over the next few years, the Ukraine war will continue without expanding. Iran will take the initiative against the United States. North Korea will become more belligerent, forcing America to focus on East Asia. The relationship between Putin and Xi Jinping will strengthen.

Afshin Rattansi introduces New Order as broadcasting worldwide, including to RT India, focusing on how India and its allies are reshaping the 21st-century geopolitical landscape. The show references reports of a first high-level face-to-face security meeting between the UAE and Iran since the “Epstein War” began against Iran. It also discusses the G7 meeting, branding it “Genocide 7,” and notes that the G7 is hosting India’s longest-serving Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Rattansi turns to Moscow for foreign policy scholar Dr. Andrey Kortunov of the Valdai Discussion Club, asking how to characterize India–Russia relations given that Modi has defied U.S. threats about buying oil from Russia, has connections with Iran, and this week India summoned a U.S. diplomat over “US Navy blockade violence” off the coast of Oman. Dr. Kortunov says the period is important for India’s transition into a “global actor” rather than a regional power, and argues India must now be responsible for “the reproduction of global commons,” requiring an independent foreign policy strategy and responsibility for the emerging global order. He describes India–Russia relations as one of the few major-power relationships that remains stable and predictable amid global instability, emphasizing trust and continuity despite divergences on specific issues. He states that Russia can rely on India and India can rely on Russia. On the Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Support Agreement (RELOS), Dr. Kortunov calls it a rapid and significant development. He says both sides agreed to provide each other access to military infrastructure, expanding mutual outreach. He adds that India could be permanently present in the Arctic region while Russia could gain access to the Indian Ocean, framing this as symbolic and strategically tied to diversifying communication routes and extending presence in remote Eurasian regions. Rattansi raises U.S. concerns and reactions, and Dr. Kortunov argues the United States still views India as a junior partner that will serve U.S. interests in confrontation with China, aiming to break India–Russia ties. He says India is too big to be “hijacked,” and expects India to maintain relations with Russia and Iran even while developing ties with the United States for technology and investment. The discussion then addresses India summoning a U.S. diplomat over an attack on an Indian tanker in the Strait of Hormuz and asks how long India can sustain this while remaining friends with Iran. Dr. Kortunov says the limits of U.S. power matter more than India’s choices. He references Trump granting waivers allowing Russian oil to reach global markets and India to buy Russian oil without secondary sanctions threats, and says it may take time for the U.S. to formally recognize limitations. On future oil waivers, the discussion notes an expiration date of June 17, and it is argued that even without renewed waivers, Russia’s oil would still reach end users due to the global oil market, with the U.S. able to complicate exports but not stop them. On the Quad, Dr. Kortunov frames it primarily as a “China problem,” arguing Russia has little to do with it “at least for the time being.” He says Quad is not an alliance and that its development depends on New Delhi, particularly if India prioritizes cooperation in technologies or logistics. He adds that “Quad II,” involving West Indian Ocean countries, could be shaped by similar limits. After returning to BRICS, Dr. Kortunov says the Trump administration is portrayed as obsessed with BRICS because Trump believes it is anti-American, while Dr. Kortunov argues BRICS is a non-Western group that can offer views on the emerging world order and global financial and trade rules. He says BRICS is diverse and difficult to reach consensus within, giving the example of US–Iran conflict, where both the Islamic Republic of Iran and the UAE are members and are reported to be in talks. He argues Gulf security cannot remain stable without involving Iran, making an “Arab NATO” that contains and deters Iran “not a very promising option.” Rattansi asks about the Russia–Ukraine war and why it has not ended, with Dr. Kortunov saying the dynamic suggests a goal of saving lives and achieving a steady advance in Donbas, while Western support and complications such as Ukrainian drone attacks must be considered. He says both sides believe time benefits them and notes difficulty seeing flexibility from either side. He also responds to claims about the Russian economy, saying similar predictions have been made since the conflict began and that he does not expect immediate collapse, describing “spectacular resilience” and “adaptivity.” The conversation ends with Zahra Khan fielding viewer questions. One asks whether India is changing global politics or playing better; Zahra Khan cites India’s GDP and growth and claims India’s actions—such as summoning U.S. diplomats—demonstrate strategic power. Another asks about Emirates and “shuddering US imperialism,” with discussion connecting UAE–India trade and the UAE’s position within BRICS and as a Shanghai Cooperation Organization dialogue partner. The segment concludes with a viewer question: whether the Ukraine proxy war will end in 2026.

Ashwin Rutansi hosts New Order, exploring how India and the global South navigate new alignments catalyzed by West Asia’s war. Tehran’s rejection of direct peace talks with Washington sits beside regional powers—from Beijing to Islamabad—pushing for negotiated outcomes that safeguard security. The Gulf anchors India’s energy security and now becomes the pivot of a new order as the U.S. loses control over key sea lanes, including the Strait of Hormuz. Global energy prices rise, compelling New Delhi to reassess sourcing and diplomacy as India tries to navigate between major powers to protect economic and security interests. Jeffrey Sachs, adviser to UN secretaries-general and Padma Bhushan recipient, joins from New York City. He emphasizes that if Iran is bombed into the stone age and energy in West Asia ignites, the entire world would suffer. He describes a global energy system where disruptions affect fertilizer, food production, industrial petrochemicals, and the broader supply chain. He warns that a war of the length Trump talks about could lead to catastrophic energy supply collapse in weeks, affecting not just Hormuz, but production across Middle East fields, pipelines, ports, and refineries. He argues Trump misunderstands the link between U.S. energy resources and Hormuz, noting a broader energy vulnerability. The discussion shifts to why India might resist intervening in a Iran-Israel crisis. Sachs critiques U.S. foreign policy as pursuing perpetual hegemony and describes Trump’s behavior as part of a broader pattern. He characterizes the American president as lacking a “foot on the brake” for war machine expansion, contrasting it with past attempts to restrain aggression. He describes Trump as displaying a “dark triad”—narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy—with possible frontotemporal dementia factors, and he attributes alarming rhetoric from Netanyahu to a similar mindset in Israel’s leadership. He contends this policy approach is dangerous and urges restraint. On why Modi, Delhi, and BRICS should avoid entanglement with Israel and push for a negotiated settlement, Sachs argues India should not align with Israel, which he says has committed genocide in Gaza and launched a “war of whim” against Iran. He stresses that India, as BRICS president, should advocate a multipolar world rooted in international law and the UN Charter, collaborating with Russia, China, and other BRICS partners to counter American delusions of a unipolar order. He asserts that BRICS can serve as a stabilizing force for the world and that India can be a peacemaker given its long-standing ties with Persia. He calls for India, China, and Russia to cooperate and to recognize the 1914 Simla line as an historical footnote, not a barrier to current cooperation; BRICS, he says, can build practical institutions like the New Development Bank to support a multipolar framework. The program shifts to audience questions with Zara Khan. She asks if BRICS could create a new clearinghouse for world commerce. Sachs remains optimistic about BRICS, noting that sanctions-heavy Russia still conducts substantial trade and that Gulf Hormuz deals illustrate transactions independent of the U.S. petrodollar and SWIFT. Another question concerns how Iran could bypass sanctions via BRICS and overcome SWIFT, with Sachs noting SWIFT’s days may be numbered and suggesting BRICS-enabled trade could proceed without Western financial systems. Shaila from Johannesburg asks why BRICS leaders still entertain a two-state solution; the host invites reconsideration of that stance in light of genocide accusations and calls for a broader, more principled approach. The show ends with a prompt for viewers: How can Modi, Putin, or Xi pressure Trump to end the war in Iran? The program invites continued discussion on Sunday, tracking shifting global power and India’s central role in the new order.

Professor Richard Wolff discusses the US-Iran situation framed as a memorandum of understanding rather than a peace agreement, arguing that it represents a tactical retreat by Washington after misjudging its capabilities and overreaching. He says the underlying drive toward overreach will persist and that the Middle East/Western Asia remains an open arena—especially if Israeli leadership shifts in Lebanon or if Bennett’s approach to Turkey continues, with implications for Turkey’s ties to NATO, Russia, and the United States. Wolff also argues that American media and centrist Democrats would not reduce support for Israel or European stances on Ukraine if Democrats win in November, and that international alignments already reflect that pattern. On economic consequences, Wolff argues Iran “won” regardless of what the memorandum says, while emphasizing uncertainty in oil and gas markets, strategic petroleum reserve depletion, and how long prices might remain lower even if they fall. He frames these outcomes as evidence of a declining American empire whose deterioration shapes where and when overreach happens, producing devastating consequences. He adds that many voices do not yet connect declining-empire dynamics to current events. A major “momentous consequence,” Wolff says, is the Strait of Hormuz shifting from US authority to Iranian management via a fee rather than a toll, with the fee described as covering costs such as navigation assistance, safety infrastructure, safe and rescue, and environmental issues. He characterizes this as a validation of “declining empire” logic and a change of management from the United States as the authority in fact to Iran as the authority in fact, with Iranian oversight and missile deterrence described as extending throughout the strait. Wolff says US control can still be challenged through actions such as reimposing blockades or bombing again, and he notes that headlines about potential renewed bombing exist. He links the result to broader security turmoil for Israel, Gulf states, and Europe. Wolff further argues that European Russophobia functions politically to deflect anxieties and justify political and economic adjustments, describing an internal European squeeze between the United States and China. He characterizes European political leadership as using Russia as a “usual suspect” while responding to urgent demands for government support from business, including energy-cost relief and shifts in welfare-state spending. He suggests the United States is “throwing up disasters” as it crashes downward in its historical trajectory, including misjudging Iran and distancing from allies. In discussing global ramifications, Wolff shifts to an economic lens: he portrays China as a “bemused spectator” focused on growth, avoiding being bombed, building military capacity, and benefiting from BRICS alignment. He says Iran’s BRICS membership contributed to support from Russia and China and changes the balance between BRICS and the G7, predicting that Gulf and Asian states that hesitated about BRICS will hesitate less. He describes the event as another indication that countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia are already in BRICS, Turkey may join, and questions remain about Turkey’s relationship to NATO. Wolff also argues that within the United States, support for Israel has shifted: he claims Israel lost the majority of American people, citing lobbying power and political alignment as weaker than during his lifetime. He gives an example from New York City, where a Muslim socialist mayoral candidate reportedly said he would arrest Benjamin Netanyahu if Netanyahu comes to New York, and where, Wolff says, the majority voted for him. He connects this to broader questioning of capitalism and the decline of the empire pulling down the economic system expressed through it. When asked “where this is all going,” Wolff says China will likely be the major player deciding whether the next phase becomes a Chinese empire or some form of genuine multilateral order beyond empire logic. He compares the risk to how empires provoke revolutions against them, and he calls for domestic economic arrangements that can support multilateral working-out rather than war-driven national-state competition. He argues capitalism’s dynamics and internal wealth concentration drive great-power conflict outcomes, linking imperial overreach and decline to economic structure. As a final thought, Wolff ties the empire question to democratic legitimacy and wealth concentration, citing Felix Frankfurter’s statement that great concentrations of wealth cannot coexist with democracy. He describes the United States as having extreme inequality and a government “bought and paid for,” and he uses Israel as an example: he claims US funding for Israel, Israel funding AIPAC, and AIPAC buying the government that funds Israel. He concludes that handling capitalism’s dynamic is central to how the world’s great-power trajectory—especially China’s—turns out, suggesting internal economic management will determine whether China avoids the “evolutionary dead end” he attributes to the United States.

The speaker discusses the expansion of the BRICS group, which now includes Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. They argue that the BRICS countries are becoming increasingly influential in the global economy, with a larger share of global GDP and oil production compared to the G7. The speaker also highlights the strategic trade routes controlled by BRICS and their goal of settling trades in local currencies to bypass the US dollar. They emphasize that BRICS aims for economic sovereignty and independence from the US, particularly due to the weaponization of the dollar. The speaker acknowledges that there are challenges to overcome, but believes recent events have motivated BRICS to take action.

Pepe Escobar and Glenn discuss the Iran situation amid escalating US-Israeli pressure and Iran’s response. Key points: - Iran as “the holy grail” in US policy: Iran has long been seen as the ultimate target within a broader project that includes Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran, with the goal of reshaping West Asia and advancing a Greater Israel concept. The project dates back to at least the nineties, with frameworks like the Project for the New American Century and Clean Break cited as influencing DC thinking. - War planning and messaging: The war was described as planned for decades, with Iran identified as the likely target when other measures failed. The Trump administration reportedly pressed forward, and the “barbarian baboon in the White House” metaphor is used to underscore perceived Zionist influence and financial beneficiaries around the war. - Domestic US-financial dynamics: The war’s perceived profitability for insiders is highlighted, naming Jared Kushner, Ivanka Trump, Steve Lutnick, and others as profiting from related moves. The discussion emphasizes that financial markets (bond yields, gold, oil) influence US decisions, with high bond yields constraining US action. - Iranian strategic posture: Iran’s leaders reportedly signaled that there are no conversations with the US at the moment, and that a deal is impossible given the lists of demands from both sides. The Iranians have shifted from defense to offense, with missiles and drones increasingly employed. - Iranian deterrence and capabilities: The talk notes Iran’s use of missiles such as the Khorramshahr 4 and Fateh-2, with added emphasis on underground missile cities in the Sistan Baluchistan region and near the Afghan border. Iran’s deterrence is described as decentralized and mosaic, enabling precise targeting and escalation control. The Iranian approach includes limiting attacks to dual-use civilian infrastructure in Israel while avoiding civilianTargeted attacks in Iran, and threatening Dimona if Natanz is bombed. - Israeli and Iranian targeting: Iran has begun to attack civilian dual-use infrastructure in Israel and is targeting Haifa refineries and military installations near Ben Gurion Airport, while Israel continues to strike near Natanz and other Iranian sites. The balance of escalation is framed as a deterrence dynamic, with both sides escalating in different ways. - International alignment and support: Russia and China are described as backing Iran diplomatically and with intelligence support, including satellite intel and the movement of Iranian Shahids between Russia and Iran. The three BRICS actors—Russia, China, and Iran—are cited as central to a multipolar Eurasian integration project, with BRICS described as currently comatose or nonfunctional due to internal divisions and external pressures (e.g., UAE and India’s actions). - BRICS and SCO status: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization released a weak statement; BRICS is portrayed as having internal problems, with India’s actions, especially in relation to Iran, criticized as betrayals from many countries. Russia and China are positioned as active backers of Iran, while BRICS’s future is uncertain. - Iran’s regional strategy and neighbors: The discussion covers Azerbaijan, Turkey, and India’s roles. Azerbaijan could be drawn into potential conflicts, with Iran warning that involvement could bring severe consequences. Turkey is described as hedging and pursuing its own strategy; Erdogan’s stance is viewed as unreliable. India’s involvement is criticized for inviting Iran to participate in naval exercises and later backing away from condemning US actions against Iran, while still seeking to preserve a Middle East corridor aligned with energy and transport routes. - Long-term outlook: Iran is portrayed as fighting for the global South with Russia and China, challenging Western-dominated orders. The potential for a postwar settlement remains remote, given the Iranians’ demands (no more US bases in West Asia, reparations, no sanctions). Mediation is considered unlikely unless Russia intervenes as a mediator. The conversation concludes with the view that Iran’s resistance, continuity through leadership like the IRGC, and soft-power appeal have changed global perceptions, while the broader Eurasian integration project remains dependent on Iran, Russia, and China. - Closing note: The participants reflect on the costs and uncertainty of the conflict, noting that ending the crisis will require navigating deep geopolitical fault lines, including Azerbaijan and the broader energy architecture of Eurasia.

Tomorrow, the BRICS summit begins in South Africa, marking a significant moment in the shift of global power. The agenda includes discussions on currency, trade, military cooperation, AI, microchips, and infrastructure. The BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) are poised to dominate the global economy, with Goldman Sachs predicting their dominance by 2050. The United States, Britain, and Germany are notably absent from the summit. The focus is on reducing reliance on the US dollar as a reserve currency, with a gold-backed currency being introduced. Additionally, BRICS aims to lead in AI, with China already declaring its ambition to become the global leader by 2030.

The speaker discusses various points from the BRICS meeting. They mention their support for the open and fair multilateral trading system, as well as a strong global financial safety net centered around the IMF. They also condemn terrorism in all its forms, but the speaker suggests that terrorism is often used as a tool by certain leaders to create problems and justify measures. They mention examples such as the Moscow bombings in 2001 and the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, suggesting involvement by the CIA and British intelligence. The speaker finds it interesting that the BRICS leaders believe in the threat of terrorism despite its alleged manipulation. They briefly mention the Bataclan incident but don't elaborate.

Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst, joins the program to discuss the dramatic developments in the war against Iran. The conversation centers on the strike on Karg Island, the strategic choke point for Iran’s oil exports, and the broader implications of escalating U.S. actions. - Karg Island and the oil threat: The host notes that Karg Island handles 90% of Iran’s oil exports and asks why Trump isn’t targeting this area. Johnson argues the attack on Karg Island makes little strategic sense and points out that Iran has five oil terminals; destroying one would not end Iran’s potential revenue. He emphasizes that the U.S. bombed the runway of the major airport on the island, which he says remains irrelevant to Iran’s overall capacity to generate revenue. He notes the runway damage would not support U.S. objectives for invading the island, given runway length constraints (6,000 feet measured vs. need for 3,500–3,700 feet for certain aircraft) and the limited air force in Iran. Johnson asserts that Iran has indicated it would retaliate against oil terminals and Gulf neighbors if oil resources or energy infrastructure are attacked. - Economic and strategic consequences of closing the Strait of Hormuz: Johnson states that the action effectively shut the Strait of Hormuz, cutting off 20% of the world’s oil supply, 25% of global LNG, and 35% of the world’s urea for fertilizer. He explains fertilizer’s criticality to global agriculture and notes that rising gas and diesel prices in the United States would impact consumer costs, given many Americans live paycheck to paycheck. He suggests the price hikes contribute to inflationary pressure and could trigger a global recession, especially since Persian Gulf countries are pivotal energy suppliers. He also points out that the U.S. cannot easily reopen Hormuz without unacceptable losses and that Iran has prepared for contingencies for thirty years, with robust defenses including tunnels and coastal fortifications. - Military feasibility and strategy: The discussion covers the impracticality of a U.S. ground invasion of Iran, given the size of Iran’s army and the modern battlefield’s drone and missile threats. Johnson notes the U.S. Army and Marine numbers, the logistical challenges of sustaining an amphibious or airborne assault, and the vulnerability of American ships and troops to drones and missiles. He highlights that a mass deployment would be highly costly and dangerous, with historical evidence showing air power alone cannot win wars. The hosts discuss limited U.S. options and the possible futility of attempts to seize or occupy Iran’s territory. - Internal U.S. decision-making and DC dynamics: The program mentions a split inside Washington between anti-war voices and those pressing toward Tehran, with leaks suggesting that top officials warned Trump about major obstacles and potential losses. Johnson cites a leak from the National Intelligence Council indicating regime change in Tehran is unlikely, even with significant U.S. effort. He asserts the Pentagon’s credibility has been questioned after disputed reports (e.g., the KC-135 shootdown) and notes that Trump’s advisors who counsel restraint are being sidelined. - Iranian retaliation and targets: The discussion covers Iran’s targeting of air defenses and critical infrastructure, including radars at embassies and bases in the region, and the destruction of five Saudi air refueling tankers, which Trump later dismissed as fake news. Johnson says Iran aims to degrade Israel economically and militarily, while carefully avoiding mass civilian casualties in some instances. He observes Iran’s restraint in striking desalination plants, which would have caused a humanitarian catastrophe, suggesting a deliberate choice to keep certain targets within bounds. - Global realignments and the role of Russia, China, and India: The conversation touches on broader geopolitical shifts. Johnson argues that Russia and China are offering alternatives to the dollar-dominated order, strengthening ties with Gulf states and BRICS members. He suggests Gulf allies may be considering decoupling from U.S. security guarantees, seeking to diversify away from the petrodollar system. The discussion includes India’s position, noting Modi’s visit to Israel and India’s balancing act amid U.S. pressure and Iran relations; Iran’s ultimatum to allow passage for flag vessels and its diplomacy toward India is highlighted as a measured approach, even as India’s stance has attracted scrutiny. - Israel, casualties, and the broader landscape: The speakers discuss Israeli casualties and infrastructure under sustained Iranian strikes, noting limited information from within Israel due to media constraints and possible censorship. Johnson presents a game-theory view: if Israel threatens a nuclear option, Iran might be compelled to develop a nuclear capability as a deterrent, altering calculations for both Israel and the United States. - Terrorism narrative and historical context: The speakers challenge the U.S. portrayal of Iran as the world’s top sponsor of terrorism, arguing that ISIS and the Taliban have caused far more deaths in recent years, and that Iran’s responses to threats have historically prioritized restraint. They emphasize Iran’s chemical weapons restraint during the Iran-Iraq war, contrasting it with U.S. and Iraqi actions in the 1980s. - Final reflections: The discussion emphasizes the cascade effects of the conflict, including potential impacts on Taiwan’s energy and semiconductor production, multiplied by China’s leverage, and Russia’s increasing global influence. Johnson warns that the war’s end will likely be achieved through shifting alignments and economic realignments rather than a conventional battlefield victory, with the goal of U.S. withdrawal from the region as part of any settlement. The conversation closes with mutual thanks and a reaffirmation of ongoing analysis of these evolving dynamics.

Pepe and Mario discuss a broad set of geopolitical developments, focusing on Venezuela, Iran, and broader U.S.-led actions, with insights on Russia, China, and other regional players. - Venezuela developments and U.S. involvement - Venezuela is described as a “desperate move related to the demise of the petrodollar,” with multiple overlapping headlines about backers maneuvering for profit and power in Latin America, and about the U.S. declaring “this is my backyard.” Delcy Rodríguez, the daughter of a slain revolutionary killed by the CIA, leads a new government, described as old-school Chavista with strong negotiation skills, who prioritizes Venezuela’s interests over U.S. interests. - The operation is criticized as having no clear strategy or forward planning for reorganizing the Venezuelan oil industry to serve U.S. interests. Estimates from Chinese experts suggest it would take five years to recondition Venezuela’s energy ecosystem for American needs and sixteen years to reach around 3 million barrels per day, requiring approximately $183 billion in investment—investment that U.S. CEOs are reportedly unwilling to provide without total guarantees. - There is debate about the extent of U.S. influence within Maduro’s circle. Some Venezuelan sources note that the head of security for the president, previously aligned with the regime, was demoted (not arrested), and there is discussion of possible U.S. ties with individuals around Maduro’s inner circle, though the regime remains headed by Maduro with key loyalists like the defense minister (Padrino) and the interior minister (Cabello) still in place. - The narrative around regime change is viewed as a two-edged story: the U.S. sought to replace Maduro with a pliant leadership, yet the regime remains and regional power structures (including BRICS dynamics) persist. Delcy Rodríguez is portrayed as capable of negotiating with the U.S., including conversations with Marco Rubio before the coup and ongoing discussions with U.S. actors, while maintaining Venezuela’s sovereignty and memory of the revolution. - The broader regional reaction to U.S. actions in Venezuela has included criticism from neighboring countries like Colombia and Mexico, with a sense in Latin America that the U.S. should not intrude in sovereign affairs. Brazil (a major BRICS member) is highlighted as a key actor whose stance can influence Venezuela’s BRICS prospects; Lula’s position is described as cautious, with Brazil’s foreign ministry reportedly vetoing Venezuela’s BRICS membership despite Lula’s personal views. - The sanctions regime is cited as a principal reason for Venezuela’s economic stagnation, with the suggestion that lifting sanctions would be a prerequisite for meaningful economic recovery. Delcy Rodríguez is characterized as a skilled negotiator who could potentially improve Venezuela’s standing if sanctions are removed. - Public opinion in Venezuela is described as broadly supportive of the regime, with the U.S. action provoking anti-American sentiment across the hemisphere. The discussion notes that a large majority of Venezuelans (over 90%) reportedly view Delcy Rodríguez favorably, and that the perception of U.S. intervention as a violation of sovereignty influences regional attitudes. - Iran: protests, economy, and foreign influence - Iran is facing significant protests that are described as the most severe since 2022, driven largely by economic issues, inflation, and the cost of living under four decades of sanctions. Real inflation is suggested to be 35–40%, with currency and purchasing power severely eroded. - Foreign influence is discussed as a factor hijacking domestic protests in Iran, described as a “color revolution” playbook echoed by past experiences in Hong Kong and other theaters. Iranian authorities reportedly remain skeptical of Western actors, while acknowledging the regime’s vulnerability to sanctions and mismanagement. - Iranians emphasize the long-term, multi-faceted nature of their political system, including the Shiite theology underpinning governance, and the resilience of movements like Hezbollah and Yemeni factions. Iran’s leadership stresses long-term strategic ties with Russia and China, as well as BRICS engagement, with practical cooperation including repair of the Iranian electrical grid in the wake of Israeli attacks during the twelve-day war and port infrastructure developments linked to an international transportation corridor, including Indian and Chinese involvement. - The discussion notes that while sanctions have damaged Iran economically, Iranians maintain a strong domestic intellectual and grassroots culture, including debates in universities and cafes, and are not easily toppled. The regime’s ability to survive is framed in terms of internal legitimacy, external alliances (Russia, China), and the capacity to negotiate under external pressure. - Russia, China, and the U.S. strategic landscape - The conversation contrasts the apparent U.S. “bordello circus” with the more sophisticated military-diplomatic practices of Iran, Russia, and China. Russia emphasizes actions over rhetoric, citing NATO attacks on its nuclear triad and the Novgorod residence attack as evidence of deterrence concerns. China pursues long-term plans (five-year plans through 2035) and aims to elevate trade with a yuan-centric global south, seeking to reduce dollar reliance without emitting a formal de-dollarization policy. - The discussion frames U.S. policy as volatile and unpredictable (the Nixon “madman theory” analog), while Russia, China, and Iran respond with measured, long-term strategies. The potential for a prolonged Ukraine conflict is acknowledged if European leaders pursue extended confrontation, with economic strains anticipated across Europe. - In Venezuela, Iran, and broader geopolitics, the panel emphasizes the complexity of regime stability, the role of sanctions, BRICS dynamics, and the long game of global power shifts that may redefine alliances and economic arrangements over the coming years.