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I had the privilege of attending President Trump's meeting with the UK Prime Minister today. I saw firsthand his exceptional diplomacy and statesmanship as he strengthens international support for peace in Europe and the Middle East. We're also pursuing a new trade deal between the US and the UK, which promises greater prosperity, security, technological advancements, and medical breakthroughs for both nations. President Trump inherited a world seemingly headed towards endless war, record-high inflation, falling living standards, and an open border. Now, we're reopening American energy to lower living costs, actively pursuing peace, and tackling debt through historic cuts to the federal bureaucracy. We're reasserting American strength and leadership, using our power and vision to restore peace globally. This has been an extraordinary first month of his presidency.

The speaker compliments the president on his shirt and mentions that Trump won. They ask the president what he plans to do to stop the war in Ukraine once he becomes the 47th president. The president responds by saying that he would start by calling two people: Putin and Zelensky. He would arrange a meeting and guarantee that he could work out a deal. The president mentions that he knows exactly what he would say to each person and that a deal would be made within 24 hours.

Let me affirm. The suffering Syria endured, we wish upon no one. We are among the peoples most deeply aware of the horrors of war and destruction. For this reason, we stand firmly with the people of Gaza.

President Trump was too gentle with Zelensky, and should handle Netanyahu the same way to prevent him from instigating a war in the Middle East, specifically a war with Iran and others. Netanyahu views the current situation as an opportunity to settle with everyone, claiming to be fighting on five or seven fronts, including Houthis, militias in Iraq and Syria, and Iran. He is allegedly trying to occupy Syria up to Damascus, a move that Erdogan opposes. The speaker believes that Turkey will eventually get involved to protect Damascus, one of the three great Islamic cities. This could create a structural problem since Turkey is a member of NATO, but the speaker doesn't think NATO matters anymore. The speaker believes what is happening will end everything we're accustomed to, including the rules-based order and global hegemony, forcing everyone in BRICS together.

Speaker 0 states: "Doing it. President Trump is in the process of doing it. They're going to lose, and we're going to win. Israel and The United States, you just wait to see what comes in the next two weeks. Two the next two weeks meaning what? We're gonna blow the hell out of these people."

Bennett says that if he became prime minister by the end of the year, Israeli foreign policy would “profoundly” change. In his first three weeks, he would fly to meet Egypt’s President Sisi, Jordan’s King Abdallah, and UAE leader Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, launching a “regional renaissance,” and he would also pursue an “Israeli renaissance” after what he describes as four difficult years involving internal instability, the October 7 massacre, and a prolonged war. On Iran, Bennett says the contemplated arrangement addresses only the nuclear component and not ballistic missiles or the regional terror/proxy component. He describes a long-term “cold war” dynamic between Israel and Iran, asserting that the regime will collapse from internal contradictions involving corruption, incompetence, radicalism, and disconnection, and he frames Iran as the “head of the octopus” that supports conflict across the region. His strategy is to weaken and accelerate the regime’s demise through “soft elements” with the United States and others, while also seeking to delay progress toward a nuclear weapon. He summarizes his end goal as toppling Iran’s regime before it acquires nuclear capability. He also gives an example from his earlier prime ministership: when protests occur, Iran cracks down violently and turns off the internet, so he proposes ensuring internet continuity in advance so the regime cannot execute its usual response to protests, comparing the approach to Reagan’s actions toward the Soviet Union. He also says no moderate Arab country is happy about Iran and that he would build regional alliances. Bennett responds to hypothetical diplomacy with Iran’s leadership by saying it is so theoretical that if Iran were willing to embrace peace and dismantle its terror proxy network, nuclear program, and ballistic missile program, it would no longer be “the Islamic Republic of Iran.” He says if such changes happen, then “come and ask me.” The discussion turns to Lebanon. Bennett says he has long called for Hezbollah’s disarmament. He describes the Lebanon issue as extremely complicated, citing concerns that Israel’s intentions could be broader than eradicating Hezbollah and pointing to the Iran-related arrangement that does not mention ballistic missiles or proxy networks. In his view, Hezbollah likely remains and Israel will always see it as a threat. For Lebanon, he says he would launch a “massive, warm and positive diplomacy” campaign focused on business to build bridges with Egypt, Jordan, the Saudis, and the UAE, which he says Israel is not doing enough. He would keep the buffer zone in place “until, Hezbollah is dismantled,” using kinetic, diplomacy, and economic tools to strengthen and legitimize a moderate Lebanese government. He frames Hezbollah as an arm of Iran that receives roughly a billion dollars a year for military purposes and says Israel has uncovered Hezbollah’s underground infrastructure in southern Lebanon. He argues he does not want Israeli territorial desires in Lebanon and that Israel’s security “insurance” would be removed only when he is confident Hezbollah is gone. On Turkey and Syria, Bennett says Turkey is “complicated” because he believes in Turkey while describing Erdogan as a disaster with radical Islamist ideology and hostility toward Israel. He says he would navigate through that and work where possible with goodwill. For Syria’s Al-Sharaa, he says he would be extremely cautious, calls him a murderer and terrorist based on past actions and what he describes as atrocities against Druze, Alawites, and Kurds, and says time and behavior are required before any chance. He does not want a greater Israel and says Israel is “great as it is,” aiming to ensure people in the Golan Heights can sleep safely. He addresses timing for withdrawal from Syrian-controlled territory by saying he would consider it when he can look at families living in the Golan Heights and feel confident they will be secure and not be slaughtered, and he says it is not on a stopwatch. He highlights concerns about other actors increasing involvement in Syria, naming Turkey and Qatar as negative contributors that support Hamas. Bennett contrasts what he describes as Netanyahu-era war conduct with his proposed approach: he says he would set clear end-game visions and sequences rather than prolonged conflict. For Gaza, his end game is a demilitarized Gaza by Hamas where Gazans govern themselves under overriding Israeli security control, aiming for dignity, freedom, and prosperity without Israeli settlements. For Lebanon, his end game is Israel not being in Lebanon, with any short-term presence framed as self-defense, and building a “beautiful Lebanon” on the condition that Hezbollah governance is removed. He says the current government does not clearly state an end game. He also addresses claims that Israel’s international position is deteriorating, saying Israel’s image in the United States and abroad is terrible despite not reflecting reality. He attributes part of this to a global tendency to see attackers as victims and vice versa, to campus attacks after October 7, to dragging wars on for too long, and to a lack of public diplomacy. On the Palestinian issue, Bennett rejects that it is the “center” of the Middle East’s problems, arguing instead that radical Islam is the core driver. He says Palestinian statehood attempts failed: Oslo is described as blowing up with thousands of Israeli deaths during the Second Intifada, and the 2005 disengagement from Gaza is described as enabling a terror state. He asserts that during Gaza’s early post-withdrawal period, there was no siege or blockade and that Gaza was Palestinian before any Israeli presence beyond the 1949 lines. He says the solution principles are security for Israelis and maximum freedom, dignity, and prosperity for Palestinians, while insisting Israel should not govern Palestinians or apply Israeli sovereignty to the PA. He describes a gradual approach by improving Palestinian lives through limited actions that do not risk Israeli security, citing an example from his premiership: removing a cap on trade between the PA and Jordan, which he says increased trade and improved lives without security risk. In closing, Bennett reiterates his emphasis on security and gradual improvements. He says Israelis should respect that a Palestinian state was tried twice and “blew up” and killed Israelis, and urges viewers to consider why Israelis oppose a Palestinian state now due to reality. He concludes that he expects “a very good period” for Israel and the region over the next 25 years.

Mister President, the U.S. is pushing for regime change in Syria, seeking a new leader and isolating you diplomatically. What are your thoughts on this? I am confident because my identity is rooted in Syria, not the U.S. Decisions about Syria should be made by the Syrian people alone. What if there were an alternative to you? Who could that be? Any Syrian could be an alternative; there are many eligible candidates. However, no one who is influenced by foreign powers should hold the presidency. This is a fundamental principle for us.

It's an honor to have President Zelenskyy of Ukraine here. We've been working closely together for a long time, and we've negotiated a fair deal that will benefit both our countries and the world. I've also had good discussions with President Putin, and we're trying to bring the conflict in Ukraine to a close. Too many soldiers are dying, and we want to see the money used for rebuilding instead. The previous administration didn't engage with Russia, but I believe if I were president, this war would have never happened. We're providing great equipment to Ukraine, and their soldiers have been incredibly brave. We're going to sign an agreement soon, and I think we're close to a deal to stop the shooting. It's an exciting moment, and I appreciate everyone being here.

Before the brutal killings and Iran's involvement in attacks, President Trump took a tough stance, defeating ISIS and maintaining peace in the Middle East. He avoided endless wars and gave no taxpayer money to Iran. Speaker 1 emphasizes that evil only respects unyielding strength, promising to show enemies that any harm to Americans will be met with a strong response. President Trump asserts that he will bring back the strength needed to make America strong again. This message is approved by Donald J. Trump.

The speaker states that sanctions against Syria were once important but are now being removed, expressing optimism about Syria's future success. The speaker hopes Syria will "show us something very special," similar to Saudi Arabia. The administration is pursuing peaceful engagement and offering friendship to those who accept it in good faith. The speaker claims unprecedented strides and progress have been made, envisioning a bright future for the Middle East. The speaker suggests that if nations in the region set aside differences and focus on shared interests, the world will be amazed. The speaker believes the Middle East, the "geographic center of the world and the spiritual heart of its greatest faiths," will transform from a place of turmoil to a land of opportunity and hope.

Starting in 2023, a British nongovernment organization, which specializes in conflict resolution, invited me to help them bring this guy out of the terrorist world and into regular politics. And at first, I have to tell you, I was very leery of going. I sort of had images of me in an orange jumpsuit with a knife to my throat. But after talking to several people who had gone in, and one of whom had met him, I decided to take the chance. And so the first time I met him, this guy's name, is known to Gare, was Abdul Qatir Jolani, but his actual name is Ahmed Sharah, which he only revealed to the world after he captured Damascus in the Blitzkrieg of December 2024, about five months ago. First time I met him, I sat down next to him, and I'm literally as close as I am to Roy. And I said, this is all in Arabic, I said, never in a million years could I imagine that I would be sitting next to you. Long beard, thin fatigues. And he looked at me, he speaks very softly. And he said, me neither. And we went on and actually had a pretty civil conversation. I share this because he said something which really piqued my interest. He never apologized, never apologized for the terrorist attacks in Iraq or in Syria, although there were many fewer in Syria. Never apologized. But he also said, you know, now I am governing an opposition held area of Northwest Syria, and I am learning that the tactics and the principles that I was following in Iraq do not apply when you actually have to govern 4,000,000 people. And they had 2,000,000 residents of that area of Syria, and then another 2,000,000 refugees who had come there from other parts of Syria. So they had a population of 4,000,000. He said, I am learning that to govern, you have to make compromises. I was very struck by that. So that was in March 2023, just over two years ago. We went back a second time in September.

The conversation begins with discussion of a sudden shift in US/Iran-Israel rhetoric and a development reported as Iran suspending its delegation trip to Switzerland for the opening round of nuclear negotiations. The initial source cited is Al Mayadeen. Iran’s stated reason is ongoing Israeli military operations in southern Lebanon. Iran argues that Israel operating more than six miles inside Lebanese territory violates Article 1 of the MOU, which calls for an immediate end to hostilities on all fronts, including Lebanon, and therefore Iran says there is “nothing to go to Geneva for” if the ceasefire clause is being breached before negotiations begin. The transcript also notes that Donald Trump posted a call for a complete ceasefire on all fronts, including Lebanon, Hezbollah, and Israel. The discussion then shifts to the “wild card” described as Israel and whether Trump can reign in Netanyahu. Colonel argues that Israeli leadership and US supporters were instrumental in putting Trump into the White House and that they are turning current events into a “test of Jewish power,” aiming to bully Trump back into attacking Iran. He claims this is where events are headed. He also references a CNN report that Netanyahu is reportedly lobbying to shape the final US-Iran agreement by pressuring Trump through allies and intermediaries in Washington, mobilizing pro-Israeli senators and media allies. The transcript further states Netanyahu believes a final agreement will be reached but remains concerned Tehran will not uphold commitments, and that Netanyahu said “we will restore security to the north” by keeping the security zone in southern Lebanon as long as Israel’s security needs require. Asked whether Trump can withstand pressure, Colonel states he believes Trump and Iran “collectively reached the point” where they see no point in further war. He describes what he says was Trump’s private impression earlier in political interactions: Trump did not want a war with Iran, thought an arrangement could be reached, and was focused on the United States. Colonel claims Trump’s transformation began with Ukraine, and later shifted into belligerence. He says that at the beginning of the collision with Iran, Trump used language around sending B-2 bombers and said “the war is over,” but that he “couldn’t do it,” and became concerned about financial markets, polls, and the economy. Colonel claims Trump kept repeating that the war would end soon, but that the only way to end it was to end it, not by talking and not by a military solution. Colonel further claims Trump did not want to use a nuclear weapon and that it was “off the table.” Colonel then discusses Trump’s relationship with Israel and the MOU as a rough framework. He says Trump finds elements of the framework comfortable, including not meddling in internal affairs and reducing overseas entanglements. He also claims Trump had conversations with Netanyahu and made it clear he does not want Israel to go nuclear. Colonel portrays Trump’s decision-making as attempting to bring the conflict to closure, after concluding bombing would not work. He says Trump may have been shown information about Israel’s actions in Gaza and Lebanon that contributed to a change in how Trump framed the issue, and he references Trump’s comments about destroying an entire apartment building to eliminate one person. The transcript moves into a broader argument about long-term regional power shifts. Colonel says the two powers that will emerge are Iran and Turkey, and that they will dominate the Middle East for decades. He distinguishes them, asserting Iran will coexist and can be talked to and do business, while provoking Turkey would be “a fight to the finish.” He argues Turkey has a martial character and cites its military effectiveness as being among the top five in the world. When asked about Turkey’s military capabilities, he emphasizes not only technology but human material and soldier character, adding a cultural reference about a funeral song for Turkish soldiers. Colonel then presents “ISR-Strike” as the strategic change behind modern warfare, linking surveillance and standoff attack systems, and claims that this makes older power projection methods less effective. He argues the world must change and criticizes calls to reset to past patterns of “go back in and bomb some more,” drawing analogies to historical Roman limits. In this context, he says Trump understands the need for change and “cutting losses.” Asked whether Israel could sabotage negotiations by continuing strikes and whether Trump could refuse to support Israel even defensively, Colonel says what the question describes is “almost already happening,” pointing to Israeli shelling and a likely effort to attack Hizballah positions. He says Israel needs US assistance with munitions, missiles, and intelligence, and argues that Netanyahu would pressure Washington through officials and lawmakers to force support. Colonel also states he is “genuinely concerned” about the president’s safety. Later, the conversation turns to speculation about how pressure could escalate beyond normal political attacks. Colonel suggests that investigations could be launched involving members of the president’s family, pointing to personal wealth growth and potential exploitation of “unsavory” matters, and references “the Epstein files” as something that could return to center stage. He then argues that escalating outcomes can range from orchestrated efforts to unexpected attempts, comparing to historical assassination attempts. He says calls for resignation are not what he supports at that moment, arguing resignation should occur after closing the chapter. Finally, the discussion addresses how much agency the president and commanders have within the system. The transcript cites claims from CENTCOM and other departments that commanders have less agency than expected and that higher-level elected officials similarly have constraints due to bureaucratic structures, service hierarchies, confirmation processes, and lobbying. Colonel ties this to a broader system of incentives and limited political time for presidents to accomplish objectives, concluding with a reference to his book “A Margin of Victory: Five Battles That Changed the Face of War, Modern Warfare.”

Israel is saying it will continue to stay in Lebanon, even though Speaker 0 says this is not part of the memorandum of understanding. Speaker 0 describes recent actions in southern Lebanon, saying Israel used a massive explosive to destroy a southern Lebanese town. Speaker 0 claims Israel is now saying there was a 200 meter long tunnel that “we had to blow it up,” and notes that this is described as one of the largest non-nuclear bombs used in modern history, with “astounding” images. Speaker 0 asks what the bomb could have been and what it indicates militarily. Speaker 1 responds that the device looks similar to the “mother of all bombs” (MOAB) and suspects it is a fueled air explosive, described as very powerful, possibly in a very large version. Speaker 1 says people online speculate it is a tactical nuclear weapon, but Speaker 1 states there is no evidence and says they lack access to data collection that could confirm radiation detection. Speaker 1 concludes that, from where they sit, it appears to involve a lot of fuel or explosive and is very devastating, while emphasizing a separate point about political messaging and troop morale. Speaker 1 says Benjamin Netanyahu is telling people, “we’re there, we’re staying, we’re not leaving,” and that listeners must listen to Netanyahu and believe him “from his vantage point.” Speaker 1 says Netanyahu spoke to a gathering of officers who had been fighting in southern Lebanon, encouraging them by telling them they had done great things and that they were “roaring ahead.” Speaker 1 says the officers’ reaction in the room was “very similar to Sersky,” describing heads down, no response, exhaustion, worn-out conditions, heavy losses, and doubt that Netanyahu would achieve what he said they would achieve. Speaker 1 also claims the war with Iran is not over, just as the war in Ukraine is not over, and predicts a shift in emphasis from the Persian Gulf region (the Gulf of Oman) toward Syria, Iraq, Israel, and Lebanon to do damage to Iran. Speaker 1 says the approach includes “going to the Kurds,” hoping they help against the Iranians, trying to enlist support of Islamist “murderers and killers” in Syria under the command of Mr. Erdogan, and “bribing him” to go along while he “murders Muslim Arabs and Christian Arabs in Gaza.” Speaker 1 further claims the United States or its allies have “bribed and essentially bought the government of Lebanon,” which “effectively said we'll cede southern Lebanon to the Israelis.” Speaker 1 adds that northern Iraq and Syria are being watched for offensive action against the Iranians. Speaker 1 states the MOU “isn’t worth the paper it’s written on,” and says if Iran hasn’t figured that out, then they are not the “smart people.” Speaker 1 finishes by stating that, instead of responding to weekend attacks, Iran should have waited until Monday morning and “tanked the markets.”

President Xi Jinping invites President Trump to deliver opening remarks and welcomes him back to China after nine years, saying the whole world is watching. Xi describes the global environment as accelerating and turbulent, with the world at a crossroads, and frames key questions: whether China and the United States can overcome the “Thucydides trap” and create a new paradigm for major-country relations; whether they can meet global challenges together and provide stability; and whether, for the well-being of their peoples and humanity’s future, they can build a brighter future for bilateral relations. Xi says these questions are vital to history, the world, and the people, and must be answered by leaders of major countries. He notes this year marks the 250th anniversary of American independence and congratulates Trump and the American people. Xi says he believes the two countries have more common interests than differences, and that success in one is an opportunity for the other. He argues that a stable bilateral relationship benefits the world, and emphasizes that both countries gain from cooperation and lose from confrontation. He calls for the two countries to be partners, not rivals, and to help each other succeed and prosper together while finding the right way for major countries to get along in the new era. Xi expresses his look forward to discussions on major issues important to both countries and the world, and to working with Trump to set the course for and steer the “giant ship” of China–U.S. relations so that 2026 becomes a historic landmark year that opens a new chapter. Trump responds by thanking Xi, calling the experience an honor, and saying he was particularly impressed by the children, who he describes as happy and beautiful. He says the military presence “couldn’t be better,” but that the children were “amazing” and represent so much to Xi. Trump says he and Xi have known each other a long time and that it is the longest relationship between leaders of the two countries. He describes their relationship as fantastic, saying they have gotten along, worked through difficulties quickly by calling each other when problems arose, and will have a fantastic future together. He says he has respect for China and for Xi’s leadership. Trump also states that he leads a delegation of leading businessmen, including “the top 30 in the world,” all of whom said yes to be present with him to pay respects to Xi and China and to pursue trade and business, which he says will be totally reciprocal. He says people in the United States are not talking about anything else, calls the summit one of the biggest ever, and concludes that the China–U.S. relationship will be better than ever before.

Rania Khalek discusses Lebanon’s situation, saying the Lebanese government “effectively abandoned” the southern territory and “handed it over to Israel,” calling the signed deal “utterly shocking” and “submissive.” She argues the agreement forfeits Lebanon’s right to pursue legal cases against Israel for violations of international law and “constant war crimes,” cements Israeli occupation of the South, allows Israel to bomb whenever it “feels threatened,” and conditions any Israeli withdrawal on Lebanon colluding with the Israelis and Americans to conduct a civil war against Hezbollah in the South. Khalek says even people who are anti-resistance are alarmed, with questions about whether the government was blackmailed and how the deal could be worse than the Oslo Accords. She links the timing and rush of the agreement to earlier developments: after a memorandum of understanding and an Iranian-American meeting, she describes a “deconfliction cell” in Lebanon involving Iranians to enforce an Israeli ceasefire and “ultimate withdrawal.” She says the Lebanese anti-resistance camp “freaked out” because it would be a win for Hezbollah, Iran, and Lebanon. She claims Marco Rubio stepped in, working with Israelis and Lebanese Zionists in Washington to undermine the American-Iranian framework spearheaded by J.D. Vance. Addressing Lebanon’s internal sectarian structure, George notes the state is built on sectarian divisions, reserved parliamentary seats, and constitutional arrangements. Khalek responds that the deal is “politically untenable” and “can’t actually work,” arguing even the Lebanese army would not agree to go to war with Hezbollah or disarm them as demanded, warning this could lead to dangerous split or civil strife within the army. She cites polling distinctions, saying that in Lebanon, supporting disarming Hezbollah is not the same as supporting Israel, and that the majority sees Israel as the main enemy while also recognizing the Lebanese army cannot defend Lebanon. Khalek argues the deal creates extreme polarization by giving the pretense of Lebanese approval to a US and Israeli plan, allowing US and Israeli actors to claim legitimacy to the Iranians. She says the people who signed away Lebanon lack popular support and are in power due to American and Saudi installation after what she describes as a Hezbollah defeat in 2024, predicting opposition could lead to uprising and civil strife. She also says Israel could not disarm Hezbollah, and that Israel’s experience shows Hezbollah’s strength and continued supply and intelligence sharing with the US. She adds that in Iran, the speaker of parliament, Ghalibaf, told Nabi Bidi, the Lebanese parliament speaker and Shia leader, insisting on a ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal, setting up “contradiction” between the Israeli-U.S. plan and Iran’s position. She frames the outcome as depending on whether the Trump administration recognizes it has lost its war and chooses to change course. In a later exchange, George raises Trump’s public threats to unleash al-Qaeda from Syria against Lebanon. Khalek says this has not gone down well due to prior Syrian occupation of Lebanon and al-Qaeda’s invasion during the ISIS era, when Lebanese forces and Hezbollah cooperated to push them out and when “Jolani” (described as Ahmed al-Shara, then al-Nusra leader) led those forces. She says obstacles prevent a Syrian move: Shara is focused on stabilizing Syria’s post-regime change situation, disciplining and killing minorities, and he answers to Turkey. Khalek claims Turkey would not greenlight a Syrian invasion weakening Hezbollah in a way that could allow Israel to target Turkey next. She also points to an agreement clause internationalizing Hezbollah disarmament by saying it would receive help from Arab countries without specifying which, suggesting that if Turkey or Saudi Arabia changed their position later, the stipulation could be used to justify an Arab, including Syrian, intervention. She concludes it is unlikely to happen soon.

And I can tell you, and I I hope that he will also hear this, that strange though it may seem, but throughout these days, both during informal and formal talks, there was not one case when anyone voiced a negative opinion about the current US administration, not once during these four days. All of all the people that I talked to supported the meeting that we had in Anchorage, and they all expressed hope that the position held by president Trump and the position held by Russia and all the other parties will lead to an end of this conflict. So that is something that I'm saying without any kind of irony. And since I'm saying this publicly and everyone in the world will hear this, It is a direct it is a direct confirmation of the fact that it's true because all of those people will hear me.

Speaker 0 asks for an interpretation of a post, saying, “I’m hoping this is it.” Speaker 1 responds that the post is the 39th one making the same claim, and that the first 38 have proven false. Despite that, Speaker 1 says they are fundamentally an optimist, waking up in a cheerful mood every morning almost without fail, and they want to believe the claim. Speaker 1 explains they have always thought a lot of Trump and that they literally campaigned for him without being paid, doing it because they wanted to. They still say they want to believe, but they cannot overstate that Iran’s fundamental demands—those from which Iran “will not move”—are non-negotiable. Speaker 1 says these demands will be really hard to accept, and that there is “no way around the fact” that Iran is going to control one of the most important pieces of real estate on the planet.

Speaker 0 expresses utmost respect for the president, noting he has given many people hope to beat the bad guys and to do it with head held high and integrity intact. He shares that the president is from Queens, New York, like him, and that the president has shown that even in the worst times you can come back from it. The speaker says the president has been through publicly having to constantly be lied on, and that it’s not funny. He emphasizes that unless you are in that person’s shoes you’ll never understand what it feels like, as the person is a human being with a family who has to read those lies. He states that this administration is full of people with heart and soul, and they make him proud. The vice president is praised as well; the speaker loves both of them. They are described as powerful, smart, and strong, with an uncanny ability to relate to people. They haven’t lost touch with the world and remain connected to what’s happening with younger and older people, with the richer and the not-so-rich. They have the ability to stay real and make us feel proud to be American.

The press is focused on narratives, but I am focused on peace. Characterizing my stance as pro-Russia or anything else is garbage. I was elected to bring peace to this conflict, and I'm working with both sides in a way that only I can. Only I can bring them to the table to end the killing. Being behind the scenes, I am laser-focused on making that happen. We're closer today than ever before because of my leadership.

Speaker 0: Welcome to game plan. I'm Shivan Jan now. So far, there is only one winner in this war in West Asia, and that's Russia. Mind you, I'm not saying that this was acknowledged by the European Council president Antonio Costa. US Israeli strikes in West Asia, they have driven up the price of oil, strengthening the Kremlin's ability to fund its military campaign. Now in a sharp reversal from last year's policy of penalizing countries for buying Russian energy, US treasury secretary Scott Pessen said that The United States could unsanction other Russian oil to keep the flow of oil intact. And this is because the Strait Of Hormuz, the pivotal point from where this war is kind of converging, that is under complete Iranian control. Movement of ships has been blocked. Movement of oil has been blocked. It has shot up the oil prices, and the repercussions are being felt across the world at this point. Is the war proving to be a boon for Russia whose economy is dependent on energy exports? As the state of Hormuz gets blocked, Russia gets a free hand at selling its oil at rates that can be expounded without proper discounts as well. Is Putin the one winning in the war that US and Israel started against Iran? To discuss this with me on game plan is doctor Glenn Deesen, professor of international relations at the University of Southeastern Norway. Glenn, always a pleasure speaking with you. Thanks so much for joining me here. Trump and Putin, they held a call recently, the first time this year, and this was to discuss the discuss the ongoing hostilities in Iran. What do you think they would have discussed, and what kind of a role can Putin be playing in the ongoing war? Speaker 1: Well, I assume some of the things to discuss was obviously the the the extent to which The US and Russia targets each other because one of the things that the American media has been complaining about is the likelihood that Russia is providing intelligence to Iran for targets, but of course this is what The United States been doing for years and continues to do, that is give the Ukrainians targets to hit Russia. So I think there's a necessity to begin to discuss is appropriate and again what happens behind these doors, I don't know. But also of course there has to be some scaling back of the energy sanctions against Russia to bring this, the energy prices under control. As you suggest, they are now very much out of control. But I think also the main thing they've discussed is how to bring this war to an end because I think it's perfectly clear now that this US attack on Iran was a terrible mistake, and it appears that Putin would be the the main middleman who would might be able to bring an end to this war. But, again, it depends what can be done as what the Iranians will demand may be more than what the Americans can deliver. Speaker 0: Glenn, as you mentioned, Putin could perhaps be the main person to bring peace in this war. Putin has the highest chance of acting as peacemaker in West Asia. Is there anyone other than Putin at this point who can bring? Because just look at the optics of it. US starts a war, and I think ten days into it, he needs to make a call to Vladimir Putin to discuss that same war. How does it look for The US? Speaker 1: Well, they don't care for this, of course, but that it's similar to what to what happened with the war against Syria. That is, if you remember, back at president Obama's time, he had set these red lines, he were gonna attack Syria. It was quite obvious that this would be a disaster. So he went to the Russian president and he was able to get a deal through and which essentially took Obama's chestnuts out of the fire. So it was, you know, it it it is the reality or the optics of it isn't great given that The US has been fighting a proxy war for years against Russia, but but, know, at some point, you have to put the optics aside. Who who else would be in a position to help to negotiate this? I'm thinking, you know, perhaps China could be a middleman, but I think given that The United States, especially under the Trump administration, wants to improve bilateral ties with Russia, I I I think he's probably the best, yeah, the best bet. Speaker 0: Would it be fair to say that Putin is emerging as a winner in this ongoing West Asia war, which only seems to be expanding within the West Asian region? Speaker 1: Well, no. I think, yeah, to a large extent, I think that is correct because the energy prices are way up. The US have to scale back sanctions. The all the weapons which The US had intended to ship towards Ukraine to fight Russia is now being depleted. For European leaders, as you mentioned earlier on, to who aspire to prolong the war in Ukraine, this is an absolute disaster. And we'll see that countries that cut the energy ties or at least reduced energy ties with Russia at the best of American pressure, they of course have learned a lesson now as well that this was not a good idea that you don't necessarily put bet too much on a hegemon in decline, so countries who before paid discounts now may have to pay premium. We'll see that Iran, which I assume is getting some support from Russia sees this relationship improving dramatically. They're moving much closer, which is good for Russia because the Iranians always have some suspicions towards the Russians given well a long history they've had through the centuries of conflict. So all of this improves. You can also say that The Gulf States, the weakening of The Gulf States has also a big impact on weakening The U. S. Ability to restore its hegemony because what show what's obvious now is that the Gulf States are not getting protection instead they're becoming very vulnerable as frontline states and The US is no longer seen as that reliable. Well, if they're not going to bet their security on The United States anymore then they may not have that much pressure to sell their oil in dollars. You're not gonna have those recycled petrodollars coming back to The US, and suddenly the whole AI race with China looks a lot weaker as well. So I think across the board, a lot of things look good for Russia, but and there is a big but here, and that is I don't think that the Russians want this war nonetheless because the Russians, much like the Chinese, value stability and predictability. And what's happening in Iran now could again, if something would happen to Iran collapse, that would be a disaster for this Greater Eurasia initiative that is to integrate economies of Greater Eurasian Continent, but also this could spiral into a world war. So from this perspective, it's very dangerous and I don't doubt that the Russians therefore want to put an end to this war simply because I guess much like India, they don't want the Eurasian Continent to be too China centric, they would like to have many poles of power and this requires diversification. This means that the Russians need close ties with Iran, with India and other countries. So for the Americans to knock off Iran off the, you know, the chessboard, the greater Eurasian chessboard would be a disaster for the Russians. So, yes, I think they're prospering or benefiting from this, but they they do wanna put an end to it. Speaker 0: Understood. Glenn, let me just come to the Strait Of Hormuz. You know, the objectives of U. S. Behind starting this war, that has been questioned enough. Why did you start this war in the first place? Those are questions not just emerging, you know, globally. They're also emerging from inside The U. S. But if you look at what a win will actually look like for US, would it be the state of Hormuz? Like, which whoever controls the state of Hormuz is eventually who walks away as you know, walks away with the victory at this point because The US was looking for a change in regime. They mentioned it enough number of times. That hasn't happened and doesn't seem like it's going to happen. Is the state of Hormuz the winning factor now? Speaker 1: Well, I I I don't think any The US would be in a position to control this just given the geography. So The US obviously went into into this war with the objective of regime change. That was the goal. This was the decapitation strike, this was the hope of killing Khamenei and obviously it didn't work. I think it shouldn't have come as a surprise, but you know killing the leader of Iran only created more solidarity within the country. And also the idea that the whole armed forces would begin to disintegrate once they had been punished enough, also proven to be incorrect. So I think at the moment you see the American pivoting a bit. Some are talking about the Strait Of Moose that this should be a goal, others are saying you see a shift now towards saying well, actually what we really want to do is just degrade Iran's missile capabilities that they won't have this long range missiles. And again, you know, these are the kind of vague objectives which they can essentially declare victory today then because Iran has had many of its missiles destroyed. Also it launched a lot of its missiles at U. S. Targets which means that its missile stockpile has been reduced. So this should be a source of optimism when The U. S. Moves from this very hard line objective such as regime change and they shift in towards missiles, reducing the missile stockpiles or something like this. But the straight of our moves, I think, is beyond what what is reasonable. It's it will be too difficult. So I don't think they will But why push too hard on do Speaker 0: you feel it would be difficult if I were to just look at the bases that they have across West Asia? They have enough military might. Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, have their bases there. How difficult would it be to exert that military might over the Strait Of Hormuz? Speaker 1: Well, controlling it just means the ability to shut it down. Many countries would have the ability to shut down this narrow strait. The problem is that no one benefits from it, that is the Gulf States are hurt, Iran is hurt from it, The US and the global economy is hurt. So it becomes an exercise in self harm. The reason why the Iranians are doing this, the ability to shut down the Strait Of Hormuz is because The US has the ability to inflict a mass amount of destruction. It can go after civilian infrastructure, it can well, look what they've done to Tehran. It looks like, well, just, you know, the chemical warfare there. You've seen in terms of going after his fuel depots. They're going after the water supplies in Iran. You you see all these things. This is what America can do. Iran doesn't have that ability. They can't hit The United States. What they can do is cause economic pain. So, yes, I think The US and many of the Gulf States can also shut down the Strait Of Our Moose, but but but that's not that's it doesn't have any purpose. It doesn't have any reasoning. Speaker 0: Can they eradicate the Iranian control over the Strait Of Hormuz? I'm not talking about shutting it down, but just get rid of the Iranians from there and they then decide who gets to control and when it has to be shut and when it has to be opened and remained and kept open and secured. Can The US exert that kind of military might over the state of Hormuz to control it? Speaker 1: Then one need us to control a massive amount of Iran's territory, which is a huge territory with populated by 90,000,000 people. So this seems very unlikely and if closing down the Strait Of Hormuz would depend on very sophisticated weapon systems, will be one thing. But this can be shut down with drones which can be manufactured in apartments. It can be also shut down with small naval drones that is this essentially drone operated small torpedoes. There's it doesn't require a lot of high technology which means that The US can't take out very key infrastructure to prevent Iran from shutting this down, to force it to open. But with very cheap and easy to make weapons, the Iranians can shut it down and it's simply too much territory, too large population for The United States to shut down the these capabilities. So at some point, they're have to make peace with the Iranians and make it make sure it's in Iran's interest to keep the Strait Of Hormuz open because it is in their interest. The problem now is that Iran faces an existential threat. That is The US now threatens to destroy not just the government, but also the country. As Trump tweeted, we we will make it impossible for Iran to even rebuild as a nation. And this is what regime change means. There is no replacement government. This means the disintegration and destruction of Iran, a massive civil war which could cost hundreds of thousands of lives. So for them this is existential which is why they went to this great extent. They've never done this before because they never believed that they faced this kind of an existential threat. So if the war ends, the Iranians have no reason to shut this straight down. This is very horrible for them as well. So, no, I I don't think The US can control the straight or almost no one can control it completely because too many actors could shut it down. Speaker 0: Glenn, thanks so much for joining me here on game plan. Whether this war continues further, that only means and if it does, that's essentially what Iran is looking at because they're not capitulating. They're not giving up. They are taking a bad amount of beating. There's no doubt in that, but they are continuing with their counters nevertheless. And straight of hormones is their main play where they're exerting their pressure with whether it's mines, whether it's their own boats, whether it's their own military boats. Now energy experts have also warned that whether the Iran crisis proves a cure for Russia's economy, that depends directly on how long it lasts. But there is little to suggest that Iran is willing to capitulate that what we just discussed. They're inviting U. S. To continue the war on the other hand. That's what the statements from Iran suggest that we're waiting. Come on, on. Now in the midst of this, Russia is emerging as the winner as we just discussed. How long this lasts? It doesn't seem to be in the favor of The U. S. We'll need to wait and watch twelfth day and running. They expected it to last for about four to five weeks, whether it goes the distance or even longer. Let's wait. That was Glenn Deeson joining me here on Game Plan. Speaker 1: Thanks, Yvonne.

I signed deals, including ceasefire and gas contracts, with other world leaders regarding this conflict. They assured me the other party would never escalate, but they broke the ceasefire, killed our people, and didn't exchange prisoners as agreed. What kind of diplomacy is this? It's disrespectful to come here and attack the administration that's trying to prevent the destruction of your country. Everyone has problems during war, but you're in no position to dictate what we feel or what will happen in the future. We are gambling with World War III and you have not been thankful for the billions in aid and military equipment we have provided. I want a ceasefire with guarantees. Ask our people what they think. And remember, Obama gave you sheets, I gave you javelins.

The discussion centers on the BBC Panorama documentary situation and the Trump camp’s reaction. It recalls that last week The Telegraph in the UK published the leaked Prescott memo, revealing that Panorama had spliced together two clips from a January 2021 Trump speech in a misleading way. After a brief period of silence from the White House, the Telegraph secured an interview with Caroline Levitt, Donald Trump’s press secretary, who described the BBC coverage as “100%, fake news.” The segment suggests the White House was aware of the documentary and the leaked memo, and that the issue was on Trump’s desk over the weekend. Nigel Farage, Reform UK leader and GB News presenter, claimed he spoke with Trump on Friday and that Trump was so angry he couldn’t broadcast a reaction. A copy of a four-page letter from Donald Trump’s lawyers, Britco PLLC of Coral Gables, Florida, to BBC general counsel Sarah Jones is discussed. The letter sets a November 14, 2025, 5 PM deadline and threatens “to enforce his legal and equitable rights, all of which are expressly reserved and are not waived,” including filing “legal action for no less, than $1,000,000,000, in damages” if the BBC does not retract what was said in the Panorama documentary. The BBC is explicitly said to be “on notice.” The BBC’s annual budget is noted as just over £5,000,000,000, underscoring the magnitude of the claimed damages. It’s noted that Panorama was produced by an outside company, October Productions, and not directly by the BBC. Some BBC journalists are reportedly angry about the splicing and the alteration of a sentence, and they wish to distance themselves from the outside production. Nevertheless, the piece emphasizes that BBC management likely should have caught the issue. The report also mentions the broader BBC context and signals that the Washington focus is on what Trump might say when he speaks to the media, anticipated alongside comments with the Syrian president in the coming days.

Speaker 0: President Trump, sir, how confident are you there could be lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan? Very confident. And does the deal today protect Christian?

Speaker 0 expresses a strong anti-Turkey stance and acknowledges the Armenian genocide, highlighting controversy around Turkey's NATO membership and leadership. The claims quoted: 'So I'm no fan of Turkey, and I acknowledge the Armenian genocide for the record.' 'Yes.' 'Which get a lot of people get mad about.' 'We I don't know why Turkey should be part of NATO.' 'I think Turkey should be kicked out of NATO for what they did to the Armenians, and they don't offer anything to America.' 'They don't. Nothing.' 'And Erdogan is a very, bad guy who's becoming an Islamic dictator of a failing country.'

The conversation discusses recent developments and long-running concerns about regional security, especially around Iran, Turkey, and Israel. In Dubai, an alert was issued for a supposed drone or missile attack and people were told to seek shelter; it turned out to be a false alarm, which triggered memories of earlier periods when desalination targets and potential strikes were being openly debated during shows, though “it’s calmer times now.” The discussion then turns to Turkey and Israel. Trump has been praised for his reported engagement with President Erdogan, including the possibility of supplying F-35s to Turkey. The Israeli minister of science and technology is cited as saying he has “no doubt” that the Iranian regime will eventually fall and that after it ends, the Ottoman Empire’s ambition will expand influence, making Turkey a “real future threat” to Israel’s citizens. Foreign Minister Gideon Saar is also mentioned as requesting official recognition of the Armenian genocide in retaliation, with Netanyahu having recognized it personally but not the country yet. The speakers link these moves to Trump weighing possible F-35 sales to Turkey and to broader talk about the risk of Turkey and Israel clashing. The main guest argues that the war with Iran is not over, pointing to a “massive missile assault by the Iranians against Israel” as retaliation for Israeli attacks in northern Lebanon, and contends that assumptions of regional safety are mistaken. He further claims Iran is strong militarily and politically, and that Iran has powerful allies such as China and Russia. He also states that Turkey has historically been the principal threat to Israel’s existence and argues that Israel unnecessarily provoked the Iran conflict. He contrasts Iran’s and Turkey’s likely priorities, focusing on what he says are Turkish ambitions tied to former Ottoman territories and the central issue of Kurdistan and the Kurds. Trump’s reported idea to invite Sunni Islamists described as part of ISIS to kill Hezbollah is criticized as “asinine talk,” with the guest arguing it would insert a Turkish-relevant subordinate element into Lebanon, allowing Turkey to intervene later. He denies the idea of “friendship” in international relations and emphasizes “only interests,” claiming Turkey views Syria as a Turkish province and Northern Iraq as a Turkish area. He argues Turkey’s NATO membership is “nice but irrelevant,” asserting Turkey’s cultural foundation and future focus are in the Middle East and Central Asia rather than Europe, and that Turkey does not want war with Russia, instead cultivating good relations with it. The guest then addresses the possibility that an incentive-based arrangement could produce an outcome involving Lebanon: he references reporting that military buildup on the Lebanese border accelerated after Trump’s comments, and considers theories offered by other guests about border control or arms flow to Hezbollah through Syrian territory. He also describes Trump’s approval of a $700 million sale of General Electric jet engines for use by Turkey and its new fighter “Khan,” and suggests Trump is hoping to achieve a broader political outcome against Hezbollah in Lebanon, while arguing the larger picture makes control unrealistic. A central theme is proposed “disengagement.” The guest argues the only way to end the “mess” is unilateral withdrawal, saying Americans cannot protect forward bases under modern missile ranges and that any strategy of “doubling down” merely postpones outcomes. He argues Trump is under “duress,” explaining it not through specific allegations from files but through leverage from “Zionist billionaires” and the Israel lobby, suggesting support can be withdrawn if Iran is not destroyed, and that political consequences could follow. He also claims that Trump cannot simply “say no” because Congress cannot simply “say no,” citing the role of money in U.S. politics. In response to questions about whether disengagement is starting—citing Vance’s and Trump’s rhetoric, and discussions of F-35s to Turkey—the guest agrees there are internal indications that people think they must “get out,” including after demonstrating that the U.S. military approach failed to produce the desired outcome against Iran. Later, the discussion asks what would happen if the U.S. distances itself from Israel, lessening battlefield support. The guest says a looming U.S. financial crisis could be the event that disrupts engagement, because economic problems would constrain attention and priorities, potentially affecting alliance behavior. He suggests that absent such a financial shock, the alliance would not break up, framing it as a partnership sustained by mutual interests rather than a formal, easily separable alliance. Finally, the interview closes by asking the likelihood of direct conflict between Israel and Turkey over the next five to 10 years and what the biggest risks would be. The guest predicts Turkey will seek dominance over northern Iraq, Syria, and the Arabian Peninsula and that Arabs either negotiate with Turkey or are “march[ed] in” upon. He portrays Iran’s focus as southern Iraq and protection of Shiites in the Gulf region. He concludes that these developments reflect shifting regional power centers and that Middle East borders created by Sykes-Picot are “on the road to extinction.”