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Congress passed a law (2 US, code 1970) requiring approval from the Capitol Police Board and congressional leadership in advance for bringing in national guard or federal assistance. The speaker's request for approval was denied twice by Paul Irving and Mike Stenger, who work for Pelosi and McConnell respectively. The denial was due to optics and lack of intelligence support. The speaker finds it unbelievable that they are the only chief of police with a law controlling their ability to protect the capital, even in emergencies. They highlight the absurdity of having to seek approval from the same individuals during an attack.

The January 6th committee never requested my public testimony as the Capitol Police chief. This raises questions about their intentions, as my testimony could reveal critical details about the events of that day and the days leading up to it, including the involvement of political leaders and their appointees.

The former Capitol Police chief, Stephen Sund, reveals in his new book that the Pentagon, FBI, and DHS failed on January 6th during the attack on the Capitol. Despite the federal government's extensive security network, which was designed to detect potential threats, it provided no protection on that day. Sund explains that the FBI, DHS, and his own agency were aware of the right-wing extremists' plans to attack the Capitol but failed to take action. Additionally, military leaders hesitated to send help due to political or tactical concerns. Sund warns that without proper measures, a similar incident could easily occur again.

President Trump authorized 10,000 National Guard troops before January 6th, but the request was denied by Mayor Bowser and Pelosi. Capitol Police were blamed for not calling in the Guard earlier despite intelligence about a possible attack. There are allegations of a cover-up by Pelosi and Democrats, with claims of evidence being destroyed. Witnesses testify that Trump did authorize the Guard deployment. Calls for criminal referrals for obstruction have been made.

Congress passed a law requiring the speaker to request federal resources for events like the Capitol attack. The speaker was denied twice by the House and Senate Sergeant Arms due to optics and lack of intelligence support. The speaker had to go through these individuals to request the National Guard, even during the attack. After 71 minutes and 32 calls, the speaker finally received approval. This delay is surprising considering the severity of the situation, and the speaker was frustrated by the delay.

The transcript centers on discussions about security failures on January 6, 2021, and the steps taken to address them, including the involvement of the House Sergeant at Arms and Speaker Nancy Pelosi. Key points: - Initiating discussions on National Guard: The witness confirms meeting with the House Sergeant at Arms regarding the National Guard prior to January 6. The House Sergeant at Arms was Paul Irving, appointed by Speaker Pelosi at that time. Irving reportedly stated he “didn’t like the optics” when the National Guard was first raised. - Run it up the chain and approval process: On January 6, when the witness sought approval to call in the National Guard, Irving indicated he would “run it up the chain,” understood as the leadership chain, leading toward the Speaker’s office and Speaker Pelosi. The witness clarified that the leadership chain on the House side comprises the top security official and the elected leadership team up to Speaker Pelosi. - How it ends up with Pelosi’s office: The witness stated that running up the chain would likely end with the Speaker’s office and possibly Speaker Pelosi, describing the path as through the speaker’s office. - Three calls with Pelosi on January 6: During a January 7 press conference, Pelosi claimed she had not talked to the witness since the breach and called for the witness’s resignation. The witness asserts that Pelosi’s claim was inaccurate, stating he spoke with Pelosi three times that evening. The three calls were: 1) First call: When the witness went to brief Vice President Pence at the secure location; he briefed Irving about returning to the chambers and the timing. Irving called Pelosi on the witness’s cell phone around 05:34 to have Pelosi on the line. 2) Second call: After walking away from Pence briefing, the witness met with Stenger and headed to brief the Senate. Jennifer Hemingway handed him Emily Barrett’s phone, and Pelosi was on the line as they discussed the information given to Pence about when the Capitol could be back in session; the witness stated he assured Pelosi the information was correct and that the chambers could be reoccupied by 7 PM. The call ended. 3) Third call: While at the Senate, on a cell phone, using another official’s cell line, the witness briefed leadership off-site at a secure location about plans to get them back into chambers. Pelosi participated in this third call as part of briefing leadership. - Pelosi’s comment and resignation: The witness concurs with Pelosi’s claim that he spoke three times, contradicting Pelosi’s assertion of no contact since the breach. The witness expresses a wish that Pelosi had considered the challenges faced and the efforts to bring in outside resources on January 6 before she called for his resignation. - Additional clarifications: When asked if Pelosi’s office or Pelosi herself politicized capital security, the witness said he had no idea. He also offered a closing remark hoping Pelosi would consider the witness’s efforts and the steps taken to reinforce security that day.

Capitol Police Chief describes an "intelligence failure" before Jan 6: "absolutely zero with the intelligence that we know now existed talking about attacking the capital, killing my police officers, attacking members of Congress and killing members of Congress." He says "FBI DHS was swimming in that intelligence" and "the military seemed to have some very concerning intelligence as well." There was "no jib, a joint intelligence bulletin zero for January 6" and "no coordination, no discussion in advance." He notes FBI Washington field office and DHS "didn't put out a single official document specific to January 6" and cites a Senate/GAO finding of emails to Steve D’Antuano about threats he did not hear on a conference call: "Nobody from DHS was on" January 5 call. On Jan 4, Miller "puts out a memo restricting the National Guard from carrying the various weapons"—and Pelosi/McConnell allegedly blocked his request: "optics." After 12:53 attack, he makes "32 calls" over "seventy-one minutes" until "02:09" when "approval" comes. "The chain is Pelosi" and "The law says in a mercy, he can grant me authorization, but he didn't."

In this video, former Chief of Capitol Police, Stephen Sund, discusses the intelligence failures and lack of support during the January 6th Capitol attack. He reveals that the intelligence he received did not accurately convey the severity of the attack, and that key agencies like the FBI and DHS had more concerning intelligence that was not shared. Sund also highlights the delayed response in providing National Guard assistance, questioning the motives behind these decisions and suggesting a deliberate effort to downplay the intelligence. He further raises concerns about potential political influence, the presence of federal agents in the crowd, and the lack of arrests for those instigating violence. Sund emphasizes the need for an independent investigation to uncover the truth.

In this video, former Chief of Capitol Police, Stephen Sund, discusses the intelligence failures and lack of support during the January 6th Capitol attack. He reveals that the severity of the attack was not indicated in the intelligence he received, and key agencies like the FBI and DHS were aware of the threats. Sund also highlights the delay in receiving approval to bring in the National Guard, with Pelosi and McConnell denying his requests for 71 minutes. He questions the political motivations behind these decisions and the lack of accountability. The military's response is criticized for prioritizing optics over immediate assistance. Sund raises concerns about a possible setup and emphasizes the need for a thorough investigation. He also questions why the Pentagon and Defense Intelligence Agency did not provide support or share intelligence regarding the potential threats. Sund raises concerns about the presence of federal agents in the crowd and the lack of arrests for individuals instigating violence. He criticizes the media for not thoroughly investigating these issues and emphasizes the need for an independent investigation.

The speaker, who is the chief of police, expresses frustration over the law that prevents them from bringing in the national guard without approval. They recount the events of the attack on the Capitol and their efforts to request assistance. They made multiple calls to different agencies, including the sergeant in arms and the chairman of the Capitol Police Board, but authorization was delayed for 71 minutes. Finally, at 2:09, they received approval and immediately informed their colleague. The speaker emphasizes their anger and marks the time as 2:10 when they finally got approval for the National Guard.

The speaker reveals that during conference calls before the Capitol attack, no one discussed the intelligence regarding the storming of the Capitol or the potential harm to members of Congress and police officers. They mention a call on January 5th with law enforcement leaders, including the FBI and National Guard, where no one mentioned any concerns about the attack or threats. Other police chiefs, like Robert Conte, also claim they were unaware of the threats. The speaker highlights reports of emails and memos sent to the FBI and FBI director, Steve D'Antuano, predicting violence, yet nothing was mentioned during their video call. The lack of communication and awareness is perplexing.

General Milley was found to be using an intelligence platform called DataMiner, which he used to gather information about potential threats to Congress and the US Capitol. However, he did not share this intelligence with the Chief of Police or other relevant authorities. The Chief of Police expresses concern about not being informed, as it is their duty to take necessary action. They discuss how this handling of intelligence differs from previous protests and suggest that the intelligence may have been intentionally downplayed.

The discussion centers on the security failures during the January 6, 2021, Capitol breach. It is clarified that there were three calls between the Chief and Speaker Pelosi on that day, contradicting her claim of no communication. The Chief expressed concerns about the House Sergeant at Arms, Paul Irving, who prioritized optics over security, delaying the National Guard's deployment. The conversation shifts to political implications, with accusations that Speaker Pelosi politicized security issues. Several speakers criticize the focus on January 6 rather than pressing issues like crime and inflation. They emphasize the need for serious discussions about security and governance, expressing frustration over perceived political gamesmanship. The dialogue also touches on the treatment of January 6 detainees and the use of force by correctional officers, highlighting concerns about civil rights violations.

The speaker urgently called General Walker to request the National Guard's assistance at the Capitol. Despite the imminent danger, the speaker faced resistance from higher-ups who didn't like the optics of the National Guard's presence. The speaker pleaded for help, but was denied multiple times. Eventually, shots were fired, and the speaker had to hang up to handle the situation. The National Guard didn't arrive until 6 PM, and instead of being deployed at the Capitol, they were driven back to the DC Army. The speaker felt betrayed and questioned if there was a conspiracy against protecting the Capitol. The systematic denial of intelligence and support from various agencies led to the baffling conclusion of not protecting the capital.

The speaker explains that the handling of the event was different from previous situations. They mention that the decision was made by the intelligence agency and the military. According to a federal law, the speaker was required to request federal resources like the National Guard in advance from the Capitol Police Board. However, they were denied twice due to optics and lack of intelligence support. The decision was made by Paul Irving and Mike Stenger, who work for Pelosi and McConnell respectively.

Steve D'Antwono, the FBI director, received multiple emails warning about the violence expected at the Capitol before January 6th, but nothing was mentioned during a video call with him. The military had discussed locking down Washington DC and revoking permits on Capitol Hill due to concerns about violence. However, on January 4th, the acting secretary of defense issued a memo restricting the National Guard from carrying weapons or equipment for crowd control. This decision hindered the National Guard's response when assistance was desperately needed on January 6th. Governor Hogan even pleaded for help but was denied due to the memo. The situation doesn't make sense.

On January 6, 2021, the House Sergeant at Arms, Paul Irving, appointed by Speaker Pelosi, expressed concerns about the "optics" of deploying the National Guard. When Chief Sun requested the Guard, Irving said he'd "run it up the chain," implying Pelosi's office. Pelosi stated she hadn't spoken to Chief Sun since the initial breach, but Sun says he spoke with her three times that evening. He briefed her on plans to get everyone back into chambers. Prior to January 6, Sun requested National Guard assistance from Irving and Senate Sergeant at Arms Michael Stenger. Irving didn't like the optics and Stenger suggested Sun contact General Walker about availability. Stenger later told Sun that Irving had forewarned him, saying Pelosi would never approve the Guard. During a call on January 6, military personnel recommended against Sun's request for the National Guard. Chief Conte of the Metropolitan Police Department questioned this denial. General Milley did not share intelligence about violent rhetoric and threats with Chief Sun. The Capitol Police requested National Guard assistance at 1:49 PM, but approval from the acting Secretary of Defense didn't come until 5:08 PM. The Guard arrived at the Capitol by 5:20 PM.

As the former chief of the Capitol Police, I find it interesting that the January 6th committee never asked me to publicly testify. I believe they were worried about what I would reveal about the events leading up to that day and the role of political leaders and their appointees.

I requested the National Guard urgently to come to Capitol Hill. I spoke with Pentagon officials to get approval. During the call, I emphasized the urgency of the situation, but was told they didn't like the optics of having the National Guard present.

We had a responsibility that we failed to meet, and there was a lack of accountability for the situation. It’s absurd to question whether we should call the Capitol Police or National Guard after the breach occurred. The National Guard should have been present from the start, as the assessment of the situation was clearly inadequate. I take responsibility for not ensuring they were prepared for potential issues.

The speaker questions why the FBI didn't inform cabinet secretaries about potential threats on January 6th. They criticize the lack of security measures at the Capitol and mention offering National Guard support, which was declined. They believe better information sharing could have prevented the events. The speaker emphasizes that protecting the Capitol is a law enforcement responsibility, not a military one, and suggests cooperation between agencies. They imply political reasons for the lack of action.

We had a responsibility, but there was a lack of accountability for what was happening. It's absurd to question whether we should call the Capitol Police or National Guard after the breach had already occurred. The National Guard should have been present from the start, as the assessment of the situation was clearly inadequate. I take responsibility for not ensuring they were prepared for more significant events.

The speaker recounts a phone call with Lieutenant General Pyot Pyot and General Flynn, where they discuss the urgent need for the National Guard at the Capitol. However, General Pyot expresses concern about the optics of having the National Guard present. The speaker emphasizes the dire situation and the denial of assistance, leading to frustration. They mention the shooting of Ashley Babbit and the delayed arrival of the National Guard at 6 PM. The speaker also highlights the fact that resources were sent to protect the homes of other generals but not theirs. They suggest that this systematic denial of support raises suspicions and could lead to conspiracy theories. The conversation ends with a discussion about the lack of intelligence and the politically charged nature of the situation.

Speaker 0 expressed confusion about the lack of answers regarding two significant events on January 6. Firstly, other federal agencies withheld crucial information from the speaker, who was in charge of security at the Capitol. Secondly, despite the situation escalating for 71 minutes, Speaker Pelosi denied permission to bring in the National Guard. The speaker questioned why there is a lack of investigation into these matters, suggesting a lack of interest in uncovering the truth. The situation is described as worsening beyond these events.