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In May 2024, 194 WHO member states will vote on international agreements for pandemic prevention behind closed doors. These agreements give the WHO leadership in health matters related to pandemics, but the process is not widely reported or discussed in the media, parliaments, universities, or society.

By making the right investments, we can build a health system that stops outbreaks before they become global pandemics. A team of 3,000 disease experts called the Germ Team, managed by the WHO, will track suspicious disease clusters and share data with governments. Governments and pharmaceutical companies will collaborate to quickly produce diagnostics and vaccines on a large scale. An agreed protocol will ensure global sharing of results. The WHO and countries will work together to allocate these tools and ensure efficient delivery. To be prepared, the Germ Team will conduct drills with each country to assess readiness. The goal is to prevent diseases from becoming pandemics. For more information, check out the book "How to Prevent the Next Pandemic?"

The discussion centers on gain-of-function (GoF) research, its regulation, and the motivations behind it. The first speaker notes the administration’s goal to end GoF research and asks where that stands. The second speaker says progress has been made, and the White House is working on a formal policy. He then defines the issue in stages: what GoF research is, why someone would do it, and how to regulate it to prevent dangerous projects that could catastrophically harm human populations. He clarifies that GoF research is not inherently bad, but dangerous GoF research is. He gives an insulin example: creating bacteria to produce insulin is a legitimate GoF that benefits diabetics. In contrast, taking a virus from bat caves, bringing it to a lab in a densely populated city with weak biosafety, and manipulating it to be more transmissible among humans is a dangerous GoF that should not be supported. The administration’s policy aims to prevent such dangerous work entirely, and the President signed an executive order in April or May endorsing this policy. Next, he discusses implementation: how to create incentives to ensure this research does not recur. He explains that the utopian idea behind such research was to prevent all pandemics by collecting viruses from wild places, testing their potential to infect humans by increasing their pathogenicity, and then preparing countermeasures in advance (vaccines, antivirals) and stockpiling them, even though those countermeasures would not have been tested against humans yet. If a virus did leap to humans, the foreseen countermeasures might prove ineffective because evolution is unpredictable. This “triage” approach—identifying pathogens most likely to leap and preemptively preparing against them—was the rationale for dangerous GoF work, a rationale he characterizes as flawed. He notes that many scientists considered this an effort to do bioweapons research under the guise of safety and defense. The work is dual-use. The U.S. is a signatory to the Biological Weapons Convention and does not conduct offensive bio-weapons research, but other countries might. The discussion highlights that the GoF research discussed during the pandemic can backfire and may not align with true biodefense, since countermeasures might not match whatever pathogen actually emerges. The speaker concludes that this agenda—pursuing GoF to prevent pandemics—has drawn substantial support from parts of the Western world and other countries for about two and a half decades, but he implies it is not deserving of continuation.

We are having high-level and low-level meetings to address the challenges of the virus. We have learned from the past and are working on improvements in operations. This situation highlights the importance of research to keep up with the virus's mutations as it spreads.

I have served in 5 administrations and want to emphasize that the next administration will face challenges in infectious diseases. There will be both chronic diseases and surprise outbreaks. History shows that these challenges are inevitable, so it is crucial to be prepared. Many have underestimated infectious diseases, but they remain a significant threat.

The new global health security strategy aims to enhance capabilities to combat various health threats worldwide. It focuses on strengthening capacities through partnerships, mobilizing political support and financing, and fortifying global defenses. The strategy emphasizes the importance of investing in prevention, early detection, and response to outbreaks to protect lives and economies. Collaboration with partners, including governments and organizations, is crucial for effective global preparedness. The strategy also highlights the need for sustainable investments in technologies and manufacturing to ensure readiness for future health crises. The strategy underscores the significance of bipartisan support and partnership with Congress to address health security challenges effectively. Translation: The new global health security strategy aims to enhance capabilities to combat various health threats worldwide. It focuses on strengthening capacities through partnerships, mobilizing political support and financing, and fortifying global defenses. The strategy emphasizes the importance of investing in prevention, early detection, and response to outbreaks to protect lives and economies. Collaboration with partners, including governments and organizations, is crucial for effective global preparedness. The strategy also highlights the need for sustainable investments in technologies and manufacturing to ensure readiness for future health crises. The strategy underscores the significance of bipartisan support and partnership with Congress to address health security challenges effectively.

A meeting occurred in June involving biopharma, the military, DARPA, and ASPR, focusing on medical countermeasures. The DOD is planning for a future event, allowing biopharma companies to manufacture countermeasures before FDA approval, similar to how COVID shots were stockpiled. The meeting, titled "Partnering with US government to achieve our national security mission," indicates a planned public health threat that will impact national security. The aim is to advance defense readiness through DOD partnerships for rapid development and deployment of medical countermeasures. AI will be used without safety or efficacy testing, creating dual-use products that could be weaponized. Laws have been rewritten, making the PREP Act seem minor in comparison, potentially deputizing police or doctors as DOD employees. Deployment methods may include spraying schools, cruise ships, or communities, or using transdermal patches, not just injections. DARPA has been funding dual-use products, turning military bioweapons into an industry.

The speaker discusses the current state of biodefense and the need for a different approach due to emerging threats and advancements in technology. They highlight the importance of collaboration and the removal of bureaucratic barriers in addressing these challenges. The speaker also mentions the development of nonspecific medical countermeasures to enhance the immune system's response to unknown agents, as well as the rapid advancement of specific drugs through computational systems. They emphasize the role of situational awareness and the vulnerabilities in the industrial base and supply chain. The speaker concludes by discussing the review of policies, strategies, operational posture, research and development pipeline, and total force readiness in biodefense.

I have served in 5 administrations and want to share my perspective on pandemic preparedness. Based on my experience, I want to emphasize that the coming administration will face challenges in dealing with infectious diseases. This includes both chronic diseases and unexpected outbreaks. The history of the last 32 years as the director of NIAID shows that there is no doubt the next administration will have to confront these challenges.

Project BioShield is a proposed initiative to enhance future security against bioterrorism. The speaker requests support for a budget proposal of almost $6,000,000,000. This funding aims to rapidly develop and provide effective vaccines and treatments. The focus is on agents like anthrax, botulinum toxin, Ebola, and plague. The speaker asserts the necessity to act preemptively, based on the assumption that enemies may weaponize these diseases.

To create a defensive program against bioterrorism, the speaker consulted with unconventional sources. These included former U.S. bioweapons experts from decades ago, international figures from countries like the U.K., and defectors from the Soviet Union. The speaker learned from these experts to inform the development of a multi-billion dollar program.

The second multi-domain task force is one of five the Army is building. It executes operations across air, land, sea, cyber, and space. Its uniqueness lies in bringing capability to a formation at the lowest level, something the Army hasn't been able to do before. This allows for faster operations and quicker mission execution. The task force synchronizes effects across all domains.

The speaker, who has served in 5 administrations, discusses the issue of pandemic preparedness. They emphasize that the coming administration will face challenges in dealing with infectious diseases, including both chronic diseases and surprise outbreaks. The speaker highlights the importance of learning from past experiences, such as HIV, and stresses the need for substantial resources, involvement of communities, cross-sector collaboration, and engagement of leaders and policymakers. They assert that infectious diseases are a perpetual challenge that will not go away, and confidently state that such challenges will be seen in the next few years.

In the future, there may be a deadly airborne disease. To effectively deal with it, we need to establish a global infrastructure that enables us to quickly detect, isolate, and respond to such outbreaks. By investing in this infrastructure now, we can be better prepared for future strains of flu, like the Spanish flu, that may emerge in the next five to ten years. It is a wise investment to make.

The speaker outlines the range of stakeholders that are important to their work, emphasizing a broad and diverse audience. They identify business as a very important audience, alongside politics, highlighting the role of ongoing engagement across multiple governmental contexts through continuous partnerships with many governments around the world. The speaker also notes NGOs and trade unions as key groups to consider, along with media, which is acknowledged as an important stakeholder category. Further, the speaker highlights that experts, scientists, and academia are crucial for informing a forward-looking perspective, particularly when considering future directions and solutions. The statement underscores the belief that the future will be shaped largely by technological developments, implying a need to incorporate cutting-edge innovations and technical expertise in strategic discussions and decision-making. In addition to these conventional sectors, the speaker mentions religious leaders as part of the stakeholder landscape, signaling recognition of faith-based perspectives and moral or ethical considerations in broader dialogues. Social entrepreneurs are singled out as well, described as very important, suggesting that venture-driven approaches to social impact are seen as a significant component of the ecosystem. Overall, the speaker communicates a philosophy of inclusivity and broad collaboration, integrating political, business, civil society, media, scientific, religious, and entrepreneurial voices. The emphasis on continuous partnerships with governments worldwide indicates an ongoing, collaborative approach to governance, policy, and implementation across different regions. The repeated references to a future oriented by technological development signal a strategic priority placed on innovation and science as drivers of forthcoming solutions, informing how they engage with the various stakeholder groups and respondents to emerging challenges. In sum, the speaker presents a multi-stakeholder framework that spans business, politics, governments, NGOs, trade unions, media, experts, scientists, academia, religious leaders, and social entrepreneurs, all contributing to a future shaped by technological progress and collaborative problem-solving.

In May 2024, 194 WHO member states will vote on international agreements for pandemic prevention and response. The process is secretive and not publicly discussed. The WHO seeks absolute leadership in health matters related to pandemics.

We used to defend against a known list of chemical and biological threats, but now we face new challenges. Global warming is causing the permafrost to melt, revealing forgotten pathogens. Additionally, our adversaries have advanced technologies that expand the definition of biodefense beyond known threat agents. To address these changes, the Department of Defense is forming a council that will involve combatant commands, services, and other components. Working groups will be established to tackle the complex policy and strategy challenges and prioritize efforts. These bodies will shape the biodefense environment within the department.

In the future, there might be a deadly airborne disease. To effectively handle it, we need a global infrastructure that enables us to detect, isolate, and respond to it swiftly. This infrastructure should be in place not only in our country but worldwide. By investing in this infrastructure, we can be better prepared to tackle future outbreaks, such as a new strain of flu similar to the Spanish flu, that may emerge in the next five or ten years.

I will discuss pandemic preparedness today. Based on my experience, I can say that the next administration will face challenges with chronic infectious diseases and unexpected outbreaks. In my 32 years as NIAID director, history shows that these challenges are inevitable for the new administration.

The speaker discusses the importance of the Bioposture Review (BPR) and the need for active US government engagement in biodefense. They mention the appointment of new leadership, the creation of a Biodefense Council, and the need for better biosafety and biosecurity. The BPR addresses bio threats from various sources, including natural, man-made, and accidental, and emphasizes the importance of international cooperation. The speaker also highlights the role of the Department of Defense (DoD) in supporting civilian efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic and other bio threats. They mention the need for ongoing reviews and the establishment of working groups to address policy and strategy challenges in biodefense. The speaker concludes by discussing the funding request for biodefense initiatives.

The end of COVID-19 as a global health emergency doesn't mean it's no longer a threat. The Global Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan for COVID-19 emphasizes the need for action in five core areas. We still face the risk of new variants causing more disease and death, as well as the potential emergence of deadlier pathogens. We can't ignore these challenges. We must make necessary changes now to be prepared for the next pandemic. The Pandemic Accord is a commitment to international cooperation and a shared response to future threats. It's a generational agreement that aims to prevent panic and neglect, ensuring a more resilient world.

The speaker discusses the importance of biodefense and the need to prioritize it beyond just the context of COVID-19. They highlight the need to prevent the acquisition of dangerous pathogens and maintain the capability to control outbreaks in the event of a biological attack. The speaker mentions the inaugural biodefense posture review and efforts to align with the national defense strategy. They emphasize the need for collaboration and integration across departments, agencies, and allies. The speaker also discusses the evolving threat landscape, the importance of biosurveillance, and the concept of integrated layered defense. They mention the development of non-specific medical countermeasures and advancements in drug development. The speaker concludes by emphasizing the need for cohesion, coordination, and collaboration within the biodefense community.

This morning, the United Nations approved a political declaration on pandemic prevention. In May 2024, the WHO will have a final vote on international agreements behind closed doors. The WHO seeks absolute leadership in health matters related to pandemics.

In preparation for a new pandemic, the United States has begun searching for and applying various technologies for global management purposes. This includes creating crisis situations of a global nature.