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The speaker states that the United States is conducting an operation with a clear goal: to eliminate the threat posed by Iran’s short-range ballistic missiles and by Iran’s navy to naval assets. The speaker says the operation is focused on this objective and is progressing “quite successfully,” with the details of tactics and progress to be discussed by the Pentagon and the Department of War. Two reasons are given for acting now. First, the speaker asserts that if Iran came under attack by the United States, Israel, or another party, Iran would respond against the United States. According to the speaker, orders had been delegated down to field commanders, and within an hour of the initial attack on Iran’s leadership compound, the Iranian missile forces in the south and in the north were activated to launch. The speaker notes that those forces were “prepositioned.” Second, the speaker explains that the assessment was that if the United States stood and waited for Iran’s attack to come first, American casualties would be much higher. Therefore, the president made the decision to act preemptively. The speaker emphasizes that they knew there would be an Israeli action, and that action would precipitate an attack against American forces. The implication is that delaying a preemptive strike would result in greater casualties, potentially billions of dollars in losses, and more American lives at risk. The overarching message is that the preemptive operation aims to neutralize Iran’s short-range ballistic missiles and navy threats before they are used in consolidation with anticipated Israeli actions and any Iranian counterattacks against U.S. forces. The speaker frames the decision as prudent and anticipatory, intended to prevent higher casualties and to maintain safety for American personnel and assets. The speaker stops short of detailing specific tactical methods, pointing listeners to the Pentagon and the Department of War for a deeper discussion of tactics and progress.

- New footage from Tel Aviv is shown, including videos outside windows of what sources say they are seeing, with a claim that Fox News is not covering this damage in Tel Aviv. The discussion centers on the reality of buildings being hit near City Hall, and questions why it isn’t being widely covered by Fox News. - The conversation shifts to missile stocks and interceptors. A comment references Keith Kellogg on Fox News discussing a Wall Street Journal report about running out of interceptor missiles within four to five weeks, and a claim that there is no problem because orders were placed and allies could supply missiles. The speaker notes that UAE reportedly has about a week left of interceptor missiles and says missiles from Iran are getting through “like a sieve.” - It is argued that the U.S. has a limited stockpile because many missiles have been transferred to Israel and Ukraine over the past years, leaving the U.S. inventory low. The claim is made that continuing the war with depleted missiles would heighten national security risk and vulnerability globally. - The transcript discusses potential international responses. The speaker contends that Europe’s mobilization rhetoric (France, Greece) should not be expected to deter Iran, noting that Greece does not have a major army and that NATO-funded contingents are involved rather than independent power. The assertion is made that Iran’s strikes in Tel Aviv, Tehran, Qom, and other cities show that Iran believes it can strike back effectively, signaling a preference to fight the United States and Israel rather than submit again. - The central point is that the conflict is described as 100% about missiles and air-defense missiles, not ground forces. The speaker argues Iran likely has enough offensive missiles to prolong the conflict for months, possibly longer than U.S. capacity to sustain it, especially with Hormuz potentially shut or partially shut, which could hurt the western economy. - Admiral James Stavridis is cited by Speaker 0, noting that as the U.S. and Israel expend hundreds of precision weapons, the focus should shift to logistics and stockpiles. The discussion emphasizes the need for inventory clarity, planning, and alignment between political objectives and military capabilities. - Speaker 1 asserts that the planning should have assessed inventories, timeframes, and whether the means match the objectives. The argument states that risking all resources without sufficient offensive or defensive capacity is a dangerous gamble, suggesting the current course could be a “huge blunder.” - The conversation touches on General Dan Kane, who reportedly told the president two weeks earlier that there were not enough ammunition and it would not be pretty to win. A reference is made to Trump’s Truth Social claiming Kane’s assessment was incorrect, with talk of whether Kane did or did not say the president’s characterization was accurate. The claim is made that there are concerns about integrity and whether senior leaders would publicly contradict the administration’s framing if necessary. - A follow-up question is raised about whether admitting a ground invasion would imply insufficient missiles to sustain the mission, with Speaker 1 acknowledging that admitting ground troops would signal a lack of missiles for sustained action. - The segment then shifts to a sponsorship note about depression treatment options, promoting Ataybekli and its lead program BPL-003 (a nasal spray psychedelic-based therapy) developed for treatment-resistant depression, with background on the company, its investors, and the roadmap toward Phase 3 in 2026. It emphasizes the potential for faster, more scalable treatment sessions and invites viewers to learn more at a website, with disclaimers about not providing medical or financial advice.

- The discussion frames Iranian capabilities as the current biggest threat to the US Navy, noting that Iran’s position is now stronger, with significant new efforts in the last six months supported by China and Russia. The guest emphasizes that Iranian capabilities today are far more lethal than in 2020 and that Iran has benefited from Chinese and Russian involvement, including help with integrated air defenses. - On the protests in Iran, the guest contends that Mossad, with CIA and MI6, joined the efforts to provoke the regime into a brutal crackdown, aiming to trigger a stronger US response. He argues the protests were legitimate at their core (economic grievances and reformist aims) and that the attempt to exploit them for regime change failed. He explains that, after discovering 40,000 starlight terminals used to orchestrate regime-change efforts, the intelligence community judged the operation a failure, and President Trump was advised that a broader, more forceful campaign would be required, potentially including more firepower and assets. - Regarding Russia and China’s responses to potential regime collapse in Iran, the guest asserts that Russia would intervene only if the regime seemed in danger of collapsing, and China would respond similarly, considering strategic and financial consequences. - In the Maduro Venezuela operation, the guest recounts paying off many actors to enable the abduction of Maduro and his wife, noting air defenses largely stood down due to bribes, with one battery reportedly firing and damaging a helicopter. He suggests the operation accomplished regime alteration but not a change in leadership style, since the new president reportedly will not take instructions from Washington. He speculates that continued oil income from the captured Venezuelan oil could influence outcomes, and he notes skepticism about the profitability of Venezuelan drilling for major oil corporations, who may turn to private or mercenary groups. - The “secret weapon” comment (the discombobulator) is described as an exaggeration; the guest hints at undisclosed capabilities but declines further public discussion, citing high clearance and Pentagon confidentiality. - On Iran’s protests and possible US strikes, the guest reiterates that the initial protests were economically driven and that the Mossad-CIA-MI6 effort to provoke a harsher regime response stalled, leading to the decision for a larger potential strike. He outlines a plan for a prolonged air campaign with multiple carriers and a heavy emphasis on air power over naval action, suggesting a Kosovo-like approach with extensive air sorties to degrade Iran’s air and missile defenses, using surface ships as needed but relying on air power for sustained damage. He notes that the air campaign would require time and additional assets, possibly two to three more carrier groups, and would hinge on the ability to degrade defenses to enable broader bombing operations. - When discussing Iranian capabilities against the US Navy, the guest says Iran’s current capabilities are more dangerous, with Iran receiving about 500 missiles from China and improved Russian integrated air defenses. He notes concern about long-range missiles capable of reaching US bases and questions whether Iran’s Orion missiles could reach Diego Garcia. He asserts that Russian help could be more for deterrence or limited military support rather than supplying exotic missiles like Reshnik, and that the Chinese missiles could threaten ships at sea. - On the US mobilization (Lincoln, submarines, aircraft, drones, HIMARS, Patriot/THAAD), the guest says the response is a time-buying effort to pressure negotiations, with more assets likely and ongoing dialogue with Iran. He suggests the US may pursue enriched uranium settlements, acknowledging Netanyahu’s and Trump’s positions, while noting Iran’s insistence that missile development is not negotiable and that JCPOA prospects are unlikely. - About Iran’s possible escalation strategies, the guest analyzes several options: drone swarms could threaten bases; sea mines in the Strait of Hormuz would be a last resort but remain a hazard; a swarm of boats and diesel submarines pose challenges but are not existential threats to carriers; and long-range missiles (including those supplied by China) could target US bases or ships. He emphasizes that the navy can defend against many of these threats but highlights the difficulty of countering missiles and the threat submarines pose in shallow gulf waters. - On Russia and China’s potential responses if the regime falls: Russia would likely intervene militarily or economically to prevent regime disintegration, while China could leverage financial power (including debt leverage) and maintain strategic flexibility. The Turkish role is described as a wild card; Turkey could be motivated to counter Israeli hegemony in the region, potentially drawing NATO into conflict, despite NATO’s current limited capacity. - Finally, the guest touches on broader geopolitical implications: he suggests Europe is drifting towards greater autonomy from the US, NATO’s effectiveness is questionable, and the regime’s fall could trigger wider regional instability. He argues Taiwan is a separate, less feasible target for conflict, given distance and economic stakes, and calls for more cautious rhetoric regarding Taiwan. He closes by noting that Ukraine’s fate and Europe’s stance will influence how the US and its allies manage any Iran escalation.

John Mersheimer argues that the war against Iran is not proceeding as the United States hoped and that there is no plausible off-ramp or decisive pathway to victory. He contends that Washington cannot narrate a decisive end to the conflict the way it could have against Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, because the war has not produced a decisive Iranian collapse. Instead, Iran has an incentive to convert the fight into a protracted war of attrition and possesses the means to do so, including a broad set of missiles and drones and the ability to retaliate across the region. The result, he says, is a stalemate in which Iran would drive a hard bargain to secure sanctions relief or other concessions, and escalation by the U.S. and Israel will simply provoke Iran to escalate further. On why Iran will not settle on American terms, Mersheimer emphasizes that Iran has a strong hand and time on its side. He notes that the more time passes, the more desperate the U.S. will be to settle, which strengthens Iran’s position. He argues that even heavy bombardment would not compel Iran to quit; rather, Iran could strike back against Gulf states, Israel, and American assets with significant effect. The Gulf States are particularly vulnerable due to a small number of petroleum sites, short-range missiles, drones, and, crucially, desalination plants that provide most of their fresh water. He cites Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman as heavily dependent on desalination, implying that destroying such infrastructure would have catastrophic humanitarian and economic consequences. Iran could also target energy infrastructure, and even if the Strait of Hormuz remains open, widespread damage to Gulf energy infrastructure would devastate the regional and global economy. He warns that Israel could suffer increasing Iranian pressure as time goes on, especially as interceptors become depleted. Regarding energy and the Strait of Hormuz, Mersheimer stresses that 20% of the world’s oil and gas passes through the Persian Gulf, making the energy dimension the war’s most consequential aspect. He argues that opening the Strait of Hormuz would be exceedingly difficult, and destroying desalination and petroleum infrastructure in the Gulf States would negate any advantage of keeping the straits open. He suggests that escalation without a viable endgame will have grave economic repercussions for the world, pushing the U.S. toward a coerced end that would not be a victory. Mersheimer contends that strategic bombing or air power alone cannot win such wars. He contrasts World War II and Korea/Vietnam with the present, where there are no boots on the ground and no clear path to victory via air power alone. He notes that the deterrent value of air power is limited, and a regime change strategy is notoriously difficult without ground forces. He argues that the decapitation strategy and ongoing escalations are unlikely to produce a decisive American/Israeli victory, and could instead lead to a stalemate or American concession under economic strain. On leadership and credibility, Mersheimer critiques U.S. leadership, particularly President Trump, for ignoring warning from generals and the National Intelligence Council that regime change was unlikely to succeed. He cites General James Mattis-era warnings that there was no viable military option and notes the pre-war intelligence that suggested limited prospects for quick regime change. He points to Trump’s sometimes contradictory and inaccurate statements about Iranian capabilities, including claims that Iran possessed Tomahawk missiles and that U.S. strikes had erased Iran’s nuclear capability. He argues that such statements undermine U.S. credibility, though he distinguishes between outright lies and genuine mistaken beliefs by leaders. The discussion also covers Russia’s involvement, with Russia believed to be providing intelligence to Iran and possibly supplying matériel and oil if needed. Mersheimer asserts that the war benefits Russia strategically: it diverts U.S. resources from Europe and Ukraine, potentially worsens Ukraine’s trajectory, and could raise global energy prices that benefit Russian revenue. He suggests that Russia, and possibly China, have strong incentives to aid Iran to counter American power. Europe’s role is analyzed as largely symbolic or marginal in determining the war’s outcome. Mersheimer argues that European elites are aligned with the U.S., prioritizing NATO continuity and the maintenance of American military presence, despite the damaging consequences for Europe. He suggests a radical approach for Europe: adopt a hardball stance toward the U.S., diversify its economic and strategic relations (including with China, Russia, and India), and resist being economically manipulated or coerced by Washington. He emphasizes that Europe’s interests would be better served by reducing overreliance on the United States and pursuing a more balanced set of strategic partners. Towards the end, the hosts revisit the idea that leaders lie and that liberal democracies tend to rely more on public persuasion and propaganda, with Trump’s statements illustrating the complexities of truth in international politics. The conversation ends with a reflection on whether Europe should recalibrate its posture toward the United States and broaden its strategic hedges to protect its own interests, rather than assuming continued U.S. leadership in a costly and protracted confrontation with Iran.

The deadline for attaining this goal is extremely close. Iran is outpacing Iraq in the development of ballistic missile systems that they hope will reach the Eastern Seaboard of the United States within fifteen years. By next spring, at most by next summer, at current enrichment rates, they will have finished the medium. The foremost sponsor of global terrorism could be weeks away from having enough enriched uranium for an entire arsenal of nuclear weapons. That would place a militant Islamic terror regime weeks away from having the fissile material for an entire arsenal of nuclear bombs. If not stopped, Iran could produce a nuclear weapon in a very short time. It could be a year. It could be within a few months, less than a year.

We've targeted Iran's top nuclear scientists, comparing them to Hitler's nuclear team, as well as ballistic missile manufacturing facilities. Iran is allegedly targeting our population with one-ton bombs, while we are targeting military, nuclear, and ballistic missile sites to prevent them from possessing 20,000 such weapons. If we don't act now, it will be too late. We're protecting ourselves, our Arab neighbors, and the world from Iran's ballistic missiles that can reach Europe and soon the United States. This regime has caused death to Americans, and we don't want them to have nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. Today it's Tel Aviv, tomorrow it's New York. We're doing something in the service of mankind, a battle of good against evil. America stands with the good, and I appreciate President Trump's support.

The United States has begun major combat operations in Iran with the objective of defending the American people by eliminating imminent threats from the Iranian regime. The regime is described as a vicious group whose menacing activities endanger the United States, its troops, bases overseas, and allies worldwide. The speech cites decades of hostile actions, including back­ing a violent takeover of the US embassy in Tehran (the 444-day hostage crisis), the 1983 Marine Barracks bombing in Beirut (241 American fatalities), involvement in the USS Cole attack (2000), and killings and maimings of American service members in Iraq. Iranian proxies are described as having launched countless attacks against American forces in the Middle East and against US vessels and shipping lanes in recent years. From Lebanon to Yemen and Syria to Iraq, the regime is said to have armed, trained, and funded terrorist militias that have caused extensive bloodshed. Iran’s proxy Hamas is credited with the October 7 attacks on Israel, which reportedly slaughtered more than 1,000 people, including 46 Americans, and took 12 Americans hostage. The regime is also described as having killed tens of thousands of its own citizens during protests, labeling it as the world’s number one state sponsor of terror. A central policy stated is that Iran “can never have a nuclear weapon.” The administration asserts that in Operation Midnight Hammer last June, the regime’s nuclear program at Fordo, Natanz, and Isfahan was obliterated. After that attack, the regime was warned never to resume its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and repeated attempts to negotiate a deal are described as unsuccessful. Iran is said to have rejected renouncing its nuclear ambitions for decades and to have tried to rebuild its program while developing long-range missiles capable of threatening Europe, US troops overseas, and potentially the American homeland. The United States military is undertaking a massive ongoing operation to prevent this regime from threatening U.S. interests. The plan includes destroying Iran’s missiles and raising its missile industry to the ground, annihilating the regime’s navy, and ensuring that terrorist proxies can no longer destabilize the region or attack American forces or use IEDs against civilians. The speaker asserts that Iran will not obtain a nuclear weapon and asserts the capabilities and power of the U.S. Armed Forces. Steps to minimize risk to U.S. personnel are claimed, but the reality that lives of American service members may be lost is acknowledged as a possible outcome of the operation. The message to the IRGC and Iranian police is to lay down weapons with immunity or face certain death. To the Iranian people, the timing is described as their moment to take control of their destiny with America’s support, urging sheltering and caution as bombs are dropped. The speech ends with blessings for the armed forces and the United States.

Stanislav and Speaker 0 discuss a rapidly evolving, multi-front crisis that they argue is in its early days but already sprawling across the region and the global energy order. Key military and strategic points - The conflict has expanded from warnings into a broader destruction of regional economic infrastructure, extending from Israel to Iran. Israel began by hitting southern oil fields; Iran responded with attacks on oil and gas facilities and US bases, and warned it would strike “everywhere” including US bases if attacked again. - Iran’s stated aim includes purging the US from the Persian Gulf by destroying American bases and making hosting US forces prohibitively expensive. This has been coupled with actions that blinded US radars and pressured Gulf Arab states to expel the Americans. - Israel attacked infrastructure and a nuclear power plant associated with Russia’s project; Israel’s destruction of oil infrastructure and oil fires contributed to a widespread environmental contamination event, with oil smoke and carcinogenic particulates dispersing over Central Asia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Northern India, and potentially further. - The war is generating cascading economic damage, including a potential long-term hit to energy supply chains. The speaker who has oil-industry experience (Speaker 1) explains that refinery expansions and LNG projects involve complex, lengthy supply chains and custom equipment; extensive damage means years, not months, to recover, with LNG output potentially 20%–30% lower for Europe, and cascading effects on fertilizer supplies and food production. - European energy and fertilizer dependencies are stressed: Russia supplies a large share of chemical fertilizer; Europe could face severe energy and food crises, while the US appears more flexible on sanctions and fertilizer sourcing. - On the military side, there is discussion of a possible ground invasion by US forces, including the 82nd Airborne (as part of the XVIII Airborne Corps) and Marines. The analysis emphasizes the daunting difficulty of any cross-border operation into Iran or even taking forward positions in the Strait of Hormuz or on nearby islands. The speaker argues that the 80th/82nd Airborne’s capabilities are limited (light infantry, no back-up armor), making large-scale incursions extremely costly and unlikely to achieve strategic objectives (e.g., seizing enriched uranium on Kare Island). The argument stresses that “mission impossible” scenarios would yield heavy casualties and limited gains, especially given Iran’s mountainous terrain, entrenched defense, and pervasive drone threat. - Kare Island (Hormuz Strait) is described as highly vulnerable to drone swarms. FPV drones, longer-range drones, and loitering munitions could intercept or complicate the deployment of troops, supply lines, and casualty evacuation. Even with air superiority, drones combined with coastal defenses could make an island seizure a “turkey shoot” for Iran unless ground troops can be rapidly reinforced and sustained against a rising drone threat. - The role of drones is emphasized: drones of various sizes, including small FPV systems and larger retranslated-signal drones, could operate from Iranian coastlines to disrupt coastlines such as Kare Island and other Hormuz approaches. The talk highlights how drones complicate casualty evacuation, medical triage, and resupply, and how air assets (helicopters, Ospreys) are vulnerable to drone attacks. Nuclear and regional deterrence questions - Enriched uranium: Iran reportedly has around 60% enrichment; 90% would be necessary for weapons, which could provide a deterrent or escalation leverage. The possibility of nuclear weapons remains a major concern in the discussion. - Fatwas and leadership: The new supreme leader in Iran could alter policy on nuclear weapons; there is debate about whether Iran would actually pursue a weapon given its political culture and regional risk. Regional and international dynamics - The role of Russia and China: The discussion suggests the US is being leveraged by adversaries through proxy relationships, with Russia and China potentially supporting Iran as a way to undermine US influence and the Western-led order. - Regime and leadership dynamics in the US: Speaker 1 predicts intense internal political pressure in the US, including potential civil unrest if casualties rise and if policies become unsustainable. There is skepticism about the willingness of US political leadership to sustain a protracted conflict or a ground invasion. Recent events and forward-facing notes - A ballistic missile strike on southern Israel and simultaneous missile salvos from Iran were reported during the interview; there were also reports of air-defense interceptions near Dubai. - The discussion closes with warnings about the potential for catastrophic outcomes, including a nuclear meltdown risk if nuclear facilities are struck in ways that disable cooling or power systems, and emphasizes the fragility of the current strategic balance as this crisis unfolds.

Stanislav (Speaker 1) and Speaker 0 engage in a wide-ranging, combative analysis of the Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict and broader geopolitical implications. Key points and claims are as follows: - On Iran’s military activity: The volume of Iranian drone and rocket attacks has dropped by about 95% in the last few days, but Iran’s strategic goals appear to be advancing. The Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and Iran has not fallen from power, suggesting a durable regime in Iran despite reduced attack tempo. Israel is said to be taking a pounding with strikes on Haifa refinery, electrical plants, and other targets, while Iran is pursuing a long-haul campaign rather than a rapid blitz. - Terminology and legitimacy: Stanislav objects to labeling Iran’s leadership as a “regime,” arguing it’s a derogatory term and positing that the regime is a theocracy that is comparatively stable under pressure. He notes that air campaigns have never toppled governments and argues that people rally around governments when their families are being harmed, especially within Shia culture. - Information and truth in war: Both sides are accused of misrepresenting losses and capabilities; the Pentagon’s numbers on drones and rockets are treated with skepticism. There is emphasis on the difficulty of verifying battle damage in real time, and the reality that “the first sacrifice of any war is truth” in war reporting. - Military capabilities and constraints: Stanislav emphasizes that the U.S. and Israel have suffered damage to critical infrastructure, and the U.S. faces munitions shortages. He cites the first six days of conflict as consuming thousands of missiles (3,600 missiles across defensive and offensive systems). He argues U.S. industrial/munitions capacity is strained, with missiles being produced in small quantities and largely by hand, constraining rapid replacement. - Iran’s defense and offense: Iran is portrayed as possessing underground “missile cities” and being able to move and launch missiles from concealed locations. The use of decoy aircraft and other decoys is noted, complicating target acquisition. Iran is described as capable of sustaining a long campaign, with continued missile production and hidden launch capability, including launchers that can be moved and re-deployed quickly. - Sensor/shooter network: The discussion mentions a new U.S.-reported capability described as a “sensor shooter network” that uses satellites to spot a missile launcher as it emerges, relaying coordinates to fighters such as F-35s to intercept before launch. This is framed as making missile launches harder for Iran and easier to strike launchers for Israel and the U.S. - Strait of Hormuz as the central objective: The primary objective for Iran, per Speaker 0, is to close the Strait of Hormuz for as long as possible and disrupt Gulf states, with closing the strait potentially forcing an American exit due to economic pressure. Attacks that target Israel are framed as secondary (“bonus”) relative to the Hormuz objective. - Ground warfare and invasions: Both speakers argue that a U.S. or allied ground invasion of Iran would entail massive casualties and potential domestic political backlash, making it a less likely option. The difficulty of projecting power through Iran’s mountainous terrain and the risk of a popular uprising are highlighted. - Regime durability and external support: Iran’s government is described as a theocracy with deep cultural unity, making political collapse unlikely. Russia and China are discussed as critical backers: Russia provides MiG-29s, SU-35s, S-400s, and jamming capabilities, while China provides satellite connections and political cover, and both nations see Iran as an existential interest—Russia especially, given Central Asia and the Caucasus. Iran is portrayed as having backing from Russia and China that would prevent a wholesale collapse. - U.S. allies and credibility: The U.S. is portrayed as depleting its ability to defend Gulf allies, with discussions of allied air-defense systems being diverted elsewhere (to Israel) and questions about long-term U.S. willingness or capacity to sustain a commitment in the Gulf. - Ukraine comparison and broader geopolitics: The dialogue touches on Ukraine, NATO, and the differential treatment of Ukraine versus Iran, noting perceived manipulation by Western actors and the difficulty of achieving durable peace through negotiations when proxies and local actors have entrenched interests. Zelensky and Kyiv’s internal politics are referenced to illustrate broader critique of Western interventions. - Potential off-ramps and negotiations: There is debate about whether a political settlement could be engineered that would preserve the Iranian regime while offering concessions (e.g., limitations on ballistic missiles or nuclear ambitions) and provide Trump with a way to claim a diplomatic win. Stanislav suggests the unpredictable nature of the current leadership and that an off-ramp may be difficult to secure; Speaker 0 contends that a pragmatic, deal-oriented path could exist if a credible intermediary or concessions are arranged, perhaps involving a different leadership or mediator. - Final reflections on strategy and endurance: Stanislav stresses that drones, missiles, and human ground forces all have limits, and argues that real military victory rarely comes from air campaigns alone; the fundamental test remains whether ground forces can secure and hold territory. Speaker 0 adds that the regime’s resilience in Iran and the long-term strategic calculus—especially regarding Hormuz, energy, and allied alliances—will shape the conflict’s trajectory in the coming weeks. Both acknowledge the enormous complexities and the high stakes for regional and global stability.

In the conversation, Syed Mohammed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, addresses multiple interwoven geopolitical issues, centering on Iran, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and the broader strategic rivalry with the United States and its allies. Syria and ISIS release - Marandi asserts that the Damascus regime, described as al-Qaeda/ISIS-aligned factions, would not tolerate Kurdish forces backed by the United States. He notes prior violence against Alawites, Christians, and Druze as context for the current disturbing images from Syria. - He argues the United States is not a reliable partner for its allies, pointing to past episodes such as Obama’s refusal to support Arbil when ISIS threatened the Kurdish government, and Soleimani’s rapid military response to save the city. - He states that ISIS prisoners have been released in Syria, implying that thousands of ISIS members are now free and could destabilize Syria and possibly Iraq. He emphasizes that both Jolani (an ISIS-linked figure) and the Kurdish groups in northeast Syria are allied to the United States, making it unclear who released the prisoners but suggesting that those actors are aligned with the U.S. - The broader implication is that the release increases instability in Syria and potentially across the region. Border security and spillover fears - The discussion turns to Iraq’s border with Syria, with Marandi weighing whether U.S.-backed jihadist forces might spill into Iraq or Lebanon. He suggests a likelihood that ISIS/Al-Qaeda remnants could be used to pressure Lebanon and Iraq to prevent closer Iranian influence. - He notes that Iran’s potential responses could include its missile and drone capabilities, should security worsen on a front involving its allies in Lebanon and Iraq; however, Iran currently refrains from large-scale involvement in Syria but would consider action if threats to Iran or its allies escalate. Regime change, fragmentation, and U.S.-Israel aims - The conversation shifts to Iran post-riots, with questions about U.S./Israel strategies for regime change. Marandi contends the plan is to destabilize and fragment Iran, not to establish a unified post-regime scenario. - He cites alleged Israeli and Western involvement in organizing riots as evidence of a broader conspiracy to create chaos and justify military action. He claims Mossad and other intelligence agencies were on the ground, and public statements from former CIA officials acknowledged Israeli involvement. - He describes the riot phase as highly organized, with foreign funding (including Bitcoin), online recruitment, and careful targeting of police and infrastructure. He portrays the protests as initially legitimate grievances that devolved into violent chaos fueled by external coordination, with widespread destruction and deaths, including the killing of police officers. - In contrast, he highlights large pro-government demonstrations, especially a national day of demonstrations that he says showed widespread popular support for the Islamic Republic and condemnation of rioters. He points to extensive media coverage highlighting peaceful protests, while arguing that the riot narrative dominated Western coverage. Internal Iranian dynamics and public opinion - Marandi emphasizes the fragmentation among Iranian opposition groups: MEK, monarchists, Takfiri remnants near the Pakistan border, and Kurdish separatists, all of whom he asserts lack credible popular support. - He argues that even if the regime were at risk, fragmentation would prevent any single faction from stabilizing the country post-regime change. He suggests this aligns with his view of broader Israeli aims to weaken and fragment Iran and neighboring states, as seen in Syria and Iraq. Military capability and deterrence - He asserts Iran’s substantial missile and drone capabilities and asserts that Iran could defend allies in Lebanon and Iraq if needed. He notes Iran’s long-term preparedness against U.S. threats, including underground bases and extensive drone/missile stocks. - He contends that if war occurred, it would have wide regional and global economic consequences, potentially destabilizing oil markets and prompting broader geopolitical upheaval. He argues that U.S. restraint may be influenced by the risk of a global economic meltdown. Russia, China, and Starlink - Regarding technological assistance for countering communications, he mentions rumors of Russian or Chinese involvement in aiding Iran's internet disruption and Starlink-related issues, acknowledging uncertainty but highlighting a growing trilateral closeness among Iran, Russia, and China in the face of U.S. pressure. media narratives and leadership - He criticizes Western media for portraying protests as peaceful, while Israeli claims and cyber/disinformation around the events are presented as demonstrations of foreign involvement. He maintains that internal Iranian unity—visible in large-scale demonstrations—contrasts with the portrayal of a fractured nation. - He closes by suggesting that while some European leaders may align with U.S. policies, the overall strategic outlook remains uncertain, with a warning that Trump’s approach could escalate tensions rather than yield stability.

The United States will not allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. An attack on Iran would occur if, during the next ten years, they considered launching an attack on Israel. The U.S. would be able to totally obliterate them. A nuclear-armed Iran is a challenge that cannot be contained. It would threaten the elimination of Israel, the security of Gulf nations, and the stability of the global economy, risking a nuclear arms race and the unraveling of the non-proliferation treaty. The United States will do what it must to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Ensuring that Iran never achieves the ability to be a nuclear power is one of the highest priorities. Iran's key nuclear and nuclear facilities have been completely and totally obliterated.

Host: Welcome back. We’re joined by Larry Johnson, a former CI analyst, to discuss what looks like a war with Iran coming sooner rather than later. The world is watching as the US mobilizes more military assets to the region. How should we read this? Is this preparation for war, or a show of strength during negotiations? Larry Johnson: I hoped it was intimidation, but people I trust in national security say this is far more serious. It’s described as one of two things: either a reprise of Midnight Hammer, when US and Iran coordinated two raids into northern Iran, or they’re preparing for an Israeli attack and to back Israel. It’s not just to force concessions at the negotiating table; it’s a warning indicator. Steve Bryan, a former undersecretary of defense, reacted emotionally to US–Iran negotiations, arguing that Iran is using a rope-a-dope strategy. This pressure toward attacking Iran is enormous, and Netanyahu’s visit suggests coordination. The issue has moved beyond nuclear weapons to ballistic missiles and support for Hamas and Hezbollah. The rhetoric around Hamas and Hezbollah is, in my view, a red herring; Israeli claims don’t match the facts. Trump is under heavy pressure from the Zionist lobby to act, and I think a violence outbreak in the next two weeks is plausible, though I hope I’m wrong. Host: The debate you referenced about motives is revealing. If the goal is to destabilize or create chaos to justify action, which past interventions show that hasn’t produced sustainable stability. If the aim is negotiation leverage, what can be achieved now? It seems the US insists on tying any nuclear deal to Iran abandoning its allies and deterrence. Johnson: Iran has built a formidable arsenal: 18 types of ballistic missiles, a recently reportedly successful intercontinental ballistic missile test, five types of cruise missiles, and over 15 types of drones. They’ve learned from decades of conflict with the US and see themselves as at war with the United States. The US narrative of Iran as the aggressor clashes with historical US actions that damaged Iran’s economy and civilian life. Iran’s patience has been tested; they’ve drawn a line in the sand and are prepared to defend themselves, retaliating massively if attacked. They now have support from China and Russia, including advanced radar and air defense, with Chinese and Russian ships headed to the Arabian Sea for a joint exercise. If conflict escalates, Iran could retaliate across the region, with regional actors potentially joining in. Host: You mentioned the tactical realities of the region. The US has deployed many F-35s to the region, including land-based F-35s for SEAD. There are reports of a large US presence in Armenia, and Iran’s potential to strike Haifa or Tel Aviv if attacked. The geopolitical picture is complex, with Russia and China providing support to Iran. The US carrier fleet in the Gulf would face Iranian, Russian, and Chinese air defenses and missiles, including hypersonics. The question is whether the US can sustain a prolonged, scalable war against Iran. Johnson: The US’s sea-based strength is being tested. In the Red Sea, the US faced difficulties against the Houthis with two carriers and a robust air-defense screen; in the current scenario, Iran’s capabilities—air defenses, missiles, drones, and support from Russia and China—make a quick, decisive victory unlikely. Moreover, Israel’s own readiness for a broader war is uncertain; Netanyahu’s visit to the US could signal coordination, but Israeli media note that they may join only if Iran is on the back foot. There’s concern about intelligence reliability: Mossad assets that aided last year’s operations in Iran may be compromised, while Iran benefits from new radar and integrated air defenses. Host: Regional reactions could be pivotal. Iran has contingency plans against regional targets, and Armenia/Azerbaijan might be used as launch pads. Saudi Arabia and Qatar may sit this out if possible, while Iraq has aligned with Iran. The broader question is whether diplomacy can prevail, or whether the cycle of treating conflicts with force will continue. There’s a critique of Western policy: the idea that Iran wants to destroy the US is simplistic, and the region’s dynamics are far more nuanced. Johnson: Iran’s potential to escalate, regional dynamics, and great-power backing mean this could be more than a localized conflict. The overarching point is that there are limits to military power; politics and diplomacy remain essential, and the West’s current posture underestimates the complexity of Iran’s deterrence and regional links. Host: Thanks, Larry. I’ll link to Sonar 21 for more of your writings.

At Iran’s aerospace museum, the speakers outline Iran’s military capabilities—drones, ballistic missiles, and a Nour space program—highlighting the Fata hypersonic missile that "can actually release warheads, change directions after it locks onto its target. It goes up to Mach 15, reaches Tel Aviv in, like, five minutes." They note the Weitzman Institute strike and say "the Iranian ballistic missiles ... are significant in turning the tables on Israel and will be the key" if deterrence is established. They cite air-defense claims of shooting down "up to three" F‑35s and a captured Israeli pilot. They recount Tajrish bombing: "a huge bombing there today. It may have been a terrorist car bombing." They discuss Netanyahu’s calculus with Trump, and propose: "suspend spare parts to... Nevatim Air Base" to end it; "APAC would have to be registered as a foreign agent," with an espionage act investigation.

The discussion covers Iran, its regional threats, and potential US actions, along with broader geopolitical implications. - Iranian capabilities and external support: The on-hand capabilities are said to be far more lethal and the Iranian position stronger, with enormous recent investment by Iran, notably with Chinese and Russian involvement over the last six months. Russia is aiding integrated air defenses and China has reportedly provided missiles; the exact mix and ranges are not fully disclosed. The panelists expect Iranian air and missile defenses to work much better with Russian and Chinese assistance this time. - Protests in Iran and US strike calculations: The protests were described as legitimate initially, driven by economic distress, with two groups present: reform-minded and more conservative elements. The Mossad, with CIA and MI6, allegedly joined to provoke brutality by the regime, aiming to push it toward a brutal crackdown and to exploit the protests as a regime-change opportunity. It was claimed that 40,000 starlight terminals were smuggled in to orchestrate protests but were discovered and eliminated, marking the operation as a failure. Consequently, strikes were deemed impractical unless more firepower and longer duration were available, leading to a predicted extended air campaign rather than a quick strike. - Maduro kidnapping and Venezuela: The operation involved paying off those in the way and exploiting air defenses; one air-defense battery fired, hitting a helicopter but not bringing it down. The new president in Venezuela reportedly refuses to take instructions from Washington, raising questions about regime-change outcomes. There is speculation about continued income from oil captured and sold illegally, and about who will protect Venezuelan oil interests as drilling resumes, including potential mercenaries and maverick oil groups. The oil leadership reportedly lacks interest in going down there unless it is highly profitable. - Secret weapon discussions: The “discombobulator” and other secret weapons mentioned by Trump are described as exaggerated; the speaker notes there are weapons kept secret for dire circumstances but declines to elaborate beyond public knowledge, given high-level clearance. - Iran-focused air campaign planning: The US would rely on a prolonged air campaign, potentially comparable to the Kosovo campaign in 1999, avoiding nuclear weapons and using extensive air power with support from bases in Europe and the region. The Navy would be complemented by the Air Force with a long campaign, while the Navy would need replenishment and time to rearm. - Missile and weapon capabilities: Iran’s capabilities have evolved, aided by Chinese missiles (allegedly hundreds) and Russian support. The range of missiles questions whether they can reach Diego Garcia, with concerns about more capable missiles hitting US bases in the region. Russia’s supply of Reshnik missiles (hypersonic, multiple warheads) is viewed as unlikely; the focus is on Iranian missiles that can threaten ships and bases in the Middle East. - US force posture and diplomacy: The force buildup (aircraft, submarines, drones, THAAD, Patriot) signals a “play for time” strategy while pursuing negotiations, including enriched uranium discussions. There is debate about what agreement might be possible on enriched uranium and JCPOA-related issues; Iran reportedly rejects several Netanyahu/Trump demand points, including missile constraints as a non-starter. - Russia, China, and Turkey as wild cards: Russia would likely intervene militarily only if Iran’s regime faces collapse; China would likely use economic means and some political leverage. Turkey is seen as a wild card; it could join a regional confrontation and potentially align against Israel or the US, with NATO’s response viewed as uncertain and largely lacking a unified, decisive stance. - Nuclear arms and START: The May suspension of START is mentioned; Russia claims willingness to extend, while the US has not responded, raising concerns about unconstrained Russian nuclear activity if treaties lapse. - Ukraine and Taiwan implications: European nerves and NATO dynamics are evolving; the Europeans are portrayed as vacillating between opposing and challenging Trump-era policies, with NATO potentially facing existential questions. A strike on Iran could shift focus away from Ukraine and Taiwan, empowering adversaries, or strengthen deterrence depending on actions and diplomacy. The speaker suggests that, pragmatically, Taiwan poses a far more difficult strategic challenge and that escalation there would be highly unrewarding, potentially increasing China’s incentives to avoid direct conflict.

The speaker argues that there has been an “unbelievable success in by, degrading Iran,” moving Iran from a first-rate power to a second- or third-rate power. Iran is described as “throwing their weight all over the place” and “exporting terrorism,” not only across the Middle East but also to Venezuela, where they are “in cahoots with the Maduro regime.” The claim extends to Iran exporting terrorism to America and to the American hemisphere, and to Hamas and Iran’s proxies attempting to get their guys into the United States. The speaker asserts that Hamas and Iran’s proxies are a threat not only to the United States but to Israel and to “all America’s allies in The Middle East,” and to America itself.

Scott Ritter argues that indicators suggest a major US military action against Iran is being prepared, with US naval forces and air power in the region and discussions of precision strikes against Iranian officials. He assessment that the move toward war seems likely, noting Iran’s capabilities to retaliate in multiple devastating ways: Iran can terminate regional energy production at will and inflict horrific harm on American bases, potentially killing hundreds or thousands of American service members; Iran could also deliver near-lethal damage to Israel. He warns that the US could suffer losses of ships, including an aircraft carrier. Israel reportedly has told the US it is prepared to absorb up to 700 Iranian ballistic missiles if the US ensures removal of the Iranian regime from power. Ritter contends the US lacks the means to remove Iran’s military and civilian leadership from power, especially after telegraphing a strike. He recalls the 2006 or 2008-style dynamic where Iran would respond forcefully if attacked, including a possible knockout strike against Israel with long-term consequences for regional energy security and the global economy. He discusses Iran’s preparedness, including underground command posts and buried enrichment capabilities (citing Ferdow as an example) and the likelihood that Iran has continuity plans that would withstand decapitation attempts. He asserts Iran would respond by disrupting energy and possibly Hormuz, with a broad, existential resilience against disruption. On the objective of potential operations, Ritter believes the aim would be to destroy Iran’s national-level command and control, suppress regional security institutions, and enable uprisings in various regions (Balochistan, Arab regions, Azeris, MEK-supported factions). He notes the CIA-backed groups and a possible attempt to resurrect a monarchy, suggesting Trump may have been influenced by expatriate anti-regime voices. He says Iran is prepared for such moves, including networks in Northern Iraq, Kurdish forces, and other regional proxies, and anticipates a surge of paramilitary activity, assassination campaigns, and widespread sabotage to create chaos and fracture the country. Ritter asserts that Russia and China would resist a US-Israeli strike against Iran. Russia has strategic ties with Iran and could push for Iranian retaliation against US assets, including the possibility of shooting down US B-2 bombers to humiliate American military superiority. He argues that Moscow and Beijing would support Iran to blunt US actions, including potential disruptions of US naval power or shipping. Regarding a possible off-ramp, Ritter suggests that an off-ramp would require the US to claim it forced concessions and to double down on sanctions, avoiding another large-scale strike. He cites that a “deal” from Trump would resemble a gangland arrangement rather than a treaty, warning that Iran should seek a comprehensive treaty based on international law rather than a high-pressure bargain. He contends Iran should avoid preemptive strikes that might invite nuclear retaliation, though he believes Iran could justify self-defense under UN Article 51 if threatened imminently. In closing, Ritter states that the situation is dangerous, with surveillance and reconnaissance ongoing, and notes that while war seems likely, an off-ramp could still be presented through sanctions and political messaging rather than immediate military action. He acknowledges the tension and pressures on both sides, and offers a cautious, war-weary perspective.

Speaker 0 provides a characterization of recent events, alleging that the American people are being lied to by their government about what’s transpiring. He claims Iran has destroyed five radars, specifying two types: AN TPY and AN FPS. He states that one type costs $500,000,000 and the other two each cost a billion dollars. He asserts that these radars were located at the military base at Al Udeid and at the naval base in Bahrain, and that all have been bombed or attacked, with the Bahrain facility essentially destroyed. Speaker 0 emphasizes that these radars were critical for the air defense system because they would provide “the immediate warning that, oh, there’s been a missile launch. It’s going on this trajectory. This is where you need to be prepared to engage it,” and notes that they were tied into a system called THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense). He states there are “like a total of 10 THAAD batteries in the world,” and claims that Iran has destroyed three of those, representing “30% of our total number of THAADs in the world” in the last week. He continues by asserting that Iran has destroyed “about $4,000,000,000 worth of radars, in a week.” He adds that Iran is now regularly hitting Israel despite claims that the United States has “blown up their launchers.” He concludes by stating that authorities “continue to think that we can solve these problems with force instead of diplomacy.”

The speakers discuss Iran's nuclear capabilities and Israel's potential response. Netanyahu claimed in 2012 that Iran was months away from a nuclear bomb. In 2015, he stated Iran was weeks away from having the fissile material for an arsenal. In 2018, Israel revealed Iran's secret nuclear files, including alleged warhead designs. A hot war between Israel and Iran could threaten the United States, but one speaker suggests the U.S. should stay out of it. Marco Rubio stated Israel took unilateral action against Iran and the U.S. was not involved. However, Trump acknowledged he was aware and gave a green light. Israel used American equipment during the strikes.

Iran has achieved unbelievable success in degrading itself from a first-rate power to a second- or third-rate power. It has been throwing its weight around, exporting terrorism not only across the Middle East but to Venezuela, and it’s in cahoots with the Maduro regime. They are exporting terrorism to America and to the American hemisphere, and they want these Hezbollah and Hamas operatives to get their people into the United States. Hamas and Iran’s proxies are a threat not only to us, but to Israel, all of America's allies in the Middle East, and to America itself.

Iran is outpacing Iraq in ballistic missile development, aiming to reach the US Eastern Seaboard within fifteen years. By next spring or summer, Iran will finish medium enrichment and move to the final stage. From there, it could take only a few months or weeks to get enough enriched uranium for the first bomb. The speaker claims the foremost sponsor of global terrorism could be weeks away from having enough enriched uranium for an arsenal of nuclear weapons. If not stopped, Iran could produce a nuclear weapon in a short time, possibly within a few months or less than a year.

Nadav Shoshani and Mario discuss the Israel-Lebanon situation, Iran’s role, and broader regional dynamics. Key points: - On Nadav’s claim verification: Nathaniel is alive, and Nadav confirms he has five fingers “as much as I know,” vowing to make sure. - AI and information warfare: Mario notes Iran is doing a lot of work on AI and that, when there are no real achievements, they use AI to create appearances of achievements. Nadav agrees that information warfare is strong and that Iran’s AI videos appear unconvincing, citing tunnels and such as examples. - Lebanon and potential invasion: Mario highlights concerns that 450,000 troops were called up and that a large invasion could bring back memories of the 1970s–80s. Nadav clarifies that the 450,000 figure refers to what might be needed or called up, not what has already been mobilized. He states Israel has taken steps limited to targeting Hizballah threats to civilians and is not currently conducting a wide ground operation in Lebanon. A decision for a full invasion has not been made, though it appears increasingly possible. He notes there are discussions and that Macron (France) may be brokering behind-the-scenes negotiations that could avert an invasion. - Objectives and strategy in Lebanon: Nadav explains Hizballah cannot be an armed group threatening both countries. He emphasizes military options exist but that diplomatic avenues have produced limited success. The immediate threat is Hizballah’s rocket and UAV fire against Israel (over 1,200 rockets and UAVs launched toward Israel, over 100 per day). Hizballah has reportedly deployed hundreds of Radwan forces into southern Lebanon, engaging Israeli troops. Israel is expanding its defensive measures and striking specific targets to push Hizballah away from the border. The aim is to remove a threat, not to expand territory. The Lebanese Armed Forces’ attempts to clear terrorists were less effective in the last two weeks, while UN missions previously failed to achieve lasting security. Nadav stresses there is no war against the Lebanese people; many Israelis would welcome friendship with Lebanon, and messaging and actions are aligned to protect civilians and strike terrorist targets with advance warning. - Territorial considerations: Nadav says the Israeli border area is the focus, with limited figures on actual Lebanese territory under Israeli control; the border area includes hills where Lebanon sits above Israel. He asserts that most Israeli activity is near the border and within specific locations tied to intelligence on terror threats. - Personal reassurance to Lebanese civilians: Nadav reiterates Israel has no war with the people of Lebanon and that Israel’s actions are against Hizballah. He underscores that if Hizballah stops posing a threat, Israeli forces would not need to be there. - Iran and the broader threat: Nadav discusses diminished Iranian attacks but ongoing risk. Israel and the US coordinate closely, with ongoing operations to neutralize missiles and launchers. About 70% of Iran’s missile launchers have been neutralized, and Iran’s leadership is described as being in disarray and difficult to target from the sky. Iran’s use of drones and missiles to pressure Gulf states and US bases continues, with Israel monitoring and countering UAV production and launch capabilities. Iran’s ability to affect energy infrastructure is acknowledged, but Nadav asserts that Israel has targeted fuel depots that power Iran’s war machine, while Iran has previously targeted energy facilities in the region. - Oil depots and strategic strikes: Nadav contends Iran targeted civilian energy infrastructure before Israel’s actions and characterizes Israel’s strikes as precise against fuel depots fueling Iran’s war effort. He notes ongoing cooperation with the United States and stresses that Iran’s strategy centers on pressuring global economics and leveraging civilian targets. - Supreme leader rumors and whereabouts: Nadav touches on rumors about the supreme leader’s health and location, saying there are question marks about his condition and that he has not heard reports of him going to Moscow; he suggests the leadership is “on the run” and hiding, with public statements increasingly written rather than spoken. He asserts there is evidence of long-term intelligence gathering against the Iranian leadership, and that the information is not produced overnight. - End note: The discussion closes with praise for Israel’s intelligence capabilities and a caution that talks and on-record planning continue, with a recognition that the situation remains dynamic and risky.

Erica Fronse, host of Millennials Rock, introduces Dr. Peter Pry, executive director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security and director of the US Nuclear Strategy Forum, both congressional advisory boards. Pry has served on the Congress’s EMP Commission, the Strategic Posture Commission, the House Armed Services Committee, and the CIA, and is the author of Apocalypse Unknown. Fronse asks Pry to address the grid vulnerability facing the United States and to explain what EMP is, what threats Americans should be aware of, and what represents a major security issue today. Pry explains that an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) can be generated by detonating a nuclear weapon at high altitude in outer space. He notes that such an event would not produce a visible blast or nuclear fallout, but would generate a super energetic radio wave known as an electromagnetic pulse. This EMP would destroy electronics across all of the Continental United States, leading to the collapse of the power grid, communications, transportation, business, and finance. He adds that under a year-long blackout scenario caused by a nuclear EMP attack, the Congressional EMP Commission estimated that nine out of ten Americans could die from starvation, disease, and societal collapse. He emphasizes that this devastation could be achieved with a single nuclear weapon. Pry then references Iran, noting that Iran has written in its military doctrine that developing the bomb is tied to this kind of capability. He also mentions that Iran has demonstrated practices of launching missiles from short-range platforms on ships to simulate an EMP attack, illustrating a strategic interest in exploiting EMP-like effects or the threat they pose. The discussion underscores the perceived severity of an EMP threat as a major security concern, highlighting both the potential scale of disruption to critical infrastructure and the included risks to human life in the event of a prolonged outage.

The speaker states: "Is developing now ballistic missiles that are intercontinental ballistic missiles for 8,000 kilometers range." They add: "They add another 3,000 kilometers and they've got under their gun, under their atomic guns, the New York City in Target, Washington, Boston, Miami, Mar A Lago." "That is a very great danger." "You don't want to be under the nuclear gun of these people who are not necessarily rational and who chant Death to America." These observations underscore concerns about strategic stability and the potential impact on major U.S. metropolitan areas.

Iran seeks to expand its influence in the Middle East and possesses ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and UAVs capable of striking US targets and allies. Iran has demonstrated a willingness to use these weapons, including attacks in Iraq in 2020 and against Israel in April 2024. Iran's cyber capabilities pose a threat to US networks. The IC assesses that Iran is not currently building a nuclear weapon and that Supreme Leader Khamenei has not authorized the nuclear weapons program suspended in 2003. However, the IC is closely monitoring whether Tehran decides to reauthorize the program. There has been an erosion of a taboo on publicly discussing nuclear weapons in Iran, potentially emboldening advocates. Iran's enriched uranium stockpile is at unprecedented levels for a state without nuclear weapons. Iran will likely continue efforts against Israel and to press for US military withdrawal by supporting its "axis of resistance," which, despite being weakened, poses threats to Israel, US forces, and international shipping.

Speaker 0 discusses the development of ballistic missiles with intercontinental range, stating 'Is developing now ballistic missiles that are intercontinental ballistic missiles for 8,000 kilometers range.' He questions the implications with 'What does that mean?' and explains that 'They add another 3,000 kilometers and they've got under their gun, under their atomic guns, the New York City in Target, Washington, Boston, Miami, Mar A Lago.' He pauses with 'Okay?' and concludes that 'So that is a very great danger.' The speaker adds a stark warning: 'You don't want to be under the nuclear gun of these people who are not necessarily rational and who chant Death to America.'