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The panelists discuss whether recent developments around Ukraine, NATO security guarantees, and Western support can produce a peace agreement acceptable to Russia and Ukraine, and what the war’s trajectory might look like by year-end and beyond. Initial reactions and sticking points - Speaker 1 sees potential in recent moves if true and reliable, arguing Ukraine is signaling goodwill to the United States, but remains skeptical that a peace deal will satisfy both sides given core demands over territory and Donbas control. He emphasizes the Donbas as the central unresolved issue. - Speaker 2 notes Putin’s need to show tangible gains to save face, arguing the war is being fought to achieve declared goals and that Russia will not sign a deal unless it secures substantial results. Security guarantees, no-fly zones, and peacekeeping - The discussion centers on two main proposed points: U.S. security guarantees (including possible no-fly zone enforcement) and a European-led peacekeeping force in Ukraine. There is debate about how binding such guarantees would be and whether Russia would accept them, with concerns about the Budapest Memorandum’s history of non-fulfillment versus what a new, more comprehensive, legally binding framework might look like. - Speaker 1 points out that even a robust security package would require Russian agreement, which he doubts will be forthcoming given Moscow’s current aims. He underscores that Europe’s and the U.S.’s support for Ukraine is contingent on political will, which could waver, but he notes Ukraine’s trust gap with U.S. guarantees given past experiences. - Speaker 2 stresses that Putin’s aims include defeating NATO and achieving a U.S.-level accommodation (a “Yalta 2.0” style deal) while keeping Western control over Europe at arm’s length. He argues Putin would accept U.S. and possibly some European troops but not a formal NATO presence on Ukrainian soil, especially in western Donbas or beyond. Budapest memorandum vs. new guarantees - Both sides discuss the difference between a nonbinding Budapest Memorandum and a more robust, legally binding security guarantee. Speaker 1 highlights Ukraine’s past trust in security assurances despite U.S. and European failures to honor them, suggesting skepticism about the enforceability of any new guarantees. Speaker 2 suggests that a stronger, more binding arrangement could be essential for Russia to accept any settlement, but that Moscow would still resist concessions over full Donbas control. On-the-ground realities and war dynamics - The panelists agree Russia is advancing on multiple fronts, though the pace and strategic significance of gains vary. They discuss Ukraine’s ability to sustain the fight through Western weapons flows and domestic production (including drones and shells). They acknowledge the risk of Western fatigue and the potential for a more protracted war, even as Ukraine builds its own capabilities to prolong the conflict. - The West’s long-term willingness to fund and arm Ukraine is debated: Speaker 1 argues Europe’s economy is strained but notes continued political support for Ukraine, which could outlast Russia’s economic stamina. Speaker 2 emphasizes that Russia’s economy is fragile mainly in the provinces, while Moscow and Saint Petersburg remain relatively insulated; he also points to BRICS support (China and India) as sustaining Moscow politically and economically. Economic and strategic pressures - The role of energy revenues and sanctions is debated. Speaker 1 suggests Russia can be pressured economically to seek a deal, while Speaker 2 counters that Russia’s economy is adapting, with China and India providing strategic support that helps Moscow resist Western coercion. They discuss shadow fleet strikes and global energy markets as tools to erode Russia’s war-finance capability. - There is disagreement about whether, over time, economic pressure alone could force regime change in Russia. Speaker 1 is skeptical that penalties will trigger a voluntary Russian withdrawal, while Speaker 2 argues that sustained economic and political pressure, combined with Western unity, could push toward a settlement. Strategies and potential outcomes - Putin’s internal calculus is described as existential: he seeks a win that he can publicly claim to legitimize his rule and justify the costs of the war to the Russian people and elites. This shapes his openness to concessions and to the kinds of guarantees he would accept. - Alexander posits that a near-term peace could emerge from a deal brokered at high levels (potentially involving Trump and Putin) that reshapes European security with U.S. leadership and BRICS engagement, while Paul emphasizes that any credible end to the conflict would require Ukraine and Russia to agree to a swap-like territorial arrangement and to accept a new security framework that deters renewed aggression. End-of-year and longer-term outlooks - By year-end, the panel agrees it is unlikely that a major peace agreement will be realized under the current conditions; any real breakthrough would depend on significant concessions, including Donbas arrangements, and a credible security guarantee framework. - By the end of next year, both expect a continuation of a contested balance: Ukraine likely to press for stronger Western guarantees and EU integration, Russia seeking to preserve Donbas gains while navigating internal and external pressures. Alexander envisions two “wins” emerging: the United States under Trump coordinating a broader peace framework, and China leveraging its economic influence to shape Europe’s response. Paul anticipates a gradual trajectory with ongoing military and economic pressures and a continued stalemate unless a major concession reshapes incentives on both sides.

Diplomacy is difficult but necessary to avoid nuclear war. The U.S. is running out of options with Russia because it underestimated the Russian economy and civilization. Some U.S. Senators believed Russia was merely a gas station with nuclear weapons, which was an absurd assessment. Sanctions were levied, and Russia was cut off from SWIFT, but ultimately, the U.S. hurt itself more than it hurt Russia. The speaker is not endorsing the Russian economy or civilization, but stating that the U.S. did not understand it.

- Speaker 0 notes that vaccines and boosters are readily available, testing has been dramatically scaled with millions of rapid tests, and that 82 percent of adult Americans have taken the vaccine. He states that those not vaccinated are nine times more likely to be hospitalized or die from the virus, and emphasizes that the country is in a different place than a year ago, with ongoing work to fight the virus. - On the strategic petroleum reserve (SPR), Speaker 0 explains that the release totals 50,000,000 barrels, with 18,000,000 already congressionally required and accelerated by the president to provide immediate relief. The remaining 32,000,000 comes from an exchange, putting barrels on the market now in exchange for their return in the future. He describes the exchange as a tool matched to the current economic environment and notes the aim to lower costs for the American people, particularly gas prices ahead of the holiday season, while acknowledging the pandemic’s impact on the global cost of goods and gas. He also mentions pressing OPEC+ to increase supply and using every tool at the administration’s disposal to help working families. - When pressed about the 50,000,000 barrels figure, Speaker 0 refrains from further detail beyond the explanation that 18,000,000 were congressionally required and the rest come from the exchange arrangement. - On China, Speaker 0 clarifies that the president did not intend to separate China publicly, saying China may do more, but the president does not want to speak for any country. He notes that the president has had conversations with other countries and that the national security team has communicated with them; announcements will be made by those countries themselves. Speaker 1 asks whether the president spoke with Xi Jinping; Speaker 0 confirms they did talk, as referenced in a readout issued afterward, and that the president asked China to discuss helping with supply, without detailing further. - Regarding Ukraine, Speaker 1 asks for updates on White House assessments and plans for a possible phone call with President Putin. Speaker 0 says there is nothing to preview at this time, but reiterates that the United States remains in very close contact with European partners.

The president's strategy drove recent events. He and the speaker discussed it at length on Sunday. The president may have goaded China into a bad position, leading them to be perceived as bad actors. The U.S. is willing to cooperate with allies and trading partners who did not retaliate. The message was simple: don't retaliate, and things will turn out well.

In the video, the speaker mentions that there is a belief in the West that Russia and Ukraine are at war. However, the speaker argues that it is actually the USA that is against Russia, using the potential of NATO and the European Union, as well as the armed forces of Ukraine. The speaker suggests that these entities are interested in weakening Russia, but also points out that China is another center of power in the world. The speaker concludes by saying that once these entities believe they can handle Russia, their next challenge will be dealing with China.

Speaker: Discussing the future of Ukraine, Putin requested written plans from the Americans, but Biden refused to negotiate. This should have sparked concern in Germany, as a potential war would involve them. If conflict arises as the Americans warned, Germany will be drawn into the issue.

Checklist for summary approach: - Identify core claims, end-state, and strategic stakes across the dialogue. - Preserve unique or surprising assertions, including direct phrases where pivotal. - Exclude repetition, filler, and off-topic asides; focus on moving arguments. - Translate nothing (content is already in English); present claims as stated, with minimal interpretation. - Do not insert opinions or adjudicate truth; report claims exactly as presented. - Target a concise, coherent 388–486 word summary. Speaker 1 asserts that the globalists—described as a "globalist neocon elite" on both the Hill and in the White House, plus elites in Europe—want to see BlackRock "take over Ukraine" to strip its resources and turn it into a subjugated state for the broader agenda. They also want to see Russia destroyed, arguing the war has never been about Ukraine but about what can be done to destroy Russia. Russia is depicted as weak, with references to earlier contemptuous assessments like "Russia is Spain with a gas station." The speakers contend Moscow had legitimate concerns about Western actions in Eastern Ukraine and NATO on its border; they claim Washington ignored those concerns and installed a hostile government in Kyiv in 2014. They say President Trump attempted to listen but was surrounded by loyalists who "took an oath of obedience" but who ignored his orders. The outcome foreseen is a serious war that could become regional or global, with the claim that the globalists are losing. When the ground dries in June, a "massive Russian offensive" is anticipated, and much of what is called Ukraine would be swept away, especially the Kyiv government, which the speaker claims serves elite interests rather than the Ukrainian people. Speaker 0 pivots to the petrodollar, noting Putin’s outreach to Saudis and Xi, suggesting that moving away from the petrodollar would undermine U.S. borrowing and living beyond means. Speaker 1 reframes the war as now financial as well as military. The BRICS alliance is described as expanding—"81 additional members"—and moving to a currency backed by gold, whether a single currency or a basket. This, they argue, would undermine the dollar and signal grave trouble for global finance, driving the globalists to desperate measures. They warn that once Western Ukraine falls, there would be pressure to deploy U.S. forces into Poland and Romania, with possible Romanian participation, leading to a full-fledged war if intervention occurs. Putin is described as having exercised tremendous restraint and patience, avoiding a war with the West; he supposedly does not want conflict with the West, but if Western forces involved themselves near the Polish border or beyond, “the gloves will come off.” The dialogue also asserts Russia’s strategic calculus: Putin warned against advancing the border to Russia, sought equal rights for Russians in Eastern Ukraine, and refused to surrender Crimea, which was seen as a bulwark against a U.S. naval base. Biden’s goal is framed as regime change and dividing Russia, with oligarchs such as Koloboyski and Soros alleged to be part of this globalist project. The plan is described as a strategic defense with an economy-of-force approach pushing toward the Polish border, setting up the threat of a protracted, multi-year conflict. The United States’ military recruitment is depicted as underprepared, including Marines being encouraged to recruit illegals.

Larry Johnson outlines a sequence of escalations between Russia and the United States after December 28, beginning with a failed drone attack on Vladimir Putin’s official residence and followed by Russia’s retaliatory actions in Ukraine and at sea. He describes Russia as engaging in cautious escalation: the December 28 strike signaled a deliberate move tied to a broader pattern of attacks on Russian nuclear-related targets, and the subsequent seizure of a Russian-flag tanker by the United States scene, which Russia condemned as piracy. He notes the crew composition (two Russians, eight Georgians, 20 Ukrainians) and observes that the United States released the two Russians while charging the others in the US, arguing the episode demonstrates how Washington uses force and intimidation without clear accountability. The exchange emphasizes that Russia’s response has targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, rather than NATO facilities in Europe, as part of a warning to NATO about escalation risk. Russia reportedly cut 50% of Ukraine’s stored natural gas and attacked energy substations across multiple Ukrainian regions (Nyropetrov, Zaporizhzhia, Kyiv), causing widespread disruptions to heating and plumbing in winter. Kyiv officials, including Klitschko, warned residents to leave high-rise buildings to prevent pipe bursts. Johnson frames this as measured signaling rather than indiscriminate aggression, suggesting it’s a warning to the West that Moscow can reach out and touch them if escalation continues, while still aiming to avoid a full-scale direct confrontation with NATO. He remarks that Russia’s targeting of facilities owned by the United States in Ukraine signals willingness to attack US-affiliated targets inside Ukraine. The discussion then shifts to the broader geopolitical significance: US actions, including piracy at sea and attacks on Russian ships, contribute to a perception in Moscow that international law is being abandoned by the United States, especially under Trump and his aides who publicly dismiss international treaties. Johnson asserts that, from a Russian analytic perspective, this undermines trust in written agreements and pushes Russia toward preparing for broader conflict, potentially with NATO, while acknowledging Russia’s restraint—limiting strikes to Ukraine to avoid misinterpretation as a direct war with NATO. He suggests Russia might consider flagging ships with Russian or Chinese flags and deploying specialized forces on ships to deter or respond to attempts to board, as a possible evolution of maritime risk. The two discuss the purpose of Washington’s stance: is it to force concessions, provoke a broader European response, or achieve escalation dominance? Johnson asserts that US policy appears aimed at coercing Russia and pressuring Western Europe, though he notes China and India now press Russia toward negotiation; however, the Lula-like convergence of US internal dynamics and Trump’s rhetoric makes negotiations appear dead ends to Moscow. Johnson references a broader view that the US under Trump has eroded norms of international law, arguing that a shift toward force and lawless behavior leaves Russia imagining a future with reduced Western unity and increased incentives to diversify alliances with East/ Eurasian powers. On the military horizon, Johnson anticipates Ukraine’s manpower problem versus Russia’s growing mobilization, with Russia expanding its ground force to potentially over 2 million to prepare for future conflict with NATO, not merely Ukraine. He predicts continued Ukrainian misfortune on the battlefield, with major cities such as Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, and Sumy potentially at risk of encirclement, and Kyiv facing the broader strategic impact of energy outages and urban shutdowns. He foresees possible explorations of a post-war order, including who controls weapons and governance in Ukraine; Russia might threaten US reconnaissance aircraft or vessels in denial of freedom of navigation, while NATO could become more disunited as some European leaders push for separate talks with Moscow. In sum, the interview frames the current phase as a dangerous, escalatory dynamic with potential for miscalculation, where the United States’ posture of force, the erosion of international norms, and Russia’s strategic patience converge toward a possible broader confrontation, or, at minimum, a hardening of positions and a reorientation toward Eastward-alignments.

Ian and Mario discuss the Venezuelan operation and its wider implications. - Maduro’s regime and Venezuela’s situation are contrasted with Chavez. Maduro is not as popular or charismatic, the economy is in shambles, and Venezuela possesses billions in Russian air defenses that failed to down US helicopters, highlighting a discrepancy between defense systems and battlefield outcomes. - The Washington assessment is that the operation to capture Maduro involved substantial internal support from Maduro’s circles, potentially including CIA-assisted tips and insider cooperation, enabling real-time intelligence on Maduro’s movements. This inside help is seen as a critical factor alongside the United States’ capabilities. - The operation was planned for months, with the White House reportedly approving strikes in advance as long as a window existed. The goal was to capture Maduro and bring him to the United States, not simply to eliminate him; the plan also involved a minimal American casualty count (one helicopter injury, no American deaths). - The vice president, Delsy Rodríguez, is discussed as a possible insider who might have privately engaged with the United States, though it’s not clear she knew the exact timing of the strike. Cuban intelligence was described as protecting Maduro, and Maduro’s inner circle would have had reasons to avoid leaks. - There was emphasis that the operation was not framed as democracy promotion or regime change, but rather about removing Maduro and establishing a transition that could reshape Venezuela’s leadership and oil/drug policy, with the oil sector and sanctions regime central to the US strategy. The leaders around Maduro, not Maduro alone, shape the outcome. - The Venezuelan air defense systems, largely Russian, were targeted and neutralized in advance of the Delta Strike Force. The attack demonstrated US surgical strike capabilities, but also underscored the risk of Venezuelan retaliation and the complexity of operating in a heavily defended airspace. - The discussion shifts to the political implications for allied and regional actors. The operation raises questions for Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, and Denmark (in terms of leverage and responses to US unilateral actions). Colombia, under Petro, faces considerable pressure as US leverage increases, while Brazil’s stance is tempered by prior sanctions and subsequent negotiations. Denmark and other partners are noted for their responses to geopolitical shifts. - China’s role is addressed: China had a delegation in Caracas at the time, with public shock at the US move. The US did not appear to have given heads-up to China. This underscores the multipolar dynamic where the US can project military power, but economic and technological power remains more distributed. - The broader geopolitical context includes Russia’s strategic vulnerabilities. The Venezuela operation signals American military capability and willingness to act unilaterally, yet Africa, the Middle East, and Ukraine illustrate ongoing limits and risks. Moscow’s alliances with Venezuela and Iran are highlighted, but the operation did not rely on formal mutual defense commitments; Russia’s global influence is depicted as waning in the face of US operational decisiveness. - The discussion covers potential long-term effects on global order. The US displays “extraordinary military capability” but faces political constraints as a democracy with checks and balances. The speaker warns of a possible “law of the jungle” trajectory if the US continues to rely on coercive power, potentially diminishing international legitimacy and provoking responses from China and others who possess economic leverage. - The possible phase two is referenced as a strategic instrument; if the new Venezuelan leadership does not align with US aims, offshore oil facilities could be targeted to compel compliance, signaling ongoing leverage without ground troop deployments. - Regarding Iran, there is no current plan for a Maduro-like operation. Israel’s potential pushes against Iran are discussed, but the US position remains cautious: strikes would be contingent on broader strategic considerations, with the US wary of deepening conflicts if not coordinated with partners. - Ian offers forecasts: Iran is likely to face increased pressure domestically and internationally, while Venezuela could see a transitional government for 12–18 months amid power-sharing negotiations, with ongoing instability possible as opposition figures push for more influence. The expectations emphasize ongoing US leverage, limited appetite for full regime change, and the risk that military weakness and political maneuvering will shape outcomes in the near term.

In a wide-ranging discussion about the January 3 operation in Venezuela, the speakers explore initial reactions, possible motives, and the broader geopolitical implications. - Initial reaction and early concerns: The exchange begins with the worry that the events marked the start of a full amphibious assault or a new war. Speaker 1 recalls staying up late and being shocked by the “sheer gangsterism” of Maduro’s kidnapping, noting that Maduro was flown out of the country with little resistance. He models several theories around how such an operation could occur with minimal opposition and suggests the possibility of a negotiated exit that would keep the Chavista structure in place through a successor like Delsy Rodriguez. - The “deal” theory and who might be involved: Speaker 1 explains a theory that Donald Trump and Marco Rubio wanted a negotiated exit for Maduro that would allow the Pesuv (Chavista) structure to remain and enable the installation of a figure like Delsy Rodriguez to work within Chavismo to secure resource contracts for Trump’s allies. He cites sources close to negotiations and references coverage in the New York Times supporting elements of this narrative. He also notes Trump’s public dismissal of Maria Carina Machado as lacking support to rule, a point he says he predicted on a livestream. - The military stand-down hypothesis: The conversation delves into why no strikes targeted the helicopters, positing a stand-down order. Speaker 0 asks who would authorize such a stand-down and cites Ian Bremmer’s assessment as a possibility but unlikely due to the risk. Speaker 1 acknowledges the plausibility of many theories, including the idea that a stand-down could spare the country from greater U.S. violence, reminiscent of past operations in Baghdad or Raqqa, and emphasizes that the question of who issued any stand-down order remains unresolved. He mentions Delsy Rodriguez’s potential self-protection concerns and notes Diosdado Cabello’s visible signaling alongside military figures after Maduro’s abduction. - Delsy Rodriguez and potential motivations: The interlocutors discuss Rodriguez’s political stature, her management of Venezuela’s COVID response, and the perception she could pose a more direct challenge to U.S. interests due to her economic stabilization efforts and heavy ties to China. Speaker 1 underscores that Rodriguez stabilized the economy and was central to a revival that included substantial China-driven oil exports, a point supported by a New York Times profile. He clarifies that he did not speculate Rodriguez was the U.S. mole but stresses she would be asked by interviewers about such questions. - Maduro’s leadership and the economic crisis: The participants debate Maduro’s competence, acknowledging corruption and structural issues within a petro-state framework but arguing that the decline in living standards and oil production has deep roots, including U.S. sanctions and geopolitical pressure. Speaker 1 contends that while Maduro was not a “stupid” leader, Chavez-era and post-Chavez mismanagement, together with U.S. financial sanctions and regime-change tactics, contributed to Venezuela’s economic collapse. He insists the regime’s persistence does not hinge on one leader and cautions against simplistic characterizations of Maduro or Chavez as solely responsible for ruin. - Economic dynamics and sanctions: The discussion emphasizes that Venezuela’s economic trajectory has been shaped by sanctions and counter-sanctions, with Speaker 1 asserting that U.S. maximum-pressure campaigns and the theft of assets (including Sitco and gold reserves) severely impacted the economy. He argues the sanctions constitute financial terrorism and compares U.S. policy to broader imperial dynamics centered on dollar dominance and oil leverage. - Regime change prospects and future leadership: The speakers speculate about possible future leadership within the Pesuv or an alternative power structure, including the potential grooming of a candidate from within the regime or the return of Maria Carina Machado if conditions align. They note that a political shift would require military backing, and they discuss whether an eventual election could be staged or delayed to a more favorable time for U.S. interests. They emphasize that, absent military support, it would be difficult for any non-Maduro leadership to emerge. - China, Russia, and global signaling: The conversation covers the Chinese envoy’s presence in Caracas before the operation and the broader implications for China’s role in Venezuela. Speaker 1 argues the operation sent a global message to rivals (China, Russia, Iran) that the U.S. can seize leadership and resources, while also suggesting that China could be leveraged to avoid deeper conflict by permitting continued oil exports. The dialogue also touches on potential retaliatory moves by Russia or China and the broader geopolitical chessboard, including implications for Greenland and other strategic theaters. - Legal proceedings and comparisons to other regime changes: Maduro’s indictment in the Southern District of New York is discussed, with reflections on its weaknesses and how it compares to similar prosecutions (e.g., Juan Orlando Hernandez). The discussion concludes with a sense that Venezuela will likely face a prolonged, complex confrontation, with lingering questions about who will govern next and under what terms.

Afshun Rataty opens Going Underground from the UAE as Russia marks Victory Day and asserts Russia’s contribution to international peace by defeating fascism and Nazism, while noting the UAE has intercepted missiles and drones aimed by Iran. He claims millions have been killed, wounded, or displaced by the Trump-Netanyahu wars on Iran and Lebanon, and accuses Western Europe of perpetuating lies about the Soviet contribution to World War II in schools and universities. He suggests Trump triangulated over the deaths of Iranian schoolgirls, referencing Miriam Adelson and the midterms, and notes a long phone call with Putin, with Putin allegedly not revealing how war and rising oil prices aid the Russian economy. He mentions Britain and the EU continuing to fund Zelensky, and that Trump may have congratulated Russia on Victory Day. Dmitry Trenin, former director of the Carnegie Moscow Center and member of Russia’s Foreign and Defense Policy Council, joins from Moscow. He calls Victory Day the most important date on the Russian calendar and says Europe is Russia’s principal adversary for the first time since 1945, framing the Ukraine war as a proxy war with Europe in the front line. He cautions that victory will be a long process, not simply a return to the post‑Cold War era, and that Russia’s triumph will be “against those elements in Ukraine that are branded Nazi,” while European elites have portrayed Russia as a bogeyman for ulterior motives. The host challenges the notion of a narrow window of opportunity under a Trump presidency, suggesting Trump would provide more arms to Ukraine. Trenin responds that Russia’s war is restrained and that Kyiv and Donbas share similar populations, framing the conflict as driven by Western manipulation. They discuss eight years of Donetsk and Lugansk separatist resistance, Ukrainian operations, and Russian support, noting the Western European countries have shouldered substantial costs to arm and support Kyiv, with the United States still providing substantial aid even as Trump’s involvement wanes. The discussion touches on Western Europe’s economic strain and militarization as a means to consolidate the EU, while Trenin argues that the United States is guided by a deep state more than any single president, asserting Trump proposed a peace framework in August 2025 that Putin agreed to, but Washington did not press European leaders to accept, indicating limited impact of Trump’s direct influence on the war’s course. They discuss Putin’s planned visit to Beijing, timed independently of Trump’s visit, and reflect on US-China relations. Trenin suggests China is hardening its stance against the United States and that Moscow does not fear deals between Xi and Trump at Russia’s expense. They also consider Armenia’s balancing act between Russia and the EU, noting Armenia’s heavy Russian trade yet Western-leaning political leadership. The program closes with well-wishes for Victory Day, acknowledging ongoing NATO-related conflicts and promising further coverage of US wars in West Asia. The closing credits invite viewers to watch on rumble and social media.

Speaker 0: Welcome to game plan. I'm Shivan Jan now. So far, there is only one winner in this war in West Asia, and that's Russia. Mind you, I'm not saying that this was acknowledged by the European Council president Antonio Costa. US Israeli strikes in West Asia, they have driven up the price of oil, strengthening the Kremlin's ability to fund its military campaign. Now in a sharp reversal from last year's policy of penalizing countries for buying Russian energy, US treasury secretary Scott Pessen said that The United States could unsanction other Russian oil to keep the flow of oil intact. And this is because the Strait Of Hormuz, the pivotal point from where this war is kind of converging, that is under complete Iranian control. Movement of ships has been blocked. Movement of oil has been blocked. It has shot up the oil prices, and the repercussions are being felt across the world at this point. Is the war proving to be a boon for Russia whose economy is dependent on energy exports? As the state of Hormuz gets blocked, Russia gets a free hand at selling its oil at rates that can be expounded without proper discounts as well. Is Putin the one winning in the war that US and Israel started against Iran? To discuss this with me on game plan is doctor Glenn Deesen, professor of international relations at the University of Southeastern Norway. Glenn, always a pleasure speaking with you. Thanks so much for joining me here. Trump and Putin, they held a call recently, the first time this year, and this was to discuss the discuss the ongoing hostilities in Iran. What do you think they would have discussed, and what kind of a role can Putin be playing in the ongoing war? Speaker 1: Well, I assume some of the things to discuss was obviously the the the extent to which The US and Russia targets each other because one of the things that the American media has been complaining about is the likelihood that Russia is providing intelligence to Iran for targets, but of course this is what The United States been doing for years and continues to do, that is give the Ukrainians targets to hit Russia. So I think there's a necessity to begin to discuss is appropriate and again what happens behind these doors, I don't know. But also of course there has to be some scaling back of the energy sanctions against Russia to bring this, the energy prices under control. As you suggest, they are now very much out of control. But I think also the main thing they've discussed is how to bring this war to an end because I think it's perfectly clear now that this US attack on Iran was a terrible mistake, and it appears that Putin would be the the main middleman who would might be able to bring an end to this war. But, again, it depends what can be done as what the Iranians will demand may be more than what the Americans can deliver. Speaker 0: Glenn, as you mentioned, Putin could perhaps be the main person to bring peace in this war. Putin has the highest chance of acting as peacemaker in West Asia. Is there anyone other than Putin at this point who can bring? Because just look at the optics of it. US starts a war, and I think ten days into it, he needs to make a call to Vladimir Putin to discuss that same war. How does it look for The US? Speaker 1: Well, they don't care for this, of course, but that it's similar to what to what happened with the war against Syria. That is, if you remember, back at president Obama's time, he had set these red lines, he were gonna attack Syria. It was quite obvious that this would be a disaster. So he went to the Russian president and he was able to get a deal through and which essentially took Obama's chestnuts out of the fire. So it was, you know, it it it is the reality or the optics of it isn't great given that The US has been fighting a proxy war for years against Russia, but but, know, at some point, you have to put the optics aside. Who who else would be in a position to help to negotiate this? I'm thinking, you know, perhaps China could be a middleman, but I think given that The United States, especially under the Trump administration, wants to improve bilateral ties with Russia, I I I think he's probably the best, yeah, the best bet. Speaker 0: Would it be fair to say that Putin is emerging as a winner in this ongoing West Asia war, which only seems to be expanding within the West Asian region? Speaker 1: Well, no. I think, yeah, to a large extent, I think that is correct because the energy prices are way up. The US have to scale back sanctions. The all the weapons which The US had intended to ship towards Ukraine to fight Russia is now being depleted. For European leaders, as you mentioned earlier on, to who aspire to prolong the war in Ukraine, this is an absolute disaster. And we'll see that countries that cut the energy ties or at least reduced energy ties with Russia at the best of American pressure, they of course have learned a lesson now as well that this was not a good idea that you don't necessarily put bet too much on a hegemon in decline, so countries who before paid discounts now may have to pay premium. We'll see that Iran, which I assume is getting some support from Russia sees this relationship improving dramatically. They're moving much closer, which is good for Russia because the Iranians always have some suspicions towards the Russians given well a long history they've had through the centuries of conflict. So all of this improves. You can also say that The Gulf States, the weakening of The Gulf States has also a big impact on weakening The U. S. Ability to restore its hegemony because what show what's obvious now is that the Gulf States are not getting protection instead they're becoming very vulnerable as frontline states and The US is no longer seen as that reliable. Well, if they're not going to bet their security on The United States anymore then they may not have that much pressure to sell their oil in dollars. You're not gonna have those recycled petrodollars coming back to The US, and suddenly the whole AI race with China looks a lot weaker as well. So I think across the board, a lot of things look good for Russia, but and there is a big but here, and that is I don't think that the Russians want this war nonetheless because the Russians, much like the Chinese, value stability and predictability. And what's happening in Iran now could again, if something would happen to Iran collapse, that would be a disaster for this Greater Eurasia initiative that is to integrate economies of Greater Eurasian Continent, but also this could spiral into a world war. So from this perspective, it's very dangerous and I don't doubt that the Russians therefore want to put an end to this war simply because I guess much like India, they don't want the Eurasian Continent to be too China centric, they would like to have many poles of power and this requires diversification. This means that the Russians need close ties with Iran, with India and other countries. So for the Americans to knock off Iran off the, you know, the chessboard, the greater Eurasian chessboard would be a disaster for the Russians. So, yes, I think they're prospering or benefiting from this, but they they do wanna put an end to it. Speaker 0: Understood. Glenn, let me just come to the Strait Of Hormuz. You know, the objectives of U. S. Behind starting this war, that has been questioned enough. Why did you start this war in the first place? Those are questions not just emerging, you know, globally. They're also emerging from inside The U. S. But if you look at what a win will actually look like for US, would it be the state of Hormuz? Like, which whoever controls the state of Hormuz is eventually who walks away as you know, walks away with the victory at this point because The US was looking for a change in regime. They mentioned it enough number of times. That hasn't happened and doesn't seem like it's going to happen. Is the state of Hormuz the winning factor now? Speaker 1: Well, I I I don't think any The US would be in a position to control this just given the geography. So The US obviously went into into this war with the objective of regime change. That was the goal. This was the decapitation strike, this was the hope of killing Khamenei and obviously it didn't work. I think it shouldn't have come as a surprise, but you know killing the leader of Iran only created more solidarity within the country. And also the idea that the whole armed forces would begin to disintegrate once they had been punished enough, also proven to be incorrect. So I think at the moment you see the American pivoting a bit. Some are talking about the Strait Of Moose that this should be a goal, others are saying you see a shift now towards saying well, actually what we really want to do is just degrade Iran's missile capabilities that they won't have this long range missiles. And again, you know, these are the kind of vague objectives which they can essentially declare victory today then because Iran has had many of its missiles destroyed. Also it launched a lot of its missiles at U. S. Targets which means that its missile stockpile has been reduced. So this should be a source of optimism when The U. S. Moves from this very hard line objective such as regime change and they shift in towards missiles, reducing the missile stockpiles or something like this. But the straight of our moves, I think, is beyond what what is reasonable. It's it will be too difficult. So I don't think they will But why push too hard on do Speaker 0: you feel it would be difficult if I were to just look at the bases that they have across West Asia? They have enough military might. Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, have their bases there. How difficult would it be to exert that military might over the Strait Of Hormuz? Speaker 1: Well, controlling it just means the ability to shut it down. Many countries would have the ability to shut down this narrow strait. The problem is that no one benefits from it, that is the Gulf States are hurt, Iran is hurt from it, The US and the global economy is hurt. So it becomes an exercise in self harm. The reason why the Iranians are doing this, the ability to shut down the Strait Of Hormuz is because The US has the ability to inflict a mass amount of destruction. It can go after civilian infrastructure, it can well, look what they've done to Tehran. It looks like, well, just, you know, the chemical warfare there. You've seen in terms of going after his fuel depots. They're going after the water supplies in Iran. You you see all these things. This is what America can do. Iran doesn't have that ability. They can't hit The United States. What they can do is cause economic pain. So, yes, I think The US and many of the Gulf States can also shut down the Strait Of Our Moose, but but but that's not that's it doesn't have any purpose. It doesn't have any reasoning. Speaker 0: Can they eradicate the Iranian control over the Strait Of Hormuz? I'm not talking about shutting it down, but just get rid of the Iranians from there and they then decide who gets to control and when it has to be shut and when it has to be opened and remained and kept open and secured. Can The US exert that kind of military might over the state of Hormuz to control it? Speaker 1: Then one need us to control a massive amount of Iran's territory, which is a huge territory with populated by 90,000,000 people. So this seems very unlikely and if closing down the Strait Of Hormuz would depend on very sophisticated weapon systems, will be one thing. But this can be shut down with drones which can be manufactured in apartments. It can be also shut down with small naval drones that is this essentially drone operated small torpedoes. There's it doesn't require a lot of high technology which means that The US can't take out very key infrastructure to prevent Iran from shutting this down, to force it to open. But with very cheap and easy to make weapons, the Iranians can shut it down and it's simply too much territory, too large population for The United States to shut down the these capabilities. So at some point, they're have to make peace with the Iranians and make it make sure it's in Iran's interest to keep the Strait Of Hormuz open because it is in their interest. The problem now is that Iran faces an existential threat. That is The US now threatens to destroy not just the government, but also the country. As Trump tweeted, we we will make it impossible for Iran to even rebuild as a nation. And this is what regime change means. There is no replacement government. This means the disintegration and destruction of Iran, a massive civil war which could cost hundreds of thousands of lives. So for them this is existential which is why they went to this great extent. They've never done this before because they never believed that they faced this kind of an existential threat. So if the war ends, the Iranians have no reason to shut this straight down. This is very horrible for them as well. So, no, I I don't think The US can control the straight or almost no one can control it completely because too many actors could shut it down. Speaker 0: Glenn, thanks so much for joining me here on game plan. Whether this war continues further, that only means and if it does, that's essentially what Iran is looking at because they're not capitulating. They're not giving up. They are taking a bad amount of beating. There's no doubt in that, but they are continuing with their counters nevertheless. And straight of hormones is their main play where they're exerting their pressure with whether it's mines, whether it's their own boats, whether it's their own military boats. Now energy experts have also warned that whether the Iran crisis proves a cure for Russia's economy, that depends directly on how long it lasts. But there is little to suggest that Iran is willing to capitulate that what we just discussed. They're inviting U. S. To continue the war on the other hand. That's what the statements from Iran suggest that we're waiting. Come on, on. Now in the midst of this, Russia is emerging as the winner as we just discussed. How long this lasts? It doesn't seem to be in the favor of The U. S. We'll need to wait and watch twelfth day and running. They expected it to last for about four to five weeks, whether it goes the distance or even longer. Let's wait. That was Glenn Deeson joining me here on Game Plan. Speaker 1: Thanks, Yvonne.

BRICS will continue to expand and may announce a new currency or trading system to counteract the American-led system. BRICS doesn't have to replace the dollar, it just has to threaten it, as finance is based on confidence. Putin will maintain a close relationship with China; he needs China to remain neutral so Russia can pressure the American empire. Over the next few years, the Ukraine war will continue without expanding. Iran will take the initiative against the United States. North Korea will become more belligerent, forcing America to focus on East Asia. The relationship between Putin and Xi Jinping will strengthen.

The speaker argues that Russia, China, and India are the major powers, with a potential union under SCO or BRICS posing a US disaster, a result of failed US policy. He claims only three powers matter—Russia, China, and the United States—and suggests a two-against-one dynamic, with the US aligning with Russia to isolate China. Citing Nixon’s 1971 pivot to China, he asserts this approach helped isolate the Soviet Union. He urges engaging with Russia rather than treating it as a pariah, noting the war in Ukraine blocks a pivot. At the Alaska summit, Trump reportedly listened to Putin unfiltered, and Putin seeks a comprehensive peace treaty with security guarantees, though misunderstandings over those guarantees (and Article 5) persist. The plan would involve Russia, China, perhaps Turkey, with minimal Western boots, and sidelining Zelensky to seal a quick deal.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and Glenn discuss the current strategic picture across Ukraine, the Russia–China–Iran axis, and the broader Western political environment. On Russia and Ukraine: - MacGregor notes a major “Cauldron battles” situation in Southeastern Ukraine, with remaining Ukrainian forces being encircled and largely annihilated by precision strike weapons, and a Russian swarm anticipated to complete the encirclement. - He identifies two focal points of Russian activity: Odessa (where Russian special operations are reportedly active at night, Odessa largely undefended with air defenses degraded) and Kharkov, with ongoing pressure toward Kyiv. He emphasizes that none of these alone solves the core problem of removing Zelenskyy’s government in Kyiv, which he describes as a facade Europeans seek to preserve. - Russia has increased its force size, adding reservists and training new draftees; options for Moscow appear to be Odessa, Kharkov, and Kyiv. Putin is watching Western European political developments to gauge timing, potentially waiting for Western government changes to move decisively. - MacGregor argues NATO is effectively irrelevant to Russia’s calculus and asserts the United States does not want a war with Russia over Ukraine, giving Moscow more freedom of action than Western audiences realize. On Russia–China relations and Europe: - Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are pursuing a bilateral strategy to mutually reinforce military and economic capabilities, forming a large continental fortress against the United States. The two powers seek to strengthen ties as they view the U.S. as increasingly belligerent. - MacGregor contends that European leaders, including Starmer, Macron, and Metz, are aligned with globalist and financial elites (referencing ties to BlackRock and others) and that personal relationships between leaders are not meaningful in the international arena; strategic interests drive policy. - He argues that many European elites’ rhetoric about Russia serves to deflect from domestic vulnerabilities and to mobilize anti-Russian sentiment as political cover. On the Middle East and Iran: - The talk about Iran is framed as not serious; MacGregor describes a plan to escalate toward regime change in Iran, driven by U.S., Israeli, and allied intelligence communities, despite Iranian resistance and regional risk. - He claims Mossad, MI6, and CIA influenced President Trump regarding Iran’s fragility, while Iran’s internal protests (economic grievances) were legitimate and quickly mischaracterized as attempts to overthrow the government. He asserts Chinese and Russian assistance helped Iran counter covert efforts, including providing satellite imagery and assisting integrated air and missile defenses. - The declared Western goal is to destroy Iran as a nation-state, with the Iranian leadership prepared to respond with full use of capabilities if attacked. He suggests a potential air and missile campaign could target the regime and strategic hubs, with the United States likely relying on high-altitude precision strikes and long-range missiles, while questioning the effectiveness and survivability of U.S. platforms like B-52s against Iranian defenses. - China and Russia are depicted as unlikely to allow Iran to be pulverized; they could intervene if Iran is near disintegration, possibly through non-nuclear actions such as a collision at sea, leveraging their submarine capabilities and influence. On European political legitimacy and future: - MacGregor connects the Epstein-related discourse in Europe to a broader critique of ruling elites, comparing the potential for political upheaval to late-18th-century France. He argues that as publics grow disillusioned with elites, there could be a crisis of political legitimacy and a shift toward more realistic leadership, with potential upheaval in Britain, France, and Germany. On Putin and future moves: - He suggests Putin views the possibility of reconciliation with Washington as unlikely, having reached somber conclusions about the prospects for meaningful agreement. He predicts Russia will act on its terms, potentially advancing toward the Dnieper River, Odessa, and perhaps Kyiv, while noting Russia does not intend to govern Western Ukraine long-term. He emphasizes that events will unfold on Russian terms, with European irrelevance in the decision-making process fading as Moscow executes its plans.

America would want China's help to avoid fighting too many wars, ensuring China continues buying US dollars to sustain American debt. Also, historically, Russia has been more of a threat to China, so US friendship with China would force Putin to focus on defense. China is now transferring its US dollars into gold, encouraging others to do the same because America's debt is a huge problem. It makes sense for China and the US to be friends because the US is a huge market for Chinese exports and provides technology. China wants to be friends with Russia because it feels threatened by the US, which has military bases surrounding China. China needs oil and food imports to sustain its economy, and if the US launches an embargo, China collapses. China needs new trade routes, and Russia is the best partner for energy and oil access. Chinese policymakers know China's economy and demographics have collapsed, making it vulnerable and dependent on the world.

Diplomacy is difficult but necessary to avoid nuclear war. The U.S. is running out of options with Russia because it underestimated the Russian economy and civilization. Some U.S. Senators believed Russia was merely a gas station with nuclear weapons, which was an absurd assessment. Sanctions were levied, and Russia was cut off from SWIFT, but ultimately, the U.S. hurt itself more than it hurt Russia.

Mario (Speaker 0) and the Ukrainian ambassador (Speaker 1) discuss a mix of domestic corruption allegations, high-stakes diplomacy, and battlefield realities shaping Ukraine’s path toward ending the war. - Corruption scandal in Ukraine: The ambassador notes the scandal involved two government members and another former member, not Zelenskyy personally. She says lessons have been learned: war does not justify turning a blind eye to corruption, and the president has instructed the government to maintain full control of the situation and meet commitments and expectations. She emphasizes that the silver lining is the independent National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) digging out the scandal, describing NABU as the positive development in this context. Zelenskyy’s response included calls for retirement of involved officials and a push for court hearings and convictions; he reportedly found it personally complex to accept the retirement of his long-time ally, Andriy Yermak, the head of the president’s office, but acknowledges the need for accountability and signals that further exposures would trigger similar actions. The ambassador stresses that all institutions must follow procedures and that the public pressure around the issue is especially painful as winter approaches. - Putin, NATO, and Ukraine’s diplomatic posture: The conversation turns to recent developments. President Putin’s comment after a meeting with the U.S. delegation—“we’ll take Donbas by force or by surrender”—is viewed as a signaling to the American side about Russia’s stance, with the ambassador noting limited progress from the Ukrainian delegation’s talks (Rostov Mumarov and Vipkov) and anticipating a fuller readout. The ambassador says Macron’s discussions with China and China’s involvement in Moscow at the same time as U.S. delegations signals China’s continuing engagement with both Russia and Western actors; China previously supported Russia’s war with material and financial backing, and the ambassador argues China’s presence in Moscow is natural given the broader geopolitics and the need to monitor unpredictable developments. - China and the broader strategic context: The ambassador explains that while Ukraine receives limited direct messaging from China, Beijing maintains dialogue with Russia, the United States, and European allies; China’s alignment with Russia was highlighted at the start of the large-scale invasion, with Xi Jinping and Putin signaling a “thousand-year partnership.” She notes Russia’s shift in narrative after Putin’s Alaska meeting with the U.S. president and suggests Chinese watchdogs in Moscow are a natural counterpoint to Western diplomacy. - The two major sticking points in negotiations: The ambassador notes that Russia presented a 28-point plan (narrowed to 20 points) focused on Donbas, with broader implications including security guarantees and the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO. She argues that it’s not productive to comment on each point in isolation since the Russian side uses a broader narrative that includes education of Ukrainian youth about anti-Western narratives. Ukraine is prepared to discuss a multi-layer solution: ceasefire, security guarantees, deterrence, and post-war political frameworks, while preserving sovereignty. - NATO and security guarantees: The ambassador contends security guarantees could be as strong as a NATO article-five framework, likening allied military actions to past operations conducted with partners. She distinguishes between the mere membership debate and practical security guarantees, asserting that Ukraine’s sovereignty remains paramount and that security guarantees are a meaningful path alongside potential NATO membership. - Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner’s roles: The ambassador describes a layered U.S. approach (Witkoff as special envoy with direct dialogue with Russia, Rubio coordinating with European allies and NATO officials, plus others like Daniel Driscoll and Candy Baker). She says these are not adversarial to diplomacy; rather, they form a structured process that could converge on a formal U.S.-Ukraine negotiation framework with eventual endorsement by the U.S. administration. - Pokrovsk and battlefield dynamics: The ambassador downplays the idea that Pokrovsk’s capture would decisively alter front-line dynamics, noting that the front experiences hundreds of engagements weekly. She acknowledges that Russia’s propaganda around Pokrovsk is designed to signal progress, but argues the reality is a broader battlefield picture with ongoing Ukrainian resilience. - Long-term strategic questions and sanctions: The ambassador reiterates bipartisan U.S. support for sanctions and designating Russia as a sponsor of terrorism, while acknowledging that enforceability is challenging and that Russia seeks time through delaying tactics. She emphasizes that Ukraine cannot rely on speed alone and must continue leveraging strikes on Russia’s energy and military infrastructure, including the so-called “shadow fleet” vessels, while avoiding direct strikes on civilians. - The Yermak corruption episode: The NABU-led investigation exposed the scandal; the president requested retirement for implicated officials and supported legal proceedings. The ambassador clarifies that there is no evidence implicating Zelenskyy himself, stressing the personal responsibility of the president and the need for transparent procedures moving forward, while maintaining that Yermak’s future role is subject to ongoing scrutiny. She notes media rumors (e.g., “golden toilets”) are not substantiated and emphasizes that Yermak has been sanctioned and that the government is pursuing accountability in a manner consistent with legal processes.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss a cascade of developments around Ukraine, Russia, and Western policy. - Speaker 0 notes that Trump reportedly changed his stance on Tomahawk missiles, mentions a meeting with Zelensky where Zelensky supposedly urged acceptance of a Putin deal, and recalls that the Trump-Putin meeting was canceled. Speaker 1 responds that Russia has 100% made clear there will be no freeze and that for the war to end, Ukraine must leave all Russian territory. He says Tomahawk missiles were never on the table, that this was a pressure ploy by Trump to push Russia, and that it could have led to a thermonuclear war, which Putin reminded the US about in their conversations. - According to Speaker 1, Ukrainians will die, Russians will advance, Ukrainian economy will be destroyed, and Ukrainian energy infrastructure will be annihilated, leading to the collapse of Ukraine as a nation. Speaker 0 sketches a timeline: initial plans for a Putin-Trump-Zelensky sequence, Putin’s call after Trump hinted at Tomahawks, then a Zelensky meeting where Zelensky allegedly pressed Trump to accept a Putin deal, after which Tomahawks were no longer on the table and the Trump-Putin meeting was canceled. - Speaker 1 repeats: Tomahawks were never on the table; this was a pressure tactic. He explains the Russia-US exchange as frank, with Russia laying down the law; he asserts that the US would have faced a major escalation if Tomahawks had been supplied, because Tomahawks are nuclear-capable. He claims Ukraine would have been made a party to the conflict through US involvement. He adds that Russia will not accept a freeze because, constitutionally, Ukraine must leave all Russian territory, including Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Lugansk. - Speaker 0 asks why Tomahawks would matter, and Speaker 1 reiterates that Storm Shadow and Scout missiles are not nuclear capable, while Tomahawks would be, and contrasts this with Ukraine’s Flamingo drone, dismissing Flamingo as a propaganda tool. He describes Flamingo as a wooden drone designed to mimic a flock of birds and says it will be shot down and is not a serious threat; Ukraine’s drone capability is strong, with Ukrainians as the second-best fighters and drones in the world, while Russians are first in drone capability. - They discuss the trajectory of the war: Speaker 1 emphasizes that Russia’s advance is strategic, with drone warfare transforming the battlefield into piecemeal advances. He asserts Russia’s kill ratio of 36 Ukrainians to 1 Russian, and argues the West’s narrative of Russia suffering more is fantasy. He notes the West’s support for Ukraine drains Ukraine’s resources while Russia’s defense industry booms, and that Russia’s economy, energy, and sanctions resistance show resilience. - On economics, Speaker 1 claims the Russian economy is thriving; gas is cheap in Russia, Novosibirsk and Ekaterinburg are booming, and sanctions have not toppled Russia. He argues Europe’s sanctions are not beating Russia and that Russia’s ruble remains strong; he contrasts this with Western expectations of Russia’s collapse. - They discuss casualty figures and manpower. Speaker 0 asks for a definite casualty number; Speaker 1 cites Ukrainians dying daily (tens of thousands over time) and asserts Russians suffer hundreds daily on their worst day, noting Ukraine’s manpower shortages and Russia’s mobilization efforts: Russia conducted a one-time 300,000-mobilization; Ukraine has mobilized seven or eight times and relies on volunteers and external manpower, including Western units in some cases. He contends Russia’s total forces expanded to 1.5 million due to NATO expansion and ongoing operations. - On battlefield tactics, Speaker 1 explains Russia’s algorithm: three-man assault teams using drone support to seize bunkers held by larger Ukrainian forces, followed by reinforcement, all while drone warfare dominates. He asserts Ukraine’s drone capacity is strong, but Russia counters with its own drones and targeting of Ukrainian drone operators. - They debate why Russia would not freeze lines even if Ukraine yielded Donbas, Lugansk, and Donetsk. Speaker 1 insists those regions are Russian territory per referendum and constitutional absorption in September 2022, and argues that Ukraine cannot give up Donbas, which is Russia’s, and that a freeze would not be acceptable to Russia. He asserts that Moscow will not abandon these territories and that any idea of a freeze is a Western fantasy. - The discussion touches on the Minsk accords, the Istanbul talks, and the argument that Ukraine’s leadership initially pursued peace but later prepared for renewed conflict with NATO backing. Speaker 1 contends that Minsk was a sham agreed to buy time, and that Russia’s goal was to compel Ukraine to honor commitments to protect Russian speakers; Ukraine’s leadership is accused of pursuing war rather than peace after early negotiations. - They discuss Wagner and Prigozin’s role: Wagner provided a vehicle to surge capabilities into Lugansk and Donetsk; after September 2022 these troops were to be absorbed into the Russian military, but Prigozin continued operations in Bachmuth, recruited prisoners, and pressured for offensive allocations; this culminated in a confrontation with Shoigu and Gerasimov, and Wagner eventually faced disbandment pressure and a mobilization response. - In closing, Speaker 0 notes recent sanctions and Putin’s response condemning them as attempts to pressure Russia, while Speaker 1 reiterates that Russia seeks to end the war and rebuild relations with the US, but not under ongoing Ukraine conflict. He emphasizes that India and China will stand with Russia, citing strategic partnerships and the desire to maintain sovereign energy decisions, and predictsRussia will endure sanctions while seeking new buyers and alliances. - The exchange ends with Putin signaling that new sanctions will have costs for the EU, while Speaker 1 reiterates that Russia will adapt and maintain its strategic position, with China and India aligned with Russia rather than yielding to Western pressure.

Vladimir Putin presents a long, historically framed justification for Russia’s actions and the Ukraine conflict, arguing that Ukraine’s status and borders have been shaped by centuries of Russian influence, foreign domination, and shifting empires. He begins by outlining Ukraine’s origins in a narrative of a centralized Russian state forming around Kyiv and Novgorod, with key moments including the adoption of Orthodoxy in 988, the fragmentation of Rus, and the subsequent rise of Moscow as the center of a unified Russian state. He asserts that lands now in Ukraine were historically part of Russia, and that Polish and Lithuanian unions, as well as later Polish oppression and colonization, shaped Ukrainian identity as a fringe or border region rather than a separate nation. He claims documents show Ukrainian lands and peoples sought Moscow’s rule in 1654 and that Catherine the Great later reclaimed those lands for Russia, reinforcing a line that Ukraine’s borders were continually redrawn by empires. Putin emphasizes that the Soviet period created a Soviet Ukraine, and that Lenin’s decisions and Ukrainianization policies made Ukraine an “artificial state” formed by Stalin’s later redrawing of borders after World War II, incorporating Black Sea lands and other territories into the Ukrainian republic. He questions whether Hungary or other neighbors should reclaim lands lost in earlier centuries, and shares a personal anecdote about Hungarians in Western Ukraine as evidence of long-standing ethnic ties there. He suggests that post-Soviet borders were decided under coercive international pressures and that NATO’s expansion violated assurances given to Russia in 1990 not to expand eastward. The interview then moves to the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia’s expectation of a welcoming partnership with the West that did not materialize. Putin contends that NATO expanded five times despite Russian hopes for cooperation, and recounts a perceived Western willingness to undermine Russia’s security through missile defense systems, support for separatists in the Caucasus, and a “special relationship” with Ukraine. He tells a story of a 2000s-era dialogue with US leaders about a joint missile defense system, describing assurances from US officials (Gates, Rice) that such cooperation might occur, which he says later failed and led Russia to develop its own hypersonic capabilities in response. He insists that the West’s treatment of Serbia in the 1990s—bombing Belgrade and overriding UN norms—demonstrates a double standard and a willingness to ignore international law when it serves Western interests. He asserts that the Bucharest 2008 agreement promised NATO membership to Ukraine and Georgia, despite opposition from Germany, France, and others, and claims that President Bush pressured European partners to expand NATO anyway. He argues that Ukraine’s move toward association with the EU would harm Russian economic interests, given their interlinked industries, and that Yanukovych’s hesitation to sign the association agreement was abruptly exploited by the West, leading to the Maidan coup in 2014. On the Donbas and Minsk, Putin states that Ukraine’s leadership in 2014 declared they would not implement Minsk and that Western leaders openly admitted they never intended to implement Minsk. He says Russia’s goal was to stop the war started by neo-Nazis in Ukraine in 2014, not to invade in 2022, and he blames the West for pushing Ukraine toward militarization and for pressuring Kyiv. He claims the current Ukrainian leadership and its foreign backers refused to engage in negotiations and even banned talks with Russia, citing Istanbul negotiations as a missed opportunity that could have ended the war many months earlier. Denazification is presented as a central objective: Putin describes a nationalist Ukrainian movement that idolizes figures who collaborated with Nazi Germany, culminating in neo-Nazi iconography and the glorification of Bandera-era figures. He argues that Ukraine’s leadership and legislature have supported or tolerated neo-Nazi symbolism, including a Canadian parliament ceremony supporting a former SS member who fought against Russians. He insists denazification would mean prohibiting neo-Nazi movements at the legislative level and removing their influence in Ukraine, and says Ukraine’s leadership has refused to implement this, contrasting it with Istanbul’s negotiated proposals that supposedly prohibited Nazism in Ukraine. Regarding negotiations and settlements, Putin says Russia is open to dialogue and that Istanbul proposals could have ended the conflict eighteen to twenty-four months earlier if not for Western influence, particularly Johnson’s opposition. He states Russia is not seeking to humiliate Ukraine but wants a negotiated settlement, including the withdrawal of troops and protection for Russian-speaking populations. He suggests that Zelenskyy’s freedom to negotiate exists, but asserts Kyiv’s decrees and the influence of the United States and its allies have prevented meaningful talks. He contends that the Ukraine conflict is driven by a Western-led alliance system that seeks to deter Russia and preserve strategic advantages, while Russia seeks a multipolar world where security is shared. In discussing geopolitics and economics, Putin argues the global order is shifting. He notes a rising China and a growing BRICS, with the United States increasingly using sanctions and weaponizing the dollar, which he believes undermines American power. He provides statistics: Russia’s share of dollar-denominated trade has fallen, yuan and ruble use have risen, and he suggests the dollar’s role as a reserve currency is eroding as countries seek alternatives. He asserts that the world should not be split into two blocs and that cooperation with China is essential, highlighting a bilateral trade volume with China around 230–240 billion dollars and saying their trade is balanced and high-tech oriented. Finally, Putin discusses broader questions about religion and identity, linking Orthodoxy to Russian national character and arguing that Russia’s spiritual and cultural ties unify diverse peoples within the country. He rejects the notion that war contradicts Christian ethics, arguing that defending the homeland and its people is a form of protection rather than aggression. Throughout the interview, Putin reframes the Ukraine conflict as a consequence of Western expansion and security policy, presents Russia as seeking peace and dialogue, and positions Moscow as defending historical legitimacy, protecting Russian-speaking populations, and resisting a re-drawn European security architecture that he argues threatens Russia’s sovereignty. He repeatedly points to missed opportunities for negotiated settlement and emphasizes that additional talks remain possible if Western leadership chooses to engage in good faith.

The speaker argues that using the dollar as a tool of foreign policy is one of the biggest strategic mistakes by the US political leadership, stating that the dollar is the cornerstone of US power and that printing more dollars leads to their wide dispersion worldwide. Inflation in the United States is described as minimal, about 3% to 3.4%, and the speaker asserts that the US will not stop printing. The debt of $33 trillion is said to indicate emission, and the dollar is described as the main weapon used by the United States to preserve its power globally. Once the political leadership decided to use the US dollar as a tool of political struggle, the speaker claims a blow was dealt to American power. The speaker avoids strong language but calls the strategy a stupid thing to do and a grave mistake, pointing to world events as evidence. The speaker notes that US allies are downsizing their dollar reserves, and asserts that these actions cause everyone to seek ways to protect themselves. They claim that US restrictive measures—such as placing restrictions on transactions and freezing assets—cause great concern and send a signal to the world. A historical point is made: until 2022, about 80% of Russian foreign trade transactions were conducted in US dollars and euros, with US dollars accounting for approximately 50% of Russia’s transactions with third countries; currently, the share is down to 13%. The speaker emphasizes that Russia did not ban the use of the US dollar; it was a decision by the United States to restrict transactions in US dollars. The speaker contends that the policy is foolish from the standpoint of US interests and taxpayers because it damages the US economy and undermines US power, and notes that transactions in Yuan accounted for about 3%. Today, 34% of transactions are in rubles, and a little over 34% in yuan. The speaker asks why the United States did this, offering “self conceit” as the guess, claiming the US probably thought it would lead to full collapse, but nothing collapsed. Additionally, the speaker states that other countries, including oil producers, are thinking of and already accepting payments for oil in yuan. The question is posed to the United States about whether anyone realizes what is happening and what they are doing, as the speaker suggests that the US is cutting itself off. Finally, the speaker asserts that all experts say this, and that anyone intelligent in the United States should understand what the dollar means for the US, but claims the US is “killing it with your own hand.”

Glenn: Welcome back. We are joined today by Professor John Mersheimer to understand what is happening in the world with this new great power rivalry and how the outcome of the Ukraine war will impact this new Cold War. Have we entered a new Cold War? Who are the players, competing interests, and the rules? Mersheimer: I think we have entered a new Cold War. We're in a multipolar system, and the United States, China, and Russia are the three great powers. The United States is certainly in a cold war with China. China is powerful and threatens to dominate East Asia, and the United States will almost certainly go to great lengths to prevent that from happening, which axiomatically creates an intense security competition in China. An intense security competition is a cold war, and the name of the game is to make sure that security competition does not turn into a hot war. We are in a cold war with the Chinese, or the Chinese are in a cold war with us. The hot war is avoided. Regarding Russia, since we moved into multipolarity, the Russians and the Chinese have been close allies against the United States. This is largely a result of the Ukraine war, which has pushed the Russians into the arms of the Chinese and caused closer Sino-Russian cooperation. The United States, through the Biden administration, was involved in a cold war with both Russia and China. Trump tried to change that, seeking good relations with Russia to form a Russia-plus-US alliance against China, but he has been unable to make that happen. The result is that the United States is basically still in a cold war with both Russia and China. The war in Ukraine has made me worry greatly that the Cold War in Europe could turn into a hot war, even as the U.S.-China relationship remains cooler so far. Glenn: European leaders hoped the United States and Europe would unite in this new Cold War, with liberal hegemony fading and a return to unity against Russia. But Ukraine has instead divided Europe. How do you explain this? Is it the US not seeing Russia as the same threat as Europeans, or a concern about pushing Russia toward China, or Europe’s costs of the partnership? Is this uniquely a Trump-era approach? Mersheimer: From an American point of view, good relations with Russia make sense. China is the peer competitor, and the United States wants to pivot to East Asia to prevent China’s dominance. Russia is the weakest of the three great powers and not a major threat to Europe. The Americans believe Europe can deal with Russia, freeing them to focus on China. Europe, by contrast, is threatened by Russia’s proximity and thus prioritizes Russia. NATO expansion into Ukraine is seen by many Europeans as a disaster, poisoning Russia–Europe relations, making Europe deeply committed to using Ukraine to weaken Russia. The transatlantic alliance becomes strained, especially with Trump raising the possibility of leaving NATO. Europeans fear losing the American pacifier that keeps centrifugal forces in check, which would complicate European coordination with Russia. Glenn: If the United States signals a departure, won’t Europe face greater challenges in managing Russia? And is Russia truly an empire-building threat, or is this a post-2014 narrative that intensified after February 2022? Mersheimer: Bringing Ukraine into NATO was destined to cause trouble. The crisis began in 2014, and the 2022 war is ongoing. The Ukrainians and Europeans want a security guarantee for Ukraine, essentially NATO membership, while Russia demands territory and rejects a security guarantee that would enshrine NATO’s presence near its borders. The Europeans see NATO expansion as threatening, while the Americans view Russia as the weaker power and the need to pivot to China. The controversy over responsibility for this disaster arises from competing interpretations of NATO expansion and Russian aggression. Glenn: Do you see Russia changing course soon? There has been escalation—Odessa blockades, port attacks, and targeting infrastructure. Could this signal a new stage of the war? Mersheimer: The Russians believe Ukraine is on the ropes and expect to win on the battlefield in 2026, possibly expanding fronts in Kharkiv and Sumy. They may consider increasing conventional force and possibly using nuclear weapons if the war drags on. They view the conflict as existential and fear losing, which could push them toward drastic measures to end the war. The Russians could escalate if they think they cannot win conventionally. Glenn: What are the non-nuclear options to win quickly? Could the Russians deliver a decisive conventional victory? Mersheimer: It’s a war of attrition. If Ukraine’s army is weakened, Russia could surround large Ukrainian formations, disrupt logistics, and open larger fronts. They may build up forces in the rear, potentially for a breakthrough or to deter Western escalation. The battlefield outcome may determine the next steps, including whether nuclear options are considered. Glenn: How will Ukraine end? Is it a military defeat, economic collapse, or political fragmentation? Mersheimer: Ukraine is likely to be defeated on the battlefield. Its economy is in desperate shape, and losing Odessa or more territory would worsen it. Politically, Ukraine will face internal divisions once the war ends. Europe will face a broken Russia–Ukraine relationship, with some European states viewing the conflict differently. Ukraine’s demographic decline compounds its bleak outlook, and the country may become a problematic rump state. The war should have been settled earlier; the negotiators in Istanbul in 2022 could have sought a different path. Zelensky’s choice to align with Western powers and walk away from Istanbul negotiations deepened Ukraine’s predicament. Glenn: Any final reflections? Mersheimer: The war’s outcome will reshape Western unity and European security. Historians may view this as a major mistake in weakening the West. The blame for the disaster will likely be attributed in the West to Russia’s imperialism, but the expansion of NATO is also central. Europe’s economic and political landscape will be altered, and Ukraine’s future will be deeply challenging.

Pepe and Mario discuss a broad set of geopolitical developments, focusing on Venezuela, Iran, and broader U.S.-led actions, with insights on Russia, China, and other regional players. - Venezuela developments and U.S. involvement - Venezuela is described as a “desperate move related to the demise of the petrodollar,” with multiple overlapping headlines about backers maneuvering for profit and power in Latin America, and about the U.S. declaring “this is my backyard.” Delcy Rodríguez, the daughter of a slain revolutionary killed by the CIA, leads a new government, described as old-school Chavista with strong negotiation skills, who prioritizes Venezuela’s interests over U.S. interests. - The operation is criticized as having no clear strategy or forward planning for reorganizing the Venezuelan oil industry to serve U.S. interests. Estimates from Chinese experts suggest it would take five years to recondition Venezuela’s energy ecosystem for American needs and sixteen years to reach around 3 million barrels per day, requiring approximately $183 billion in investment—investment that U.S. CEOs are reportedly unwilling to provide without total guarantees. - There is debate about the extent of U.S. influence within Maduro’s circle. Some Venezuelan sources note that the head of security for the president, previously aligned with the regime, was demoted (not arrested), and there is discussion of possible U.S. ties with individuals around Maduro’s inner circle, though the regime remains headed by Maduro with key loyalists like the defense minister (Padrino) and the interior minister (Cabello) still in place. - The narrative around regime change is viewed as a two-edged story: the U.S. sought to replace Maduro with a pliant leadership, yet the regime remains and regional power structures (including BRICS dynamics) persist. Delcy Rodríguez is portrayed as capable of negotiating with the U.S., including conversations with Marco Rubio before the coup and ongoing discussions with U.S. actors, while maintaining Venezuela’s sovereignty and memory of the revolution. - The broader regional reaction to U.S. actions in Venezuela has included criticism from neighboring countries like Colombia and Mexico, with a sense in Latin America that the U.S. should not intrude in sovereign affairs. Brazil (a major BRICS member) is highlighted as a key actor whose stance can influence Venezuela’s BRICS prospects; Lula’s position is described as cautious, with Brazil’s foreign ministry reportedly vetoing Venezuela’s BRICS membership despite Lula’s personal views. - The sanctions regime is cited as a principal reason for Venezuela’s economic stagnation, with the suggestion that lifting sanctions would be a prerequisite for meaningful economic recovery. Delcy Rodríguez is characterized as a skilled negotiator who could potentially improve Venezuela’s standing if sanctions are removed. - Public opinion in Venezuela is described as broadly supportive of the regime, with the U.S. action provoking anti-American sentiment across the hemisphere. The discussion notes that a large majority of Venezuelans (over 90%) reportedly view Delcy Rodríguez favorably, and that the perception of U.S. intervention as a violation of sovereignty influences regional attitudes. - Iran: protests, economy, and foreign influence - Iran is facing significant protests that are described as the most severe since 2022, driven largely by economic issues, inflation, and the cost of living under four decades of sanctions. Real inflation is suggested to be 35–40%, with currency and purchasing power severely eroded. - Foreign influence is discussed as a factor hijacking domestic protests in Iran, described as a “color revolution” playbook echoed by past experiences in Hong Kong and other theaters. Iranian authorities reportedly remain skeptical of Western actors, while acknowledging the regime’s vulnerability to sanctions and mismanagement. - Iranians emphasize the long-term, multi-faceted nature of their political system, including the Shiite theology underpinning governance, and the resilience of movements like Hezbollah and Yemeni factions. Iran’s leadership stresses long-term strategic ties with Russia and China, as well as BRICS engagement, with practical cooperation including repair of the Iranian electrical grid in the wake of Israeli attacks during the twelve-day war and port infrastructure developments linked to an international transportation corridor, including Indian and Chinese involvement. - The discussion notes that while sanctions have damaged Iran economically, Iranians maintain a strong domestic intellectual and grassroots culture, including debates in universities and cafes, and are not easily toppled. The regime’s ability to survive is framed in terms of internal legitimacy, external alliances (Russia, China), and the capacity to negotiate under external pressure. - Russia, China, and the U.S. strategic landscape - The conversation contrasts the apparent U.S. “bordello circus” with the more sophisticated military-diplomatic practices of Iran, Russia, and China. Russia emphasizes actions over rhetoric, citing NATO attacks on its nuclear triad and the Novgorod residence attack as evidence of deterrence concerns. China pursues long-term plans (five-year plans through 2035) and aims to elevate trade with a yuan-centric global south, seeking to reduce dollar reliance without emitting a formal de-dollarization policy. - The discussion frames U.S. policy as volatile and unpredictable (the Nixon “madman theory” analog), while Russia, China, and Iran respond with measured, long-term strategies. The potential for a prolonged Ukraine conflict is acknowledged if European leaders pursue extended confrontation, with economic strains anticipated across Europe. - In Venezuela, Iran, and broader geopolitics, the panel emphasizes the complexity of regime stability, the role of sanctions, BRICS dynamics, and the long game of global power shifts that may redefine alliances and economic arrangements over the coming years.