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Bennett says that if he became prime minister by the end of the year, Israeli foreign policy would “profoundly” change. In his first three weeks, he would fly to meet Egypt’s President Sisi, Jordan’s King Abdallah, and UAE leader Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, launching a “regional renaissance,” and he would also pursue an “Israeli renaissance” after what he describes as four difficult years involving internal instability, the October 7 massacre, and a prolonged war. On Iran, Bennett says the contemplated arrangement addresses only the nuclear component and not ballistic missiles or the regional terror/proxy component. He describes a long-term “cold war” dynamic between Israel and Iran, asserting that the regime will collapse from internal contradictions involving corruption, incompetence, radicalism, and disconnection, and he frames Iran as the “head of the octopus” that supports conflict across the region. His strategy is to weaken and accelerate the regime’s demise through “soft elements” with the United States and others, while also seeking to delay progress toward a nuclear weapon. He summarizes his end goal as toppling Iran’s regime before it acquires nuclear capability. He also gives an example from his earlier prime ministership: when protests occur, Iran cracks down violently and turns off the internet, so he proposes ensuring internet continuity in advance so the regime cannot execute its usual response to protests, comparing the approach to Reagan’s actions toward the Soviet Union. He also says no moderate Arab country is happy about Iran and that he would build regional alliances. Bennett responds to hypothetical diplomacy with Iran’s leadership by saying it is so theoretical that if Iran were willing to embrace peace and dismantle its terror proxy network, nuclear program, and ballistic missile program, it would no longer be “the Islamic Republic of Iran.” He says if such changes happen, then “come and ask me.” The discussion turns to Lebanon. Bennett says he has long called for Hezbollah’s disarmament. He describes the Lebanon issue as extremely complicated, citing concerns that Israel’s intentions could be broader than eradicating Hezbollah and pointing to the Iran-related arrangement that does not mention ballistic missiles or proxy networks. In his view, Hezbollah likely remains and Israel will always see it as a threat. For Lebanon, he says he would launch a “massive, warm and positive diplomacy” campaign focused on business to build bridges with Egypt, Jordan, the Saudis, and the UAE, which he says Israel is not doing enough. He would keep the buffer zone in place “until, Hezbollah is dismantled,” using kinetic, diplomacy, and economic tools to strengthen and legitimize a moderate Lebanese government. He frames Hezbollah as an arm of Iran that receives roughly a billion dollars a year for military purposes and says Israel has uncovered Hezbollah’s underground infrastructure in southern Lebanon. He argues he does not want Israeli territorial desires in Lebanon and that Israel’s security “insurance” would be removed only when he is confident Hezbollah is gone. On Turkey and Syria, Bennett says Turkey is “complicated” because he believes in Turkey while describing Erdogan as a disaster with radical Islamist ideology and hostility toward Israel. He says he would navigate through that and work where possible with goodwill. For Syria’s Al-Sharaa, he says he would be extremely cautious, calls him a murderer and terrorist based on past actions and what he describes as atrocities against Druze, Alawites, and Kurds, and says time and behavior are required before any chance. He does not want a greater Israel and says Israel is “great as it is,” aiming to ensure people in the Golan Heights can sleep safely. He addresses timing for withdrawal from Syrian-controlled territory by saying he would consider it when he can look at families living in the Golan Heights and feel confident they will be secure and not be slaughtered, and he says it is not on a stopwatch. He highlights concerns about other actors increasing involvement in Syria, naming Turkey and Qatar as negative contributors that support Hamas. Bennett contrasts what he describes as Netanyahu-era war conduct with his proposed approach: he says he would set clear end-game visions and sequences rather than prolonged conflict. For Gaza, his end game is a demilitarized Gaza by Hamas where Gazans govern themselves under overriding Israeli security control, aiming for dignity, freedom, and prosperity without Israeli settlements. For Lebanon, his end game is Israel not being in Lebanon, with any short-term presence framed as self-defense, and building a “beautiful Lebanon” on the condition that Hezbollah governance is removed. He says the current government does not clearly state an end game. He also addresses claims that Israel’s international position is deteriorating, saying Israel’s image in the United States and abroad is terrible despite not reflecting reality. He attributes part of this to a global tendency to see attackers as victims and vice versa, to campus attacks after October 7, to dragging wars on for too long, and to a lack of public diplomacy. On the Palestinian issue, Bennett rejects that it is the “center” of the Middle East’s problems, arguing instead that radical Islam is the core driver. He says Palestinian statehood attempts failed: Oslo is described as blowing up with thousands of Israeli deaths during the Second Intifada, and the 2005 disengagement from Gaza is described as enabling a terror state. He asserts that during Gaza’s early post-withdrawal period, there was no siege or blockade and that Gaza was Palestinian before any Israeli presence beyond the 1949 lines. He says the solution principles are security for Israelis and maximum freedom, dignity, and prosperity for Palestinians, while insisting Israel should not govern Palestinians or apply Israeli sovereignty to the PA. He describes a gradual approach by improving Palestinian lives through limited actions that do not risk Israeli security, citing an example from his premiership: removing a cap on trade between the PA and Jordan, which he says increased trade and improved lives without security risk. In closing, Bennett reiterates his emphasis on security and gradual improvements. He says Israelis should respect that a Palestinian state was tried twice and “blew up” and killed Israelis, and urges viewers to consider why Israelis oppose a Palestinian state now due to reality. He concludes that he expects “a very good period” for Israel and the region over the next 25 years.

The senator advocates for regime change in Iran via a popular uprising, clarifying he does not support military force for this purpose. He identifies as a "non-interventionist hawk," prioritizing U.S. national security interests in foreign policy decisions. The discussion shifts to U.S. foreign policy failures in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, with the senator opposing intervention in those countries. He considers the collapse of the Soviet Union a successful regime change. The senator defends military aid to Israel as beneficial to U.S. security, citing intelligence sharing and a commonality of enemies. He acknowledges that allies spy on each other. He denies that APAC, the American Israeli Political Action Committee, is a foreign lobby. The senator believes Iran is actively trying to murder Donald Trump and has hired hitmen. He supports Israel taking out Iran's military leadership and nuclear capacity. He opposed the Iraq war and military intervention in Syria, but believes Iran is different because it poses a threat to the U.S. The senator blames Biden's weakness for the war in Ukraine. He says that Nord Stream 2 sanctions legislation that he authored prevented a war. He voted for the initial tranche of funding for the Ukraine war, but voted against subsequent funding streams.

The conversation centers on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Iran, and regional dynamics, with Speaker 0 (a former prime minister) offering sharp criticisms of the current Israeli government while outlining a path he sees as in Israel’s long-term interest. Speaker 1 presses on US interests, Lebanon, and the ethics and consequences of the war. Key points and claims retained as stated: - Iran and the war: Speaker 0 says he supported the American strike against Iran’s leadership, calling Ayatollah Khamenei’s regime a brutal threat and praising the move as punishment for Iran’s actions, including backing Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. He questions why there was a lack of a clear next-step strategy after the initial attack and asks whether a diplomatic alternative, similar to Obama’s Iran agreement, could have achieved nuclear supervision without war. He notes the broader regional risk posed by Iran’s proxies and ballistic missiles and emphasizes the goal of constraining Iran’s nuclear program, while acknowledging the economic and security costs of the war. - On Netanyahu and influence: Speaker 1 references the New York Times report about Netanyahu’s influence on Trump and asks how much Netanyahu affected the decision to go to war. Speaker 0 says he isn’t certain he’s the best judge of Netanyahu’s influence but believes Netanyahu sought to push the war forward even during a ceasefire and that Iran’s threat required action, though he questions whether the next steps beyond initial strikes were properly planned. He states, “Iran deserve to be punished,” and reiterates the need for a strategy to end hostilities and stabilize the region. - Proxies and regional instability: The discussion highlights Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis as Iranian proxies destabilizing the Middle East, with Speaker 0 insisting that Iran’s support for these groups explains much of the regional violence and Israel’s security concerns. He argues that eliminating or significantly curbing Iran’s influence is essential for regional stability. - Gaza, West Bank, and war ethics: Speaker 1 cites humanitarian and civilian-impact statistics from Gaza, arguing that the war has gone beyond a proportionate response. Speaker 0 concedes there were crimes and unacceptable actions, stating there were “war crimes” and praising investigations and accountability, while resisting the accusation of genocide. He criticizes certain Israeli political figures (e.g., Ben-Gvir, Smotrich) for rhetoric and policies that could protract conflict, and he condemns the idea of broad acceptance of annexation policies in the South of Lebanon. - Lebanon and Hezbollah: The core policy debate is about disarming Hezbollah and the future of Lebanon-Israel normalization. Speaker 0 argues against annexing South Lebanon and says disarming Hezbollah must be part of any Israel–Lebanon peace process. He rejects “artificial” solutions like merging Hezbollah into the Lebanese army with weapons, arguing that Hezbollah cannot be permitted to operate as an independent armed force. He believes disarming Hezbollah should be achieved through an agreement that involves Iran’s influence, potentially allowing Hezbollah to be integrated into Lebanon’s political order if fully disarmed and bound by Lebanese sovereignty, and with international support (France cited). - Practical path to peace: Both speakers acknowledge the need for a negotiated two-state solution. Speaker 0 reiterates a longstanding plan: a two-state solution based on 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, the Old City administered under a shared trust (involving Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Palestine, Israel, and the United States). He emphasizes that this vision remains essential to changing the regional dynamic and that the current Israeli government’s approach conflicts with this pathway. He frames his opposition to the present government as tied to this broader objective and says he will continue opposing it until it is replaced. - Personal reflections on leadership and regional hope: The exchange ends with mutual recognition that the cycle of violence is fueled by leadership choices on both sides. Speaker 0 asserts that a different Israeli administration could yield a more hopeful trajectory toward peace, while Speaker 1 stresses the importance of accountability for war crimes and the dangers of rhetoric that could undermine regional stability. Speaker 0 maintains it is possible to pursue peace through a viable, enforceable two-state framework, and urges focusing on disarming Hezbollah, negotiating with Lebanon, and pulling back to an international front to prevent further escalation. Overall, the dialogue juxtaposes urgent punitive action against Iran with the imperative of a negotiated regional settlement, disarmament of proxies, and a concrete two-state solution as the viable long-term path, while condemning certain actions and rhetoric that risk perpetuating conflict.

The speaker argues that Russia is winning the war in Ukraine due to superior weaponry and manpower, and Ukraine's dependence on Western support. He claims Trump will likely end the "Biden pipeline" of weaponry. A negotiated settlement is unlikely because Russia's demands—Ukraine's neutrality, demilitarization, and acceptance of Russian annexation of Crimea and four oblasts—are unacceptable to Ukraine and the West. The speaker believes Ukraine is losing and should cut a deal now to minimize losses, but nationalism and Western Russophobia prevent this. He dismisses the idea that Russia threatens to dominate Europe, calling it a "ridiculous argument" given their struggles in Eastern Ukraine. He says Putin wants to restore the Soviet empire, but Putin has stated that recreating the Soviet Union makes no sense. He views NATO expansion into Ukraine as the "taproot" of the war, analogous to the US Monroe Doctrine. He argues that the US foreign policy establishment is incompetent and has driven Russia into China's arms, undermining US strategic interests. He says the decision to bring NATO to Ukraine was made in 2008, and backing off is unacceptable to the US and the West. He claims the US has a special relationship with Israel that has no parallel in recorded history, and the Israel lobby has awesome power and profoundly influences US foreign policy in the Middle East. He says the Israelis are executing a genocide in Gaza, and the goal is ethnic cleansing. He believes the world will be dominated by the US, China, and Russia in the next 10 years.

The speaker argues that Russia is winning the war in Ukraine due to superior weaponry and manpower, and Ukraine's dependence on Western support. He claims that Trump won't refill the "Biden pipeline" of weaponry. He says Ukraine's defenses are collapsing and a diplomatic settlement is impossible because Russia's demands are unacceptable to Ukraine and the West. These demands include Ukraine becoming a neutral state, demilitarizing, and accepting Russia's annexation of Crimea and four oblasts. He believes Ukraine should cut a deal now to minimize losses, but nationalism prevents it. He dismisses the idea of Russia dominating Europe as ridiculous, stating Russia struggles to conquer eastern Ukraine. He says Putin pines for the Soviet era but understands recreating the Soviet empire is impossible. He views NATO expansion into Ukraine as the taproot of the war, analogous to America's Monroe Doctrine. He says the decision in 2008 to bring Ukraine into NATO was made despite recognizing Ukraine as a special case and a potential source of trouble. He attributes this decision to the belief that the US could "shove it down their throat," underestimating Russia's security concerns. He says the US has driven Russia into China's arms, which is against American interests. He says the Israel lobby has awesome power and influences US foreign policy in the Middle East, even when it conflicts with American interests. He says Israel is executing a genocide in Gaza to ethnically cleanse Palestinians from Greater Israel. He says the US has a special relationship with Israel that has no parallel in recorded history.

Wanna get on to Ukraine. But, given that Israel is signaling it doesn't like the, Al Qaeda operative, Jelani in Damascus, and we know Tulsi Gabbard is something of an expert on Syria because she exposed the lies and the, phony war in Syria when The United States was supporting the ISIS and Al Qaeda rebels there. How do you and Trump has been very brave arguably saying, he's not gonna, start sending loads of money like Britain is to Tchelani. There's still thousands of American troops, though, in Syria. What is American Syrian policy Syria policy? America's policy towards Syria is basically Israel's policy. And what The United States was bent on doing was wrecking Syria and keeping it wrecked. That's the Israeli objective here. This is what the Israelis wanna do with Iran. They don't simply wanna do away with Iran's nuclear capability. They surely do wanna do that, but they wanna wreck Iran. They wanna turn Iran into Syria. And what the Israelis are doing in Syria is going to great lengths to make sure that Syria remains, a dysfunctional state. They don't want Syria to become, a formidable adversary. They want it to remain broken. And, of course, The United States will support the Israelis in that regard. So, of course, the Israelis are not gonna allow the Americans to give huge amounts of aid to Jalani so that he can produce a viable Syrian state because that's not Israeli policy. Just look at what they're doing in Iran. I mean, excuse me, what they're doing in Lebanon. It's a similar situation.

A senator supports regime change in Iran via popular uprising, not military force, aiming for a leader who is friendly to the U.S. He identifies as a "non-interventionist hawk," prioritizing U.S. national security interests. He opposed the Iraq War and intervention in Syria, but views Iran differently due to its anti-American stance and nuclear ambitions. The senator believes supporting Israel is in America's interest, citing intelligence sharing and a commonality of enemies. He acknowledges Israel likely spies on the U.S., but considers it acceptable. He defends APEC, stating it lobbies for a strong U.S.-Israeli relationship, not for the Israeli government. He claims Iran is actively trying to murder Donald Trump and has hired hitmen, but does not support military action, deeming their efforts ineffective. He believes stopping Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons is crucial, even if it requires military action. He criticizes the Biden administration's handling of the Ukraine war and advocates for a focus on America's interests.

The speaker states that America's national interest is the single criterion for foreign policy decisions. He says he came to Congress to defend Israel and believes those who bless Israel will be blessed, citing Genesis. He equates the nation of Israel with the current political entity led by Netanyahu. The speaker denies APAC lobbies for a foreign government, asserting it promotes a strong US-Israeli relationship. He does not know the population or ethnic mix of Iran, a country he believes is trying to murder Trump. He supports Israel's bombing campaign against Iran, with US support. He criticizes Zelensky's behavior and believes sanctions on Nord Stream 2 prevented war. He supports regime change in Iran but denies advocating military force. He acknowledges that allies, including Israel, likely spy on the US, stating it is not in America's interest for Israel to spy on the US.

The speaker believes Israel's recent attack on Iran is politically motivated, referencing a close Knesset vote where Netanyahu narrowly avoided another election. They argue that focusing on Iran's nuclear program is a distraction, as North Korea poses a greater nuclear threat to the U.S. and Iran lacks the necessary delivery systems. The speaker highlights Israel's own uninspected nuclear program, suggesting a double standard. They propose a deal where both Iran and Israel denuclearize, potentially brokered by Trump. They draw a parallel to South Africa's denuclearization and the possibility of Israel needing to grant voting rights in the West Bank. The speaker criticizes the enthusiasm for regime change wars, citing the Iraq War as a costly failure that benefited China and ISIS. They question whether those advocating for regime change in Iran have sufficient knowledge about the country, referencing a senator who couldn't estimate Iran's population or ethnic makeup. They contrast the comfort of advocating for war from safe positions with the sacrifices made by those who fight and die in them.

Joe Kent, former director of the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, explains why he resigned over the war against Iran, arguing Iran posed no imminent threat and that the war was driven by Israeli influence and a regime-change agenda. Key points: - Imminent threat and escalation: In his view, Iran was not on the cusp of attacking the U.S. during Trump’s second term. Iran followed a calculated escalation ladder, stopping proxies during Operation Midnight Hammer and returning to negotiation afterward. After the attack on nuclear sites, Iran retaliated in kind, then returned to talks, indicating a calibrated approach rather than irrational behavior. The “imminent threat” cited by some officials was viewed as primarily tied to Israeli actions against Iran, not Iranian intent to attack the U.S. directly. - Regime-change as miscalculation: Kent contends that regime-change aims in Iran—similar to Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya—are flawed. He believes attempts to remove the Iranian regime strengthen it instead, and he personally did not want another costly war in the Middle East. - Israeli influence and the policymaking process: He describes a multilayered Israeli influence network—strong PAC presence, intelligence sharing, and media/think-tank leveraging—that shapes U.S. policy. Israelis push for no enrichment and regime-change outcomes, using media echo chambers and direct access to U.S. decision-makers to steer policy in a direction that aligns with their goals, sometimes at odds with longer-term U.S. interests or what Trump might publicly advocate. - Intelligence versus policy sales: He notes that intelligence briefings can inform or sell a policy. Israeli influence can bypass traditional channels, presenting threats in emotionally resonant terms (e.g., fear of Ayatollahs obtaining a bomb) to push for aggressive stances. This has contributed to a cycle of escalation and military action. - Negotiation space and red lines: The administration’s narrowing of red lines around enrichment (from broader nuclear nonproliferation to zero enrichment) limited potential deal space. The Iranians did show willingness to negotiate on enrichment levels, monitoring, and proxies, but the Israelis and policy ecosystem continually sought broader prohibitions, complicating any potential agreement. - The Iran-Israel dynamic: The Israeli objective appears oriented toward regime change or a state of chaos preventing Iran from leveraging its regional power. Kent argues the U.S. has enabled Israel by subsidizing its defense and offense, creating pressure that constrains U.S. policy and international leverage. - Strategic and regional assessment: The Gulf, Straits of Hormuz, and regional energy security are central. He argues that the U.S. cannot easily open Hormuz militarily in the long term and that any durable arrangement would require restraining Israel, easing sanctions relief for Iran, and returning to a sustainable regional security framework. - Iran’s current strategy: Iran has managed to deter substantial American escalation by threatening to disrupt energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz and by leveraging proxies and regional influence. The leadership has shown discipline in controlling proxies and presenting a credible threat that optimizes Iran’s strategic position. - Great power dynamics: China is seen as a major beneficiary of the current cycle, gaining leverage as global energy transactions shift away from the dollar and as U.S. attention diverts to the Middle East. Russia’s posture is also affected; sanctions and energy markets interact with Iran’s actions, while Russia and China could exploit the distraction and reframe influence in their favor. - Syria and broader war lessons: Kent emphasizes that regime-change in Syria contributed to instability, with various factions and external powers (Turkey, Israel, HTS, Al Qaeda offshoots) complicating the landscape. He remains skeptical about the future stability of Syria, warning that competing external interests could lead to further conflict. - Prospects for de-escalation: A path to de-escalation would require restraining Israel’s offensive actions, offering some sanctions relief to Iran, and engaging in constructive regional diplomacy to reopen Hormuz. He suggests a sustainable deal would avoid large U.S. troop commitments and focus on practical counterterrorism cooperation, stable oil flow, and avoiding regime-change rhetoric. Overall, Kent argues that the Iran war was driven by a dominant Israeli influence, a flawed regime-change impulse, and a diplomacy dynamic that prioritized aggressive measures over practical, balanced engagement. He advocates restraining Israel, pursuing a pragmatic, limited set of objectives with Iran, and reframing U.S. regional strategy to reduce perpetual conflict in the Middle East. He also warns that without de-escalation, the conflict risks drawing the U.S. into a prolonged and costly cycle with broad regional and global repercussions.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the possibility of striking Iran to eliminate its nuclear program and the broader implications of regime change. - Speaker 0 acknowledges arguments that Israel has wanted to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, and that American involvement with B-52s and large bombs might be needed to finish the job. He notes the idea of a strike that proceeds quickly with minimal American casualties, under a Trump-era frame that Iran will not get a nuclear bomb. - He observes a shift among Washington’s neoconservative and Republican circles from opposing Iran’s nuclear capability to opposing Ayatollah rule itself, suggesting a subtle change in objectives while maintaining the theme of intervention. He concedes cautious support if Trump executes it prudently, but warns of a “switcheroo” toward regime change rather than purely disabling the nuclear program. - Speaker 0 criticizes the record of neocons on foreign policy (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, the Arab Spring) and argues that the entire Middle East bears their failures. He emphasizes a potential regime-change drive and questions what would come after removing the Ayatollah, including possible US troop deployments and financial support for a new regime. - He highlights the size of Iran (about 92,000,000 people, two and a half times the size of Texas) and warns that regime change could trigger a bloody civil war and a large refugee crisis, possibly drawing tens or hundreds of thousands of deaths and destabilizing Europe. - Speaker 1 presents a more vocal stance: he would like to see the regime fall and leaves to the president the timing and method, insisting that if the nuclear program isn’t eliminated now, “we’ll all regret it” and urging to “be all in” to help Israel finish the job. - In cuts 3:43, Speaker 1 argues that removing the Ayatollah’s regime would be beneficial because staying in power would continue to threaten Israel, foment terrorism, and pursue a bomb; he characterizes the regime as aiming to destroy Jews and Sunni Islam, calling them “fanatical religious Nazis.” - Speaker 0 responds that such a forceful call for regime change is immature, shallow, and reckless, warning that certainty about outcomes in foreign interventions is impossible. He asserts that the first rule of foreign policy is humility, noting that prior interventions led to prolonged conflict and mass displacement. He cautions against beating the drums for regime change in another Middle Eastern country, especially the largest, and reiterates that the issue is not simply removing the nuclear program but opposing Western-led regime change. - The discussion frames a tension between supporting efforts to deny Iran a nuclear weapon and resisting Western-led regime change, with a strong emphasis on potential humanitarian and geopolitical consequences. The speakers reference public opinion (citing 86% of Americans not wanting Iran to have a bomb) and critique interventions as historically destabilizing.

Netanyahu may be pushing for regime change in Iran to distract from his political troubles at home, as he recently survived a vote of no confidence by only two votes. The speaker believes the focus on Iran's nuclear program is a pretext, as North Korea poses a greater nuclear threat to the U.S. because they possess the bomb, delivery system, and reentry vehicle, unlike Iran. While Iran's rhetoric is hostile, North Korea openly threatens to wipe out US cities. The speaker suggests a diplomatic approach with Iran, similar to Trump's approach with North Korea, but acknowledges Iran has expelled IAEA inspectors, raising concerns about a secret nuclear program. The speaker points out that Israel, which also possesses nuclear weapons, allows no international inspections. While not judging Israel's nuclear ambitions, the speaker deems it hypocritical to initiate a regime change war over secret nuclear weapons when Israel has them too. The speaker proposes a deal where both Iran and Israel give up their secret nuclear weapon programs, suggesting Trump could broker such a deal.

I think Bibi is completely evil and completely destructive, "hurting The United States" and "destroying his own country" and I think he imperils the world. They believe they're gonna try and blow up Al Aqsa Mosque on the Temple Mount to "build a third temple," risking "global war." They ask, "What's Lindsey Graham's excuse?" and "What's Ted Cruz's excuse?" They quote Cruz: "I was elected. My main goal was to help Israel." I came into congress with the stated intention of being the leading defender of Israel in the United States Senate. "I've worked every day to do that." "Really? Ted, how did you get on a platform ... my main goal is to help another country? This is deranged. Where's our self respect? I don't want you to think about it. You know, I'm not interested. I'm very interested in how American leaders could betray their own country. That enrages me."

"this is a good thing because it brings The United States into a conflict that we've been involved in on an existential level for decades." "There was an Israeli spy ring in The United States, and they clearly knew nine eleven was coming." "They aired it." "They're real people." "They're not crazy." "Those are factually true statements." "How many Shiite terror attacks have there been in The United States in my lifetime? Let me do the math." "Zero." "Don't tell me that the greatest threat we face is Iran. That's a lie." "You're telling it on behalf of a foreign power." "Iran is not even in the top 10 list." "Our problems would include tens of millions of foreign nationals living illegally in my country." "Nobody knows their identities." "A drug crisis that's killed millions of Americans over the past twenty years." "My family was attacked." "It's true." "And everyone kind of knows it's true."

The senator supports regime change in Iran via a popular uprising, not military force. He considers himself a "non-interventionist hawk," prioritizing US national security interests and advocating "peace through strength." He opposed military action in Syria, but views Iran as different due to its anti-American stance and pursuit of nuclear weapons. He believes the US military support for Israel is massively in America's national security. He acknowledges Israel likely spies on the US, but accepts it as a reality among allies. He defends APAC as an American lobby focused on strengthening US-Israeli relations, not acting as a foreign agent. The senator believes Iran is actively trying to murder Donald Trump and has paid hitmen to do so. He supports Israel's actions to take out Iran's military leadership and nuclear capacity. He opposed the Iraq War and military intervention in Libya, citing negative consequences for the US. He also believes that Joe Biden's weakness caused the war in Ukraine.

Trump was considered good on foreign policy, including getting out of Syria and defeating ISIS, but he was always hawkish on Iran. Zionists wanted a full conflict with Iran but only got the Soleimani assassination. Despite popular belief, Trump was allegedly pursuing regime change in Iran throughout his term, even getting close to overthrowing the Iranian government. This was also happening in Venezuela. Trump ripped up the JCPOA, and the rhetoric now suggests that such events wouldn't occur if Trump were president. Trump is trying to run even further to the right, making it hard to say no to war with Iran. Iran will be in the crosshairs regardless of the administration, especially for Israel, making them more of a target for the United States.

In this discussion, Colonel Douglas MacGregor argues that the Islamabad peace talks were likely a fabrication and that Iran showed no real interest in negotiating. He asserts there was no evidence of Iranian intent to negotiate in the last talks, and notes that Vice President Harris’s momentary outside call during a meeting suggested to him that Netanyahu, not Trump, was effectively in charge of decisions affecting the conflict. He claims the White House comments about a possible ceasefire or talks are “nonsense” or designed to calm markets, and predicts the Iranian ceasefire deadline (3 AM Iranian time) would not yield a negotiated halt to hostilities. He says Iran is preparing for renewed attacks and for the possibility of a quicker American strike. MacGregor frames the conflict in strategic terms, contrasting American offensive power with Iran’s defense-focused posture. He describes the United States as a power that “banks on the offense, the ability to attack beyond its normal limits,” while Iran operates from within its borders with substantial underground storage and a defense-oriented program. He emphasizes Iran’s capability to wage a long-range, dispersed defense and to strike from 500 to 1,000 miles beyond its borders, complicating sustained air and naval operations. He believes the opening phase of any renewed U.S. campaign will be “far more intense”—more sorties, missiles, and bombings aimed at targets that could influence the outcome, focusing on infrastructure to degrade the Iranian state rather than merely military targets. Regarding resources, MacGregor estimates the Iranians have substantial unmanned systems (perhaps 45–50,000) and missiles (15–20,000, possibly more) with ongoing underground production capacity, aided by external resupply from China and Russia. He suggests the United States may have replenished some missile stocks, including air-to-surface missiles and anti-missile stocks, but questions the current readiness of destroyed radars and other critical C4ISR assets. He anticipates greater use of carpet bombing and destruction of critical infrastructure (bridges, power plants, desalination and oil infrastructure), describing this as an effort to destroy the state. On ground forces, he notes reports that President Trump has been reluctant to use them and expresses skepticism about their usefulness in the Gulf, given supply and medical evacuation challenges. He mentions potential but limited appetite for ground operations by Special Operations forces and the Army/Marines. MacGregor discusses global repercussions, warning that Iranian destruction could trigger famine due to Gulf-region fertilizer supply chains, rising fuel prices, and energy insecurity worldwide. He claims Europe is already facing energy crises and political upheaval, predicting governments will be overthrown as they confront shortages and the realities of energy dependency, and asserts the petrodollar system is dead or in decline, with China potentially stepping in as a financial hub. He argues that the multipolar shift will constrain U.S. power and that Europe should re-engage with Moscow, possibly under a new arrangement akin to a Manchurian-style convention to manage straits and regional influence. In the European and Asian context, he says NATO is finished and warns that Western media have misrepresented Russia’s intentions, instead blaming Western leaders for the escalation. He criticizes Western support for Ukraine, arguing that Ukrainian actions have been complicit in wider war costs, and he contends the broader goal of Israel’s regional plans has driven U.S. policy toward Iran. He predicts open revolutions or political turnover in Western Europe, calls for Europe to move away from wind/solar dependence in favor of more traditional energy sources, and urges a diplomatic resolution to end the war with Iran through mediation rather than continued conflict. Toward the end, MacGregor casts Trump as trapped by a Washington status quo and the Israel lobby, expresses pessimism about congressional restraint, and reiterates his view that the current approach is unsustainable. He closes by reiterating the need to end the hostilities and find a different path forward, arguing that Iran should logically oversee a new, negotiated framework for the region.

The speaker believes Israel's recent attack on Iran is politically motivated, referencing a close Knesset vote where Netanyahu narrowly avoided another election. They argue the conflict isn't about Iran's nuclear program, as North Korea poses a greater nuclear threat to the US. The speaker highlights that Iran lacks the capabilities for a nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile, unlike North Korea. They suggest a deal where both Iran and Israel give up their secret nuclear weapon programs, drawing a parallel to South Africa's denuclearization. The speaker criticizes the enthusiasm for regime change wars, recalling the flawed Iraq War, which cost trillions and aided the rise of China and ISIS. They question whether those advocating for attacks on Iran understand the country, citing a senator's lack of knowledge about Iran's population and ethnic mix. The speaker contrasts the comfortable political stance of supporting regime change wars with the sacrifices made by those who fight and die in them.

Extremely clearly. 'Do you think there's been a lot of talk today about another war with Iran? I think it's very likely because Netanyahu is absolutely intent, and he has been intent for nearly thirty years.' Netanyahu back in 1996 with American political advisers, actually came up with a a document, called Clean Break. 'There's just one footnote to that. When, Netanyahu said that we will go to war, what he meant was The United States will go to war for us.' 'So Netanyahu has been the great champion of pushing America into endless wars for the last three decades. He was the big cheerleader of the Iraq war.' 'This has its roots in Netanyahu's doctrine, which is, we will control all of Palestine.' 'We will overthrow the governments that support the militancy against Israel's control over Palestine.'

Ashwin Rutansi hosts Going Underground from Dubai, discussing the unfolding Trump-Netanyahu campaign against Iran and Lebanon, amid claims of a failed ceasefire and a chaotic US policy that could lead to peace talks or mass US casualties. The conversation centers on how US military operations were conducted with unclear objectives, the blockade of Hormuz, and broader questions about international alignments, domestic politics, and the integrity of US national security. Key points and claims discussed - James Webb, former senior foreign policy adviser to RFK Jr., discusses the conflict’s origins and the US military response: - The Iran conflict is described as atypical for the US military, with a lack of contingencies for evolving events, including the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Webb contrasts this with the Iraq War era, noting that past conflicts saw hundreds of thousands of troops staged for various contingencies. - He asserts the Strait of Hormuz closure is a significant, probable danger, and claims it was “the most probable and dangerous course of action” by the Iranian government, though later remarks acknowledge it was “closed for some.” - Webb accuses the President of denying the risk of such a closure and asserts this has harmed the US’s reputation and economic partnerships, painting the war as one fought on behalf of another country; he notes this stance as anomalous and unpopular domestically. - Assassination of Khamenei and Netanyahu’s involvement: - Webb describes waking to news of the assassination attempt on Khamenei as indicative of an Israeli planning cycle, arguing that assassinating foreign leaders risks violating norms and has long-term strategic consequences. - He claims the operation “bloody[s] the United States” and creates a blood feud between the US and Iran, undermining state-to-state negotiation dynamics. - Netanyahu’s influence and possible foreign power infiltration: - Webb questions what Netanyahu might have over Trump that resonates with MAGA voters, touching on theories involving foreign influence and the Epstein files, and suggesting long-standing efforts to cultivate influence within US politics. - He describes a broader pattern of neoconservative and pro-war pressures predating the Iraq War and accuses various political actors of co-opting Congress and government for an ongoing Iran-focused agenda. - Webb cites corruption in the US military procurement system and sanctions dynamics, noting cases where private-sector investments allegedly intersect with sanction decisions. - War powers, legality, and governance: - Webb emphasizes the constitutional requirement that Congress holds war powers (Article I, Section 8) and argues that the war with Iran did not follow proper processes or a legitimate declaration. - He critiques the War Powers Resolution’s applicability in this context, suggesting the administration acted beyond its constitutional authority. - RFK Jr., Tulsi Gabbard, and broader political dynamics: - Webb says he resigned from the RFK Jr. campaign after RFK Jr. equivocated on IDF tactics in Gaza, arguing this demonstrated an external influence on policy. He notes Tulsi Gabbard as DNI and expresses hope she can influence decisions, while acknowledging restricted access to the White House. - He believes there is bipartisan concern about the drift toward war and notes polling showing growing public wariness of foreign entanglements, including U.S.-Israel dynamics. He highlights potential shifts toward a more America-first foreign policy. - Military hardware, strategy, and vulnerability: - Webb discusses modern anti-ship and ballistic missile capabilities from Iran, Russia, and China, arguing US carriers require significant standoff distance and are vulnerable to advanced missiles, limiting traditional carrier-based operations. - He mentions USS George H.W. Bush’s unusual movements and raises questions about naval readiness and procurement integrity, as well as unexplained incidents aboard ships (e.g., clogging sewage systems) used to illustrate perceived internal disruptions. - Regional realignments and the petrodollar: - Webb suggests that aggressive Middle East actions could push regional allies to rethink loyalties and alliances, with potential implications for the dollar’s status as the global reserve currency. - He expresses cautious optimism that public sentiment toward “America first” and opposition to endless wars could drive political renewal, including a return to merit-based leadership and reduced foreign entanglements. - Final reflections: - Webb laments civilian casualties and school-targeting incidents, emphasizing the need for accountability and a reconsideration of strategic aims, while reiterating concern about the influence of powerful interests on national security decisions. - The program closes with condolences to those affected by NATO-related conflicts and a tease of continued coverage of the Trump-Netanyahu war. Note: The summary preserves the speakers’ names and quotes as presented, without adding external evaluation or commentary.

He's using The United States, its economy, and its military power for his own ends. What's remarkable to me is how effective he's been at that and how contemptuous he is. "80% of Americans this is an old one. 80% of Americans support us." "BB is completely evil and completely destructive." "He's hurting The United States and he's destroying his own country and I think he imperils the world." "They're gonna try and blow up Al Aqsa Mosque" "to build the third temple, and then you've got global war." "No, I am way, way more angry at my leaders than I am at Netanyahu. Much it's not even close." "Ted Cruz says right into the camera, I was elected. My main goal was to help Israel." "Where's our self respect?" "anti Semitism very often is a way to pass the buck." "It's their fault." "Why are we allowing this?"