reSee.it - Related Video Feed

Since 2013, mobile devices are now the primary focus, with smartphones constantly emitting signals to cell towers even when idle. These signals contain unique identifiers like IMEI and IMSI, allowing tracking of a user's movements. Companies store this data for unknown purposes, leading to privacy concerns and mass surveillance through bulk collection.

Liberals are proposing a law where a minister can ban me from the Internet, my Internet service provider ban me from the Internet, and neither of us be able to say anything about it. Matt Strauss, who's a doctor and a physician and also a member of parliament, said that you need to be concerned about bill c eight. It allows Melanie Jolley to kick anyone off the Internet with no trial and no warrant. Worse off, you won't be able to say that you've even been kicked off. And this is the Emergencies Measures Act on steroids, only permanent and secret? "Watch this. Ministers order if there are reasonable grounds to believe that it is necessary to do so to secure the Canadian telecommunication system against any threat, including that of interference, manipulation, disruption, degradation, the minister may by order and after consultation with the minister of public safety, prohibit a telecommunications service provider from providing any service to any specified person, including telecommunications service provider." "The order may also include a provision prohibiting the disclosure of its existence or some or all of its contents by any person." "This is crazy." "The minister may require any person to provide to the minister or any person designated by the minister, meaning she's able to designate whoever the heck she wants, within any time and any subject to any conditions that the minister may specify." "Any information that the minister believes on reasonable grounds is relevant for the purpose of making, amending, or revoking an order under section 15." "This is insane." "This is a minister that will have the sole power to kick you off the Internet at their will, then ban you or anyone else from being able to speak on this." "If the conservatives did this, there would be an uproar all over the media, all over the world." "They would call them a dictatorship. They would call them communist. They would say this is Nazi like." "But the liberals are doing this, and now everyone's quiet." "Come people have to speak up." "I promise you, if this bill goes through, it's gonna be ugly for everyone." "And if I get kicked off, I'm going to break that ban." "I will talk about it. I will let the world know that a totalitarian state, a communist state of the Liberal Party is trying to silence its people at its discretion, not the police, but the government." "Ridiculous."

Speaker 0: What about the public attitude held by millions of everyday Americans? All I've got on a computer is pictures of my family, CCTV cameras that are prevalent in a ton of American cities and overseas capitals. Those cameras are your friend if you're innocent and have nothing to hide. Speaker 1: Well, I'd say that's very much what the average Chinese citizen believed or perhaps even still to this day believes. But we see how these same technologies are being applied to create what they call the social credit system. If any of these family photos, if any of your activities online, if your purchases, if your associations, if your friends are in any way different from what the government or the powers that be of the moment would like them to be, you're no longer able to purchase train tickets. You're no longer able to board an airplane. You may not be able to get a passport. You may not be eligible for a job. You might not be able to work for the government. All of these things are increasingly being created and programmed and decided by algorithms, and those algorithms are fueled by precisely the innocent data that our devices are creating all of the time constantly, invisibly, quietly right now. Our devices are casting all of these records that we do not see being created, that in aggregate seem very innocent. Even if you can't see the content of these communications, the activity records, what the government calls metadata, which they argue they do not need a warrant to collect, tells the whole story. And these activity records are being created and shared and collected and intercepted constantly by companies and governments. And ultimately it means as they sell these, as they trade these, as they make their businesses on the backs of these records, what they are selling is not information, what they are selling is us. They're selling our future. They're selling our past. They are selling our history, our identity, and ultimately, they are stealing our power.

The speaker describes a rented car equipped with built-in tracking technology, saying a cell phone tower is installed in the vehicle to track the driver continuously. They claim that while settings allow turning off features like Bluetooth and Wi‑Fi, the “cell phone” function cannot be turned off, meaning the car has an always-on connection for tracking. They further state the car uses location tracking and that apps in the vehicle also track location. The speaker points to a microphone feature they say can be turned off to prevent listening while driving and talking to friends or family. They characterize the overall system as everything syncing together so Google can access location and related data. The speaker argues that car companies sell built-in features approved by car manufacturers that enable access to the car’s location for assistance while driving, ticket generation, and police use to identify speeding based on GPS and location. They claim authorities can use an app to send tickets to a person’s house. They mention a “speed camera audio warning” feature, saying it informs the driver when a speed camera is coming so they can slow down, rather than banning speed cameras. They also reference a climate change or air quality feature, claiming the system reports “denied” climate and air quality access to location and associates it with “punishment.” Finally, they advise that under location settings, the driver must disable location permissions for installed apps; otherwise, they claim the car tracks location 24/7/365. They conclude by emphasizing that the collected data could be sold to Google.

Eric Prince and Tucker Carlson discuss what they describe as pervasive, ongoing phone and device surveillance. They say that a study of devices—including Google Mobile Services on Android and iPhones—shows a spike in data leaving the phone around 3 AM, amounting to about 50 megabytes, effectively the phone “dialing home to the mother ship” and exporting “all of your goings on.” They describe “pillow talk” and other private interactions being transmitted, and claim that even apps like WhatsApp, which is marketed as end-to-end encrypted, ultimately have data that is “sliced and diced and analyzed and used to push … advertising” once it passes through servers. They argue that this surveillance is not limited to phones but extends to other devices in the home, including Amazon’s Alexa and automobiles, which they say now have trackers and can trigger a kill switch, with recording of audio and, in many cases, video. The speakers contend this situation represents a monopoly by a handful of big tech companies that can use the collected data to control markets, dominate, and vertically integrate the economy, potentially shutting down competitors. They connect this to broader concerns about political power, claiming that the data profiles built on individuals enable manipulation of public opinion, messaging, and even election outcomes. They reference banking data, noting that banks like Chase have announced selling customers’ purchasing histories to other companies, as part of what they call a broader data-driven power shift. The discussion expands to warnings about a “technological breakaway civilization” operating illegally and interfaced with private intelligence agencies to manipulate, censor, and steal elections. They argue that AI, capable of trillions of calculations per second, magnifies these risks and increases the ability to take control of civilization. They reference geopolitical events, such as China’s blockade of Taiwan, and claim that microchips sold internationally have kill switches that could disable critical military and infrastructure. They speculate about the capabilities of NSA, Chinese, Russian, or hacker groups to exploit this vulnerability, describing a world in which the infrastructure is exposed like Swiss cheese to criminals and governments. Throughout, the speakers criticize the idea that technology is neutral, asserting instead that it has been hijacked by corrupt governments and corporations. They contrast these concerns with Google’s founding motto “don’t be evil,” claiming it was contradicted by later documents showing CIA involvement and In-Q-Tel’s role, and they warn that a social-credit, cashless society rollout could be enforced by private devices rather than drones or troops. The segment emphasizes education of Congress, state attorneys general, and the public about these supposed threats. Note: Promotional product endorsements and sponsor requests in the transcript have been omitted from this summary.

Smartphones are constantly connected to cellular towers, even when the screen is off. They emit radio frequency emissions to communicate with the nearest tower, creating a record of the phone's presence. This data is stored and can be accessed by companies and governments for surveillance purposes. The problem is that users have no control or visibility over what their phones are doing at any given time. Hacking is a common method used to gain access to devices, allowing attackers to control and collect personal information. Companies like Google and Facebook also collect and store user data, which can be accessed by governments. The lack of transparency and control over data collection poses a threat to privacy and individual power. Trust in technology is limited.

Governments are increasingly drunk on power, as evidenced by the UK's order for Apple to backdoor encrypted iCloud data, affecting 2 billion users globally. This stems from the UK's Online Safety Act, which threatens imprisonment for dissenting tweets. Apple was secretly ordered to allow access to worldwide data and faced criminal charges for revealing the order. The UK's actions are part of a broader, globally orchestrated censorship agenda, with the Digital Services Act in the EU granting governments power over online content. Leaked documents show UK intelligence coordinating with the Biden administration to censor online speech. It's a war on encryption and control, mirroring the Rockefeller lockstep document's vision of authoritarian governance.

ICE is using fake cell towers to turn your phone into a tracking device. It's a technology called Stingray. They put it in a vehicle and drive through a neighborhood broadcasting a signal stronger than a real cell tower. Your phone automatically connects to the strongest signal, so it connects to the fake one, and you never know what happened. Once you're connected, they can pinpoint your exact location in real time. Here's the most terrifying part: the Stingray doesn't just connect to the target's phone. It forces every phone in the area to connect to it. Your phone, your neighbor's phone, anyone just walking down the street, it scoops up data from hundreds of people to find one person. This isn't a theory. Forbes just uncovered a warrant showing ICE used one to track a person across a 30 block area in Utah, and they've spent millions on these cell site simulator vehicles. Your phone is constantly looking for a signal. You just have to hope it's a real one. ICE

Speaker 0 argues Canada introduced a bill allowing the minister to 'kick any Canadian citizen off the Internet to cut off their phone line, to turn off their phone.' 'If there is reasonable grounds to believe that it is necessary to do so to secure the Canadian telecommunication system against any threat, the minister may prohibit a telecommunication service provider from providing any service to the specified person.' He warns 15.2 clause five makes the decision 'secret.' He says this signals 'Chinese Communist Party levels of government overreach.' He links the bill to the digital ID agenda and World Economic Forum's claim that digital identity is crucial for 'civic participation' and to UN 'Real ID' plans, noting Rand Paul tweets. He argues it could isolate people from paying bills, banking, or organizing politics, describing a potential 'digital gulag.' He advocates repeal in the US and hopes Canada defeats the agenda.

Signal, a company, may be asked by the regulator Ofcom about the data they gather. Signal claims they don't collect data on people's messages. However, the concern is that the bill doesn't specify this and instead gives Ofcom the power to demand spyware downloads to check messages against a permissible database. This sets a precedent for authoritarian regimes and goes against the principles of a liberal democracy. It is seen as unprecedented and a negative shift in surveillance practices.

The speaker claims that 99% of phones worldwide are being tracked by governments through push notifications. The US government allegedly has a gag order on the two largest phone companies to keep this information hidden. Senator Ron Wyden states that foreign governments have reached out to Google and Apple for push notification data. These notifications, which appear on the screen, are sent from the app to a cloud server and then to the phone. The governments are requesting this data from Google and Apple, potentially including text information, metadata, and location details. The speaker suggests that the lack of coverage on this issue may be due to the influence of advertising and algorithms controlled by Apple and Google.

Washington lawmakers are advancing two proposals that would expand the state’s control over how three-dimensional printers and similar equipment can be used, citing the spread of “untraceable firearms” as justification. House bill 2321 would require that all three‑D printers sold in Washington after 07/01/2027 include built‑in safeguards that detect and block attempts to produce firearms or firearm components. The safeguards must reject such print requests with a high degree of reliability and prevent users from disabling or bypassing the control system. To meet the rule, manufacturers could embed the detection algorithm directly into a printer’s firmware, integrate it through preprint software, or use an authentication process that screens design files before printing. Manufacturers failing to comply could be charged with a class C felony, facing penalties of up to five years in prison and a $15,000 fine. The measure defines these safeguards as a firearms blueprint detection algorithm. A related bill, House bill 2320, would prohibit the use of three‑D printers, CNC milling machines, or other tools to produce unregistered firearms. It would also make it illegal to distribute or possess digital files capable of creating gun parts. The bill targets both the physical manufacturing of ghost guns and the online exchange of design data. Representative Osman Sallehuden introduced the legislation, saying it is meant to close a dangerous gap in state law: “with a three‑D printer that cost a few hundred and a digital file that can be downloaded online, someone can now manufacture an untraceable firearm at home, no background check, no serial number, and no accountability.” The discussion notes that under U.S. federal law, unlicensed individuals may produce firearms for personal noncommercial use without registering them or adding a serial number, often referred to as ghost guns. However, this is restricted by state laws and federal regulations against manufacturing items like silencers or machine guns, and against firearms that are undetectable by metal detectors. The article emphasizes that apart from some prohibited items, it is legal to use three‑D printers for this purpose under certain conditions, subject to state variations. The proposed safeguards would require the algorithm to be unbypassable, effectively outlawing firmware modification or gaining root access. In short, tinkering with your own hardware could be treated as a crime. The bills are framed as public safety measures, but the discussion warns they could push toward closed systems that require server authentication or proprietary software, turning open hardware into a controlled platform. The broader concern is about government or corporate control over what devices a person may own or modify, with potential for expanded restrictions through the attorney general’s broad authority to define blocked designs in the future. The debate touches on parallels to proposed and enacted “kill switches” and remote controls in other domains, and to the tension between innovation and control.

The speakers discuss the breadth and invasiveness of data that can be accessed from a person’s phone, highlighting how such information can be retrieved and used in investigations. They enumerate the various types of data that can be obtained: call logs, chats, cookies, device notifications, emails, instant messages, and passwords. They note that deleted conversations on encrypted apps like WhatsApp and Signal can also be accessible, as well as Millie’s deleted web browsing history. The speakers emphasize that contact information for everyone the person has spoken to, and the locations of all their calls, can be seen. They point out that information about other people’s phone numbers can be accessed, and they ask whether those people’s messages to the person can be seen, with the answer being yes. The police can obtain information about people the person has contacted, not only in relation to any arrest that might have occurred but also concerning individuals who may have contacted the person securely (for example, through Signal) about work. The speakers express that the most worrying aspect is that this kind of data access can happen at the time of arrest, even when charges are never brought, and that it can also apply to witnesses and victims. They argue that there appears to be little clarity about deletion, implying that the police can effectively do what they want when they obtain someone’s phone, which they describe as a scary amount of information. Despite the fear, they also acknowledge that this data is extremely useful for the police in investigations. A central concern raised is the current lack of a required warrant to obtain any of this information. They argue that there should be a degree of checks and balances to determine whether it is proportionate to access such data in a given case, stating that in some cases it may not be necessary to access a person’s phone. Overall, the discussion highlights a tension between the usefulness of comprehensive digital data for investigative purposes and the potential for overreach or abuse in the absence of warrants or robust safeguards.

- "This is the Apple intelligence report." - "It exports everything that you do, including messages, every fifteen minutes by default." - "While you're at it, turn off everything for Apple advertising and analytics Now scroll to the top of that section and turn off allow apps to track." - "Under Apple intelligence and Siri, scroll all the way to the bottom." - "And if I were you, I would turn off Apple intelligence for now." - "If you haven't seen all the lawsuits and what's going on, it just doesn't seem safe, and you don't wanna be surveilled under any pretense." - "In the photos app, scroll all the way down to the bottom where you will see enhanced visual search." - "This is basically taking a sketch, an AI, duplication of every single one of your photos, to analyze them."

Speaker 0: The government’s proposal, as outlined in the document, sets out the steps to move the legislation. It says the committee will meet within one hour of adopting the order to complete clause-by-clause consideration. If they have not finished within 30 minutes of the meeting’s start, all remaining amendments submitted by 4:30 will be “dean moved,” and subsequent steps will follow to move the bill quickly through the House of Commons. Speaker 1: This is dangerous territory because the subject matter involves giving police and other authorities increased powers. An order that requires all bill details to be passed within 30 minutes is frustrating to those who want police to have the right tools and also want Canadians’ privacy protected. The issue is that such a process is likely to be imperfect and then challenged and applied unevenly (“too strong here,” “too weak here”). Speaker 1 contrasts the idea of pushing back: if an important priority is truly important, time should be set aside, while dragging heels and causing chaos can justify pushing; however, Speaker 1 is not sure that justification applies to this bill. Speaker 1 also describes a broader pattern across multiple bills, saying the government will later claim people have been examining them for months even though they were introduced at the last minute with the clock running. Speaker 1 concludes that the bills matter, are very important to Canadians, and are likely to be gotten wrong without sufficient scrutiny or pushback on the government’s original ideas.

Participants argue Bill C-22 is being rushed and contend it contains provisions that pose major risks to Canadian privacy. One view says the process is “quite rushed,” noting the committee has had only three sitting days to hear witnesses, which is not enough for legislation of that complexity. A participant describes Bill C-22 as the “most dangerous surveillance bill” they have seen in more than 10 years in Canada, and even in other democracies. They say the Public Safety Minister should not be trusted to claim limited amendments will fix C-22, stating that nothing short of striking the majority of Part 2 would protect Canadian privacy. Multiple speakers focus on Part 2 as the key problem. They argue Part 2 is incompatible with the fundamental human right to privacy and could ultimately make Canadians less safe, not more. Concerns include a blanket secrecy provision that would prevent them from explaining to users what changes were made or, if discovered, why they were made. Speakers also say C-22 would let the government compel organizations to build surveillance capabilities to log who is talking to whom, when, and from where for up to a year. One participant states this would affect Canadians who rely on secure private communications to bank, access healthcare, run a business, or talk to family, emphasizing it is not a hypothetical risk. Google is cited as having significant concerns with several elements of Part 2 as currently drafted, particularly the potential for the law—without stronger definitions—to force dismantling critical privacy protections. Examples given include breaking encryption, overriding users’ data deletion controls, and building remote access capability, which the speakers say could facilitate foreign interference and weaken global user privacy. One speaker characterizes a “backdoor built for the good guys” as “simply a vulnerability,” waiting for bad actors. In closing, a speaker urges taking more time to receive and review all public evidence and to thoroughly reform or abandon Part 2 of C-22 before it moves forward, describing the process as under-researched given the “massive stakes.”

Bill c eight can hand the government secret warrantless powers over Canadians' communications. This is a serious setback for privacy. The commissioner notes that privacy impact assessment is required by the treasury board directive but "it's not a legal obligation in the privacy act." He argues there should be "the opportunity for my office to give input before the fact" on major changes, including legislation, and that we are "not consulted on the specific pieces of legislation before they're tabled." He calls for "necessity and proportionality, strict criteria for the exercise of powers, and appropriate transparency and reporting mechanisms." The bill's provisions would allow "secret orders to disable an individual's telecommunications access" and "a minister compel data without judicial oversight," with concerns about secrecy and reporting, "reports to appropriate authorities" and "confidential reporting" to raise questions. He warns of "a parallel system" where data can be seized in secret with no redress.

Governments worldwide are following a totalitarian control agenda outlined in the Rockefeller Foundation's "Lockstep" document. The UK government, in particular, is leading the charge, secretly ordering Apple to create a backdoor for encrypted iCloud data, affecting 2 billion users worldwide. This order, issued under the Investigatory Powers Act, is a global privacy nightmare. Apple faces a difficult choice: comply and weaken encryption globally, or withdraw services from the UK. This move ties into a broader censorship agenda, including the UK's Online Safety Bill and the EU's Digital Services Act, which criminalize dissent and censor free speech. Governments are using tech companies as enforcement arms, threatening citizens for online criticism, highlighting a war on encryption and control.

The RCMP has expanded surveillance capabilities in the last 5 years, adopting technologies that raise privacy concerns. Covert software infiltrates devices, accessing communications and activating cameras/microphones. Cell site simulators collect data from nearby devices, raising concerns about tracking innocent individuals. The speaker claims the RCMP is unwilling to target organized crime and protects corrupt politicians, and that these actions demonstrate unfairness and injustice towards Canadians. The speaker suggests these surveillance tools encourage self-censorship because the RCMP can infiltrate devices and monitor citizens. Surveillance in totalitarian regimes aims to control populations by creating constant observation, driving obedience.

Speaker 0 asserts that there is no security whatsoever and that cybersecurity professionals face this problem daily. They state that while people are watching their phones, their phones are watching them. The operating system is designed to watch and listen to users, to know who their friends are, what is being said in text messages, and to listen at times. They claim that, although people look at their phones and it has many facilities, it is the world’s greatest spy device, designed as a spy device. Now, this.

The speaker argues that people are fleeing to Mexico to escape government tyranny, corruption, taxation, and high food prices, and claims Mexico is responding by requiring mobile users to register their phones. He states: “Mexico is telling a 130,000,000 mobile users, register your phone or it goes dark,” noting the claim as voluntary but comparing it to coercive tax compliance. He recalls 2008 reforms (the renout) that collected phone data, which allegedly led to a massive data leak sold on black markets. In 2022, he says the plan resurfaced with barometrics, fingerprints, and facial scans. According to the speaker, the Mexican Supreme Court ruled prior attempts unconstitutional because they were too evasive and dangerous, likening it to building a criminal record for simply having a phone. He fast-forwards to January 9, 2026, when a new law allegedly passes requiring every SIM—prepaid, postpaid, and eSIM—to be tied to an identity. He describes an upgrade: a “CURP barometrica” that goes beyond name and number to include face, iris, ten fingerprints, and a digital signature. The claim is that you don’t just have an ID anymore—you become the ID. The speaker asserts this data isn’t stored in a distant vault but connects to law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and a national card database, effectively creating a criminal record built on you. He contends there will be no notification, oversight, or transparency about who can access it. He says the stated purpose is missing persons, but he dismisses this as false framing, suggesting the history shows otherwise. He warns that whenever the government says the measure is for safety, the real purpose is control. He predicts anonymous SIM cards will disappear, journalists will be tracked, activists flagged, and ordinary people logged and searchable in real time. He frames the move as the third attempt, each time larger, broader, and more evasive, with a central aim of tracking people through a “barometric” digital ID that, once built, won’t go away. He cautions to observe the pattern, noting the evolution begins in Mexico and will spread elsewhere, presenting this as a blueprint for global digital identification and tracking. The speaker, Mike Martin, concludes with a firm assertion: “I have spoken.”

The UK is attempting to demand that everyone download spyware that checks messages against a database of permissible content, setting a dangerous precedent for authoritarian regimes. Encryption either protects everyone, or it allows access to malicious actors, including governments and hackers. While child abuse is concerning, there are existing law enforcement tools and underfunded child welfare services that should be prioritized. It's important to ask how platforms enforce their terms of service against illegal use, but we are not an enforcement agency. We are a technology platform working to provide private communication. We need to check large tech companies on changing the norms for human communication to be completely surveilled. We're trying to keep the default of privacy that has existed for hundreds of thousands of years.

The RCMP has expanded surveillance capabilities in the last 5 years, adopting technologies raising privacy concerns. Covert software infiltrates devices, accessing communications and activating cameras/microphones. Cell site simulators collect data from devices, potentially tracking innocent individuals. The speaker suggests the RCMP's actions indicate a willingness to protect corrupt politicians and a tendency towards unfair practices, leading to self-censorship among Canadians. The speaker claims that the RCMP's surveillance capabilities can cause people to curb what they are saying. The speaker equates these surveillance tactics to those used in totalitarian regimes to drive obedience within the population.

The Communications Security Establishment or CSEC has insisted it targets only foreign communication. But now it's been revealed it's also sweeping up the personal information of thousands of Canadians and storing it for up to thirty years. Canada's conservative government is giving sweeping new powers to this country's spy agency. It's also providing police new tools to track and detain those who would commit terrorist acts. Prime minister Stephen Harper says the new bill tabled today is necessary to protect Canadians. The report frames these changes as a necessary expansion of national security powers. The new measures are presented as essential for protecting citizens within a broadened security framework.

The speaker discusses the potential dangers of phone surveillance and the Pegasus software. They mention that the phone could be a portal to the CIA and criticize the lack of oversight and safeguards imposed by Congress. The speaker also highlights Israel's role in developing surveillance and AI technology. They mention instances where the Pegasus software has been used to target human rights activists and journalists. The speaker expresses concern about the tracking of digital information by foreign governments and emphasizes that the US government is equally sinister in tracking digital footprints without oversight. They caution listeners to be mindful of their online activities.