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Netanyahu claimed Iran had nukes and wanted to attack. Trump sent Tosa Gilbert, who reported in March that Iran didn't appear to have nukes. Trump told Netanyahu to chill out, wanting peace and economic benefits, but Netanyahu, seemingly wanting to stay in power through war, insisted Iran had nukes. Ayatollah Khomeini said "death to America." Trump refused to fund or arm Israel, wanting peace and staying out of it. After Israel bombed Iran, Ayatollah threatened everyone. Trump warned against involving America, reiterating the desire for peace. Trump discovered three potential nuclear sites in Iran. He launched strikes, obliterating these sites that could withstand 20 feet of concrete. Trump eliminated Iran's alleged nuclear capabilities, aiming to prevent further conflict. He demanded Iran stop mentioning America. North Korea and China were warned. The goal is peace and economic prosperity.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the unfolding conflict with Iran, focusing on miscalculations, strategy, and potential trajectories. - Speaker 1 says the war is a major miscalculation, identifiable before it began. Signs were evident: movement of military equipment, force postures, and statements suggested that absent an eleventh-hour change by Trump, the plan was to use prepositioned forces and enablers for sustained combat. He notes this pattern matches previous experiences in which the U.S. saw a buildup as a precursor to war, citing Russia’s 2022 invasion and his own observations of earlier prepositioning, logistics, air support, refueling, and large-scale aviation assets (C-17s, C-5s, fighter jets, aircraft carriers). - He argues Iran’s leadership intended to pursue war rather than negotiation, pointing to what he calls a central missed opportunity: the Oman foreign minister’s Friday-night submissions to the Iranian negotiator offering zero reprocessing, stockpile reductions, and at least preliminary talks on long-range missiles and proxies. He asserts that if the Trump administration had accepted those terms, a ceasefire or settlement might have been possible; instead, he claims the next morning’s attack signaled that negotiations were never the aim. - Regarding U.S. objectives, Speaker 1 says the stated aims from Trump were unattainable given Iran’s resolve and the regime’s calculations that fighting a war with the U.S. is less risky than submitting to U.S. demands. He cites a New York Times report indicating Iran believed war with the U.S. was a viable risk, yet he notes Iran’s leadership now appears to be consolidating support at home and regionally after the Ayatollah’s assassination and the subsequent martyrdom of Qasem Soleimani’s successor in Iran’s internal narrative. - On battlefield dynamics, he emphasizes that Iran’s force deployment is not merely pressure but designed for use, with extensive underground facilities capable of withstanding sustained pressure. He forecasts continued high-intensity operations for a period, but warns the U.S. faces a tightening window: if the Iranian side holds firm and the U.S. cannot sustain supplies and missiles, the U.S. could reach a crisis point. - He discusses possible ceasefire dynamics and political reaction: Trump’s suggestion of a ceasefire could be “complete BS” if the Ayatollah’s position remains solid; the martyrdom and regional protests strengthen Iran’s stance. He expects continued escalation and a hardening of Iran’s demands, including sanctions relief or designation changes, should the conflict drag on. - On regional response, Speaker 1 notes that Iran has drawn regional actors into the conflict, with protests supporting Iran across Iraq, Pakistan, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. He says many Iranians—though opposed to the regime—are unlikely to embrace Israel or the United States as a path out of the crisis, given decades of antagonism and past betrayals by Western powers. - Regarding U.S. vulnerabilities, he says there are reports of U.S. casualties (three killed, five seriously wounded, others lightly wounded) though some figures are disputed; the public reporting may lag behind direct sources. He mentions possible gaps in air defense and the risk of shortages in interceptors as drones and missiles proliferate, warning that Iran could escalate if U.S. stocks are depleted. - Looking ahead, Speaker 1 argues the conflict is a battle of wills and a war of attrition. The U.S. attempted a “cheap” approach with naval and air power but no ground forces; Iran appears ready to continue long enough to force concessions. He warns the Iranian threat could extend to oil infrastructure and the broader economy if the United States or its regional partners target Iran’s energy sector, potentially broadening the conflict. - In sum, he characterizes Iran’s strategy as all-in, aiming to impose pain to compel a negotiated settlement unfavorable to the U.S., while the U.S. faces a narrowing margin to sustain supply chains, missiles, and air defenses as the conflict potentially drags on for weeks to months. He cautions that the escalation ladder remains with higher rungs available, including strikes on energy infrastructure, if the conflict widens.

- The discussion reassesses how the Iran-focused conflict has progressed since it began, contrasting current dynamics with earlier expectations about an exit ramp or rapid change in Iran. - Speaker 1 argues that it was unlikely Trump would off-ramp; instead, major mistakes were made in understanding Iran and the war’s nature. He attributes false assurances to Israel’s Mossad, notably David Barnea, who allegedly pressed Washington that Iran was on the verge of a revolution and that a “house of cards” would collapse after a short spark. - He outlines three U.S. attempts at decapitation-style moves: 1) June 13: the first decapitation strike, 2) January: protests hoped to topple the government by destabilizing the rial and bazaars, 3) February 24: another decapitation strike targeting the supreme leader and others. He cites Israeli press as saying these were intelligence errors and that there is no sign of Iran’s collapse. - Israeli public sentiment, per the Hebrew press, is shifting from earlier regime-change aims to pressing Trump to take “Cargilland” (i.e., a new approach or frontline) as the key to the future, implying a pivot in expectations from Israel. - Trump is described as still seeking an exit ramp, motivated by looming midterm elections and an improving political position, but his chances depend on actions within weeks. Iran has rejected his ceasefire proposals, echoing past patterns where Western talks (notably Wittkopf and Kushner) talked of ceasefires without addressing Iranian demands or broader regional security architecture. - The speaker notes a recurring pattern: repeated ceasefire discussions that don’t resolve phase two or underlying security concerns, with Iran consistently saying no to proposed ceasefires or terms. - The situation is set against a broader political backdrop: Netanyahu’s government has reportedly given up on regime change and is considering boots on the ground, with a focus on whether Trump can sustain casualties. - Military developments cited include: - An expeditionary military unit expected to arrive soon, two MEUs, and the 82nd Airborne Division, with staging locations uncertain (Jordan or elsewhere). - The war widening rapidly and becoming more dangerous in the region. - Regional reactions and potential escalations include: - U.S. airstrikes on Iraqi forces prompting Iraqi factions, including Ashad al-Hashabi, to threaten attacks on the U.S. and Iran. - Reports of Iraqi troops massing near Kuwait, raising concerns of a broader sectarian conflict. - The Houthis (and Hezbollah) indicating willingness to join if attacks escalate, with both already signaling involvement on the periphery. - The overall trajectory described suggests a move toward a wider, sectarian conflict involving Iraq, Iran-aligned groups, and regional actors, with ongoing disagreements over ceasefires and strategic aims.

Netanyahu believed Iran had nukes and wanted to strike, but Trump sent Tosa Gilbert, who reported in March that they didn't. Trump told Netanyahu to chill out, wanting peace and economic benefits. However, Netanyahu, seemingly wanting to stay in power through war, persisted. Ayatollah Khomeini threatened America. Trump refused to fund or arm Israel, reiterating America's desire for peace. When Israel bombed Iran, Ayatollah threatened everyone. Trump warned against involving America, emphasizing peace. After further threats, Trump discovered three potential nuclear sites in Iran. He launched strikes, obliterating these sites. Trump aimed to eliminate the reason for conflict, demanding Iran's leader be removed and for Iran to stop threatening America. North Korea and China were warned, with a call for peace and economic cooperation.

The conversation centers on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Iran, and regional dynamics, with Speaker 0 (a former prime minister) offering sharp criticisms of the current Israeli government while outlining a path he sees as in Israel’s long-term interest. Speaker 1 presses on US interests, Lebanon, and the ethics and consequences of the war. Key points and claims retained as stated: - Iran and the war: Speaker 0 says he supported the American strike against Iran’s leadership, calling Ayatollah Khamenei’s regime a brutal threat and praising the move as punishment for Iran’s actions, including backing Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. He questions why there was a lack of a clear next-step strategy after the initial attack and asks whether a diplomatic alternative, similar to Obama’s Iran agreement, could have achieved nuclear supervision without war. He notes the broader regional risk posed by Iran’s proxies and ballistic missiles and emphasizes the goal of constraining Iran’s nuclear program, while acknowledging the economic and security costs of the war. - On Netanyahu and influence: Speaker 1 references the New York Times report about Netanyahu’s influence on Trump and asks how much Netanyahu affected the decision to go to war. Speaker 0 says he isn’t certain he’s the best judge of Netanyahu’s influence but believes Netanyahu sought to push the war forward even during a ceasefire and that Iran’s threat required action, though he questions whether the next steps beyond initial strikes were properly planned. He states, “Iran deserve to be punished,” and reiterates the need for a strategy to end hostilities and stabilize the region. - Proxies and regional instability: The discussion highlights Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis as Iranian proxies destabilizing the Middle East, with Speaker 0 insisting that Iran’s support for these groups explains much of the regional violence and Israel’s security concerns. He argues that eliminating or significantly curbing Iran’s influence is essential for regional stability. - Gaza, West Bank, and war ethics: Speaker 1 cites humanitarian and civilian-impact statistics from Gaza, arguing that the war has gone beyond a proportionate response. Speaker 0 concedes there were crimes and unacceptable actions, stating there were “war crimes” and praising investigations and accountability, while resisting the accusation of genocide. He criticizes certain Israeli political figures (e.g., Ben-Gvir, Smotrich) for rhetoric and policies that could protract conflict, and he condemns the idea of broad acceptance of annexation policies in the South of Lebanon. - Lebanon and Hezbollah: The core policy debate is about disarming Hezbollah and the future of Lebanon-Israel normalization. Speaker 0 argues against annexing South Lebanon and says disarming Hezbollah must be part of any Israel–Lebanon peace process. He rejects “artificial” solutions like merging Hezbollah into the Lebanese army with weapons, arguing that Hezbollah cannot be permitted to operate as an independent armed force. He believes disarming Hezbollah should be achieved through an agreement that involves Iran’s influence, potentially allowing Hezbollah to be integrated into Lebanon’s political order if fully disarmed and bound by Lebanese sovereignty, and with international support (France cited). - Practical path to peace: Both speakers acknowledge the need for a negotiated two-state solution. Speaker 0 reiterates a longstanding plan: a two-state solution based on 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, the Old City administered under a shared trust (involving Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Palestine, Israel, and the United States). He emphasizes that this vision remains essential to changing the regional dynamic and that the current Israeli government’s approach conflicts with this pathway. He frames his opposition to the present government as tied to this broader objective and says he will continue opposing it until it is replaced. - Personal reflections on leadership and regional hope: The exchange ends with mutual recognition that the cycle of violence is fueled by leadership choices on both sides. Speaker 0 asserts that a different Israeli administration could yield a more hopeful trajectory toward peace, while Speaker 1 stresses the importance of accountability for war crimes and the dangers of rhetoric that could undermine regional stability. Speaker 0 maintains it is possible to pursue peace through a viable, enforceable two-state framework, and urges focusing on disarming Hezbollah, negotiating with Lebanon, and pulling back to an international front to prevent further escalation. Overall, the dialogue juxtaposes urgent punitive action against Iran with the imperative of a negotiated regional settlement, disarmament of proxies, and a concrete two-state solution as the viable long-term path, while condemning certain actions and rhetoric that risk perpetuating conflict.

The discussion centers on whether Israel is driving a war against Iran and how the United States fits into that effort, with conflicting reporting from major outlets and a mosaic of intelligence interpretations. - The hosts outline two competing major-news stories. The New York Times reports that Netanyahu has asked Trump not to bomb Iran, arguing Israel is not prepared to withstand Iran’s retaliation. The Washington Post had reported a few weeks earlier that Israel sent a delegation to Russia to assure Iran that Israel does not intend to strike first, while Netanyahu in Washington was pressing Trump to strike Iran. The implication is that Israel is trying to avoid being seen as the aggressor while hoping the U.S. acts, effectively using the United States to carry out escalation. - The Post’s framing suggests Israel wants to escalate tensions but avoid the perception of initiating the conflict; Iran, according to the Post, responded positively to Israeli outreach but remains wary that the US could still carry out attacks as part of a joint campaign. - Iran’s perspective: they are wary and believe the U.S. and Israel are not to be trusted, even as they respond to outreach. There is a suggestion that Iran, with Russia and China, is prepared to counter, and that Tehran is not fully aligned with Western narratives about Iran as a terrorist state. - Larry Johnson (Speaker 2), a former CIA intelligence officer, joins to break down the behind-the-scenes dynamics. He references an alleged economic operation around Trump’s meeting with Zelensky that targeted Iran’s currency, triggering protests and destabilization, allegedly orchestrated with CIA/Mossad involvement. He lists various actors (Kurds, the MEK, Beluchis) and claims they were directed to inflame unrest, with the aim of manufacturing chaos to enable a military strike that could be stopped or degraded by outside intervention. He argues the plan failed as Iran’s security forces countered and electronic warfare helped by Russia and China blocked the destabilization. - Johnson emphasizes a broader geopolitical balance: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey told the United States they would not permit overflight for strikes; Russia and China bolster Iran, raising the cost and risk of Western action. He notes that 45% of global oil passes through the Persian Gulf and that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz, which would massively impact oil prices and global economies, benefiting Russia. - On the potential next moves, the panel discusses whether Israel might consider nuclear options if faced with existential threats, and they acknowledge the difficulty of countering hypersonic missiles with current defenses. They reference reports of an earthquake or saber-rattling related to Dimona and mention that some in Israel fear escalation could be imminent, but there is no consensus on what comes next. - The conversation also touches on U.S. political voices, including Lindsey Graham’s reaction to Arab involvement, and questions whether there is any mainstream American call to accommodate Iran rather than confront it. Overall, the dialogue presents a complex, multi-layered picture: Israel seeking US-led action while trying to avoid direct attribution as aggressor; Iran resisting Western pressure but positioning to counter with support from Russia and China; and a regional and global economic dimension that could amplify or deter conflict depending on strategic choices and alliance dynamics.

Israel cannot finish a war on its own, even against non-state actors, and requires U.S. support. Israel complained about being alone before a potential war with Iran. Starting a war while complaining about a lack of support raises questions. If war plans rely on a superpower's assistance, it explains why Trump had leverage, as he could order Israel to stop because he rescued them.

The host notes the ceasefire appears to be over after Israel scuttled Trump’s plans for a two-week peace; the Wall Street Journal reports that Netanyahu was furious he wasn’t included in the peace plan discussions. The host says Israel wasn’t formally part of Iran negotiations and was unhappy it learned a deal was finalized late and wasn’t consulted, according to mediators and a promoter familiar with the matter. Speaker 1 interjects apologetically, then remarks that online narrative suggests that if you say Israel led the US into this war, you’re antisemitic, which they call antisemitic, and speculate that they’re all antisemitic. Speaker 0 describes Israel as throwing a tantrum “like a toddler” after the peace plan’s collapse and launching massive airstrikes on residential buildings in southern Lebanon, supposedly with no military purpose. Speaker 2 counters that civilians are involved and mentions tunnels under the area. Speaker 0 notes these attacks also targeted Iranian and Chinese Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure, calling it a direct attack on China, and claims at least 250 people were killed in these attacks on civilian apartment complexes in southern Lebanon. Speaker 1 adds that bombs continue to hit Beirut, with images described as horrific; there are 256 confirmed deaths at that point. Israel is also ramping up attacks in Gaza and the West Bank, which some warned would happen once the ceasefire was announced. Speaker 3 states that Netanyahu says the ceasefire with the US and Iran “is cute, but it doesn’t really have much to do with Israel,” and that Israel will keep fighting whenever they want, noting that two weeks were announced but not the end of the world. Acknowledgment follows that “we were not surprised in the last moment.” Calls for Netanyahu’s resignation in Israel rise. Iran announces it will close the Strait of Hormuz; the Trump administration says water will open but contradicts Fox News reporting that tankers have been stopped due to the ceasefire breach. Fox News reports raise concerns about whether the plan is credible. Speaker 4 mentions that Iran’s parliament says the ceasefire is violated in three ways: noncompliance with the ceasefire in Lebanon (civilians being slaughtered), violation of Iranian airspace, and denial of Iran’s right to enrichment; Iran insists uranium enrichment remains part of the deal, while the Trump administration claims they will not enrich uranium. Speaker 5 adds that Iran’s ability to fund and support proxies has been reduced, claiming Iran can no longer distribute weapons to proxies and will not be able to acquire nuclear weapons; prior to the operation, Iran was expanding its short-range ballistic missile arsenal and its navy, which posed an imminent threat to US assets and regional allies. The host counters that June had claimed “done enriching uranium,” but Iran says they will do whatever they want, having “won the war.” Speaker 6 asks how one eliminates a proxy’s ability to distribute weapons if the weapons and proxy networks already exist. Speaker 1 notes the points are contentious and shifts to a discussion with Ryan Grimm from Dropside News. The host, Speaker 0, asks Grimm to weigh in on the 10-point plan circulated as Trump’s plan, which Grimm says is not a formal document and not necessarily accurate; a “collection of different proposals” from Iran that was “collected into a single proposal” and later claimed to be new when presented as a new 10-point plan. Grimm describes the process as inconsistent and says the administration’s narrative has become convoluted. A segment follows about a centenarian, Maria Morea (born 1907, died 2024 at 117), whose gut microbiome showed diverse beneficial bacteria; studies of long-lived people show similar patterns, suggesting longevity relates to daily habits and gut health. The sponsor pitch for kimchi capsules is included, noting it provides gut-beneficial bacteria with Brightcore’s product, offering a discount. Speaker 0 returns to the ceasefire discussions, arguing that Israel’s actions indicate it does not want peace. Grimm expands, saying Israel is in a worse position than before and aims to push north into Lebanon and perhaps target maritime resources; Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz would elevate its regional status, with Belt and Road targets implying a significant structural shift. The host questions whether Trump would abandon Netanyahu if necessary and whether Trump would throw Netanyahu under the bus to stop the war. Grimm suggests Trump may prefer an out to avoid broader conflict, while noting the political stakes in the US and international responses. The discussion then revisits how Netanyahu allegedly sold the war to Trump and cabinet members, with New York Times reporting that the aim was to kill leaders, blunt Iran’s power, and potentially replace the Iranian government, while acknowledging that the initial strikes did not achieve regime change and that Iran’s ballistic missiles and proxies have been affected by the conflict. The segment closes with a humorous analogy to a Broadway line about a fully armed battalion.

The conversation centers on Israel’s war with Iran and its broader regional implications, with Speaker 0 (an Israeli prime minister) offering his assessment and critiques, and Speaker 1 pushing for clarification on motives, strategy, and policy directions. Key points about the Iran war and its origins - Speaker 0 recalls learning of the war on February 28 in Washington, and states his initial reaction: the United States’ claim that Iran is an enemy threatening annihilation of Israel is understandable and something to be supported, but questions what the next steps and the endgame would be. - He argues that Iran, through proxies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, posed a global and regional threat by arming missiles and pursuing nuclear capacity, and asserts that Iran deserved punishment for its actions. He raises the question of whether the outcome could have been achieved without war through a prior agreement supervised by international bodies. - He emphasizes that the lack of a clear, articulated next step or strategy undermines the legitimacy of the war’s continuation, even as he concedes the necessity of addressing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. - He also notes that the war affected the global economy and regional stability, and stresses the importance of coordinating a path that would end hostilities and stabilize the region. Speaker 1’s analysis and queries about U.S. interests and Netanyahu’s influence - Speaker 1 questions the rationale behind U.S. involvement, suggesting that strategic interests around the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear program were not the only drivers, and cites reporting that Netanyahu presented Iran as weak to push Trump toward regime change, with limited pushback within the U.S. administration. - He asks how much influence Netanyahu had over Trump, and whether the war was pushed by Netanyahu or driven by broader strategic calculations, including concerns about global economic consequences. - He notes that, even if Iran was making concessions on nuclear issues, the war’s continuation raises concerns about broader U.S. and global interests and the potential damage to European and allied relationships. Israeli-Lebanese dimension and Hezbollah - The discussion moves to Lebanon and the question of a ground presence in the South of Lebanon. Speaker 1 asks whether Netanyahu’s administration intends annexation of Lebanese territory and whether there is a real risk of such plans, given the recent destruction of villages and the broader context of regional diplomacy. - Speaker 0 distinguishes between military necessity and political strategy. He says the ground operation in southern Lebanon is unnecessary because Hezbollah missiles extend beyond 50 kilometers from the border, and he argues for negotiating a peace process with Lebanon, potentially aided by the international community (notably France), to disarm Hezbollah as part of a larger framework. - He asserts that there are voices in the Israeli cabinet that view South Lebanon as part of a Greater Israel and would seek annexation, but he insists that such annexation would be unacceptable in Israel and that disarming Hezbollah should be tied to a broader peace with Lebanon and Iran’s agreement if a negotiations-based settlement is reached. - The idea of integrating Hezbollah into the Lebanese military is rejected as artificial; disarmament is preferred, with the caveat that Hezbollah could not be dissolved as a military force if Iran remains a principal backer. Speaker 0 suggests that a Hezbollah disarmed and integrated into Lebanon’s political-military system would require careful design, potentially with international participation, to prevent Hezbollah from acting as an independent proxy. War crimes and accountability - The participants discuss imagery like a soldier breaking a statue of Jesus and broader allegations of misconduct during the Gaza war. Speaker 0 condemns the act as outrageous and unacceptable, while Speaker 1 notes that individual soldier actions do not represent an entire army and contrasts external reactions to abuses with a broader critique of proportionality in Gaza. - Speaker 0 acknowledges that there were crimes against humanity and war crimes by Israel, rejects genocide, and endorses investigations and accountability for those responsible, while criticizing the political leadership’s rhetoric and the behavior of certain ministers. - They touch on the controversial death-penalty bill for Palestinians convicted of lethal attacks, with Speaker 0 characterizing the Israeli government as run by “thugs” and criticizing ministers for celebratory conduct, while Speaker 1 argues that such rhetoric inflames tensions. Two-state solution and long-term vision - The conversation culminates in Speaker 0 presenting a long-standing two-state plan: a two-state solution based on 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, and the Old City of Jerusalem not under exclusive sovereignty but administered by a five-nation trust (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Palestine, Israel, and the United States). - He asserts that this approach represents an alternative to the current government’s policies and reiterates his commitment to opposing Netanyahu’s administration until it is replaced. - They close with mutual acknowledgment of the need for a durable peace framework and reiterate that Hezbollah’s disarmament must be a condition for normalization between Israel and Lebanon, while cautioning against artificial or compromised arrangements that would leave Hezbollah armed or entrenched.

An Israeli official stated that a plan to take out the supreme leader of Iran was rejected by the U.S. President over concerns of escalating the conflict. The official believes that removing the supreme leader would end the conflict, not escalate it, claiming Iran spreads terrorism, sabotage, and subversion throughout the Middle East and is bringing the world to the brink of nuclear war. According to the official, Israel is preventing a horrific war and bringing peace to the Middle East. They believe that defanging Iran will allow for new heights in the Middle East, expanding the Abraham Accords, trade, tourism, and communication between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The official stated that the U.S. has provided tremendous help, including American pilots shooting down drones, THAAD batteries in Israel, and Aegis ships.

The discussion centers on the ongoing tensions with Iran, the potential for American military involvement, and the role of media and ideology in shaping public perception. The speakers express a critical view of how the situation is being managed and portrayed. Key points about the Iran situation: - President Trump publicly claimed “we’ve won the war against Iran,” but the panel notes Israel’s public interest in a broader outcome, specifically regime change in Iran, which would require boots on the ground rather than air strikes. - It is argued that air strikes alone cannot achieve regime change; the Israeli military, even with about 170,000 active-duty soldiers plus reservists, would need American boots on the ground to accomplish such aims against a larger Iranian army. - Senators, including Richard Blumenthal, warned about the risk to American lives in potentially deploying ground troops in Iran, citing a path toward American ground forces. - The new National Defense Authorization Act renewal could lead to an involuntary draft by year’s end, a concern raised by Dan McAdams of the Ron Paul Institute who argues it treats citizens as owned by the government. - There is tension between Trump’s public push for a quick end to conflict and Netanyahu’s government talking about a larger, more prolonged objective in the region, including a potential demilitarized zone in southern Lebanon akin to Gaza’s situation. - Iran’s new supreme leader Khomeini issued a televised statement threatening to shut the Strait of Hormuz until the United States begs and vowing vengeance for martyrs, signaling that the conflict could continue or escalate beyond initial claims of victory. - The panel highlights potential escalation, including the possibility of nuclear weapons discussion by Trump and concerns about who controls the war, given factions within Iran and differing US-Israeli goals. Tucker Carlson’s analysis and warnings: - Carlson is presented as having warned that a war with Iran would be hard due to Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal aimed at US bases and allies’ infrastructure, and that it would push Iran closer to China and Russia, potentially undermining the US. - Carlson emphasizes the lack of a clear, publicly articulated endgame or exit strategy for the war, arguing that diplomacy has deteriorated and that the US appears discredited in its ability to negotiate peace. - He discusses the governance of Israel and the idea that some Israeli leaders advocate for extreme measures, referencing “Amalek” language used by Netanyahu to describe enemies, which Carlson characterizes as dangerous and incompatible with Western civilization’s values. - Carlson argues that American interests and Israeli strategic aims diverge, and questions why Israel is the partner with decision-making authority in such a conflict. He notes the US’s reliance on Israel for intelligence (with Israel translating SIGINT) and suggests that Israel’s endgame may be to erode American influence in the region. - He also suggests the war is being used to advance a broader political and ideological project, including America’s pivot away from foreign entanglements; he asserts that certain power centers in the US and in media and defense circles benefit from perpetual conflict. - Carlson discusses the moral framework around targeting and civilian casualties, asserting that there is concern over the ethical implications of autonomous targeting and the potential for AI to play a role in warfare decisions. - He notes the possibility that AI involvement in targeting decisions exists in other conflicts, though in the Iran situation, he mentions that a human pressed play in the specific case of an attack (the school near an Iranian base), while coordinates may have come from other sources, possibly shared by Israel. - Carlson discusses media dynamics, describing mainstream outlets as “embedded” with the defense establishment and questioning why there isn’t a robust public discussion about the war’s endgame, exit ramps, or the true costs of war. Media, propaganda, and public discourse: - The panel critiques media coverage as lacking skepticism, with anchors and outlets seemingly aligned with the administration’s war narratives, raising concerns about “access journalism” and the absence of tough questions about goals, timelines, and consequences. - Carlson and participants discuss the use of propaganda—historically, Disney and the Treasury Department in World War II as examples—arguing that today’s propaganda around Iran relies on pop culture and entertainment to normalize or justify intervention without clear justification to the public. - They argue that contemporary media often fails to examine the ethics and consequences of war or to question the necessity and legitimacy of continuing conflict, suggesting a broader risk of technology-enabled control over public opinion and civil discourse. White House dynamics and internal debate: - The guests discuss the possibility of internal disagreement within the White House, noting that while some senior figures had reservations, external pressure, particularly from Netanyahu, may have pushed the administration toward action. - They touch on the strategic ambiguity surrounding US forces in the region, noting that while large-scale ground invasion is unlikely, special forces and other assets may be deployed, with civilian and military costs disproportionately affecting American families. - The conversation also explores concerns about civil liberties, surveillance, and the potential for centralized control of information and warfare technologies to influence domestic politics and social cohesion. Overall, the dialogue presents a multifaceted critique of the handling and propulsion of a potential Iran conflict, emphasizing the risk of escalatory dynamics, the clash of strategic goals between the US and Israel, concerns about democratic consent and media accountability, and the ethical implications of modern warfare technology.

Israel and Iran have fully agreed to a complete and total ceasefire in approximately six hours. After Israel and Iran wind down and complete their final missions for twelve hours, a ceasefire will commence for twelve hours. Officially, Iran will start the ceasefire, and upon the twelfth hour, Israel will start the ceasefire. Upon the twenty-fourth hour, an official end to the twelve-day war will be saluted by the world. During each ceasefire, the other side will remain peaceful and respectful, assuming everything works as it should. Both Israel and Iran are congratulated for having the stamina, courage, and intelligence to end the twelve-day war, which could have gone on for years and destroyed the entire Middle East, but it didn't and never will.

Netanyahu wants to fight Iran to remain in office indefinitely. The speaker hopes Trump, or anyone, will defuse the situation. The U.S. needs to convince Middle Eastern allies of its support, but undeclared wars victimizing civilians are not a good solution. The speaker believes Iran must be stopped from acquiring nuclear weapons, something they previously attempted to do successfully. However, this does not require constant killing of civilians who cannot defend themselves and simply want to live.

In a discussion about the Iran confrontation and its wider implications, Glenn and John Mearsheimer analyze the sequence of events and underlying dynamics behind President Donald Trump’s statements and policy shifts. - Trump’s two Monday tweets frame the episode: an initial threat to “wipe Iran off the face of the earth” to force concession, followed by a reversal to announce a ceasefire based on Iran’s 10-point plan. Mersheimer emphasizes that this sequence reveals Trump’s desperation to end the war and to secure a ceasefire quickly, then to shift to negotiations with Iran’s plan as the basis. - The framework of the negotiations is contrasted with the US’s prior maximalist aims. The United States had demanded four core goals: regime change, Iran’s nuclear enrichment cessation, elimination of long-range missiles, and cessation of support for groups like the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Mersheimer notes none of these have been realized, while Iran reportedly gains leverage through control of the Strait of Hormuz. - The Iranian 10-point plan is presented as a basis for negotiations that would, in effect, concede the big US demands. Trump’s evening tweet signaling acceptance of the 10-point plan is read as a defeat for the US position and a shift toward Iranian maximalism on its own terms. The claim is that the ceasefire, if it occurs, would involve concessions that Iran had already proposed. - The feasibility of a ceasefire is questioned. Iran’s open Strait of Hormuz depends on Israel halting attacks in Lebanon (on Hezbollah), which has not happened. Therefore, a true ceasefire is not in place, and the Israelis’ actions are seen as undermining any potential halt to hostilities. - The broader strategic picture is outlined. Iran’s leverage includes allied groups (Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas) and the ability to close chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el-Mandab strait via the Houthis. The discussion notes Iran’s large missile/drone arsenal and potential to threaten American bases, though Mersheimer stresses that sanctions and the prolonged war have devastated Iran’s economy, which complicates assessments of its strength. - The role of external powers and economies is highlighted. Mersheimer argues that the global economy—especially oil and fertilizers—drives the push to end the conflict. He suggests China and Pakistan, with Russian input, pressured Iran to negotiate, given the global economic risks of a prolonged war. He also notes that the New York Times reported that all 13 US bases in the Gulf were damaged or destroyed, undermining U.S. presence there. - Domestic political concerns are discussed. Trump’s ability to declare victory while acknowledging defeat creates a political hazard. Vance is presented as a potentially capable negotiator who could press for a ceasefire, but there is concern about internal political blowback if he concedes too much. - Israel’s position is considered crucial. Netanyahu’s government is described as having promoted the war, and the war’s outcome is said to damage U.S.-Israel relations. There is speculation that Israel may consider drastic options, including nuclear consideration against Iran, given the perceived failure of conventional means. - The Ukraine war and its relation to the Iran conflict are explored. If Iran’s war ends or is perceived as winding down, European capacity and willingness to support Ukraine become central questions. The U.S. may shift blame to Europe for Ukraine’s defeat if Russia advances, while withholding weapons to Ukraine to avoid further strain on U.S. stockpiles. - The discussion on rationality in international relations emphasizes that states act rationally when their decisions align with a plausible theory of international politics and a sound decision-making process. Mersheimer argues Europe’s behavior toward the U.S. is not irrational, though he criticizes its liberal-theory basis (NATO expansion) as potentially misguided but not irrational. He contrasts this with Trump’s Iran attack in February 2029, which he deems irrational due to a lack of a plausible theory of victory. - The multipolar world dynamic is reinforced. The war’s outcomes are viewed as weakening U.S. ability to project power, diminishing transatlantic cohesion, and boosting Russia and China’s relative position. The loss of Gulf bases and diminished American influence are expected to push Europe toward greater strategic autonomy, with NATO potentially becoming less meaningful by 2029, depending on future leadership. - Final notes include concerns about the political risk for Vance as a negotiator, the likelihood of a difficult peace process, and the possibility that misperceptions and propaganda—analyzed through historical parallels like the Vietnam War and Walter Lippmann’s ideas—have locked leaders into an “evil enemy” narrative that complicates peacemaking. Overall, the conversation portrays Trump’s messaging as a sign of desperation to end a costly conflict, the ceasefire as a fragile construct dependent on Iranian terms, Iran’s expanding leverage in the region, the fragility of U.S.-Israel and transatlantic bonds, and a shifting global order moving toward multipolarity with lasting economic and strategic consequences.

Jeffrey Sachs and Glenn discuss the chaotic state of U.S.–Iran diplomacy and broader U.S. foreign-policy dysfunction as of mid-April. Sachs argues the events are not linear or transparent: a ceasefire seems announced, but then Israel escalates in Lebanon, the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and U.S. officials debate the format and basis of negotiations without consistency. He notes that the United States previously demanded a maximal list and Iran countered, but those details fell away and no clear path emerged. In his view, there is no “deeper cleverness” behind the moves; rather, a chaos in the process. Sachs emphasizes that one partner in the conflict, Israel, does not want a ceasefire or negotiations and aims for Iran’s destruction, which helps explain the abrupt shifts around ceasefires and mediation. He points to the U.S. “blockade” and the inconsistent signals from Trump and his aides, including the claim that Iran was “begging for further negotiations,” which Sachs sees as inconsistent with the earlier hard demands. He suggests the episode is not a rational statecraft process but a one-person show centered on Donald Trump, with advisers around him either skeptical or insufficiently influential. Sachs cites NYT reporting (as an inside-account example) that Netanyahu and Mossad pitched war to Trump, with Vance and other senior officials doubtful or opposed, yet Trump pressed ahead. He describes this as a potentially individualized decision-making process rather than a formal, institutional policy debate, implying a de-institutionalized approach dominated by a few insiders and Trump’s impulses. He also contends that Trump’s approach—bluster, bombing threats, and attempts to “bully” through negotiations—has not been historically effective and may reflect a delusional or incompetent leadership style. Sachs notes Trump’s publicly erratic posts and rhetoric, including provocative statements about civilizations, which he reads as signs of mental instability or at least a departure from normal presidential conduct. He contrasts this with Iran’s demeanor, which he says appears polite publicly, though Iran is not simply yielding to U.S. demands. Beyond Iran, Sachs broadens the critique to U.S. strategic thinking: the United States has failed to anticipate multipolar realities, leading to miscalculations with China, Russia, and Iran. He argues that sanctions and choke points have not produced expected outcomes and that both China and Russia have responded in ways that contradicted U.S. expectations. He attributes much of the problem to a “deinstitutionalization” of U.S. decision-making: incompetent or poorly chosen personnel, a perceived corruption of political power, and leadership that operates more as a personal show than as an organized, collective process. Sachs contends that the underlying backdrop is a decline in U.S. relative power and a failure to adapt to a multipolar world, which, coupled with internal political polarization and an ailing administrative system, drives the current instability. He suggests the trade policy and sanctions experiences during the Trump and Biden periods illustrate a pattern of amateurish, impractical decision-making in high-stakes geopolitics. The conversation ends with a reflection on how the current U.S. apparatus—especially in security and foreign policy—appears increasingly improvisational, with governance processes sidelined in favor of personal prerogatives and reactive moves.

Ashwin Rutansi hosts Going Underground, opening with a claim that Dubai was hit harder by Iranian retaliation than anywhere else in the region outside Israel, and noting this broadcast marks 73 years since the CIA’s MKUltra program. He frames the USA and what it represents as a malign influence, and argues the US propaganda system has failed to spin defeats in multiple wars, including the Iran conflict. He says the world recognizes Israel’s genocide in Gaza despite NATO attempts to shield it, and notes that US public opinion shows disapproval of Israel. Netanyahu is accused of tightly controlling the media and cracking down on protests. Rutansi then welcomes Avram Berg (Israel’s former president, speaker in the Knesset, professor at NYU Abu Dhabi and Notre Dame Jerusalem) who speaks from Jerusalem. The discussion concentrates on the power dynamic between Netanyahu and Trump, and whether Netanyahu was surprised by Trump’s ceasefire declaration, plus how Netanyahu might retaliate if the ceasefire were sabotaged. Speaker 1 (Avram Berg) characterizes the situation as highly serious and delicate. He suggests the war’s origins and triggers are unclear, describing a “divorce” in the relationship between Trump and Israel: Trump’s ceasefire move is seen as coordinated or at least not fully aligned with Israel. Berg notes Netanyahu has not publicly spoken yet, and might frame the ceasefire as coordinated with him, but he views the immediate outcome as neither side having real winners and sees Iran as having survived strongly. He suggests China is rising in the background. Rutansi asks how secure Netanyahu is if the ceasefire persisted, recalling Israel’s aggressive actions in Lebanon after Trump’s ceasefire announcement and Trump’s retreat from conditions. Berg replies that politically, Israel has an election looming; the war was a strategic move for internal politics—Israelis rally around the government during wartime—yet Netanyahu may not gain politically from this round and could face backlash in upcoming elections. Berg also argues Netanyahu’s broader agenda—weakening Iran, disarming Hezbollah, and stopping Hamas—has failed across these fronts, leaving Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran still viable or intact. The host probes whether Netanyahu needs a false flag or propaganda to counter what Trump’s supporters might claim. Berg distinguishes substance from rhetoric, noting Hezbollah in the north is a problem for Lebanon and Syria; Iran’s threat was real but not existential for Israel, and suggests diplomacy and balancing could have handled it better. Berg emphasizes that war without political settlement is wasteful and results in casualties across many sides. Rutansi notes growing global hatred of Israel, while Berg refrains from embracing Hamas/Hezbollah as liberation movements, warning against falling into such narratives. Berg acknowledges global resentment of Israel but doubts a wholesale shift in allegiance toward Hamas or Hezbollah. The host asks about Epstein-related intelligence rumors and Trump’s leverage. Berg dismisses Epstein-related conspiracy as gossip rather than serious political leverage, insisting on reasoning over sensationalism. He does acknowledge Epstein’s notoriety but rejects tying it to concrete policy influence. When the discussion turns to nuclear weapons, Berg asserts Israel’s nuclear capability remains officially unacknowledged domestically, recounting past suppression of open debate on the topic. Berg argues that Iran’s perceived threats and regional rivalries push towards deterrence and urges a Middle East no-weapon agreement to reduce risk. He contends the broader regional security architecture must discourage all nuclear powers, including Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and neighboring states, with energy collaboration coupled with non-proliferation. On whether Netanyahu would use a nuclear weapon to stay out of jail, Berg says no, arguing the strategic logic of nuclear use deters first use and that leaders know once a nuclear device is used, it invites retaliation. He views Netanyahu as unlikely to employ a nuclear weapon. Rutansi closes, promising continued coverage of the Trump-Netanyahu-Iran dynamic, while Berg declines to dive into conspiracy theories, reiterating that discourse should be grounded in arguments, values, and policy.

President Trump was reportedly upset with both Israel and Iran following a recent exchange of attacks, feeling Israel retaliated too strongly and quickly after a deal was made. Despite this, Trump reaffirmed that Israel would not attack Iran and that a ceasefire was in effect. The speaker highlights Trump's willingness to risk military involvement to defend Israel and achieve peace, contrasting it with past administrations' approaches. They also criticize Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for allegedly pushing for US military action in the Middle East, referencing his support for the Iraq invasion after 9/11. The speaker questions the extent of US involvement in foreign conflicts, particularly in Ukraine, and suggests that Americans are ready for an "America first" president focused on domestic issues. They contrast the support given to Ukraine with the problems faced in American cities, implying resources are misallocated. Trump has told Netanyahu not to expect further US military action in Iran.

President Trump initiated a ruse against Iran, calling for nuclear deal negotiations in Moscow, and then greenlit Netanyahu to start a war four days prior. Trump warned Tehran residents to evacuate, addressing 10 million people. He allegedly sent B-2 bombers to bomb Iran without provocation. Trump is attempting to appear as the "good guy" stopping a war he enabled. He supports Israel, supplying interception missiles and bombs. He intervened when Israel failed to achieve its objectives. Trump has leverage over Netanyahu and could ask him to stop the war. Netanyahu dropped bombs on Tehran and its outskirts before halting the attacks. Iran then agreed to stop the war.

Trump may have already launched a war, restarting Biden and Obama's wars. The United Arab Emirates won't allow the US to use its base in Abu Dhabi for an attack. Iran is better than others who stand with Israel or do nothing for Palestine. A war on Iran is what Netanyahu wants, who has been dragging Trump in his direction. Trump came to power claiming he was a man of peace and wanted a Nobel Peace Prize, but now he is being dragged into military actions. An attack on Iran would be a huge disaster for the region, the world's economy, and everybody. Netanyahu dreams of being the new imperial leader controlling the Middle East. Netanyahu seems to control Trump. The whole crowd around Trump is Zionist and totally supportive of Israel. Trump has forced Netanyahu to accept a temporary ceasefire, but now supports violations of every ceasefire by Netanyahu. This will lead to disasters for everybody, including the United States.

The White House is expressing optimism about the situation, but the implementation and agreement between Iran and Israel remain to be seen. Just 24 hours prior, President Trump suggested regime change in Iran was possible, following a US strike. The situation may be connected to Iran's limited response, where they fired on a US base in Qatar without casualties, after giving a warning. The US felt no need to respond to the Iranian retaliation, which administration officials suggest created space for the current situation. According to a CNN-briefed diplomat, Iran has agreed to a ceasefire. Previously, the only indication of progress was the president's social media post from two hours prior.

This is not the end of the war, but a ceasefire without conditions or details. The rules have changed; Iran has proven it can take hits and hit back, causing pain to Israeli society and the military. Israel has demonstrated its willingness to escalate preemptively and declare war on Iran. The US has shown it will call a ceasefire without an agreement if it serves Israel's interests. This is not a rendezvous with peace, but with the next chapter. Whether this chapter begins with a missile barrage, a nuclear test, or Iran making a nuclear bomb depends on the future. The clock is ticking.

In this discussion, Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst, analyzes whether Donald Trump is seeking an off-ramp from the Iran war and what he might trade away to gain it. Glenn, the host, frames the conversation around the Strait of Hormuz as a potential barrier to an exit, given Trump’s recent tweet that the Strait is not America’s problem and that regional countries should handle it. Johnson emphasizes that Trump’s apparent objective is to declare victory, but he identifies several impediments and possible paths. Johnson contends that the United States has claimed a “100% victory,” asserting that “we've wiped out all of the Iranian army, the Iranian navy, the Iranian air force,” and asks rhetorically why more countries would be needed. He warns, however, that a victory would come with devastating worldwide consequences, including rising gas prices, shortages of fertilizer, and global distress from economic ripples. He notes that Iran began striking back within an hour of the attack on March 28, systematically targeting U.S. military installations, destroying radar systems, and forcing relocations of the Fifth Fleet’s Bahrain base and related assets. He describes the war as becoming a political burden for Trump, who also publicly boasted of military successes even as costs mount. Johnson links Trump’s rhetoric with Netanyahu, suggesting a coordination to present an exit pattern: claim success, then exit with a narrative that the objective was met, while implying Iran must accept a settlement. He asserts that Iran is not going to capitulate simply because the United States and Israel say so, and that Iran seeks a rock-solid guarantee that it will not be attacked again. He notes Russia’s involvement in mediation efforts and argues that Iran can endure a longer war than the United States, particularly as the 2024-2025 political cycle intensifies pressure on Trump. The discussion expands to strategic and economic dimensions. Johnson highlights the Kuwait-like vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz, the potential for Iran to impose a separate corridor or “selective access” within Iranian waters, and the implications for the petrodollar system if Gulf states must pay Iran for safe passage. He argues that an Iranian victory could effectively expel the United States from the Middle East if the region no longer depends on American protection. He questions whether such a shift is feasible, given Iran’s capability and resolve and the West’s miscalculation of Iran’s endurance and strategy. They discuss the broader international-law questions and the West’s posture toward rules-based order. Glenn notes that the Netanyahu-Trump axis may be seeking an off ramp, while Johnson contends that Iran’s response is to demand a political settlement that would reverse U.S. presence and align with IAEA inspections or nonproliferation commitments—an outcome that Trump might try to package as a victory. Johnson stresses that Iran’s stance has shifted from “defeat Iran” to seeking outcomes like IAEA oversight and adherence to nonproliferation norms as conditions for strategic concessions. The conversation also critiques Washington’s military logistics and political optics. Johnson argues that boots-on-the-ground options in the Hormuz region are militarily impractical, given the geography (Normandy-scale landings in a cliff-lined, fortified zone) and Iran’s layered defense. He questions the plausibility of a successful river-to-sea offensive, given the risk to ships, drones, and supply lines, and points to potential escalatory cycles that could involve Russia and China more deeply. Towards the end, they touch on the idea of an exit built around a renewal of JCPOA-like constraints—without naming it as such—as a possible route for Trump to declare victory and withdraw. However, they remain skeptical about whether Iran would accept renewed constraints, given its current strategic posture and allies. The discussion closes with a candid recognition that, according to Johnson, there is a lack of a coherent, realizable strategy to end the conflict on favorable terms for Washington, and that Trump’s political vulnerability could further constrain any viable off-ramp.