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The discussion centered on whether Iran would retaliate to an Israeli strike on Beirut and how that could affect an expected U.S.-Israel-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU). Iran was described as having made retaliation a “red line,” particularly because Israel had previously tested it and Iran launched a “pretty aggressive attack” about a week earlier. The strike on Beirut was also noted as occurring on the same day as the MOU was meant to be signed. Glenn argued that Iran faced a dilemma: retaliating would invite Israel’s full-force response against Iran, leading to a “high-intensity war” and derailing talks about peace; not retaliating would leave Iran to uphold a new deterrence reality while still facing the possibility Israel intended to sabotage the agreement. He suggested the bombing timing could be a trap set by Israel, with both options “unfavorable” and difficult for Iran’s “hawks” and leadership. He also emphasized that speculation about whether Israel had U.S. authorization (or only informed the U.S.) was complicated by limited transparency, but that the timing and wording in public statements pointed to attempts to shape escalation and the political narrative. Trump’s public messaging was a major focus. Trump was quoted urging “stand down,” blaming Netanyahu’s “fucking attack” and arguing it should not have happened on a special day close to peace, while also telling media outlets he believed the Iran agreement would still be signed that day. Trump also said he told Iran “not to respond” and warned that retaliation would “ruin everything,” and claimed Iran should not launch missiles. Glenn discussed how this rhetoric could be intended for multiple audiences—Iranians, Americans, and Israelis—potentially weakening U.S.-Israeli relations while simultaneously trying to pressure escalation. A video clip of the strike was discussed as showing a “precision strike” rather than buildings being leveled as in earlier examples. The channel guest also drew parallels to how ceasefires are framed alongside continued attacks, arguing that targeting choices under a “precision” label still raises concerns about what peace means in practice. He linked the lack of clarity to possible gaps in the MOU, especially sequencing and specificity about obligations—particularly from the Iranian side, which was described as skeptical that the U.S. would implement commitments. The guest cited concerns that Iran wanted either a complete peace or no peace, and that otherwise the U.S. and Israel might pause intense conflict while continuing incremental actions against Hezbollah and potentially later resume fighting Iran. There was also discussion of whether Israel would remain part of the Lebanese peace framework. Since Israel was said to be not part of the MOU, questions were raised about whether provisions for Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon would be included, and whether Trump could force Israel to pull out given Israel’s actions on the day the agreement was supposed to be signed. Iranian political and military statements were highlighted as reinforcing the “red line” theme. The head of Iran’s National Security Commission was cited as saying the Beirut attack proved the U.S. was weak and that “a strong response is coming.” Iranian commanders were cited warning that the strike would not go unanswered. Another post by an Iranian official urging punishment of the “Zionist child killers” was mentioned as deleted after Trump’s comments, raising uncertainty about whether threats were being walked back. The secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council was also cited as saying violating Iran’s red lines “will not be tolerated,” with Lebanon framed as “our life.” As the conversation ended, they returned to the central uncertainty: whether Iran would retaliate and, if it did, whether Israel and Iran would repeat prior cycles of exchange in a limited de-escalation pattern or escalate significantly harder. The overarching theme was whether the strike was designed to provoke retaliation and derail the MOU, or whether Iran could decide to avoid escalation—both of which were described as heavily dependent on interpretation of intentions and the MOU’s specific terms.

Mario: Daniel, after decades of diplomacy, the Middle East is now at war. Early on you suggested Hormuz and economic leverage; as the conflict evolved, US ground invasion talk, targeted Iranian leadership, and new developments—like JD Vance’s reaction to US intel and Israel striking energy infrastructure in Iran—have shaped concerns that Israel wields outsized influence. Broad question: how did we get here and why? Daniel: There’s a long history of American and Israeli influence in play. There is American agency and a geopolitical logic tying chokepoints like Hormuz to broader aims, such as reasserting US primacy vis-à-vis China. But this doesn’t fully explain how the last 10 yards into war were crossed. Netanyahu’s long effort to shape a strategic environment culminated when he found a president open to using American power in the region. Israel’s strategy appears to be to assert greater regional dominion by leveraging US military power and creating dependencies with Gulf states. Netanyahu reportedly offered the president an actionable plan, including on-the-ground assets, to decapitate Iran’s leadership and spark a broader upheaval, which helped push the White House toward a twelve-day war in June. Israel also presented a narrative of rapid US escalation to secure its aims, while the American interagency process—though deteriorated in recent years—had to interpret unusually aggressive, yet selective, Israeli intelligence and objectives. The result is a complex dynamic where US rhetoric and decisions are deeply entangled with Israeli designs for regional hegemony, an outcome that was not broadly anticipated by many regional partners. Mario: If the US administration had not fully understood Israel’s project, how did this come to pass? And how does Mossad factor in? Daniel: Israel has tremendous access to influence over an American administration through lobbying, media echo chambers, and political finance, which Netanyahu exploited to drive a course toward major confrontation with Iran. Before Trump’s term, Netanyahu was nervous about a president who could pivot against allies; he devised a strategy that culminated in Operation Midnight Hammer and subsequent US-Israeli collaboration, reinforced by the possibility of rapid decapitation of Iran’s leadership. There are reports (and debates) about Mossad presenting on-the-ground assets and the possibility of instigating a street revolution in Iran, which may not have been fully believed by Washington but was persuasive enough to shape policy. The question remains how much of Israeli intelligence makes it to Trump and his inner circle, especially given concerns about cognitive ability and decision-making in the White House at that time. Netanyahu’s aim, according to Daniel, was not simply to topple Iran but to maximize Israel’s regional leverage by using American power while reducing other regional peers’ influence. Mario: What about Gulf states and broader regional realignments? How did the Gulf respond, and what does this mean for their security calculus? Daniel: The Gulf states face a stark dilemma. They fear Iran's retaliatory capabilities but also distrust America’s consistency and question whether US support will be cost-effective. Iran’s strikes into the Gulf have forced Gulf capitals to reassess their reliance on US protection and Israel’s influence, particularly given Israel’s aggressive posture and expanded regional footprint—Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza—with potential implications for the Gulf’s own security and economic interests. Some Gulf actors worry about over-dependence on American security assurances while Israel intensifies operational reach. The GCC’s calculus is shifting: they confront a choice between continuing alignment with the US-Israel bloc or seeking more independent security arrangements. The possibility of a broader Gulf-Israel axis, or at least closer coordination, is tempered by concerns over long-term regional stability, public opinion, and the risk of escalation. Mario: How has this affected perceptions of Iran, Israel, and the broader regional order? Has the Gulf’s stance shifted? Daniel: The region’s balance has been unsettled. Iran’s actions have damaged Gulf trust in its neighbors’ security guarantees, while Israel’s aggressive posture and reliance on US power have complicated Gulf states’ calculations. Turkey’s role is pivotal as it balances concerns about Iran and Israel, while also watching how the region realigns. The possibility of a future where Iran’s power is weakened is weighed against the risk of destabilization and long-term security costs. Negotiations between the US, Iran, and regional actors—stoked by Turkish diplomacy and shifting Gulf positions—are ongoing, with Turkey signaling that diplomacy remains important, even as Gulf states reassess their security dependencies. Mario: What about Lebanon and Hezbollah, and the potential for broader spillover? Daniel: Lebanon faces severe consequences: displacement, civilian harm, and a domestic political paralysis that complicates relations with Israel. Hezbollah remains a factor, with ongoing tensions in Lebanon and the South. Israel’s goal of establishing security-control in Lebanon risks reigniting long-standing conflicts, while Lebanon’s government seeks a balance that could prevent further escalation, if possible. The broader picture is that Israel’s approach—driven by a perceived need to neutralize Iran and all potential threats—could provoke wider regional blowback, complicating already fragile domestic politics across the Levant. Mario: Final thoughts as the war unfolds? Daniel: Israel’s strategic ambitions appear to extend beyond countering Iran to shaping a broader order in which it remains the dominant regional power, aided by US military leverage. Gulf states face a difficult reorientation, reassessing longstanding alliances in light of perceptions of US reliability. The coming months will reveal whether regional actors can recalibrate toward diplomatic resolutions or wind up in a deeper, more protracted conflict. The question remains whether a political path could replace military escalation, and whether external powers can deter further aggression and stabilize the region without allowing a broader conflagration.

Lawrence Wilkerson and Glenn discuss a fragile ceasefire in Southwest Asia and what it signals about broader geopolitics and U.S. strategy. - Ceasefire prospects and Lebanon: Wilkerson says, as a military professional, ceasefires need the first week or two to establish, and with Iran-related communications, longer to restore contact with dispersed forces. He notes Netanyahu’s continued bombing in Lebanon and Beirut, arguing this is a major impediment to a durable ceasefire, with Iran having made clear that if Lebanon is not part of the ceasefire the deal may fail. - NATO and U.S. commitments: Wilkerson declares NATO effectively dead, though not formally, predicting the U.S. will disengage from NATO in practice as Ukraine’s conflict accelerates the decline. He links this to a broader reevaluation of U.S. alliances, suggesting a shift away from formal alliances toward other strategic arrangements, especially given changes in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. - U.S. role in Southwest Asia: He argues the United States is moving toward “offshore balancing” or withdrawal from the region, citing aging maritime assets, vulnerable aircraft carriers, and a changing energy/security architecture that lessens the need for a permanent U.S. ground presence. He predicts a transformation where pipelines and land routes become more important than sea routes, with Central Asia (Caspian energy) and the broader Eurasian land corridor strengthening, while Gulf oil dynamics and the Arab-Israeli tie weaken. - Russia and China in a multipolar world: Wilkerson contends power is shifting toward a multipolar order. He suggests Russia will become a major land and maritime power, leveraging Arctic routes and expanding naval reach, while China leverages both the Belt and Road and maritime interests (including deep-sea fishing and ports). He emphasizes the need to accept this shift rather than fight it, warning against a Thucydides trap scenario if the U.S. doubles down on containment. - The Middle East and regional realignments: He describes potential strategic shifts, such as Saudi Arabia redirecting Gulf investment toward Syria and away from Israel, and Israel’s future as a “tool” rather than the driver of U.S. policy. He fears Israel’s days could be numbered if the wider regional energy and political alignments move against it and if U.S. support falters. He calls for a genuine two-state framework and democracy in Israel for long-term viability, but doubts such changes will occur given current leadership. - U.S. domestic politics and leadership: The discussion touches on the perceived degradation of U.S. institutions (Congress, Supreme Court) and political finance concerns (Citizens United). Wilkerson criticizes the leadership around Donald Trump and Pete Hegseth, accusing them of pursuing religious-nationalist agendas and purging military leadership to build a partisan base. He cites the potential for internal conflict, including a possible civil dimension in the United States, exacerbated by polarization and militarized factions. - Iran and diplomacy: Wilkerson presents two opposing paths for the Iran question: a subterfuge scenario where negotiations are used to lull Iran into a false sense of security, followed by renewed pressure, or a serious diplomatic track led by a serious U.S. president to end the war and negotiate a settlement that satisfies Iran’s terms (reparations, sanctions removal, regional security guarantees). He doubts the current leadership will pursue genuine diplomacy, anticipating muddled outcomes or renewed strikes. - The ceasefire’s optics and escalation: He suggests the ceasefire could be a tactical pause while threats of escalation persist, with the Iranians possibly misreading U.S. diplomacy. He notes the risk of renewed Israeli actions against Iranian targets or proxies, and the potential for further bombardment or military missteps (citing past U.S. missteps as cautionary examples). - Cultural and geopolitical macro-trends: Wilkerson emphasizes the erosion of Western-led order, the rising importance of land-based energy and trade corridors, and the need to recalibrate how the United States engages a rising, multipolar world. He uses historical analogies (Halford Mackinder, Monroe Doctrine) to describe the strategic pivot toward inland power centers and away from exclusive maritime dominance. - Concluding outlook: The conversation ends on a bleak note about continued instability, the potential for regional and domestic turmoil, and the sense that without new leadership and a fundamental rethinking of strategy, the current trajectory risks further deterioration of global stability and U.S. influence.

President Trump made it clear that the conflict should end, leading to de-escalation. Benjamin Netanyahu requested Trump's intervention via Qatar's mediation with Iran to halt the war due to heavy Israeli losses, dwindling interception missiles, and unrealized objectives. Netanyahu sought a ceasefire to prevent Israeli public backlash, claiming victory to justify the cessation. Iran agreed to stop the war because it did not initiate it. Both sides have agreed to halt the conflict, but the ceasefire lacks specific terms or conditions for a lasting resolution, suggesting a potential future conflict.

The host notes the ceasefire appears to be over after Israel scuttled Trump’s plans for a two-week peace; the Wall Street Journal reports that Netanyahu was furious he wasn’t included in the peace plan discussions. The host says Israel wasn’t formally part of Iran negotiations and was unhappy it learned a deal was finalized late and wasn’t consulted, according to mediators and a promoter familiar with the matter. Speaker 1 interjects apologetically, then remarks that online narrative suggests that if you say Israel led the US into this war, you’re antisemitic, which they call antisemitic, and speculate that they’re all antisemitic. Speaker 0 describes Israel as throwing a tantrum “like a toddler” after the peace plan’s collapse and launching massive airstrikes on residential buildings in southern Lebanon, supposedly with no military purpose. Speaker 2 counters that civilians are involved and mentions tunnels under the area. Speaker 0 notes these attacks also targeted Iranian and Chinese Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure, calling it a direct attack on China, and claims at least 250 people were killed in these attacks on civilian apartment complexes in southern Lebanon. Speaker 1 adds that bombs continue to hit Beirut, with images described as horrific; there are 256 confirmed deaths at that point. Israel is also ramping up attacks in Gaza and the West Bank, which some warned would happen once the ceasefire was announced. Speaker 3 states that Netanyahu says the ceasefire with the US and Iran “is cute, but it doesn’t really have much to do with Israel,” and that Israel will keep fighting whenever they want, noting that two weeks were announced but not the end of the world. Acknowledgment follows that “we were not surprised in the last moment.” Calls for Netanyahu’s resignation in Israel rise. Iran announces it will close the Strait of Hormuz; the Trump administration says water will open but contradicts Fox News reporting that tankers have been stopped due to the ceasefire breach. Fox News reports raise concerns about whether the plan is credible. Speaker 4 mentions that Iran’s parliament says the ceasefire is violated in three ways: noncompliance with the ceasefire in Lebanon (civilians being slaughtered), violation of Iranian airspace, and denial of Iran’s right to enrichment; Iran insists uranium enrichment remains part of the deal, while the Trump administration claims they will not enrich uranium. Speaker 5 adds that Iran’s ability to fund and support proxies has been reduced, claiming Iran can no longer distribute weapons to proxies and will not be able to acquire nuclear weapons; prior to the operation, Iran was expanding its short-range ballistic missile arsenal and its navy, which posed an imminent threat to US assets and regional allies. The host counters that June had claimed “done enriching uranium,” but Iran says they will do whatever they want, having “won the war.” Speaker 6 asks how one eliminates a proxy’s ability to distribute weapons if the weapons and proxy networks already exist. Speaker 1 notes the points are contentious and shifts to a discussion with Ryan Grimm from Dropside News. The host, Speaker 0, asks Grimm to weigh in on the 10-point plan circulated as Trump’s plan, which Grimm says is not a formal document and not necessarily accurate; a “collection of different proposals” from Iran that was “collected into a single proposal” and later claimed to be new when presented as a new 10-point plan. Grimm describes the process as inconsistent and says the administration’s narrative has become convoluted. A segment follows about a centenarian, Maria Morea (born 1907, died 2024 at 117), whose gut microbiome showed diverse beneficial bacteria; studies of long-lived people show similar patterns, suggesting longevity relates to daily habits and gut health. The sponsor pitch for kimchi capsules is included, noting it provides gut-beneficial bacteria with Brightcore’s product, offering a discount. Speaker 0 returns to the ceasefire discussions, arguing that Israel’s actions indicate it does not want peace. Grimm expands, saying Israel is in a worse position than before and aims to push north into Lebanon and perhaps target maritime resources; Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz would elevate its regional status, with Belt and Road targets implying a significant structural shift. The host questions whether Trump would abandon Netanyahu if necessary and whether Trump would throw Netanyahu under the bus to stop the war. Grimm suggests Trump may prefer an out to avoid broader conflict, while noting the political stakes in the US and international responses. The discussion then revisits how Netanyahu allegedly sold the war to Trump and cabinet members, with New York Times reporting that the aim was to kill leaders, blunt Iran’s power, and potentially replace the Iranian government, while acknowledging that the initial strikes did not achieve regime change and that Iran’s ballistic missiles and proxies have been affected by the conflict. The segment closes with a humorous analogy to a Broadway line about a fully armed battalion.

Calls for a ceasefire are deemed impossible by those who understand Hamas. A ceasefire would only benefit Hamas as they would use the time to rebuild their armaments and fortify their positions against future Israeli attacks. We find ourselves in a different world, one that could have been avoided. However, we must now navigate our way forward.

On Monday, June 15, the discussion centers on whether peace could break out in Iran following a Trump announcement that a deal has been reached, and how sustainable it is given the painful concessions involved and uncertainty about U.S. ability to implement such agreements—especially with Iran. Professor Jeffrey Sachs says the parties have said an agreement has been signed by Iran, the United States, and Pakistan as mediator, but the details are unknown and the agreement comes in stages, making it potentially fragile and able to fall apart “quite easily.” He reports that all sides involved say there will be a ceasefire, described by Pakistan as a “permanent end to hostilities.” Israel is not included as a formal party, and he argues Israel would likely not accept at least one “crucial term” claimed about the agreement, including a cessation of fighting in Lebanon. Exactly what Lebanon terms are is unclear, but he says Israel may try to undermine the agreement by continuing bombing or by using claims such as Hezbollah shooting drones or missiles into Israel as a pretext, contributing to fragility. Sachs describes the framework as two broad phases. The first phase is to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and international oil and gas traffic. The second phase concerns nuclear issues over about 60 days, in which Iran would “in some sense irrevocably” refrain from producing or procuring a nuclear weapon, while U.S. and other international economic sanctions would be dropped. He says, based on announcements, the agreement does not include other demands the U.S. had previously put on the table regarding Iran’s missile systems or support for groups such as Hezbollah. He highlights uncertainty about governance of the Strait. Iran claims it is not an “international waterway,” but a shared waterway with Oman with co-responsibility, and it is unclear whether this is inscribed in the agreement. Trump says no tolls will be charged, and Iran had claimed tolls of $1 a barrel; sources also suggest that tolls may be dropped. On assets, he says statements indicate the U.S. will unfreeze Iranian assets, with $25 billion mentioned, but which assets, why, and under what authority remains unclear. He adds that there appears to be an arrangement in which Iranian and Omani control over the Strait continues and tolls are not charged, while the U.S. unfreezes significant amounts of frozen assets. Sachs then argues the broader war accomplished “absolutely nothing,” calling it useless and harmful, resulting in death and harm without substantive achievement. He says it weakened Israel diplomatically and that the U.S. lost “any aura of strength and invincibility,” while he characterizes the overall outcome as lose-lose for the U.S. and Israel, and “battered” for Iran. He notes rumors and public dispute over whether the ceasefire will hold, including claims it could fail quickly, while also stating that he would not conclude that fighting is inevitably a ruse. In response to concerns about concessions, Sachs and the interviewer discuss how distinctions between tolls and fees matter operationally and legally, and how painful concessions could provoke opposition once details emerge. They also describe opposition from the Zionist lobby in the U.S. and criticism directed at what the U.S. did, including claims of a unilateral launch without public backing or congressional backing and with stated goals not achieved. The conversation shifts to broader U.S. strategic limits and power dynamics. Sachs argues the U.S. executive branch lacks operative norms against war and portrays U.S. leadership as operating with “gangster mentality,” emphasizing action without legal or moral compunction beyond victory. He argues that military and economic pressures have not produced strategic leverage and that the U.S. economic blockade and “economic war” have hurt Iran, with Iran seeking asset releases as bargaining leverage. On whether the Iran ceasefire could be a turning point, Sachs says the world is changing and that U.S. ability to impose military victory and enforce hegemonic control has reached limits across key theaters. He cites the U.S.-Iran-Middle East, Ukraine, and China as areas where he says the U.S. cannot impose its will militarily, and he argues this reflects a broader end to U.S. unipolar dominance. He discusses balancing dynamics, rejects the myth of enduring U.S. technological superiority, and argues that advanced technologies are widespread and that countries such as Iran and Russia can make sophisticated weaponry. The interviewer agrees that adversaries moving closer to each other, combined with failure of unipolar assumptions, suggests policies must reflect reality. The discussion ends by emphasizing that these wars signal not only an end to the post-Cold War hegemonic era but also the broader shift in Western technological dominance.

In this discussion, Speaker 0 interviews Scott Ritter, a former UN weapons inspector and US Marine Corps intelligence officer, about the implications of a phone call between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin and the broader geopolitics around Ukraine, Iran, and energy. - On the Trump-Putin call and diplomacy with the US: Ritter notes that Trump initiated the call, and Russia has kept a diplomatic channel open with the United States, despite tensions and distrust. Russia reportedly invited figures like Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to continue diplomacy. He interprets Russia’s openness as a strategic move to maintain influence in decision-making, particularly with the US seeking Russian assistance on energy and conflict termination in Ukraine and Iran. - Russia’s behavior in response to Western strikes and its strategic calculus: Ritter argues Russia has deliberately avoided a rapid military overreaction to Western actions (e.g., UK strikes on Bryansk using Storm Shadow missiles and Flamingo systems) to prevent elevating Ukrainian nationalism or provoking a harsher Western stance. He suggests Russia can legally justify countermeasures against British facilities tied to Storm Shadow and Flamingo production, but chooses restraint to avoid elevating domestic political backlash and to exploit diplomatic openings. - Economic dimensions and sanctions: He contends Russia benefits from the lifting of oil sanctions, with Russia able to sell crude at much higher market prices, improving its budget and war finances without further escalation. This is framed as a strategic reward for keeping the diplomatic channel open and for not overreacting militarily. - The strategic objective in Ukraine and the West: Ritter states Russia aims to remove Ukrainian nationalism from Europe’s security equation and to establish Ukraine as a neutral party. He argues that Russian actions, including potential pressure on Ukraine and Western states, are designed to compel a settlement more favorable to Moscow, with less emphasis on Ukrainian terms. - The Iran context and US leverage: The conversation posits that Russia’s phone call with Trump could enable further discussions with Kushner and Witkoff on terms that reflect Russian objectives, given the US’s urgent need for Russian help on energy and geopolitical cover. Ritter suggests Moscow could pressure Iran to negotiate in a way that aligns with broader Russian goals and reduces US influence, including potentially linking Ukraine settlements to Iran’s termination or moderation. - Off-ramps and the Iranian war: In Iran, the sole off-ramp is one Iran accepts; the US and Israel no longer control the process. Ritter argues that US strategies (e.g., general Cain’s claims about missile successes) are misguided, with Iran reportedly evading decisive pressure and maintaining leverage. The path forward would involve Russia acting as mediator and engaging Iranian leadership more directly, while the US’s ability to impose a decisive settlement appears limited. - US military options and feasibility: Ritter points out the limits of US military options in Iran and the Strait of Hormuz. He argues that large-scale ground involvement (e.g., 80,000 Marines to seize territories around Hormuz) is impractical given resource constraints, political risk, and logistical challenges. He criticizes the reliance on bombing campaigns with insufficient precision munitions and questions target selection and legality, highlighting a historical precedent where strategic air campaigns did not compel German surrender in World War II. - Broader geopolitical consequences and alliances: The discussion covers how a perceived US strategic defeat could reshape global alignments. Ritter foresees BRICS strengthening as the US loses credibility, with China advancing in Taiwan and the South China Sea, and Russia expanding influence in the Middle East. He suggests Iran could emerge as a regional power, while Israel’s nuclear program could come under renewed pressure. Russia’s involvement in the Middle East, grounded in a strategic framework with Iran, provides Moscow with diplomatic legitimacy to lecture Gulf states. - Lavrov’s stance and Gulf politics: The speakers address Lavrov’s public admonition of Gulf states for pressuring Iran and seeking Western support, arguing this reflects Russia’s adherence to its diplomatic framework and a legally grounded position. Russia’s recent strategic framework with Iran underpins its legitimacy to influence Gulf behavior. - Closing assessment: Ritter emphasizes that the war’s trajectory is being driven by Iranian resilience and US strategic miscalculations. He maintains that Russia’s role as mediator and its leverage over energy markets position Moscow to shape outcomes, while the United States appears increasingly constrained, resource-drained, and vulnerable to strategic defeats on multiple fronts. The result could be a reordering of global alliances and regional power dynamics, with Russia and Iran gaining greater influence and the US recalibrating its priorities accordingly.

This was a war of choice for both Israel and the United States, a preventive military strike against a gathering threat from Iran, not an imminent one. According to The Economist, Iran had advanced its nuclear program faster than anticipated, accumulating highly enriched uranium, though it's unclear if weaponization has occurred. Israel struck because they no longer had to worry about Iranian proxies or air defenses. The president's call for two weeks of diplomacy suggests three possibilities: a diplomatic development, intel on Iran moving nuclear materials, or a ploy to set Iran up for a US strike. The speaker does not believe that the president being at odds with Tulsi Gabbard is of importance.

Iran faces three options: compliance with the US and IAEA, further integration with China and Russia, or seeking a nuclear bomb. Compliance would mean humiliation and loss of sovereignty, without stopping Israeli aggression. Increased integration with China and Russia, especially in air defense, would mean some loss of independence but aligns with Iran's current partnerships. Seeking a nuclear bomb would provide deterrence like North Korea, but could trigger nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, opposed by Russia and China. The speaker believes compliance is unacceptable. Stronger alliances with China and Russia are more probable, given Iran's importance for oil and transit. Securing a nuclear bomb is the second most likely path. The speaker warns that current ceasefires are a trick to rearm Israel for further escalation. Given Israel's actions in Gaza, the speaker wouldn't be surprised if Israel dropped a tactical nuclear bomb on Iran, enabled by Western control of the narrative. The war is far from over.

The discussion centers on the Iran ceasefire, Iran’s negotiating stance, and how Israel’s actions and U.S. political dynamics are shaping perceptions and potential outcomes. - President Trump describes the Iran ceasefire as “on life support” and says Iran’s peace terms are “totally unacceptable” and “garbage.” Iran’s position, according to Iranian media cited in the segment, treats Washington’s peace proposal as a surrender document, insisting on the end of U.S. sanctions, release of frozen Iranian assets, the right to sell oil freely, and control of the Strait of Hormuz—a nonstarter for Washington. Trump also threatens more war, aligning with Netanyahu’s preferences. - On the ceasefire, another participant notes “the ceasefire remains in place for the time being,” while a speaker mocks the peace proposal as weak and life-supporting, using medical imagery to describe its fragility. - Netanyahu’s appearance on 60 Minutes is summarized as him “begging for more war,” outlining how to remove enriched uranium and how to achieve that goal, with emphasis on military action. He suggests “you go in” and take it out, implying American and Israeli cooperation, though one participant stresses not to reveal military plans and cautions about the feasibility and risks of such missions. There is also a claim that Netanyahu implies the United States should bear primary responsibility for military actions if needed. - The dialogue expands to a broader critique of Israel’s conduct in Gaza and the West Bank, with one participant stressing that Israel is “besieged on the media front” and that propaganda has harmed Israel’s image. There is a claim that social media manipulation by other countries has contributed to negative impressions of Israel, and a consensus that Israel has not used adequate or effective propaganda in its defense. - The panel discusses the ethics and consequences of censorship, with one speaker arguing against censorship yet acknowledging the impact of social media manipulation on public opinion. They contend that attempts to silence critics or punish those who oppose Israel’s policies are counterproductive and harm Jewish communities globally by conflating Jewish identity with Israeli policy. - Anna Kasparian (The Young Turks) weighs in, describing Netanyahu as untrustworthy and arguing that Israel’s actions—targeting hospitals, education centers, and civilians—have generated global criticism. She asserts the issue is not merely a social media phenomenon but an Israel-centered one, citing the ongoing destruction in Gaza and military actions in Lebanon. She argues that U.S. support for Israel is a political question driven by lobbying, and she predicts growing political pressure against leaders who prioritize Israel’s interests over American interests. - The panel critiques U.S. political alignments, noting that Democratic and Republican positions have not yielded a clear consensus on Iran. They argue that diplomacy has varied across administrations (Obama’s JCPOA vs. other strategies), and they contend that Netanyahu’s influence has pushed the United States toward a harder stance on Iran, often aligning with Israel’s regime-change objectives. - Looking ahead, the speakers caution against a renewed kinetic war with Iran, referencing military experts who argue that the United States lacks the capacity or strategic justification for a large-scale confrontation. They emphasize the high costs, the effectiveness of Iran’s drones, and the risks of escalating conflict, suggesting that a more restrained approach or different leverage might be necessary. - The closing segment underscores uncertainty about future conflict, with a warning that a return to bombing Iran could be counterproductive and that political and public opinion dynamics in the United States are shifting, especially regarding support for Netanyahu and Israel.

The discussion centers on shifting U.S. rhetoric toward Iran and Israel amid negotiations and escalating conflict. As the interview goes live, news reports Iran suspended its trip to Switzerland for the opening round of nuclear negotiations. Iran’s stated reason is ongoing Israeli military operations in southern Lebanon, arguing Israel is operating over six miles inside Lebanese territory in violation of Article 1 of the MOU calling for an immediate end to hostilities on all fronts, including Lebanon. Iran says if the ceasefire clause is being breached before negotiations begin, there is nothing to go to Geneva for. Trump is also described as posting a call for a complete ceasefire on all fronts, including Lebanon, Hezbollah, and Israel. The interview then focuses on Israel as a “wild card” in the MOU and whether Trump can restrain Netanyahu. The colonel says Israeli leadership and U.S. billionaire supporters helped put Trump into office and are turning current events into “a test of Jewish power,” aiming to pressure Trump back into attacking Iran. He argues this approach reflects disproportionate influence already held by these actors, and predicts efforts to bully the president toward war. A CNN report is referenced describing Netanyahu lobbying to shape the final U.S.-Iran agreement by pressuring Trump through allies and intermediaries in Washington, mobilizing pro-Israeli senators and media allies. Netanyahu is said to believe a final agreement will be reached but is concerned Tehran will not uphold it. Separately, Netanyahu is described as saying Israel will restore security to the north through maintaining a security zone in southern Lebanon until Israel’s security needs require it, which the interviewer links to Netanyahu rallying U.S. influence to pressure Trump. When asked whether Trump can withstand this pressure, the colonel describes a transformation in Trump’s foreign-policy posture: he says Trump did not want a war with Iran, believed an arrangement could be reached, and showed reluctance to go to war generally. The colonel describes interruptions in foreign-policy dialogue after Ukraine in April 2022, then describes increasing belligerence around the early Iran conflict, including an account of Trump’s expectation that military action could end the war quickly. He then says Trump concluded the approach was not going well, became concerned about financial markets and the U.S. economy, and that the repeated claim “this war is going to end soon” could not end the conflict without a closure. The colonel argues Trump found no military solution and that using a nuclear weapon was “off the table.” He frames Trump’s challenge as dealing with Israel in a context where only an MOU exists as a rough framework, and highlights provisions aligned with Trump’s instincts, including not meddling in internal affairs and desire for forces to return home. He claims Trump was shown information about atrocities by Israelis against people in Gaza and Lebanon and that Trump’s statement about not needing to destroy an entire apartment building to eliminate one person reflects a broader realization. The colonel says some people are calling for Trump’s resignation because he “lost a war,” and responds that major powers do not achieve permanent “perfect victory streaks,” but instead must cut losses and move on. The colonel argues that future power in the Middle East will be dominated by Iran and Turkey, describing them as different from Israel and emphasizing that provoking Turkey would lead to a “fight to the finish.” He argues Israel’s existential threat is not Iran but Turkey, and contends that Israel and others are operating in a changing global environment where ISR-strike complexes and persistent surveillance plus standoff attack weapons enable new defensive and offensive capabilities. He concludes that the war must be brought to an end because the world has fundamentally changed and efforts to “reset it to backwards” are tied to calls for bombing more. A question is raised about how escalation could work if Israel continues strikes in Lebanon and Iran retaliates, and Trump chooses not to get involved, including not intercepting missiles. The colonel replies that this is “almost already happening,” citing Israeli shelling from southern Lebanon artillery positions and predicting Israel will attack Hizballah positions, which he describes as an existential threat for Israel. He says Israel would need U.S. assistance—munitions, missiles, intelligence—and predicts Netanyahu would pressure Trump politically if support were withheld, including threats aimed at Trump’s political survival. He also says he is “genuinely concerned” about the president’s safety. The conversation then shifts to claimed political and systemic factors limiting presidential agency and the possibility of escalation beyond normal pressure campaigns. The colonel suggests investigations involving members of the president’s family and references wealth growth and “Epstein files” as elements that could return to center stage. He also describes how criminal or political actions and unpredictable events have historically led leaders to be removed or harmed, and compares concerns to the experience of President Kennedy’s assassination. When discussing how pressure campaigns could become more sinister, he outlines ways investigations, media narratives, and orchestrated blame could be pursued. Near the end, the colonel discusses how broader U.S. and military bureaucracies operate, stating commanders can be constrained by service chiefs and confirmed positions, and arguing that institutional incentives discourage independent action. He recommends his book “A Margin of Victory: Five Battles That Changed the Face of War, Modern Warfare,” and says it addresses the limits of what government can accomplish on an average day due to other people’s decisions and confirmed constraints. The interview closes with the colonel referencing a Substack piece coming out Sunday or Monday discussing a shift in power and asserting that Iran has won the war and is “invincible,” “humbled, but not broken.”

The discussion centers on the ongoing tensions with Iran, the potential for American military involvement, and the role of media and ideology in shaping public perception. The speakers express a critical view of how the situation is being managed and portrayed. Key points about the Iran situation: - President Trump publicly claimed “we’ve won the war against Iran,” but the panel notes Israel’s public interest in a broader outcome, specifically regime change in Iran, which would require boots on the ground rather than air strikes. - It is argued that air strikes alone cannot achieve regime change; the Israeli military, even with about 170,000 active-duty soldiers plus reservists, would need American boots on the ground to accomplish such aims against a larger Iranian army. - Senators, including Richard Blumenthal, warned about the risk to American lives in potentially deploying ground troops in Iran, citing a path toward American ground forces. - The new National Defense Authorization Act renewal could lead to an involuntary draft by year’s end, a concern raised by Dan McAdams of the Ron Paul Institute who argues it treats citizens as owned by the government. - There is tension between Trump’s public push for a quick end to conflict and Netanyahu’s government talking about a larger, more prolonged objective in the region, including a potential demilitarized zone in southern Lebanon akin to Gaza’s situation. - Iran’s new supreme leader Khomeini issued a televised statement threatening to shut the Strait of Hormuz until the United States begs and vowing vengeance for martyrs, signaling that the conflict could continue or escalate beyond initial claims of victory. - The panel highlights potential escalation, including the possibility of nuclear weapons discussion by Trump and concerns about who controls the war, given factions within Iran and differing US-Israeli goals. Tucker Carlson’s analysis and warnings: - Carlson is presented as having warned that a war with Iran would be hard due to Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal aimed at US bases and allies’ infrastructure, and that it would push Iran closer to China and Russia, potentially undermining the US. - Carlson emphasizes the lack of a clear, publicly articulated endgame or exit strategy for the war, arguing that diplomacy has deteriorated and that the US appears discredited in its ability to negotiate peace. - He discusses the governance of Israel and the idea that some Israeli leaders advocate for extreme measures, referencing “Amalek” language used by Netanyahu to describe enemies, which Carlson characterizes as dangerous and incompatible with Western civilization’s values. - Carlson argues that American interests and Israeli strategic aims diverge, and questions why Israel is the partner with decision-making authority in such a conflict. He notes the US’s reliance on Israel for intelligence (with Israel translating SIGINT) and suggests that Israel’s endgame may be to erode American influence in the region. - He also suggests the war is being used to advance a broader political and ideological project, including America’s pivot away from foreign entanglements; he asserts that certain power centers in the US and in media and defense circles benefit from perpetual conflict. - Carlson discusses the moral framework around targeting and civilian casualties, asserting that there is concern over the ethical implications of autonomous targeting and the potential for AI to play a role in warfare decisions. - He notes the possibility that AI involvement in targeting decisions exists in other conflicts, though in the Iran situation, he mentions that a human pressed play in the specific case of an attack (the school near an Iranian base), while coordinates may have come from other sources, possibly shared by Israel. - Carlson discusses media dynamics, describing mainstream outlets as “embedded” with the defense establishment and questioning why there isn’t a robust public discussion about the war’s endgame, exit ramps, or the true costs of war. Media, propaganda, and public discourse: - The panel critiques media coverage as lacking skepticism, with anchors and outlets seemingly aligned with the administration’s war narratives, raising concerns about “access journalism” and the absence of tough questions about goals, timelines, and consequences. - Carlson and participants discuss the use of propaganda—historically, Disney and the Treasury Department in World War II as examples—arguing that today’s propaganda around Iran relies on pop culture and entertainment to normalize or justify intervention without clear justification to the public. - They argue that contemporary media often fails to examine the ethics and consequences of war or to question the necessity and legitimacy of continuing conflict, suggesting a broader risk of technology-enabled control over public opinion and civil discourse. White House dynamics and internal debate: - The guests discuss the possibility of internal disagreement within the White House, noting that while some senior figures had reservations, external pressure, particularly from Netanyahu, may have pushed the administration toward action. - They touch on the strategic ambiguity surrounding US forces in the region, noting that while large-scale ground invasion is unlikely, special forces and other assets may be deployed, with civilian and military costs disproportionately affecting American families. - The conversation also explores concerns about civil liberties, surveillance, and the potential for centralized control of information and warfare technologies to influence domestic politics and social cohesion. Overall, the dialogue presents a multifaceted critique of the handling and propulsion of a potential Iran conflict, emphasizing the risk of escalatory dynamics, the clash of strategic goals between the US and Israel, concerns about democratic consent and media accountability, and the ethical implications of modern warfare technology.

Israel and Iran have fully agreed to a complete and total ceasefire in approximately six hours. After Israel and Iran wind down and complete their final missions for twelve hours, a ceasefire will commence for twelve hours. Officially, Iran will start the ceasefire, and upon the twelfth hour, Israel will start the ceasefire. Upon the twenty-fourth hour, an official end to the twelve-day war will be saluted by the world. During each ceasefire, the other side will remain peaceful and respectful, assuming everything works as it should. Both Israel and Iran are congratulated for having the stamina, courage, and intelligence to end the twelve-day war, which could have gone on for years and destroyed the entire Middle East, but it didn't and never will.

In the dialogue, Seyyed Mohammed Marandi, a Tehran University professor and former Iran nuclear negotiation adviser, discusses the prospect of renewed U.S. aggression against Iran and the stability of any ceasefire. He says that since the ceasefire began, preparations for war in Tehran have been ongoing “twenty four hours a day,” driven by the belief that Trump will not accept defeat and that the “Zionist lobbying” and the Israeli regime remain behind the war. He suggests that although it is not certain, a new round of conflict could erupt over a weekend or soon after markets close, noting that the U.S. and Netanyahu’s positions previously clashed with ceasefire terms. He recounts that Iran had insisted on an off-ramp when Netanyahu accepted the ceasefire, but Trump then claimed the Strait of Hormuz would remain open while maintaining a siege on Iranian ports, implying that an off-ramp was possible but not pursued. Marandi emphasizes that the Strait of Hormuz was never closed by Iran, except to ships linked to adversaries, and argues that the escalation followed Netanyahu’s actions despite Iranian signals. He asserts that even if a limited agreement allows more ships through, the broader pain from any renewed conflict will persist, potentially causing a global economic depression if critical infrastructure is destroyed or if negotiations on Hormuz or Gaza/ Lebanon ceasefires are delayed for weeks due to fighting. On the U.S. side, the host notes that the U.S. was in trouble and desperate, pointing to missile defenses and ammunition shortages as signs of strain, and remarks that Trump accepted Iran’s 10-point plan as a ceasefire framework but later abandoned it, while presenting an extended ceasefire as a favor. Marandi agrees that Trump’s actions have been inconsistent and that the Iranians might expect the U.S. to pursue assassinations and infrastructure strikes again, with Iran prepared to retaliate robustly. A key point is Iran’s stated willingness to escalate in response to attacks on its leadership and critical infrastructure. An Iranian MP, associated with the Islamabad delegation, reportedly warned that if any assassinations occur, Iran will target leaders of Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf (Kuwait, Bahrain, the Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia) because they are complicit in the war. The discussion outlines that Iran would retaliate not only against Israeli targets but also within the Persian Gulf region, potentially striking infrastructure and power facilities, with implications for the region’s electricity and climate conditions during the hot season. Marandi argues that Iran has already demonstrated strategic restraint, saying that Iranian authorities aim to minimize civilian casualties and that Iranians would respond to attacks on critical Iranian infrastructure by striking broader targets in the Israeli regime and in regional partners. He contends that Iran does not initiate escalation but escalates in response, pointing to past cycles where Iran’s retaliation was effective without targeting civilians. He notes that Iran has assets across its mountainous interior, including deep underground factories and bases, which he claims the United States underestimates, leading to miscalculations about Iran’s missile and drone capabilities. Regarding the broader geopolitical landscape, Marandi notes rising Western and Israeli concerns about Iran’s expanding influence, while acknowledging growing sympathy for Iran in parts of the world, including some shifts in India and Latin America. He highlights the Putin-Trump dynamic, suggesting Putin’s meeting with Iran’s Foreign Minister and Russia’s praise for the Iranian people signal a strengthening axis of resistance against Western pressures. He also remarks that Iran’s resilience under sanctions and its ability to mobilize regional allies, such as Hezbollah, complicates Western expectations of quick regime change. Finally, Marandi suggests that Iran’s role on the global stage is shifting perceptions of Iran’s strength and legitimacy, and he foresees continued pressure, potential escalation, and a regional balance of power that narrows Western maneuvering space as the crisis evolves.

In a discussion about the Iran confrontation and its wider implications, Glenn and John Mearsheimer analyze the sequence of events and underlying dynamics behind President Donald Trump’s statements and policy shifts. - Trump’s two Monday tweets frame the episode: an initial threat to “wipe Iran off the face of the earth” to force concession, followed by a reversal to announce a ceasefire based on Iran’s 10-point plan. Mersheimer emphasizes that this sequence reveals Trump’s desperation to end the war and to secure a ceasefire quickly, then to shift to negotiations with Iran’s plan as the basis. - The framework of the negotiations is contrasted with the US’s prior maximalist aims. The United States had demanded four core goals: regime change, Iran’s nuclear enrichment cessation, elimination of long-range missiles, and cessation of support for groups like the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Mersheimer notes none of these have been realized, while Iran reportedly gains leverage through control of the Strait of Hormuz. - The Iranian 10-point plan is presented as a basis for negotiations that would, in effect, concede the big US demands. Trump’s evening tweet signaling acceptance of the 10-point plan is read as a defeat for the US position and a shift toward Iranian maximalism on its own terms. The claim is that the ceasefire, if it occurs, would involve concessions that Iran had already proposed. - The feasibility of a ceasefire is questioned. Iran’s open Strait of Hormuz depends on Israel halting attacks in Lebanon (on Hezbollah), which has not happened. Therefore, a true ceasefire is not in place, and the Israelis’ actions are seen as undermining any potential halt to hostilities. - The broader strategic picture is outlined. Iran’s leverage includes allied groups (Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas) and the ability to close chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el-Mandab strait via the Houthis. The discussion notes Iran’s large missile/drone arsenal and potential to threaten American bases, though Mersheimer stresses that sanctions and the prolonged war have devastated Iran’s economy, which complicates assessments of its strength. - The role of external powers and economies is highlighted. Mersheimer argues that the global economy—especially oil and fertilizers—drives the push to end the conflict. He suggests China and Pakistan, with Russian input, pressured Iran to negotiate, given the global economic risks of a prolonged war. He also notes that the New York Times reported that all 13 US bases in the Gulf were damaged or destroyed, undermining U.S. presence there. - Domestic political concerns are discussed. Trump’s ability to declare victory while acknowledging defeat creates a political hazard. Vance is presented as a potentially capable negotiator who could press for a ceasefire, but there is concern about internal political blowback if he concedes too much. - Israel’s position is considered crucial. Netanyahu’s government is described as having promoted the war, and the war’s outcome is said to damage U.S.-Israel relations. There is speculation that Israel may consider drastic options, including nuclear consideration against Iran, given the perceived failure of conventional means. - The Ukraine war and its relation to the Iran conflict are explored. If Iran’s war ends or is perceived as winding down, European capacity and willingness to support Ukraine become central questions. The U.S. may shift blame to Europe for Ukraine’s defeat if Russia advances, while withholding weapons to Ukraine to avoid further strain on U.S. stockpiles. - The discussion on rationality in international relations emphasizes that states act rationally when their decisions align with a plausible theory of international politics and a sound decision-making process. Mersheimer argues Europe’s behavior toward the U.S. is not irrational, though he criticizes its liberal-theory basis (NATO expansion) as potentially misguided but not irrational. He contrasts this with Trump’s Iran attack in February 2029, which he deems irrational due to a lack of a plausible theory of victory. - The multipolar world dynamic is reinforced. The war’s outcomes are viewed as weakening U.S. ability to project power, diminishing transatlantic cohesion, and boosting Russia and China’s relative position. The loss of Gulf bases and diminished American influence are expected to push Europe toward greater strategic autonomy, with NATO potentially becoming less meaningful by 2029, depending on future leadership. - Final notes include concerns about the political risk for Vance as a negotiator, the likelihood of a difficult peace process, and the possibility that misperceptions and propaganda—analyzed through historical parallels like the Vietnam War and Walter Lippmann’s ideas—have locked leaders into an “evil enemy” narrative that complicates peacemaking. Overall, the conversation portrays Trump’s messaging as a sign of desperation to end a costly conflict, the ceasefire as a fragile construct dependent on Iranian terms, Iran’s expanding leverage in the region, the fragility of U.S.-Israel and transatlantic bonds, and a shifting global order moving toward multipolarity with lasting economic and strategic consequences.

Alistair Crook argues that the “Iran war” is not only a regional crisis but an inflection point reshaping multiple geopolitical centers, beginning with Israel. He describes a crisis inside Israel tied to Netanyahu: Israeli reporting suggests Netanyahu is “in despair” about a potential agreement opposed to him, while pending corruption cases and the lack of the promised erasure/pardon contribute to growing tensions. Crook says Israeli speculation increasingly favors Netanyahu resigning before elections, which are expected in September rather than October, partly to distance from the resonance of October 7. He also notes internal pressure about conscription and Orthodox groups, and says growing criticism of Israel’s war in Gaza is broad enough that the government could implode. If Netanyahu is gone, Crook poses uncertainty over who could carry forward the long-standing Likud/Nanyahu agenda and whether the broader political structure built over roughly two decades could fragment into internal faction fighting. He frames Iran’s outcome in Israel as an “internalized” shift from expectations of U.S. destruction of Iran to the belief that “Iran has won the war,” leaving Israel trapped in “unwinnable wars” without sufficient troops, and without a clear way out. Crook then links Iran’s impact to Russia and China. He cites Russian strategist Sergey Karaganov arguing Russia should “take the lessons” from Iran, specifically how Iran used conventional missile weapons to hit vulnerable Western targets and how the West “backed off and withdrew.” Crook says this moves Russian thinking toward conventional weapons alongside a return to nuclear deterrence, emphasizing fear as necessary for deterrence. He describes a changing European mood: European ratcheting of support for Ukraine through missiles and drones, including claims that NATO space could protect against Russian retribution, is portrayed as potentially mistaken. Crook says Russia instead indicates it will attack decision-making centers, which he claims are in Britain, France, and Germany rather than Latvia, and that this is “changing rapidly,” including after the summit in Beijing between Putin and Xi. On China, Crook says Beijing is pushing back mainly through economic measures: restricting purchases of Chinese holdings or access via U.S. stock markets, opposing elements of U.S. efforts to expand dollar/digital-currency influence, and strengthening the role of China-linked assets as collateral in bond markets—alongside European issuers issuing yuan-denominated bonds. He argues this reflects a broader move into a “hard-nosed” posture toward the West and that Chinese pushback is intensifying through measures rather than noise. In the discussion, Crook emphasizes a shift in Russia’s and Europe’s psychology. He contrasts the Western “luxury” of past decades—where wars were fought elsewhere with escalation control—with the current Russian desire for restraint and fear-based deterrence. He says Western actions that target Russian capabilities risk forcing Russia toward retaliation, including nuclear escalation at some point. A central theme is that fear and psychological awareness matter for deterrence, and that complacency in Europe is a threat. Crook expands to Israel and Iran’s strategic constraints and the possibility of a “third strategy” beyond all-or-nothing defeat. He argues Israel could eventually change relations with Iran and recalls that after the Iranian Revolution Israel had a period of better relations with Tehran. He attributes Israel’s later shift to internal Israeli political changes: the Labor Party’s attempt to invert the earlier equation (periphery allies vs. Arab states enemy) and the subsequent need to maintain an Iran “enemy” narrative within U.S. domestic support structures. He also proposes that changing the regional equation could lead to renewed dialogue with Iran. He links this to Gulf security developments: Crook describes Gulf states moving toward a Gulf-led security architecture without American participation, driven by fear of future attacks on Iran and their consequences, and says Iran has made clear it could accept Gulf security arrangements that do not leave Gulf states under Iranian dominance. Crook argues Iran’s leverage is not only military but also economic and logistical: controlling the Strait of Hormuz reduces dependence on crippling sanctions and enables toll-based incentives and pressure, including dismantling petrodollar-linked arrangements. He claims this would affect Gulf financial systems and the Gulf’s petrodollar/financialized Western architecture and also complicate AI/data-center investments tied to Western and U.S. security assumptions, because Gulf reliance on U.S. protection is weakened and ties to Iran must adjust. He adds that many states are already attempting to open relations with Iran—he cites “about thirty” states—and predicts that these changes will become more open and fixed, altering the region’s complexion.

The discussion centers on conflicting statements attributed to Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump shortly after a call, with Netanyahu saying there would be no ceasefire and operations would continue as normal, while Trump allegedly claimed a full ceasefire would take effect. The speakers argue this contradiction is expected, and they suggest Netanyahu may pause for 24–48 hours but will likely resume operations, framing the conflict as continuing rather than stopping. They describe Netanyahu’s political survival as the key driver, arguing he cannot afford politically to end the war, and instead needs to maintain momentum to justify his leadership to the Israeli public and handle legal and political challenges that they expect to intensify after the war. They also claim Netanyahu would prefer “the man on top of a burning cinder” to losing position in a more stable environment. The speakers say Trump may use harsh language to pressure Netanyahu, but that Netanyahu has “experienced far worse” from other U.S. presidents, with Obama cited as particularly difficult due to resisting involvement and pursuing an attempted nuclear agreement with Iran. A separate point is raised about U.S. legislative constraints—specifically Section 224 of the Pending National Defense Authorization Act—described as ensuring future administrations cannot reverse aid to Israel and integrating Israel more fully into U.S. defense and industrial infrastructure, making it harder to disentangle. On escalation and de-escalation, the speakers say a real de-escalation is not happening, arguing that violence resumes quickly when ceasefire arrangements break down. They claim Israeli actions show they are not pulling back, including continued strikes and specific reference to Beirut. They argue that Israel could be slowing or “slow-walking” strikes temporarily, potentially to reposition, while Hezbollah prepares defenses and maintains contingency planning. The conversation also addresses an I24-reported assessment that Hezbollah has not resumed its core leadership or central command structure in southern Beirut’s Dahi district since the ceasefire, with Hezbollah reportedly relocating major parts of its command network to other Beirut areas. Israeli officials in the report are described as believing additional Israeli strikes on Dahi would have limited impact on Hezbollah’s operational capabilities, and that Israel’s push toward Beirut is partly to pressure Lebanese actors against Hezbollah. A broader strategic framing is offered: the speakers suggest Iran’s threats to strike Israel’s northern homeland could provide Netanyahu with political leverage to portray continued fighting as existential and necessary. They also discuss “red lines,” saying Iran drew a red line and that what comes next depends on which side dictates actions. Trump is described as wanting a peace deal, while the speakers claim Israel does not mind sabotaging it. Regarding Iran’s posture, the speakers say Iran escalated in a way that surprised them less than it might have otherwise, noting Iran threatened significant escalation against Israel and recommended citizen evacuations. They argue this looks more like calibrated retaliation than chaotic escalation, describing Iran as a “counter puncher” and suggesting the conflict could include off-ramps. They also criticize rhetoric that labels Iran “crazy,” arguing that ceasefire terms involving Lebanon were not implemented and Israel was breaching the ceasefire. The conversation extends to the broader question of U.S. involvement, debating arguments that the U.S. should walk away versus the idea that the U.S. owes allies an effort to stabilize—particularly stopping hostilities in Lebanon. One speaker argues the U.S. struggles with post-war stabilization and that pulling back could force regional actors to be more reasonable, describing this as reducing moral hazard. Finally, the speakers discuss press access and censorship, including reporting that the Pentagon restricted journalists by designating its press office as a classified area and barring journalists from entering to interact with public affairs staff. They argue this is inconsistent with claims of free speech, and they also mention bans or restrictions in the UK against controversial media figures in connection with Israel-related debates. The transcript closes with the host listing additional interviews and guests from the channel lineup and stating more interviews will follow.

Ashwin Rutansi hosts Going Underground, opening with a claim that Dubai was hit harder by Iranian retaliation than anywhere else in the region outside Israel, and noting this broadcast marks 73 years since the CIA’s MKUltra program. He frames the USA and what it represents as a malign influence, and argues the US propaganda system has failed to spin defeats in multiple wars, including the Iran conflict. He says the world recognizes Israel’s genocide in Gaza despite NATO attempts to shield it, and notes that US public opinion shows disapproval of Israel. Netanyahu is accused of tightly controlling the media and cracking down on protests. Rutansi then welcomes Avram Berg (Israel’s former president, speaker in the Knesset, professor at NYU Abu Dhabi and Notre Dame Jerusalem) who speaks from Jerusalem. The discussion concentrates on the power dynamic between Netanyahu and Trump, and whether Netanyahu was surprised by Trump’s ceasefire declaration, plus how Netanyahu might retaliate if the ceasefire were sabotaged. Speaker 1 (Avram Berg) characterizes the situation as highly serious and delicate. He suggests the war’s origins and triggers are unclear, describing a “divorce” in the relationship between Trump and Israel: Trump’s ceasefire move is seen as coordinated or at least not fully aligned with Israel. Berg notes Netanyahu has not publicly spoken yet, and might frame the ceasefire as coordinated with him, but he views the immediate outcome as neither side having real winners and sees Iran as having survived strongly. He suggests China is rising in the background. Rutansi asks how secure Netanyahu is if the ceasefire persisted, recalling Israel’s aggressive actions in Lebanon after Trump’s ceasefire announcement and Trump’s retreat from conditions. Berg replies that politically, Israel has an election looming; the war was a strategic move for internal politics—Israelis rally around the government during wartime—yet Netanyahu may not gain politically from this round and could face backlash in upcoming elections. Berg also argues Netanyahu’s broader agenda—weakening Iran, disarming Hezbollah, and stopping Hamas—has failed across these fronts, leaving Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran still viable or intact. The host probes whether Netanyahu needs a false flag or propaganda to counter what Trump’s supporters might claim. Berg distinguishes substance from rhetoric, noting Hezbollah in the north is a problem for Lebanon and Syria; Iran’s threat was real but not existential for Israel, and suggests diplomacy and balancing could have handled it better. Berg emphasizes that war without political settlement is wasteful and results in casualties across many sides. Rutansi notes growing global hatred of Israel, while Berg refrains from embracing Hamas/Hezbollah as liberation movements, warning against falling into such narratives. Berg acknowledges global resentment of Israel but doubts a wholesale shift in allegiance toward Hamas or Hezbollah. The host asks about Epstein-related intelligence rumors and Trump’s leverage. Berg dismisses Epstein-related conspiracy as gossip rather than serious political leverage, insisting on reasoning over sensationalism. He does acknowledge Epstein’s notoriety but rejects tying it to concrete policy influence. When the discussion turns to nuclear weapons, Berg asserts Israel’s nuclear capability remains officially unacknowledged domestically, recounting past suppression of open debate on the topic. Berg argues that Iran’s perceived threats and regional rivalries push towards deterrence and urges a Middle East no-weapon agreement to reduce risk. He contends the broader regional security architecture must discourage all nuclear powers, including Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and neighboring states, with energy collaboration coupled with non-proliferation. On whether Netanyahu would use a nuclear weapon to stay out of jail, Berg says no, arguing the strategic logic of nuclear use deters first use and that leaders know once a nuclear device is used, it invites retaliation. He views Netanyahu as unlikely to employ a nuclear weapon. Rutansi closes, promising continued coverage of the Trump-Netanyahu-Iran dynamic, while Berg declines to dive into conspiracy theories, reiterating that discourse should be grounded in arguments, values, and policy.

Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst and State Department counterterrorism official, discusses the ceasefire and the possibility of renewed war between the United States and Iran, arguing that U.S. military options are constrained while Iran’s readiness and ability to disrupt regional logistics have increased. Johnson says the United States has been prepared to launch strikes for about six weeks since the ceasefire declaration around April 15, but that its remaining operational flexibility is limited by Gulf state access. He emphasizes that Saudi Arabia has not allowed U.S. air operations from Saudi territory. He describes an episode in which, after Trump announced “project freedom” to open the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi leadership shut down the ability to conduct air operations from its territory, even after Trump spoke with Mohammed bin Salman. With Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait affected, Johnson leaves Bahrain out due to its size and says it has been “decimated” by Iranian airstrikes. He also links timing to major religious and diplomatic periods, saying that with the Hajj beginning on Sunday and Eid occurring about next Wednesday or Thursday, Saudi Arabia does not want to be positioned as a target during those activities. He argues that Iran has rearmed faster than U.S. intelligence expected and that Iran can use multilayered air defense and missile capabilities to threaten any entering ships. Johnson highlights a U.S. constraint: U.S. air refueling operations have been largely confined to Iraq airspace, which he says creates additional risk and also forces attacks through narrower routes rather than across wider fronts. He suggests this narrowed channel makes it easier for Iran’s air defense to concentrate. He also cites testimony by Admiral Daryl Caudle, who said the U.S. lacks the capability to open the Strait of Hormuz due to cost and risk, and says Iran’s arsenal can be brought to bear against ships that enter the strait. He further claims the CIA briefings to Congress align more closely with Iran’s increased capabilities since the ceasefire than with Trump administration claims. Johnson connects this situation to negotiations. He says reported negotiations are taking place in Tehran and Islamabad and that Pakistan has stepped up with backing from China and Russia. He suggests a possible deal may not necessarily involve the United States if Gulf states and Iran agree, potentially including Turkey and possibly Egypt, in a broader security arrangement. He argues that if Gulf states shut down U.S. operations on their territory, the United States would have limited options, including for sustained air campaigns. Johnson also proposes a possible window before the World Cup begins, saying he does not see renewed action before the first two weeks of June, with international pressure expected once the World Cup starts. On the substance of talks, Johnson portrays Iran’s negotiating positions as: sanctions relief “up front,” return of frozen assets, and continuing to charge ships entering or leaving the Persian Gulf to comply with rules implemented by the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA). He says nuclear issues are being framed by Iran as a “red herring,” and he cites a claim attributed to Moshe Saba Khamenei (the new Ayatollah) that nuclear material is not even on the table. Johnson also asserts Iran has signed the NPT and allowed IAEA inspections, and he describes Iran as having faced persistent attacks including the “murdering of nuclear scientists,” using this to explain why Iran would assert sovereignty rather than comply with demands he says are being made. In response to a question about how war could happen if the Strait of Hormuz cannot be opened, Johnson reiterates U.S. capability concerns and says Iran’s ability to disrupt logistics remains a central factor. He also argues that markets are reacting in a way he describes as abnormal: over day 84 since the war began and day 22 of a “complete cutoff,” he lists reductions affecting “20% of the world’s oil,” “10% of the world’s access to liquid natural gas,” “35% of the world’s urea,” “30% of the world’s sulfur,” and “44% of the world’s helium.” He claims the U.S. is emptying its strategic reserves and selling them overseas, calling it a “charade,” and says economic effects are likely delayed and could translate into recession or depression, with shortages becoming more apparent later. Johnson argues that Russia and China are pushing an inclusive Persian Gulf security architecture rather than an alliance system aimed at containing Iran, and he says Iran could be pragmatic and flexible on concessions with Gulf states for ship passage in exchange for broader security guarantees. He suggests the most likely outcome is ongoing negotiations producing partial progress rather than an abrupt halt, especially if Saudi refusal to allow unfettered U.S. air operations continues to limit U.S. sustainment. Finally, Johnson ties the likelihood of further U.S. strikes to economic constraints, saying he cannot conceive of strikes strengthening the world economy or the U.S. financial position, and that further escalation would have the opposite effect. He also predicts that by around the end of June the United States will suffer greater economic consequences. He ends by saying the economic situation will ultimately determine whether military strikes continue, and that there are real obstacles preventing a straightforward transition back to major attacks, while pressures for renewed action remain.

Glenn welcomed Seyyed Muhammad Marandi, a Tehran University professor and former Iran nuclear negotiator adviser, and asked about the terms of the current ceasefire and why clarity is hard to get. Marandi explained the progression: the U.S. initially demanded unconditional surrender, then shifted to a “15 plan,” which Iran rejected. Iran developed its own plan, with the Supreme National Security Council sending a modified version to the leader, Ayatollah Bahamani, who finalized it and sent it to Pakistan. Trump ostensibly accepted Iran’s framework as the basis for negotiations, though “that doesn’t mean that we’re going to have peace” and there’s little faith in U.S. willingness to concede the 10 points Iran presented. He described the U.S. as an empire whose capitulation is unlikely, given internal and international pressure and the current closure of the Strait of Hormuz. He warned that the U.S. military footprint in the region would be hard to sustain and would face logistical and environmental strain, which could complicate any new war; nonetheless, Iran is preparing for the worst, having previously negotiated with the U.S. twice and seeing both efforts end in renewed conflict. He attributed recent Israeli actions against Lebanon as an effort to derail the ceasefire, noting that Israeli leadership (Netanyahu) appears motivated to induce more violence to gain leverage domestically, while Western media outlets largely abstain from criticizing these actions. Glenn pressed on how to interpret the two-week window for negotiations and whether Lebanon’s inclusion in the ceasefire remains valid. Marandi reiterated skepticism that the full Iran-focused 10-point plan would be accepted by the United States, calling Trump inconsistent and unpredictable. He suggested the two-week period might be extended if negotiations progress modestly, but doubted any comprehensive agreement would be reached given the U.S. tendency to resist rights-based terms and to change positions rapidly. The two discussed the possibility of renewed U.S.-Iran conflict, with Iran continuing to strike at Israeli targets and American assets in the Gulf if necessary. The conversation then moved to the question of who bears responsibility for the broader regional disruption. Marandi argued that Gulf regimes (the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar) are not in a position to fight Iran; without electricity and infrastructure, they would suffer cataclysmic losses. He asserted that the U.S. could not unify the Gulf states in a new campaign and that Iran would control the Strait of Hormuz if attacked. The UAE’s rumored strike on petrochemical facilities was cited as an example of the ongoing broader conflict. He also suggested Lebanon’s fate is tied to whether Israel continues striking Lebanon or shifts its focus back to Iran, and warned that a failure to constrain Israel would undermine any peace talks. Marandi asserted that the ceasefire’s terms could be undermined by the “Epstein class” influence over Western media and governments, arguing that the global media’s support for Israel’s actions betrays a broader humanitarian and democratic legitimacy crisis in the West. He also noted that Oman’s cooperation around Hormuz might be part of a negotiated arrangement, given Oman’s more favorable relationship with Iran and its geographic position on the strait. He stressed that Iran’s apparent victory could reshape global power dynamics, weakening the U.S. and empowering Iran and other Global South actors, with implications for the petrodollar system and regional alignments. Towards the end, Glenn and Marandi touched on the potential long-term regional changes, including borders and governance in the Gulf, and the broader economic and political costs for Gulf monarchies. Marandi attributed the crisis to Zionist influence on U.S. policy and lamented missed opportunities to pursue normal relations with the United States, referencing authors Flint and Leverett and their book Going to Tehran, which he suggested could have altered current events if heeded. He concluded by reiterating that lessons were not learned and that the war’s consequences would be lasting.

In this discussion, Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst, analyzes whether Donald Trump is seeking an off-ramp from the Iran war and what he might trade away to gain it. Glenn, the host, frames the conversation around the Strait of Hormuz as a potential barrier to an exit, given Trump’s recent tweet that the Strait is not America’s problem and that regional countries should handle it. Johnson emphasizes that Trump’s apparent objective is to declare victory, but he identifies several impediments and possible paths. Johnson contends that the United States has claimed a “100% victory,” asserting that “we've wiped out all of the Iranian army, the Iranian navy, the Iranian air force,” and asks rhetorically why more countries would be needed. He warns, however, that a victory would come with devastating worldwide consequences, including rising gas prices, shortages of fertilizer, and global distress from economic ripples. He notes that Iran began striking back within an hour of the attack on March 28, systematically targeting U.S. military installations, destroying radar systems, and forcing relocations of the Fifth Fleet’s Bahrain base and related assets. He describes the war as becoming a political burden for Trump, who also publicly boasted of military successes even as costs mount. Johnson links Trump’s rhetoric with Netanyahu, suggesting a coordination to present an exit pattern: claim success, then exit with a narrative that the objective was met, while implying Iran must accept a settlement. He asserts that Iran is not going to capitulate simply because the United States and Israel say so, and that Iran seeks a rock-solid guarantee that it will not be attacked again. He notes Russia’s involvement in mediation efforts and argues that Iran can endure a longer war than the United States, particularly as the 2024-2025 political cycle intensifies pressure on Trump. The discussion expands to strategic and economic dimensions. Johnson highlights the Kuwait-like vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz, the potential for Iran to impose a separate corridor or “selective access” within Iranian waters, and the implications for the petrodollar system if Gulf states must pay Iran for safe passage. He argues that an Iranian victory could effectively expel the United States from the Middle East if the region no longer depends on American protection. He questions whether such a shift is feasible, given Iran’s capability and resolve and the West’s miscalculation of Iran’s endurance and strategy. They discuss the broader international-law questions and the West’s posture toward rules-based order. Glenn notes that the Netanyahu-Trump axis may be seeking an off ramp, while Johnson contends that Iran’s response is to demand a political settlement that would reverse U.S. presence and align with IAEA inspections or nonproliferation commitments—an outcome that Trump might try to package as a victory. Johnson stresses that Iran’s stance has shifted from “defeat Iran” to seeking outcomes like IAEA oversight and adherence to nonproliferation norms as conditions for strategic concessions. The conversation also critiques Washington’s military logistics and political optics. Johnson argues that boots-on-the-ground options in the Hormuz region are militarily impractical, given the geography (Normandy-scale landings in a cliff-lined, fortified zone) and Iran’s layered defense. He questions the plausibility of a successful river-to-sea offensive, given the risk to ships, drones, and supply lines, and points to potential escalatory cycles that could involve Russia and China more deeply. Towards the end, they touch on the idea of an exit built around a renewal of JCPOA-like constraints—without naming it as such—as a possible route for Trump to declare victory and withdraw. However, they remain skeptical about whether Iran would accept renewed constraints, given its current strategic posture and allies. The discussion closes with a candid recognition that, according to Johnson, there is a lack of a coherent, realizable strategy to end the conflict on favorable terms for Washington, and that Trump’s political vulnerability could further constrain any viable off-ramp.