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I have said many times that in Istanbul three years ago, we were very close to signing a full agreement. However, Boris Johnson prevented Ukraine from signing it. A Ukrainian official confirmed in an interview that they were ready to sign three years ago, but London and Washington forbade them from doing so.

The panelists discuss whether recent developments around Ukraine, NATO security guarantees, and Western support can produce a peace agreement acceptable to Russia and Ukraine, and what the war’s trajectory might look like by year-end and beyond. Initial reactions and sticking points - Speaker 1 sees potential in recent moves if true and reliable, arguing Ukraine is signaling goodwill to the United States, but remains skeptical that a peace deal will satisfy both sides given core demands over territory and Donbas control. He emphasizes the Donbas as the central unresolved issue. - Speaker 2 notes Putin’s need to show tangible gains to save face, arguing the war is being fought to achieve declared goals and that Russia will not sign a deal unless it secures substantial results. Security guarantees, no-fly zones, and peacekeeping - The discussion centers on two main proposed points: U.S. security guarantees (including possible no-fly zone enforcement) and a European-led peacekeeping force in Ukraine. There is debate about how binding such guarantees would be and whether Russia would accept them, with concerns about the Budapest Memorandum’s history of non-fulfillment versus what a new, more comprehensive, legally binding framework might look like. - Speaker 1 points out that even a robust security package would require Russian agreement, which he doubts will be forthcoming given Moscow’s current aims. He underscores that Europe’s and the U.S.’s support for Ukraine is contingent on political will, which could waver, but he notes Ukraine’s trust gap with U.S. guarantees given past experiences. - Speaker 2 stresses that Putin’s aims include defeating NATO and achieving a U.S.-level accommodation (a “Yalta 2.0” style deal) while keeping Western control over Europe at arm’s length. He argues Putin would accept U.S. and possibly some European troops but not a formal NATO presence on Ukrainian soil, especially in western Donbas or beyond. Budapest memorandum vs. new guarantees - Both sides discuss the difference between a nonbinding Budapest Memorandum and a more robust, legally binding security guarantee. Speaker 1 highlights Ukraine’s past trust in security assurances despite U.S. and European failures to honor them, suggesting skepticism about the enforceability of any new guarantees. Speaker 2 suggests that a stronger, more binding arrangement could be essential for Russia to accept any settlement, but that Moscow would still resist concessions over full Donbas control. On-the-ground realities and war dynamics - The panelists agree Russia is advancing on multiple fronts, though the pace and strategic significance of gains vary. They discuss Ukraine’s ability to sustain the fight through Western weapons flows and domestic production (including drones and shells). They acknowledge the risk of Western fatigue and the potential for a more protracted war, even as Ukraine builds its own capabilities to prolong the conflict. - The West’s long-term willingness to fund and arm Ukraine is debated: Speaker 1 argues Europe’s economy is strained but notes continued political support for Ukraine, which could outlast Russia’s economic stamina. Speaker 2 emphasizes that Russia’s economy is fragile mainly in the provinces, while Moscow and Saint Petersburg remain relatively insulated; he also points to BRICS support (China and India) as sustaining Moscow politically and economically. Economic and strategic pressures - The role of energy revenues and sanctions is debated. Speaker 1 suggests Russia can be pressured economically to seek a deal, while Speaker 2 counters that Russia’s economy is adapting, with China and India providing strategic support that helps Moscow resist Western coercion. They discuss shadow fleet strikes and global energy markets as tools to erode Russia’s war-finance capability. - There is disagreement about whether, over time, economic pressure alone could force regime change in Russia. Speaker 1 is skeptical that penalties will trigger a voluntary Russian withdrawal, while Speaker 2 argues that sustained economic and political pressure, combined with Western unity, could push toward a settlement. Strategies and potential outcomes - Putin’s internal calculus is described as existential: he seeks a win that he can publicly claim to legitimize his rule and justify the costs of the war to the Russian people and elites. This shapes his openness to concessions and to the kinds of guarantees he would accept. - Alexander posits that a near-term peace could emerge from a deal brokered at high levels (potentially involving Trump and Putin) that reshapes European security with U.S. leadership and BRICS engagement, while Paul emphasizes that any credible end to the conflict would require Ukraine and Russia to agree to a swap-like territorial arrangement and to accept a new security framework that deters renewed aggression. End-of-year and longer-term outlooks - By year-end, the panel agrees it is unlikely that a major peace agreement will be realized under the current conditions; any real breakthrough would depend on significant concessions, including Donbas arrangements, and a credible security guarantee framework. - By the end of next year, both expect a continuation of a contested balance: Ukraine likely to press for stronger Western guarantees and EU integration, Russia seeking to preserve Donbas gains while navigating internal and external pressures. Alexander envisions two “wins” emerging: the United States under Trump coordinating a broader peace framework, and China leveraging its economic influence to shape Europe’s response. Paul anticipates a gradual trajectory with ongoing military and economic pressures and a continued stalemate unless a major concession reshapes incentives on both sides.

Biden and Austin admitted that the purpose of the war in Ukraine was not about Ukrainian freedom, but rather to exhaust the Russian army and engage in a proxy war. The US repeatedly prevented Zelensky from signing the Minsk Accords, which could have prevented the war. The speaker believes that the US deliberately provoked Russia and that the war could have been avoided. They argue that the US's actions have led to negative consequences, such as pushing Russia towards China and risking the dollar's status as the world reserve currency. Additionally, the speaker highlights the danger of provoking a nuclear superpower and questions why the conflict was not resolved peacefully from the start.

I was part of the Ukrainian negotiators trying to reach a peaceful settlement with Russia. We were close to finalizing an agreement in April, but it was postponed. In my opinion, Putin realized his mistake and quickly tried to make a deal with Ukraine. He personally accepted the Istanbul communique, which was a compromise compared to Russia's initial ultimatum proposal. It's important to remember that Putin genuinely wanted a peaceful resolution with Ukraine.

Putin initially sought to avoid war and aimed for a diplomatic solution before February 24, 2022. After the conflict began, he engaged in negotiations with Ukraine, focusing on NATO expansion and seeking a neutral Ukraine, without intentions to annex further territory aside from Crimea. However, the U.S. and U.K. influenced Zelensky to abandon negotiations, believing Ukraine and the West could win the war. Initially, this seemed plausible in 2022, but by 2023, the situation has shifted, indicating a challenging year for Ukraine and a potential advantage for Russia in the conflict.

Negotiations with Russia in Istanbul were successful, even to the point of opening a champagne bottle in celebration. The agreement was 90% ready for a direct meeting between Putin and Zelensky, with only the size of Ukrainian armed forces in peacetime remaining. However, after the discovery of Bucha, Zelensky was shocked and the negotiations were halted. A meeting scheduled for April 9th was canceled. The speaker doesn't know if Boris Johnson's visit to Kyiv influenced this decision. Although Russia showed readiness to continue negotiations, Ukraine declined. The speaker now believes an agreement at that time was impossible, as Putin could reframe the conflict as a war against the West, opening a "Pandora's box" of global issues. The speaker views the current situation as a new "Thirty Years' War," signaling the end of the modern era.

Speaker: Discussing the future of Ukraine, Putin requested written plans from the Americans, but Biden refused to negotiate. This should have sparked concern in Germany, as a potential war would involve them. If conflict arises as the Americans warned, Germany will be drawn into the issue.

The United States also wants to end this conflict. And before Putin launched his full invasion, we used every tool we could to try to prevent it. We used every tool diplomatically to prevent this war from starting. Did we really? Nope. The exact opposite is the case. The Russians were desperate to avoid a war. All you have to do is go back and look at the 12/17/2021 letter that Putin sent to both he and Stoltenberg, the head of NATO, and to president Biden, suggesting a deal and talking about getting together to figure out how to shut this conflict down and avoid a war. And we basically in fact, it was Tony Blinken who gave the Russians the high sign. We told them we're not interested, and we continued to push and push and push. And then when the Russians invaded on 02/24/2022, the Russians immediately thereafter sent a signal to the Ukrainians that they wanted to start peace negotiations. They wanted to end the war. This is right after they started it. Why? Because the Russians had no interest in a war. And, the peace negotiations were moving along quite well. There was no final agreement for sure, and one can never be certain that an agreement would have been worked out. But they were making major progress for sure, throughout March and early April. And lo and behold, The United States and the British basically tell the Ukrainians that they should walk away from the negotiations.

On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine after sabotaging the Minsk agreements for seven years. The video argues that the primary purpose of the United States and United Kingdom was to sabotage the Istanbul negotiations in April 2022 in order to keep a long war going, using Ukrainians as a proxy to weaken Russia as a strategic rival. The author asserts that a US hegemonic strategy relies on perpetual dominance and NATO expansion, and that US aims include preserving global primacy by weakening rivals like Russia. The video emphasizes that this view is controversial, but presents evidence of Western actions that allegedly undermined peace talks. Before Istanbul, Zelensky had signaled openness to discussing Ukraine’s neutral status immediately after the invasion (February 25–26, 2022). By February 27, Moscow and Kyiv agreed to peace talks without preconditions. Meanwhile, US and UK officials signaled opposition to peace without preconditions and framed diplomacy as contingent on Russia’s withdrawal and a de-escalation, framing Moscow’s proposals as negotiation under the barrel of a gun. Ned Price of the US State Department stated that Moscow was proposing diplomacy at the barrel of a gun and urged Russia to halt its bombing and withdraw. UK comments by James Heappey on February 26 framed regime change as the objective, asserting Putin’s days as president would be numbered and that Ukrainian sovereignty must be restored. The EU’s €450 million in military aid approved on February 27 was said to reduce incentives to negotiate with Moscow. UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson on February 28 framed measures as bringing down the Putin regime. In March 2022, US officials framed the war as broader than Russia or Ukraine, emphasizing world order and rules to uphold, with Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stating the aim to weaken Russia so it could not quickly reproduce aggression. Former CIA Director Leon Panetta described the conflict as a proxy war with Russia, advocating direct actions to “kill Russians.” Bloomberg reports by Neil Ferguson in March 2022 suggested a preference for extending the conflict to bleed Putin, with the endgame being the end of the Putin regime. Zelensky’s March 27, 2022 interview with The Economist noted that “everyone has varied interests,” including some Western factions preferring a long war to exhaust Russia, even at Ukraine’s expense. Despite this, negotiations proceeded in Istanbul, where progress was reported as substantial and a deal near. Ukrainian media (Ukrainian Pravda) quoted Boris Johnson as telling Kyiv that Putin is a war criminal and that even if Ukraine were ready to sign guarantees, the UK and US would not support it. Johnson would later advocate “strategic endurance” and a long war, while Zelensky’s party leader Andriy Arakhamiya indicated Johnson had told Kyiv not to sign any deal at all, opting to continue the war. Turkey and Israel played mediator roles; Naftali Bennett argued that Russia wanted to end NATO expansion and make huge concessions, and that Zelensky accepted neutrality, but the West blocked a peace agreement to keep pressuring Putin. Turkish officials suggested Zelensky was ready to sign a peace agreement before US/UK intervention, and implied the war is not simply Russia–Ukraine but a war between Russia and the West, with the West prolonging the conflict to weaken Russia. In later years, Western leaders publicly praised using Ukraine to weaken Russia and pivot focus to China, framing continued arms support as essential. By 2024, as negotiations stalled and Ukraine’s situation worsened, Johnson warned that Ukraine’s fall would threaten Western hegemony, while European diplomacy was downplayed in favor of weapon aid as the path to peace. The speaker concludes that recognizing the Istanbul negotiations’ sabotage matters for seeking the best possible deal today, rather than pursuing a protracted proxy war that harms Ukraine and prolongs the conflict.

Trump was elected partly on the promise to end costly wars like the one in Ukraine. Ending the war has been a topic since before it began. The Minsk agreements aimed to resolve the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, but Ukraine didn't implement key provisions, like constitutional changes for Russian-speaking people. In 2021, Zelensky signed a law to reclaim temporarily occupied areas, including Crimea, a red line for Russia. Crimea has historically been Russian, with a majority Russian population. A plebiscite showed Crimeans favored joining Russia. We could have avoided war by saying NATO would never accept Ukraine. Johnson shut down negotiations in Istanbul. This has been a failure on our military leadership.

Russia has shown willingness to negotiate and make concessions in the past, such as withdrawing its presence in Ukraine. However, a proposed agreement between Russia and Ukraine did not materialize due to intervention from the West, specifically former British Prime Minister Johnson. The current situation calls for both sides to return to the negotiating table, with the United States exerting pressure on Ukraine to express its readiness. General Milley, the American Chief of Staff, has recently called for an end to the ongoing military conflict in Ukraine, as the country cannot make further progress or win the war.

The speakers argue about how to achieve peace with Russia and what must be on the table. The central claim is that a lasting peace on Ukraine cannot be achieved without addressing the status of certain Russian-held territories. They contend that the priority of the Slovak opposition is not simply “peace” but “closing down Putin,” and they suggest that some Western leaders misunderstand the reality of concessions necessary for peace. A key point raised is that, according to the speaker, a proposed agreement would leave the Donbas, along with Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, at their current front-line lines. They recount an account that, when Putin visited Alaska, Trump asked whether such concessions were on the table, and Trump reportedly accepted them but asked for time to think, prompting Zelensky and the European Union to reconsider. The speaker asserts that both Trump and Putin understood that if this issue is not resolved, it would repeatedly derail any agreement, noting that this pattern has persisted in past negotiations. The speaker asserts that, theoretically, there can be no peace without some territorial concessions, and asks whether the opposition has a different idea. They challenge those who claim to seek peace to propose an alternative. The speaker also argues that civil casualties alone cannot dictate the terms of peace; even if more civilians die, the numbers complicate rather than resolve the moral calculus. They claim that the leadership must meet to discuss and reach a plan that both sides could accept or reject, implying that unilateral opinions on the war’s end are insufficient. There is critique of postponing summits for political reasons, suggesting that meetings should happen regularly regardless of electoral timelines (e.g., waiting for Hungary’s elections to influence talks). The speaker asserts that hundreds or thousands are discussed at every summit, and argues that stopping discussions is not a solution, implying that only negotiations can yield real outcomes. Regarding energy policy, the speaker labels a proposed energy package as ideologically driven and harmful to all parties. They question what happens when the war ends and how the energy debate persists. They assert that Russia remains a major supplier of gas to Europe and to Ukraine’s needs, portraying sanctions as failing to alter Russia’s behavior. Finally, the speaker contends that Russia’s conventional military power cannot be defeated outright, and that the Ukraine will bear the heaviest losses and territorial losses in any outcome. They describe the war as ultimately producing a costly result for Ukraine, with the prospect that the country will lose territory and suffer immense casualties, while Russia continues to hold the upper hand militarily in many respects.

Larry: Lavrov claimed Ukraine attempted to attack Putin’s official residence in Novgorod with around 91 long-range drones in December; allegedly all intercepted, no proof provided, no reported injuries or damage. Lavrov said retaliation is coming, targets for retaliatory strikes and timing had been set. Putin supposedly mentioned this on a call to Trump two days before the Zelensky meeting in Florida; Yuri, a Kremlin aide, said Putin was shocked and outraged, and that it would influence Washington’s approach to working with Zelensky. Russians claim Trump was relieved that no Tomahawk missiles were provided to Ukraine. No US confirmation; Trump described the meeting with Putin as very productive, and discussions included the temporary ceasefire not being an option. Budanov had suggested it wouldn’t be the first assassination attempt on Putin, but the most consequential due to timing. The question posed: who is the target—Ukraine, Zelensky, Budanov—or a Russian false flag to justify attacks and derail negotiations. Speaker 1: Timelines. The attack allegedly began the night of the 28th and continued into the 29th. The Russians say it was an attack on one of Putin’s residences, described as terrorism. Putin hasn’t lived at his residences for three years, using the Kremlin instead, but this is not the first Ukrainian attempt to target Putin; there was a proposed attack when he flew into Kursk by helicopter. Russians are upset that this attack had no military objective, only potential assassination, and they know Putin wasn’t there. The Russians view it as real and plan to respond; Lavrov indicated that negotiations would be reexamined. Budanov claims Ukrainian intelligence has targeted Putin multiple times; the attack timing coincides with Zelensky in Florida, suggesting possible rifts or risk of undermining negotiations. The possibility of Western (American or British) intelligence involvement is raised, with speculation about CIA influence or European intelligence, particularly Britain’s MI6, given its Ukrainian roots. The question remains whether the attack was staged to derail negotiations or a genuine strike. Larry: If Ukraine did this, why would they? Ukraine might want to eliminate an obstacle to peace, though that could backfire; some argue Putin is more restrained than any immediate successor. If 91 drones were launched, Western intelligence would likely be involved, possibly undermining Trump’s approach. There is a sense of mixed messages from U.S. intelligence, with individuals like Susan Miller pushing claims of Russian interference that contradict other narratives. Zelensky stated no territory would be ceded as part of negotiations; Russia’s position is that Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk must be permanently part of the Russian Federation, elections must occur in Ukraine before negotiations, NATO must be out of Ukraine, and demilitarization is non-negotiable. Russia suggests there will be no 800,000-man army; these conditions are not open for negotiation. Russia may be willing to discuss numbers of troops for Ukraine, but not to concede core territorial goals. Speaker 0: If CIA or other elements were behind this, could it be to undermine Trump or push for a peace deal by pressuring Putin? Putin showed up in uniform with the military leadership, signaling a hard stance on land/territory, stating that negotiations should proceed without ceasing. Some argue this would trigger a stronger Russian push, while others see this as undermining Trump’s efforts. Trump and Zelensky had discussed a peace plan with 90-95% agreement, with a few thorny issues, possibly territorial. Trump characterized their call as productive; Russia reportedly agreed to support Ukraine postwar with discounted energy and resources. Lavrov’s rapid response to the attack and the potential retaliation would affect ongoing negotiations, which some view as already derailed due to Ukraine’s intransigence on concessions. Speaker 1: Could European intelligence be involved? Britain’s MI6 is seen as critical; there is a suggestion that British intelligence could have acted without American consultation. This would strain relations with Trump, especially after new security strategy. The transcript also notes a broader shift in Western posture: some European leaders are pushing for stronger defense and a more independent European stance, which might influence the dynamic around negotiations and intelligence actions. Speaker 0: Zelensky’s Christmas remark, “may he perish,” followed by an attack on Putin’s residence, prompts questions about who’s pulling Zelensky’s strings. Zelensky is described as the “highest paid actor in the world” with large sums allegedly pilfered from Ukraine’s aid; Zelensky could be expendable to those steering Ukraine’s direction. The meeting in Mar-a-Lago between Zelensky, Trump, and others occurred while the Putin residence attack was underway, suggesting an attempt to undermine negotiations. Budanov’s connection to the CIA and potential independent actions by Ukrainian intelligence raise further concerns about internal Ukrainian divisions. Speaker 1: Russia’s potential retaliation could target Ukrainian intelligence assets like the SBU headquarters in Kyiv, or European assets inside Ukraine if evidence points to Western involvement. Russia’s current military actions include continuing strikes on power infrastructure, with movements in Zaporizhzhia and around Kherson, indicating an axis of attack. Independently, Russia claims significant ground progress; Ukraine counters with claims of selective advances by Russia and a favorable propaganda edge for Ukraine. The battlefield metrics show Russia increasing manpower and maintaining multiple axes of attack, with eight or more fronts, while Ukrainian recoveries of bodies show a ratio suggesting heavy Ukrainian losses. Speaker 0: The conversation ends with expectations for retaliation, possible new European involvement, and the enduring fear that negotiations remain unsettled. The next days could reveal more about who is behind the attack, how Russia responds, and whether a path to peace remains possible, given the conflicting narratives and competing strategic interests.

They were ready to end the war if we take on the neutrality of Finland and promise not to join NATO. Boris Johnson came to Kyiv and said we won't sign anything with them, let's just fight. But as soon as we called on them to sit down, the next day they were already waiting with a delegation.

Russia has been invaded three times through Ukraine, and they don't want Ukraine to join NATO. Gorbachev agreed to German reunification under NATO with the promise that NATO wouldn't expand eastward. However, in 1997, plans were made to move NATO eastward, incorporating 15 countries and surrounding the Soviet Union. NATO expanded into 14 new nations and withdrew from nuclear weapons treaties with Russia, placing missile systems in Romania and Poland. The U.S. allegedly overthrew the Ukrainian government in 2014, installing a Western-sympathetic government. Russia then entered Crimea to protect its warm water port. The new Ukrainian government allegedly began killing ethnic Russians in Donbas and Lugans. The Minsk Accords, designed to keep NATO out of Ukraine, were refused by the Ukrainian parliament. Zelenskyy was elected in 2019 promising to sign the Accords, but allegedly pivoted due to threats from ultra-rightists and the U.S. Russia then intervened, aiming to negotiate. A treaty guaranteeing Ukraine wouldn't join NATO was allegedly signed, but Boris Johnson, allegedly under Joe Biden's direction, forced Zelenskyy to abandon it.

Naftali Bennett said that Boris Johnson interfered and prevented Ukrainians from signing a deal with Russia. Ukrainian representative Karakami confirmed that Johnson advised stopping negotiations to win the war militarily. According to Speaker 1, the Ukrainians began asking for advice late in the negotiation process. It became clear that Putin's main condition, buried in an annex, would limit the kinds of weapons systems Ukraine could have, effectively neutering it militarily. Russia would face no similar constraints, such as pulling back or creating a buffer zone. Questions arose about whether this was a good deal, at which point the deal fell apart.

Speaker 0 argues that this is not an attack by Putin on Ukraine in the way it is commonly framed. The speaker references 1990, stating that on 02/09/1990 James Baker III told Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not move eastward if Germany unified, and that Gorbachev agreed, ending World War II. The speaker asserts that the US then cheated starting in 1994 when Clinton signed off on a plan to expand NATO all the way to Ukraine, marking the rise of the neocons and identifying Clinton as the first agent of this. NATO expansion began in 1999 with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, at which point Russia did not see a direct threat. The speaker notes the US-led bombing of Serbia in 1999 as problematic, describing it as NATO bombing Belgrade for seventy-eight straight days to break the country apart, which Russia did not like. Putin became president, and the Russians initially tolerated and complained but were largely subdued. The speaker claims Putin started out pro-European and pro-American, even suggesting joining NATO when there was some mutual respect. After 9/11 and the Afghan conflict, Russia supported the effort to root out terror. Two decisive actions are highlighted: in 2002, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, described as perhaps the most decisive event rarely discussed in this context. This led to the US placing missile systems in Eastern Europe, which Russia views as a direct threat. The speaker mentions a soft regime change operation in Ukraine in 2004-2005, followed by Yanukovych winning the election in 2009 and becoming president in 2010 on the basis of neutrality for Ukraine. This calmed tensions because the US was pushing NATO, while Ukrainian public opinion reportedly did not want NATO membership, citing a divided country between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians and a desire to stay away from certain conflicts. In 02/22/2014, the United States allegedly participated in the overthrow of Yanukovych, described as a typical US regime change operation. The Russians supposedly intercepted a call between Victoria Nuland (then at the State Department, now at Columbia University) and Jeffrey Piot, the US ambassador to Ukraine, discussing who would be in the next government. The speaker asserts that after these events, the US said NATO would enlarge, while Putin repeatedly warned to stop, noting that promises were made not to enlarge NATO. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia are listed as having joined NATO in 2004, before the broader enlargement. The speaker accuses the US of rejecting the basic idea of not expanding NATO to Russia’s border while placing missile systems after breaking a treaty, including walking out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019. On 12/15/2021, Putin allegedly proposed a draft Russia-US security agreement with no NATO enlargement, which the speaker says he communicated to the White House, urging negotiations to avoid war. The speaker claims Jake Sullivan asserted an open-door policy for NATO enlargement, calling it “bullshit,” and asserts that they refused negotiations, leading to the special military operation, with Zelensky offering neutrality and Western leaders pushing Ukraine to fight, resulting in “600,000 deaths now of Ukrainians.”

The Russians sent a small number of troops to Ukraine to pressure them into negotiations. They wanted assurance that Ukraine wouldn't join NATO. After signing a treaty, Putin began withdrawing troops. However, Joe Biden allegedly forced the British prime minister to tear up the treaty during a visit to Ukraine. Since then, a significant number of children have tragically lost their lives.

Putin claimed to have a document outlining a peace agreement with Ukraine, which he showed during negotiations in Istanbul. The agreement was called the Permanent Agreement on Ukraine and Security Guarantees, consisting of 18 articles covering everything from military equipment to personnel. However, Putin did not make the document public. The Ukrainian delegation aimed to prolong the process, while the Russian delegation wanted to pressure Ukraine into signing the agreement, particularly by ensuring Ukraine's non-membership in NATO. Ukraine refused this point due to the need for constitutional changes and lack of trust in Russia's commitment. The lack of preparation and uncertainty led Ukraine to only work towards an agreement with 100% assurance that history would not repeat itself. Boris Johnson's visit to Kyiv further complicated matters, as he stated that no agreements would be signed, suggesting a preference for continued conflict.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss a cascade of developments around Ukraine, Russia, and Western policy. - Speaker 0 notes that Trump reportedly changed his stance on Tomahawk missiles, mentions a meeting with Zelensky where Zelensky supposedly urged acceptance of a Putin deal, and recalls that the Trump-Putin meeting was canceled. Speaker 1 responds that Russia has 100% made clear there will be no freeze and that for the war to end, Ukraine must leave all Russian territory. He says Tomahawk missiles were never on the table, that this was a pressure ploy by Trump to push Russia, and that it could have led to a thermonuclear war, which Putin reminded the US about in their conversations. - According to Speaker 1, Ukrainians will die, Russians will advance, Ukrainian economy will be destroyed, and Ukrainian energy infrastructure will be annihilated, leading to the collapse of Ukraine as a nation. Speaker 0 sketches a timeline: initial plans for a Putin-Trump-Zelensky sequence, Putin’s call after Trump hinted at Tomahawks, then a Zelensky meeting where Zelensky allegedly pressed Trump to accept a Putin deal, after which Tomahawks were no longer on the table and the Trump-Putin meeting was canceled. - Speaker 1 repeats: Tomahawks were never on the table; this was a pressure tactic. He explains the Russia-US exchange as frank, with Russia laying down the law; he asserts that the US would have faced a major escalation if Tomahawks had been supplied, because Tomahawks are nuclear-capable. He claims Ukraine would have been made a party to the conflict through US involvement. He adds that Russia will not accept a freeze because, constitutionally, Ukraine must leave all Russian territory, including Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Lugansk. - Speaker 0 asks why Tomahawks would matter, and Speaker 1 reiterates that Storm Shadow and Scout missiles are not nuclear capable, while Tomahawks would be, and contrasts this with Ukraine’s Flamingo drone, dismissing Flamingo as a propaganda tool. He describes Flamingo as a wooden drone designed to mimic a flock of birds and says it will be shot down and is not a serious threat; Ukraine’s drone capability is strong, with Ukrainians as the second-best fighters and drones in the world, while Russians are first in drone capability. - They discuss the trajectory of the war: Speaker 1 emphasizes that Russia’s advance is strategic, with drone warfare transforming the battlefield into piecemeal advances. He asserts Russia’s kill ratio of 36 Ukrainians to 1 Russian, and argues the West’s narrative of Russia suffering more is fantasy. He notes the West’s support for Ukraine drains Ukraine’s resources while Russia’s defense industry booms, and that Russia’s economy, energy, and sanctions resistance show resilience. - On economics, Speaker 1 claims the Russian economy is thriving; gas is cheap in Russia, Novosibirsk and Ekaterinburg are booming, and sanctions have not toppled Russia. He argues Europe’s sanctions are not beating Russia and that Russia’s ruble remains strong; he contrasts this with Western expectations of Russia’s collapse. - They discuss casualty figures and manpower. Speaker 0 asks for a definite casualty number; Speaker 1 cites Ukrainians dying daily (tens of thousands over time) and asserts Russians suffer hundreds daily on their worst day, noting Ukraine’s manpower shortages and Russia’s mobilization efforts: Russia conducted a one-time 300,000-mobilization; Ukraine has mobilized seven or eight times and relies on volunteers and external manpower, including Western units in some cases. He contends Russia’s total forces expanded to 1.5 million due to NATO expansion and ongoing operations. - On battlefield tactics, Speaker 1 explains Russia’s algorithm: three-man assault teams using drone support to seize bunkers held by larger Ukrainian forces, followed by reinforcement, all while drone warfare dominates. He asserts Ukraine’s drone capacity is strong, but Russia counters with its own drones and targeting of Ukrainian drone operators. - They debate why Russia would not freeze lines even if Ukraine yielded Donbas, Lugansk, and Donetsk. Speaker 1 insists those regions are Russian territory per referendum and constitutional absorption in September 2022, and argues that Ukraine cannot give up Donbas, which is Russia’s, and that a freeze would not be acceptable to Russia. He asserts that Moscow will not abandon these territories and that any idea of a freeze is a Western fantasy. - The discussion touches on the Minsk accords, the Istanbul talks, and the argument that Ukraine’s leadership initially pursued peace but later prepared for renewed conflict with NATO backing. Speaker 1 contends that Minsk was a sham agreed to buy time, and that Russia’s goal was to compel Ukraine to honor commitments to protect Russian speakers; Ukraine’s leadership is accused of pursuing war rather than peace after early negotiations. - They discuss Wagner and Prigozin’s role: Wagner provided a vehicle to surge capabilities into Lugansk and Donetsk; after September 2022 these troops were to be absorbed into the Russian military, but Prigozin continued operations in Bachmuth, recruited prisoners, and pressured for offensive allocations; this culminated in a confrontation with Shoigu and Gerasimov, and Wagner eventually faced disbandment pressure and a mobilization response. - In closing, Speaker 0 notes recent sanctions and Putin’s response condemning them as attempts to pressure Russia, while Speaker 1 reiterates that Russia seeks to end the war and rebuild relations with the US, but not under ongoing Ukraine conflict. He emphasizes that India and China will stand with Russia, citing strategic partnerships and the desire to maintain sovereign energy decisions, and predictsRussia will endure sanctions while seeking new buyers and alliances. - The exchange ends with Putin signaling that new sanctions will have costs for the EU, while Speaker 1 reiterates that Russia will adapt and maintain its strategic position, with China and India aligned with Russia rather than yielding to Western pressure.

In April 2022, an agreement was signed between President Putin and President Zelensky, facilitated by the leaders of Israel and Turkey. This agreement was favorable for the American people, primarily addressing Putin's demand to keep NATO out of Ukraine. Following the signing, Putin began withdrawing troops. However, President Biden intervened, sending Boris Johnson to pressure Zelensky into abandoning the treaty. As a result, the conflict escalated, leading to the tragic loss of 600,000 Ukrainian children and bringing the world closer to nuclear confrontation.

Putin's intention in the war was to force Zelensky to negotiate—Neutrality. "The idea was to keep NATO. And what is NATO? It's The United States off of Russia's border. No more, no less." When the Soviet Union ended in 1991, an agreement was made that NATO will not move one inch eastward, but "the decision was taken formally in 1994 when president Clinton signed off on NATO enlargement to the East, all the way to Ukraine and into Georgia." Enlargement continued: 1999 (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic); 2004 (Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia). Putin said "stop" in 02/2007; in 02/2008, "The United States jammed down Europe's throat enlargement of NATO to Ukraine and to Georgia." 02/2010, Yanukovych neutrality; US overthrow in 2014; Minsk accords; "autonomy for the Russian speaking regions" in the East. "Blinken told Lavrov in January 2022, The United States reserves the right to put missile systems wherever it wants." The war started; "Ukraine walked away unilaterally from a near agreement" because "The United States told them to." It's the pure proxy war; and "a million Ukrainians have died or been severely"

Naftali Bennett said that Boris Johnson interfered and prevented Ukrainians from signing a deal at the end of negotiations. Ukrainian representative Karakami confirmed that Johnson advised stopping negotiations to win the war militarily. According to Speaker 1, the Ukrainians began asking for advice late in the process. It became clear that Putin's main condition, buried in an annex, would limit the kinds of weapons systems Ukraine could have, effectively neutering it as a military force. Russia would face no similar constraints, such as pulling back or creating a buffer zone. Questions arose about whether it was a good deal, and the deal fell apart.

Speaker 1 argues that the United States has repeatedly engaged in illegal military actions and regime changes in multiple countries, starting with the bombing of Belgrade for 78 days to change borders of a European state, with the aim of breaking Serbia and installing Bondsteel, a large NATO base in the Balkans, under Clinton. They claim this was done without UN authority and described as a NATO mission. Speaker 1 continues, alleging that the US has subsequently waged war in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, where, according to them, the Obama administration and Hillary Clinton tasked the CIA with overthrowing Bashar al-Assad. They also claim NATO illegally bombed Libya to topple Muammar Gaddafi, and that in Kyiv in February 2014 the US overthrew Yanukovych together with right-wing Ukrainian military forces, noting that the overthrow happened the day after EU representatives had reached an agreement with Yanukovych for early elections, a government of national unity, and a stand-down of both sides. They assert that the US supported the new government immediately afterward, despite that agreement and without addressing it as unconstitutional. Speaker 1 asserts that Russia, the United States, and the EU were parties to the 2015 Minsk two agreement, which was unanimously voted on by the UN Security Council, signed by the government of Ukraine, and guaranteed explicitly by Germany and France. They contend that Minsk II was dismissed as a holding pattern by inside-US government circles, despite the UN Security Council approval. They claim Angela Merkel later said Minsk II was a holding pattern to allow Ukraine time to build its strength, countering the assertion that Minsk II was meant to end the war. The speaker emphasizes distrust of the United States government and calls for all sides to sit down publicly to agree on terms, with both the United States and Russia committing to specific boundaries, and for NATO not to enlarge, so that a written, global judgment can be made. Speaker 2 adds that there has been an ongoing effort to create an anti-Russian platform in Ukraine, describing it as an enclave, and accusing the US and its allies of lying about not expanding NATO multiple times. Speaker 3 states that President Putin sent a draft treaty asking NATO to promise no more enlargement as a precondition for not invading Ukraine, and notes that this draft was not signed.

They were ready to end the war if we took a neutral stance like Finland and promised not to join NATO. When we returned to Istanbul, Boris Johnson came to Kyiv and said we wouldn't sign anything with them and let's just fight. But as soon as we called on them to sit down, the next day they would already be sitting, waiting with a delegation.