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President Trump was asked if he still considers President Xi a dictator. He confirmed that he does, explaining that President Xi holds significant power and authority.

China and the United States have the potential to collaboratively address global issues. It's crucial for both nations to work together. I had a long-standing friendship with him, and we spent countless hours discussing various topics. He is truly remarkable. Have you had a chance to talk to him in private? The press often disapproves of my casual remarks, but I find him to be an extraordinary individual. Did you discuss the trailer from last week?

To sell to Americans, products must be made in America or face tariffs. China's economic model is uniquely imbalanced, with extremely high export levels relative to GDP and population. China is in a deflationary recession and is trying to export its way out, which the US can't allow. The ideal scenario involves a deal where the US and China rebalance their economies. China would consume more and manufacture less, while the US would consume less and manufacture more. This would level the playing field, although military and economic rivalry would persist. China's business model is considered broken, potentially due to tariffs. Because China has a large deficit with the US, they need US markets to survive. The relationship between President Trump and Chairman Xi provides confidence that details can be worked out and prevent things from going haywire.

The president's strategy drove recent events. He and the speaker discussed it at length on Sunday. The president may have goaded China into a bad position, leading them to be perceived as bad actors. The U.S. is willing to cooperate with allies and trading partners who did not retaliate. The message was simple: don't retaliate, and things will turn out well.

Chinese leaders mistakenly believed the U.S. intended to attack. I assured General Lee that there would be no war between great powers and emphasized that if tensions rose, communication would occur. I made it clear that the U.S. would not attack, aiming to convey President Trump's intent to prevent escalation. In a different segment, a new collectible coin commemorating the fight against the deep state and the election of Donald Trump is introduced. This coin, limited to 4,000 pieces, celebrates the anticipated inauguration of Trump as the 47th president on January 20, 2025. Purchasing this coin supports ongoing efforts against globalist influences.

Xu Qinhua, host of Dialogue at CGTN, joined Glenn to discuss Donald Trump’s meeting with Xi Jinping in Beijing on 05/14/2026, including the atmosphere, objectives, and key issues shaping China–U.S. relations. Xu Qinhua said the day’s atmosphere was “very positive.” Trump was impressed by the welcoming ceremony, reviewing the ceremonial guards with Xi Jinping, visits to the Temple of Heaven, and a state banquet. The leaders spent the morning in discussions with their teams, then met at the Temple of Heaven in the afternoon. In the evening, they attended a state banquet hosted by the presidency. Xi Jinping’s speech emphasized that China–U.S. should be “partners rather than rivals,” while Trump’s warm response highlighted shared values between Chinese and Americans and referenced long engagement between the peoples over about 250 years. Trump cited early U.S. contact with China in 1784, including the arrival of a U.S. ship, Chinese terms for newcomers, Chinese workers helping link the Pacific and Atlantic through a continental railroad, the establishment of Tsinghua University, U.S.-China allied cooperation during World War II, and Confucius being respected in the U.S. Xu Qinhua said both sides agreed on a vision described as “strategic constructive… strategic stability” to guide the relationship for the next three years or even beyond. Glenn raised the broader concern that Trump’s administrations, and more broadly U.S. views that China is the main peer rival, often place China in the spotlight. He referenced Xi Jinping’s idea of overcoming the “Thucydides’ trap” and asked about prospects for easing the economic war shaped by trade, technology, and tariffs. Xu Qinhua said Xi Jinping meant overcoming the trap and setting a new model for major-power relationships. Xu described China and the U.S. as peers in terms of economy, high-tech development, innovation, and military capabilities, arguing that how they handle the relationship affects not only both countries but global stability. He said trade used to serve as a “ballast” stabilizer because of investment and exports, but the relationship is now again at a challenging time involving trade war, tech war, and tariffs. Xu said both sides were discussing the possibility of a “new model” of coexistence, emphasizing “cooperation” and limiting “zero sum” thinking. Glenn asked what specific issues must be resolved, including whether the focus is tariffs, chip export limitations, or China’s willingness to export rare earths, and noted U.S. interest in Chinese purchases of U.S. energy and agriculture. Xu Qinhua responded that they were discussing building a “border for trade” and a “board of investment” to institutionalize dialogues and communications to address individual issues regularly rather than in isolated cases. Xu said from China’s perspective the trade war has brought suffering to both sides; China’s exports continued to grow even as U.S. tariff efforts did not stop Chinese exports. Xu said the Chinese side was pragmatic about expanding trade in areas that are not sensitive, such as advanced chips, and that U.S. companies could be willing to sell items like oil, agriculture products (including soybeans and beef), and Boeing airplanes if trade targets fall outside high-tech and national-security sensitivities. He said China’s theme is cooperation-focused “strategic stability,” with limited competition, and communication across multiple areas including military and trade. Xu argued trade itself is mutually beneficial and that trade imbalance is not the real issue, tying underlying concerns to the U.S. role as the supplier of the major reserve currency. On energy security, Glenn described U.S. efforts to reduce exports from key energy exporters and replace them with U.S. supplies, including claims about Europe after Nord Stream and a push for U.S. centrality in energy infrastructure and sales. Xu Qinhua said China has concern about over-reliance on U.S. oil and LNG and forming reliance on the U.S. market amid negative U.S. media coverage and low trust. He said China has diversified exports to ASEAN, Southeast Asia, African countries, Latin America, and European markets, and diversified energy sources so reliance on a single source is usually not over 20%, with oil and gas coming from Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Ghana, among others. Xu said China is rapidly developing renewable energy (EVs, solar panels, and wind turbines), investing in nuclear power plants under construction, and also has coal resources and technology to transform coal into gas so that coal can provide electricity in worst-case scenarios. He linked this to energy security being both about sufficient supply and access to energy resources globally. Glenn raised Taiwan as a central security issue and asked how central it was in talks and whether a reduced-tension common meeting point existed. Xu Qinhua said Xi Jinping raised Taiwan as expected in discussions with Trump, calling it the most important issue between China and the U.S. and warning that mishandling it could put the overall relationship in jeopardy. Xu said the Chinese side increased the volume and severity of its messaging, warning that Taiwan separatist activity threatens regional peace and stability; Xu said arms sales to Taiwan embolden secessionists and create security risks. Xu said the U.S. “one China” principle has been hollowed out, citing that while a 1982 communiqué foundation includes that the U.S. would reduce arms sales until zero, Xu claimed the U.S. has increased arms sales to Taiwan. Xu argued that if Washington truly cared about peace, it would make clear to separatists that it opposes Taiwan independence and support peaceful reunification efforts, which Xu said would remove a persistent irritant and allow cooperation on issues such as AI governance and crises including the Strait of Hormuz and Ukraine. Xu added that even with U.S. intervention, Taiwan purchases of arms would not match Mainland capabilities, and he said U.S. support for separatists would fail to slow China’s modernization. Glenn asked about Iran and the Strait of Hormuz as an issue discussed between Xi and Trump. Xu Qinhua said the leaders’ discussions covered the Iranian crisis. Xu said some U.S. media coverage claimed Trump should pressure China to pressure the Iranians, but Xu said the “wrong approach” would be pressure from Washington; Xu said Beijing has nothing to do with the crisis and that the crisis is tied to a war launched by Washington and the Israelis without UN authorization, without proper explanation, and without legitimacy. Xu said China and the U.S. share some common interest in opening the Strait of Hormuz because Gulf nations’ exports rely on it and because China purchases about 50–40% of its energy from the region. Xu said Washington would need to restrain demands, respect the fact that it launched the war and failed to achieve its goals, and accept reality, while the Chinese side would help seek a long-term deal and stable relationship between the U.S. and Iran. Xu said the U.S. side had not been seen as earnest or faithful in resolving the problem. When Glenn asked how this aligns with a common stance that Iran should not have nuclear weapons, Xu Qinhua said he did not see tensions upcoming between China and Iran. Xu said multiple oil tankers were navigating the Strait of Hormuz with limited disruption, and that about 90% of Iranian oil exports go to China, meaning there is no point for China to ask for tolls on tankers destined for China. Xu said if Iranian control or tolls occur, China would not oppose, especially if the U.S. refuses compromise, refuses to lift sanctions, and does not allow normal business with other countries. Xu described the key issue as how long the U.S. will tolerate inflationary pressure and how the U.S. continues its approach against what he characterized as an Iranian blockade against the U.S. blockade. In closing, Glenn asked whether the meeting would produce a “grand bargain” or only minor tweaks to resolve disputes. Xu Qinhua said the encounter was significant, not only between the leaders but also because top executives mingled and talked, which Xu said could increase understanding and opportunities for engagement that had been absent for nine years or longer. Xu said 2026 could be a milestone year for China–U.S. relations due to frequent future meeting opportunities: Trump’s invitation for Xi to visit the U.S. in late September, plus further opportunities on the sidelines of APEC in Shenzhen and the G20 summit in the U.S. Xu said they had found the “right approach” of constructive strategic stability with cooperation-focused limited competition, moving away from zero-sum mentality, which Xu said could benefit both sides and the world.

During my campaign, I supported Taiwanese independence. I hate China, and I hate Xi Jinping. I've denounced China and would die for America. I'm making it clear that these people will never be near me again. I have nothing to do with them! Do you want me to shout from the rooftops that the CCP is bad? Because I think Xi Jinping is a piece of shit, and he should go to hell. I believe that the most important relationship is that between China and the United States. We need leaders to see that China is now a peer. We are better off as partners. We can do business and trade, and have student exchanges. Every four years we hear the same China bashing, but after the election the tone changes. They do this because it riles up the voters. But that kind of rhetoric is harmful.

Glenn opened by noting the upcoming Trump-Xi meeting in Beijing and recalling Nixon’s 1972 visit as a historic opening, asking Chas Freeman for an assessment of why Trump is going, what’s on the agenda, and what to expect. Chas Freeman replied that Trump’s trip seems driven more by ego and the desire to feel honored in public pomp, rather than any clear strategic preparation. He contrasted the current visit with Nixon’s, which occurred amid a perceived Soviet expansion threat that made China a “protected state.” Nixon’s approach aimed to bind China to the West against a common threat, leveraging China’s sovereignty to counter Japanese expansion and Soviet influence. Freeman said the current moment lacks evidence of serious preparation or sherpa-style groundwork; there is a hurried, last-minute negotiation underway in South Korea between China’s trade negotiator and U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s administration. He suggested Trump is accompanied by senior American business figures seeking deals—likely Boeing sales, soybean trade, AI topics—and noted the China-U.S. contrast in AI strategies: the U.S. pursues general intelligence with heavy investment, while China applies AI to practical projects with open software. Freeman argued that beyond trade and tech issues, the broader context is muddled, with no obvious shared interests that would compel China to act concretely to help the U.S. in the Gulf or Hormuz, despite China’s interest in free trade and openness. He projected the question of how this meeting might affect West Asia: the war’s outcome signals a post-Iraq-Iran era emerging not favorable to the West, and he anticipated China’s strategic calculus would be to avoid being drawn into U.S. missteps while advancing its own interests in energy corridors and regional stability. Glenn speculated about wanting a grand power compromise (with Putin included) and suggested more is needed on Iran. He referenced Robert Kagan’s “The Jungle Grows Back,” noting that the West’s disregard for international law now clashes with a rising Sino-Russian-Iran axis. Freeman agreed with Kagan’s assessment of the war as a strategic debacle for the U.S., arguing that Iran’s retention of the Strait of Hormuz is likely and that international law is endangered in sea-navigational terms. He described a broader shift: Gulf Arabs may diversify away from the U.S., leaning toward Sino-Russian partnerships, and sea-power norms could be devalued. He emphasized that the conflict reduces the likelihood of a favorable new status quo and could push proliferation in the region; Iran may have or soon develop a nuclear capability, while others might follow. The war’s main strategic consequence, Freeman asserted, is a move toward a Sino-Russian axis and a transformed balance of power in the Middle East, with diversification away from U.S. security guarantees. Glenn added that the Nixon move was strategic, while Trump’s engagement seems tactical, and Freeman underscored the broader transformation in West Asia. They discussed the rule-of-law crisis in the West, the difference between “rule of law” and “rule by law,” and how domestic and international norms influence each other. Freeman argued that China has become a defender of the UN Charter and international law, in contrast to perceived Western unilateralism, and that the “jungle” is reconstituting a new order under Westphalian principles with many middle powers maneuvering. They debated whether China would want Iran to succeed to push the U.S. out of the region, and Freeman reiterated that the Chinese aim aligns with Westphalian sovereignty and peaceful coexistence, not ideological missionary diplomacy. They concluded that the Trump-Xi meeting could yield either a cautious pause or a dangerous misstep, given Trump’s temperament and Xi’s steadiness, and Freeman voiced cautious relief that nothing catastrophic occurs, while Glenn expressed a wish for a constructive outcome that could open space for rethinking Western hegemonic strategies.

During a conversation with Xi Jinping, I was asked to define America. I responded with one word: possibilities.

- The discussion begins with concern about the quality of Speaker 1’s internet connection for recorded YouTube work. Speaker 1 explains that their neighborhood has a monopolist limiting updates to local software/hardware, and says their own Starlink setup is going up, with 20+ or ~30 satellites already online and deploying quickly. Speaker 1 then jokes about sponsoring revolutions abroad, noting France and the UK should be ready. - The conversation shifts to international developments, focusing on the “Iran war” and later Ukraine/Russia, and then on Trump’s visit to China. - Speaker 1 describes alleged details from Trump’s China visit: Tajikistan’s president was visiting the same day, and during Trump’s arrival only part of the route’s flags were reportedly changed from Tajik to US flags. Speaker 1 frames this as a “soft insult.” - On Xi Jinping meeting Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin at airports/tarmacs, Speaker 1 says some claims are not true and emphasizes protocol and past examples: in prior meetings (Xi and Putin; Trump arriving previously), Xi reportedly met Putin at the tarmac, sat down with the top down, and drove into the city. Speaker 1 also says that in Trump’s last China arrival, Trump reportedly had Xi waiting. - Speaker 1 assesses the Xi–Trump meeting as unprepared compared with highly structured US-style or adversarial-country meetings. They describe how security teams, working diplomats, document preparation, possible joint statements, and agenda negotiation are typically handled before leaders meet. Speaker 1 compares this to earlier dynamics seen in Anchorage (with Trump allegedly seeking speed for a PR/picture moment). - The thread links the China visit to energy leverage involving Iran and Venezuela. Speaker 1 says Venezuela’s capacity is limited (around 800,000 barrels/day) and that significantly expanding it takes time and large investment. Speaker 1 argues US refining limitations matter: US refineries were set up for heavier sour crude (described as “viscous” and “sour” due to sulfur) and the US has not built a new refinery in over 30 years, citing bureaucracy and environmental laws as reasons companies left. - Speaker 1 elaborates on why the US cannot easily expand refining quickly, citing high insurance costs for factory work and related regulatory burdens, leading factories to move elsewhere. - Speaker 0 asks whether Trump intended a different sequence: Speaker 1 says the initial idea was to seek earlier wins and use Venezuela and Iran concessions to gain leverage, but the meeting reportedly came with Trump facing weaker leverage and needing help on Iran. - Taiwan discussions: Speaker 1 says reunification preferences exist among the Taiwanese opposition party that met Xi in China, with Taiwan described as the “Republic of China” and some groups categorized as seeking reconquest/reunification. Speaker 1 discusses why supplying Taiwan for conflict is difficult across open water and notes past US War College war-game conclusions that China would win if the US fleet intervened between China and Taiwan, while US strategy (as described) aims to make invasion costly rather than “winning.” - Proxy-war framing: Speaker 1 describes Ukraine and Iran/Yemen conflict patterns as proxy dynamics, referencing Marco Rubio’s admission that one war is a proxy war. - Iran supply/blockade claims: Speaker 1 says Iran is supplied via multiple routes—ports on the Caspian connected through Russian ports, and a rail line through Pakistan to China—plus other smaller export/storage options. Speaker 1 argues Iran’s weakness has historically included refining and diesel shortages, comparing it to the US importing refined product because it cannot refine enough to meet demand. - Venezuela capacity and US-advantaged/refinery/infrastructure problems are revisited, including discussion of reserves being held in gold in the US, social spending reductions of reinvestment, and US confiscation/export restrictions on equipment replacement, leading to worn-out infrastructure and the lack of “quick fixes.” - Straits of Hormuz and alleged “fee” idea: Speaker 0 cites a White House statement that China agreed to buy American oil to diversify from Hormuz and that Iran should not charge a fee for the Straits of Hormuz. Speaker 1 responds that Iran does not charge China fees (as stated by Speaker 1), then argues China’s commitments would only be clear if China confirms them, and compares this to past statements where purchases were claimed without matching agreements. - Speaker 1 argues sanctions can be moved/bypassed by the US government, not lifted by it, and says only US Congress can remove sanctions. Speaker 1 also claims the US continues buying sanctioned Russian products, while Europeans are criticized for accepting costly resell markups. - Speaker 1 also argues Hormuz isn’t treated as international waters in their view, and that Oman involvement matters, including claims about Oman not installing tollbooths and Iran striking ships—contrasted with the idea that a long-term/perpetual fee would open global choke-point “can of worms.” - Broader geopolitical framing: Speaker 1 says the “global system” is effectively gone, arguing the US helped build it and then killed it when it no longer served US interest, citing examples like the WTO and the strategic focus on controlling key choke points. Speaker 1 contrasts sea routes with Eurasia land connectivity and high-speed rail, linking this to belt-and-road connectivity. - Back to Iran: Speaker 0 asks whether China is pressuring Iran to concede or offering Trump political support with words. Speaker 1 says China prefers status quo and would prefer an end to war without weakening American stockpiles; Speaker 1 also says Iran’s ceasefire is not a full ceasefire and that both sides continue actions. - US military capacity and escalation: Speaker 1 argues that if Trump restarts the war, missile production is “null and void” at scale, and US manufacturing/industrial ramp-up would take years, citing the “missile production is null and void” point and the difficulty of rapid industry re-shoring due to state regulations. Speaker 1 discusses rare earths as a limiting factor in a different way—refining/processing capacity rather than shortage of elements—then argues chemical/electrolysis processing is expensive, energy intensive, and environmentally complex, often causing multi-year delays similar to refineries. - Soft-power indicators from Xi’s alleged absence and flag changes are used to explain Chinese behavior toward Trump, contrasted with prior high-level airport greetings and seating/handshake optics. Speaker 1 compares seating arrangements and perceived humiliation in European/Serbia contexts as a recurring pattern of power display. - Iran-war outcome speculation: Speaker 0 proposes a 50/50 scenario: continuation of conflict with Israeli strikes (and Iran mirroring strikes in the Gulf) versus Trump walking away. Speaker 1 says Israelis are driving outcomes and that APAC donors and money make turning away difficult, arguing Trump wants out but is constrained. Speaker 1 also says Iran and even Saudis/Kuwaitis reportedly would prefer US withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. - US military withdrawal and logistics: Speaker 1 says the US fifth fleet has left, its forward headquarters is moving to Israel, and damage estimates/repair costs are discussed. Speaker 1 argues the US is drawn into a genocide-perception dynamic once bases/equipment and US involvement are present. - Historical Iraq/Kuwait/Persian Gulf narrative: Speaker 0 asks why the US wanted Saddam to invade Kuwait. Speaker 1 asserts the US wanted Iraq to enter the Persian Gulf and become positioned for broader US presence, describing US backing for conflicts involving Iran and chemical weapons channels, and claiming Kuwait engaged in slant drilling stealing Iraqi oil. Speaker 1 says the US/Soviet coalition dynamics allowed the Gulf buildup and entry point into the region. - Final escalation discussion and regional future: Speaker 0 asks whether Trump will walk away or get trapped into escalation for a “win.” Speaker 1 says Israel’s influence over the US is expected to decline, claims generational shifts among American Jews/Christians and anti-Israel demonstrations, and argues Iran and the Gulf could reshape into new blocks with improved Gulf-Iran relations if stability is prioritized. - The conversation ends with debate over perceived misconceptions about Iran’s treatment of minorities and religious/political representation, plus discussion contrasting Iran with Saudi Arabia in terms of women’s legal status and religious policing, followed by a plan to do a future live recording using appropriate software.

The speaker emphasizes the rise of China as a positive development and dismisses the idea of slowing down Chinese growth. They criticize Donald Trump's approach, accusing him of hysteria and xenophobia towards China. The speaker also mentions Joe Biden's stance, suggesting that he believes China always wins. The transcript ends with a mention of a trade agreement and a disclaimer about the content of the advertising.

The speaker updates viewers on developments between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping and says the talks are “getting very interesting.” The speaker contrasts Trump’s approach toward different countries: they say Trump “bullies” European leaders and that those opponents are “weak,” but that this pattern does not apply with Russia or Iran. The speaker claims that when Trump goes to China, he will not be able to negotiate in the way he usually does, citing the situation involving Iran. The speaker reports that China is taking a harder stance. China is described as saying that future sanctions will not matter—“we’re not gonna pay attention”—and that China will continue tariffs with the United States, including a 77% tariff on American beef and a 22% tariff on soybeans. The speaker adds that these tariffs have upset American farmers. The speaker says China’s position is that it will consider lowering tariffs if the United States comes to China “and you ask nicely,” and describes this as a reversal. The speaker then introduces the “Thucydides trap,” attributing it to a Greek warrior turned philosopher and describing it as a theory about US–China relations: when one power grows much larger, it can overtake another, making war between them difficult to avoid. The speaker says Xi raised this concept in his opening remarks, expressing hope the United States and China can “transcend the Thucydides trap” and “forge a new model” for relations, with the idea that both countries being large does not automatically require them to clash. The speaker highlights Xi’s warning about Taiwan. They say Xi called the “Taiwan question” the most important issue in China–US relations and stated that if it is handled properly, the bilateral relationship will enjoy overall stability. The speaker reports that Xi then warned that mishandling it would lead to clashes and even conflicts, putting the entire relationship in jeopardy—framing it as a direct warning to Trump that interference over Taiwan could become “really serious.”

The speaker welcomes everyone to the Ben Franklin Room and discusses the historical ties between China and the United States. They mention the importance of cooperation in tackling global challenges, particularly climate change. The speaker emphasizes the need for strategic mutual trust and increased cooperation between the two countries. They highlight the progress made in negotiations and discussions during the visit. The speaker expresses confidence in the future of China-US relations and proposes a toast to friendship and a better tomorrow.

Einar Tangin and Glenn discuss the forthcoming Xi Jinping–Donald Trump meeting and the broader strategic landscape shaping U.S.–China competition. - On the Trump–Xi meeting: Tangin expects very little substantive outcome. China’s strategy toward the United States is to keep engagement open rather than push Trump into a corner, despite Trump’s past actions and their consequences. He notes a narrow scope to be discussed in a California meeting, with Trump volunteers unprepared and pushing “the usual maximist stuff.” China is signaling that Taiwan will be a red line. Beyond that, the Chinese may accept limited concessions such as grain, gas, or oil purchases, but no sweeping arrangements. The overall takeaway: continued engagement, but not a game-changing breakthrough. - U.S. energy and global strategy: Tangin argues the United States uses energy as a tool of influence, aiming to control access and shape markets (the petrodollar legacy, strategic chokepoints). The Ukraine war has accelerated Europe’s decoupling from Russia and the U.S. seeks to expand similar dynamics in East Asia. He emphasizes that the energy game is dynamic: oil prices impact inflation, and long-term, demand destruction and a shift to alternatives (electricity, renewables) will reshape markets. He points to new energy tech and scale: batteries and storage (CATL’s battery capacity) enable large-scale decoupling from fossil fuels; China’s plans to deploy up to 50 nuclear plants at a time and to pursue commercially available fusion power could transform the energy landscape. The U.S. may face higher exploration costs and geopolitical risk in sustaining high oil output, while heavy reliance on fossil fuels could erode long-term economic viability. - Global consequences and who bears the pain: In the short term, countries without reserves (notably parts of the Global South, including India) will face fertilizer and diesel shortages during planting seasons, with potential 15–25% yield reductions and elevated inflation. Food security risks loom as energy costs ripple through fertilizer, transport, processing, and farming inputs. The analysis highlights fertilizer nitrogen production’s energy intensity and the cascading nature of energy in food supply chains. The discussion stresses that global south economies will be hit hardest early on, with food and fuel inflation compounding social and political pressure. - The Iran war and maritime strategy: The discussion connects the Persian Gulf crisis to broader blockades and maritime competition. A naval blockade approach risks escalation and confrontation with China, which has extensive trade links through ASEAN and other partners that would be harmed by disruption. Tangin notes that China cannot be easily forced into combat in Europe or the Middle East; any escalation involving tactical nuclear use would be dangerous. He suggests that Europe’s elites may push for confrontation against Russia, but the political climate and energy constraints could destabilize Western allies and push towards alternative alignments, particularly with China. - China’s strategic posture and alternative world order: Tangin emphasizes that China has a model that emphasizes no ideology between states, sovereignty, and mutual non-interference, echoing a Westphalian framework. He describes China’s global governance concept as a peer-to-peer, negotiation-centered approach, where disputes are settled at the table rather than through force. He frames China’s proposition as simple: “No more ideology between countries. Every country should be secure. Security should not depend on the insecurity of another country. Every country has the right to choose its own path of development.” This is presented as a peaceful, governance-based alternative to U.S.-led hegemony. - Europe’s strategic crossroads and the future: Europe faces existential economic strains, competitiveness challenges, and the temptation of isolationist or right-wing governance. The conversation predicts prolonged political volatility if energy prices and inflation persist, with potential swings between different leaderships. China’s strategy, in this vision, is to promote internal diversification and consumption-led growth while engaging with international partners on a governance framework that reduces the incentives for confrontation. - Concluding note: The speakers agree that Europe’s willingness to embrace China’s model, rather than clinging to a confrontational U.S.-led paradigm, could shape a more stable global order. They caution that the old order has ended, and creative destruction is underway, with China advocating a negotiated, governance-based path forward.

I have met with Xi Jinping more than any other world leader, spending over 68 hours in private meetings. We started as simultaneous interpreters when I was vice president, as it wasn't appropriate for the president to meet with the vice president. I traveled 17,000 miles for these meetings. In addition to the 68 hours, I've had around 12 to 15 hours of discussions with him.

Respecting each other, coexisting peacefully, and pursuing cooperation is key for China and the US to find the right way to get along. The speaker believes in a promising future for their bilateral relationship. The responsibility of steering China-US relations falls on the shoulders of the speaker and the president.

Chinese President Xi Jinping plans to visit the United States to meet with President Biden. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a long-standing strategy of using this approach. Their internal propaganda convinces the Chinese people that when they meet Americans, they will persuade them that the US has no other option. Once in the US, they urge Americans to remain calm and optimistic, emphasizing the desire for China and the US to be friends again. This tactic has previously allowed the CCP to gain entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), which some argue has had detrimental effects on the US economy.

The speaker states that China wants to make a deal with the United States and believes China has to make a deal. China made a mistake when it retaliated. When America is punched, the president punches back harder, which is why 4% tariffs will go into effect on China tonight at midnight. The president believes that Xi and China want to make a deal, but they just don't know how to get that started. If China reaches out to make a deal, the president will be incredibly gracious but will do what's best for the American people. The Chinese want to make a deal, but they just don't know how to do it.

The speaker believes President Trump has "won" because 40% of the world's countries are supposedly trying to reduce tariffs with America due to his actions. The speaker claims China wants a deal, not primarily for economic reasons, but to "save face." China's economy is allegedly in its worst shape in 25 years, making it unable to withstand further economic conflict. The speaker asserts China is quietly seeking a deal with President Trump, similar to 40% of countries worldwide. The speaker urges seizing the opportunity and pursuing a deal aggressively.