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The discussion centers on the Ukraine peace process, with Trump reportedly optimistic after his envoy discussed ceasefire conditions in Moscow. A key point is whether Ukraine has privately agreed to any fundamental conditions for peace, such as neutrality, territorial settlements, and security arrangements. Publicly, Ukraine continues to demand NATO membership and full territorial recovery, which Russia rejects. The US may have shifted, suggesting NATO will not enlarge, territorial concessions are needed, and US involvement in security arrangements will be limited. However, European leaders remain bellicose, possibly indicating two levels of diplomacy: closed-door negotiations versus public statements. NATO expansion is viewed as a fundamental cause of the conflict. Crimea is unlikely to return to Ukraine, and Russia's battlefield gains complicate territorial negotiations. Security arrangements should involve the UN Security Council, including Russia and China. The 2022 Istanbul agreement is seen as a potential basis for peace, which was allegedly undermined by the US. Some European leaders are accused of lying, stating privately that NATO won't expand while publicly asserting the opposite. The purpose of NATO is questioned, with some suggesting it lost its purpose after the Cold War and has become an instrument of American hegemony.

Glenn (Speaker 0) argues that the idea Russia started the war merely for territory is nonsense and that NATO’s involvement is not genuinely helping Ukraine; he says “This is NATO’s war. Nothing we’re doing is actually helping Ukraine. They’re an instrument. They’re a tool.” He contends the conflict began as a failure to build a common European security architecture, and that Russian demands are high, making a peace settlement unlikely. He defines victory in a war of attrition as exhausting the adversary first, suggesting Russia would prefer a neutral Ukraine without NATO, and that if Ukraine remains in NATO orbit, Russia would rather take Odessa. He asserts that NATO expansion revived Cold War logic and that Ukraine’s neutrality was the original Russian objective. He argues that Ukraine’s current war losses and economic strain indicate Russia’s advantage, and claims NATO support has not truly helped Ukraine, noting that in his view NATO and Western actions have been a driver of the conflict, including claims about Istanbul, Minsk, and the 2014 coup. Jonathan (Speaker 1) pushes back on several points. He says the war is not solely about territory and disputes Glenn’s claim that NATO’s role is responsible for the conflict. He emphasizes that if this were simply about NATO, NATO could have destroyed Russia by arming Ukraine more aggressively, yet “they could have done it so much more, effectively,” implying NATO has not fully acted. He sees both sides as losing in a prolonged attritional battle and notes that neither side has achieved decisive victory due to limits on production, economies, and allied support. He argues the conflict is about more than territory and rejects the idea that NATO guarantees Ukraine’s security; he questions whether NATO would credibly defend an attacked ally in Europe. He says the Maidan movement in 2014 was organic and not fully orchestrated by the US, though he concedes US influence existed. He disputes Glenn’s claims about Western NGOs and American orchestration, and he highlights that many Ukrainians initially favored non-NATO paths, with polls showing limited appetite for NATO membership before 2014. He also contends that Ukraine’s future lies beyond mere territorial concessions, pointing to the EU’s role and the broader security order, and he warns that negotiations with a “mafia cabal” running Moscow are unlikely to yield lasting peace, arguing that Putin’s governance frames negotiations as instrumental and potentially destabilizing. Speaker 2 (moderator) asks for reactions to ongoing developments, including Trump and Kushner’s involvement, Putin’s aides’ statements about known positions and lack of progress, and questions about what Russia truly seeks: Donbas control or preventing Ukraine from joining NATO. The participants discuss definitions of “winning” in a war of attrition, the role and credibility of NATO guarantees, and the strategic importance of neutrality versus alliance membership. They debate whether Russia values a neutral Ukraine with security guarantees or insists on broader concessions, and whether Ukraine could ever be secure without a credible deterrent. Glenn asserts that there was never credible deterrence in Ukraine prior to 2014, while Jonathan argues that NATO’s efficacy and unity are questionable, with concerns about member states’ commitments and the real level of Western support. On NATO and security guarantees, Glenn maintains that true security for Ukraine would come from a non-NATO arrangement that prevents Ukraine from becoming a future proxy battleground, suggesting limited, carefully designed guarantees could be acceptable, but that any path toward NATO-like intrusion would be unacceptable. Jonathan says NATO is not delivering credible security and emphasizes that EU membership and security arrangements also factor into Russia’s calculations, with the European Union potentially offering security commitments if Ukraine joined, though that possibility remains contentious for Moscow. They discuss the costs of war, civilian impact, and the global economic ripple effects, including potential impacts on food prices and shipping routes if Russia responds to Ukrainian actions against its maritime traffic. Towards the end, they forecast no immediate peace and emphasize unpredictability due to Western political shifts, central bank asset issues, and external actors like China, North Korea, and Trump’s stance. Glenn predicts Ukraine’s military unraveling and a weakening economy, while Jonathan stresses that a peace deal remains unlikely under current leadership, with outcomes dependent on Western resolve and external support. The conversation closes with a sense that the next months will be dangerous and uncertain, with the broader international order potentially shifting as the conflict persists.

When the Soviet Union ended, the U.S. believed it could do as it wanted, leading to wars in the Middle East, Serbia, and Africa. Europe, lacking a foreign policy, has shown only American loyalty. It's time for European officials to lead with a European foreign policy. The war in Ukraine is ending. Putin's intention was to negotiate neutrality. Ukraine walked away from a near agreement because the U.S. told them to. I advised Ukraine to be neutral, echoing Kissinger's warning: "To be an enemy of the United States is dangerous, but to be a friend is fatal." The U.S. viewed NATO enlargement as its right, ignoring Russian concerns. This project, dating back to the 90s, aimed to neutralize Russia. Trump and Putin will likely agree to end the war, regardless of Europe's warmongering.

The panelists discuss whether recent developments around Ukraine, NATO security guarantees, and Western support can produce a peace agreement acceptable to Russia and Ukraine, and what the war’s trajectory might look like by year-end and beyond. Initial reactions and sticking points - Speaker 1 sees potential in recent moves if true and reliable, arguing Ukraine is signaling goodwill to the United States, but remains skeptical that a peace deal will satisfy both sides given core demands over territory and Donbas control. He emphasizes the Donbas as the central unresolved issue. - Speaker 2 notes Putin’s need to show tangible gains to save face, arguing the war is being fought to achieve declared goals and that Russia will not sign a deal unless it secures substantial results. Security guarantees, no-fly zones, and peacekeeping - The discussion centers on two main proposed points: U.S. security guarantees (including possible no-fly zone enforcement) and a European-led peacekeeping force in Ukraine. There is debate about how binding such guarantees would be and whether Russia would accept them, with concerns about the Budapest Memorandum’s history of non-fulfillment versus what a new, more comprehensive, legally binding framework might look like. - Speaker 1 points out that even a robust security package would require Russian agreement, which he doubts will be forthcoming given Moscow’s current aims. He underscores that Europe’s and the U.S.’s support for Ukraine is contingent on political will, which could waver, but he notes Ukraine’s trust gap with U.S. guarantees given past experiences. - Speaker 2 stresses that Putin’s aims include defeating NATO and achieving a U.S.-level accommodation (a “Yalta 2.0” style deal) while keeping Western control over Europe at arm’s length. He argues Putin would accept U.S. and possibly some European troops but not a formal NATO presence on Ukrainian soil, especially in western Donbas or beyond. Budapest memorandum vs. new guarantees - Both sides discuss the difference between a nonbinding Budapest Memorandum and a more robust, legally binding security guarantee. Speaker 1 highlights Ukraine’s past trust in security assurances despite U.S. and European failures to honor them, suggesting skepticism about the enforceability of any new guarantees. Speaker 2 suggests that a stronger, more binding arrangement could be essential for Russia to accept any settlement, but that Moscow would still resist concessions over full Donbas control. On-the-ground realities and war dynamics - The panelists agree Russia is advancing on multiple fronts, though the pace and strategic significance of gains vary. They discuss Ukraine’s ability to sustain the fight through Western weapons flows and domestic production (including drones and shells). They acknowledge the risk of Western fatigue and the potential for a more protracted war, even as Ukraine builds its own capabilities to prolong the conflict. - The West’s long-term willingness to fund and arm Ukraine is debated: Speaker 1 argues Europe’s economy is strained but notes continued political support for Ukraine, which could outlast Russia’s economic stamina. Speaker 2 emphasizes that Russia’s economy is fragile mainly in the provinces, while Moscow and Saint Petersburg remain relatively insulated; he also points to BRICS support (China and India) as sustaining Moscow politically and economically. Economic and strategic pressures - The role of energy revenues and sanctions is debated. Speaker 1 suggests Russia can be pressured economically to seek a deal, while Speaker 2 counters that Russia’s economy is adapting, with China and India providing strategic support that helps Moscow resist Western coercion. They discuss shadow fleet strikes and global energy markets as tools to erode Russia’s war-finance capability. - There is disagreement about whether, over time, economic pressure alone could force regime change in Russia. Speaker 1 is skeptical that penalties will trigger a voluntary Russian withdrawal, while Speaker 2 argues that sustained economic and political pressure, combined with Western unity, could push toward a settlement. Strategies and potential outcomes - Putin’s internal calculus is described as existential: he seeks a win that he can publicly claim to legitimize his rule and justify the costs of the war to the Russian people and elites. This shapes his openness to concessions and to the kinds of guarantees he would accept. - Alexander posits that a near-term peace could emerge from a deal brokered at high levels (potentially involving Trump and Putin) that reshapes European security with U.S. leadership and BRICS engagement, while Paul emphasizes that any credible end to the conflict would require Ukraine and Russia to agree to a swap-like territorial arrangement and to accept a new security framework that deters renewed aggression. End-of-year and longer-term outlooks - By year-end, the panel agrees it is unlikely that a major peace agreement will be realized under the current conditions; any real breakthrough would depend on significant concessions, including Donbas arrangements, and a credible security guarantee framework. - By the end of next year, both expect a continuation of a contested balance: Ukraine likely to press for stronger Western guarantees and EU integration, Russia seeking to preserve Donbas gains while navigating internal and external pressures. Alexander envisions two “wins” emerging: the United States under Trump coordinating a broader peace framework, and China leveraging its economic influence to shape Europe’s response. Paul anticipates a gradual trajectory with ongoing military and economic pressures and a continued stalemate unless a major concession reshapes incentives on both sides.

Russia wanted the West to back off, and in some basic way, they won. They took land and don't have to give it back. Short of nuclear weapons, there's no way to force them to return it, which constitutes victory. The victor gets to set a lot of the terms. These are the rules of life, not international law. The winner gets more say than the loser, and Ukraine is the loser. Ukrainians, like many populations, learned that following the US government's dictates leads to being killed without rescue.

After watching that meeting, I'm convinced this administration has zero interest in helping Ukraine maintain its sovereignty. They want us to shut up, stop complaining, stop asking for help and money, concede to Russia, and leave the US alone. Trump wants peace, but his idea of peace is to end the war and let Russia do whatever it wants. Zelensky was villainized for wanting guarantees and protections for Ukraine while being open to a ceasefire. He was told he's prolonging the war and wants World War III. No, he wants to defend his country and maintain as much freedom as possible, but he's being villainized for it. After that meeting, we're fucked.

Donald Trump started the war in Ukraine, not Joe Biden, and Russia is aware of this. Despite Trump's unpredictability, Russia will engage in diplomacy with the U.S. Trump's alleged leaked 2024 campaign statement, where he threatened to bomb Moscow if Putin moved into Kyiv, was never made, portraying Trump as a liar in the eyes of the Russians. Sanctions are not a credible threat because Russia doesn't care about them, and its major partners won't yield. Trump's claim of providing 17 weapon batteries to Ukraine is unrealistic, as countries like Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands cannot readily supply that many. Germany won't provide transit support until they receive replacements, and the U.S. is prioritizing Israel and replenishing its own stocks. Trump's proposition to Mark Rutte involves the Netherlands giving up its weapons to Ukraine and then buying them from the U.S. at no cost to America. Rutte should instead tell Trump to leave NATO because he is useless. This is not a serious proposal, but posturing to appease the Republican base who oppose aid to Ukraine.

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis and Speaker 1 (Galloway) discuss domestic and international political currents surrounding Donald Trump, Iran tensions, and the Ukraine conflict, weighing consequences, risks, and strategic realities. Epstein and distraction debate: - Davis argues Trump is not convincing anyone to divert attention from the Epstein files, noting a core supportive base that defends him regardless of accusations. He observes a faction around Trump’s inner circle (Todd Blanche, etc.) pushing to move on and deny accountability, while impeachment remains the legislative route to any justice in the United States. - Davis emphasizes a dynamic where a loyal core persists, but that base is “leaking” and may erode as evidence and claims mount. The potential for impeachment remains a central, if unlikely, pathway to accountability given Republican control of the House and Senate. - He notes Trump’s domestic and international actions could fuel a “blue wave” for Republicans, but insists the public’s perception of the economy and released (and unreleased) files could undermine support. There is skepticism about whether the core will accept the unfolding disclosures. War with Iran and the wag-the-dog concern: - The discussion touches on whether Trump’s mobilization and rhetoric are intended to distract (a wag-the-dog scenario) or whether diplomacy could prevail. Davis cautions that few feel reassured by the prospect of a limited air-dominant campaign without ground troops, describing it as a gamble with “nearly no chance of success” and potential for significant strategic and credibility damage. - Galloway counters that some Trump advisers advocate diplomacy, while others press for hardline action. He notes the domestic political pressure to strike and questions the plan for post-regime-change Iran, citing Secretary of State testimony indicating uncertainty about what would follow a successful removal of the Ayatollah. - Both acknowledge the risk of severe economic and regional instability: the destruction of oil infrastructure, closure of straits, and cascading repercussions in Europe and globally, with Iran’s proxies potentially exacerbating conflict. Iraq, post-conflict planning, and economic stakes: - The conversation revisits the 2003 Iraq War, highlighting the lack of a credible plan for post-regime outcomes and the possibility of unleashing broader regional upheaval, including ISIS and Al Qaeda resurgence. - They stress the economic carnage that could accompany any conflict: the potential for an “economic nuclear winter” in the West and in Europe, with oil and gas disruptions and a collapse of allied economies, especially if adversaries fight to the last. Ukraine track and Russia’s leverage: - On Ukraine, Davis notes the discrepancy between public statements by political figures (e.g., Mark Rutte’s coalition-building claims) and battlefield realities: Russia continues to gain ground while Ukraine’s military resources lag. - Russia reiterates demilitarization and denazification terms; Western pivot toward terms favorable to Moscow appears uncertain but possibly underway due to growing recognition of Russia’s gains. - Davis suggests President Trump’s private ultimatum rhetoric to Zelensky—about deadlines for negotiations or withdrawal—reflects a broader sense that Russia has effectively won the war, with Ukraine bearing substantial losses. - The overall assessment is that, regardless of whether Trump acts, Russia’s victory in Ukraine appears likely to redefine the regional balance, with the total costs and consequences of any Western intervention remaining unclear.

In a wide-ranging discussion about the Ukraine war and related strategic developments, Colonel and the host cover several key topics, facts, and analyses. Skyfall/Burevznik nuclear-powered cruise missile - The Skyfall (Burevznik) is a nuclear-powered, nuclear-capable cruise missile. A test five years ago ended with five deaths and an explosion; a newer test reportedly flew 14 hours and 15,000 miles. Its characteristics include very long range, low-altitude flight to hug terrain, and high maneuverability, making detection and interception challenging. - The U.S. perspective is that it is not a silver bullet, but it represents an advanced capability: maneuvering over great distances, flying subsonically at very low altitude (within about 20 meters of the ground), and potentially approaching from unexpected directions. - Russia claims it cannot be shot down; the guest cautions that nothing is invulnerable until proven operational, but the missile adds a troubling dimension to deterrence and arms competition. - The broader significance is that it accentuates concern about nuclear weapons and underscores the desirability of nuclear arms reduction talks before START’s expiration. Nuclear arms talks and China’s potential role - The guest indicates Russia is pushing for nuclear arms reduction talks before START expires (February). China is conceptually willing to join, according to some Russian sources, but no authoritative statements from China are cited. Any willingness would depend on Western engagement to explore meaningful participation. Poseidon and other advanced weapons - Poseidon is described as a Russian nuclear-powered autonomous underwater vehicle (a "massive unmanned torpedo drone") intended as a strategic deterrent. Its exact status is uncertain; reports and videos circulate, but it remains largely experimental. - The discussion notes general concerns about U.S. safety from advanced weapons such as Poseidon and other long-range strike capabilities. Encirclement near Donbas: Pokrovsk and Kupiansk - Grasimov claimed 49 Ukrainian battalions are involved in Donbas, with about 31 allegedly encircled near Pokrovsk (for roughly 5,000 troops). Ukraine says supply lines are not cut and that encirclement is not complete. - The analysts explain that Russia has achieved notable progress in Kupiansk and Pokrovsk areas. Ukraine has mounted limited counterattacks in the north near Pokrovsk to disrupt a potential northern encirclement pivot at Rodinsky, but sustained pressure is difficult due to Ukraine’s manpower and logistics constraints. - The northern shoulder near Rodinsky is a focal point: if Russians move beyond Rodinsky, encirclement risk increases. Ukraine’s ability to keep tens of thousands of troops supplied and to hold the city is limited; Russia’s reserves enable more methodical advances. - The overarching view: Ukraine can slow Russian advances but cannot realistically stop or reverse the broader trajectory due to manpower, equipment, and ammunition imbalances. Russia’s advantage in resources makes a prolonged war of attrition unfavorable to Ukraine. Ukraine’s manpower, equipment, and ammunition - The central constraint for Ukraine is manpower. Even with missiles, drones, and air defense, without sufficient infantry to hold and seize territory and to provide reserves, Ukraine cannot win. - Russia’s industrial capacity and reserves enable it to sustain campaigns, whereas Ukraine’s supply and manpower constraints limit sustained operations. - The discussion notes Western missiles (Storm Shadow, Flamingo) and the pace of Tomahawk deliveries, with the implication that gaps in long-range standoff capability affect Ukraine’s offensive and defensive options. Mercenaries and potential foreign troop contributions - Reports of North Korean troops aiding Pokrovsk are discussed. The guest sees little likelihood of other countries sending troops, given the risk of provoking Russia. Mercenary recruitment by other countries is mentioned as a potential but unverified factor. Western sanctions and energy dynamics - The significant development of American sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil (two-thirds of Russia’s oil exports, roughly 4.4 million barrels per day) is analyzed. China’s state-owned majors and India are reducing seaborne imports but still engaging via pipelines or other mechanisms; the long-term impact on Russia’s revenue is likely substantial but may be offset through workarounds. - The guest emphasizes that history shows Russia tends to absorb economic pain and adapt, making it unlikely that sanctions alone will force strategic changes in Russia’s posture. Global Thunder and other security signals - The Global Thunder nuclear command exercise is mentioned, but the guest signals incomplete knowledge of this particular exercise’s details. Other security signals include drone activity near the Kremlin and assertions about Russia’s broader strategic planning, including potential NATO-related concerns and the Arctic buildup. NATO, European militaries, and relative capabilities - The discussion contrasts Europe’s growing modernization and ambition with actual combat experience. Europe’s strategic parity with Russia is viewed as plausible at a high level, but conventional capabilities lag Russia’s real-time battlefield experience and industrial scale. - The guest warns that perception of inevitable war between NATO and Russia could create self-fulfilling dynamics, urging cautious interpretation of escalatory signaling on both sides. Trump’s negotiation tactics and Ukraine peace prospects - The host questions Trump’s peace negotiation tactics: threats of Tomahawk missiles, meetings with Putin, and attempts to tailor a peace deal offering to freeze lines or concede Donbas. The guest describes Trump’s approach as transactional and inconsistent, with fluctuating positions that depend on the perceived personal and political gains. - The guest argues that Russia’s position has remained consistent since 2014-2022, centering on existential-security demands and denazification logic, including ensuring rights and language protections for ethnic Russians within the contested territories. A lasting peace would require a win-win vision that both sides can accept; transactional bargaining alone is unlikely to lead to a durable settlement. Venezuela and broader geopolitics - The discussion notes a Wagda-linked cargo flight to Venezuela amid sanctions evasion talk, with implications of mercenaries or military parts and a broader strategic alignment with Russia. The host and guest agree that U.S. regime-change impulses in Venezuela complicate international norms, risk escalation, and could inadvertently shift attention away from Ukraine. Overall, the conversation traces the evolving military balance in Ukraine, the emergence of new weapons systems and strategic deterrence concerns, the limits of Western capabilities and sanctions, and the complex interplay of diplomacy, negotiation tactics, and geopolitical aims shaping the conflict and potential resolutions.

Speaker 0 believes that Putin's end game is to gain recognition for Crimea, control of the port in Sebastopol, and the two Russian provinces. Putin orchestrated the recent events in Ukraine to show that he can take over the country, but he doesn't want to keep it due to the risk of insurgency. Speaker 1 mentions that the Democrats are now supporting the arming of Ukrainians, which could make the situation messier than Putin anticipated. Speaker 0 suggests that Putin wants to negotiate after getting close to taking Ukraine and causing significant damage. He aims to keep the sanctions off and secure his provinces.

Gilbert Doktorov and the host discuss the evolving, multi-layered negotiations surrounding the Ukraine war, stressing that talks involve more than Ukraine and Russia, extending to US-Russia dynamics and broader European and global interests. - They note that trilateral talks among Ukraine, Russia, and the US have begun, with the first phase completed. The conversation emphasizes that the US-Russia dimension is crucial because the conflict is viewed as a proxy war between NATO and Russia, and that “the US toppled the government in Ukraine” with intelligence support, military planning, weapons, and targets coordinated through backchannels. The implication is that any durable settlement would require some deal between the US and Russia to de-escalate the proxy confrontation. - On US-Russia relations, Speaker 1 identifies several dimensions: renewal or non-renewal of New START, and the functioning of embassies, as negative signs, but points to positive changes elsewhere. He highlights Kislyov’s Sunday night program remarks, noting Russia’s proposal to contribute $1,000,000,000 to become a permanent board member using frozen US assets (total US assets frozen around $5 billion in equivalent value). He mentions that Trump was asked about using frozen assets and reportedly declined, but the implication is that Moscow views this as a potential lever. Kislyov also notes that the additional $4,000,000,000 in frozen assets would be allocated to reconstruction in Palestine, and that Russia’s participation on the board would influence regional diplomacy, including with Palestinians and Israelis. - The discussion suggests that the absence of official diplomacy (e.g., embassies) does not necessarily indicate a lack of progress, arguing that backchannels between Putin and Trump are functioning well. The speakers discuss the broader context of Russia’s strategic posture, including alleged advancements in space-based and other new military capabilities that are not fully captured by New START, and the sense from Moscow that the US is preparing a space-based missile system that would enable first strikes, a point the Russians emphasize in public discourse. - On Ukraine, Zelensky’s stance is described as uncompromising: Ukraine will not cede territory and will demand security guarantees, which could undermine a neutral status. The dialogue suggests Zelensky is using a posture of firmness to buy time for negotiations, with Ukrainian leadership potentially exchanging assurances for a broader settlement that could include regime change and financial support for reconstruction. - The potential for compromise is discussed in terms of strategic timing and leverage. The Russians’ primary interest is regime change, and there could be an understanding with Trump about a democratic replacement in Ukraine, possibly replacing Zelensky with a pro-Russian administration under conditions tied to substantial monetary reparations for reconstruction. The timing and mechanism, including potential referenda or buyouts, are considered critical elements that could determine the settlement’s architecture. - The European role is analyzed as increasingly fraught. Europe’s diplomatic engagement has been limited, but Moscow is open to leveraging European assets in a peace process. Lavrov’s stated position that talks with Ursula von der Leyen’s European Commission leadership are unlikely, and the broader fragmentation within Europe (France, Germany, Finland, the EU leadership) are highlighted as complicating factors. There is speculation about European figures who could bridge talks, such as Finland’s Stubb, though there is skepticism about Kalas’s leadership within the EU. - The speakers speculate that Davos and Trump’s stance have reshaped European perceptions of US leadership, with European elites increasingly questioning the reliability of US-backed security guarantees. The conversation closes with an expectation that the year 2025 will be dominated by Trump as a central variable in resolving global issues, and that Moscow remains optimistic about achieving a settlement with Washington while signaling a tougher stance toward Ukraine if needed. Overall, the discussion portrays a complex, interwoven set of negotiations across US-Russia, Ukraine-Russia, and European dynamics, with backchannels, asset controls, potential regime-change considerations, and timing as key levers for reaching any settlement.

Mario: Let's start with Venezuela. Do you think this is a strategy by Trump? Larry: I saw something similar back in 1988. The CIA was involved with trying to provoke Manuel Noriega into taking some action, so we could say we had to respond to set the stage for a military invasion, which I believe that in 2018, Donald Trump signed a finding authorizing a covert CIA action to get rid of Maduro. That attempt failed. And now the objective is to get control of the oil. That's the number one priority, with an eye toward the risk of a renewed Iran conflict and the prospect of shutdown of the Persian Gulf, and the need to have an alternative supplier. Ukraine defeating Russia was the plan, and Russia’s military is now around 1,500,000. Mario: What’s your initial reaction to Venezuela? I talked to John Kuriaki who said to read naval movements to gauge what the military plans. The buildup on the coast of Venezuela is significant. They’ve got 14, 12 warships, including the Gerald Ford. Do you think they are bluffing or this is a Trump strategy? Larry: It could be a bluff. I saw something similar in 1988. I was in the Central America branch, and the CIA’s analytical thrust was to provoke Noriega into taking action to justify a response and invasion. That happened in 1988. But that time there were US bases in Panama; Quarry Heights was full. Southern Command was there. Now Southern Command has moved to Miami, just near Southcom. Another issue: within the military, the concept of supported and supporting commands means the special operations command (SOCOM) would normally be the supporting commander, but here Southern Command would be subordinate to SOCOM, which is problematic because SOCOM cannot fight a conventional war. Delta Force, SEAL Team Six, and others are light infantry for raids, not mass warfare. So launching shells or sending ground forces won’t solve Venezuela; terrain is rugged and favors ambushes. If US troops ashore, body bags would likely exceed those from Iraq and Afghanistan. Venezuelans will fight, and insurgents from Brazil and Colombia could join. Decapitation strikes against Maduro could provoke an insurgency that the US would struggle to pacify. Mario: Could we see a decapitation strike like Israel against Hezbollah and Iran? Larry: Decapitating Maduro would still leave loyalists and other actors with weapons; an insurgency could erupt, and the US would be unable to pacify it. The real objective here is unclear. The State Department’s INL/INSCR programs have long documented Venezuela as a transit point for drugs; Trump claimed fentanyl is the issue, but most cocaine also goes to Europe. The 2018 Trump era mentioned the Trendy Aragua as a pretext to justify covert actions; I believe Trump signed a finding authorizing a CIA operation to remove Maduro, leading to Guaidó, but that failed. The broader agenda appears to be regaining oil influence and countering Russia, China, and Iran’s influence in Venezuela. Mario: Elaborate the agenda and strategy behind these strikes on boats out of Venezuela and Trump’s public acknowledgement of a CIA covert operation. What’s the strategy and intention? Larry: The objective is to restore oil control in Venezuela and reduce adversary influence. Maduro once aligned with the CIA, and Chavez/Maduro have maintained cordial relations with Moscow and Beijing. The US aims to curtail BRICS and reduce Venezuelan ties to Russia, China, and Iran, potentially moving Venezuela away from the dollar-based system. The theory that this is a message to Putin circulates, but if that were the aim, it’s a poor strategy given the broader geopolitical dynamics in Syria, Iran, and the Palestinian-Israeli arena. The US previously overpromised in the Red Sea and failed to secure freedom of navigation, signaling limited military capacity for large-scale campaigns. The objective of any Venezuela action must be concrete, otherwise it risks entanglement in an insurgency. Mario: Turning to general foreign policy under Trump. What about the national security strategy? Europe’s criticisms, and Trump’s approach to Ukraine—Witkoff and Kushner meeting Putin? Larry: The 2025 national security strategy signals change, but these documents are not blueprints; they’re guidelines. Europe is being asked to step up, while the US distances itself, arguing Europe’s resources and industrial capacity have diminished while Russia and China shift. Europe’s censorship and defense spending are under scrutiny. The US–UK intelligence relationship still lingers, but overall the West’s ability to project force is questioned. Russia and China’s relationship is deep and mutually reinforcing; the Rand Corporation’s earlier ideas that Ukraine would defeat Russia to force Moscow to join the West have not materialized. Ukraine’s fight has forced Russia to mobilize and shift front lines; casualty counts are contested, but Russia’s front has expanded with a larger force and higher attrition. Mario: What about Ukraine negotiations and Putin’s terms? Larry: Putin’s terms (as stated on 06/14/2024) are: Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk permanently part of Russia; Ukraine must withdraw forces from those territories before negotiations begin. An election must be held in Ukraine with a legitimately elected president, potentially replacing Zelenskyy, and Russia would then talk to Ukraine. Russia’s stance treats these territories as non-negotiable; freezing lines is not acceptable to Russia. If negotiations fail, Russia is likely to maintain control over large parts of Donbas and southern Ukraine, potentially extending into Kharkiv and Odessa. Western military support is insufficient in scale to match Russia’s production; Russia’s oil revenue remains a significant portion of GDP, and the global south is pivoting toward BRICS, with Modi’s meeting signaling stronger ties with Russia and China. The strategic trend is a shift away from Western dominance toward a multipolar order. Mario: Larry, appreciate your time. Larry: Pleasure as always, Mario.

Putin initially tried to prevent the war and sought a diplomatic solution. He negotiated with Ukraine, focusing on Crimea. However, his main concern was NATO expansion into Ukraine. If Ukraine had remained neutral, the war might have been avoided. But the US and UK intervened, pressuring Ukraine to abandon negotiations. In 2022, it seemed possible for Ukraine and the West to win, but 2023 has been disastrous for Ukraine, and now it appears Russia will emerge victorious.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss a cascade of developments around Ukraine, Russia, and Western policy. - Speaker 0 notes that Trump reportedly changed his stance on Tomahawk missiles, mentions a meeting with Zelensky where Zelensky supposedly urged acceptance of a Putin deal, and recalls that the Trump-Putin meeting was canceled. Speaker 1 responds that Russia has 100% made clear there will be no freeze and that for the war to end, Ukraine must leave all Russian territory. He says Tomahawk missiles were never on the table, that this was a pressure ploy by Trump to push Russia, and that it could have led to a thermonuclear war, which Putin reminded the US about in their conversations. - According to Speaker 1, Ukrainians will die, Russians will advance, Ukrainian economy will be destroyed, and Ukrainian energy infrastructure will be annihilated, leading to the collapse of Ukraine as a nation. Speaker 0 sketches a timeline: initial plans for a Putin-Trump-Zelensky sequence, Putin’s call after Trump hinted at Tomahawks, then a Zelensky meeting where Zelensky allegedly pressed Trump to accept a Putin deal, after which Tomahawks were no longer on the table and the Trump-Putin meeting was canceled. - Speaker 1 repeats: Tomahawks were never on the table; this was a pressure tactic. He explains the Russia-US exchange as frank, with Russia laying down the law; he asserts that the US would have faced a major escalation if Tomahawks had been supplied, because Tomahawks are nuclear-capable. He claims Ukraine would have been made a party to the conflict through US involvement. He adds that Russia will not accept a freeze because, constitutionally, Ukraine must leave all Russian territory, including Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Lugansk. - Speaker 0 asks why Tomahawks would matter, and Speaker 1 reiterates that Storm Shadow and Scout missiles are not nuclear capable, while Tomahawks would be, and contrasts this with Ukraine’s Flamingo drone, dismissing Flamingo as a propaganda tool. He describes Flamingo as a wooden drone designed to mimic a flock of birds and says it will be shot down and is not a serious threat; Ukraine’s drone capability is strong, with Ukrainians as the second-best fighters and drones in the world, while Russians are first in drone capability. - They discuss the trajectory of the war: Speaker 1 emphasizes that Russia’s advance is strategic, with drone warfare transforming the battlefield into piecemeal advances. He asserts Russia’s kill ratio of 36 Ukrainians to 1 Russian, and argues the West’s narrative of Russia suffering more is fantasy. He notes the West’s support for Ukraine drains Ukraine’s resources while Russia’s defense industry booms, and that Russia’s economy, energy, and sanctions resistance show resilience. - On economics, Speaker 1 claims the Russian economy is thriving; gas is cheap in Russia, Novosibirsk and Ekaterinburg are booming, and sanctions have not toppled Russia. He argues Europe’s sanctions are not beating Russia and that Russia’s ruble remains strong; he contrasts this with Western expectations of Russia’s collapse. - They discuss casualty figures and manpower. Speaker 0 asks for a definite casualty number; Speaker 1 cites Ukrainians dying daily (tens of thousands over time) and asserts Russians suffer hundreds daily on their worst day, noting Ukraine’s manpower shortages and Russia’s mobilization efforts: Russia conducted a one-time 300,000-mobilization; Ukraine has mobilized seven or eight times and relies on volunteers and external manpower, including Western units in some cases. He contends Russia’s total forces expanded to 1.5 million due to NATO expansion and ongoing operations. - On battlefield tactics, Speaker 1 explains Russia’s algorithm: three-man assault teams using drone support to seize bunkers held by larger Ukrainian forces, followed by reinforcement, all while drone warfare dominates. He asserts Ukraine’s drone capacity is strong, but Russia counters with its own drones and targeting of Ukrainian drone operators. - They debate why Russia would not freeze lines even if Ukraine yielded Donbas, Lugansk, and Donetsk. Speaker 1 insists those regions are Russian territory per referendum and constitutional absorption in September 2022, and argues that Ukraine cannot give up Donbas, which is Russia’s, and that a freeze would not be acceptable to Russia. He asserts that Moscow will not abandon these territories and that any idea of a freeze is a Western fantasy. - The discussion touches on the Minsk accords, the Istanbul talks, and the argument that Ukraine’s leadership initially pursued peace but later prepared for renewed conflict with NATO backing. Speaker 1 contends that Minsk was a sham agreed to buy time, and that Russia’s goal was to compel Ukraine to honor commitments to protect Russian speakers; Ukraine’s leadership is accused of pursuing war rather than peace after early negotiations. - They discuss Wagner and Prigozin’s role: Wagner provided a vehicle to surge capabilities into Lugansk and Donetsk; after September 2022 these troops were to be absorbed into the Russian military, but Prigozin continued operations in Bachmuth, recruited prisoners, and pressured for offensive allocations; this culminated in a confrontation with Shoigu and Gerasimov, and Wagner eventually faced disbandment pressure and a mobilization response. - In closing, Speaker 0 notes recent sanctions and Putin’s response condemning them as attempts to pressure Russia, while Speaker 1 reiterates that Russia seeks to end the war and rebuild relations with the US, but not under ongoing Ukraine conflict. He emphasizes that India and China will stand with Russia, citing strategic partnerships and the desire to maintain sovereign energy decisions, and predictsRussia will endure sanctions while seeking new buyers and alliances. - The exchange ends with Putin signaling that new sanctions will have costs for the EU, while Speaker 1 reiterates that Russia will adapt and maintain its strategic position, with China and India aligned with Russia rather than yielding to Western pressure.

The discussion centers on the Ukraine peace process, with Trump reportedly optimistic after his envoy discussed ceasefire conditions in Moscow and a call with Putin expected. A key point is that Russia seeks recognition of the war's fundamental causes, including Ukraine's neutrality, territorial settlements, and security arrangements. Publicly, Ukraine continues to demand NATO membership and full territorial recovery, which are not conducive to peace. The US may be shifting, suggesting NATO will not enlarge, territorial concessions are needed, and security arrangements won't involve the US. However, Ukraine's agreement on these points is uncertain. European leaders' bellicosity is contrasted with potential behind-the-scenes diplomacy. NATO expansion is viewed as a core issue, with Crimea unlikely to return to Ukraine. The failure of the Istanbul process in April 2022, allegedly blocked by the West, worsened Ukraine's territorial situation. Security arrangements should involve the UN Security Council, including Russia and China. Some European leaders privately acknowledge NATO enlargement to Ukraine is unlikely, despite public statements, which is seen as dangerous lying. The purpose and future of NATO are also questioned, given its original purpose has expired.

Mario: Let's start with Venezuela. Do you think this is a strategy by Trump? Larry: I saw something similar back in 1988. The CIA was involved with trying to provoke Manuel Noriega into taking some sort of action. They could say, oh, well, we gotta go respond to this to set the stage for our military invasion, which I believe that in 2018, Donald Trump signed a finding authorizing a covert action by the CIA to get rid of Maduro. That attempt failed. And now the objective, get control of the oil. That's the number one priority. And I think it's being done with an eye looking forward, recognizing the potential risk. If conflict is renewed with Iran, prospect of the shutdown of Persian Gulf— Mario: Ukraine defeated Russia. Larry: Yeah. That was the plan. Russia's military is now around 1,500,000. Mario: Let’s talk Venezuela. What’s your initial reaction? When John Kuriaki suggested the best indicator is naval movements, and the buildup off Venezuela is significant. I’ve heard they have 14, twelve warships, including the Gerald Ford. Do you think they are bluffing? Is this Trump strategy? Larry: It could be a bluff. I saw something similar in 1988. I was in the CIA’s Central America branch. They tried to provoke Noriega into action to justify invasion, which happened in December 1988. What’s different now is the base infrastructure. In Panama, Quarry Heights was full; Southern Command was there. Southern Command has moved to Miami. The weaponization of the idea of a “supported vs. supporting” commander is reversed here: Southern Command would be subordinate to Special Operations Command. SOCOM cannot fight a conventional war; they’re light infantry, raids, hostage rescue. So the question is: what will the ships actually do? Shells into Venezuela won’t defeat Venezuela. Ground forces would require mass, and Venezuela is three times the size of Vietnam with rugged terrain that favors ambushes. If US troops ashore, you’d stack body bags far beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Mario: Do Venezuelans have the will to fight Maduro? Larry: Yes. It will rally insurgents from Brazil and Colombia. If we decapitate Maduro, there are loyalists with weapons; an insurgency could follow, and the US would be hard-pressed to pacify it. The State Department’s INL/INSCR reports on narcotics note Venezuela as a transit point for marijuana and some cocaine, with fentanyl less central than claimed by Trump. The 2018 emphasis on Trendy Aragua looked CIA-driven. Trump reportedly signed a covert action finding in 2018 to remove Maduro, leading to the Guaidó fiasco; that covert action included some public diplomacy via USAID. The objective now, as you asked, is oil control and curtailing Russia, China, and Iran’s influence, with an eye toward BRICS. Mario: Could there be a decapitation strike on Maduro, and would someone like Maria take over? Larry: A decapitation strike could spark insurgency; the US would not be able to pacify it. The broader agenda seems to include a strategy to seize oil and reduce regional influence by Russia and China. Venezuela’s role as a transit point and possible BRICS alignment complicates any straightforward regime-change scenario. Mario: Moving to general foreign policy under Trump. The national security strategy (NSS) for 2025 signals a shift, but you question how binding NSS papers are. What did you make of it, and how does it relate to Ukraine? You’ve noted Trump isn’t serious about peace in Ukraine on some occasions. Larry: The NSS is a set of guidelines, not a blueprint. Europe is being asked to step up, the US distancing itself from Europe, and the strategic relationship with Europe is damaged by the perception of long-term reliability and sanctions. The document highlights China as an economic rival rather than an enemy; it criticizes Europe’s defense spending and censorship, and it frames Russia as less of a direct threat than before, though the reality is nuanced. The US-EU relationship is strained, and the US wants Europe to shoulder more of the burden in Ukraine while maintaining strategic pressure. Mario: What about Ukraine? Zelensky’s negotiation posture, security guarantees, and the Moscow terms? Larry: Putin spoke on 06/14/2024 with five Russian demands: Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk are permanently part of Russia; Ukraine must withdraw its forces from those republics; there must be an election in Ukraine with a legitimately elected president (the Russians argue Zelensky is illegitimate for not holding elections); they suggest a successor to Zelensky and elections within 90 days. Freezing lines in Donbas is not accepted by Russia; the Russians claim further territory may be annexed with referenda. If peace talks fail, Russia is likely to push to occupy Kharkiv, Sumy, Mykolaiv, and Odessa, potentially Kyiv. Western support is insufficient to alter that trajectory, given Russia’s large artillery and drone production. The US and Europe cannot match Russia’s drone and shell output; even if they supply Tomahawks, escalation risks, including nuclear considerations, grow. Russia’s economy and war capacity remain robust, and the BRICS poles are strengthening as Western leverage wanes. Mario: What about sanctions strategy and Russia’s oil revenues? Larry: Oil remains a significant but not decisive portion of Russia’s GDP. The West’s sanctions are not enough to force collapse; Russia has endured the 1990s and remains resilient. BRICS cooperation and the shift to the Global South are changing the global order, with Russia and China deepening ties and reducing Western influence. The war in Ukraine has not produced a decisive Western victory, and the global south is moving away from Western-led sanctions, reshaping geopolitical alignments. Mario, it’s been a pleasure.

It's surprising that a call between Trump and Putin occurred, and even more so that negotiations were discussed as the meeting concluded, leaving many unable to react. This raises concerns that Trump and Putin might reach agreements without considering the interests of Ukraine and Europe. This development comes after the new US Defense Minister, Pete Haxhes, during his visit, stated firmly that US troops would not participate in security arrangements in Ukraine. The US also doesn't believe that NATO membership is a realistic outcome of negotiations. Haxhes dismissed Ukraine's hopes of regaining all occupied territories, including Crimea, calling it unrealistic.

He's trying to broker peace, but our engagement caused this war. We can't fix it with more engagement. Trump wanted a mineral deal, but it's unclear why he's pushing it. He initially considered removing sanctions on Russia, but after Russia's robust bombing campaign, he proposed large-scale sanctions and tariffs until a ceasefire. It's a proxy war, and it's best to admit our side has lost and wind down. Sanctions only strengthen Russia and weaken the West. Trump's back-and-forth is setting him up for a defeat that could have been blamed on Biden. He should walk away and disengage, it's Biden's war. More sanctions are ridiculous, they've all failed. Russia's fine, and we failed on the battlefield. It's like more COVID boosters, they don't work, get out of this already.

Participants discuss the potential outcomes of a meeting with Vladimir Putin. The best case is that no damage occurs; the worst is that Donald Trump concedes to Putin on Ukraine, with fear that Trump will be swayed by Putin. The speaker notes Putin is an international pariah indicted for war crimes and has been granted the privilege of meeting the U.S. president in Alaska. They express concern that Washington may signal concessions on Ukraine, including possible territorial trade. Trump reportedly says he will listen to Putin, while Europeans doubt the reliability of U.S. commitments amid Trump's mercurial policies. Some warn Europeans cannot trust U.S. statements, and question whether the Trump administration will sustain any security guarantees to Ukraine in the years ahead.

What Trump wants is a ceasefire. That's it. He wants a ceasefire. And if Putin can get convince him that the quickest route to a ceasefire is for Ukraine to leave mother Russia and say no to NATO, that's it. That's all that has to happen for a ceasefire. And what Putin is going to say is it won't matter in a month. In a month, we're going to own it all. If you want your ceasefire now, tell Ukraine to leave. If the Ukraine won't leave, we'll make them leave. There's nothing you can do to stop us. We're not afraid of your sanctions. We're not afraid of any of your threats. This is going to happen. We can either happen have it happen in a way that gets you the ceasefire you want, or it's just gonna happen. And I think Trump understands it.

Ray McGovern, a former CIA officer who chaired the National Intelligence Estimate and prepared daily briefs for the president, discusses the newly released US national security strategy and its implications for the war in Ukraine, as well as broader US-Russia and US-Europe dynamics. - McGovern notes a dramatic shift in the national security strategy’s emphasis. He observes it prioritizes the Western Hemisphere, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, with Russia treated as part of Europe. He contrasts this with past eras, recalling Paul Wolfowitz’s post–Gulf War doctrine, which asserted US primacy and the ability to act that Russia could not stop, and he emphasizes the stark difference between that era and the current document. - He recounts a historical anecdote from 1991–1992: Wolfowitz’s belief that the US could win where others could not, followed by a warning to General Wesley Clark that Russia would challenge US primacy as times changed. He points to subsequent US actions in Iraq (2003) and Syria (2015) as evidence of a shift in capability to project power, and he argues that in 2022 Russia halted US plans by preventing NATO expansion into Ukraine. - McGovern interprets the current strategy as signaling a recalibration: the US may be acknowledging a changing balance of power, with a focus on deterring Russia and stabilizing relations with Moscow, while recognizing that Europe is central to strategic calculations. He stresses that Russia’s core principle, in its view, is to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, and he underscores that the strategy doc frames core interests as seeking strategic stability with Russia and a negotiated modus vivendi, though he notes these appear as a “castaway” in the Europe section. - He discusses ongoing high-level discussions in Berlin involving Witkoff (Wittkop) and Jared Kushner, and Zelenskyy’s positions on NATO membership and security assurances. He recalls past European reactions, including Rubio’s role in watering down European talking points and US–Russian negotiations, suggesting a pattern of European concessions followed by US–Russian engagement that sidelines European voices. - McGovern argues that Russia has “won the war” on the battlefield and that Moscow’s tactic is gradual, minimizing Ukrainian casualties while consolidating control over parts of Donetsk and other territorial objectives. He asserts Putin’s priority is to maintain a workable relationship with the United States, with Ukraine as a secondary concern. He also notes Trump’s stated interest in improving US-Russia relations, including a willingness to consider extending New START, and he highlights that Moscow would react to whether Trump commits to the treaty’s limits for another year, which would influence Moscow’s strategic calculations. - The discussion covers the internal US debate over how to handle Ukraine and whether to pursue negotiations with Russia. McGovern argues that the reality of Russia’s position and Ukraine’s losses complicate any simple “win” scenario for Ukraine, and he suggests that a negotiated settlement might eventually emerge if a durable US–Russia relationship can be pursued, given Russia’s advances on the battlefield and its leverage in European security. - They discuss John Mearsheimer’s realist perspective, arguing that Western expansion toward Ukraine contributed to the conflict, and that voices emphasizing NATO enlargement as the sole cause are contested. McGovern mentions Obama’s warnings not to give Ukraine illusions of prevailing against Russia and to avoid escalation, and he contrasts this with Stoltenberg’s statements about Russia’s preconditions for peace. - They also critique EU moves to seize Russian assets to fund Ukraine, suggesting that European leaders may be acting to preserve political power rather than align with the public’s long-term interests, and question whether such measures will endure or provoke wider political backlash. - In closing, McGovern reiterates that Russia has the upper hand for now, with the war’s outcome dependent on political decisions in Washington and Moscow, particularly whether Trump can extend New START, and whether European and US policymakers can sustain a realistic approach to security guarantees and the balance of power in Europe. The conversation ends with a cautious note about the potential for a settlement but ongoing uncertainties about the strategic environment and transatlantic politics.