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The speaker argues that international security is broader than military-political stability and includes global economic stability, poverty reduction, economic security, and civilizational dialogue. He emphasizes the principle that security of each is security of all, recalling Franklin Roosevelt’s idea that “wherever peace is violated, peace everywhere is threatened.” He asserts that two decades ago the world was split ideologically and economically, with security provided by the large strategic potential of two superpowers, and that global confrontation has moved to the periphery of international relations, leaving acute economic and social issues unresolved. He criticizes the unipolar world as not achievable or acceptable, defining it as one center of power and one center of decision-making, a model he says is not democracy and ultimately destructive for both the ruled and the ruler. He notes that unilateral, illegitimate actions have not solved problems and have caused new tragedies and tens of thousands of civilian deaths. He points to the increasing and unchecked use of force in international affairs, the neglect of core principles of international law, and the tendency to resolve issues on the basis of political expediency. The speaker highlights new threats such as weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, arguing for a balanced approach that considers the interests of all international actors. He notes the rapid changes in the international landscape, including the rise of China and India, whose combined GDP (at PPP) surpasses the US, and BRICS collectively surpassing the EU, predicting that economic power will increasingly translate into political influence and strengthen multipolarity. He calls for multilateral diplomacy, openness, transparency, and predictability, with force used only as an exceptional measure and in accordance with the UN Charter, not as a substitute for collective security institutions such as the UN, NATO, or the EU. The speaker defends adherence to international treaties on nonproliferation and disarmament, recalling Russia’s agreement with the US to cut strategic nuclear weapons to 1700–2200 deployable warheads by December 31, 2012, and emphasizes Russia’s commitment to the NPT and multilateral controls on missile technologies. He critiques the proliferation of missile systems in various countries and the existence of new high-tech weapons, including space-based systems, warning that militarization of space could have consequences comparable to the nuclear era. He announces a Russian proposal for a Space Weapons Prevention Treaty and discusses concerns about missile defense deployments in Europe, arguing they provoke a new arms race and distrust. Regarding conventional forces in Europe, he criticizes the Adapted CFE Treaty for insufficient ratification and notes NATO’s expansion near Russian borders, arguing that such expansion reduces mutual trust. He recalls a 1990 NATO secretary-general statement about not placing troops beyond Germany’s borders and stresses that Russia seeks an independent foreign policy with responsible partners to build a fair and democratic world order for all. He also discusses energy cooperation, arguing that energy prices should be market-driven and that foreign capital participates significantly in Russian oil production, with investments in Russia exceeding Russian investments abroad by about 15:1. He mentions Russia’s ongoing WTO accession and criticizes double standards in poverty alleviation, noting how aid and subsidies can perpetuate economic underdevelopment and fuel radicalism and conflict. Finally, he defends the OSCE as a body intended to address security in a holistic way but contends it has been used to serve external interests and to finance NGOs that may interfere in internal affairs. He calls for the OSCE to respect sovereignty and for cooperation based on mutual trust. He closes by reaffirming Russia’s longstanding tradition of independent external policy and expresses a desire to work with responsible, independent partners to build a just, democratic world order that ensures security and prosperity for all.

The panelists discuss whether recent developments around Ukraine, NATO security guarantees, and Western support can produce a peace agreement acceptable to Russia and Ukraine, and what the war’s trajectory might look like by year-end and beyond. Initial reactions and sticking points - Speaker 1 sees potential in recent moves if true and reliable, arguing Ukraine is signaling goodwill to the United States, but remains skeptical that a peace deal will satisfy both sides given core demands over territory and Donbas control. He emphasizes the Donbas as the central unresolved issue. - Speaker 2 notes Putin’s need to show tangible gains to save face, arguing the war is being fought to achieve declared goals and that Russia will not sign a deal unless it secures substantial results. Security guarantees, no-fly zones, and peacekeeping - The discussion centers on two main proposed points: U.S. security guarantees (including possible no-fly zone enforcement) and a European-led peacekeeping force in Ukraine. There is debate about how binding such guarantees would be and whether Russia would accept them, with concerns about the Budapest Memorandum’s history of non-fulfillment versus what a new, more comprehensive, legally binding framework might look like. - Speaker 1 points out that even a robust security package would require Russian agreement, which he doubts will be forthcoming given Moscow’s current aims. He underscores that Europe’s and the U.S.’s support for Ukraine is contingent on political will, which could waver, but he notes Ukraine’s trust gap with U.S. guarantees given past experiences. - Speaker 2 stresses that Putin’s aims include defeating NATO and achieving a U.S.-level accommodation (a “Yalta 2.0” style deal) while keeping Western control over Europe at arm’s length. He argues Putin would accept U.S. and possibly some European troops but not a formal NATO presence on Ukrainian soil, especially in western Donbas or beyond. Budapest memorandum vs. new guarantees - Both sides discuss the difference between a nonbinding Budapest Memorandum and a more robust, legally binding security guarantee. Speaker 1 highlights Ukraine’s past trust in security assurances despite U.S. and European failures to honor them, suggesting skepticism about the enforceability of any new guarantees. Speaker 2 suggests that a stronger, more binding arrangement could be essential for Russia to accept any settlement, but that Moscow would still resist concessions over full Donbas control. On-the-ground realities and war dynamics - The panelists agree Russia is advancing on multiple fronts, though the pace and strategic significance of gains vary. They discuss Ukraine’s ability to sustain the fight through Western weapons flows and domestic production (including drones and shells). They acknowledge the risk of Western fatigue and the potential for a more protracted war, even as Ukraine builds its own capabilities to prolong the conflict. - The West’s long-term willingness to fund and arm Ukraine is debated: Speaker 1 argues Europe’s economy is strained but notes continued political support for Ukraine, which could outlast Russia’s economic stamina. Speaker 2 emphasizes that Russia’s economy is fragile mainly in the provinces, while Moscow and Saint Petersburg remain relatively insulated; he also points to BRICS support (China and India) as sustaining Moscow politically and economically. Economic and strategic pressures - The role of energy revenues and sanctions is debated. Speaker 1 suggests Russia can be pressured economically to seek a deal, while Speaker 2 counters that Russia’s economy is adapting, with China and India providing strategic support that helps Moscow resist Western coercion. They discuss shadow fleet strikes and global energy markets as tools to erode Russia’s war-finance capability. - There is disagreement about whether, over time, economic pressure alone could force regime change in Russia. Speaker 1 is skeptical that penalties will trigger a voluntary Russian withdrawal, while Speaker 2 argues that sustained economic and political pressure, combined with Western unity, could push toward a settlement. Strategies and potential outcomes - Putin’s internal calculus is described as existential: he seeks a win that he can publicly claim to legitimize his rule and justify the costs of the war to the Russian people and elites. This shapes his openness to concessions and to the kinds of guarantees he would accept. - Alexander posits that a near-term peace could emerge from a deal brokered at high levels (potentially involving Trump and Putin) that reshapes European security with U.S. leadership and BRICS engagement, while Paul emphasizes that any credible end to the conflict would require Ukraine and Russia to agree to a swap-like territorial arrangement and to accept a new security framework that deters renewed aggression. End-of-year and longer-term outlooks - By year-end, the panel agrees it is unlikely that a major peace agreement will be realized under the current conditions; any real breakthrough would depend on significant concessions, including Donbas arrangements, and a credible security guarantee framework. - By the end of next year, both expect a continuation of a contested balance: Ukraine likely to press for stronger Western guarantees and EU integration, Russia seeking to preserve Donbas gains while navigating internal and external pressures. Alexander envisions two “wins” emerging: the United States under Trump coordinating a broader peace framework, and China leveraging its economic influence to shape Europe’s response. Paul anticipates a gradual trajectory with ongoing military and economic pressures and a continued stalemate unless a major concession reshapes incentives on both sides.

Ray McGovern recounts a long, inside view of U.S.–Soviet/Russian arms control and how it shaped or hindered security over decades, tying personal experience to broader strategic lessons. - Continuity and historical perspective. McGovern notes that, after decades in the CIA, he has witnessed both continuity and change in U.S. strategy across eras and administrations. He emphasizes that serious arms control and verification work has often depended on skilled, principled diplomacy even amid bureaucratic friction and political constraints. - Early arms-control work and verification. As chief of the Soviet Foreign Policy Branch in the CIA during the SALT era, he helped support Kissinger and Nixon while recognizing that the Russians faced pressure from both arms racing and concerns about China’s progress. He recalls briefing the Moscow delegation and the importance of verification: “Trust but verify.” He describes witnessing the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty negotiations and the process of uncovering Russian cheating (a radar at Krasnoyarsk later identified as ABM-related). The experience reinforced the value of independent verification mechanisms. - Personal anecdotes about diplomacy and decision-making. McGovern shares instances illustrating how diplomacy operated in practice: Kissinger touring Moscow covertly to broker deals; ambassador Beam's reaction in Helsinki; the sense that a president’s trusted aides could push forward arms-control progress even amid Senate resistance. He stresses the role of credible, informed analysis about the Soviet Union and Gorbachev, and the way that genuine engagement with Moscow helped reduce tensions at key moments (e.g., the late-1970s/early-1980s path toward detente and arms control). - Key treaties and turning points. He highlights several milestones: - ABM Treaty (1972): limiting ABM sites to two, then one, to preserve deterrence stability; verification challenges and the Russians’ willingness to negotiate under pressure. - Reykjavik and the late-1980s era: Reagan’s willingness to pursue arms-control breakthroughs; the shift that helped lead to meaningful reductions. - INF Treaty (1991/1992 onward) and its later withdrawal under Trump: the collapse of a pillar of strategic stability and its consequences for future arms control. - New START (2011): described as “really good” in limiting offensive missiles; its expiry topic is central to the current security calculation. Putin’s public suggestion to extend the treaty for another year, conditional on U.S. reciprocity, is noted; Trump’s stance is portrayed as uncertain or inconsistent. - The broader security architecture and indivisible security. McGovern stresses that “there is no security without mutual security” and points to the OSCE concept of indivisible security—no country should increase its security at the expense of others. He argues that NATO expansion and security dynamics in Europe have undermined mutual security and contributed to the current fragility in the security architecture. - Ukraine, NATO, and the stakes of perception. He contends that Moscow viewed NATO expansion and Ukraine’s trajectory as threats to its core security interests, contributing to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. He argues that Americans are often not educated about mutual security principles, which fuels misperceptions and escalatory dynamics. - Putin as a cautious actor and the risk of leadership reliability. McGovern describes Putin as a cautious statesman who aims to protect Russia’s core interests and avoid existential risk. He suggests Putin is calculating the reliability of U.S. leadership, especially under Trump, whose unpredictability complicates trust and predictability in negotiations. He notes Trump’s perceived narcissism and the possibility that Trump’s motivations in pursuing a peace process could be mixed with personal prestige or political gain. - Current and near-term outlook. The discussion touches on the likelihood of renewed arms-control leverage if U.S. and Russian leaders can agree on Ukraine-related constraints and verify compliance. It also notes that the broader trend—toward weaker, inconsistent adherence to treaties and a perceived decline in diplomacy—risks fueling a renewed arms race and greater instability. - Closing sentiment. McGovern underscores that genuine arms-control diplomacy, mutual restraint, and credible verification are essential for reducing the security dilemma that drives dangerous competition. He frames Putin as a potential hinge for stabilizing relations if U.S. leadership can articulate and sustain a credible, reciprocal security posture. Overall, the dialogue weaves historical memory with current geopolitics, stressing that lasting security rests on mutual restraint, verifiable agreements, and a shared understanding of indivisible security—even as political winds shift and alliances realign.

Good afternoon. I ask you to convene here today to inform you about how the negotiations are going on on the Ukrainian crisis and how the negotiations are developing in the bilateral format with the Ukrainian delegation in one way or another. And two, I'd like to inform you about at what stage we are currently with the American administration. We know that they are taking quite vigorous and sincere efforts to put an end to the hostilities, to put an end to this crisis, and to reach an agreement that would be of interest for all the parties involved in this conflict to ensure durable conditions for peace between our countries and in Europe in general and globally as well. If the next stage would be agreement about strategic offensive weapons, that's what I wanted to say in the beginning.

**Original Summary (Deutsch):** Der Sprecher analysiert ein Gesprächsprotokoll von 1990 zwischen James Baker und Michael Gorbatschow bezüglich der NATO-Osterweiterung. Laut dem Protokoll, das aus dem National Security Archive stammt, sicherte Baker Gorbatschow zu, dass sich die NATO nicht ausdehnen würde. Baker argumentierte, dass die NATO die amerikanische Vorherrschaft über Europa sichern könne, was ohne die NATO gefährdet wäre. Wörtlich sagte Baker, man verstehe, dass es für Gorbatschow wichtig sei, dass sich die NATO nicht einen Zentimeter nach Osten ausdehnt, auch nicht im Zuge der deutschen Wiedervereinigung. Der Sprecher betont, dass es sich um Originalprotokolle handelt, die belegen, dass die USA den Sowjets versprochen hätten, die NATO nicht zu erweitern. **English Translation:** The speaker analyzes a 1990 conversation transcript between James Baker and Michael Gorbachev regarding NATO expansion. According to the transcript, sourced from the National Security Archive, Baker assured Gorbachev that NATO would not expand. Baker argued that NATO could secure American dominance over Europe, which would be jeopardized without NATO. Baker literally said that he understood it was important to Gorbachev that NATO not expand one inch eastward, not even in the course of German reunification. The speaker emphasizes that these are original protocols proving that the US promised the Soviets not to expand NATO.

The speakers discuss their trust in Vladimir Putin, with Speaker 0 expressing confidence in him and Speaker 1 highlighting Biden's past praise for Putin's move towards democracy. Speaker 2 acknowledges Putin's intelligence and positive personal relationship, emphasizing his trustworthiness. Speaker 3 confirms that Putin kept his word in their deals. Speaker 1 explains the challenges Putin faces, including the need for economic restructuring and rebuilding civic society after communism. They also mention historical legacies in Russia's external relations. The video concludes with Speaker 0 expressing optimism about increased cooperation between NATO and Russia.

Checklist: - Identify and extract core claims: NATO not moving east; no extension of defense area eastward; not absorbing the GDR; applies generally. - Translate to English while preserving meaning. - Present claims precisely as in the transcript; avoid added judgments. - Exclude filler and repetition; be concise. - Highlight any nuanced phrasing (e.g., “by the way” indicating emphasis). - Keep within a concise length given the brief source. In exchange for German reunification, the West promises not to push NATO further to the east. We were in agreement that there is no intention to extend NATO's defense area to the east. By the way, this does not apply only to the GDR, which we do not want to absorb there, but it applies generally.

In 1994, the U.S. initiated a project to expand NATO eastward indefinitely, despite assurances given to Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990 that NATO would not move "one inch eastward." This expansion continued under multiple presidents, with seven more countries added in 2004. In 2007, Putin urged the U.S. to halt expansion, reminding them of the earlier promise. In 2002, the U.S. unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and began installing anti-ballistic missile systems in Russia's bordering territories. In 2008, George Bush Jr. aimed to include Ukraine and Georgia in NATO, which led to conflict. The U.S. also played a role in the 2014 overthrow of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, who favored neutrality. Recently, President Trump had a call with President Putin, signaling a respect for Russia's concerns. The new defense secretary stated that Ukraine will not join NATO. Additionally, Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged a multipolar world, marking a shift from the U.S. mindset of sole superpower dominance. These events signal a potential shift towards peace.

The speaker discusses the idea of Russia joining NATO and relates it to recently declassified documents. He reads a 1954 note from the Soviet government to NATO member countries, stating: "Relying on the unchanging principles of our peaceful foreign policy and striving to reduce tension in international relations, the Soviet government expresses readiness to consider jointly with interested governments the question of the USSR's participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." He then presents the response to that proposal: “There is no need to underline the utterly unrealistic nature of such a proposal.” The speaker recalls an earlier moment, about a year prior, when, in response to the question about Russia possibly joining NATO, he said, “why not?” He notes that former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, while traveling in Europe, responded that this is not being discussed now. The core discussion is framed around understanding whether NATO is a military organization and whether Russia would be welcome there. The speaker suggests that NATO is indeed a military organization and questions whether Russia would be wanted there. He asserts that NATO “is moving toward our borders,” and he ascribes to this movement a purpose or inevitability that shapes Russia’s position on the issue. In summarizing the underlying basis of the Russian position, the speaker emphasizes the perception that NATO’s character as a military alliance and its movements toward Russia’s borders inform a strategic stance against expanding membership to include Russia. He contrasts the historical openness expressed in 1954 with the contemporary response that such a proposal is not realistic, and with current statements from Western officials indicating that Russia’s accession is not under consideration. The narrative ties together declassified archival material, a past provocative-appearing suggestion, and present-day geopolitical calculations about NATO’s reach and military posture near Russia.

The Alaska Summit reinforced my belief that while difficult pieces within reach, I believe that in a very significant step, President Putin agreed that Russia would accept security guarantees for Ukraine, and this is one of the key points that we need to consider. We're going to be considering that at the table, also, like who will do what, essentially. I'm optimistic that collectively we can reach an agreement.

Speaker 1: We have not gone to war with Russia. Russia is isolated, more than five years ago, a regional power threatening neighbors, not out of strength but out of weakness. Ukraine had influence for decades since the Soviet breakup. We have considerable influence on our neighbors and generally don't need to invade to have cooperation. Russia's military action violates international law and signals less influence. They don't pose the number one national security threat to United States; I am concerned about a nuclear weapon going off in Manhattan. Speaker 2: It is up to the Ukrainian people to decide how they organize themselves. The Ukrainian government is prepared to negotiate with Russia, and the international community supports a diplomatic process to de-escalate tensions, move Russian troops back from Ukraine's borders, and organize elections; the Ukrainian people will choose leadership. They will want a relationship with Europe and with Russia; this is not a zero-sum game.

There's debate over expanding NATO to Central European countries like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Russia is against further expansion, warning of a potential "cold peace." While the US hasn't set a date, the understanding is that expansion will happen eventually. The issue isn't *if*, but *when*. Germany primarily advocates for expansion within NATO. While keeping the option open, expansion should only proceed if there's a real threat. The focus should be on encouraging Russia to cooperate peacefully. It's also more important for Eastern European countries to join the European Union for economic benefits. Expanding NATO to protect borders that aren't currently threatened doesn't make sense. Creating a buffer zone in Central Europe could lead to renewed tensions between Russia and Germany. We should aim for friendly relations with Russia.

The speaker expresses deep sadness about the current situation with Russia, noting extensive time spent in Russia in the 1980s and 1990s and connections with people who ran the government then. He argues that a fundamental error by the United States in the mid to late 1980s and early 1990s was the expansion of NATO. He emphasizes that after the Cold War was won, there was debate about NATO’s future, and the idea of expanding it arose despite it being a bureaucracy that “works.” The speaker recounts a key episode from the reunification negotiations with Germany. He says that during those talks, Gorbachev and Jim Baker discussed the treaty, which stated that there would be no NATO troops in East Germany, and Baker told Gorbachev that if Germany were reunified and NATO expanded beyond that, NATO would not expand “one inch further east.” The speaker states that Gorbachev told him and others that Baker had promised this interpretation, and that Gorbachev also told Coal (likely a reference to other Russian officials) the same thing, which he says was new information. He asserts that the first Bush administration kept this promise, or at least appeared to honor it, pursuing a partnership for peace that Russians somewhat liked. With the Clinton administration, the speaker asserts, the first thing done in his first term was to expand NATO. He questions the rationale, referencing Strobe Talbot’s Foreign Affairs article on why NATO was expanded, and implies the reasons were insufficient. In conversations with Russians who ran for president in 1996 and 2000, he recalls a question from the Urals about why the Americans were expanding NATO, noting that although NATO is a military alliance, Russians might not understand puts and calls but do understand tanks. He quotes a Russian politician who says, “Russians might not be able to understand puts and calls, but they certainly understand tanks.” The speaker uses a banking analogy: a friend or supporter goes bankrupt, and you call to offer encouragement; instead, the United States “kicked them when they were down” by expanding NATO. He contends that this expansion created the justification for authoritarianism’s return in Russia and characterizes it as a blunder of monumental proportions. He reflects that at Oxford he studied Cold War origins and believes the Russians were responsible for much of it, describing the expansion as born of bureaucratic inertia within NATO, or, in the worst case, a self-fulfilling prophecy among certain Clinton-era officials who believed Russia would forever be the enemy. Looking forward, the speaker suggests a missed opportunity for a strategic partnership built on common long-term threats and cooperation, noting that Russia would have been a significant partner given its oil and regional influence. He concludes with a sense of profound sadness, arguing that the United States created a problem that could have been avoided and lost an important long-term partner, especially on today’s most threatening issues.

Gilbert Doktorov and the host discuss the evolving, multi-layered negotiations surrounding the Ukraine war, stressing that talks involve more than Ukraine and Russia, extending to US-Russia dynamics and broader European and global interests. - They note that trilateral talks among Ukraine, Russia, and the US have begun, with the first phase completed. The conversation emphasizes that the US-Russia dimension is crucial because the conflict is viewed as a proxy war between NATO and Russia, and that “the US toppled the government in Ukraine” with intelligence support, military planning, weapons, and targets coordinated through backchannels. The implication is that any durable settlement would require some deal between the US and Russia to de-escalate the proxy confrontation. - On US-Russia relations, Speaker 1 identifies several dimensions: renewal or non-renewal of New START, and the functioning of embassies, as negative signs, but points to positive changes elsewhere. He highlights Kislyov’s Sunday night program remarks, noting Russia’s proposal to contribute $1,000,000,000 to become a permanent board member using frozen US assets (total US assets frozen around $5 billion in equivalent value). He mentions that Trump was asked about using frozen assets and reportedly declined, but the implication is that Moscow views this as a potential lever. Kislyov also notes that the additional $4,000,000,000 in frozen assets would be allocated to reconstruction in Palestine, and that Russia’s participation on the board would influence regional diplomacy, including with Palestinians and Israelis. - The discussion suggests that the absence of official diplomacy (e.g., embassies) does not necessarily indicate a lack of progress, arguing that backchannels between Putin and Trump are functioning well. The speakers discuss the broader context of Russia’s strategic posture, including alleged advancements in space-based and other new military capabilities that are not fully captured by New START, and the sense from Moscow that the US is preparing a space-based missile system that would enable first strikes, a point the Russians emphasize in public discourse. - On Ukraine, Zelensky’s stance is described as uncompromising: Ukraine will not cede territory and will demand security guarantees, which could undermine a neutral status. The dialogue suggests Zelensky is using a posture of firmness to buy time for negotiations, with Ukrainian leadership potentially exchanging assurances for a broader settlement that could include regime change and financial support for reconstruction. - The potential for compromise is discussed in terms of strategic timing and leverage. The Russians’ primary interest is regime change, and there could be an understanding with Trump about a democratic replacement in Ukraine, possibly replacing Zelensky with a pro-Russian administration under conditions tied to substantial monetary reparations for reconstruction. The timing and mechanism, including potential referenda or buyouts, are considered critical elements that could determine the settlement’s architecture. - The European role is analyzed as increasingly fraught. Europe’s diplomatic engagement has been limited, but Moscow is open to leveraging European assets in a peace process. Lavrov’s stated position that talks with Ursula von der Leyen’s European Commission leadership are unlikely, and the broader fragmentation within Europe (France, Germany, Finland, the EU leadership) are highlighted as complicating factors. There is speculation about European figures who could bridge talks, such as Finland’s Stubb, though there is skepticism about Kalas’s leadership within the EU. - The speakers speculate that Davos and Trump’s stance have reshaped European perceptions of US leadership, with European elites increasingly questioning the reliability of US-backed security guarantees. The conversation closes with an expectation that the year 2025 will be dominated by Trump as a central variable in resolving global issues, and that Moscow remains optimistic about achieving a settlement with Washington while signaling a tougher stance toward Ukraine if needed. Overall, the discussion portrays a complex, interwoven set of negotiations across US-Russia, Ukraine-Russia, and European dynamics, with backchannels, asset controls, potential regime-change considerations, and timing as key levers for reaching any settlement.

"Our position is that we're going to have an operation that works." "We want Russia to be involved in it." "We made some progress today consistent with both of our objectives with neither side giving up the things that were most important to it." "We made some progress today on that, and we recognized that some of the things that needed to be decided, neither of us could in good conscience decide without giving our military leaders the chance to work through that." "So we agreed that this week this week, our military leaders would be keep working." "That is all I can tell you." "The more we say about it, the worse it'll be." "We are moving toward peace." "The first and most important thing is make peace in Bosnia." "That has not been done yet." "There is no relationship between two"

Speaker 0 argues that this is not an attack by Putin on Ukraine in the way it is commonly framed. The speaker references 1990, stating that on 02/09/1990 James Baker III told Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not move eastward if Germany unified, and that Gorbachev agreed, ending World War II. The speaker asserts that the US then cheated starting in 1994 when Clinton signed off on a plan to expand NATO all the way to Ukraine, marking the rise of the neocons and identifying Clinton as the first agent of this. NATO expansion began in 1999 with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, at which point Russia did not see a direct threat. The speaker notes the US-led bombing of Serbia in 1999 as problematic, describing it as NATO bombing Belgrade for seventy-eight straight days to break the country apart, which Russia did not like. Putin became president, and the Russians initially tolerated and complained but were largely subdued. The speaker claims Putin started out pro-European and pro-American, even suggesting joining NATO when there was some mutual respect. After 9/11 and the Afghan conflict, Russia supported the effort to root out terror. Two decisive actions are highlighted: in 2002, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, described as perhaps the most decisive event rarely discussed in this context. This led to the US placing missile systems in Eastern Europe, which Russia views as a direct threat. The speaker mentions a soft regime change operation in Ukraine in 2004-2005, followed by Yanukovych winning the election in 2009 and becoming president in 2010 on the basis of neutrality for Ukraine. This calmed tensions because the US was pushing NATO, while Ukrainian public opinion reportedly did not want NATO membership, citing a divided country between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians and a desire to stay away from certain conflicts. In 02/22/2014, the United States allegedly participated in the overthrow of Yanukovych, described as a typical US regime change operation. The Russians supposedly intercepted a call between Victoria Nuland (then at the State Department, now at Columbia University) and Jeffrey Piot, the US ambassador to Ukraine, discussing who would be in the next government. The speaker asserts that after these events, the US said NATO would enlarge, while Putin repeatedly warned to stop, noting that promises were made not to enlarge NATO. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia are listed as having joined NATO in 2004, before the broader enlargement. The speaker accuses the US of rejecting the basic idea of not expanding NATO to Russia’s border while placing missile systems after breaking a treaty, including walking out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019. On 12/15/2021, Putin allegedly proposed a draft Russia-US security agreement with no NATO enlargement, which the speaker says he communicated to the White House, urging negotiations to avoid war. The speaker claims Jake Sullivan asserted an open-door policy for NATO enlargement, calling it “bullshit,” and asserts that they refused negotiations, leading to the special military operation, with Zelensky offering neutrality and Western leaders pushing Ukraine to fight, resulting in “600,000 deaths now of Ukrainians.”

“I I commend president Yeltsin for his commitment to continuing the path of economic reform.” He notes that in 1993 versus 1992 “the deficit was reduced as a percentage of annual income,” “inflation was brought down,” and “the stabilization of the currency was improved.” He supports further integrating the Russian economy into a global market system, acknowledges dislocations, and urges assistance so the Russian people know there is effort to address these problems. He predicts benefits will flow in the coming year as trade and investment expand and stresses the need for a social safety net and retraining. He says the people of Russia have to define their own future and rejects the idea that the US directs policy, declaring that as long as we share “the same values and the same vision” he wants to be “an equal partner” because “the world, the whole world and particularly Europe has a real interest in seeing Russia succeed and seeing this reform movement succeed.”

Speaker 0 states he wanted Ukraine, not Russia, to join NATO. He felt Ukraine needed to be in the EU and NATO. Speaker 1 brings up that Secretary of State Baker primed Gorbachev in the early nineties not to expand NATO. Speaker 0 responds that times change and the United States must be flexible and adjust to the times, which is why there is strong support for Speaker 1's country now. Speaker 1 says it doesn't matter what Baker primed Gorbachev with in the past, and that we have to see what is going on now.

In 1990, Gorbachev made a deal to dismantle the Warsaw Pact in exchange for NATO not moving eastward. This deal was deeply discussed and negotiated, leading to the reunification of Germany. The speaker believed in this deal and in Gorbachev.

Speaker is saddened about Russia, arguing the fundamental blunder was the expansion of NATO in the mid eighties and early nineties. He cites the Germany reunification talks: Gorbachev and Jim Baker discussed 'no NATO troops in what was in East Germany' and 'NATO if you agree to reunification of Germany in NATO, no expand NATO will not expand one inch further east.' The first Bush administration kept its promise; Russians liked that. Clinton expanded NATO in his first term. He cites Strobe Talbot's article on why expand NATO. A Russian politician asked, 'Russians might not be able to understand puts and calls, but they certainly understand tanks.' He says expanding NATO 'kicked them when they were down' and was a 'blunder of monumental proportions.' He argues a 'strategic partnership' on 'common threats over the long term' could have worked; 'Russia would be back.' We've lost a partner that could have been enormously important over the long term.

In 1994, the U.S. initiated a project to expand NATO eastward indefinitely, despite earlier assurances to President Gorbachev that NATO wouldn't move "one inch eastward." This expansion continued under successive presidents, with seven more countries added in 2004. Putin voiced his opposition in 2007, reminding the U.S. of their promise. Further destabilization occurred when the U.S. unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and moved towards including Ukraine and Georgia in NATO, which led to conflict. In 2010, Ukraine elected a neutral president, Yanukovych, who was later overthrown in 2014. Recently, a call between Presidents Trump and Putin, along with a statement from the new defense secretary, suggests a potential shift towards respecting Russia's concerns and acknowledging that Ukraine will not join NATO, potentially forming a basis for peace.

Putin's intention in the war was to force Zelensky to negotiate—Neutrality. "The idea was to keep NATO. And what is NATO? It's The United States off of Russia's border. No more, no less." When the Soviet Union ended in 1991, an agreement was made that NATO will not move one inch eastward, but "the decision was taken formally in 1994 when president Clinton signed off on NATO enlargement to the East, all the way to Ukraine and into Georgia." Enlargement continued: 1999 (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic); 2004 (Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia). Putin said "stop" in 02/2007; in 02/2008, "The United States jammed down Europe's throat enlargement of NATO to Ukraine and to Georgia." 02/2010, Yanukovych neutrality; US overthrow in 2014; Minsk accords; "autonomy for the Russian speaking regions" in the East. "Blinken told Lavrov in January 2022, The United States reserves the right to put missile systems wherever it wants." The war started; "Ukraine walked away unilaterally from a near agreement" because "The United States told them to." It's the pure proxy war; and "a million Ukrainians have died or been severely"

Two speakers, one being former President George W. Bush, express trust in Vladimir Putin, praising his straightforwardness and trustworthiness. Another speaker, possibly Joe Biden, acknowledges Putin's intelligence and their good relationship, stating that Putin kept his word in personal agreements. Another speaker highlights the challenges Putin faces as the President of Russia, including the need for economic restructuring, rebuilding civic society, and overcoming historical legacies in external relations. The transcript ends with a statement expressing confidence in a new level of cooperation between NATO members and Russia.

Scott Ritter and the interviewer discuss the looming end of the New START treaty and the broader implications for global arms control, stability, and security. - The New START treaty, described by Ritter as the remaining nuclear arms control framework, expires, and without a moratorium on deployed caps or a new treaty, the risk of nuclear war between the United States and Russia, and also with China, could rise significantly. Ritter calls this “earth ending significant” and says the six-decade arms-control legacy would be at risk if no replacement is negotiated. - Ritter emphasizes that New START has provided a framework of stability through on-site inspections, data exchange, and verifiable limits. He notes that the treaty’s value rests on confidence that numbers are correct, which requires robust verification, something he argues was compromised by the lack of inspections in the last two years and by political gamesmanship during negotiations. Rose Gutermiller’s warning about needing a confidence baseline for a potential one-year moratorium is highlighted. - The historical arc of arms control is traced from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the ABM treaty, which Ritter says was foundational because it established the concept of mutually assured destruction. He argues that many subsequent arms-control efforts, including START and particularly INF, were intertwined with the ABM framework and mutual deterrence. The INF treaty is highlighted as the occasion where Ritter was the first ground-based weapons inspector in the Soviet Union, underscoring the value of on-site verification. - Ritter recounts how START was negotiated amid a collapsing Soviet Union, and how post-Soviet realities (nuclear weapons in former Soviet states under Russian control) affected negotiations. He contends that Soviet/Russian leaders perceived START as potentially “bullying” and that Western confidence in Russian strategic deterrence diminished after the end of the Cold War, which contributed to tensions over missile defenses and strategic postures. - The dialogue reviews the evolution of U.S.-Russian relations and how perceptions of threat or weakness influenced policy. Ritter recalls that Russian leadership warned of consequences when the ABM treaty was abandoned and that fear and respect shaped early arms-control cooperation. He asserts that American arrogance toward Russia, including dismissive attitudes toward Russian concerns about missile defenses, harmed trust and contributed to instability. - The involvement of China is treated as a separate but connected issue. China’s position, as outlined in its white paper, is not seeking an arms race and endorses a “no first use” policy, but argues that the United States and Russia must first resolve their bilateral arms-control arrangements before China would join in a broader framework. China argues for all parties to reduce numbers, while insisting China should not be treated as a mere subset of a U.S.-Russia framework. - Ritter asserts that the current U.S. approach to modernization and expansion of strategic forces could precipitate a three-way arms race (U.S., Russia, China) and notes a planned shift in U.S. posture, including potential reactivation of underground testing and revamping warhead delivery systems. He argues that if the process proceeds, other nations might follow with their own nuclear programs, eroding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework and undermining decades of nonproliferation efforts. - He contrasts the current situation with past arms-control muscle memory. He laments the loss of experienced negotiators and Russian area expertise, arguing that today’s policymakers and some academics treat arms control as transactional or overly adversarial rather than as a reciprocal, trust-based process. He claims there is a shortage of genuine arms-control specialists and describes a culture in which the media and academia have overlooked or mischaracterized Russia’s behavior, often blaming Moscow for cheating when, in his view, the problem lies with Western overreach and a lack of mutual understanding. - The conversation ends on a bleak note: without renewed treaties, verification, and mutual recognition of security concerns, the world could regress to a “Wild West” dynamic of proliferation and competition, with Europe’s security umbrella eroded and a broader risk of renewed testing, modernization, and potential conflict. Overall, the discussion frames the expiry of New START as a pivotal moment with potentially catastrophic consequences for strategic stability, arguing for renewed arms-control engagement, better verification, and a recognition of the intertwined histories and motivations of the United States, Russia, and China.

Speaker 1 argues that the United States has repeatedly engaged in illegal military actions and regime changes in multiple countries, starting with the bombing of Belgrade for 78 days to change borders of a European state, with the aim of breaking Serbia and installing Bondsteel, a large NATO base in the Balkans, under Clinton. They claim this was done without UN authority and described as a NATO mission. Speaker 1 continues, alleging that the US has subsequently waged war in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, where, according to them, the Obama administration and Hillary Clinton tasked the CIA with overthrowing Bashar al-Assad. They also claim NATO illegally bombed Libya to topple Muammar Gaddafi, and that in Kyiv in February 2014 the US overthrew Yanukovych together with right-wing Ukrainian military forces, noting that the overthrow happened the day after EU representatives had reached an agreement with Yanukovych for early elections, a government of national unity, and a stand-down of both sides. They assert that the US supported the new government immediately afterward, despite that agreement and without addressing it as unconstitutional. Speaker 1 asserts that Russia, the United States, and the EU were parties to the 2015 Minsk two agreement, which was unanimously voted on by the UN Security Council, signed by the government of Ukraine, and guaranteed explicitly by Germany and France. They contend that Minsk II was dismissed as a holding pattern by inside-US government circles, despite the UN Security Council approval. They claim Angela Merkel later said Minsk II was a holding pattern to allow Ukraine time to build its strength, countering the assertion that Minsk II was meant to end the war. The speaker emphasizes distrust of the United States government and calls for all sides to sit down publicly to agree on terms, with both the United States and Russia committing to specific boundaries, and for NATO not to enlarge, so that a written, global judgment can be made. Speaker 2 adds that there has been an ongoing effort to create an anti-Russian platform in Ukraine, describing it as an enclave, and accusing the US and its allies of lying about not expanding NATO multiple times. Speaker 3 states that President Putin sent a draft treaty asking NATO to promise no more enlargement as a precondition for not invading Ukraine, and notes that this draft was not signed.