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Jiang Shuichin argues that rapid shifts in international power generally become highly disruptive and destabilizing, often coinciding with major world-order changes after major wars or state collapses. He says the Iran war could have wider ramifications beyond the Strait of Hormuz and the region, potentially dragging the broader world into escalating conflict. He explains that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has long been a major driver of the global economy by selling oil cheaply in US dollars and recycling revenue into the US economy. If GCC states were removed from the global economy, he says it would have “tremendous consequences.” He claims that within “a month or two” the world could run out of strategic fuel reserves, grounding airplanes. He also links the conflict to global food supply, stating that the Tigray War provides one third of the world’s fertilizer, and that during the global growing season widespread famine could occur within “five months” or “six months,” especially in Africa. On the Middle East’s reorientation, he argues that Iran can control the Strait of Hormuz de facto, collect tolls, and de facto use it to reconstruct its economy, industrialize, and build stronger trade relations with China and Russia. He says the US imposed a naval blockade to embargo Iranian oil exports to China, but that enforcement is difficult due to the Indian Ocean’s scale and US resource limitations. He asserts that the UAE is “most desperate for war” after losing control of trade through the region’s shipping and finance hub. He adds that Saudi Arabia faces long-term threat dynamics because Iranian influence and proxies affect both Hormuz/Straight security and the Red Sea. He claims Israel wants the war to continue to advance the “Greater Israel” project and warns it has discussed attacking Turkey and Egypt next. He frames the region as a “powder keg,” arguing it is hard for the status quo to persist and predicting possible future breakout regional hostilities, including possible US airstrikes against Tehran and possible Israeli false-flag escalation modeled on the Gulf of Tonkin incident. He suggests the status quo could last “the next three to five months,” arguing Trump would avoid being seen as a loser and might pursue a tentative agreement before shifting attention elsewhere. He presents Cuba as a potential “next global flash point,” arguing the US embargo blocks Cuba from accessing fuel, food, and water, and that Raúl Castro could be indicted, recalling a prior pattern involving Maduro and special forces. He says Russia is heavily invested in Cuba and that both Russia and China are trying to support it. He predicts the Middle East conflict could expand to other flashpoints worldwide, including the possibility of tensions involving North Korea and South Korea, and he claims the war in Europe will also escalate. In discussing Russia’s Ukraine war trajectory, he references an attack on a student dormitory in Luhansk that reportedly killed at least six students and says Putin promised swift retaliation, framing this as potential movement from a “special military operation” toward declaring war and switching to “total war.” He then argues that European elites are trapped in a self-reinforcing fantasy that Ukraine is winning, describing domestic and institutional dynamics that prevent acknowledgment of losses and sustain continued war support. Regarding China’s and Russia’s roles, he says Iranian Foreign Minister Araki visited both Russia and China and claims Putin told him Russia is supportive of the Iranian people and views the US and Israel as aggressors. He says if Iran faces difficulties, Russia would reinforce Iran through the Caspian Sea and describes Russia’s response to GCC complaints about Iran. He contrasts China’s approach as neutral and mediation-focused, arguing China seeks peace and ceasefire so the world can return to global trade and that China refuses a clear stance. He also claims China might sign an agreement with the US to buy more LNG to compensate for lost Middle East LNG, especially Qatar. He describes negotiations between the US and Iran as having “three sticking points.” The uranium issue, he says, could allow compromise through allowing international inspectors while keeping uranium. The Strait of Hormuz control, he says, is core to Iranian security and not something Iran would give up. The third sticking point is Lebanon and the requirement that any peace treaty with the US also applies to Lebanon, including Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. He argues that Israel’s offensive in Lebanon makes lasting peace unlikely and suggests any settlement with Iran would be tentative and could resume within “at most six months.” He argues the US cannot retreat from the Iran war because US financing needs depend on the world continuing to buy US Treasuries and because continuous bombardment is limited by depleted munitions stocks after earlier sustained airstrikes. He states that to “fight this war effectively” the US would need ground troops, which he says would require a national draft and also a chain of events to justify the invasion, including a need for “justification” to rally Americans and create broader economic chaos that would make the invasion acceptable. On Israel’s “Greater Israel” project, he argues that Lebanon is part of the project and that even if the US and Iran reach tentative terms, Israel’s long-term objective would continue, preventing permanent peace. He also claims the Zionist lobby has significant political sway in the US and cites campaign spending aimed at defeating a Republican congressman to warn others. He further argues that conflict models in Europe and Asia are tied to a broader US grand strategy: shifting global conflict to sustain debt and delay economic constraints. He says the US would aim to retreat geographically while still financing and arming partners to prolong wars. For East Asia, he claims the US might allow Japan and South Korea to handle more while American forces and allied structures support containment dynamics. Finally, he argues that Taiwan’s status quo is not sustainable and points to a “grand bargain” after Trump’s China visit. He says Western reporting frames the visit as unproductive, while Chinese media and experts view it as a breakthrough that could end the trade war. He claims the bargain could involve US access to China’s financial market and China opposing Taiwan independence, with the US pausing or blocking a weapons shipment to Taiwan and considering onshoring semiconductors. He states he expects Taiwan to be a future flashpoint only near-term at minimum and argues the next major flashpoint could be North Korea rather than Taiwan. He closes by describing a Western “legitimacy crisis,” attributing it to demographic crisis, financialization, and moral decay, and arguing it will lead to a decline of Western society. He also argues immigration debates are framed as purely pro-immigrant versus racist, while culture and cultural cohesion are not addressed.

In this conversation, Brian Berletic discusses the current collision between the United States’ global strategy and a rising multipolar world, arguing that U.S. policy is driven by corporate-financier interests and a desire to preserve unipolar primacy, regardless of the costs to others. - Structural dynamics and multipolar resistance - The host notes a shift from optimism about Trump’s “America First” rhetoric toward an assessment that U.S. strategy aims to restore hegemony and broad, repeated wars, even as a multipolar world emerges. - Berletic agrees that the crisis is structural: the U.S. system is driven by large corporate-financier interests prioritizing expansion of profit and power. He cites Brookings Institution’s 2009 policy papers, particularly The Path to Persia, as documenting a long-running plan to manage Iran via a sequence of options designed to be used in synergy to topple Iran, with Syria serving as a staging ground for broader conflict. - He argues the policy framework has guided decisions across administrations, turning policy papers into bills and war plans, with corporate media selling these as American interests. This, he says, leaves little room for genuine opposition because political power is financed by corporate interests. - Iran, Syria, and the Middle East as a springboard to a global confrontation - Berletic traces the current Iran crisis to the 2009 Brookings paper’s emphasis on air corridors and using Israel to provoke a war, placing blame on Israel as a proxy mechanism while the U.S. cleanses the region of access points for striking Iran directly. - He asserts the Arab Spring (2011) was designed to encircle Iran and move toward Moscow and Beijing, with Iran as the final target. The U.S. and its allies allegedly used policy papers to push tactical steps—weakening Russia via Ukraine, exploiting Syria, and leveraging Iran as a fulcrum for broader restraint against Eurasian powers. - The aim, he argues, is to prevent a rising China by destabilizing Iran and, simultaneously, strangling energy exports that feed China’s growth. He claims the United States has imposed a global maritime oil blockade on China through coordinated strikes and pressure on oil-rich states, while China pursues energy independence via Belt and Road, coal-to-liquids, and growing imports from Russia. - The role of diplomacy, escalation, and Netanyahu’s proxy - On diplomacy, Berletic says the U.S. has no genuine interest in peace; diplomacy is used to pretext war, creating appearances of reasonable engagement while advancing the continuity of a warlike agenda. He references the Witch Path to Persia as describing diplomacy as a pretext for regime change. - He emphasizes that Russia and China are not credibly negotiating with the U.S., viewing Western diplomacy as theater designed to degrade multipolar powers. Iran, he adds, may be buying time but also reacting to U.S. pressure, while Arab states and Israel are portrayed as proxies with limited autonomy. - The discussion also covers how Israel serves as a disposable proxy to advance U.S. goals, including potential use of nuclear weapons, with Trump allegedly signaling a post-facto defense of Israel in any such scenario. - The Iran conflict, its dynamics, and potential trajectory - The war in Iran is described as a phased aggression, beginning with the consulate attack and escalating into economic and missile-strike campaigns. Berletic notes Iran’s resilient command-and-control and ongoing missile launches, suggesting the U.S. and its allies are attempting to bankrupt Iran while degrading its military capabilities. - He highlights the strain on U.S. munitions inventories, particularly anti-missile interceptors and long-range weapons, due to simultaneous operations in Ukraine, the Middle East, and potential confrontations with China. He warns that the war’s logistics are being stretched to the breaking point, risking a broader blowback. - The discussion points to potential escalation vectors: shutting Hormuz, targeting civilian infrastructure, and possibly using proxies (including within the Gulf states and Yemen) to choke off energy flows. Berletic cautions that the U.S. could resort to more drastic steps, including leveraging Israel for off-world actions, while maintaining that multipolar actors (Russia, China, Iran) would resist. - Capabilities, resources, and the potential duration - The host notes China’s energy-mobility strategies and the Western dependency on rare earth minerals (e.g., gallium) mostly produced in China, emphasizing how U.S. war aims rely on leveraging allies and global supply chains that are not easily sustained. - Berletic argues the U.S. does not plan for permanent victory but for control, and that multipolar powers are growing faster than the United States can destroy them. He suggests an inflection point will come when multipolarism outruns U.S. capacity, though the outcome remains precarious due to nuclear risk and global economic shocks. - Outlook and final reflections - The interlocutors reiterate that the war is part of a broader structural battle between unipolar U.S. dominance and a rising multipolar order anchored by Eurasian powers. They stress the need to awaken broader publics to the reality of multipolarism and to pursue a more balanced world order, warning that the current trajectory risks global economic harm and dangerous escalation.

Jeffrey Sachs argues that we are witnessing the limits of Western power, including the limits of U.S. power, and that this is part of a long-term trend toward the waning dominance of the Western world as Asia rises. He frames the broader arc as follows: - After World War II, Europe lost its colonies and the United States emerged to replace European empires, competing with the Soviet Union as the two major imperial powers. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States appeared to be the sole superpower, leading to an era some called the unipolar moment. Sachs contends this moment was largely an illusion economically: for about a century and a half leading up to 1950, the West dominated, but the long-term trend was the narrowing of the gap between the West and Asia. - From the end of World War II onward, Asia began a sustained process of catching up in literacy, education, infrastructure, and industrialization. While Western economic and military dominance remained evident, Asia’s rise gradually altered the balance of power. By the 1990s and into the 2000s, Asia’s relative power had grown substantially, with China emerging as a major economic and technological force. - The “unipolar moment” faded as reality: Asia has been rising since the mid-20th century, and the post-1991 euphoria in the United States about unipolarity was economically questionable. Sachs notes that even at the height of U.S. power, the U.S. could not defeat Vietnam or sustain European empires, and that China’s rise began well before 2010, becoming evident in manufacturing and heavy industry led by China. - He highlights the Ukraine war as another demonstration of the limits of American expansion and NATO’s enlargement, arguing that the war marks the end of NATO enlargement and challenges the notion that the U.S. could redraw power on Eurasia at will. He recalls Zbigniew Brzezinski’s idea of U.S. dominance over Eurasia and argues that Putin’s stance showed that such dominance would not be realized. - Sachs emphasizes that technology and economic growth diffuse over time, making monopolies unsustainable. He cites historical examples: Britain’s early industrial edge, Germany and the United States catching up, and even the limited lasting power of nuclear monopoly due to espionage and scientific advances. He argues that “choke points” are a recurring meme that eventually fail to prevent rising challengers. - He discusses realist theories: offensive realism (John Mearsheimer) arguing that great powers cannot find stable balance and constantly seek advantage, versus defensive realism (and Kissinger’s Concert of Europe-inspired view) suggesting some stability through negotiation and norms. He notes that U.S. strategists often view China and Russia as destabilizing and dangerous, though he himself advocates cooperative accommodation with China, avoiding confrontations over red lines and arms sales to Taiwan. - Sachs connects these ideas to ideology, noting that dominant powers often rationalize dominance through imperialist or civilizing ideologies. He references Robert Kagan’s liberal imperialism concept and traces it back to European imperial thought, suggesting that Western mentalities persist even as formal empires fade. He argues that imperial mindsets continue in Britain and the United States, with imperial ideologies shaping how power is exercised and justified. In sum, Sachs frames the current era as a gradual but undeniable shift away from Western, particularly American, dominance toward a more multipolar order led by Asia, with the Ukraine war and Iran as illustrating events showing the limits of unipolarity and the enduring, complex dynamics of great-power competition.

Alex Kraner and Glenn discuss the geopolitical and economic fallout from Iran’s weekend strikes and the broader shifts in global risk, energy, and power blocs. - Oil and energy impact: Iran’s strikes targeted energy infrastructure, including Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia, and crude prices jumped about 10% with Friday’s close around $73.50 and current levels near $80 per barrel. Prices could push higher if Hormuz traffic is disrupted or closed, given that one in five barrels of crude exports pass through the Hormuz gates. The potential for further oil disruptions is acknowledged, with the possibility of triple-digit or higher prices depending on how the conflict evolves. - Market dynamics and energy dependence: The guest notes a hockey-stick pattern in uptrends across markets when driven by large asset holders waking up to energy exposure, referencing shadow banking as a driver of rapid moves. He points to vast assets under management (approximately $220 trillion) among pension funds, hedge funds, endowments, and insurers that could push energy markets higher if they reallocate toward oil futures and energy-related assets. He emphasizes that energy is essential for broad economic activity, and a curtailed oil economy would slow economies globally. - European vulnerabilities: Europe faces a fragile energy security position, already dealing with an energy crisis and decreased reliance on Russian hydrocarbons. Disruptions to LNG supplies from Qatar or other sources could further threaten Europe, complicating efforts by Ursula von der Leyen and Christine Lagarde to manage inflation and debt. The panel highlights potential increased debt concerns in Europe, with Lagarde signaling uncertainty and the possibility of higher interest rates, and warns of a possible future resembling Weimar-era debt dynamics or systemic stress in European bonds. - Global geopolitics and blocs: The discussion suggests a risk of the world fracturing into two blocs, with BRICS controlling more diverse energy supplies and the West potentially losing its energy dominance. The US pivot to Asia could be undone as the United States becomes more entangled in Middle East conflicts. The guests anticipate renewed US engagement with traditional alliances (France, Britain, Germany) and a possible retraction from attempts to pursue multipolar integration with Russia and China. The possibility of a broader two-block, cold-war-like order is raised, with energy as a central question. - Iran and US diplomacy optics: The negotiations reportedly had Iran willing to concede to American proposals when the leadership was assassinated, prompting questions about US policy and timing. The attack is described as damaging to public opinion and diplomacy, with potential impeachment momentum for Trump discussed in light of his handling of the Iran situation. The geopolitical optics are characterized as highly damaging to US credibility and to the prospects of reaching future deals with Iran and other actors. - Middle East dynamics and US security commitments: The strikes impact the US-Israel relationship and the US-Gulf states’ security posture. Pentagon statements reportedly indicated no signs that Iran planned to attack the US first, raising questions about the strategic calculus of the strikes and the broader risk to regional stability. The conversation notes persistent supply chain and defense material challenges—including concerns about weapon stockpiles and the sustainability of military deployments in the region. - Long-range grim projections: The discussion concludes with caution about the potential long arc of decline for Western economic and political influence if current trajectories persist, contrasted with the rise of Eastern blocs. There is warning about a possible long-term, multi-decade period of geopolitical and economic restructuring, with energy security and debt dynamics at the core of those shifts. - Closing reflections: The speakers acknowledge the unpredictability of markets and geopolitics, refraining from definitive forecasts but underscoring how energy, debt, and alliance realignments will likely shape the coming period.

Lawrence Wilkerson and Glenn discuss a fragile ceasefire in Southwest Asia and what it signals about broader geopolitics and U.S. strategy. - Ceasefire prospects and Lebanon: Wilkerson says, as a military professional, ceasefires need the first week or two to establish, and with Iran-related communications, longer to restore contact with dispersed forces. He notes Netanyahu’s continued bombing in Lebanon and Beirut, arguing this is a major impediment to a durable ceasefire, with Iran having made clear that if Lebanon is not part of the ceasefire the deal may fail. - NATO and U.S. commitments: Wilkerson declares NATO effectively dead, though not formally, predicting the U.S. will disengage from NATO in practice as Ukraine’s conflict accelerates the decline. He links this to a broader reevaluation of U.S. alliances, suggesting a shift away from formal alliances toward other strategic arrangements, especially given changes in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. - U.S. role in Southwest Asia: He argues the United States is moving toward “offshore balancing” or withdrawal from the region, citing aging maritime assets, vulnerable aircraft carriers, and a changing energy/security architecture that lessens the need for a permanent U.S. ground presence. He predicts a transformation where pipelines and land routes become more important than sea routes, with Central Asia (Caspian energy) and the broader Eurasian land corridor strengthening, while Gulf oil dynamics and the Arab-Israeli tie weaken. - Russia and China in a multipolar world: Wilkerson contends power is shifting toward a multipolar order. He suggests Russia will become a major land and maritime power, leveraging Arctic routes and expanding naval reach, while China leverages both the Belt and Road and maritime interests (including deep-sea fishing and ports). He emphasizes the need to accept this shift rather than fight it, warning against a Thucydides trap scenario if the U.S. doubles down on containment. - The Middle East and regional realignments: He describes potential strategic shifts, such as Saudi Arabia redirecting Gulf investment toward Syria and away from Israel, and Israel’s future as a “tool” rather than the driver of U.S. policy. He fears Israel’s days could be numbered if the wider regional energy and political alignments move against it and if U.S. support falters. He calls for a genuine two-state framework and democracy in Israel for long-term viability, but doubts such changes will occur given current leadership. - U.S. domestic politics and leadership: The discussion touches on the perceived degradation of U.S. institutions (Congress, Supreme Court) and political finance concerns (Citizens United). Wilkerson criticizes the leadership around Donald Trump and Pete Hegseth, accusing them of pursuing religious-nationalist agendas and purging military leadership to build a partisan base. He cites the potential for internal conflict, including a possible civil dimension in the United States, exacerbated by polarization and militarized factions. - Iran and diplomacy: Wilkerson presents two opposing paths for the Iran question: a subterfuge scenario where negotiations are used to lull Iran into a false sense of security, followed by renewed pressure, or a serious diplomatic track led by a serious U.S. president to end the war and negotiate a settlement that satisfies Iran’s terms (reparations, sanctions removal, regional security guarantees). He doubts the current leadership will pursue genuine diplomacy, anticipating muddled outcomes or renewed strikes. - The ceasefire’s optics and escalation: He suggests the ceasefire could be a tactical pause while threats of escalation persist, with the Iranians possibly misreading U.S. diplomacy. He notes the risk of renewed Israeli actions against Iranian targets or proxies, and the potential for further bombardment or military missteps (citing past U.S. missteps as cautionary examples). - Cultural and geopolitical macro-trends: Wilkerson emphasizes the erosion of Western-led order, the rising importance of land-based energy and trade corridors, and the need to recalibrate how the United States engages a rising, multipolar world. He uses historical analogies (Halford Mackinder, Monroe Doctrine) to describe the strategic pivot toward inland power centers and away from exclusive maritime dominance. - Concluding outlook: The conversation ends on a bleak note about continued instability, the potential for regional and domestic turmoil, and the sense that without new leadership and a fundamental rethinking of strategy, the current trajectory risks further deterioration of global stability and U.S. influence.

Mario interviews Professor Yasheng Huang about the evolving US-China trade frictions, the rare-earth pivot, Taiwan considerations, and broader questions about China’s economy and governance. Key points and insights - Rare earths as a bargaining tool: China’s rare-earth processing and export controls would require anyone using Chinese-processed rare earths to submit applications, with civilian uses supposedly allowed but defense uses scrutinized. Huang notes the distinction between civilian and defense usage is unclear, and the policy, if fully implemented, would shock global supply chains because rare earths underpin magnets used in phones, computers, missiles, defense systems, and many other electronics. He stresses that the rule would have a broad, not narrowly targeted, impact on the US and global markets. - Timeline and sequence of tensions: The discussion traces a string of moves beginning with US tariffs on China (and globally) in 2018–2019, a Geneva truce in 2019, and May/June 2019 actions around nanometer-scale chip controls. In August, the US relaxed some restrictions on seven-nanometer chips to China with revenue caps on certain suppliers. In mid–September (the period of this interview), China imposed docking fees on US ships and reportedly added a rare-earth export-control angle. Huang highlights that this combination—docking fees plus a sweeping rare-earth export control—appears to be an escalatory step, potentially timed to influence a forthcoming Xi-Trump summit. He argues China may have overplayed its hand and notes the export-control move is not tightly targeted, suggesting a broader bargaining chip rather than a precise lever against a single demand. - Motives and strategic logic: Huang suggests several motives for China’s move: signaling before a potential summit in South Korea; leveraging weaknesses in US agricultural exports (notably soybeans) during a harvest season; and accelerating a broader shift toward domestic processing capacity for rare earths by other countries. He argues the rare-earth move could spur other nations (Japan, Europe, etc.) to build their own refining and processing capacity, reducing long-run Chinese leverage. Still, in the short term, China holds substantial bargaining weight, given the global reliance on Chinese processing. - Short-term vs. long-term implications: Huang emphasizes the distinction between short-run leverage and long-run consequences. While China can tighten rare-earth supply now, the long-run effect is to incentivize diversification away from Chinese processing. He compares the situation to Apple diversifying production away from China after zero-COVID policies in 2022; it took time to reconfigure supply chains, and some dependence remains. In the long run, this shift could erode China’s near-term advantages in processing and export-driven growth, even as it remains powerful today. - Global role of hard vs. soft assets: The conversation contrasts hard assets (gold, crypto) with soft assets (the dollar, reserve currency status). Huang notes that moving away from the dollar is more feasible for countries in the near term than substituting rare-earth refining and processing. The move away from rare earths would require new refining capacity and supply chains that take years to establish. - China’s economy and productivity: The panel discusses whether China’s growth is sustainable under increasing debt and slowing productivity. Huang explains that while aggregate GDP has grown dramatically, total factor productivity in China has been weaker, and the incremental capital required to generate each additional percentage point of growth has risen. He points to overbuilding—empty housing and excess capacity—as evidence of inefficiencies that add to debt without commensurate output gains. In contrast, he notes that some regions with looser central control performed better historically, and that Deng Xiaoping’s era of opening correlated with stronger personal income growth, even if the overall economy remained autocratic. - Democracy, autocracy, and development: The discussion turns to governance models. Huang argues that examining democracy in the abstract can be misleading; the US system has significant institutional inefficiencies (gerrymandering, the electoral college). He asserts that autocracy is not inherently the driver of China’s growth; rather, China’s earlier phases benefited from partial openness and more open autocracy, with current autocracy not guaranteeing sustained momentum. He cites evidence that in China, personal income growth rose most when political openings were greater in the 1980s, suggesting that more open practices during development correlated with better living standards for individuals, though China remains not a democracy. - Trump, strategy, and global realignments: Huang views Trump as a transactional leader whose approach has elevated autocratic figures’ legitimacy internationally. He notes that Europe and China could move closer if China moderates its Ukraine stance, though rare-earth moves complicate such alignment. He suggests that allies may tolerate Trump’s demands for short-term gains while aiming to protect longer-term economic interests, and that the political landscape in the US could shift with a new president, potentially altering trajectories. - Taiwan and the risk of conflict: The interview underscores that a full-scale invasion of Taiwan would, in Huang’s view, mark the end of China’s current growth model, given the wartime economy transition and the displacement of reliance on outward exports and consumption. He stresses the importance of delaying conflict as a strategic objective and maintains concern about both sides’ leadership approaches to Taiwan. - Taiwan, energy security, and strategic dependencies: The conversation touches on China’s energy imports—especially oil through crucial chokepoints like the Malacca Strait—and the potential vulnerabilities if regional dynamics shift following any escalation on Taiwan. Huang reiterates that a Taiwan invasion would upend China’s economy and government priorities, given the high debt burden and the transition toward a wartime economy. Overall, the dialogue centers on the complex interplay of China’s use of rare-earth leverage, the short- and long-term economic and strategic consequences for the United States and its allies, and the broader questions around governance models, productivity, debt, and geopolitical risk in a shifting global order.

In this discussion with Glenn, Professor John Mearsheimer analyzes the U.S. handling of the Iran war under Trump, the role of Israel and the lobby, and the broader implications for the international system as power shifts from unipolar to multipolar. Key points on U.S. strategy and diplomacy - Trump’s approach is a unique form of diplomacy: he pursued a ceasefire grounded in Iran’s 10-point plan as a starting point for negotiations, then moved to a blockade of Iranian ports and allowed escalation elsewhere. The aim, according to the speakers, was to gain breathing space to rearm and regroup, and to press Iran into concessions. - The absence of a viable military option: there is no credible American military path to victory in the Iran war. Escalation would be Iranian-dominant, and further escalation would damage the world economy, creating political and economic consequences domestically and internationally. - The administration’s diplomacy is hampered by incompetence, notably in Ukraine-Russia diplomacy, which erodes confidence in negotiating with Iran as well. The Israeli lobby adds pressure to avoid a peace that acknowledges Iran’s gains. - Four goals in the war, from an Israeli perspective, are regime change, eliminating Iran’s nuclear enrichment, destroying long-range missiles, and stopping Iranian support for Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Israel and its lobby view the situation as existential and push for continued pressure unless Iran is decisively defeated. From the U.S. perspective, this means consensus among allies is fragile and often subordinated to domestic and lobby pressures. The strategic logic of the blockade and escalation - The blockade is not a war-winning instrument. The naval option is constrained by ship counts, wear on assets, potential Chinese escorts, and reciprocal Iranian actions (Iran already captured ships in retaliation). Iran’s tolerance for pain is high, and the blockade is not a reliable lever to force compliance. - Air power failed to defeat Iran, confirming that the war cannot be won through bombing alone. Ground invasion is unlikely due to limited American combat troops, political will, and public tolerance for casualties. Consequently, the U.S. has turned to naval coercion via the Strait of Hormuz and global oil interdictions, but this too is unlikely to compel a definitive Iranian capitulation. - A ceasefire is seen as essential to halt the fighting and begin negotiations; however, the ceasefire has not achieved meaningful negotiations because the blockade remains in place, and Iran has demanded its end as a condition to return to talks. Possible Iranian responses and risk dynamics - If the United States were to resume massive bombing, Iran could launch a “Goderdammerung” response—shutting down the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, attacking energy infrastructure and desalination plants, and wrecking the world economy. This would imply a broader regional and global calamity, with Iran threatening to pull down others with it. - The Iranians are expected to leverage the Strait of Hormuz and toll revenues, and to press for sanctions relief and ongoing control of the Strait as bargaining chips. The blockade may inflict pain, but Iran has shown a high capacity to tolerate it, making the naval option unlikely to deliver victory. Europe, diplomacy, and the evolving alliance system - Elbridge Colby’s remarks suggest Europe should take primary responsibility for conventional and Ukraine support, reflecting U.S. weapon stock depletion and a shift toward East Asia as the priority theater. This signals a “buck-passing” of security obligations and a withdrawal of the United States from Europe at the conventional level. - The Colby framework implies the U.S. is reorienting away from Europe and toward East Asia, potentially weakening NATO cohesion as American weapons support diminishes. This could push Europe to diversify security arrangements and rely less on U.S. guarantees. - There is a broader pattern of “divorcing” from allies: as the Gulf, Europe, and Ukraine face continued pressures, the alliance system frays. The U.S. may seek to offload security burdens, while Russia and China adapt by intensifying their own strategic ties and exploiting the rifts within Western alliances. The multipolar world and regional flashpoints - The discussion emphasizes that the world has moved from a post–Cold War unipolar moment to a multipolar system, with East Asia (China) as the primary U.S. strategic focus, but with persistent, volatile conflicts in Europe (Russia-Ukraine) and the Middle East (Israel-Iran, and allied networks like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis). - The speakers stress the interconnections among conflicts: resolving Israel-Iran involves Hezbollah and Hamas; resolving Ukraine involves European commitments and American supplies; and the evolving alliance structures—where the U.S. may reduce its conventional footprint in Europe—could heighten tensions or provoke Russian reactions. Final reflections - The conversation closes by acknowledging the plastic, uncertain moment in world politics: many possible futures depend on diplomacy, leadership choices, and how quickly new equilibria are formed among emerging great powers. The two speakers stress that avoiding a major conflagration will require careful diplomacy, recognition of interlinked flashpoints, and a willingness to rethink traditional alliance structures in a multipolar world.

Professor Robert Pape warned on X that within ten days parts of the global economy will start running short of critical goods, based on thirty years studying economic sanctions and blockades. He said this would bring not just higher prices but shortages, and that markets are not ready for this. The Kobelisi letter stated the world is experiencing its biggest energy crisis in history with 600,000,000 barrels of lost oil supply, US gas prices up 47% since December, and inflation approaching 4% in a path similar to the 1970s. The discussion then touched on Iran’s war potentially returning to open conflict. The United States seized an Iranian-flagged cargo ship, which Larry Johnson described as piracy and an act of war aimed at clearing the Strait of Hormuz; Tehran called it armed piracy and promised a response. JD Vance was headed to Islamabad for talks, though Iranian officials said they had not agreed to anything. Fox’s Tel Aviv correspondent relayed that Trump told him they would blow up everything in Iran if they didn’t come to the table, saying the deal would reopen the Strait of Hormuz and prevent Iran from possessing highly enriched uranium. Professor Pape, director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats at the University of Chicago and author of Escalation Trap on Substack, joined the program. He referenced his April 12 post predicting shortages within forty-five to sixty days and described three stages: Stage one, the first ~45 days with price increases; Stage two (40–60 days) with shortages emerging; Stage three (day 60–90) with worsening shortages and then contraction, beginning around May 31. He explained that shortages would escalate into reduced production of commodities, fewer airline seats, and broader disruptions across supply chains. Pape detailed the implications for air travel and energy: jet fuel shortages could cause European and global aviation reductions, with Europe’s ~110,000,000 monthly air passengers dropping to potentially 80 million or fewer as fuel becomes scarce; cargo, mail, and just-in-time deliveries would be affected, and overall product availability would contract. He argued that 20% of the world’s oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz and that Iran’s potential shutdown and the U.S. response would complicate efforts to keep that oil flowing. He emphasized that the contraction would begin even as oil access becomes more difficult and other nations (including the U.S.) struggle to secure energy. The conversation then shifted to China. Pape noted that in China, the impact on GDP could be modest (about 1%), but the U.S. could be drawn into a larger conflict that could benefit China. He observed China’s preparation for energy independence: stockpiling oil, relying on solar, nuclear, and coal, and maintaining a robust energy strategy even during tensions with the U.S. He suggested that tariffs and conflicts did not significantly disrupt China’s planning, which could lead to China gaining relative advantage as the U.S. faces a widening energy and economic crisis. There was discussion about the United States’ energy independence. Pape stated he has long advocated energy independence since 2005, but warned that the broader picture involves debt, energy policy, and strategic choices that could threaten American leadership. He stressed the need for a concrete five-year plan to navigate the crisis without harming the economy in the short term and cautioned against escalating war in Iran. In addressing the everyday impact, the speakers considered who would be hardest hit: the poorest, and particularly non-college-educated white working-class voters, who had experienced the largest deterioration in income since 1990. The conversation included proposals to mitigate consumer pain, such as targeted economic measures for working Americans affected by rising gas prices, potentially including tax considerations or subsidies for those whose jobs require fuel, while avoiding broad handouts. Pape reiterated that his Escalation Trap Substack presents a framework based on twenty-one years of modeling the bombing of Iran and indicates that the stages he predicted are unfolding faster than anticipated, with a focus on concrete policy options that could be enacted by May 1. He emphasized that his analysis centers on consequences for ordinary people and urged practical policy steps to address the crisis.

In a discussion with Glenn (Speaker 0) and Professor Jeffrey Sachs (Speaker 1), the speakers analyze the current Iran war in the context of a shifting world order. Sachs argues that two things are unfolding simultaneously: the erratic behavior of the United States (personalized in Donald Trump) and the broader question of American hegemony, alongside battlefield realities that challenge the claims of “shock and awe” and irreversible American victory. Key points raised: - The US, under Trump, exhibits “brazenness, lawlessness, the viciousness” in rhetoric and actions, including a statement about sending Iran back to the stone age. Netanyahu’s speech is described as equally shocking, with Netanyahu portraying himself in a biblical, godlike framing and extending “10 plagues” to Iran. - On the battlefield, the idea that American power guarantees victory is questioned. Counterattacks in Israel and the Gulf region have occurred, downing American jets and showing Iranian retaliatory capability and waning missile defense. This challenges the notion that US military supremacy is unassailable. - Sachs notes a stark contrast in public opinion: in the United States, there is widespread opposition to the war; in Israel, the public appears to largely support the war and the associated violence. - He characterizes the conflict as one driven by a “war of whim” with unclear aims, and asserts that the claimed U.S. “shock and awe” does not align with the observed battlefield and morale realities. - Beyond Iraq/Iran, Sachs discusses broader structural factors: American hegemony is pursued as a policy objective but often unfulfillable; the military-industrial complex and figures like Trump contribute to the propulsion of war; personal traits of leaders (described as psychologically unstable by some forensic psychiatrists) influence decision-making. - A possible path toward de-escalation, according to Sachs, hinges on dialogue among global peers. He suggests that Trump listens to leaders he regards as peers (Putin, Xi, Modi) and that these leaders need to tell him to stop, though he remains skeptical whether this would be sufficient. - Sachs emphasizes a multipolar world as the reality: countries should avoid hosting US bases, which he argues undermine sovereignty and security. He advocates neighbors engaging with one another, cooperation with major powers (China, Russia, India), and reducing dependence on the United States. - He critiques Western and European reliance on US leadership, noting that Europe’s internal politics still echo imperial mindsets and that NATO’s expansion and anti-Russia policies have complicated security. He argues that European and Gulf leaders often pursue “peace through strength” rather than genuine diplomacy. - Specific regional advice includes: be wary of US hegemonic guarantees; avoid dividing lines that empower a hegemon; pursue regional engagement (GCC-Iran dialogue) and view China, Russia, and India as potential partners rather than adversaries; understand that technologies (AI, data centers, chips) are not substitutes for credible security. Towards the end, Sachs reiterates that the current approach is producing insecurity and economic crisis, urging readers to adjust to a multipolar reality and to seek regional cooperation over reliance on US dominance. He closes by expressing the hope that governments will embrace reason and adapt to current realities.

Speaker 0: China appears to be the only country pushing back against Trump’s tariff stance, with other countries—including neighboring ones and India—reaching deals with Trump. India, which initially showed resilience, moved toward China after the Shanghai summit and the tariffs. Recently, India and the US signed a deal to gradually reduce Russia oil exports to 50% of imports. This suggests China is the sole major power resisting the US in this round of measures. The discussion then shifts to a broader pattern: the US has overplayed its hand in its dollar dominance and control of the financial system via SWIFT. In the wake of sanctions on Russia after the Ukraine conflict—freezing assets and limiting access to SWIFT—many nations have begun moving away from the US dollar toward gold. The speaker sees China’s current move as accelerating other countries’ push toward self-reliance, particularly in rare earths. The US is investing in its own rare earth industry, while Europe seeks alternatives. There is mention of a US deal with Ukraine involving rare earths, and speculation that Greenland’s abundant rare earth reserves could be relevant to what Trump sought with Greenland. The long-term downside or repercussions for China from this move are noted. Speaker 1: The discussion distinguishes between the financial sanctions used after the Ukraine war and the current situation. While sanctions are not perfect substitutes for dollar assets like crypto or gold, they remain available, so US leverage is not as strong as China’s leverage in rare earths. The speaker agrees that in the long term, China’s move will push other countries to build processing capacity for rare earths. Although rare earths are not truly rare, the processing and concentration are. Countries will be motivated to develop processing facilities. Japan is innovating substitutes for rare earths, which may take time and will not provide immediate relief for the US.

Richard Wolff and Glenn discuss the future of the West, NATO, Europe, and the international economic system. - The central dynamic, according to Wolff, is the rise of China and the West’s unpreparedness. He argues that the West, after a long era of Cold War dominance, is encountering a China that grows two to three times faster than the United States, with no sign of slowing. China’s ascent has transformed global power relations and exposed that prior strategies to stop or slow China have failed. - The United States, having defeated various historical rivals, pursued a unipolar, neoliberal globalization project after the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of that era left the U.S. with a sense of “manifest destiny” to shape the world order. But now time is on China’s side, and the short-term fix for the U.S. is to extract value from its allies rather than invest in long-run geopolitics. Wolff contends the U.S. is engaging in a transactional, extractive approach toward Europe and other partners, pressuring them to concede significant economic and strategic concessions. - Europe is seen by Wolff as increasingly subordinated to U.S. interests, with its leadership willing to accept terrible trade terms and militarization demands to maintain alignment with Washington. He cites the possibility of Europe accepting LNG imports and investments to the U.S. economy at the expense of its own social welfare, suggesting that Europe’s social protections could be jeopardized by this “divorce settlement” with the United States. - Russia’s role is reinterpreted: while U.S. and European actors have pursued expanding NATO and a Western-led security architecture, Russia’s move toward Greater Eurasia and its pivot to the East, particularly under Putin, complicates Western plans. Wolff argues that the West’s emphasis on demonizing Russia as the unifying threat ignores the broader strategic competition with China and risks pushing Europe toward greater autonomy or alignment with Russia and China. - The rise of BRICS and China’s Belt and Road Initiative are framed as major competitive challenges to Western economic primacy. The West’s failure to integrate and adapt to these shifts is seen as a strategic misstep, especially given Russia’s earlier openness to a pan-European security framework that was rejected in favor of a U.S.-led order. - Within the United States, there is a debate about the proper response to these shifts. One faction desires aggressive actions, including potential wars (e.g., Iran) to deter adversaries, while another emphasizes the dangers of escalation in a nuclear age. Wolff notes that Vietnam and Afghanistan illustrate the limits of muscular interventions, and he points to domestic economic discontent—rising inequality, labor unrest, and a growing desire for systemic change—as factors that could press the United States to rethink its approach to global leadership. - Economically, Wolff challenges the dichotomy of public versus private dominance. He highlights China’s pragmatic hybrid model—roughly 50/50 private and state enterprise, with openness to foreign participation yet strong state direction. He argues that the fixation on choosing between private-market and public-control models is misguided and that outcomes matter more than orthodox ideological labels. - Looking ahead, Wolff is optimistic that Western economies could reframe development by learning from China’s approach, embracing a more integrated strategy that blends public and private efforts, and reducing ideological rigidity. He suggests Europe could reposition itself by deepening ties with China and leveraging its own market size to negotiate from a position of strength, potentially even joining or aligning with BRICS in some form. - For Europe, a potential path to resilience would involve shifting away from a mindset of subordination to the United States, pursuing energy diversification (including engaging with Russia for cheaper energy), and forming broader partnerships with China to balance relations with the United States and Russia. This would require political renewal in Europe and a willingness to depart from a “World War II–reboot” mentality toward a more pragmatic, multipolar strategy. - In closing, Wolff stresses that the West’s current trajectory is not inevitable. He envisions a Europe capable of redefining its alliances, reconsidering economic models, and seeking a more autonomous, multipolar future that reduces dependency on U.S. leadership. He ends with a provocative suggestion: Europe might consider a realignment toward Russia and China as a way to reshape global power balances, rather than defaulting to a perpetual U.S.-led order.

Einar Tangin and Glenn discuss the forthcoming Xi Jinping–Donald Trump meeting and the broader strategic landscape shaping U.S.–China competition. - On the Trump–Xi meeting: Tangin expects very little substantive outcome. China’s strategy toward the United States is to keep engagement open rather than push Trump into a corner, despite Trump’s past actions and their consequences. He notes a narrow scope to be discussed in a California meeting, with Trump volunteers unprepared and pushing “the usual maximist stuff.” China is signaling that Taiwan will be a red line. Beyond that, the Chinese may accept limited concessions such as grain, gas, or oil purchases, but no sweeping arrangements. The overall takeaway: continued engagement, but not a game-changing breakthrough. - U.S. energy and global strategy: Tangin argues the United States uses energy as a tool of influence, aiming to control access and shape markets (the petrodollar legacy, strategic chokepoints). The Ukraine war has accelerated Europe’s decoupling from Russia and the U.S. seeks to expand similar dynamics in East Asia. He emphasizes that the energy game is dynamic: oil prices impact inflation, and long-term, demand destruction and a shift to alternatives (electricity, renewables) will reshape markets. He points to new energy tech and scale: batteries and storage (CATL’s battery capacity) enable large-scale decoupling from fossil fuels; China’s plans to deploy up to 50 nuclear plants at a time and to pursue commercially available fusion power could transform the energy landscape. The U.S. may face higher exploration costs and geopolitical risk in sustaining high oil output, while heavy reliance on fossil fuels could erode long-term economic viability. - Global consequences and who bears the pain: In the short term, countries without reserves (notably parts of the Global South, including India) will face fertilizer and diesel shortages during planting seasons, with potential 15–25% yield reductions and elevated inflation. Food security risks loom as energy costs ripple through fertilizer, transport, processing, and farming inputs. The analysis highlights fertilizer nitrogen production’s energy intensity and the cascading nature of energy in food supply chains. The discussion stresses that global south economies will be hit hardest early on, with food and fuel inflation compounding social and political pressure. - The Iran war and maritime strategy: The discussion connects the Persian Gulf crisis to broader blockades and maritime competition. A naval blockade approach risks escalation and confrontation with China, which has extensive trade links through ASEAN and other partners that would be harmed by disruption. Tangin notes that China cannot be easily forced into combat in Europe or the Middle East; any escalation involving tactical nuclear use would be dangerous. He suggests that Europe’s elites may push for confrontation against Russia, but the political climate and energy constraints could destabilize Western allies and push towards alternative alignments, particularly with China. - China’s strategic posture and alternative world order: Tangin emphasizes that China has a model that emphasizes no ideology between states, sovereignty, and mutual non-interference, echoing a Westphalian framework. He describes China’s global governance concept as a peer-to-peer, negotiation-centered approach, where disputes are settled at the table rather than through force. He frames China’s proposition as simple: “No more ideology between countries. Every country should be secure. Security should not depend on the insecurity of another country. Every country has the right to choose its own path of development.” This is presented as a peaceful, governance-based alternative to U.S.-led hegemony. - Europe’s strategic crossroads and the future: Europe faces existential economic strains, competitiveness challenges, and the temptation of isolationist or right-wing governance. The conversation predicts prolonged political volatility if energy prices and inflation persist, with potential swings between different leaderships. China’s strategy, in this vision, is to promote internal diversification and consumption-led growth while engaging with international partners on a governance framework that reduces the incentives for confrontation. - Concluding note: The speakers agree that Europe’s willingness to embrace China’s model, rather than clinging to a confrontational U.S.-led paradigm, could shape a more stable global order. They caution that the old order has ended, and creative destruction is underway, with China advocating a negotiated, governance-based path forward.

The conversation centers on whether a “deal or no deal” involving Iran amounts to more than temporary relief, and how those developments could drive U.S. economic fallout. The hosts argue that the U.S. has been operating in a “fake paper” environment where demand and consequences are being covered up, comparing it to wallpaper over “black mold” that eventually makes people sick. Brandon Weichert (host of the Natsack podcast) says he has been emphasizing these issues for months, and that later mainstream coverage effectively made earlier reporting seem newly “real.” A key part of the discussion is weapons depletion from past conflicts. Weichert points to a claim that it would take “five plus years” to replace “thirty-nine days of munitions used in the Iran War,” and says the U.S. has “blown through” many weapon systems already. He argues replenishment is not meaningfully possible because the U.S. needs China’s rare earth minerals, and China will not allow access to what he describes as “dual-use rare earth minerals.” He describes U.S. reliance on outsourcing and says the processing infrastructure was moved to China, giving China “the leverage” in the supply chain. Weichert extends the argument to other conflicts. On Ukraine, he says the U.S. “isn’t going to have their back,” and describes a “silver lining” as limited U.S. ability to send further material support because the U.S. “can’t send any more” weapons. He also claims the U.S. depleted systems used for protecting bases in the Middle East and then redirected air defense interceptors toward Israel. He says Israelis were “astounded” the U.S. used more air defense interceptors than Israel did, including a claim that an IDF general said Americans were “wasteful” with limited stockpiles, and that these systems were not primarily protecting American bases. He argues these depleted systems will not return soon due to finite supplies and lack of replenishment, with knock-on effects for U.S. ability to respond in the Indo-Pacific to conflicts he lists (Taiwan, China-Japan, China-Philippines). He adds that even if the U.S. had light rare earth minerals on the West Coast, the U.S. lacks processing power and would still need China. He further asserts the U.S. does not have abundant heavy rare earths compared to China, Australia, and contested regions. The discussion also addresses a “sixty-day ceasefire agreement.” Weichert says “we don’t have a deal” and calls it at best a “sixty-day patch.” He frames the proposed terms as reopening the Strait of Hormuz for sixty days, then negotiations on Iran’s nuclear material. He says Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei stated Iran would not give up nuclear materials “under no circumstances.” He predicts that at day sixty, the situation would deteriorate back toward either a shooting war or the strait closing, or an Iranian “service fee system” that he says would destabilize the world economy and alter shipping costs and access based on flags and country treatment. He argues that politically the ceasefire is meant to “drag out the pain,” and he says the Trump administration has been “goosing” paper oil markets through manipulation that markets still fall for. He also links the strait reopening to avoiding economic collapse, arguing that without it the U.S. could face an economic downturn comparable to “the worst parts” of 2008 and COVID-era depression. For the economic mechanics, Weichert describes rising diesel prices as a driver of shipping and logistics costs, noting claims of diesel up “as high as seventy percent” since the war began and fuel price increases for consumers. He says natural gas and oil prices have risen by about “fifty percent” at the pump, and that strategic reserves are being pulled “for political purposes.” He predicts that once buffers are depleted (timed to a period around July 4), the U.S. would compete more for energy on global markets, driving higher prices. He adds projected reductions in travel (including flights and summer vacations), and he emphasizes possible shortages of food items tied to fertilizer constraints, which would raise grocery prices, including beef. He concludes that the combination of high inflation and low employment points toward stagflation and could lead to a “lost decade” with higher prices and lower wages, blaming the escalation as beginning with an event dated February 28.

Chas Freeman and Glenn discuss the broader geopolitical implications of the ongoing war with Iran, focusing on perspectives from China, Russia, and the United States, and then turning to regional dynamics involving Israel, Japan, Brazil, South Africa, and others. Freeman argues that China does not have a unified view on the Iran war. He notes that some in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army are pleased to see the United States seemingly disarmed by its own stalemate and by depleting weapons stockpiles, including the pivot away from stationing intermediate-range missiles in the Pacific. Geopolitical thinkers fear the war destabilizes a central region for global commerce and energy, with the Hormuz Strait now effectively impassable. He asserts that Azerbaijan has become a primary route for Asia-to-Europe transit, while Iran’s control of the strait and safe passage for Chinese tankers complicate sanctions regimes. China, he says, is also recalibrating its economy toward renewables and away from fossil fuels due to the war’s effects. Freeman highlights how Asia-Pacific dynamics are affected: Japan is highly dependent on oil and gas imports and is stressed; Taiwan faces limits due to its own energy constraints; South Korea is economically hurt by the strait closure; Southeast Asia suffers from reduced petroleum exports; and the war pushes China closer to Russia, with Russia’s planned Siberia gas project gaining traction as a diversified supply route away from maritime routes. He also mentions Brazil and South Africa increasing military cooperation, noting potential Brazilian-Japanese collaborations and rising defense spending in Japan, with implications for US influence and global supply chains. Freeman then discusses Russia, noting Trump’s call with Putin and the possibility that Russia is seeking to influence or assist in ending the war with Iran. He asserts Iran seeks to deter or destroy Israel and to decolonize West Asia, including removing American forces from the Gulf. He emphasizes that Russia and China do not want Iran subjugated and abstained on a Security Council resolution condemning Iran, aiming to avoid offending Gulf Arabs while not endorsing the war. The war has drawn Iran closer to Russia, with Iranian drones and technology transfers now in Russian use, and Russia increasing influence in Iran as Gulf reconstruction becomes necessary. Freeman also points out that Iran has demanded reparations and sanctions relief, and that sanctions have deeply distressed the Iranian population. He argues that Russia benefits from higher oil and gas prices and European energy dependence on Russian supply, while the conflict complicates Western weapon stockpiles and European defense needs. He contends Putin benefits from divisions within the US and diminished American global leadership, while the war is not advantageous for the United States overall. Freeman emphasizes a broader moral and strategic dimension, criticizing what he sees as a departure from international law and ethical norms, including the suspension of targeting guidelines and collateral-damage assessments in certain operations. He cites concerns about human rights and humanitarian law, warning that the erosion of a universal moral order could have long-term consequences for Western diplomacy. He invokes historical and religious ethical frameworks (Kant, Grotius, and others) to argue for a return to principled conduct in war and postwar reconciliation. The conversation turns to Israel, with Freeman suggesting that Netanyahu’s long-standing aim to reshape Israel’s security and borders faces a difficult reckoning as Iran becomes a tangible military threat. Freeman contends that Israel’s plan for regime change in Iran is failing, and he questions what Plan B might be if Israel cannot secure its strategic goals. He warns that Israel could contemplate extreme options, including nuclear considerations, if it feels existentially threatened, while noting the potential for Israel’s positions to undermine American public support for Israel and complicate US domestic civil liberties and freedom of inquiry. Glenn and Freeman close by acknowledging that the situation has created a shifting web of alliances and rivalries, with European willingness to appease Trump waning and broader questions about coexistence in the Middle East. They stress the need for a more sustainable approach to regional security and a reconsideration of diplomatic norms to avoid escalating toward broader conflict.

In this conversation, Brian Berletic, a former US Marine and political analyst, discusses how the United States pursues a pattern of strategic sequencing that targets rivals one by one, often using negotiation or peace as delaying tactics or outsourcing parts of conflict to allies. He connects this to a broader framework outlined in a 2019 Rand Corporation paper and to a speech by Elbridge Colby, the US undersecretary of war for policy, arguing that the US aims to keep Ukraine’s war ongoing by shifting more responsibility and escalation to Europe, thereby pressuring Russia while also targeting Iran and, ultimately, China. Berletic frames Pete Hegseth’s early-2025 pivot as Europe taking over a proxy war against Russia and Ukraine, with Europe increasing defense spending and doubling down on Ukraine support. He says this demonstrates a natural progression where Europe becomes the frontline in the proxy conflict, while the US maintains involvement through its command in Germany and intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities. He asserts that the US is fighting Russia through Ukraine and Europe, and that there was never an intention to defeat Russia outright in this phase; instead, the aim was to create multiple dilemmas for Russia, Iran, and China as described in the Rand paper. He notes that the US sought to destroy Russia’s energy exports to Europe and replace them with LNG from the US, turning peacetime relationships into wartime dependencies. The host pushes back on the idea that evidence is ignored, highlighting how public discourse often promotes the Ukraine war as beneficial for the US, while the real dynamic is a shift toward European engagement and energy decoupling from Russia. Berletic reiterates that Europe’s energy dependence on the US mirrors how Europe was cut off from Russia through war, paralleling Asia’s potential energy realignment. He points to the Nord Stream destruction as part of a long-running strategy to subordinate Europe to US interests and to enable a broader energy strategy that pressures Asia similarly. He claims that US corporate and political influence in Europe, including the EU’s governance and non-democratic manipulation of information spaces, results in a system where national sovereignty is eroded in favor of a US-led foreign policy. They discuss elite capture, where a handful of individuals in European Union leadership and other allied governments operate for US interests, often through think tanks and institutions like the New York Times’ reporting on CIA involvement in Ukraine’s internal security apparatus. Berletic argues this results in client regimes and a lack of true national sovereignty, making European and East Asian leadership more pliant to US strategic aims. He notes that the EU’s approach—treating opposition as a temporary obstacle to be overcome—has facilitated centralized power and an ever-tightening foreign policy framework that undermines independent decision-making. On China, Berletic argues that US actions against Iran are also aimed at Asia, cutting energy flows and pressuring regional states to depend on US energy. He points to LNG projects prepared in advance of conflict with Russia, designed to be economically viable only if energy flows can be constrained, and he describes a broader energy-dominance framework aimed at surrounding China with US-backed energy dependencies. He asserts there is a coordinated plan to surround China with hostile proxies and to leverage energy as strategic leverage, transforming countries like Vietnam, Japan, and South Korea into instruments of US policy. The discussion then touches on what happens if allies resist this burden-sharing, suggesting that truly independent leadership in Europe or East Asia would reject the arrangement as unsustainable. Berletic argues that diplomacy is not dead, but multipolarism—led by Russia, China, and Iran—offers a path away from US-led hegemony, albeit with ongoing conflict and upheaval. He closes by emphasizing the importance of alternatives to Western media narratives and the need for multipolarism to reduce war and promote a more equitable global order.

Brian Berletic discusses connections between the US “economic war against China” and wars/proxy conflicts involving Russia and Iran, arguing that the US seeks primacy rather than balance of power and uses diplomacy to build pretexts for additional war and to shape geopolitics. He says US policymakers do not expect China to pressure Iran or to pressure Russia, because China has reasons to avoid helping isolate itself, and he frames US actions as deliberate attempts to keep adversaries from becoming independent centers of power. He argues the US aims to weaken Russia, Iran, and China by creating wedges and subordination through client regimes and proxies. He claims Europe, Israel, Persian Gulf states, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines are treated as extensions of US foreign policy rather than independent balancing powers. He also contrasts what he describes as US strategic framing—portraying America as reasonable while treating opponents as “evil”—with the claimed reality of proxy war, including in Europe and Iran. When asked about the goal of restoring primacy, Berletic says the US tries to pursue multiple forms of dominance—military, financial, trade-route control, and technological dominance—while acknowledging it is becoming less realistic as China surpasses the US plus its proxies. He says US strategy, as he describes it, shifts to wrecking multiple theaters and trade systems rather than direct head-to-head conflict, including efforts to disrupt energy exports and contested waterways. He cites US-created crises in the Middle East and describes US pressure on Indonesia near the Strait of Malacca, attempts to gain military access to that chokepoint, and blockading tactics affecting Russian energy exports and other routes. He claims the US has reorganized the Marine Corps into an anti-shipping force “specifically” for interdicting shipping, with preparation starting before the Trump administration. He argues that these actions aim to increase leverage over Asian states through energy dependence on US LNG exports, and to coerce regional countries away from balancing China. He compares this to how he says the US subordinated Europe via energy dependence, including by disrupting Russia–Europe energy flows over years. Addressing the US strategy’s “double blockade” concept and chokepoints, Berletic argues it is not about shutting everything down instantly. He claims the US does not need to seize every ship; he says ships often turn back and/or are disabled or seized, and he points to examples of US warplanes disabling ships. He argues this creates deterrence and manages economic damage rather than causing total collapse at once, with the goal of controlled destabilization and increased dependency that can be used to disrupt what China is doing in the region. On the Russia–China dynamic, he says Russia is a large energy producer and shares a direct border with China, leaving fewer “middle countries” through which disruption can be mediated compared with routes like Russia–Europe gas via Ukraine. He argues that because Russia and China together can attract other states into a broader gravitational pull, the US strategy carries risks but fits a longstanding pattern of maritime corridor control and chokepoint strategies. Berletic expands on what he describes as long-running pressure against Belt and Road corridors: he claims US-backed militants attack Belt and Road infrastructure in Myanmar and that the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor is attacked by US-backed terrorists. He also describes attacks in Afghanistan against the Afghan government and Chinese investments, framing this as a long-term “global dirty war” against China and its partners. When discussing Iran and Russia, he says Iran and Russia could strike deals with the US but are instead aiming to prevent a return to the prior status quo of sanctions/perpetual threats and NATO’s incremental expansion. He frames their posture as insisting adversaries must be included in the security architecture. He then compares the current era to a “new great game,” arguing it extends beyond Eurasia and now involves technology and rapid integration of advanced capabilities into deterrence for states such as Iran. He characterizes US behavior as either dividing adversaries or weakening them to prevent coordination. He says the US does not want friends among Iran or Russia because it wants them to be subordinated or weakened; otherwise, he claims they would work together with China. Finally, regarding Taiwan, he says the US “keeps” the one-China policy rhetorically but undermines it in practice through laws, troop presence, and military cooperation with Taiwan alongside regional partners, framing US support as preventing any meaningful back-off. He says US diplomacy functions as cover, including in relation to Russia/Ukraine and Iran, and describes US strategy as a multi-domain approach that already functions as economic and proxy war against China while escalating across Russia, Iran, the Middle East, and Asia-Pacific military integration. He concludes by warning that US policy will likely continue escalating and that China’s ability to build faster than the US can disrupt and destroy is central to whether open conflict can be deterred.