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Gilbert Doktorov is asked how the Iran war is reshaping dynamics in the East, especially for Russia and China, and what the broader implications are for global order. - On Russia’s stance and reaction: Doktorov notes a gap between the Kremlin’s official positions and what “chattering classes” discuss. He observes astonishingly limited reaction from President Putin and his close foreign-policy circle to dramatic developments that could redefine regional and global orders. He contrasts Putin’s cautious, “slow-war” approach with sharper criticisms from other Russian voices (e.g., Salaviyev and Alexander Dugin) who urge moving beyond a gradual strategy. There is a sense within some Russian circles that a more assertive stance may be required, yet official channels show restraint. - On Iran’s strategic position and alliances: He points out that Iran has withstood intense pressure and maintained the ability to threaten Gulf energy infrastructure and the Strait of Hormuz, thereby sustaining global leverage despite severe attacks. Iran has managed to survive and press the global energy market, calling into question how meaningful Iran’s inclusion in BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is in practice. He notes scant evidence of meaningful Russian or Chinese military or intelligence support to Iran in public accounts, and cites Israeli claims of Russian arms shipments being denied by Moscow. - On the West’s behavior and international law: The discussion highlights what is described as the United States’ “might makes right” posture and the dismissiveness toward traditional international-law norms, including UN Charter commitments. The panelists contrast American rhetoric about legality with its real-world actions, and discuss how Russia’s and China’s responses have been cautious or critical rather than conciliatory or confrontational. - On potential military cooperation and bloc dynamics: The conversation explores whether a deeper Russia-China-North Korea alignment could emerge in reaction to US and Israeli actions against Iran. Doktorov mentions that North Korea is viewed as a, “will and determination to act,” supplying munitions such as underwater drones and missiles to Iran, whereas Russia and China are characterized as more talk than action. He argues Moscow benefits from maintaining broad, non-aligned diplomacy, but acknowledges a shift in Russian thinking after recent events toward more decisive posture. - On Europe and the US-European split: The panel discusses the European Union’s fragility and its leaders’ inconsistent responses to the Iran crisis and to US pressure. They consider European solidarity rhetoric as a cover for avoiding hard choices, with examples including Belgian leadership suggesting normalization with Russia post-conflict. The discussion reflects concern that EU leaders may be forced to confront realignments as Gulf energy supplies and US LNG leverage reshape Europe’s energy security and political calculus. - On diplomacy and pathways forward: The speakers debate the prospects for diplomacy, including possible three-way or broader security arrangements, and whether Alaska or other meeting points could offer reprieve. They note a public split within Moscow’s foreign-policy establishment about how to proceed, with internal figures pushing for diplomacy and others advocating a stronger balance of power. There is explicit skepticism about the utility of negotiations with Donald Trump and the idea that the war could end on the battlefield rather than through diplomacy. - On the Ukraine war’s interconnection: The discussion emphasizes that the Iran crisis has global ramifications that feed back into Ukraine, noting that Russia’s current posture and Western responses influence the Ukraine conflict. Doktorov highlights that the depletion of US air defenses observed in the Israel-Iran context affects Ukraine, underscoring the interrelatedness of the two wars and their combined impact on global power dynamics. - Final takeaway: The dialogue reiterates that the Iran war has a global dimension with the two wars being intimately connected; the Iran conflict reshapes alliances, energy security, and strategic calculations across Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, while signaling a potential reconfiguration of Western alliances and multipolar governance.

Glenn: Welcome back with professor Richard Wolff to discuss economic fury, the economic weaponization of the US campaign against Iran. How do you assess this effort, given the mix of oil sanctions, open markets for oil, and port blockades? Wolff: I’ll be blunt: I don’t know how to answer cleanly because the statements keep flipping on/off and have become “herky jerky.” The steps are inconsistent, sometimes increasing supply of oil and pushing down prices, other times constraining it. It’s not clear which way any given move will go, and the sequence is hard to parse. He notes that Gulf states are pressing for dollar swaps—foreign central banks can access dollars via swaps rather than buying them on markets. These swaps have shifted from weekly to daily, signaling worry about dollar access. The Gulf states—UAE and others—allege they depend on dollar-denominated oil revenues to service debts incurred through investments abroad. If dollars tighten due to strait closures and sanctions, they may be forced to sell assets in the US, including Treasury securities, which would lower bond prices and raise interest rates, potentially triggering a US recession. They could also sell holdings in the American stock market, affecting prices. Wolff emphasizes this as a surface manifestation of a broader global liquidity and debt dilemma tied to the Persian Gulf and the dollar’s role in the world economy. Glenn: So essentially the petrodollar is being unraveled because if Gulf states price and sell oil in dollars, but if they’re not exporting and not receiving dollars, they can’t pay debts or roll them over. They might sell treasuries or assets to cover shortfalls. How far can the US hold this position? Wolff: I don’t have a crystal ball, but I think the likely scenario is a political and economic squeeze. Trump has lost parts of his base—issues like the Epstein file and the economy’s inflation and job market. He relies on a narrative of victory; his base may be shrinking, while the wealthier 10% who own stock might be more supportive as the stock market stays buoyant. If the Gulf states must exchange dollars for debt relief or to cover losses, the government may have to grant more dollar swaps to prevent a spike in interest rates and a stock sell-off. Steven Bannon has warned that war could cost Trump the election, so the administration may shore up swaps to protect markets. Wolff suggests this is a desperate regime trying to exit a bad position with minimal damage. Glenn: You describe a broader pattern: the petrodollar’s decline, and the US dollar’s dwindling centrality in global reserves. How does this fit into the larger arc of American empire and capitalism? Wolff: It fits as part of the decline of the American empire and the corresponding decline of American capitalism. BRICS, China’s rise, and the shift away from dollar-dominated trade illuminate a trend toward reduced dollar dominance. Sanctions in Ukraine exposed the limits of that model, and there’s growing acceptance of payments outside the dollar for oil. The United States remains influential, but the dollar’s dominance is waning, and there’s no clear strategy to reverse that trend. Manufacturing has moved to other countries, notably China, which maintains low inflation and large-scale production. The world is moving toward multipolar arrangements, and the dollar’s preeminence is no longer assured. Glenn: Given this trajectory, is there any viable way to salvage the petrodollar, or is it beyond rescue? Wolff: I don’t predict the future with certainty, but I view the larger context as a decline in American hegemony and an erosion of dollar dominance. The war in Iran, like the war in Ukraine, demonstrates the limits of sanctions and the unintended consequences of aggressive confrontation. The dollar’s global reserve role is shrinking, and other powers are willing to transact outside it. He emphasizes this as a systemic shift, not a temporary setback. Glenn: Any final thoughts on how history and memory shape current policy? Wolff: History often gets reframed to fit current aims. There’s a tendency to present “victories” regardless of outcome, especially in wartime rhetoric. The dialogue in Europe and the US reflects a mix of nostalgia for past dominance and struggle to adapt to a changing global order. The conversation ends with questions about how Europe and the US should reorient foreign policy toward a multipolar world, where old assumptions no longer hold.

Chas Freeman and the host Glenn discuss how sea power has shaped global politics and why the current era may be signaling a shift toward land power and new kinds of strategic leverage. - Historical context of maritime dominance: Freeman traces a long arc from British naval hegemony after the Seven Years’ War to American preeminence after World War II, noting that naval power helped sustain a rules-based order and open sea lanes. He argues that dominance of the seas is no longer guaranteed, highlighting evolving ranges of weapons and the emergence of land-based controls that can threaten naval movements. - The evolving limits of naval power: He notes that artillery ranges kept territorial seas limited to about three miles in the eighteenth century, but advances in missiles and shore-based defenses have eroded that traditional maritime advantage. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’s 12-mile territorial limit is described as a political compromise rather than a fixed physical law. Modern missiles with ranges of up to 2,000 kilometers enable coastal forces to threaten carriers far from home waters, while shore installations can enforce blockades from land, as seen with Yemen’s Houthis in Bab El Mandeb and Iran in Hormuz. - The Strait of Hormuz as a strategic focal point: Freeman describes the current blockade as a sea-change that challenges the historic assumption that ships can freely operate in open waters. Aircraft carriers must stay well back from Iranian batteries, and surface ships at risk from Iran’s cruise missiles and drones. He emphasizes that control of Hormuz now rests more on land-based capabilities than on naval forces, making open-sea dominance increasingly untenable. - Implications for the traditional order: The discussion suggests that Anglo-American naval dominance, which helped sustain a liberal international order, is becoming less viable. Freedom of navigation operations and the appearant stability they created are no longer sufficient or sustainable in the new environment, where land-power and non-military instruments (energy, finance, and partnerships) matter more. - Energy, finance, and the petrodollar: The energy-trade dimension is central. Freeman and Glenn consider how the Strait of Hormuz underpins the petrodollar system, and discuss recent currency-swaps and dollar-reliance questions. They propose that if Gulf states shift toward the yuan or other currencies, U.S. financial hegemony could be challenged, catalyzing broader strategic realignments. China’s willingness to tolerate sanctions resistance and issue directives to its banks suggests a pushback against U.S. financial dominance. - China, Iran, and strategic realignments: Freeman notes China’s rise as a major sea power but argues China will not inherit Western maritime hegemony. He highlights China’s land-based connectivity initiatives (rail, roads, free-trade zones) that have maritime dimensions but are primarily land-centric, including Iran’s overland oil transport to China. He underscores a broader multipolar shift and the potential for Chinese and Iranian strategies to erode the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions. - Negotiations and potential outcomes: The conversation concludes that there is no viable military path to open Hormuz or a negotiated settlement in sight. Freeman describes the situation as a high-stakes stalemate with no clear diplomatic avenue. He suggests that the war could subside into a lower-intensity conflict reminiscent of Israel-Iran dynamics in the region, with ongoing tensions and episodic explosions rather than a decisive end. - NATO, Europe, and Israel: The hosts discuss the potential decline or reform of NATO, the pivot of U.S. strategy away from Europe toward Asia and the Western Hemisphere, and how these shifts could affect European security. Freeman questions the future viability of Israel given shifting U.S. stance and waning Western consensus, noting domestic and international criticisms of Israeli actions and leadership. He observes growing Western skepticism toward Netanyahu’s approach, and the broader political costs for Israel on the world stage. - Final reflections: Both speakers anticipate profound, systemic changes in international relations—multipolarity, weakened sea-power advantages, a possible redefined European security architecture, and a reevaluation of essential alliances. They caution against overreliance on any single power’s hegemonic framework and emphasize gradual, incremental reforms over abrupt, destabilizing shocks.

In this discussion, Zhang Shuay Shin and Speaker 1 analyze the evolving U.S.-Iran confrontation through the lens of global power dynamics, the petrodollar, and the shifting balance among major powers. - The war is framed as primarily about preserving the petrodollar. Speaker 1 argues the United States, burdened by enormous debt, seeks to maintain the dollar’s dominance by controlling energy trade through naval power and strategic choke points. The belief is that the U.S. can weaponize the dollar against rivals, as seen when it froze Russian assets and then moved to stabilize oil markets. BRICS and others are moving toward alternatives, including a gold corridor, challenging the petrodollar’s centrality. The aim is to keep Europe and East Asia dependent on U.S. energy, reinforcing American hegemony, even as historical hubris risks a global backlash turning growing powers against Washington. - The sequence of escalation over six weeks is outlined: after the American attack on Tehran and the Iranian move to close the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. eased sanctions on Russian and Iranian oil to maintain global stability, according to Treasury statements. Escalations targeted civilian infrastructure and strategic chokepoints, with discussions of striking GCC energy infrastructure and desalination plants. A U.S. threat to “bomb Iran back to the stone age” was countered by Iran proposing a ten-point framework—encompassing uranium enrichment rights, lifting sanctions, and security guarantees for Iran and its proxies. The Americans reportedly suggested the framework was workable, but negotiations in Islamabad stalled when U.S. officials did not engage seriously. - The broader objective is posited as not simply a tactical war but a strategic move to ensure U.S. imperial supremacy by shaping energy flows. Speaker 1 speculates Trump’s motive centers on keeping the petrodollar intact, potentially forcing China and other partners to buy energy with dollars. Iran’s willingness to negotiate in Islamabad is linked to pressure from China amid China’s economic strains, particularly as energy needs and Belt and Road investments create vulnerabilities for China if Middle East energy becomes unreliable. - The proposed naval blockade is discussed as difficult to implement directly against Iran due to ballistic missiles; instead, the plan may aim to choke off alternative routes like the Strait of Malacca, leveraging trusted regional partners and allies. Iran could respond via the Red Sea (Bab al-Mandab) or other leverage, including the Houthis, challenging Western control of energy corridors. The overarching aim would be to force a global energy reorientation toward North America, though it risks long-term hostility toward the United States. - The roles of great powers are analyzed: the U.S. strategy is described as exploiting Middle East disruption to preserve the petrodollar, with short-term gains but long-term risks of a broader alliance against U.S. hegemony. Europe and Asia are pressured to adapt, with China’s energy needs especially salient as sanctions tighten Middle East supply. Russia is identified as the principal challenger to U.S. maritime hegemony, while China remains economically entangled, facing strategic incentives to cooperate with the United States if required by economic pressures. - The dialogue considers NATO and Europe, arguing that the real contest is between globalists and nationalists in the United States, with Trump viewed as an agent of empire who may threaten the existing globalist framework. The speakers discuss whether this competition will redefine alliances, the future of NATO, and the possibility that a more Eurasian-led order could emerge if Western powers fail to maintain their maritime advantages. - Finally, Russia’s role is emphasized: Moscow is seen as the key counterweight capable of challenging American maritime dominance, with the war in Iran serving, in part, to counter Russian actions in Ukraine and to incentivize alignment with Russia, China, and Iran against U.S. leadership over the next two decades.

Ashwin Rutansi hosts New Order from a global vantage on how the West Asia conflict and its disruption to energy routes are reshaping the India-led global South. He notes the Trump-Netanyahu war in Iran and its ripple effects: thousands killed, over a million displaced, and billions impoverished by higher energy and commodity prices as supply lines through the Strait of Hormuz tighten. He highlights India’s external affairs minister Jaishankar visiting the UAE to stress the urgency for New Delhi as it navigates a multipolar world. The program then centers on the attack on the oil tanker Safe Sea Vishnu on March 11 in Iraqi waters, carrying around 50,000 tons of oil. Doctor Anjan (the speaker) describes it as a calibrated, inside-territorial-water attack, not just a drone or missile strike. He notes a speedboat mapped the attack beforehand, the operation conducted on an unmanned vessel, and the possible involvement or at least facilitation by the host country. He emphasizes there was no reported activity from Iraq’s coast guards after the incident, and he urges investigations by international bodies including the UN, IMO, and guardian maritime bodies. He explicitly states there was no indication of targeting based on UN or World Food Program associations, but attributes motive to a US-national ultimate beneficiary owner. Anjan explains the wider shipping crisis: about 800 ships are stuck in the Strait of Hormuz, with roughly 16,000 crew members affected, potentially including around 8,000 Indian seafarers. He questions IMO’s effectiveness as “guardian of the maritime industry,” asking who is protecting the more than 16,000 civilians at sea and why a robust response from international bodies has not materialized. He contrasts the ceasefire with ongoing threats and warns of food and water shortages for crews if peace remains elusive. He challenges why the UN’s leadership and IMO have not mobilized more forcefully and suggests a broader South- and BRICS-led approach to maritime security. In discussing geopolitics and logistics, Anjan mentions Bandar Abbas and Chabahar Port as strategically significant for energy and regional trade. He notes US and Israeli strikes on these hubs and acknowledges India’s historic plans to develop Chabahar, which have slowed recently, raising questions about reactivation and peace-building roles. He argues that the entire Global South could benefit from activated regional corridors, and he suggests BRICS could contribute—by strengthening IMO authority and pursuing practical, multi-lateral security measures to safeguard navigation and prevent humanitarian crises at sea. He also critiques the WTO and western-dominated mechanisms, implying that Beijing and Moscow’s stance on global trade norms is complex and that BRICS could offer alternative pathways for peacemaking and economic resilience. During the break, Zara Khan fields audience questions. They touch on Turkey’s likely role, China and Russia’s stance toward WTO norms and Western hegemony, BRICS’ centrality in peacemaking, and Pakistan’s active role despite not being a BRICS member. The discussion returns to the broader question: how shipping, energy security, and global governance will evolve in this “new order,” and what Delhi’s BRICS agenda should emphasize as India chairs BRICS. The show closes inviting feedback on whether rising living costs from the war will spur political upheaval worldwide.

- The discussion begins with concern about the quality of Speaker 1’s internet connection for recorded YouTube work. Speaker 1 explains that their neighborhood has a monopolist limiting updates to local software/hardware, and says their own Starlink setup is going up, with 20+ or ~30 satellites already online and deploying quickly. Speaker 1 then jokes about sponsoring revolutions abroad, noting France and the UK should be ready. - The conversation shifts to international developments, focusing on the “Iran war” and later Ukraine/Russia, and then on Trump’s visit to China. - Speaker 1 describes alleged details from Trump’s China visit: Tajikistan’s president was visiting the same day, and during Trump’s arrival only part of the route’s flags were reportedly changed from Tajik to US flags. Speaker 1 frames this as a “soft insult.” - On Xi Jinping meeting Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin at airports/tarmacs, Speaker 1 says some claims are not true and emphasizes protocol and past examples: in prior meetings (Xi and Putin; Trump arriving previously), Xi reportedly met Putin at the tarmac, sat down with the top down, and drove into the city. Speaker 1 also says that in Trump’s last China arrival, Trump reportedly had Xi waiting. - Speaker 1 assesses the Xi–Trump meeting as unprepared compared with highly structured US-style or adversarial-country meetings. They describe how security teams, working diplomats, document preparation, possible joint statements, and agenda negotiation are typically handled before leaders meet. Speaker 1 compares this to earlier dynamics seen in Anchorage (with Trump allegedly seeking speed for a PR/picture moment). - The thread links the China visit to energy leverage involving Iran and Venezuela. Speaker 1 says Venezuela’s capacity is limited (around 800,000 barrels/day) and that significantly expanding it takes time and large investment. Speaker 1 argues US refining limitations matter: US refineries were set up for heavier sour crude (described as “viscous” and “sour” due to sulfur) and the US has not built a new refinery in over 30 years, citing bureaucracy and environmental laws as reasons companies left. - Speaker 1 elaborates on why the US cannot easily expand refining quickly, citing high insurance costs for factory work and related regulatory burdens, leading factories to move elsewhere. - Speaker 0 asks whether Trump intended a different sequence: Speaker 1 says the initial idea was to seek earlier wins and use Venezuela and Iran concessions to gain leverage, but the meeting reportedly came with Trump facing weaker leverage and needing help on Iran. - Taiwan discussions: Speaker 1 says reunification preferences exist among the Taiwanese opposition party that met Xi in China, with Taiwan described as the “Republic of China” and some groups categorized as seeking reconquest/reunification. Speaker 1 discusses why supplying Taiwan for conflict is difficult across open water and notes past US War College war-game conclusions that China would win if the US fleet intervened between China and Taiwan, while US strategy (as described) aims to make invasion costly rather than “winning.” - Proxy-war framing: Speaker 1 describes Ukraine and Iran/Yemen conflict patterns as proxy dynamics, referencing Marco Rubio’s admission that one war is a proxy war. - Iran supply/blockade claims: Speaker 1 says Iran is supplied via multiple routes—ports on the Caspian connected through Russian ports, and a rail line through Pakistan to China—plus other smaller export/storage options. Speaker 1 argues Iran’s weakness has historically included refining and diesel shortages, comparing it to the US importing refined product because it cannot refine enough to meet demand. - Venezuela capacity and US-advantaged/refinery/infrastructure problems are revisited, including discussion of reserves being held in gold in the US, social spending reductions of reinvestment, and US confiscation/export restrictions on equipment replacement, leading to worn-out infrastructure and the lack of “quick fixes.” - Straits of Hormuz and alleged “fee” idea: Speaker 0 cites a White House statement that China agreed to buy American oil to diversify from Hormuz and that Iran should not charge a fee for the Straits of Hormuz. Speaker 1 responds that Iran does not charge China fees (as stated by Speaker 1), then argues China’s commitments would only be clear if China confirms them, and compares this to past statements where purchases were claimed without matching agreements. - Speaker 1 argues sanctions can be moved/bypassed by the US government, not lifted by it, and says only US Congress can remove sanctions. Speaker 1 also claims the US continues buying sanctioned Russian products, while Europeans are criticized for accepting costly resell markups. - Speaker 1 also argues Hormuz isn’t treated as international waters in their view, and that Oman involvement matters, including claims about Oman not installing tollbooths and Iran striking ships—contrasted with the idea that a long-term/perpetual fee would open global choke-point “can of worms.” - Broader geopolitical framing: Speaker 1 says the “global system” is effectively gone, arguing the US helped build it and then killed it when it no longer served US interest, citing examples like the WTO and the strategic focus on controlling key choke points. Speaker 1 contrasts sea routes with Eurasia land connectivity and high-speed rail, linking this to belt-and-road connectivity. - Back to Iran: Speaker 0 asks whether China is pressuring Iran to concede or offering Trump political support with words. Speaker 1 says China prefers status quo and would prefer an end to war without weakening American stockpiles; Speaker 1 also says Iran’s ceasefire is not a full ceasefire and that both sides continue actions. - US military capacity and escalation: Speaker 1 argues that if Trump restarts the war, missile production is “null and void” at scale, and US manufacturing/industrial ramp-up would take years, citing the “missile production is null and void” point and the difficulty of rapid industry re-shoring due to state regulations. Speaker 1 discusses rare earths as a limiting factor in a different way—refining/processing capacity rather than shortage of elements—then argues chemical/electrolysis processing is expensive, energy intensive, and environmentally complex, often causing multi-year delays similar to refineries. - Soft-power indicators from Xi’s alleged absence and flag changes are used to explain Chinese behavior toward Trump, contrasted with prior high-level airport greetings and seating/handshake optics. Speaker 1 compares seating arrangements and perceived humiliation in European/Serbia contexts as a recurring pattern of power display. - Iran-war outcome speculation: Speaker 0 proposes a 50/50 scenario: continuation of conflict with Israeli strikes (and Iran mirroring strikes in the Gulf) versus Trump walking away. Speaker 1 says Israelis are driving outcomes and that APAC donors and money make turning away difficult, arguing Trump wants out but is constrained. Speaker 1 also says Iran and even Saudis/Kuwaitis reportedly would prefer US withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. - US military withdrawal and logistics: Speaker 1 says the US fifth fleet has left, its forward headquarters is moving to Israel, and damage estimates/repair costs are discussed. Speaker 1 argues the US is drawn into a genocide-perception dynamic once bases/equipment and US involvement are present. - Historical Iraq/Kuwait/Persian Gulf narrative: Speaker 0 asks why the US wanted Saddam to invade Kuwait. Speaker 1 asserts the US wanted Iraq to enter the Persian Gulf and become positioned for broader US presence, describing US backing for conflicts involving Iran and chemical weapons channels, and claiming Kuwait engaged in slant drilling stealing Iraqi oil. Speaker 1 says the US/Soviet coalition dynamics allowed the Gulf buildup and entry point into the region. - Final escalation discussion and regional future: Speaker 0 asks whether Trump will walk away or get trapped into escalation for a “win.” Speaker 1 says Israel’s influence over the US is expected to decline, claims generational shifts among American Jews/Christians and anti-Israel demonstrations, and argues Iran and the Gulf could reshape into new blocks with improved Gulf-Iran relations if stability is prioritized. - The conversation ends with debate over perceived misconceptions about Iran’s treatment of minorities and religious/political representation, plus discussion contrasting Iran with Saudi Arabia in terms of women’s legal status and religious policing, followed by a plan to do a future live recording using appropriate software.

Chas Freeman, a former US assistant secretary of defense, and Glenn discuss the current state of diplomacy and security in West Asia, broader great-power dynamics, and Lebanon, Iran, and the Strait of Hormuz. Freeman argues that West Asia shows an ongoing, long-running unraveling, with a core issue being whether the United States still understands diplomacy or relies on inexperienced envoys and “the cronies or the son-in-law” rather than seasoned diplomats. He asserts that the Iranians understand diplomacy and seized an opportunity when the Strait of Hormuz was opened under Iranian-controlled conditions, which could have set the stage for a long-term management arrangement for the strait. Instead, the Trump administration’s response—doubling down on the blockade—led Iran to retract its opening, returning to essential closure and increasing pressure on global economies, including higher gasoline prices for American consumers. Freeman contends the credibility of Iran in this context is greater than that of the United States, and he speculates that the blockade may have been a pretext for a military action that did not materialize. Freeman notes several shifting tactical realities: the U.S. blockade has drawn down the global oil market, and oil markets have changed with India paying Iranian oil in Chinese yuan, suggesting a potential move away from the petrodollar. He observes that a substantial portion of the US Navy is in the Arabian Sea or Gulf of Oman conducting the blockade, with deteriorating shipboard conditions. Iran, by contrast, appears better positioned in a war of attrition, with stored missiles and the ability to resume bombardment if needed. He mentions that Iran has oil to export and can sell it, highlighting the strategic geography beyond Hormuz. On Gulf states, Freeman says Saudi Arabia does not approve the blockade and has been in touch with Tehran; Saudi Arabia is the GCC’s best-positioned state but remains under pressure. The UAE is caught between blocs, Oman is relatively exempt, while Saudi Arabia acts as a conduit for Kuwait and Qatar. Iran has threatened to call on Ansar al-Law/Houthis to close the Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea if needed. Even with an open strait and sailing ships, the global oil shock remains likely, and a broader energy realignment could benefit Russia and Venezuela, with Venezuela not yet seeing a substantial production rise. Freeman emphasizes that if the Strait of Hormuz is opened as a mere tactical victory for the U.S., it would be hard to argue for a comprehensive peace process in the region. Freeman asserts that Iran’s strategy emphasizes regime consolidation rather than collapse, with its missiles and energy reserves enabling continued pressure. He argues that China has a different position: China defends the UN Charter and the international system and benefits from a global, multinodal order. China seeks to preserve access to the Persian Gulf and aligns with Pakistan as an intermediary, while developing a broader regional strategy that can facilitate a Belt and Road integration, including energy routes and LNG imports. He notes that China is seen by regional actors as a defender of international law and a stabilizing interlocutor, contrasting with US actions that undermine the rule of law domestically and internationally. China is also doubling down on Central Asia routes and the Power of Siberia gas pipeline, with the possibility of energy swaps from Iran. On Lebanon, Freeman describes an illegitimate Lebanese government aligned with Israel’s objectives and Hezbollah’s resistance to coercive measures. He views Israel’s strategy as destroying Hezbollah’s military and political influence in southern Lebanon, blowing bridges and imposing a Gaza-like model in Lebanon. He predicts a recurrence of a phony ceasefire with Israel continuing its operations, potentially triggering a new confrontation with the United States and Netanyahu’s government, unless the Trump administration capitulates to Israeli priorities. He frames Iran as achieving a regional peace objective through a comprehensive, region-wide approach, rather than mere truces. Regarding diplomacy and negotiations, Freeman criticizes “fantasy foreign policy” driven by media narratives rather than real negotiations. He argues that the Islamabad meeting with Iran’s delegation was not a true negotiation, and the American side lacked expert staff and real leverage. He contrasts this with Iran’s delegation, which arrived with hundreds of knowledgeable participants and full authority. He notes that the overall approach has been amateur, with no binding documents or real settlement. Freeman closes with reflections on historical U.S. grand strategy, noting the United States’ tradition of exporting its values, but arguing that today’s approach is inconsistent with the rule of law, international diplomacy, and lasting peace. He contends that the current trend favors Iran in the Gulf struggle and that China remains a stabilizing, influential actor amid US and Israeli actions.

Ashwin Rutansi introduces New Order, a global show tracing how India and its allies sit at the center of a transformation in world history. The program aims to explore partnerships, shifting alliances, and how structural changes ripple from global powers to streets, villages, markets, and boardrooms. The show promises to examine diplomatic architecture, networks of power, money flows, and levers of influence, presenting a fundamental reordering rather than mere turbulence. Zara Khan will join later to field viewer questions. Guest: John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago professor and coauthor of The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy. The discussion opens with the recent incident of Iran firing missiles at an F-35 and what it implies given anticipated US and allied arms purchases. Mearsheimer notes that aircraft over adversary territory face real risks from surface-to-air missiles and air defenses, even if the US and Israel have degraded Iran’s defenses. He suggests this is a factor behind why the US and Israel refrain from flying over Iran. Geopolitical framing: Who benefits from the ongoing war (in Iran) at the time of the interview? Mearsheimer identifies two clear winners: Russia and China. Russia benefits from sanctions relief on oil and gas pushed by Trump-era policies, and the war diverts munitions away from Ukraine, aiding Russia in its position. China gains as US credibility in foreign policy deteriorates, increasing its influence in the Middle East and globally as nations worry about an unreliable US, with Europe showing signs of leaning toward China. India’s position is discussed as a potential loser in this new order. The discussion asserts that India’s relations with Israel and Iran, and its ties to both the US and the Gulf, place it in a precarious position. The possibility of a summit or peace conference is deemed unlikely to solve inflation, gas prices, fertilizer costs, or Indian food production challenges; the war is characterized as bad news for India, as reflected in Indian media. On US policy and the Israel lobby: Mearsheimer contends that the Israel lobby has significant influence over US foreign policy and that its role in dragging the United States into wars, including Iraq in 2003, was central. He notes with some irony that the lobby’s power is increasingly in the open, referencing Joe Kent’s statements and public figures like Tucker Carlson and Bernie Sanders endorsing similar criticisms. He points to Francesca Albanese, UN official on Palestinian territories, describing the Israeli actions in Gaza as genocidal, and notes the lobby’s efforts to undermine her career. Policy advice for the Global South, focusing on India: Mearsheimer argues that India should maintain distance from excessive US alignment to avoid heavy leverage over Indian policy. He suggests speaking up against US policy when it harms national interests but avoiding becoming overly dependent on the United States. He cites examples such as Indonesia where maintaining friendly ties with China while balancing US relations would be prudent. He warns that excessive closeness to the US invites sanctions and pain, whereas diversifying partnerships could reduce vulnerability. BRICS and multipolarity: The war could benefit BRICS and the Global South, with Russia and China gaining, while some BRICS members like India and possibly Indonesia could suffer. The conflict may prompt a strategic rethinking of US ties, encouraging greater independence from Washington. The discussion also touches on Europe’s economic strain and NATO’s perceived setback if Russia prevails in Ukraine, describing a “double whammy” for European leadership from the Gulf conflict alongside Ukraine. End of interview: The program teases future exploration of the Israel lobby’s influence and the potential for a broader discussion on the end of the Israel lobby era, followed by viewer questions. Zara Khan presents questions from the audience, including whether the broader humanity will gain a say on the world stage and how the Iran war might differ from Vietnam and Afghanistan, emphasizing asymmetrical warfare and the risk of ground involvement. The show signs off, inviting viewers to follow and watch future episodes.

Larry Johnson and Glenn discuss the shifting dynamics of the US dollar, the international financial system, and the rise of competing powers. - Johnson recalls the 1965 term exorbitant privilege describing the US dollar’s reserve-currency advantages. In 1971, the US closed the gold window, ending fixed gold value for the dollar; the dollar later became backed by “our promise,” enabling the petrodollar system as oil purchases were conducted in dollars. The dollar’s dominance rested on predictability, a stable legal system, and non-abusive use of the dollar as an economic tool rather than a political weapon. - Trump-era sanctions expanded broadly, impacting friends and adversaries alike, and BRICS nations began moving away from the dollar. Russia’s disconnection from SWIFT after its 2022 actions is noted as a turning point that encouraged the BRICS’ development of alternative financial infrastructure, including China’s cross-border interbank payment system (CIPS). This shift accelerates the decline of the dollar’s dominance. - Nations like Russia and China (and India, Brazil) are unloading US Treasuries and increasing gold and silver holdings. This is tied to concerns about the dollar’s reliability and the reduced faith in paper promises. The BRICS countries reportedly plan a currency tied to gold, with components of their reserves backing individual BRICS currencies, signaling a structural move away from the dollar. - The paper-gold issue is central: for every ounce of real gold, there is a range of 20-to-1 to 100-to-1 in paper gold. This disparity can undermine trust in the paper promise and create a run on physical gold. The price gap between New York (lower) and Shanghai (higher) for gold demonstrates a market dislocation and growing demand for physical metal. - Glenn emphasizes that a unipolar dollar system allows the US to run large deficits via inflation, which acts as a hidden tax on global dollar holders. Weaponizing the dollar through sanctions challenges trust and accelerates decoupling, prompting other nations to seek alternatives to reduce exposure. - Johnson argues that the US is confronting a historic realignment: the Bretton Woods order is dissolving, the dollar’s international dominance is waning, and sanctions and coercive policies are provoking pushback. He highlights Japan as a major remaining dollar treasuries holder that is now offloading, further increasing dollar supply and depressing its value. - The geopolitical implications are significant. Johnson warns that potential US actions against Iran—given their strategic position and the Gulf oil supply—could trigger a severe global disruption, including a price surge in oil. He notes that such actions would complicate global stability and magnify inflationary pressures. - The discussion also covers NATO’s cohesion, Western attempts to shape global alignments, and how rapidly shifting leverage could undermine existing alliances. Johnson suggests that Russia’s strategic gains in the war in Ukraine, combined with Western missteps, may prompt a rapid reevaluation of settlements and borders, while also noting that Russia’s position has hardened. - On Venezuela, Johnson argues that the stated pretexts (drug trafficking, oil control) were questionable and points to economic motives, including revenue opportunities for political allies like Paul Singer, and to Greenland’s strategic interests as possible motivators for US actions. - Looking ahead, Johnson predicts hyperinflation for the United States as the dollar loses value globally, while gold and silver retain value. He asserts that the ruble and yuan may hold value better, and that a mass shift toward de-dollarization is likely to continue, potentially culminating in a new multipolar financial order. - Both speakers agree that trust and predictability are crucial; the current trajectory—threats, sanctions, and unilateral actions—undermines trust and accelerates the move toward alternative currencies and stronger physical-commodity holdings. The overall tone is that a pivotal, watershed moment is unfolding in the global monetary system.

Mike Adams discusses China’s potential moves in the context of the US war with Iran, sharing thoughts from an interview with Eric Yong, a Chinese citizen living in Hong Kong who travels between Hong Kong, Beijing, and other Chinese cities, and who has family in Taiwan. Yong is described as an advocate of gold and silver and a successful former manufacturer. Key points: - China imports oil despite domestic production, with about 30% of its oil produced domestically. China maintains large oil storage and a diverse supplier list, but does not want its tankers interdicted or pirated by the US Navy on the high seas. - A Chinese official reportedly said the US should not interfere with China’s trade agreements with Iran. Trump is portrayed as opposing this, threatening to disrupt ships. - Yong’s view (not a military expert) is that China would likely provide naval escorts for its tankers to protect trade routes and agreements. Such escorts would aim to signal to the US Navy that these tankers are off-limits; according to Yong, this could avoid escalation. - Adams notes a broader shift in naval power dynamics: the US Navy’s role as global police may be waning. He references comments about the US Navy’s vulnerabilities, including equipment issues and the difficulty of maintaining access in conflicts like Iran or Yemen, where Iranian forces reportedly kept the US Navy at bay. - The future of warfare is described as moving away from traditional aircraft carriers toward drone carriers and missiles capable of striking ships globally. Iran’s actions are used to support the claim that the US Navy cannot easily project power near Iran or in key chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz. - The potential for a reconfiguration of global naval strategy is discussed: if the US cannot enforce its will universally, other nations will consider escorting their own trade routes, possibly through multilateral or regional arrangements, and the dollar’s dominance could decline as the petrodollar system weakens. - The Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz are highlighted as critical chokepoints. Indonesia’s reported plan to impose fees on ships transiting the Strait of Malacca is mentioned as an example of new cost structures in maritime trade. The toll through Hormuz could be paid in Chinese yuan, Bitcoin, gold, or other currencies, rather than dollars, according to the discussion. - Adams predicts a multipolar world where the US is not the sole arbiter of global trade. He suggests that even major powers like Russia, China, and Iran are recalibrating their defense and economic strategies around drone and underwater drones, shore-based missiles, and other forms of non-traditional military capabilities. - The conversation emphasizes the need for states to secure sea lanes through self-defense measures, potentially including drones on transport ships, as the era of universal naval dominance by the US declines. He cautions against the world of “Mad Max ocean” where piracy and escalatory actions raise costs and risk for all, and notes a shift away from a unipolar policing model toward negotiated trade and multipolar cooperation. - Adams concludes with a call for a shift toward peaceful trade, reducing aggressive postures, and rethinking US reliance on the dollar, arguing for broader global trade partnerships and renewed domestic priorities. Note: The latter part of the transcript contains promotional content for gold and health products. This summary excludes those promotional sections and focuses on the discussion of geopolitics, naval strategy, and economic implications.

Speaker 0: China appears to be the only country pushing back against Trump’s tariff stance, with other countries—including neighboring ones and India—reaching deals with Trump. India, which initially showed resilience, moved toward China after the Shanghai summit and the tariffs. Recently, India and the US signed a deal to gradually reduce Russia oil exports to 50% of imports. This suggests China is the sole major power resisting the US in this round of measures. The discussion then shifts to a broader pattern: the US has overplayed its hand in its dollar dominance and control of the financial system via SWIFT. In the wake of sanctions on Russia after the Ukraine conflict—freezing assets and limiting access to SWIFT—many nations have begun moving away from the US dollar toward gold. The speaker sees China’s current move as accelerating other countries’ push toward self-reliance, particularly in rare earths. The US is investing in its own rare earth industry, while Europe seeks alternatives. There is mention of a US deal with Ukraine involving rare earths, and speculation that Greenland’s abundant rare earth reserves could be relevant to what Trump sought with Greenland. The long-term downside or repercussions for China from this move are noted. Speaker 1: The discussion distinguishes between the financial sanctions used after the Ukraine war and the current situation. While sanctions are not perfect substitutes for dollar assets like crypto or gold, they remain available, so US leverage is not as strong as China’s leverage in rare earths. The speaker agrees that in the long term, China’s move will push other countries to build processing capacity for rare earths. Although rare earths are not truly rare, the processing and concentration are. Countries will be motivated to develop processing facilities. Japan is innovating substitutes for rare earths, which may take time and will not provide immediate relief for the US.

First speaker: Iran doesn’t really need to attack American ships or force the strait to open because it could actually be advantageous for the strait to remain closed. There are floating oil reserves and cargo ships in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea that Iran could rely on. In fact, Iran has a substantial stockpile: 160,000,000 barrels of Iranian crude already floating at sea, outside the Persian Gulf, past the Strait of Hormuz into the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. That amount could fuel a country like Germany for over two months, and most of it is headed to Chinese independent refiners. Exports remain high, and the blockade is real, even if the timing is late. Do you agree that Iran is prepped for this day? Second speaker: I do agree. I think this is not harming the Iranians as much as it is harming the United States and the rest of the world. First speaker: What is Trump’s thought process? He has spoken with secretary Besant and other advisers, so he’s already sought advice. What alternative could work in Trump’s favor? Second speaker: Whenever the first round of negotiations ended, the president believed that his style of brinksmanship would produce immediate capitulation and agreement by the Iranians. The Iranians have never negotiated like that. Even the first treaty in the late 2000s took a long time to negotiate, not one and done. This administration wants short-term gains, and that isn’t possible with the Iranians. In the short term, the Iranians are in the driver’s seat. Negotiating and diplomacy are very difficult work; you don’t bully your way through. There is no unconditional surrender. There is none of that except in the president’s mind, unfortunately.

Afshun Ratanjee hosts New Order, examining how the global South is navigating a more fragmented world shaped by West Asia tensions, disrupted trade corridors, volatile energy markets, and a realignment of power. She notes the Trump-Netanyahu war in West Asia has killed, wounded, or displaced millions and is reshaping the global economy in real time. China, as the largest buyer of Iranian oil, warns against U.S. escalation, while Russia’s Lavrov is shown as helping China with energy shortfalls. Modi and Trump spoke for forty minutes in what is described as reflecting India’s delicate diplomatic balancing act as India prepares to host a BRICS foreign ministers meeting in New Delhi, with Lavrov and Wang Yi expected to attend. The BRICS gathering will test India’s 2026 presidency amid the West Asian war. April 19 marks fourteen years since India tested the Agni five missile, underscoring a world of renewed great power tension, deterrence, alignment, and active strategic choices. The program then turns to an interview with Colonel Larry Wilkerson, former chief of staff at the U.S. State Department, live from Virginia. The discussion centers on a BRICS dimension to the conflict and a provocative claim that Trump may be a tactical mastermind. Wilkerson cautions that he does not think Trump “even hints at this” and suggests the actions are orchestrated by others behind the scenes, potentially inside the Pentagon, who aim to exploit crises (including Ukraine, Arctic tensions, and the Baltic) to confront China and use a southern rail corridor as an opportunity. The bombing of the China–Iran railway is discussed as an action with potentially strategic aims, though Wilkerson emphasizes China’s inertia and preference not to disrupt a successful overland route that could shift Asia–Europe trade onto land routes, reducing reliance on maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz. Wilkerson explains China’s strategy of building overland railways to divert commerce from sea routes, arguing this would reduce costs and increase security, and notes China’s rail networks and pipelines tie into a broader aim to move significant commerce into Europe via faster land routes. He mentions Saudi Arabia reconfiguring its pipeline plans to move north through Turkey and Syria, altering traditional transshipment dynamics and potentially diminishing Hormuz’s importance. He argues Russia will supply energy if needed, and asserts a long-term Caspian Sea supply base, with LNG and petroleum waiting to be tapped, potentially outside U.S. reach. Iran, he contends, is well-placed to resist pressure and may avoid major strategic losses, while Israel’s position in Lebanon appears precarious as Hezbollah gains influence. Regarding U.S. policy, Wilkerson argues that Trump’s behavior is driven by political savvy and a desire to claim victory, while Netanyahu pursues Lebanon policies that may backfire. He advises global South foreign ministers to maintain their course and not disrupt their advantages, highlighting BRICS as a growing, profitable alternative hub for renewables and advanced technologies, including EVs and batteries. He cites Xi Jinping’s push to replace the dollar with the renminbi in world trade, the removal of SWIFT sanctions, and China’s aim to shift financial power away from the United States, which he says has imposed sanctions responsible for millions of deaths, per a controversial statistic. Back from the break, the program returns to questions from viewers, including how BRICS should respond to Trump’s blockade claims and whether America is becoming a theocracy. The hosts emphasize that global South populations oppose the Trump–Netanyahu war and highlight the potential BRICS expansion as a counterweight to U.S. hegemony, with attention to the broader two existential global challenges: nuclear weapons without treaties and the climate crisis. The show closes with a prompt for audience participation on whether Iran should pursue a nuclear deterrent similar to North Korea and a teaser for next week’s episode.

BRICS will continue to expand and may announce a new currency or trading system to counteract the American-led system. BRICS doesn't have to replace the dollar, it just has to threaten it, as finance is based on confidence. Putin will maintain a close relationship with China; he needs China to remain neutral so Russia can pressure the American empire. Over the next few years, the Ukraine war will continue without expanding. Iran will take the initiative against the United States. North Korea will become more belligerent, forcing America to focus on East Asia. The relationship between Putin and Xi Jinping will strengthen.

Speaker 0: This war was never about Iran. And once you see it, you can't unsee it. Everyone's focused on the missiles, the Strait Of Hormuz, the oil price, but nobody's asking the only question that matters. Who actually gets hurt when Iran's oil disappears? Not America. Not Europe. China. 80% of Iranian oil goes to Asia. China has been buying millions of barrels from Iran every single month under the table around sanctions through back channels. Iran is China's cheap energy lifeline, and Trump just cut it off. He bombed Karg Island, the one port that handles 90% of Iran's oil exports. He didn't hit it by accident. He hit it because that's the pipe that feeds Beijing. But here's what makes this genius. Before he even touched Iran, he captured Maduro, took Venezuela, secured the largest oil reserves on the planet for The US. So when Iran's oil disappears from the global market, America has the replacement. China doesn't. Think about what that means. China's energy costs just exploded. Their factories, their manufacturing, their entire economic engine runs on cheap oil, and the cheap oil just got cut off. While America is sitting on Venezuela on domestic production on the strongest energy position in decades, Iran didn't lose this war. Iran was never the target. Iran was the move you sacrifice to take the queen. This was never a war in The Middle East. This is an energy war against China, and most people won't understand that until it's already over. Wake up.

Syed Mohamed Marandi discusses the collapse of the Islamabad negotiations and the wider implications of the current U.S.-Iran confrontation. - On what happened in Islamabad: Iran participated despite low expectations, aiming to show willingness to resolve the crisis if Americans are reasonable and to ensure the world sees Iran’s efforts. The Iranians believed the United States lacked will to make progress. During talks there was some progress on various issues, but near the end the United States shifted to a hard line on the nuclear program and the status of the Strait of Hormuz. Vance claimed Iran wanted to build a nuclear weapon, a claim Marandi notes was contradicted by former counterintelligence official Joe Kent’s resignation letter. Netanyahu reportedly maintains direct influence, with Vance reporting to Netanyahu daily, which Iran views as undermining an agreement. Netanyahu’s insistence on control and “being the boss” is presented as a central obstacle to any deal. The ceasefire in Lebanon was touted as failing, with Netanyahu and Trump accused of conspiring to wreck it, and Iran’s actions after the ceasefire aligned with this view. The Iranian delegation flew back by land after the flight to Tehran was diverted, reflecting the perceived danger and the Washington Post piece calling for the murder of negotiators. Iran’s approach is framed as attempting to resolve the problem while signaling willingness to negotiate if U.S. policy becomes reasonable. - On the blockade and its consequences: The U.S. blockade on Iranian ports has just begun and will likely worsen the global economic crisis, pushing more countries to oppose the United States. China is angry as Washington dictates terms against oil and trade in the region. The blockade could be used to strangle China’s energy supplies, creating a double-edged impact by simultaneously worsening the global crisis and pressuring U.S. allies. Iran says it may respond by striking ships in the Red Sea and blocking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Oman if the blockade continues. Iran notes it has substantial financial resilience from oil sales at higher prices without middlemen, with about 100 million barrels left to sell after selling half of its declared oil stock, and it views energy shortages as likely to trigger broader economic disruption, including shortages of helium, LNG, and fertilizers. - On war readiness and possible outcomes: Iran anticipates a major assault and is preparing defenses and offensive capabilities. Iran argues negotiations were not taken seriously by the United States and believes the U.S. is buying time. Iran would view victories as having the United States back down, preserving Iran’s rights, and protecting its regional allies, with a long-term ceasefire. Iran contends it should control the Strait of Hormuz to prevent future aggression and seeks compensation for damages caused by the conflict, emphasizing sovereignty over Hormuz and peace for Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, and Yemen. Iran states that if the U.S. and its regional proxies strike, Iran would respond by targeting energy and infrastructure in the Persian Gulf. - On broader geopolitical shifts and regional dynamics: Marandi argues the current crisis accelerates a move toward a multipolar world, with the United States’ hegemonic position eroding. The UAE is portrayed as pushing for war, while other Gulf states are increasingly wary. He predicts a possible land invasion of Iran, but emphasizes Iran’s long-term preparedness and resilience. Weather and terrain are cited as factors likely to complicate a potential U.S. invasion, particularly in the hot summer conditions of the region. - On potential definitions of “victory”: Iran’s victory would involve U.S. backing down, Iran preserving its rights, a long-term ceasefire, and sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. A broader victory would see the end of supremacism in Palestine and the end of genocidal actions in Lebanon, with peace across the region as a key objective. The discussion ends with the notion that a shift toward an American focus on its republic, rather than empire, would benefit global stability.

- The discussion opens with trying to map a post-war world, considering both a quick end to the war and a prolonged one, with a focus on US–China relations, US allies, Iran, and the broader region. A participant notes a broader battle between a China–Russia–Iran alignment and the Western alliance, including financial systems. - A major regional shift is already underway: by 2000, the top banks were dominated by Japanese and European players; by 2025, China dominates the top four banks. The speaker argues that power is moving from Western banks to China, and that countries with US-dollar-denominated debt are converting debt into renminbi because it’s cheaper. - In the last week, Russia and China signaled to Iran a push to revisit the Gulf security architecture. Putin spoke to Iraq about Gulf security; Wang Yi did the same. The implied shift is toward a Gulf security framework less dependent on US protection. - The current Gulf security model is described as US bases guaranteeing protection from Iran, coupled with a demand that recipient states buy US Treasuries and military equipment. The speakers argue this model left Gulf states vulnerable and exposed as US defense systems failed to prevent Iranian attacks in the recent episode. - Saudi Arabia and Qatar (and to a lesser extent the UAE) are discussed as potentially moving away from the United States toward Russia and China. A Pakistani ISI general reportedly said Saudi and Qatari leaders are breaking from the US; one NBC report cited Trump canceling Project Freedom due to Saudi resistance to air operations from Prince Saud Air Base. The implication is a Persian Gulf broadly shifting into the Russian–Chinese sphere, potentially altering Gulf financial flows away from the US dollar toward gold and the yuan. - An opposing view, aired by another economist, suggests the US will strengthen its deterrence in the Gulf, with UAE as an indicator. The counterpoint argues that the Gulf countries previously supported Iran’s adversaries, including indirect funding for attacks on Iran, implying US deterrence remains necessary. - The conversation emphasizes the gulf’s deterrence history: Iran has largely avoided offensive military action in the Gulf against the region, while Gulf states have relied on US protection. The lack of a robust Chinese or Russian security guarantee in the region is highlighted as a real risk to Gulf security calculations. - There is a debate about whether US military power remains credible. One participant argues the US has not won a major war since World War II, with recent actions described as limited or draw outcomes; another contends that US protection remains essential despite past failures, given Iran’s capabilities and history. - Military-strategy discussions cover the feasibility of a ground invasion vs. airstrike-only approaches. The speakers outline logistical challenges (water, supply lines, mountainous terrain) and the scale of forces needed (potentially large, multi-month training and buildup) to degrade Iran’s missile and drone capabilities. Arguments are made that holding the Strait of Hormuz would be difficult if Iran can still launch missiles and drones from interior positions. - The strategic importance of Gulf exports is quantified: Gulf oil about 32% of world supply; LNG around 20% (centered on Qatar and the Gulf), urea and sulfur for agriculture and industry (urea ~36%; sulfur for refining and semiconductors), and helium from Qatar at about 33%. Keeping the Gulf open is framed as essential to global energy, inflation, and agriculture. - A possible pathway to open the Hormuz is proposed: Iran could offer broad access to global markets except for countries allied with Israel or those that attacked Iran; Iran would leverage this to restart global flows, particularly to Asia. The idea is that a near-term crisis could force a negotiated settlement with Iran. - The timeline mentions a forthcoming peace negotiation in Beijing next week, with skepticism about it proceeding smoothly. If negotiations occur, Trump would not likely receive a warm reception due to recent sanctions and US actions against China; China has signaled resolve against US sanctions, instructing its companies not to acquiesce to pressure. - Overall, the dialogue frames the war as a potential catalyst for a broader realignment: power shifting toward China and Russia, a Gulf region hedging its security through new alliances, and the global economy recalibrating around yuan- and gold-based financial flows, with the Strait of Hormuz remaining a central strategic chokepoint.

Afshan Rutansi hosts New Order, a program touting a global view of how India and its allies sit at the center of a transformation in world history. The episode centers on the Trump administration’s war against Iran and its wider regional and global consequences, claiming the conflict has killed, wounded, or displaced over a million people from Iran to Lebanon to the South Caucasus, with the global South paying for shortages of fertilizer, fuel, food, and medicines as the Strait of Hormuz is mined and contested. The discussion also touches on Iran’s targeting of Israel’s nuclear program and Israel’s targeting of Iran’s nuclear reactor, and references the IEA’s view that Trump-era energy crises are worse than the 1970s oil shocks. The panel notes Pakistan’s perceived threat after Iran, and a claim by a former US DNI that Pakistan might be a concern if the US touches its WMD program. India, as this year’s chair of BRICS, says it will not broker peace between the USA and Iran. Dennis Kucinich, a former US congressman from Ohio who gave 155 speeches in the US Congress against war with Iran, joins the show. He has run for the Democratic presidential nomination twice and led RFK Jr.’s 2024 campaign. He describes the war as a “catastrophe, a circus of miscalculation,” and says Iran could be “the graveyard of the American empire.” He criticizes the US for bombing Iran while negotiations were ongoing, killing a negotiator and, with Israel, continuing bombing, and notes the death toll approaching 2,000 Iranians. He asserts that the USInduced negotiations to give up enriched uranium were under way, then bombed Iran, undermining diplomacy. He states there was “no imminent threat,” citing testimony by Joe Kent, a former official in the directorate of national intelligence, who resigned and described the threat as non-existent, and argues that the US strategy is to dominate the Middle East’s energy, currency, and trade. Kucinich argues that the war has led to higher oil and LNG prices, greater military spending in the Gulf, more fragile shipping routes, and increasing alignments with Iran and anti-western economic partners. He contends the global South bears a disproportionate burden from higher food, fuel, and grain prices, and that ordinary Americans are affected as well. He rejects the idea of neutral broker roles, noting India’s attempt to avoid binary alignment and maintain channels with both the US and Iran, arguing India’s BRICS leadership seeks de-escalation, energy security, and stability in food and fertilizer prices. On the broader strategic landscape, Kucinich says there is no real strategy to this war, only an attempt to capture supplies and control the oil market, with petrodollar dominance challenged by BRICS’ move toward local currencies. He predicts higher oil and food prices, inflation, and greater difficulty for the United States to maintain its global position, calling for the removal of bases in the Middle East. He references the “March of Folly” and suggests the new world order will follow, but not the one envisioned by current leaders. The latter portion shifts to viewer questions with Zara Khan, addressing whether BRICS will revive the UN, the nature of the January 2026 Iranian protests, and media portrayals of Iranian casualties. The discussion reaffirms skepticism toward Western media narratives, the CIA’s alleged role in provocations, and questions about international law amid perceptions of a US-led invasion. The program closes by inviting viewer engagement on whether India should maintain neutrality.

Ashwin Rutansi hosts New Order, exploring how India and the global South navigate new alignments catalyzed by West Asia’s war. Tehran’s rejection of direct peace talks with Washington sits beside regional powers—from Beijing to Islamabad—pushing for negotiated outcomes that safeguard security. The Gulf anchors India’s energy security and now becomes the pivot of a new order as the U.S. loses control over key sea lanes, including the Strait of Hormuz. Global energy prices rise, compelling New Delhi to reassess sourcing and diplomacy as India tries to navigate between major powers to protect economic and security interests. Jeffrey Sachs, adviser to UN secretaries-general and Padma Bhushan recipient, joins from New York City. He emphasizes that if Iran is bombed into the stone age and energy in West Asia ignites, the entire world would suffer. He describes a global energy system where disruptions affect fertilizer, food production, industrial petrochemicals, and the broader supply chain. He warns that a war of the length Trump talks about could lead to catastrophic energy supply collapse in weeks, affecting not just Hormuz, but production across Middle East fields, pipelines, ports, and refineries. He argues Trump misunderstands the link between U.S. energy resources and Hormuz, noting a broader energy vulnerability. The discussion shifts to why India might resist intervening in a Iran-Israel crisis. Sachs critiques U.S. foreign policy as pursuing perpetual hegemony and describes Trump’s behavior as part of a broader pattern. He characterizes the American president as lacking a “foot on the brake” for war machine expansion, contrasting it with past attempts to restrain aggression. He describes Trump as displaying a “dark triad”—narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy—with possible frontotemporal dementia factors, and he attributes alarming rhetoric from Netanyahu to a similar mindset in Israel’s leadership. He contends this policy approach is dangerous and urges restraint. On why Modi, Delhi, and BRICS should avoid entanglement with Israel and push for a negotiated settlement, Sachs argues India should not align with Israel, which he says has committed genocide in Gaza and launched a “war of whim” against Iran. He stresses that India, as BRICS president, should advocate a multipolar world rooted in international law and the UN Charter, collaborating with Russia, China, and other BRICS partners to counter American delusions of a unipolar order. He asserts that BRICS can serve as a stabilizing force for the world and that India can be a peacemaker given its long-standing ties with Persia. He calls for India, China, and Russia to cooperate and to recognize the 1914 Simla line as an historical footnote, not a barrier to current cooperation; BRICS, he says, can build practical institutions like the New Development Bank to support a multipolar framework. The program shifts to audience questions with Zara Khan. She asks if BRICS could create a new clearinghouse for world commerce. Sachs remains optimistic about BRICS, noting that sanctions-heavy Russia still conducts substantial trade and that Gulf Hormuz deals illustrate transactions independent of the U.S. petrodollar and SWIFT. Another question concerns how Iran could bypass sanctions via BRICS and overcome SWIFT, with Sachs noting SWIFT’s days may be numbered and suggesting BRICS-enabled trade could proceed without Western financial systems. Shaila from Johannesburg asks why BRICS leaders still entertain a two-state solution; the host invites reconsideration of that stance in light of genocide accusations and calls for a broader, more principled approach. The show ends with a prompt for viewers: How can Modi, Putin, or Xi pressure Trump to end the war in Iran? The program invites continued discussion on Sunday, tracking shifting global power and India’s central role in the new order.

Mario: Let's start with Venezuela. Do you think this is a strategy by Trump? Larry: I saw something similar back in 1988. The CIA was involved with trying to provoke Manuel Noriega into taking some sort of action. They could say, oh, well, we gotta go respond to this to set the stage for our military invasion, which I believe that in 2018, Donald Trump signed a finding authorizing a covert action by the CIA to get rid of Maduro. That attempt failed. And now the objective, get control of the oil. That's the number one priority. And I think it's being done with an eye looking forward, recognizing the potential risk. If conflict is renewed with Iran, prospect of the shutdown of Persian Gulf— Mario: Ukraine defeated Russia. Larry: Yeah. That was the plan. Russia's military is now around 1,500,000. Mario: Let’s talk Venezuela. What’s your initial reaction? When John Kuriaki suggested the best indicator is naval movements, and the buildup off Venezuela is significant. I’ve heard they have 14, twelve warships, including the Gerald Ford. Do you think they are bluffing? Is this Trump strategy? Larry: It could be a bluff. I saw something similar in 1988. I was in the CIA’s Central America branch. They tried to provoke Noriega into action to justify invasion, which happened in December 1988. What’s different now is the base infrastructure. In Panama, Quarry Heights was full; Southern Command was there. Southern Command has moved to Miami. The weaponization of the idea of a “supported vs. supporting” commander is reversed here: Southern Command would be subordinate to Special Operations Command. SOCOM cannot fight a conventional war; they’re light infantry, raids, hostage rescue. So the question is: what will the ships actually do? Shells into Venezuela won’t defeat Venezuela. Ground forces would require mass, and Venezuela is three times the size of Vietnam with rugged terrain that favors ambushes. If US troops ashore, you’d stack body bags far beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Mario: Do Venezuelans have the will to fight Maduro? Larry: Yes. It will rally insurgents from Brazil and Colombia. If we decapitate Maduro, there are loyalists with weapons; an insurgency could follow, and the US would be hard-pressed to pacify it. The State Department’s INL/INSCR reports on narcotics note Venezuela as a transit point for marijuana and some cocaine, with fentanyl less central than claimed by Trump. The 2018 emphasis on Trendy Aragua looked CIA-driven. Trump reportedly signed a covert action finding in 2018 to remove Maduro, leading to the Guaidó fiasco; that covert action included some public diplomacy via USAID. The objective now, as you asked, is oil control and curtailing Russia, China, and Iran’s influence, with an eye toward BRICS. Mario: Could there be a decapitation strike on Maduro, and would someone like Maria take over? Larry: A decapitation strike could spark insurgency; the US would not be able to pacify it. The broader agenda seems to include a strategy to seize oil and reduce regional influence by Russia and China. Venezuela’s role as a transit point and possible BRICS alignment complicates any straightforward regime-change scenario. Mario: Moving to general foreign policy under Trump. The national security strategy (NSS) for 2025 signals a shift, but you question how binding NSS papers are. What did you make of it, and how does it relate to Ukraine? You’ve noted Trump isn’t serious about peace in Ukraine on some occasions. Larry: The NSS is a set of guidelines, not a blueprint. Europe is being asked to step up, the US distancing itself from Europe, and the strategic relationship with Europe is damaged by the perception of long-term reliability and sanctions. The document highlights China as an economic rival rather than an enemy; it criticizes Europe’s defense spending and censorship, and it frames Russia as less of a direct threat than before, though the reality is nuanced. The US-EU relationship is strained, and the US wants Europe to shoulder more of the burden in Ukraine while maintaining strategic pressure. Mario: What about Ukraine? Zelensky’s negotiation posture, security guarantees, and the Moscow terms? Larry: Putin spoke on 06/14/2024 with five Russian demands: Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk are permanently part of Russia; Ukraine must withdraw its forces from those republics; there must be an election in Ukraine with a legitimately elected president (the Russians argue Zelensky is illegitimate for not holding elections); they suggest a successor to Zelensky and elections within 90 days. Freezing lines in Donbas is not accepted by Russia; the Russians claim further territory may be annexed with referenda. If peace talks fail, Russia is likely to push to occupy Kharkiv, Sumy, Mykolaiv, and Odessa, potentially Kyiv. Western support is insufficient to alter that trajectory, given Russia’s large artillery and drone production. The US and Europe cannot match Russia’s drone and shell output; even if they supply Tomahawks, escalation risks, including nuclear considerations, grow. Russia’s economy and war capacity remain robust, and the BRICS poles are strengthening as Western leverage wanes. Mario: What about sanctions strategy and Russia’s oil revenues? Larry: Oil remains a significant but not decisive portion of Russia’s GDP. The West’s sanctions are not enough to force collapse; Russia has endured the 1990s and remains resilient. BRICS cooperation and the shift to the Global South are changing the global order, with Russia and China deepening ties and reducing Western influence. The war in Ukraine has not produced a decisive Western victory, and the global south is moving away from Western-led sanctions, reshaping geopolitical alignments. Mario, it’s been a pleasure.

The fallout with India will cause repercussions for America. It will push India away from America, strengthening the Eastern bloc of Russia, China, India, and the rest of the world under BRICS. Dedollarization will become a reality.

Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst, joins the program to discuss the dramatic developments in the war against Iran. The conversation centers on the strike on Karg Island, the strategic choke point for Iran’s oil exports, and the broader implications of escalating U.S. actions. - Karg Island and the oil threat: The host notes that Karg Island handles 90% of Iran’s oil exports and asks why Trump isn’t targeting this area. Johnson argues the attack on Karg Island makes little strategic sense and points out that Iran has five oil terminals; destroying one would not end Iran’s potential revenue. He emphasizes that the U.S. bombed the runway of the major airport on the island, which he says remains irrelevant to Iran’s overall capacity to generate revenue. He notes the runway damage would not support U.S. objectives for invading the island, given runway length constraints (6,000 feet measured vs. need for 3,500–3,700 feet for certain aircraft) and the limited air force in Iran. Johnson asserts that Iran has indicated it would retaliate against oil terminals and Gulf neighbors if oil resources or energy infrastructure are attacked. - Economic and strategic consequences of closing the Strait of Hormuz: Johnson states that the action effectively shut the Strait of Hormuz, cutting off 20% of the world’s oil supply, 25% of global LNG, and 35% of the world’s urea for fertilizer. He explains fertilizer’s criticality to global agriculture and notes that rising gas and diesel prices in the United States would impact consumer costs, given many Americans live paycheck to paycheck. He suggests the price hikes contribute to inflationary pressure and could trigger a global recession, especially since Persian Gulf countries are pivotal energy suppliers. He also points out that the U.S. cannot easily reopen Hormuz without unacceptable losses and that Iran has prepared for contingencies for thirty years, with robust defenses including tunnels and coastal fortifications. - Military feasibility and strategy: The discussion covers the impracticality of a U.S. ground invasion of Iran, given the size of Iran’s army and the modern battlefield’s drone and missile threats. Johnson notes the U.S. Army and Marine numbers, the logistical challenges of sustaining an amphibious or airborne assault, and the vulnerability of American ships and troops to drones and missiles. He highlights that a mass deployment would be highly costly and dangerous, with historical evidence showing air power alone cannot win wars. The hosts discuss limited U.S. options and the possible futility of attempts to seize or occupy Iran’s territory. - Internal U.S. decision-making and DC dynamics: The program mentions a split inside Washington between anti-war voices and those pressing toward Tehran, with leaks suggesting that top officials warned Trump about major obstacles and potential losses. Johnson cites a leak from the National Intelligence Council indicating regime change in Tehran is unlikely, even with significant U.S. effort. He asserts the Pentagon’s credibility has been questioned after disputed reports (e.g., the KC-135 shootdown) and notes that Trump’s advisors who counsel restraint are being sidelined. - Iranian retaliation and targets: The discussion covers Iran’s targeting of air defenses and critical infrastructure, including radars at embassies and bases in the region, and the destruction of five Saudi air refueling tankers, which Trump later dismissed as fake news. Johnson says Iran aims to degrade Israel economically and militarily, while carefully avoiding mass civilian casualties in some instances. He observes Iran’s restraint in striking desalination plants, which would have caused a humanitarian catastrophe, suggesting a deliberate choice to keep certain targets within bounds. - Global realignments and the role of Russia, China, and India: The conversation touches on broader geopolitical shifts. Johnson argues that Russia and China are offering alternatives to the dollar-dominated order, strengthening ties with Gulf states and BRICS members. He suggests Gulf allies may be considering decoupling from U.S. security guarantees, seeking to diversify away from the petrodollar system. The discussion includes India’s position, noting Modi’s visit to Israel and India’s balancing act amid U.S. pressure and Iran relations; Iran’s ultimatum to allow passage for flag vessels and its diplomacy toward India is highlighted as a measured approach, even as India’s stance has attracted scrutiny. - Israel, casualties, and the broader landscape: The speakers discuss Israeli casualties and infrastructure under sustained Iranian strikes, noting limited information from within Israel due to media constraints and possible censorship. Johnson presents a game-theory view: if Israel threatens a nuclear option, Iran might be compelled to develop a nuclear capability as a deterrent, altering calculations for both Israel and the United States. - Terrorism narrative and historical context: The speakers challenge the U.S. portrayal of Iran as the world’s top sponsor of terrorism, arguing that ISIS and the Taliban have caused far more deaths in recent years, and that Iran’s responses to threats have historically prioritized restraint. They emphasize Iran’s chemical weapons restraint during the Iran-Iraq war, contrasting it with U.S. and Iraqi actions in the 1980s. - Final reflections: The discussion emphasizes the cascade effects of the conflict, including potential impacts on Taiwan’s energy and semiconductor production, multiplied by China’s leverage, and Russia’s increasing global influence. Johnson warns that the war’s end will likely be achieved through shifting alignments and economic realignments rather than a conventional battlefield victory, with the goal of U.S. withdrawal from the region as part of any settlement. The conversation closes with mutual thanks and a reaffirmation of ongoing analysis of these evolving dynamics.