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Europe should have been negotiating with Russia, but now that Trump is, some are in an uproar. If the US stops sending arms and funding, the war will end. This all stems from American arrogance, going back decades to the US declaring itself the sole superpower and expanding NATO eastward, ignoring Russian concerns. The US participated in a violent coup in Ukraine in 2014, further escalating tensions. Europe needs a grown-up foreign policy, not one based on hate speech or Russophobia, but real diplomacy. NATO should have been disbanded in 1991. The US sees this as a game, but for Russia, it's about core national security.

Diplomacy is difficult but necessary to avoid nuclear war. The U.S. is running out of options with Russia because it underestimated the Russian economy and civilization. Some U.S. Senators believed Russia was merely a gas station with nuclear weapons, which was an absurd assessment. Sanctions were levied, and Russia was cut off from SWIFT, but ultimately, the U.S. hurt itself more than it hurt Russia. The speaker is not endorsing the Russian economy or civilization, but stating that the U.S. did not understand it.

I love Europe, but the US/Europe relationship is broken because of a lack of respect. Europeans look down on Americans and act entitled. We're tired of being on the hook for security, including for non-NATO countries like Ukraine. We have our own problems at home, like fentanyl deaths, struggling veterans, and education issues. Americans across the political spectrum don't want to be in a nuclear war with Russia or continue the Ukraine war. We want peace and to focus on our own issues. The recent behavior from European leaders and Zelensky suggests the relationship is over. We'll still trade and visit, but the entitlement needs to stop. Americans are angry and want to address our own problems. It's time for a change.

I was very disappointed by the speech given by Vice President JD Vance at the conference yesterday. Our allies needed to hear a renewed commitment from America to NATO and our European partners. They needed to know that we are willing to stand up to the Kremlin and provide Ukraine with the help it needs to fight Russia's war. Instead, they got a condescending lecture that attacked our allies. The speech sent the wrong message and I believe it was enthusiastically greeted in the Kremlin.

Ian Proud argues that while ending the war and accelerating Ukraine’s EU membership are important, there is a missing focus on the future relationship with Russia and a broader, Pan-European security framework. He notes that Europe is already experiencing economic decline as energy policy shifts away from cheap Russian energy toward more expensive sources, which he says contributes to factory closures and cost-of-living pressures. He warns that simply ending the war or admitting Ukraine into the EU could result in a hostile, “anti-Russia” posture within Europe, unless the long-term security architecture is reset. He emphasizes two key consequences of the Ukraine crisis since 2014: (1) Europe’s energy and economic policies are driving a decline, partly due to cutting off cheap energy from Russia; (2) focusing only on ending the war and integrating Ukraine into Europe risks creating a new, hostile dynamic with Russia if the relationship is not normalized. Without addressing the future Russia-Europe relationship, he suggests Europe could end up with a remilitarized Europe and higher defense spending, while postponing a durable settlement. Regarding peace negotiations, Proud argues for a treaty-based, comprehensive approach to pan-European security rather than only ceasefire promises. He contends that peace cannot be achieved by refusing to discuss Russia’s security concerns or by treating Ukraine’s EU accession as a standalone solution. He traces a long history of failed attempts at a broader European security architecture—from Helsinki Accords to the OSCE and the 2005 Common Space—showing that NATO expansion and Western reluctance to embrace a wider security framework undermined these efforts. He asserts that “the red line” on Ukraine’s status was drawn too late and that a durable peace requires a broader security settlement that includes Russia and the European Union, not just NATO. If advising Putin, Proud suggests pushing for a broader, treaty-based agreement on future pan-European security, rather than accepting merely tacit assurances or expanding NATO. He argues that Ukraine’s EU membership could become “NATO light,” potentially achieving the same military posture as a formal alliance but under EU institutions, thus reinforcing Moscow’s concerns. He calls for a comprehensive accord that reorganizes European security within a broader framework—reinstating indivisible security, sovereign equality, and an integrated approach to security that encompasses Russia, the EU, and potentially broader Eurasian arrangements. He warns that without such a deal, the conflict risks a prolonged stalemate and a dangerous re-escalation. Proud notes that the atmosphere around diplomacy is terribly toxic, with Western leaders and institutions increasingly sidelining Russia from formal talks. He criticizes the Munich Security Conference for excluding Russia from diplomacy and laments the overemphasis on military solutions and the symbolic, sometimes confrontational rhetoric by European leaders (for example, chancellor statements about arming Europe and projecting suffering onto Russia). He argues that Europe’s foreign policy today is driven by a single objective—defeating Russia—and that this approach has left Europe economically and strategically paralyzed. Towards the end, Proud cautions that post-war Europe will face a transition to a multipolar world, where the United States will shift priorities toward Asia and the Western Hemisphere. He questions Europe’s readiness to engage in a multipolar order and stresses the need for Europe to reestablish normal relations with Russia to avoid a new Berlin Wall-like division. He also critiques the perception of Ukraine’s resilience and Zelensky’s role, suggesting that Europe should develop its own foreign policy vision rather than being dominated by Kyiv’s stance. Overall, the dialogue centers on the necessity of a broad, treaty-based security framework for Europe that includes Russia and the EU, a genuine normalization of relations, and diplomacy that moves beyond ceasefires and symbolic gestures to a lasting peace architecture.

Speaker 0 notes that Trump used the Davos stage to demand Greenland back, warning allies to back off or face massive tariffs, calling Greenland “a piece of ice.” Speaker 1 says the goal is a piece of ice for world protection; the U.S. could have kept the land but chose not to, giving Greenland a choice to say yes and be appreciated or no and be remembered. Greenland is reportedly protesting in the streets, saying “hands off our country.” Speaker 0 adds that Trump has struck a deal framing a future agreement on Greenland and the Arctic, posted on Truth Social, stating that based on a productive meeting with the Secretary General of NATO, Marruta, a framework for a future deal with respect to Greenland and the Arctic has been formed, and that tariffs scheduled for February 1 will not be imposed. Speaker 2 challenges the claim, noting NATO doesn’t own Greenland, and questions whether Marruta can make such a deal. Speaker 0 continues the exchange, joking about not wanting a Met Gala, and suggests the post hints at the U.S. taking control of Canada as well because of Arctic interests. Canadian Prime Minister Carney responds by saying Canada will invoke Article 5 and support NATO to protect Denmark, with Denmark also unwilling to cede sovereignty following the framework. Speaker 2 adds that two people are deciding the fate of Greenland, and another participant begins to speak. Speaker 0 provides population context, saying about 57,000 people live in Greenland. Speaker 0 then mentions Putin’s response, quoting a brief remark that he’s “kinda behind this idea.” Speaker 2 notes Ravasi’s commentary and asks for a referendum, which Speaker 3 says would give Greenlanders a semblance of deciding for themselves, though it’s unclear how such a referendum would impact broader strategic interests. Speakers turn to Ralph Schulhammer, who is in Austria, to assess European reaction. Speaker 3 says Trump’s rhetoric in Davos was “very Trumpian” but contained carrots as well as sticks: he highlighted ancestry, support for a strong Europe, concerns about migration and energy policy, and suggested that Europe must strengthen itself to be a true partner; otherwise, the U.S. may retreat. The discussion acknowledges sentiment that Europe’s elites tend to frame issues as global rather than addressing national needs, with Speaker 3 arguing that policy-wise there can be shared interests, but communication strategy differed from Trump’s approach. The panel considers whether Greenland’s referendum would matter, noting that many peoples pursue autonomy but that Greenland’s outcome would not necessarily alter large strategic interests. They discuss historical precedents of land acquisitions and acknowledge the Greenland dispute sits at the intersection of Arctic strategic interests and great-power competition, including China and Russia’s activity in the region. Speaker 3 emphasizes that the future of Europe should be anchored in defending European territory and citizens, not only global agendas, and critiques the perception that Europe should always prioritize global issues over internal concerns. In closing, Speaker 0 references Macron’s overture to meet in Paris, noting Trump’s remark that Macron won’t be in power much longer. Ralph Schulhammer is thanked for his insights, with recognition of his Hammertime podcast.

The speaker suggests that US diplomatic discussions may be mere theater, a tactic used to justify going to war. They claim the US has used this tactic before, citing the example of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. According to the speaker, inspectors found nothing, but the US wanted to end the inspections to initiate war, which was their ultimate goal.

The speaker criticizes the lack of non-military thinking in politics and argues that Chancellor Merkel made a fundamental mistake by excluding the possibility of conflict. They believe that neither Russia nor Germany wants war, so discussing it is nonsense. They also dismiss the idea that arms deliveries are dangerous for world peace. The speaker sees the Chancellor's weakness as relying too much on public perception instead of her own considerable intellect. When questioned about their condemnation of Germany's peace-seeking nature, the speaker clarifies that they do not condemn it, but rather caution against the Chancellor's misguided beliefs. They argue that military means are necessary to potentially unsettle Russia.

I see the hatred for Putin, and it's tough to make a deal with that. I want to get this thing settled. I could be tougher than anyone, but you won't get a deal that way. We had a president who talked tough about Putin, but Putin still invaded. Diplomacy is the path to peace. Russia occupied parts of Ukraine in 2014, and nobody stopped him. We signed ceasefire and gas contracts, but he broke the ceasefire and didn't exchange prisoners. What kind of diplomacy are we talking about? I'm talking about ending the destruction of your country. It's disrespectful to litigate this here. You should be thanking us for trying to bring this to a conference.

Glenn opens by noting a year has passed since Jeffrey Sachs urged Europe to adopt a realistic foreign policy that understands Russia, Europe, and the United States, and to avoid being invaded by the U.S.—even suggesting Trump could land troops in Greenland. Glenn asks how to read the current situation, including Davos and Europe’s anger at U.S. hostility, and the revived emphasis on international law. Jeffrey Sachs responds with a version of the “ride on the back of a tiger” metaphor from Kennedy, arguing Europeans forgot that the United States is an imperial power that has acted brazenly and brutally for about twenty years. He lists U.S. actions: invasions, regime changes, and reckless interference in Ukraine, and U.S. complicity in Israel’s wars across Africa and the Middle East, along with involvement in overthrowing Ukraine’s Yanukovych and other interventions. He claims Europeans were silent or complicit as the United States bombed Iran, kidnapped its president, and pursued Greenland, calling the Greenland push a grotesque power grab by Trump. He asserts New York Times recognition of U.S. imperial tendencies and says Europe’s naivete and hypocrisy are evident. He states: “The United States is thuggish, imperialistic, reckless, and that The U. S. Has left a large swath of the world in misery. Europe has been mostly compliant or complicit.” He urges Europeans to understand what the United States is about, to stop Russophobia, and to keep lines of communication with Russia open; he argues Europe’s Russophobia made it boxed in with little diplomacy with Russia or the U.S. Glenn adds that Europe’s stance mirrors a Cold War-like unity against Russia, but that the current reality differs: the U.S. does not view Russia as its main adversary, and Russophobia deepens Europe’s dependence on the U.S. Glenn notes mixed reactions at Davos, including Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney signaling a shift away from a rules-based order that privileges the West, and Macron’s private message to Trump seeking a cooperative stance on Syria, Iran, and Greenland. He remarks that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg praised NATO while Trump hinted that the real enemy is within NATO, highlighting the chaos. He asks if this signals a decline of the U.S. empire or NATO. Sachs discusses Carney's stance as significant: Carney’s trip to China and a dialogue with Beijing indicating diversification with China, including a Canadian-Chinese investment plan. He credits Carney with being a rare straightforward statesman and notes instability ahead. Trump’s Davos retreat from threats (notably Greenland) may have been influenced by stock-market declines, according to Sachs’ theory. He mentions a possible European concession about U.S. sovereignty over parts of Greenland, though he doubts any negotiation has been meaningful. He cites Scott Bessent’s Fox Business interview as revealing: sanctions on Iran are a form of economic statecraft designed to crush the Iranian economy, with Iran’s currency collapse and bank failures cited as evidence; Sachs condemns this as a violation of international law and UN Charter, and calls Bessent’s pride in wielding currency-destabilization as alarming. He points to sanctions against Cuba and a broader pattern of “thuggish gangster behavior” by the U.S., noting Europeans’ silence on Iran and other regimes until it backfires on them. Sachs argues Europe’s Russophobia is self-destructive, and he emphasizes that diplomacy remains possible if Germany, France, and Italy adopt a rational approach. He criticizes Germany for duplicity in NATO enlargement and Minsk II, blaming Merkel for dropped commitments, and notes that Italy shows less Russophobia and could shift toward diplomacy. He believes Central Europe and some leaders (e.g., Orban, Czech and Slovak figures) favor diplomacy, but German leadership has been weak. He stresses that Europe must avoid dismemberment and choose diplomacy with Russia, warning that continued war policy will leave Europe isolated. He closes with optimism that there remains a path forward if key European powers act differently. Glenn thanks Sachs for the discussion and ends.

Vladimir Putin is seen as smart and tough by the speaker, who emphasizes the need for peaceful negotiations rather than name-calling. The speaker criticizes past actions by the US and European leaders regarding Ukraine, urging for dialogue and diplomacy to prevent conflict. The focus is on avoiding war and finding peaceful solutions through negotiation, referencing historical examples like the Cuban Missile Crisis. Peaceful negotiations are emphasized over insults and aggression.

The speaker argues that winning in political struggle is currently nearly impossible, and that Donald Trump grasped this reality in a way that others have not. They say, perhaps uniquely in the Western world, Trump understands how to handle the confrontation with the deep state, and they acknowledge Viktor Orban and Bekailly Malay as potential examples of others who have challenged entrenched power. However, the speaker emphasizes that Trump embodies “the playbook of how you need to behave,” suggesting that his approach is a model for contemporary politics. The speaker contends that many politicians are clinging to a dated strategy. They describe a past era—the seventies and eighties—when the prevailing belief was that it was possible to reason with the opposition, find compromises, be bipartisan, persuade people, and sell policies in the media through traditional pitching and persuasion. According to the speaker, that strategy cannot be adopted today because the opposition has changed. In contrast to those bygone expectations, the speaker asserts that the current opposition is not composed of social democrats who merely want to raise taxes or increase public spending. Instead, they describe the current opposition as aiming to destroy Western civilization. The speaker emphasizes the severity of this shift in aims, framing the opposition as having existential goals that go beyond ordinary political disagreement. Throughout, the core claims center on a diagnosis of a strategic pivot in modern politics: the old playbook of negotiation and persuasion is no longer viable because the opposition has fundamentally changed its aims, adopting objectives that are presented as existential threats to Western civilization. The speaker positions Trump as an exemplar of the new, effective approach to navigating this transformed political landscape, highlighting the perceived necessity of a more combative and uncompromising posture in confronting opponents who, in the speaker’s view, seek to undermine foundational Western values.

The conversation centers on the idea that Europe’s leadership has deteriorated and that powerful voices from the past warned this would happen. Colin Powell, according to Speaker 1, told Speaker 0 in 1989 that Europe would end up with “horrible leaders,” and that those who replace them would be people “who have no conscience, people who have no sense of reality, people who have not been seasoned by warfare… who think they control their lives but don't.” Powell’s view, developed from his experience as a military and strategic analyst, was that once the pressure of the Cold War abated, there would be little rationale for NATO, and Europe would drift without a coherent security structure. Speaker 1 elaborates that Powell’s instincts led him to anticipate a dissolution of the postwar security order. Powell argued that NATO’s justification would erode, and a political debacle would accompany the military one as Europe’s leaders lacked direct experience of war. He advised creating a European security identity (ESI) consisting of a 3,000-person brigade, with its own equipment, training, and industrial base, divorced from NATO. The idea was that, over time (perhaps a 20–25 year period), the ESI could grow into a division, then a corps, with its own air power and arms industry, eventually allowing NATO to fade away while Europe managed its own security. Speaker 1 notes that Powell’s position was controversial with U.S. defense and defense contractors, who viewed him as dangerous for proposing such an independent European security framework. The discussion parallels George Kennan’s 1987 warning that if the Soviet Union collapsed, American society would face a shock because so much of its domestic and alliance structures depended on the external threat. The speakers discuss Clinton-era shifts, including Bill Perry’s attempts to revive cooperation with Russia, and the way Clinton’s policies altered the trajectory away from Powell’s envisioned framework. They mention a shift away from a fixed European security reliance on a NATO-centric model toward broader strategic engagement, but also criticize the departure from a legally grounded approach to world affairs. The conversation then turns to current tensions, including Europe’s involvement in Ukraine. The participants reflect on Powell’s broader aim of integrating security arrangements with law, noting that international law should guide actions, even if law alone cannot ensure outcomes. They discuss the possibility that the war in Ukraine could reflect the consequences of earlier decisions to preserve U.S. footprints in Europe and the Cold War security architecture, which in their view helped maintain stability but also embedded Europe within a security framework that relied on American leadership. The dialogue references the Balkans as an example of policy divergence: Powell warned that stabilizing the Balkans would require extensive forces, but President Bush was reluctant. Clinton eventually conducted a prolonged bombing campaign against Serbia, altering the dynamic with Russia and highlighting the tensions between ambitious security vision and political practicality. The speakers emphasize the importance of law and national security structures, the desire to rethink post–Cold War decisions, and the ongoing question of how Europe should secure its own stability while balancing relations with Russia and the United States.

The speaker argues that the European Union, the United Nations, and the World Health Organization should be abolished. They claim there are numerous European “x” accounts aiming to provoke Western Europeans to go to war with Russia because Western funding for Ukraine is dwindling, and they say these actors want to attack Russia regardless of US backing. A self-proclaimed “Gunther” is featured as a controversial figure who says he’s part of NATO, but the speaker notes that NATO publicly denies knowing him and that Gunther formed his own NGOs without funding. The speaker highlights Gunther’s post: Europeans will never be slaves. In response, the speaker asks why Gunther would arrest people for telling the truth online and trying to enslave them in a digital prison; they claim Gunther is misrepresenting online repression and compare digital punishment to real torture. The speaker cites a German police investigation of a Gab user who called a female politician fat, emphasizing the use of the term fat as quoted in the post. They challenge Gunther by asking if the photo shows a Victoria’s Secret model, implying a discrepancy between appearances and claims, and label Gunther as aligning with “the EU’s bitches” and lacking sovereignty. They accuse Hungary of being fined a million dollars a day for not accepting “undesirables,” asserting EU law requires such intake and that white Europeans are urged to fight against Russia while others (described in demeaning terms) contribute less. The speaker argues that Western Europe is dependent on the United States, stating that the US is the biggest financier of NATO and possesses the most powerful military, and that Europeans would be abandoned without US support. They remark that Gunther’s post demonstrates this dependence, noting Gunther’s post about Trump wanting to win and withdraw the US Navy from European seas, which would leave Europe exposed to Russia and Iran. The speaker mocks Gunther’s attempt to lead a European naval force and requests continued US Navy presence for a decade to help. Overall, the speaker frames a narrative of European subservience to the United States, critiques of EU sovereignty, and hostility toward Western multinational institutions, while repeatedly referencing Gunther as a focal figure in these exchanges.

Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson and Glenn discuss the trajectory of U.S. policy under Trump and the broader implications for the international order. Wilkerson argues that the postwar world order, built after World War II, is unraveling intentionally, driven by what he calls a disastrous blend of decision making and strategic aims. He faults Steve Miller’s comments on bases in Greenland and contends that the United States already had, historically, bases in Greenland and that current rhetoric reflects a Hobbesian view of a world governed by force rather than law. He attributes the drift to “the brains of some truly stupid people,” and notes that the guide for decision making is Trump’s morality, which Wilkerson asserts is deficient, shaping both domestic and international actions. On domestic policy and its international spillovers, Wilkerson cites the Minnesota situation as an example of how Trump’s approach translates into draconian, forceful actions at home. He contends that the “morality” guiding decisions in both spheres leads to a reckless use of force and an undermining of the rule of law. He emphasizes that the law disappears in the international sphere and domestic governance declines when empire comes home, suggesting that the United States is acting in ways that weaken rather than strengthen the rule of law globally. Turning to foreign policy, Wilkerson argues that America’s military posture is misposed and maldeployed. He questions why the United States maintains a large presence in the Caribbean and Gulf regions at a time when potential adversaries like China and Russia require attention elsewhere. He contends that the United States has a depleted carrier fleet and is not fulfilling presence missions or developing coherent war plans, raising concerns about the feasibility of any significant action against Iran. The discussion notes that an attack on Iran could be logistically problematic given the current force distribution, and Wilkerson fears the United States risks humiliation and strategic setback if it pursues major military action without a credible, well-deployed plan. The conversation shifts to the broader effects of U.S. strategy on global alignments. Wilkerson argues that Europe’s leaders have changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War, predicting that NATO may eventually fade as Europe develops its own security identity, a concept Powell explored historically. He cites Powell’s vision of a European security identity (ESI) separate from NATO, consisting of a modest European brigade that could grow into a fuller defense structure, potentially reducing Europe’s reliance on NATO and even integrating Russia gradually. He suggests Clinton’s era disrupted these ideas, with Serbia bombing and a shift toward a more aggressive line that drew Russia back into the geopolitical frame, complicating efforts to maintain a balanced, law-based security architecture. Powell’s long-term predictions about Europe’s leadership and the likelihood that Europe would be governed by leaders without the experience of warfare are discussed as prescient, though not realized. Wilkerson notes Powell’s belief that the center could not hold as NATO’s purpose evolved and leadership changed, leading to the potential dissolution of the NATO framework and the emergence of a European security identity. The conversation emphasizes that this shift would require a carefully calibrated approach to arms control, law, and alliance structures, rather than casting law aside in favor of a unilateral, morality-based approach to security. Regarding China and the future global order, Wilkerson aligns with Mearsheimer in predicting potential conflict with China, arguing that the combination of the U.S. unilateral approach, strategic competition, and the push toward a lawless, orderless world heightens the risk of a major confrontation. He asserts that China, studying U.S. behavior, would rather avoid a nuclear or conventional war and would seek to avoid destabilizing actions that could provoke a broader conflict. The discussion closes with reflections on U.S. regional influence, the BRICS movement, and the dollar’s reserve status. Wilkerson contends that the BRICS’ move toward dedollarization faced obstacles due to U.S. threats, and he notes China’s official stance against wanting to be the world’s reserve currency, warning that clinging to exclusive dominance harms global stability. He praises an earlier postwar framework grounded in law and international norms and laments its abandonment under current leadership, describing the present era as a disaster for both the United States and the wider world.

Speaker 0 states he wanted Ukraine, not Russia, to join NATO. He felt Ukraine needed to be in the EU and NATO. Speaker 1 brings up that Secretary of State Baker primed Gorbachev in the early nineties not to expand NATO. Speaker 0 responds that times change and the United States must be flexible and adjust to the times, which is why there is strong support for Speaker 1's country now. Speaker 1 says it doesn't matter what Baker primed Gorbachev with in the past, and that we have to see what is going on now.

I see the hatred for Putin, which makes a deal tough. I want to get this settled and align with Europe. I could be tougher, but that won't get a deal done. We had a president who talked tough, but Putin still invaded. Diplomacy is the path to peace. Putin occupied parts of Ukraine in 2014, and nobody stopped him. We signed ceasefire and gas contracts, but he broke them, killing our people and not exchanging prisoners. What kind of diplomacy are we talking about? It's disrespectful to litigate this here. You should be thanking me for trying to bring this to a conference.

The speaker asserts that NATO's defense spending target of 5% of GDP is a political decision made to appease Donald Trump. They describe NATO's posture towards Trump as servile, likening it to wayward children seeking redemption from a father figure. The speaker states they will only believe the 5% figure when each NATO member's parliament approves it. They also claim that increased military spending is meaningless without a defense industry to execute revitalization plans. Ultimately, the speaker believes the 5% figure is a politically meaningless statement.

The war in Ukraine was a terrible debacle caused by The United States expanding NATO despite Russia's objections. Ukraine and Russia were about to sign a peace agreement based on neutrality, but "The United States said, no." We want "military bases. We want NATO there. Don't sign the agreement." The speaker argues the conflict could end if Trump publicly declared that NATO will not enlarge to Ukraine: "NATO will not move one inch eastward, not one inch." They note "They promised." The piece cites Clinton in 1994 beginning NATO enlargement and calls this "the most basic point" that we do not need conflict. It says we end Ukraine's war with Ukrainian neutrality and halting NATO enlargement; Russia won't accept it, "just like The United States didn't accept bases in Cuba of the Russian military." It closes with AI as a better mediator: "it'll give you both sides of the argument."

Countries with significant military influence, especially nuclear powers, have a special responsibility. Instead of escalating conflict, they should engage in direct dialogue, similar to how disputes were resolved in old Westerns.

Speaker 0: This thing over with. You see the hatred he's got for Putin. It's very tough for me to make a deal with that kind of hate. I'm aligned with the world. I wanna get the things set. If you want me to be tough? I could be tougher than any human being you've ever seen, but you're never gonna get a deal that way. Speaker 1: For four years in The United States Of America... we had a president who stood up at press conferences and talked tough about Vladimir Putin, and then Putin invaded Ukraine. The path to peace... is engaging in diplomacy. Speaker 2: He occupied it, our parts, big parts of Ukraine, parts of East and Crimea. So 2014. We signed ceasefire, gas contract, but after that, he broken the ceasefire, he killed our people, and he didn't exchange prisoners. What kind of diplomacy? Speaker 0: You should be thanking the president for trying to bring it into this conference. Speaker 2: We have problems. Speaker 0: You're gambling with World War three. You have the cards. With us, you have the cards. Without us you don't have any cards. I gave you the javelins to take out all those tanks. Obama gave you sheets. What if Russia breaks his fire?

NATO is described as a defensive organization because it has never acted aggressively. However, there are references to NATO's involvement in the Yugoslav wars, where bombing occurred. One party argues that NATO's actions in Kosovo were defensive, while the other challenges this perspective, questioning who attacked NATO first in Yugoslavia. The conversation escalates, with one side insisting on the validity of their viewpoint and the other suggesting that admitting defeat would be more reasonable. The debate centers around the nature of NATO's actions and whether they can be classified as defensive or offensive.

The speaker emphasizes the importance of the West recognizing the central role of non-military arguments and means in the conflict. They suggest that if this understanding is not reached, there will be significant difficulties. The speaker interrupts, questioning whether this is a reaction to their belief that the West is pursuing an imperialistic path.

The speaker believes NATO has a new "daddy" and that the recent summit was farcical, an exercise in narcissism management. The American president believes he should be the center of attention and that his personal agenda is the only thing that matters. The speaker claims the president's agenda was promoting himself as a Nobel Peace Prize candidate, not improving NATO or peace in the Middle East. The speaker concludes that it was not a serious summit, NATO is not a serious organization, and the president of the United States is not a serious world leader.

The speaker states that they personally know the current NATO Secretary General, Mr. Rutte, who is a former Prime Minister of the Netherlands. They mention having visited the Netherlands for a discussion, describing Rutte as an intelligent, systemic, and effective example, and noting that the Netherlands’ economy is in good shape, “this part of his merit.” The speaker then criticizes Rutte for what they perceive as push for war with Russia, asking rhetorically what Rutte is saying about war with Russia and asserting that “they want to prepare for war with Russia.” The speaker contends that Rutte should read a specific source: the new US National Security Strategy. According to the speaker, the United States is a key player in NATO, its creator, main sponsor, and “all the main means come from the US.” They claim that “money, technologies, weapons, ammunition” all originate from the United States, calling this the foundation of NATO’s resources. The speaker asserts that in the new NATO national security strategy, Russia is not identified as an enemy or a target. Despite this, the General Secretary of NATO is preparing with them for war, and the speaker questions whether Rutte can read, implying a belief that the strategy does not designate Russia as an enemy, yet there is a push toward preparing for conflict. Overall, the speaker juxtaposes Rutte’s economic leadership in the Netherlands with a narrative of impending confrontation with Russia, emphasizing the reliance of NATO on U.S. resources and critiquing the alignment between the US strategy and the perceived stance of NATO leadership toward Russia.