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We advise Americans in Moscow to avoid large gatherings for safety. Stay where you are and follow updates from the state department. In Ukraine, Russia initiated a significant attack today.

The president's strategy drove recent events. He and the speaker discussed it at length on Sunday. The president may have goaded China into a bad position, leading them to be perceived as bad actors. The U.S. is willing to cooperate with allies and trading partners who did not retaliate. The message was simple: don't retaliate, and things will turn out well.

The discussion centers on a tense moment over Iran, with President Trump issuing an ultimatum to Iran: come to the table for a new nuclear agreement or the United States will hit Iran again, with the next strike described as far worse than the last. An armada led by the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln is reportedly moving toward Iran, framed as a ready-to-go force for a potential rapid strike if necessary. The hosts question whether this is genuine leverage for negotiations or a countdown to war. Former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter joins to analyze the buildup. Ritter argues that Trump has backed down twice before in decisive engagement with Iran, citing the downing of a Global Hawk and the aborted bombing in support of protesters. He suggests that what is unfolding is part of a broader campaign strategy, including economic pressure that led to protests in Iran, which he attributes to Mossad and CIA-controlled agitators during a “shaking the tree” phase. He contends that Israel has signaled the next strike against Iran must be the last, and believes the planned attack would be a full-spectrum assault involving air strikes, cyberattacks, and support for CIA/Mossad-backed groups inside Iran to dismantle the government quickly. Ritter claims Iran will respond with cyber warfare and possibly shut down critical infrastructure and temporarily seize control of the Strait of Hormuz; he predicts the result would be severe consequences for the region and the United States, including economic fallout. He asserts that Iran will not back down on its nuclear program, characterizing negotiations as unacceptable to Iran and linking Iran’s enrichment program to national pride and existential survival. He also argues that the United States is acting in support of Israel, with Trump’s actions influenced by Israeli money and policy, and labels Iran as not pursuing a nuclear weapons program at this time—though 60% enrichment shortens timelines and complicates intelligence efforts. Ritter emphasizes that Congress should declare war, not the president, and warns that the United States could lose an aircraft carrier and suffer broader devastation if conflict escalates. He also critiques the characterizations of Iran as imminently threatening, arguing that the preemption narrative is not supported by imminent threat criteria and suggesting diplomacy and restraint are warranted. The conversation then shifts to US preemption rhetoric and the role of Congress. A speaker argues that the baseline presence of 30,000–40,000 American troops in the region, within range of Iranian missiles and UAVs, requires a credible defensive posture. They criticize Marco Rubio for framing preemption as legitimate self-defense, noting that Article 51 of the UN Charter allows preemption only for imminent threat and that such immediacy is not demonstrated. The discussion suggests a need for congressional scrutiny and potential impeachment if war is pursued without proper authorization. On nuclear questions, Ritter shares his intelligence assessment: Iran is not currently pursuing a nuclear weapons program and has not reconstituted a full enrichment program, though 60% uranium enrichment represents a concern. He asserts that while Iran is capable of cyber warfare, a broader strike against Iran would likely trigger significant retaliation, including against Israel, which he describes as vulnerable to Iranian missiles. The dialogue moves to Cuba, with Rubio and Trump signaling aggressive moves toward regime change. Ritter sees Cuba as more resilient than Libya and notes the long-standing US effort to topple the Cuban government, complicated by Cuba’s limited leverage and its trade relations with China, Russia, and Venezuela. The panel discusses the Monroe Doctrine reinterpretation and the broader geopolitical contest with China and Russia, suggesting that Cuba will be a tougher target than the US expects. In closing, Ritter reiterates that an attack on Iran is unlikely and would be disastrous, cautioning that internal political calculations, including midterm consequences, will influence presidents’ decisions. The show thanks Ritter for his analysis.

Hackers linked to China's military have breached critical US services, aiming to disrupt systems like the Texas power grid. Targets include a Hawaii water utility, a West Coast port, and an oil pipeline. The goal is to weaken US power projection in Asia or create chaos to influence decision-making during a crisis. The People's Liberation Army has infiltrated around 24 computer systems in the past year.

- Speaker 0 asks for the first reaction to the news and whether it was clearly a special operations effort to capture Maduro or a larger military operation. Speaker 1 says it quickly became obvious it was a special operations mission, citing the ships and platforms ideal for this, and the ability to fly helicopters into Venezuela as supporting evidence. - On how the operation penetrated Caracas and Maduro’s defenses: Speaker 1 says cyber operations were used to turn off power and to blind the air defense by making tracking and identification difficult, in addition to traditional jamming and excellent on-the-ground intelligence built up over weeks. He also suggests internal help within the Venezuelan regime was likely. - On the possibility of an inside asset and the defensive protections: Speaker 0 notes Cuban intelligence and Venezuelan National Guard protection for Maduro and asks how insiders could have enabled the operation. Speaker 1 says insiders could have assisted, and acknowledges the intelligence on Maduro’s whereabouts was very strong. He cautions the president’s administration should not publicly reveal inside help, as that could cause paranoia within the command structure. - On the operation’s execution and its comparison to past regime-change operations: Speaker 1 emphasizes training and technology, noting the unit would include special operations aviation, Delta, and other components; argues this is a joint operation involving army, navy, air force, marines, cyber, and space-based platforms, requiring extensive rehearsals over weeks. He references Noriega’s capture as a point of comparison, but notes Maduro is on a different level. - On the electricity outage in Caracas: Speaker 0 asks if it was a cyber disruption or a kinetic strike. Speaker 1 responds that a cyber disruption to power is more likely than a kinetic strike, given the context. - On Venezuela’s air defense systems (S-300s, BUKs) and the $6 billion investment: Speaker 0 questions whether it’s fair to criticize these systems given the operation. Speaker 1 acknowledges they are sophisticated and capable but not sure of their maintenance and training levels. He notes the United States had telegraphed expectations for weeks and suggests negligence or incompetence in air-defense command and control if surprised. - On possible inside help and seniority of the asset: Speaker 0 asks who within the regime might have cooperated with the CIA. Speaker 1 is reluctant to speculate beyond confirming there was very good intelligence on Maduro’s whereabouts. He finds it unlikely that the vice president would have been an internal asset, though he concedes nothing is impossible, given a mix of factions in the regime and third-party interference. - On geopolitical repercussions and messaging to China, Iran, and Russia: Speaker 0 points to the timing with a Chinese delegation in Caracas and asks what message this sends to China and whether the date had symbolic resonance with other events. Speaker 1 says the date was probably driven by weather and other operations rather than a deliberate China signal; he suggests China would reassess oil dependencies and potential leverage now that Maduro is captured. He predicts the next target could be Cuba and discusses logistical challenges, such as Cuba’s island geography and Guantanamo Bay. - On US strategy in the Western Hemisphere and potential targets: Speaker 1 opines that Cuba is a plausible next target and explains why, including electoral considerations in Florida. He notes that a Cuba operation would be more difficult than Venezuela due to geography but could be motivated by domestic political calculation and the Monroe Doctrine as a signal. - On China, Russia, and Iran in the wake of Maduro’s capture: Speaker 1 argues the US demonstrates strong capabilities, and China would need to reassess oil supply and leverage; Russia’s and Iran’s interests could be pressured as the US asserts influence in the region. He mentions that the US might not directly engage in large-scale intervention in Iran but warns against overreach due to domestic political constraints. - On the broader pattern and future: Speaker 1 cautions about the risk of hubris and notes domestic political constraints and upcoming congressional pressures that could shape how far the administration pursues this strategy beyond Venezuela. He stresses the importance of not overestimating the ability to sustain similar moves without a plan for the post-Maduro environment.

Speaker 0 describes a scandal during the Obama-era USAID operations in Cuba, stating that rogue activities were run and that the aim is to reveal to the American people where tax dollars are going and how programs are structured to fool Congress and the White House. Key points: - Zunzanillo was an online social networking microblogging service created by USAID and marketed to Cuban users. It was a Twitter-like platform with the same user interface and like/retweet features, referred to in Cuban slang as the “bird.” The operation spanned roughly 2009–2014. - USAID invested about $1,200,000,000 in promoting Arab Spring–style social media revolutions, funding activist groups and civil society organizations to learn to use Facebook, Twitter, hashtags, and to coordinate street protests to topple governments. - Because Cuba did not allow US social media, the operation recreated a Cuban-looking Twitter-like service. The project began in 2010, using funds concealed as humanitarian aid for Pakistan, even though Cuba is not near Pakistan. The main contractor was Creative Associates International (CAI), with CAI designing the network. - The funds were concealed in the budget as humanitarian aid for Pakistan, routed through front companies using Cayman Islands bank accounts, and recruiting business executives who were not told of ties to the US government, according to the AP. - The network reached about 60,000 Cuban subscribers. The initiative reportedly included a surveillance dimension, building a vast database of Cuban subscribers (gender, age, political tendencies) that could be used for political purposes. The data were to be used for micro-targeting anti- and pro-government users. - Initial content would be noncontroversial, focusing on sports, music, and hurricane updates. The internal plan was to lure users in with these topics, then, once a critical mass was reached, gradually introduce political messages via social bots to encourage dissent and organize “smart mobs” or rental riots. - The strategy mirrored tactics used in Egypt and Tunisia, aiming to trigger a Cuban spring and “renegotiate the balance of power between state and society.” The Guardian has a detailed piece on this, describing the internal files that outlined luring Cubans with music, sports, and hurricane updates before pushing political content. - To conceal involvement, the operation reportedly used Cayman Islands front companies and designated funds as humanitarian aid, raising questions about US fingerprints. The discussion suggests this approach raises diplomatic blowback concerns and implies a preference for formal intelligence agencies in such operations. The speaker emphasizes that the material shows how the programs were structured to influence Cuba, how funds were misrepresented, and how data collection and targeted messaging were planned for political outcomes, reminding listeners of the broader implications for US statecraft.

An executive order signed by the president last week suspended a previous order aimed at preventing foreign interference, particularly from China, in the U.S. power grid for 90 days. Given the concerns about China, questions arise about the rationale behind this suspension, especially regarding national security. The president's perspective on the U.S.-China relationship was shared, but clarification on this specific decision will be provided later.

Russia is summoning the US ambassador to hold the United States accountable for attacks on Crimea, threatening punishment. This follows reports of Putin threatening US territories, according to Russian news. Russia is requesting dialogue with the US to discuss nuclear war and de-escalation. Russia is considering changing its nuclear doctrine to allow preemptive attacks if threatened. Putin also says Russia will potentially deliver weapons to North Korea and other US enemies due to the US, Ukraine, and Russia situation. This news comes as US members of Congress are reportedly saying this is an overdrive.

China has agreed to fully open its country, which will be beneficial for both China and the United States, and will promote unification and peace. China will also suspend and remove all of its non-monetary barriers. The agreement needs to be formalized, but China has agreed to open up.

The U.S. secretly developed a Twitter-like program called Zunzunio to undermine the Cuban government, as revealed by an Associated Press report. Funded through shell companies and foreign banks, the initiative aimed to attract young Cubans by initially sharing non-political content. Once a subscriber base was established, political messages would be introduced to inspire protests. This program, run by USAID rather than a spy agency, has drawn criticism for its covert nature and lack of transparency. Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy expressed skepticism about its effectiveness, while Peter Kornbluh highlighted the program's failure and its detrimental impact on U.S.-Cuba relations. The discussion raises concerns about the broader implications of U.S. covert operations in Cuba and the need for a shift in policy towards normalization.

The US Treasury has reportedly been hacked by a Chinese state-sponsored actor, described as a major incident. The cyber attack occurred earlier this month, with reports indicating that Treasury workstations and unclassified documents were accessed remotely.

The US Treasury has reportedly been hacked by a Chinese state-sponsored actor, described as a major incident. The cyber attack occurred earlier this month, with reports indicating that Treasury workstations and unclassified documents were accessed remotely.

The CCP launched a terrorist attack on Baltimore's bridge using remote towing technology, impacting US traffic. They can target any vehicle with a signal receiver. US officials may have known but didn't report it. No official confirmation yet.

A directive has been issued to the federal government to end the weaponization of government against political adversaries from the previous administration. Thank you.

South Sudanese economist accused of trying to export Stinger missile systems. US does not support violent regime changes in Africa. Violations of export regulations will be punished. Thank you for today.

Different countries have varying social legal systems, and the impact of technology differs across them. The United States, Russia, China, and North Korea all experience technology in distinct ways. North Korea particularly embraces technology for its own specific objectives.