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Seyyed Mohammed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiators, joins the discussion amid rising tensions around Iran. He notes that the Strait of Hormuz has been temporarily closed for Iran’s military exercises, describing it as unprecedented and potentially a warning, while the United States continues to accumulate assets in the region, including the USS Gerald Ford entering the Mediterranean. He observes that given the scale of U.S. assets, it will be hard to reverse the momentum, and wonders how Iran views the severity of the situation and what an off-ramp might look like. From the outset, Marandi says a major confrontation seems likely, though it’s unclear whether it would involve actual military aggression. He asserts that the Zionist regime, the Zionist lobby, and the so-called Epstein class in the West would do anything to aid the Israeli regime, citing the U.S. ambassador to Israel who said that if the regime takes the whole region, that would be acceptable. He argues that Iran, Hezbollah, and the resistance in Iraq are the principal forces resisting the “greater Israel project,” while other regional governments—Erdogan, the Emirates, Egypt, Qatar, Jordan—are part of the American empire and unlikely to prevent Israeli gains until it is too late. He states that Iran will not back down and that there is no scenario in which the Americans win a potential war. Marandi emphasizes that Iran has said it would shut down the Hormuz if attacked, and that this would not be a last-resort measure. He recalls that in the twelve-day war (presumably 2021-2022), the conflict mainly involved Iran and the Israeli regime, with the Americans carrying out a token strike and not destroying the global economy; Iran does not desire to cause global economic suffering. He argues that Iran has friends worldwide, and ordinary people in many countries desire peace and the ability to earn a living. He contends that Gulf monarchies hosting U.S. bases have contributed to planning against Iran, and that Iran and its allies would respond with strong measures. If attacked, Iran would do everything to protect itself and would hit hard to bring down the global economy; the war would be costly and devastating for the United States and its Western allies. Regarding U.S. strategy, Marandi says the American plan for surprise is central, and he doubts Washington can win without a full-scale ground invasion, which would be economically unfeasible for the United States. He argues that the on-the-ground resistance in Iraq and Yemen, and the potential instability of Gulf regimes, would tempt political upheaval in those states. He asserts that the longer the conflict lasts, the more irreversible the damage, with Iran’s drones and missiles capable of striking oil facilities, ports, and ships across the region, threatening Gulf and Caucasus oil flows. Marandi critiques Western media coverage, accusing it of fabricating or inflating numbers about Iranian casualties and portraying Iran as the aggressor. He points to demonstrations in Iran—millions in Tehran and across the country on February 11—versus Western reports that try to depict the opposite, and he argues that independent Western journalists who witnessed Iranian demonstrations were attacked and smeared for challenging the narrative. He says the media’s role is to lay groundwork for war, and that in his view the “Epstein class” in the West has exposed itself. On negotiations, Marandi says the United States publicly focuses on Iran’s regional allies and military capabilities, not on the nuclear deal, and that Iran will not discuss its regional policy. He notes Iran’s insistence on negotiating with the Americans directly (not in a multilateral format) and in Oman, while observing that the talks are often used as deception. He asserts that Iran restarted indirect talks to show that it is not the aggressor, and that Tehran remains prepared for war but not initiating it. He argues that Iran’s preparations have strengthened its capabilities since the twelve-day war, with more drones and missiles directed at the United States and its proxies, and that Iran’s underground bases and air defenses have advanced. Concluding, Marandi says the window for a U.S. decision is limited by the regime’s costs, and that Iran’s home-field advantage, the widespread unpopularity of Gulf monarchies, and the broader resistance in the region would shape the outcome. He believes a U.S. victory is impossible, describing a scenario where, after heavy destruction and economic collapse, Trump would be forced to retreat under the guise of victory, with the West blamed for the catastrophe. He asserts that Iran will defend itself and that the global economy would suffer far greater damage than Iran’s own infrastructure, with mass movements of people worldwide as a consequence. He closes by affirming his commitment to continue communicating despite the risks.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the unfolding conflict with Iran, focusing on miscalculations, strategy, and potential trajectories. - Speaker 1 says the war is a major miscalculation, identifiable before it began. Signs were evident: movement of military equipment, force postures, and statements suggested that absent an eleventh-hour change by Trump, the plan was to use prepositioned forces and enablers for sustained combat. He notes this pattern matches previous experiences in which the U.S. saw a buildup as a precursor to war, citing Russia’s 2022 invasion and his own observations of earlier prepositioning, logistics, air support, refueling, and large-scale aviation assets (C-17s, C-5s, fighter jets, aircraft carriers). - He argues Iran’s leadership intended to pursue war rather than negotiation, pointing to what he calls a central missed opportunity: the Oman foreign minister’s Friday-night submissions to the Iranian negotiator offering zero reprocessing, stockpile reductions, and at least preliminary talks on long-range missiles and proxies. He asserts that if the Trump administration had accepted those terms, a ceasefire or settlement might have been possible; instead, he claims the next morning’s attack signaled that negotiations were never the aim. - Regarding U.S. objectives, Speaker 1 says the stated aims from Trump were unattainable given Iran’s resolve and the regime’s calculations that fighting a war with the U.S. is less risky than submitting to U.S. demands. He cites a New York Times report indicating Iran believed war with the U.S. was a viable risk, yet he notes Iran’s leadership now appears to be consolidating support at home and regionally after the Ayatollah’s assassination and the subsequent martyrdom of Qasem Soleimani’s successor in Iran’s internal narrative. - On battlefield dynamics, he emphasizes that Iran’s force deployment is not merely pressure but designed for use, with extensive underground facilities capable of withstanding sustained pressure. He forecasts continued high-intensity operations for a period, but warns the U.S. faces a tightening window: if the Iranian side holds firm and the U.S. cannot sustain supplies and missiles, the U.S. could reach a crisis point. - He discusses possible ceasefire dynamics and political reaction: Trump’s suggestion of a ceasefire could be “complete BS” if the Ayatollah’s position remains solid; the martyrdom and regional protests strengthen Iran’s stance. He expects continued escalation and a hardening of Iran’s demands, including sanctions relief or designation changes, should the conflict drag on. - On regional response, Speaker 1 notes that Iran has drawn regional actors into the conflict, with protests supporting Iran across Iraq, Pakistan, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. He says many Iranians—though opposed to the regime—are unlikely to embrace Israel or the United States as a path out of the crisis, given decades of antagonism and past betrayals by Western powers. - Regarding U.S. vulnerabilities, he says there are reports of U.S. casualties (three killed, five seriously wounded, others lightly wounded) though some figures are disputed; the public reporting may lag behind direct sources. He mentions possible gaps in air defense and the risk of shortages in interceptors as drones and missiles proliferate, warning that Iran could escalate if U.S. stocks are depleted. - Looking ahead, Speaker 1 argues the conflict is a battle of wills and a war of attrition. The U.S. attempted a “cheap” approach with naval and air power but no ground forces; Iran appears ready to continue long enough to force concessions. He warns the Iranian threat could extend to oil infrastructure and the broader economy if the United States or its regional partners target Iran’s energy sector, potentially broadening the conflict. - In sum, he characterizes Iran’s strategy as all-in, aiming to impose pain to compel a negotiated settlement unfavorable to the U.S., while the U.S. faces a narrowing margin to sustain supply chains, missiles, and air defenses as the conflict potentially drags on for weeks to months. He cautions that the escalation ladder remains with higher rungs available, including strikes on energy infrastructure, if the conflict widens.

In a discussion with Glenn about rising US-Iran tensions and the prospect of war, Syed Mohamed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, outlines several key points and scenarios. - He asserts that Iranians are preparing for war, with the armed forces building new capabilities and underground bases, while ordinary Iranians remain calm and continue daily life. He notes large demonstrations on February 11, with up to 4,000,000 in Tehran and 26–34,000,000 nationwide, seen as a show of solidarity against what he calls Western “rioters or terrorists” and against aggressive posturing by Israel. He stresses that Iran government negotiations will be framed around Iranian sovereignty: Iran will not negotiate who its friends are, who its allies are, or give up its rights to a peaceful nuclear program or enrichment, but could consider a nuclear deal. He argues any new deal would not revert to JCPOA terms given Iran’s technological advances and sanctions. He says a deal is unlikely under current conditions, though not impossible, and that even with a deal, it wouldn’t necessarily endure long. Ultimately, Iran is portrayed as preparing for war to deter aggression and preserve sovereignty. - The conversation discusses broader regional security, linking Israeli-Palestinian issues to potential peace. Marandi argues that Zionism has ethnosupremacism and that Western media often whitewashes Israeli actions in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon. He emphasizes that a genuine peace would require recognizing Palestinian humanity and restoring fair treatment, arguing that a one-state solution could be the only viable path given the West’s failure to secure a lasting two-state arrangement. He contends the West has allowed colonization of the West Bank and that only a one-state outcome will resolve the situation, while portraying growing international hostility toward the Netanyahu regime and Zionism, including among young Jews. - On possible US strategies, Marandi rejects the notion of token strikes, arguing that even limited actions would invite broader conflict and potentially false-flag provocations that could be used to escalate toward war. He warns that Iran would respond with full force and could target US bases, naval assets, and regional interests, potentially shutting the Strait of Hormuz or sinking ships, with widespread economic ramifications. He predicts a regional war involving Iran’s allies in Iraq (where PMF played a key role against ISIS) and Yemen, and Hezbollah, suggesting that Arab Gulf regimes hosting US bases would likely collapse quickly in such a conflict. He stresses that Iran’s missile and drone capabilities are heavily focused on the Persian Gulf area and that war would be existential for Iran and its allies, but a dangerous, protracted challenge for the United States. - The potential consequences of US oil and petrochemical disruption are discussed. Marandi notes that Iran could retaliate against Iranian tankers or, conversely, seize Western tankers in response to piracy. He emphasizes Iran’s comparatively lower dependence on oil exports due to sanctions and sanctions-driven diversification, arguing that attacking Iran would backfire economically for the US and its allies. He also highlights that such a war would be regional, not just Iran versus the US, given Iran’s relationships with Iraq, Yemen, and other actors, and that Gulf regimes would be under immediate pressure. - Regarding current US leadership and narrative control, Marandi critiques the inconsistency of Western narratives around regime change, human rights, and democracy, pointing to the Epstein files as revealing a distrustful climate in Western politics. He argues Western media often uniformly pushes a narrative of Iranian repression while ignoring or whitewashing similar or worse actions by Western allies. He suggests that the lack of a cohesive, credible Western narrative signals a shift in geopolitical dynamics and could limit the ability to mobilize public support for aggressive actions against Iran. - They also touch on US-Israeli diplomacy, noting Trump and Netanyahu’s posturing and the Epstein documents’ potential implications. Marandi contends time is not on the side of aggressive policy, given midterm political pressures in the US and growing public skepticism about war, which could undermine leadership like Trump and Netanyahu if conflict escalates. The discussion ends with acknowledgment of the complexity and volatility of the situation, and gratitude for the opportunity to discuss it.

Two weeks into the conflict, the official casualty toll for Americans is rising. The Pentagon has publicly acknowledged about 140 wounded, after Redacted reported at least 137 and Reuters later published an exclusive saying as many as 150 US troops wounded. The panel notes this number and questions why it wasn’t more prominently reported earlier by major outlets. Iran asserts talks with the United States are off the table for now and vows to keep striking as long as it takes, with an “eye for an eye” stance. The discussion asks what “eye for an eye” would actually entail, debating whether it means targeting civilian or infrastructure components in retaliation. The Strait of Hormuz is deteriorating rapidly with intelligence tracking Iranian mine-laying threats, and Gulf energy infrastructure suffering damage. About 1,900,000 barrels per day of refining capacity across Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE is down, and CBS reports shipping through the Strait has ground to a virtual halt. On the broader geopolitical stage, Israel is bombarding Beirut’s southern suburbs and Lebanon, effectively expanding its operations in the region. In Washington, Lindsey Graham is openly urging Americans in the South to push their sons and daughters to fight in the Middle East, urging allied countries to step up and end back-channel support, including public pressure to move air bases out of Spain. The panel criticizes this rhetoric as urging others to bear the burden of conflict. Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst, joins to discuss wounded American troops and casualties. He notes March 4 at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, whose memo told pregnant women not to come for births, signaling a surge of casualties. He adds a nearby Kaiserslautern blood drive was issued on March 5, underscoring higher inbound casualties. Johnson explains Iran’s capacity to respond with drones, missiles, and other weapons, suggesting the Strait’s disruption affects global energy markets—oil and liquefied natural gas—while noting the impact on major economies: India and others depending on Gulf energy, with Russia benefiting from higher oil prices as Western sanctions shift flows. He highlights Russia’s oil diplomacy shifts, including India’s discounted imports and Berlin’s and BRICS dynamics, and observes that Russia’s price at about $89 a barrel reflects new market conditions. Johnson discusses how some in Washington may be leaking assessments to shift blame for any future outcomes, pointing to a leak of the National Intelligence Council memo warning against expecting regime change in Iran. He suggests there are warhawk factions in the Trump administration with aggressive aims, including potentially targeting Kharg Island, a critical oil export hub for Iran, which could provoke drone and missile countermeasures from Iran. The conversation notes that Iran could respond with drones and missiles rather than by ceding control of Hormuz, emphasizing that taking Kharg Island would be dangerous due to Iran’s drone capabilities and air defenses. Overall, the dialogue conveys a war that is not winding down as messaging might imply, with escalating casualties, strategic waterway disruption, and high-stakes diplomatic and military posturing across the region.

John Mersheimer argues that the war against Iran is not proceeding as the United States hoped and that there is no plausible off-ramp or decisive pathway to victory. He contends that Washington cannot narrate a decisive end to the conflict the way it could have against Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, because the war has not produced a decisive Iranian collapse. Instead, Iran has an incentive to convert the fight into a protracted war of attrition and possesses the means to do so, including a broad set of missiles and drones and the ability to retaliate across the region. The result, he says, is a stalemate in which Iran would drive a hard bargain to secure sanctions relief or other concessions, and escalation by the U.S. and Israel will simply provoke Iran to escalate further. On why Iran will not settle on American terms, Mersheimer emphasizes that Iran has a strong hand and time on its side. He notes that the more time passes, the more desperate the U.S. will be to settle, which strengthens Iran’s position. He argues that even heavy bombardment would not compel Iran to quit; rather, Iran could strike back against Gulf states, Israel, and American assets with significant effect. The Gulf States are particularly vulnerable due to a small number of petroleum sites, short-range missiles, drones, and, crucially, desalination plants that provide most of their fresh water. He cites Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman as heavily dependent on desalination, implying that destroying such infrastructure would have catastrophic humanitarian and economic consequences. Iran could also target energy infrastructure, and even if the Strait of Hormuz remains open, widespread damage to Gulf energy infrastructure would devastate the regional and global economy. He warns that Israel could suffer increasing Iranian pressure as time goes on, especially as interceptors become depleted. Regarding energy and the Strait of Hormuz, Mersheimer stresses that 20% of the world’s oil and gas passes through the Persian Gulf, making the energy dimension the war’s most consequential aspect. He argues that opening the Strait of Hormuz would be exceedingly difficult, and destroying desalination and petroleum infrastructure in the Gulf States would negate any advantage of keeping the straits open. He suggests that escalation without a viable endgame will have grave economic repercussions for the world, pushing the U.S. toward a coerced end that would not be a victory. Mersheimer contends that strategic bombing or air power alone cannot win such wars. He contrasts World War II and Korea/Vietnam with the present, where there are no boots on the ground and no clear path to victory via air power alone. He notes that the deterrent value of air power is limited, and a regime change strategy is notoriously difficult without ground forces. He argues that the decapitation strategy and ongoing escalations are unlikely to produce a decisive American/Israeli victory, and could instead lead to a stalemate or American concession under economic strain. On leadership and credibility, Mersheimer critiques U.S. leadership, particularly President Trump, for ignoring warning from generals and the National Intelligence Council that regime change was unlikely to succeed. He cites General James Mattis-era warnings that there was no viable military option and notes the pre-war intelligence that suggested limited prospects for quick regime change. He points to Trump’s sometimes contradictory and inaccurate statements about Iranian capabilities, including claims that Iran possessed Tomahawk missiles and that U.S. strikes had erased Iran’s nuclear capability. He argues that such statements undermine U.S. credibility, though he distinguishes between outright lies and genuine mistaken beliefs by leaders. The discussion also covers Russia’s involvement, with Russia believed to be providing intelligence to Iran and possibly supplying matériel and oil if needed. Mersheimer asserts that the war benefits Russia strategically: it diverts U.S. resources from Europe and Ukraine, potentially worsens Ukraine’s trajectory, and could raise global energy prices that benefit Russian revenue. He suggests that Russia, and possibly China, have strong incentives to aid Iran to counter American power. Europe’s role is analyzed as largely symbolic or marginal in determining the war’s outcome. Mersheimer argues that European elites are aligned with the U.S., prioritizing NATO continuity and the maintenance of American military presence, despite the damaging consequences for Europe. He suggests a radical approach for Europe: adopt a hardball stance toward the U.S., diversify its economic and strategic relations (including with China, Russia, and India), and resist being economically manipulated or coerced by Washington. He emphasizes that Europe’s interests would be better served by reducing overreliance on the United States and pursuing a more balanced set of strategic partners. Towards the end, the hosts revisit the idea that leaders lie and that liberal democracies tend to rely more on public persuasion and propaganda, with Trump’s statements illustrating the complexities of truth in international politics. The conversation ends with a reflection on whether Europe should recalibrate its posture toward the United States and broaden its strategic hedges to protect its own interests, rather than assuming continued U.S. leadership in a costly and protracted confrontation with Iran.

Speaker 0 discusses a strategic move focusing on Karg Island in the Northern Persian Gulf. He states that the island is offshore about 18 miles. He asserts that if that island were taken out, it would affect “80 to 9% of the petroleum usage that the Iranians have,” implying a substantial economic impact on Iran. The speaker contends that removing the island would essentially shut Iran off economically, preventing it from supporting China and also preventing it from supporting Russia. The argument presented suggests that such a disruption would have broad geopolitical consequences, weakening Iran’s ability to back allied actors. The speaker predicts that sooner or later, the opposing side would realize that this scenario constitutes “just a bad news thing,” implying that the economic impact would become evident and influential in international relations.

The discussion centers on whether Israel is driving a war against Iran and how the United States fits into that effort, with conflicting reporting from major outlets and a mosaic of intelligence interpretations. - The hosts outline two competing major-news stories. The New York Times reports that Netanyahu has asked Trump not to bomb Iran, arguing Israel is not prepared to withstand Iran’s retaliation. The Washington Post had reported a few weeks earlier that Israel sent a delegation to Russia to assure Iran that Israel does not intend to strike first, while Netanyahu in Washington was pressing Trump to strike Iran. The implication is that Israel is trying to avoid being seen as the aggressor while hoping the U.S. acts, effectively using the United States to carry out escalation. - The Post’s framing suggests Israel wants to escalate tensions but avoid the perception of initiating the conflict; Iran, according to the Post, responded positively to Israeli outreach but remains wary that the US could still carry out attacks as part of a joint campaign. - Iran’s perspective: they are wary and believe the U.S. and Israel are not to be trusted, even as they respond to outreach. There is a suggestion that Iran, with Russia and China, is prepared to counter, and that Tehran is not fully aligned with Western narratives about Iran as a terrorist state. - Larry Johnson (Speaker 2), a former CIA intelligence officer, joins to break down the behind-the-scenes dynamics. He references an alleged economic operation around Trump’s meeting with Zelensky that targeted Iran’s currency, triggering protests and destabilization, allegedly orchestrated with CIA/Mossad involvement. He lists various actors (Kurds, the MEK, Beluchis) and claims they were directed to inflame unrest, with the aim of manufacturing chaos to enable a military strike that could be stopped or degraded by outside intervention. He argues the plan failed as Iran’s security forces countered and electronic warfare helped by Russia and China blocked the destabilization. - Johnson emphasizes a broader geopolitical balance: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey told the United States they would not permit overflight for strikes; Russia and China bolster Iran, raising the cost and risk of Western action. He notes that 45% of global oil passes through the Persian Gulf and that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz, which would massively impact oil prices and global economies, benefiting Russia. - On the potential next moves, the panel discusses whether Israel might consider nuclear options if faced with existential threats, and they acknowledge the difficulty of countering hypersonic missiles with current defenses. They reference reports of an earthquake or saber-rattling related to Dimona and mention that some in Israel fear escalation could be imminent, but there is no consensus on what comes next. - The conversation also touches on U.S. political voices, including Lindsey Graham’s reaction to Arab involvement, and questions whether there is any mainstream American call to accommodate Iran rather than confront it. Overall, the dialogue presents a complex, multi-layered picture: Israel seeking US-led action while trying to avoid direct attribution as aggressor; Iran resisting Western pressure but positioning to counter with support from Russia and China; and a regional and global economic dimension that could amplify or deter conflict depending on strategic choices and alliance dynamics.

Clayton interviews Professor Morandi about the Iranian military situation amid claims of a US-Israeli aggression and a media blackout. - Morandi asserts the Iranian air force is intact. He says Americans and Israelis bomb decoys and provides examples of footage showing explosions on painted ground objects that do not move afterward, indicating decoys are being used to mislead about real strikes. He states Iran has deployed decoys across the region for planes, helicopters, and missile launchers. The navy’s true strength is described as underground, with bases full of speedboats that fire surface-to-sea and sea-to-surface missiles; these underground bases are reported as intact. The Iranian air force is not heavily used, operating mainly from bases to the east/northeast where access is more limited. Missiles and drones are fired day and night. - Morandi contends that Iran’s naval power for asymmetrical warfare remains intact, and that the enemy’s claims of dwindling launchers or missiles are inaccurate. He notes the initial use of older, cheap missiles to exhaust air defenses, after which Iran fires fewer missiles but still successfully penetrates defenses. - On the strategic Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, Morandi dismisses the idea that capturing Kharg Island would significantly alter outcomes. He argues that even if Kharg Island were taken, the Strait of Hormuz would remain closed unless Iran agrees to reopen it. Iran has long prepared defenses across the Persian Gulf, including naval and shore defenses, anticipating possible US attack. Iran’s missile, drone, and naval capabilities—long-, medium-, and short-range missiles, cruise and ballistic missiles, drones, and speedboats in underground bases—are positioned to deter. - If the US were to open the Strait by attacking, Morandi foresees heavy casualties, destruction of tankers and oil/gas installations, and a collapse of global oil prices, potentially around extreme levels like $250 a barrel, with severe global economic consequences. He argues the United States would lose more than Iran and would need compensation from Gulf regimes hosting US bases for allowing attacks. He asserts that traditional negotiations fail with the US given past breaches of agreements (citing the JCPOA) and implies distrust toward Washington. - Regarding a reported border invasion by Kurds or other groups, Morandi says US collaboration with Kurdish forces would likely be defeated by Iran, who would then threaten the autonomous Kurdish regional government in Northern Iraq. He suggests such actions would harm regional economies and erode Western influence, noting that Gulf states have borne significant economic and political costs from the conflict. He argues the US has harmed its own interests by engaging in war with Iran, increasing oil prices, and pushing regional countries toward confrontation. - Morandi concludes by stating that without genuine assurances on non-aggression and guarantees on future behavior, negotiations with the US are untrustworthy. He emphasizes that the US’s hostility affects not only Iran but the broader regional and global economy, and he criticizes American leadership as acting in concert with the Israeli regime.

Stanislav (Speaker 1) and Speaker 0 engage in a wide-ranging, combative analysis of the Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict and broader geopolitical implications. Key points and claims are as follows: - On Iran’s military activity: The volume of Iranian drone and rocket attacks has dropped by about 95% in the last few days, but Iran’s strategic goals appear to be advancing. The Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and Iran has not fallen from power, suggesting a durable regime in Iran despite reduced attack tempo. Israel is said to be taking a pounding with strikes on Haifa refinery, electrical plants, and other targets, while Iran is pursuing a long-haul campaign rather than a rapid blitz. - Terminology and legitimacy: Stanislav objects to labeling Iran’s leadership as a “regime,” arguing it’s a derogatory term and positing that the regime is a theocracy that is comparatively stable under pressure. He notes that air campaigns have never toppled governments and argues that people rally around governments when their families are being harmed, especially within Shia culture. - Information and truth in war: Both sides are accused of misrepresenting losses and capabilities; the Pentagon’s numbers on drones and rockets are treated with skepticism. There is emphasis on the difficulty of verifying battle damage in real time, and the reality that “the first sacrifice of any war is truth” in war reporting. - Military capabilities and constraints: Stanislav emphasizes that the U.S. and Israel have suffered damage to critical infrastructure, and the U.S. faces munitions shortages. He cites the first six days of conflict as consuming thousands of missiles (3,600 missiles across defensive and offensive systems). He argues U.S. industrial/munitions capacity is strained, with missiles being produced in small quantities and largely by hand, constraining rapid replacement. - Iran’s defense and offense: Iran is portrayed as possessing underground “missile cities” and being able to move and launch missiles from concealed locations. The use of decoy aircraft and other decoys is noted, complicating target acquisition. Iran is described as capable of sustaining a long campaign, with continued missile production and hidden launch capability, including launchers that can be moved and re-deployed quickly. - Sensor/shooter network: The discussion mentions a new U.S.-reported capability described as a “sensor shooter network” that uses satellites to spot a missile launcher as it emerges, relaying coordinates to fighters such as F-35s to intercept before launch. This is framed as making missile launches harder for Iran and easier to strike launchers for Israel and the U.S. - Strait of Hormuz as the central objective: The primary objective for Iran, per Speaker 0, is to close the Strait of Hormuz for as long as possible and disrupt Gulf states, with closing the strait potentially forcing an American exit due to economic pressure. Attacks that target Israel are framed as secondary (“bonus”) relative to the Hormuz objective. - Ground warfare and invasions: Both speakers argue that a U.S. or allied ground invasion of Iran would entail massive casualties and potential domestic political backlash, making it a less likely option. The difficulty of projecting power through Iran’s mountainous terrain and the risk of a popular uprising are highlighted. - Regime durability and external support: Iran’s government is described as a theocracy with deep cultural unity, making political collapse unlikely. Russia and China are discussed as critical backers: Russia provides MiG-29s, SU-35s, S-400s, and jamming capabilities, while China provides satellite connections and political cover, and both nations see Iran as an existential interest—Russia especially, given Central Asia and the Caucasus. Iran is portrayed as having backing from Russia and China that would prevent a wholesale collapse. - U.S. allies and credibility: The U.S. is portrayed as depleting its ability to defend Gulf allies, with discussions of allied air-defense systems being diverted elsewhere (to Israel) and questions about long-term U.S. willingness or capacity to sustain a commitment in the Gulf. - Ukraine comparison and broader geopolitics: The dialogue touches on Ukraine, NATO, and the differential treatment of Ukraine versus Iran, noting perceived manipulation by Western actors and the difficulty of achieving durable peace through negotiations when proxies and local actors have entrenched interests. Zelensky and Kyiv’s internal politics are referenced to illustrate broader critique of Western interventions. - Potential off-ramps and negotiations: There is debate about whether a political settlement could be engineered that would preserve the Iranian regime while offering concessions (e.g., limitations on ballistic missiles or nuclear ambitions) and provide Trump with a way to claim a diplomatic win. Stanislav suggests the unpredictable nature of the current leadership and that an off-ramp may be difficult to secure; Speaker 0 contends that a pragmatic, deal-oriented path could exist if a credible intermediary or concessions are arranged, perhaps involving a different leadership or mediator. - Final reflections on strategy and endurance: Stanislav stresses that drones, missiles, and human ground forces all have limits, and argues that real military victory rarely comes from air campaigns alone; the fundamental test remains whether ground forces can secure and hold territory. Speaker 0 adds that the regime’s resilience in Iran and the long-term strategic calculus—especially regarding Hormuz, energy, and allied alliances—will shape the conflict’s trajectory in the coming weeks. Both acknowledge the enormous complexities and the high stakes for regional and global stability.

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow 33-kilometer passage between Iran, Oman, and the UAE through which nearly 20% of the world’s oil flows, amounting to about 17,000,000 barrels per day. The oil originates from eight Persian Gulf countries—Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. A large portion of global oil exports depends on this chokepoint: 90% of oil exports from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar pass through Hormuz to reach other markets. If Iran blocks the strait, the following countries would be among the most affected. India, which imports 85% of its oil and sources 60% of that from Middle Eastern producers such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, would face sharply rising fuel prices and widespread disruption across oil-dependent industries, risking job losses and economic strain. China, the world’s largest oil importer at about 10 million barrels per day, would feel a major impact because 40% of its oil imports transit Hormuz; despite pipelines to Russia and Central Asia, those lines do not meet the full energy needs, so China’s economy could suffer, with global ripple effects if its growth slows. Japan would also be heavily affected, as it imports 90% of its oil, with 75% of that passing through Hormuz. Saudi Arabia, already heavily reliant on exporting through Hormuz (80–90% of its oil goes to global markets via the strait, with only about 10% reaching Europe via the Red Sea coast), would face severe revenue and economic strain; there is also a possibility of increased military action to reopen the route. Pakistan would be impacted as well, receiving about 90% of its oil through Hormuz, meeting roughly 27% of its energy needs; some diesel is reportedly imported unofficially from Iran (about 35% via border relations), suggesting Pakistan might seek oil from Iran under quiet or official terms if Hormuz is blocked. The UAE would feel a significant impact too, with around 72% of its oil exports relying on Hormuz; although it has the Habshan–Fujairah pipeline to bypass the strait and export up to 60% of its oil, losing the remaining 40% would still be serious for its economy. European nations like France, Germany, and Italy would also be affected, receiving about 10% of their oil through Hormuz. Globally, experts warn that oil prices could surge to over $150 per barrel, triggering broad inflation and a potential global recession. In sum, the Strait of Hormuz, despite its small physical size, wields outsized influence over energy security and world markets.

Alastair Crook discusses with the host the evolving US strategy toward Iran, the credibility of Iran’s deterrence, the role of Israel and Gulf states, and what is known about Iran’s domestic unrest. - Trump’s strategy toward Iran has shifted. Initially, he sought a big, quick victory with minimal entanglement, including a possible attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June and assistance from Israel to identify a gap to exploit. Crook says Trump hoped for a toppling of the Iranian leadership via a “Maduro-style” operation that could be quickly achieved with outside support. Over time, outcomes did not align with those hopes, and the plan became far more complicated. - The naval armada near Iran was intended as a pressure point but, from the Pentagon’s view, is more of a liability. The armada is loaded with Tomahawk missiles rather than air defense missiles; estimates suggest 300-350 Tomahawks among two destroyers and one carrier. Iran has countermeasures: anti-ship missiles along the coast, submarines (including mini-submarines) with anti-ship missiles, and fast attack craft. Drones threaten the fleet, and the air defense burden would be high if a drone swarm attacked. Hormuz could be shut by Iran in the event of war, a long-term strategic lever that Iran has signaled. - Iran’s deterrence has matured: any attack by Israel or the US could trigger full-scale war and Hormuz closure. Symbolic exchanges were proposed by intermediaries (an empty IRGC building and an attack on a US base), but Iran rejected such symbolic moves, insisting on a broader, sustained response if attacked. - Israel’s posture and constraints: Israel has told the US it does not view the nuclear issue as the sole determinant, but instead urges action to destroy Iran’s ballistic missile system and deter future threats. Netanyahu, meeting with Whitlock, indicated opposition to any nuclear deal if the US does not secure certain Israeli demands, warning that without Israeli endorsement, a US deal would fail. Israel insists on conditions that make a broader deal nonviable for the US. - The Arabs’ restraint: Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, do not want direct involvement in an attack on Iran, including airspace use or refueling. Several factors influence their position: fear of Iranian retaliation, concerns about broader regional instability, and shifts in regional alignments. Saudi Arabia has grown more anti-Israel, viewing Israel as destabilizing and expressing concerns about the region’s security order. There is also a fear that a major war could trigger an Arab Spring-like upheaval in Gulf monarchies. - Iran’s internal unrest: The insurrection in Iran involved trained insurgents (MEK operatives trained by the Americans in Armenia and Kurds trained in Northeastern Syria) and some Baluch participants. Corridors through Turkey and Kurdish groups facilitated their entry into Kermanshah Province. The strategy aimed at creating chaos to provoke a Western intervention, with reports that attackers were paid (roughly $5-$10) to inflame violence, burn buildings, attack ambulances, and kill. The Iranian government reports nearly 3,000 killed during the protests, with about 150 more unidentified; the majority of casualties were security forces due to exchange of fire. The narrative contrasts with outside accounts, noting the opposition did not lead to defections from key state institutions, and Israeli intelligence assessment reportedly concluded the unrest did not threaten the regime’s collapse. - Regional and great-power dynamics: Russia and China have signaled opposition to letting Iran be pressured by the United States, with discussions in Russia about offering a nuclear umbrella or naval support for Iran, though official policies are unclear.Originally planned joint exercises near Hormuz were paused; there are ongoing considerations of Chinese/Russian involvement that would complicate US options. A Chinese-Russian naval presence near Iran could limit US maneuvering. A recent drone shot down by the USS Lincoln reflects continued attempts at signaling and potential negotiation. - Overall assessment: Trump faces a dilemma between projecting strength and avoiding a costly escalation, with Israeli opposition complicating any potential US move. The US cannot easily sustain pressure without risking market turmoil and broad regional and great-power entanglements. The likely trajectory involves continued “negotiations about negotiations” rather than immediate, decisive action, while Iran’s deterrence and regional recalibrations constrain what any use of force might achieve.

Daniel Davis contends that Iran’s two primary objectives are to survive—politically and militarily—and to keep the Strait of Hormuz closed. Politically, Iran must maintain control of the IRGC, police, and regular army to endure assassination attempts and maintain regime viability. Militarily, Iran does not need to defeat the United States but must sustain missiles, drones, and attacks on regional assets to remain viable. Time benefits Iran: the longer the conflict lasts, the more it hurts the United States, especially given U.S. urgency to end the war and reopen Hormuz. Davis argues the United States has a more urgent timeline due to the economic impact of a closed Hormuz, with oil prices hovering around $100 and potential further price spikes if the Strait remains shut. Iran, however, can endure months of strikes while keeping Hormuz closed, placing pressure on the Trump administration. He notes that the U.S. has destroyed much of Iran’s surface forces and air force and much of launch infrastructure, but Iran retains missiles, submarines, speedboats, drones, and a dispersed set of launch sites, allowing continued viability. On the political front, Davis says Iran sees the Israeli-US effort as aimed at destroying the Iranian state, and that domestic opposition to the regime has rallied around the flag. He argues Trump faces significant political challenges at home, including allies unwilling to risk naval engagement and internal criticism amplified by figures like Joe Kent, who resigned as director of the National Counterterrorism Center and accused the Israeli lobby and media of orchestrating a misinformation campaign. Kent stated there was no imminent threat from Iran, arguing the war was not America-first. Davis asserts that Trump cannot count on broad allied support to open Hormuz; allies have refused to risk their ships or crews in a mission that could fail. He cites the lack of a coherent, feasible military plan to open the Strait and the risk of escalation, while noting domestic and Gulf-state economic pressures. In discussing potential military options, Davis questions the viability of a ground invasion of Iran. He estimates a ground campaign would require at least 500,000 to 1,000,000 troops and would face impassable terrain and fortified defenses, making a successful outcome unlikely. He argues a sustained air and naval campaign also fails to guarantee opening the Strait, given Iran’s dispersed defenses, underwater missiles, drones, submarines, and long-range artillery. He suggests the most feasible non-air/space option might involve attempts related to Yemen to keep Bab el-Mandeb open, but even that is uncertain and risky. Regarding weapons and logistics, Davis notes the current conflict uses different inventories than those used in Ukraine, with interceptors and air-defense assets not readily available to share, while JDAMs and other munitions are limited. He observes that munitions consumption is high and could strain stockpiles, complicating long-term operations. Finally, Davis discusses US-Israeli relations. He says there has been a public decline in support for Israel among some groups, and Joe Kent’s explicit critique of Israeli manipulation could complicate bipartisan support. He predicts that growing American casualties and economic costs from the war could lead to political pressure on Trump to adjust or disengage, potentially affecting U.S.-Israel coordination in a prolonged conflict.

Seyed Mohamed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, discusses the war launched against Iran, Iran’s aims, and the shifting regional dynamics. He argues that Western analyses over the years have been incorrect and that Iran’s objectives are clear: Iran will not accept a ceasefire until its demands are met, will no longer tolerate U.S. threats or Gulf regimes acting as bases against Iran, and will seek compensation from regional adversaries for destruction and slaughter attributed to the conflict. He asserts that Iran’s position and strength are growing, with widespread street support for the leader and resilience under missile and drone strikes against U.S. assets and Israel’s regime. Key points on Iran’s war aims and the conflict: - Iran’s demands: ceasefire is not an option; the war will continue until Iran’s demands are met. Iran will no longer accept a situation in which the United States can threaten it again, and will demand that Gulf regimes stop operating bases that threaten Iran. Yemen will demand and obtain full compensation for destruction. - Regional balance: Iran views the Palestinian and Lebanese causes as linked to regional resistance; Hezbollah, Yemen, Iraq, and other groups are actively undermining the regime’s regional military and political position. - Ground realities: Iran’s missiles and drones are striking U.S. assets across the Persian Gulf; Israel is being heavily targeted; resistance in Lebanon and Iraq is damaging the regime; Yemen is prepared to escalate its actions. The longer the war lasts, the more compensation Iran anticipates extracting from Gulf regimes. Escalation and tactics: - Civilian targets: Iran’s leadership says the United States has failed on the battlefield and is now targeting civilians and infrastructure, including attacks on fuel depots, desalination plants, and oil facilities, creating toxic rain and ecological harm in Iran. - Desalination and water security: destruction of desalination plants is described as a major risk to civilian water supply; Iranian civilians face environmental and health consequences from the attacks. - Economic impact and energy markets: Marandi contends that 20 million barrels of oil per day are missing from the market and that Western reserves could only offset two months; closing the Strait of Hormuz or sustained disruption could precipitate a global economic crisis and undermine the petrodollar system. - Strategic posture: Iran will respond with countermeasures, and if Gulf regimes push further against Iran, Tehran asserts it could take actions that would profoundly affect the region’s energy infrastructure and Western interests. International actors and alignment: - France and other Western allies: France has announced a defensive mission to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, while Trump has made highly contradictory statements about ending the war or destroying Iran, illustrating perceived Western moral and strategic hostility. - China and Russia: Marandi notes closer alignment among Iran, China, and Russia, with China and Russia benefiting from opposing U.S. dominance in West Asia; Iran’s geography allows multiple overland routes for weapons and supplies, and Moscow and Beijing are seen as unlikely to allow a Western victory in the region. - Azerbaijan and Turkey: Azerbaijan’s response and Turkey’s involvement are discussed; Iran emphasizes it would respond decisively against Gulf and regional actors supporting Israel if pushed. Domestic and regional reactions: - Iranian public sentiment: there is strong public support for the leadership, with mobilization and resilience evident in Tehran and across the country despite missile and drone strikes. - Perceived Western narratives: Marandi argues that Western elites have remained morally and strategically bankrupt, using demonstrable inconsistency in statements and policy to justify continued escalation. Broader implications: - The war is reshaping regional power dynamics, with Iran asserting greater confidence and influence, and with China and Russia increasingly integrated with Iran against U.S. hegemony in West Asia. - The deteriorating situation could produce far-reaching consequences for global energy markets, security arrangements in the Persian Gulf, and the dollar-centered economic order, depending on how escalation and potential reciprocal actions unfold.

Speaker 0: Welcome to game plan. I'm Shivan Jan now. So far, there is only one winner in this war in West Asia, and that's Russia. Mind you, I'm not saying that this was acknowledged by the European Council president Antonio Costa. US Israeli strikes in West Asia, they have driven up the price of oil, strengthening the Kremlin's ability to fund its military campaign. Now in a sharp reversal from last year's policy of penalizing countries for buying Russian energy, US treasury secretary Scott Pessen said that The United States could unsanction other Russian oil to keep the flow of oil intact. And this is because the Strait Of Hormuz, the pivotal point from where this war is kind of converging, that is under complete Iranian control. Movement of ships has been blocked. Movement of oil has been blocked. It has shot up the oil prices, and the repercussions are being felt across the world at this point. Is the war proving to be a boon for Russia whose economy is dependent on energy exports? As the state of Hormuz gets blocked, Russia gets a free hand at selling its oil at rates that can be expounded without proper discounts as well. Is Putin the one winning in the war that US and Israel started against Iran? To discuss this with me on game plan is doctor Glenn Deesen, professor of international relations at the University of Southeastern Norway. Glenn, always a pleasure speaking with you. Thanks so much for joining me here. Trump and Putin, they held a call recently, the first time this year, and this was to discuss the discuss the ongoing hostilities in Iran. What do you think they would have discussed, and what kind of a role can Putin be playing in the ongoing war? Speaker 1: Well, I assume some of the things to discuss was obviously the the the extent to which The US and Russia targets each other because one of the things that the American media has been complaining about is the likelihood that Russia is providing intelligence to Iran for targets, but of course this is what The United States been doing for years and continues to do, that is give the Ukrainians targets to hit Russia. So I think there's a necessity to begin to discuss is appropriate and again what happens behind these doors, I don't know. But also of course there has to be some scaling back of the energy sanctions against Russia to bring this, the energy prices under control. As you suggest, they are now very much out of control. But I think also the main thing they've discussed is how to bring this war to an end because I think it's perfectly clear now that this US attack on Iran was a terrible mistake, and it appears that Putin would be the the main middleman who would might be able to bring an end to this war. But, again, it depends what can be done as what the Iranians will demand may be more than what the Americans can deliver. Speaker 0: Glenn, as you mentioned, Putin could perhaps be the main person to bring peace in this war. Putin has the highest chance of acting as peacemaker in West Asia. Is there anyone other than Putin at this point who can bring? Because just look at the optics of it. US starts a war, and I think ten days into it, he needs to make a call to Vladimir Putin to discuss that same war. How does it look for The US? Speaker 1: Well, they don't care for this, of course, but that it's similar to what to what happened with the war against Syria. That is, if you remember, back at president Obama's time, he had set these red lines, he were gonna attack Syria. It was quite obvious that this would be a disaster. So he went to the Russian president and he was able to get a deal through and which essentially took Obama's chestnuts out of the fire. So it was, you know, it it it is the reality or the optics of it isn't great given that The US has been fighting a proxy war for years against Russia, but but, know, at some point, you have to put the optics aside. Who who else would be in a position to help to negotiate this? I'm thinking, you know, perhaps China could be a middleman, but I think given that The United States, especially under the Trump administration, wants to improve bilateral ties with Russia, I I I think he's probably the best, yeah, the best bet. Speaker 0: Would it be fair to say that Putin is emerging as a winner in this ongoing West Asia war, which only seems to be expanding within the West Asian region? Speaker 1: Well, no. I think, yeah, to a large extent, I think that is correct because the energy prices are way up. The US have to scale back sanctions. The all the weapons which The US had intended to ship towards Ukraine to fight Russia is now being depleted. For European leaders, as you mentioned earlier on, to who aspire to prolong the war in Ukraine, this is an absolute disaster. And we'll see that countries that cut the energy ties or at least reduced energy ties with Russia at the best of American pressure, they of course have learned a lesson now as well that this was not a good idea that you don't necessarily put bet too much on a hegemon in decline, so countries who before paid discounts now may have to pay premium. We'll see that Iran, which I assume is getting some support from Russia sees this relationship improving dramatically. They're moving much closer, which is good for Russia because the Iranians always have some suspicions towards the Russians given well a long history they've had through the centuries of conflict. So all of this improves. You can also say that The Gulf States, the weakening of The Gulf States has also a big impact on weakening The U. S. Ability to restore its hegemony because what show what's obvious now is that the Gulf States are not getting protection instead they're becoming very vulnerable as frontline states and The US is no longer seen as that reliable. Well, if they're not going to bet their security on The United States anymore then they may not have that much pressure to sell their oil in dollars. You're not gonna have those recycled petrodollars coming back to The US, and suddenly the whole AI race with China looks a lot weaker as well. So I think across the board, a lot of things look good for Russia, but and there is a big but here, and that is I don't think that the Russians want this war nonetheless because the Russians, much like the Chinese, value stability and predictability. And what's happening in Iran now could again, if something would happen to Iran collapse, that would be a disaster for this Greater Eurasia initiative that is to integrate economies of Greater Eurasian Continent, but also this could spiral into a world war. So from this perspective, it's very dangerous and I don't doubt that the Russians therefore want to put an end to this war simply because I guess much like India, they don't want the Eurasian Continent to be too China centric, they would like to have many poles of power and this requires diversification. This means that the Russians need close ties with Iran, with India and other countries. So for the Americans to knock off Iran off the, you know, the chessboard, the greater Eurasian chessboard would be a disaster for the Russians. So, yes, I think they're prospering or benefiting from this, but they they do wanna put an end to it. Speaker 0: Understood. Glenn, let me just come to the Strait Of Hormuz. You know, the objectives of U. S. Behind starting this war, that has been questioned enough. Why did you start this war in the first place? Those are questions not just emerging, you know, globally. They're also emerging from inside The U. S. But if you look at what a win will actually look like for US, would it be the state of Hormuz? Like, which whoever controls the state of Hormuz is eventually who walks away as you know, walks away with the victory at this point because The US was looking for a change in regime. They mentioned it enough number of times. That hasn't happened and doesn't seem like it's going to happen. Is the state of Hormuz the winning factor now? Speaker 1: Well, I I I don't think any The US would be in a position to control this just given the geography. So The US obviously went into into this war with the objective of regime change. That was the goal. This was the decapitation strike, this was the hope of killing Khamenei and obviously it didn't work. I think it shouldn't have come as a surprise, but you know killing the leader of Iran only created more solidarity within the country. And also the idea that the whole armed forces would begin to disintegrate once they had been punished enough, also proven to be incorrect. So I think at the moment you see the American pivoting a bit. Some are talking about the Strait Of Moose that this should be a goal, others are saying you see a shift now towards saying well, actually what we really want to do is just degrade Iran's missile capabilities that they won't have this long range missiles. And again, you know, these are the kind of vague objectives which they can essentially declare victory today then because Iran has had many of its missiles destroyed. Also it launched a lot of its missiles at U. S. Targets which means that its missile stockpile has been reduced. So this should be a source of optimism when The U. S. Moves from this very hard line objective such as regime change and they shift in towards missiles, reducing the missile stockpiles or something like this. But the straight of our moves, I think, is beyond what what is reasonable. It's it will be too difficult. So I don't think they will But why push too hard on do Speaker 0: you feel it would be difficult if I were to just look at the bases that they have across West Asia? They have enough military might. Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, have their bases there. How difficult would it be to exert that military might over the Strait Of Hormuz? Speaker 1: Well, controlling it just means the ability to shut it down. Many countries would have the ability to shut down this narrow strait. The problem is that no one benefits from it, that is the Gulf States are hurt, Iran is hurt from it, The US and the global economy is hurt. So it becomes an exercise in self harm. The reason why the Iranians are doing this, the ability to shut down the Strait Of Hormuz is because The US has the ability to inflict a mass amount of destruction. It can go after civilian infrastructure, it can well, look what they've done to Tehran. It looks like, well, just, you know, the chemical warfare there. You've seen in terms of going after his fuel depots. They're going after the water supplies in Iran. You you see all these things. This is what America can do. Iran doesn't have that ability. They can't hit The United States. What they can do is cause economic pain. So, yes, I think The US and many of the Gulf States can also shut down the Strait Of Our Moose, but but but that's not that's it doesn't have any purpose. It doesn't have any reasoning. Speaker 0: Can they eradicate the Iranian control over the Strait Of Hormuz? I'm not talking about shutting it down, but just get rid of the Iranians from there and they then decide who gets to control and when it has to be shut and when it has to be opened and remained and kept open and secured. Can The US exert that kind of military might over the state of Hormuz to control it? Speaker 1: Then one need us to control a massive amount of Iran's territory, which is a huge territory with populated by 90,000,000 people. So this seems very unlikely and if closing down the Strait Of Hormuz would depend on very sophisticated weapon systems, will be one thing. But this can be shut down with drones which can be manufactured in apartments. It can be also shut down with small naval drones that is this essentially drone operated small torpedoes. There's it doesn't require a lot of high technology which means that The US can't take out very key infrastructure to prevent Iran from shutting this down, to force it to open. But with very cheap and easy to make weapons, the Iranians can shut it down and it's simply too much territory, too large population for The United States to shut down the these capabilities. So at some point, they're have to make peace with the Iranians and make it make sure it's in Iran's interest to keep the Strait Of Hormuz open because it is in their interest. The problem now is that Iran faces an existential threat. That is The US now threatens to destroy not just the government, but also the country. As Trump tweeted, we we will make it impossible for Iran to even rebuild as a nation. And this is what regime change means. There is no replacement government. This means the disintegration and destruction of Iran, a massive civil war which could cost hundreds of thousands of lives. So for them this is existential which is why they went to this great extent. They've never done this before because they never believed that they faced this kind of an existential threat. So if the war ends, the Iranians have no reason to shut this straight down. This is very horrible for them as well. So, no, I I don't think The US can control the straight or almost no one can control it completely because too many actors could shut it down. Speaker 0: Glenn, thanks so much for joining me here on game plan. Whether this war continues further, that only means and if it does, that's essentially what Iran is looking at because they're not capitulating. They're not giving up. They are taking a bad amount of beating. There's no doubt in that, but they are continuing with their counters nevertheless. And straight of hormones is their main play where they're exerting their pressure with whether it's mines, whether it's their own boats, whether it's their own military boats. Now energy experts have also warned that whether the Iran crisis proves a cure for Russia's economy, that depends directly on how long it lasts. But there is little to suggest that Iran is willing to capitulate that what we just discussed. They're inviting U. S. To continue the war on the other hand. That's what the statements from Iran suggest that we're waiting. Come on, on. Now in the midst of this, Russia is emerging as the winner as we just discussed. How long this lasts? It doesn't seem to be in the favor of The U. S. We'll need to wait and watch twelfth day and running. They expected it to last for about four to five weeks, whether it goes the distance or even longer. Let's wait. That was Glenn Deeson joining me here on Game Plan. Speaker 1: Thanks, Yvonne.

The discussion centers on contrasting narratives about the U.S.-Israel confrontation with Iran and what is actually happening on the ground and inside Iran. - Speaker 0 relays the “fog of war,” noting Western media claims that the U.S. and Israel are delivering a rapid victory in Iran, with leadership and navy wiped out and the war ending soon, referencing statements by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth that the war “should not be protracted” and will wrap up “very soon.” Speaker 1 and Speaker 2 push back, asking whether the war could spiral into a longer conflict and what the timeline may be, noting top general Dan Cain’s warning that the objectives will take time and that President Trump also suggested the operation could take weeks. - The program then goes to Tehran with Professor Syed Mohammed Morandi, a geopolitical analyst at the University of Tehran. Morandi explains the succession process after the death of the Ayatollah: the constitution provides a council of three that runs the government until the leader is chosen by the council of experts, which should happen in the next few days. In the meantime, the president, the head of the judiciary, and a representative from the Guardian Council run the state. He notes the councilors are being arranged to meet from abroad to avoid being targeted. - On the ground in Tehran, Morandi counters the idea that a rapid regime change is possible, detailing that U.S. and Israeli strikes have targeted Tehran and civilian infrastructure, including a claim that the government ordered people to leave the city and that an elementary school was bombed, killing about 165 girls in Minab. He describes a situation where rescue teams are struck again at the scene. He asserts that the U.S. and Israel are striking civilian targets and that there is a pattern of double tapping at sites like Fair Doce Square. - Morandi disputes U.S. claims of destroyed leadership and navy: he says that ships of the Iranian navy are in port, there are thousands of small speed boats prepared for asymmetrical warfare, and the U.S. has not touched them. He argues that the underground bases and missiles/drones remain intact, and that senior commanders were not all killed—only a handful. He notes that Iran is firing missiles at Israel and striking U.S. targets in the Persian Gulf, and that oil facilities and tankers could be attacked if escalation continues. He warns of an energy crisis if oil facilities are destroyed and notes that the price of energy has risen. - Regarding public sentiment inside Iran, Morandi states that there are no celebrations; instead, people are mourning. He describes gatherings across the country under missile fire, with demonstrations in Tehran despite security concerns. He shares that slogans included “We are prepared to die. We won’t accept humiliation. Death to Trump, death to Netanyahu,” and that millions were seen on the streets via his Telegram channel, though many left the city due to danger. He characterizes Western media portrayal as propaganda and says the sentiment on the ground is in opposition to U.S. and Israeli actions. - The host suggests that the Iranian perspective views this as a prolonged confrontation, with Iran prepared to sustain resistance for years because the United States is “completely unreliable.” Morandi notes that while negotiations have repeatedly failed, Iran aims to compel the U.S. and Israeli regime to recognize that military assault has consequences, including economic and political costs. - The program later notes that U.S. and Israeli figures frame the conflict as epically swift, while Morandi’s account emphasizes Iran’s resilience and long-term resistance, highlighting the discrepancy between Western media narratives and on-the-ground Iranian realities.

Speaker 0: Nearly two weeks into this conflict, the official story is cracking, and the number of Americans wounded is slowly coming out. Yesterday, we reported based on our sources that the number of American wounded was at least one hundred and thirty seven. After our report ran, the Pentagon has now publicly acknowledged about one hundred and forty wounded. That confirms our sources on this. So why did it take a little news show like ours to report this information? Why wasn't Fox News reporting this information? The Pentagon I know it's really weird. Why is the mainstream media silent on this? The Pentagon finally comes out and actually admits to this. Speaker 1: Reuters comes out and reports this. Exclusive. As many as one hundred and fifty US troops wounded so far in Iran war. They just published this today, this morning. March 10. That's remarkable. Exclusive. Just curious how that's an exclusive when we reported it yesterday. Yesterday. Whatever. Hey, Reuters. Bite me. Anyway, this war is clearly not winding down no matter what the messaging says. President Trump is saying the war could end very soon. But Iran says talks with The United States are off the table for now. Tehran is prepared to keep striking as long as it takes. And they're vowing an eye for an eye. So what is an eye for an eye actually mean? Does it mean you hey, you killed our leader. We kill yours? Does it mean, hey, you killed all these girls who were the daughters of members of the the Iranian Navy at a girls school, do we also do that to you? Like, what is actually does that look like? Speaker 0: Does it mean we took out your water infrastructures or you took out ours? So we do that. Right. Your gas infrastructure, civilian infrastructure, that's that's a war crime. But we did it. Your oil infrastructure, we do that. Like, what exactly does that look like? Meanwhile, the Strait Of Hormuz is getting worse by the minute. US intelligence tracking Iranian mine laying threats now as Gulf energy infrastructure there is taking a major hit with about 1,900,000 barrels per day of refining capacity across Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and The UAE. All down. CBS now says shipping through the Strait Of Hormuz has ground to a virtual halt. Nothing getting through. That's of just a few minutes ago. And Israel's hammering Beirut's southern suburbs and Lebanon. So they've essentially invaded Lebanon. Speaker 2: And then there's the neocon political class in Washington saying the quiet part out loud. Senator Lindsey Graham is now openly talking about, you know, going back to South Carolina to tell the sons and daughters in South Carolina, you know, you gotta send your loved ones to the Middle East. That's what I'm doing here in South Carolina. I gotta tell them to go fight in the Middle East, and he's calling on other Middle East countries that have been sitting on the fence that we've supported over the years as allies. Get off the fence. Go bomb Iran. Help out with Iran. And, oh, by the way, Spain, we're pissed off at you because you don't want us using your air bases or airspace to bomb Iran. Listen. Speaker 0: To our allies step up, get our air bases out of Spain. They're not reliable. Move all those airplanes to a country that would let us use them when we're threatened by a regime like Iran. To our friends in Spain, man, you have lost your way. I don't wanna do business with you anymore. I want our air bases our air bases out of Spain into a country that will let us use them. To our Arab friends, I've tried to help you construct a new Mideast. You need to up your game here. I can't go to South Carolina and say we're fighting and you won't publicly fight. What you're doing behind the scenes, that has to stop. The double dealing of the Arab world when it comes to this stuff needs to end. I go back to South Carolina. I'm asking them to send their sons and daughters over to the Mideast. What I want you to do in The Mideast to our friends in Saudi Arabia and other places, step forward and say this is my fight too. I join America. I'm publicly involved in bringing this regime down. If you don't, you're making a great mistake, and you're gonna cut off the ability to have a better relationship with The United States. I say this as a friend. Speaker 1: Ugh. He's an odious friend. Speaker 0: Say this as a friend. Speaker 3: With friends pick up a gun and go fight yourself, you coward. Yeah. I freaking hate that. But you're calling so, like, bluntly for somebody else to go die for his stupid cause. Speaker 0: Yeah. Speaker 1: I am so curious about this. I mean, he's a liar. But how many people in South Carolina are really walking up to him and saying, who are we gonna get to fight with us? Who are we gonna get to fight Iran? Worried about this. My son can go, but who's going with him? Let's make some war playdates. Who does that? Speaker 0: Larry Johnson is a former CIA analyst, NRA gun trainer, and, he's been looking at all of this and doing some incredible writing over at his website, Sonar twenty one. Larry, thank you for joining us. Great to see you back on the show. Speaker 4: Hi, guys. Good to see you. Speaker 0: So I wanna talk about the American war wounded first because Mhmm. I know that this is, near and dear to your heart and, of course, something that you've been watching, closely. And the lies, of course, that are coming out about this. Again, I spoke to sources over the past forty eight hours that were telling us here at Redacted about 137 Americans wounded. Then the Pentagon comes out and then confirms about a hundred and forty. So right pretty much right on the nose. And does that number sound low to you? Or does that sound about right? Speaker 4: That sounds a little low. So on March 4, let's go to Germany. Stuttgart, just North West of Germany, there is a hospital called Landstuhl Regional Medical Center. Landstuhl's primary mission is to handle American war wounded. On March 4, they issued a memo telling all the pregnant women that were about to give birth that, sorry, don't come here. We're not birthing any more babies. We gotta focus on our main mission. So that was the first clue that there was there were a lot of casualties inbound. I know, without mentioning his name, somebody who was involved dealing with the combat casualties during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and he dealt with the personnel at Lunstul. And he called someone up and said, can't say anything, but there's a lot of casualties. Then 13 miles to the east of Landstuhl is an army base called Kaiserslautern. Kaiserslautern and the Stars and Stripes issued for that base had an appeal, a blood drive appeal. Hey. We need lots of people to show up and donate blood. So those that was on March 5. So I wrote about this March 6. So I wrote about this four days ago, that, yeah, we had a lot more casualties, and there are more coming, because Iran's not gonna stop. You know, right now, we're getting signals that the Trump administration is reaching out, trying, oh, hey, let's talk, let's talk cease fire. Iran's having none of it. They've been betrayed twice by Donald Trump and his group of clowns. Speaker 0: Right. Speaker 4: You know? And and so they're not ready to say no. No. They've got the world, by the testicles is the polite way of saying it, withholding the Strait Of Hormuz. They've shut down the movement of not only oil, liquid natural gas. They're the supplier of about 25%, 25 to 30% of the world's liquid natural gas, and, about 30%, 30 to 35% of the world's urea, which is used for fertilizer. Now, that may not I just learned that that may not be as important as I once thought it was because most of it comes out of Oman. Oman, you don't have to worry about things going through the Strait Of Hormuz. But on oil and liquid natural gas, huge. 94% of The Philippines depended upon the flow of gas, both liquid and the petroleum oil, out of the Persian Gulf. India, 80%. Japan, South Korea. So this is gonna have a major impact on certain economies in the world. Now there there I I I've said this ironically. I I think Vladimir Putin's sitting there going, maybe Donald Trump really does like me, because what he's done is he's making Russia rich again in a way I mean, they're getting, you know, they were selling they were forced to sell their oil previously under sanctions at, like, $55 a barrel. Now they're getting $88.90 dollars a barrel. Well, and they just opened it up to India. I mean, that story over the past forty eight hours, like, so they The United States has eased its restriction on Russian oil flowing to India. I mean, talk about an absolute disaster. Speaker 4: Well, yeah. And remember what had happened there is India was playing a double game too. You know, bricks India is the I in bricks, and Iran is the new I in bricks. And so what was India doing? Well, India was pretending to play along with The United States, but then going to Russia and saying, hey, Russia. Yeah. We'll buy we'll buy your oil, but we needed a discount because we're going against the sanctions, and we need to cover ourselves. So Russia said, okay. As a BRICS partner, we'll let you have for $55 barrel. So they got a discount. So now when all of a sudden the the the oil tap is turned off, including the liquid natural gas, India goes running back to Russia. Now remember, on, February 25-26, India was in Israel buttering up the rear end of BB, Net, and Yahoo, kissing rear end all they could. Oh, man. It was a love fest. We're partners with Israel. And then Israel attacks their BRICS partner. And what does India say? Nothing. Zero. They don't say a thing about the murdered girls. So now all of a sudden, the oil's turned off. It's nine days now with no oil coming out of there for India. They go running back to Russia. Hey, buddy. Let's let's get back together. And Russia says, sure. That's great. But it's gonna cost you $89 now a barrel. No more friends and family program. Gonna get market conditions. Speaker 0: We've had many journalist friends that have had their bank accounts shut down. We were literally in the middle of an interview with a great journalist from the gray zone who found out that his banking was just shut down. Literally, in the middle of an interview, he got a message that his banking was shut down. Well, Rumble Wallet prevents that, because Rumble can't even touch it. No one can touch it. Rumble Wallet lets you control your money, not a bank, not a government, not a tech company, not even Rumble can touch it. It's yours, only yours, yours to protect your future and your family. You can buy and save digital assets like Bitcoin, Tether Gold, and now the new USA USA app USAT, which is Tether's US regulated stablecoin all in one place. Tether Gold is real gold on the blockchain with ownership of physical gold bars, and USAT keeps your money steady against inflation. No banks needed. It's not only a wallet to buy and save, but it also allows you to support your favorite creators by easily tipping them if you want with the click of a button. There'll be no fees when you tip our channel or others, and we actually receive the tip instantly unlike other platforms where we have to wait for payouts. So support our show today and other creators by clicking the tip button on our Rumble channel. Speaker 1: Now I wanna ask you about president Trump responding to CBS News reports that there may be mines in the Strait Of Hormuz. That doesn't make a ton of sense. He says we have no indication that they did, but they better not. But they are picking and choosing who gets to go through, and their allies can go through. So why would they mine their allies? What do we make of this? Do we need to respond to this at all? Speaker 4: Yeah. I don't think they've done it yet. But let's recall the last time Iran mined the Persian Gulf. They didn't mine the Strait Of Hormuz. They mined farther up. It was 1987, 1988. Why did they do that? Well, in September 1980, when Jimmy Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski were still in office, The United States encouraged a guy named Saddam Hussein, don't know if you've ever heard of him, but they encouraged Saddam Hussein to launch a war against Iran. And then Ronald Reagan comes in with Donald Rumsfeld and Cap Weinberger, and by 1983 had provided chemical weapons, or the precursors that Iraq needed to build chemical weapons, and Iraq started using chemical weapons against Iran in 1983 and continued to do it in '84, 85, 86. During that entire time, Iran never retaliated with chemical weapons. They were not going because they saw it as an act against God. They were serious about the religion. So 'eighty seven, 'eighty eight, they start dropping mines there in the Persian Gulf. Well, at that time, they didn't have all these missiles, so the United States Navy, a Navy SEAL, a good friend of mine, set up what was called the Hercules barge, and he had a Navy SEAL unit with him, and they fought off attacks by Iranian gunboats. He had some Little Bird helicopters from the one sixtieth, the special operations wing of the Air Force. And but we ended up disrupting the Iranian plan to mine The Gulf back then. Well, we couldn't do that today. We do not have that capability because Iran would blow us out of the water with drones and with missiles. You as we've seen, it's been happening over the last ten days. So United States would be in a real pickle. Speaker 1: And especially given the rhetoric of US war hawks in power for three decades. Like Yeah. Yes. They kind of had to prepare all of this time. Did we think that they weren't paying attention when we said it to the world? Speaker 4: Well, when we're writing our own press clippings and then reading them, there is a tendency to say, god, I am great. Can you see this? How good we are? And so they really believed that our air def the Patriot air defense systems and the THAAD systems would be they they could shut down the Iranian missiles and drones. And what they discovered was, nope. They didn't work. And they worked at an even lower level than the you know, Pentagon kept foul. We're shooting down 90%.

Speaker 0, Speaker 1, and Speaker 2 discuss the evolving confrontation between the United States and Iran and its broader economic and strategic implications. Speaker 0 highlights three predictions: (1) Trump would win, (2) he would start a war with Iran, and (3) the US would lose that war, asking if these predictions are still valid. Speaker 1 characterizes the current phase as a war of attrition between the United States and Iran, noting that Iranians have been preparing for twenty years and now possess “a pretty good strategy of how to weaken and ultimately destroy the American empire.” He asserts that Iran is waging war against the global economy by striking Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and targeting critical energy infrastructure and waterways such as the Baghdad channel and the Hormuz Strait, and eventually water desalination plants, which are vital to Gulf nations. He emphasizes that the Gulf States are the linchpin of the American economy because they sell petrodollars, which are recycled into the American economy through investments, including in the stock market. He claims the American economy is sustained by AI investments in data centers, much of which come from the Gulf States. If the Gulf States cease oil sales and finance AI, he predicts the AI bubble in the United States would burst, collapsing the broader American economy, described as a financial “ponzi scheme.” Speaker 2 notes a concrete example: an Amazon data center was hit in the UAE. He also mentions the United States racing to complete its Iran mission before munitions run out. Speaker 1 expands on the military dynamic, arguing that the United States military is not designed for a twenty-first-century war. He attributes this to the post–World War II military-industrial complex, which was built for the Cold War and its goals of technological superiority. He explains that American military strategy relies on highly sophisticated, expensive technology—the air defense system—leading to an asymmetry in the current conflict: million-dollar missiles attempting to shoot down $50,000 drones. He suggests this gap is unsustainable in the long term and describes it as the puncturing of the aura of invincibility that has sustained American hegemony for the past twenty years.

Speaker 0 expresses concern that Iran’s escalation leads to automatic draft registration and that many people voted against the Biden administration and Kamala Harris because of floated draft ideas for Russia. They reference a report on Liberty Report about this automatic involuntary draft registration. Speaker 1 describes the NDAA as a must-pass bill that often includes dangerous language. He says the bill will automatically register young men aged 18 to 26 for the draft and create a database, removing any choice about whether to register or not. He argues this presumes the government owns you and your body, equating it to slavery. He contends that if a war is unpopular or unconstitutional, people will still be forced to register. He notes a belief that the current war is obviously unconstitutional and asserts confidence in young Americans defending their country if attacked, though he questions whether an attack has occurred. Speaker 2 counters that the threat is not existential from Iran, but argues it comes from elsewhere, including issues at the southern border. He reframes the concern as domestic rather than a direct external threat from Iran. Speaker 3 agrees and adds that the U.S. lacks a sufficiently large army due to prior cuts and a focus on exotic weapons and a large surface fleet. He contends the army is too small to project power, and any ground invasion into the Middle East would face immediate, formidable opposition, including precision missiles and drones, making a conventional ground war implausible. He criticizes naval power’s utility in modern conflicts and suggests an invasion would be impractical. Speaker 2 asks for more detail about Karg Island, a strategic island off Iran’s coast, noting 90% of oil flows through Iran from that area. He mentions talk among Trump administration officials about capturing the island and asks how the U.S. could secure it. Speaker 3 explains that much of the oil from Karg Island goes to India, China, Japan, and South Korea; destroying or occupying the island would require moving ground forces and crossing water, which would be extremely dangerous. He warns that destroying oil infrastructure in the Persian Gulf would lead Iran to target refineries, drilling rigs, and storage tanks, and notes that Gulf States heavily rely on desalination plants. He cautions that destroying these plants could cause mass death and devastate Gulf economies. He adds that the Israelis previously struck a desalination plant in Iran, which would amplify consequences for regional economies. Speaker 0 asks how the public should feel about the conflict, noting that the government started it on false pretenses and that the country’s leaders and military performance have been disappointing. They seek guidance on how to view the situation and how to respond. Speaker 1 expresses domestic concern about a potential false flag, citing FBI warnings that Iran may have launched attack drones off the West Coast, suggesting a false flag could be used to erode civil liberties. Speaker 2 agrees with the false-flag concern and notes that Israel has a history of false flags and mentions events in Azerbaijan and Turkey. He emphasizes the need for Americans to understand the consequences of U.S. actions for people in the region and to push the president and administration to stop inflammatory language. Speaker 3 clarifies that Iranian officials have instructed contacts in the Western Hemisphere not to harm the United States, arguing that causing harm would benefit Israel. He concedes that false-flag analysis is plausible but unlikely in the long run, and stresses the importance of public awareness of consequences and maintaining peaceful regional relations after the war ends.

Glenn (Speaker 0) and John Mersheimer (Speaker 1) discuss the Iran war and its trajectory. Mersheimer asserts the war is not going well for the United States and that President Trump cannot find an off ramp because there is no plausible endgame or decisive victory against Iran. He notes that if Iran can turn the conflict into a protracted war of attrition, it has incentives and means to do so, including a strong bargaining position to demand sanctions relief or reparations. He argues the United States and Israel are not the sole drivers; Iran has a say, and there is no credible story about ending the war on American terms. Mersheimer cautions that even heavy bombardment or “today being the day of the heaviest bombardment” would not necessarily compel Iran to quit. He suggests Tehran will respond by escalating, potentially striking Gulf States and Israel with missiles and drones, given Iran’s capability with accurate drones and ballistic missiles in a target-rich environment. He emphasizes Iran’s incentive to avoid a settlement that yields no gains for Tehran while seeking concessions or relief from sanctions as time passes, increasing American pressure to settle. He warns that if international economic effects worsen, the United States may push for an end to the war, but that would constitute conceding to the Iranians rather than achieving victory. Glenn asks about escalation dominance, noting Iran’s potential vulnerability of Gulf desalination and energy infrastructure. Mersheimer confirms Gulf desalination plants are a critical vulnerability (Riyadh’s desalination plant servicing 90% of Riyadh’s water; Kuwait 90%; Oman 76%; Saudi water about 70%; desalination is essential). He reiterates that Iran can target desalination alongside petroleum infrastructure to cripple Gulf States and that such actions would also affect Israel and the wider economy. He asserts Iran has the option to damage the Gulf States and thus impact the world economy, making escalation unlikely to yield a favorable US-Israeli outcome. The energy dimension is central: 20% of the world’s oil and gas comes from the Persian Gulf. The Straits of Hormuz are unlikely to be opened easily, and destroying Gulf States’ infrastructure would make that moot anyway. He explains that even if Hormuz were open, damaged Gulf States would not export oil, and American naval escorting would be impractical due to vulnerability. He observes that the Iranians’ options threaten the international economy, and the United States’ off ramp is not readily available. Mersheimer provides a historical perspective on air power: strategic bombing cannot win wars alone, as seen in World War II and later conflicts. He notes that the present campaign lacks boots on the ground, relying on air power, but history shows air power alone is insufficient to achieve regime change or decisive victory against formidable adversaries like Iran. He argues that the decapitation strategy, followed by escalation, is unlikely to succeed and that the literature on air wars and sanctions supports this. They discuss previous warnings within the administration: General James Mattis (General Keane) and the National Intelligence Council warned before the war that regime change and quick victory were unlikely. Mersheimer highlights that only 20% of Americans supported the war initially, with 80% skeptical or opposed. He attributes some of the current predicament to Trump and Netanyahu's insistence on a quick victory, arguing that Netanyahu has pushed for a regime-change approach that failed. The conversation turns to Russia and China. Mersheimer contends that Russia benefits from the war by diverting US resources and relations away from Europe and Ukraine, strengthening Russia’s own strategic position. He suggests Russia may be aiding Iran with intelligence and possibly with weapons or energy, as well as improving its image in Iran. He asserts that this war distracts the US from Ukraine, harming Ukrainian efforts and potentially strengthening Russia economically by boosting demand for Russian oil and gas if Gulf supply is constrained. Europe’s position is examined. Mersheimer claims the European Union’s support is largely rhetorical; Europe’s elites fear a US departure from Europe and want to preserve NATO. He argues Europe’s interests will be largely ignored in a US-dominated conflict, with Macron’s stance portrayed as exaggerated power. He suggests Europe is hurt by the war and that their leverage over the United States is limited unless they diversify away from exclusive dependence on the US. In closing, Glenn and John reflect on leadership and propaganda. Mersheimer reiterates that leaders lie in international politics, with democracies more prone to lying to their publics than autocracies, and notes that Trump’s statements—such as Iran possessing Tomahawk missiles or the nuclear capability being erased—are examples of implausible or untruthful claims. He emphasizes the rational strategic thinking of Iranian and Russian leaders, but critiques the American leadership’s strategic understanding. The discussion concludes with reflections on Europe’s potential hardball approach toward the United States, and the need for diversification in European strategy to counter American leverage. The interview ends with appreciation for the exchange and a shared wish that the subject were less depressing.

Speaker 0: It's very hard to explain, especially to a western audience, that a country under sanctions for forty three, forty four years, they have developed an extremely sophisticated military industry with indigenous solutions by scientists and engineers, Iranian scientists and engineers. Everything from this ghost fella all the way to the mega hypersonics, which are almost on the same level of the Russian hypersonic missiles. Everything indigenously developed in Iran. Yes. Katamoran warship is a nice way of putting it. But but go Ghost Boat is much more fun, isn't it? Speaker 1: Yeah. Ghost Boat is a very, enticing, name. Last question. Will the Iranians close the Straits Of Hormuz if the Americans attack Tehran? Speaker 0: This is very, very important, judge. I opened one of my columns with that, and I and I posted on next about it because we finally got confirmation that the parliament, the Marshallese, the Iranian parliament authorized the, Strait Of Hormuz to be blocked. But the final is not the final decision. This is binding. This means that if the order comes from the supreme leader and from the IRGC, they can close the straight anytime they want and this is constitutionally correct. This is very, very important. This means that they are ready to close the straight if, let's say, even if they sense that they're going to be attacked because they know exactly what that means. And many of us who have been writing about that for years, I'm one of them, but Zoltan Posner when he was at the Credit Suisse, he wrote about that as well. Other analysts who were in touch with Goldman Sachs experts. Goldman Sachs, just to give an idea, by 02/1718, more or less, they had already a projection that if the Strait Of Hormuz is closed before, during, or after the the the beginning of a naval war, the barrel of oil could shoot up to $700 a barrel practically in a matter of days. And this is not only the $7, $700 a barrel issue, is the fact that the pyramid of derivatives of the global economy would instantly collapse completely, and this according to Goldman Sachs derivatives experts. And then there was an enormous discussion that's still rolling about how many what's what's the size of this pyramid? It's indeed quadrillions of dollars. It's not even Or Yeah. The original number by the Bank of International Settlements in Switzerland was 700,000,000,000,000. This this figure is from, well, yeah, seven or eight years ago. And then afterwards, if you talk to Persian Gulf traders, and some of them love to talk off the record, they say, look, it's in the quadrillions now, and we know that if this happens, the the global economy can cook everything can collapse in a matter of a week or ten days. So the Iranians know about that as well. And I'm sure people in the Atlanticist sphere, they also know about that. So the question, in fact, is if this information arrives to Trump's desk.

Glenn: Welcome back. We’re joined again by Seyyed Mohamed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and a former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. There’s talk in the US of seizing Kharg Island, which would handle 80–90% of Iran’s oil shipments, effectively a nuclear option to shut down Iran’s economy. What would be Iran’s likely response if the US pursued this path? Marandi: It would be a major problem to access the island because the US would have to fly over Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf. Iran would retaliate if Iranian territory were occupied, taking the war toward a major escalation. The regimes hosting the island would have to pay a heavy price, far greater than now. For the United States, the island is well protected, with Iranian assets on the shore supporting the islanders, and it’s farther from the US Navy and closer to Iran’s shore. But more importantly, such an aggression would be futile: it would not change the Persian Gulf trade through Hormuz, which Iran has effectively controlled by requiring permission to pass. An invasion or occupation would lead to fierce combat and punishment of the regimes that enabled it—Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar—desert-based states with oil and gas but little water. If the US succeeds in taking the island, Iran’s retaliation would involve destroying assets of the cooperating countries. Long-term, Hormuz could be effectively closed, with upstream infrastructure damaged and no oil or gas able to move, making a later reopening contingent on a peace agreement. The operation would be logistically, militarily, and economically disastrous for global markets. Glenn: There are reports Iran is mining Hormuz. Do you know anything about that operation? Marandi: Iran hasn’t mined Hormuz, the Persian Gulf, or the Indian Ocean. The Iranian navy capable of wartime actions is largely in underground tunnels and includes speedboats, surface-to-sea missiles, and a network of underground bases. Iran has not moved to mine the Gulf. It does not want escalation. Iran has always negotiated; US claims that Iran wanted nuclear weapons at the negotiating table are rejected by Iran, the fatwa, and IAEA history. If negotiations had failed, the US invasion would be unjustified. Doha and Qatar are prepared to restart gas facilities and allow oil to flow if peace returns. If the US escalates to destroy key infrastructure, Iran will retaliate, and Iran can hurt US assets and its proxies more than the US can hurt Iran, with long-term global energy consequences. Iran has been striking bases in the region and says it is prepared to continue until after the midterm elections. Glenn: The US energy secretary says the US Navy is studying options to escort tankers through Hormuz. What are the main challenges? Marandi: It would be virtually impossible. Iran’s navy is largely underground, with mines, surface-to-sea missiles, and drones capable of targeting Hormuz from Iran. If open war begins, Iran would retaliate against regimes hosting US bases. Even if Hormuz were opened temporarily, without oil, gas, tankers, or production, there would be no purpose, and energy prices would spike permanently. The US would likely be forced to accept Iran’s terms for peace to allow oil to flow. Glenn: Trump has spoken of further destruction if needed, but says he’s run out of targets. What do you expect from the American side? Marandi: The US is already targeting nonmilitary sites and civilian targets in Iran. They slaughter civilians, including families and children, with premeditation. They could intensify attacks on oil, gas, electricity infrastructure, which would invite Iran to retaliate. Iran’s society is united, with people on the streets despite the bombardments. If the US destroys infrastructure, Iran would respond, but Iran does not want escalation; it would be catastrophic for the global economy. The media in the West is controlled, and there is little outrage at threats to destroy Iran. Glenn: Israeli and American aims now—what’s at stake, and how end this? Marandi: Since the Gaza genocide and Lebanon escalation, Zionism is increasingly viewed as evil, and public opinion against Zionism is growing in the US. The destruction of Israel’s credibility is the greatest defeat, not battlefield losses. End this war now would be prudent; as Iran strikes back, global sympathy for Iran grows and the empire weakens. If Israel were to use a nuclear weapon, that would be catastrophic and could prompt broader proliferation. Glenn: Any chance Iran could retaliate against Britain or European states? Marandi: Europe and the US will have diminished presence in the region; bases would be forced to leave. He notes the possibility of false-flag attacks in the West and asserts Zionist manipulation as a risk, but emphasizes Iran’s determination to defend sovereignty and support for Palestinians and others. Glenn: Just a final note—Iran had three negotiations, not two, including the JCPOA. Thank you for joining. Marandi: Thank you.

Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst, joins the program to discuss the dramatic developments in the war against Iran. The conversation centers on the strike on Karg Island, the strategic choke point for Iran’s oil exports, and the broader implications of escalating U.S. actions. - Karg Island and the oil threat: The host notes that Karg Island handles 90% of Iran’s oil exports and asks why Trump isn’t targeting this area. Johnson argues the attack on Karg Island makes little strategic sense and points out that Iran has five oil terminals; destroying one would not end Iran’s potential revenue. He emphasizes that the U.S. bombed the runway of the major airport on the island, which he says remains irrelevant to Iran’s overall capacity to generate revenue. He notes the runway damage would not support U.S. objectives for invading the island, given runway length constraints (6,000 feet measured vs. need for 3,500–3,700 feet for certain aircraft) and the limited air force in Iran. Johnson asserts that Iran has indicated it would retaliate against oil terminals and Gulf neighbors if oil resources or energy infrastructure are attacked. - Economic and strategic consequences of closing the Strait of Hormuz: Johnson states that the action effectively shut the Strait of Hormuz, cutting off 20% of the world’s oil supply, 25% of global LNG, and 35% of the world’s urea for fertilizer. He explains fertilizer’s criticality to global agriculture and notes that rising gas and diesel prices in the United States would impact consumer costs, given many Americans live paycheck to paycheck. He suggests the price hikes contribute to inflationary pressure and could trigger a global recession, especially since Persian Gulf countries are pivotal energy suppliers. He also points out that the U.S. cannot easily reopen Hormuz without unacceptable losses and that Iran has prepared for contingencies for thirty years, with robust defenses including tunnels and coastal fortifications. - Military feasibility and strategy: The discussion covers the impracticality of a U.S. ground invasion of Iran, given the size of Iran’s army and the modern battlefield’s drone and missile threats. Johnson notes the U.S. Army and Marine numbers, the logistical challenges of sustaining an amphibious or airborne assault, and the vulnerability of American ships and troops to drones and missiles. He highlights that a mass deployment would be highly costly and dangerous, with historical evidence showing air power alone cannot win wars. The hosts discuss limited U.S. options and the possible futility of attempts to seize or occupy Iran’s territory. - Internal U.S. decision-making and DC dynamics: The program mentions a split inside Washington between anti-war voices and those pressing toward Tehran, with leaks suggesting that top officials warned Trump about major obstacles and potential losses. Johnson cites a leak from the National Intelligence Council indicating regime change in Tehran is unlikely, even with significant U.S. effort. He asserts the Pentagon’s credibility has been questioned after disputed reports (e.g., the KC-135 shootdown) and notes that Trump’s advisors who counsel restraint are being sidelined. - Iranian retaliation and targets: The discussion covers Iran’s targeting of air defenses and critical infrastructure, including radars at embassies and bases in the region, and the destruction of five Saudi air refueling tankers, which Trump later dismissed as fake news. Johnson says Iran aims to degrade Israel economically and militarily, while carefully avoiding mass civilian casualties in some instances. He observes Iran’s restraint in striking desalination plants, which would have caused a humanitarian catastrophe, suggesting a deliberate choice to keep certain targets within bounds. - Global realignments and the role of Russia, China, and India: The conversation touches on broader geopolitical shifts. Johnson argues that Russia and China are offering alternatives to the dollar-dominated order, strengthening ties with Gulf states and BRICS members. He suggests Gulf allies may be considering decoupling from U.S. security guarantees, seeking to diversify away from the petrodollar system. The discussion includes India’s position, noting Modi’s visit to Israel and India’s balancing act amid U.S. pressure and Iran relations; Iran’s ultimatum to allow passage for flag vessels and its diplomacy toward India is highlighted as a measured approach, even as India’s stance has attracted scrutiny. - Israel, casualties, and the broader landscape: The speakers discuss Israeli casualties and infrastructure under sustained Iranian strikes, noting limited information from within Israel due to media constraints and possible censorship. Johnson presents a game-theory view: if Israel threatens a nuclear option, Iran might be compelled to develop a nuclear capability as a deterrent, altering calculations for both Israel and the United States. - Terrorism narrative and historical context: The speakers challenge the U.S. portrayal of Iran as the world’s top sponsor of terrorism, arguing that ISIS and the Taliban have caused far more deaths in recent years, and that Iran’s responses to threats have historically prioritized restraint. They emphasize Iran’s chemical weapons restraint during the Iran-Iraq war, contrasting it with U.S. and Iraqi actions in the 1980s. - Final reflections: The discussion emphasizes the cascade effects of the conflict, including potential impacts on Taiwan’s energy and semiconductor production, multiplied by China’s leverage, and Russia’s increasing global influence. Johnson warns that the war’s end will likely be achieved through shifting alignments and economic realignments rather than a conventional battlefield victory, with the goal of U.S. withdrawal from the region as part of any settlement. The conversation closes with mutual thanks and a reaffirmation of ongoing analysis of these evolving dynamics.