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In this video, the speaker discusses the evolution of disinformation in the context of the 2016 and 2020 elections. In 2016, the focus was on foreign disinformation, primarily from Russia, spread through fake accounts and coordinated efforts. However, in the 2020 US election, the disinformation was mostly domestic, originating from authentic accounts, including verified pundits and everyday people. While there were some foreign activities, they played a minor role. The disinformation campaign was not entirely coordinated but rather cultivated and organic, with blue check accounts being major spreaders. This shift highlights the changing nature of disinformation and the need to address it from a different perspective.

Major strategic problems in global communication have led to the spread of disinformation about the pandemic on social media. State-sponsored groups are creating accounts to sow political discord and gain financial advantages. Violence against healthcare workers and minority populations is increasing. Different countries are implementing limited internet shutdowns to manage the overwhelming amount of misinformation. Experts agree that identifying every bad actor is a huge challenge, and new disinformation campaigns are generated daily. Some believe that controlling access to information is necessary to combat the problem. However, it's not just trolls spreading fake news, but also political leaders. It's crucial to ensure that accurate public health information reaches the public through various outlets. Misinformation is causing unrest, eroding trust, and hindering response efforts. Governments are implementing interventions, including internet shutdowns and penalties for spreading harmful falsehoods. Social media companies are trying to limit misuse of their platforms, but it's a complex issue. The public is losing trust in both misinformation and the measures to control it.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss government disinformation offices and transparency concerns. - CISA’s office of mis, dis, and malinformation (MDM) operated as a DHS unit focused on domestic threat actors, with archive details at cisa.gov/mdm. The office existed for two years, from 2021 to 2023, before being shut down and renamed after the foundation published a series of reports. - The disinformation governance board was formed around April 2022. The CISOs countering foreign influence task force, originally aimed at stopping Russian influence and repurposed to “stop Trump in the twenty twenty election,” changed its name to the office of mis, dis, and malinformation and shifted focus from foreign influence to 80% domestic, 20% foreign, one month before the twenty twenty election. - Speaker 1 argues that the information environment problems are largely domestic, suggesting an 80/20 focus on foreign vs domestic issues should be flipped. - A June 2022 Holly Senate committee link is highlighted, leading to a 31-page PDF that, as of now, represents the sum total of internal documents related to the office of mis, dis, and malinformation. The speaker questions why there is more transparency about the DHS MIS office from a whistleblower three years ago than in ten months of current executive power. - The speaker calls for comprehensive publication of internal files: every email, text, and correspondence from DHS MIS personnel, to be placed in a WikiLeaks/JFK-style publicly accessible database for forensic reconstruction of DHS actions during those years, to name and shame responsible individuals and prevent repetition. - The video also references George Soros state department cables published by WikiLeaks (from 2010), noting extensive transparency about the Open Society Foundations’ relationship with the state department fifteen years ago, compared to today. The claim is that Open Society Foundations’ activities through the state department, USAID, and the CIA were weaponized to influence domestic politics while remaining secret, with zero disclosures to this day. - Speaker questions why cooperative agreements from USAID with Open Society Foundation, Omidyar Network, or Gates Foundation have never been made public, nor quarterly or annual milestone reports, network details, or the actual scope of funded activities. USAID grant descriptions on usaspending.gov are often opaque or misleading compared to the true activities funded. - The speaker urges transparency across DHS, USAID, the State Department, CIA, ODNI, and related entities, asking for open files and for accountability. They stress the need to open these records now to inform the public and prevent recurrence, especially as mid-term political considerations loom.

Russia is employing familiar tactics to influence public opinion, including leaking information that supports their national interests, such as denigrating Vice President Biden and boosting President Trump. They are also using social media to spread divisive narratives on various political issues in the United States. Russia's overt media is being utilized to promote narratives that align with their national interests. Additionally, they are sponsoring proxy websites that mimic legitimate sources to disseminate information. Furthermore, Russia is employing unwitting US individuals to lend credibility to the information they distribute, making it appear less obvious that it originates from Russia.

In June 2020, President Trump's tweet about the election received a lot of engagement. Throughout the 2020 election, a small group of influential accounts, including Trump and his sons, consistently spread false narratives about voter fraud. These accounts, along with hyperpartisan media outlets, political pundits, and qanon leaders, amplified these claims and reinforced the idea of a rigged election. This disinformation campaign was both top-down, driven by elites, and bottom-up, with everyday people sharing their own experiences and misconceptions of being disenfranchised or finding evidence of voter fraud.

We analyzed narratives used by the extreme right after the Biden election, finding they spread doubt about election results using words like fraud. This strategy is also seen in Brazil, where civil rights groups translate and spread the same messages. This international movement shows the need for broad policies to combat disinformation and protect democracy.

The speaker asserts that, similar to the Russian indictments for direct election interference and boosting Trump in 2016, some Americans are also engaged in propaganda. The speaker suggests that civil or even criminal charges against these Americans could serve as a better deterrent.

Speakers discuss the severity and novelty of threats to the United States’ political system, focusing on Russian interference and the digital domain. - All acknowledge that the country faced a cataclysmic disruption to its political system that is unlike prior experiences. Speaker 2 notes, as a Vietnam veteran, that fundamental institutions were jeopardized then but proved resilient, and expresses hope for a similar outcome now. - Speaker 1 emphasizes two points: (1) Vladimir Putin’s determination to shape political landscapes inside Russia and abroad, and (2) the consequential role of the digital domain, which allowed Russian intelligence to exploit and manipulate more effectively, culminating in the twenty sixteen election. - They note that Russian interference historically involved exploiting elections, but never with such aggression, directness, or multidimensional methods. The Internet and modern technology serve as a huge enabler for influencing opinion and undermining fundamental systems. - There is a discussion of whether this manipulation was unforeseen. Speaker 2 indicates it goes back to the Soviet era with attempts to influence elections, but the magnitude in twenty sixteen was unprecedented. The digital environment provides malefactors with more opportunities to attack and influence. - The panel explains active measures as fabricating or propagating stories (even patently false ones) to advance a narrative, color perceptions, and lend legitimacy to political actors. They note that the Russians focused on specific voter blocks in states like Wisconsin and Michigan, with estimates that 70,000–80,000 votes could have swung the election. - They discuss methods beyond information operations, including collecting information (e.g., DNC and DCCC email breaches) and money-related tactics: money laundering, disguising funding sources for political actions, and potential extortion or blackmail. They stress that collusion is a tool in the Russians’ kit and that they recruit or exploit individuals where openings exist. - Following the money is highlighted as essential across national security domains; FBI financial investigators and intelligence analysts play key roles, and there is confidence that Mueller and others will trace financial pathways to uncover motivations. - The distinction between cyber warfare and conventional warfare is acknowledged: there are no tanks or planes, but the cyber realm constitutes a war for democracy. A robust response is needed to strengthen the cyber environment, including proposals for a congressional independent commission to assess and strategize future protections, involving engineers, technologists, scientists, and private sector input. - They reflect on why the nation did not respond with the immediacy seen after physical attacks (e.g., 9/11). The lack of a physical rubble-like trigger makes cyber threats harder to mobilize a national response. Leadership issues are cited: when the White House diminishes the CIA, FBI, NSA, or intelligence and law enforcement, it undermines efforts to address the threat. - They recount briefings to the president-elect in January, noting high confidence levels in assessments that did not rely on the dossier; the bigger concern is a perceived indifference to the Russian threat and the denigration of security institutions. - They stress the importance of institutional integrity: the press, law enforcement, and intelligence are pillars of democracy, and denigration of these institutions undermines U.S. credibility abroad. They advocate for stronger checks and balances and reiterate their commitment to truthful reporting and protecting the country. - The speakers, experienced and apolitical, emphasize loyalty to the Constitution and the need for decisive leadership and sustained commitment to democratic institutions, despite political challenges. They conclude with a solemn commitment to safeguard the country and its democratic framework.

The Russians have weaponized social media by manipulating public opinion through biased or fake stories. However, domestic disinformation is also a significant issue. In 2016, the Russian efforts may not have been very sophisticated, but they learned that they don't need to create content themselves as there are people in the US who will do it. There were two types of disinformation attacks in 2016, with the Internet Research Agency taking over existing groups in the US and pushing radical positions. While foreign influence gets a lot of attention, the majority of problems in the information environment are domestic. The domestic threat of disinformation is considered the most significant immediate threat to the 2020 election.

The speaker discusses whether the Russian campaign successfully divided the United States or if the divisions already existed and were exploited. They explain that Putin takes advantage of existing weaknesses and divisive narratives. They emphasize that the campaign to undermine democracy did not start or end with the 2016 election and that it extends beyond elections. The speaker believes that Putin's main objective is to weaken the US, but they also think that his primary audience is his own population. They mention the importance of the justice system and how Putin has been undermining public trust in it. The speaker has been raising awareness among judges about this campaign and has been working to defend against disinformation and cybersecurity threats.

Many people overlook their options in dealing with misinformation on social media. Early detection is key to tracking and countering harmful narratives. Legal action can be taken against profit-driven disinformation networks. Fact-checking alone may not change beliefs, so building counter narratives is crucial. Our organization helps detect, assess, and mitigate the impact of misinformation to prevent future issues. The recent events at the US Capitol highlight the real-world consequences of online disinformation. Translation: It is important to detect and counter harmful narratives early to prevent misinformation from causing real-world harm. Legal action can be taken against profit-driven disinformation networks, and building counter narratives is essential. Our organization helps organizations address the impact of misinformation to prevent future issues. The recent events at the US Capitol show the consequences of online misinformation.

There was a coordinated campaign by elite institutions in America to delegitimize Donald Trump. They portrayed him as a stooge of Vladimir Putin and spread disinformation about his election. However, the Russian interference in the 2016 election was exaggerated, with minimal effect. Organizations like the International Fact Checking Network and the Hamilton 68 dashboard claimed that fake news caused the election outcome and installed themselves as compliance cadres within platforms like Facebook and Twitter. Twitter executives, including Yoel Roth, who reviewed the Hamilton 68 dashboard, knew that the accusations were baseless but kept quiet. The mainstream press largely ignored this information, allowing the exaggerated narrative to become the official one.

Mueller indicted Russians for direct election interference and boosting Trump in 2016. Some Americans are also engaged in this kind of propaganda. Whether they should be civilly or criminally charged could be a better deterrence.

The Russians have weaponized social media by manipulating public opinion through biased or fake stories. However, domestic disinformation is also a significant issue. In 2016, the Russian efforts may not have been very sophisticated, but they learned that they don't need to create the content themselves as there are people in the US who will do it. There were two types of disinformation attacks in 2016: the Internet Research Agency created personas to take over existing US groups and push radical positions. However, the majority of these problems are domestic, related to how we interact online, political speech, amplification, and how politicians use platforms. The domestic threat of disinformation is the most significant immediate threat to the 2020 election.

To weaken democratic institutions, it's not essential for people to believe disinformation. Overwhelming the public sphere with disinformation, raising questions, spreading dirt, and planting conspiracy theories can be enough to erode trust. Once citizens distrust leaders, mainstream media, political institutions, each other, and the possibility of truth, the goal is achieved.

The speaker emphasizes the importance of private companies in combating misinformation online. They express concern over the impact of disinformation on democratic institutions, particularly highlighting the refusal to accept election results. The speaker warns of the global spread of rigged election narratives by autocrats, leading to a loss of faith in democracy. They stress the need to trust democratic systems despite imperfections and changing dynamics. The speaker urges vigilance in countering asymmetric warfare through the weaponization of information.

One-sided news stories and the sharing of biased and false news on social media are plaguing our country. Some media outlets publish these fake stories without fact-checking. This is extremely dangerous to our democracy.

One-sided news stories and the sharing of biased and false news on social media are plaguing our country. Some media outlets publish these fake stories without fact-checking. This is extremely dangerous to our democracy.

America's election infrastructure is more secure than ever, thanks to extensive work by state and local officials. Voters can trust that their votes will be counted accurately. Voting machines are not connected to the Internet, 97% of ballots are paper, and there are multiple safeguards in place, including cybersecurity measures and audits. However, foreign adversaries like Russia and China are spreading disinformation to undermine confidence in the system. As the election approaches, it's crucial for Americans to recognize the potential for increased disinformation. To navigate this, they should rely on information from trusted sources, specifically state and local election officials, who are the experts on election matters.

Americans spreading misinformation, whether intentionally or unknowingly, can pose a significant threat to elections. This misinformation can be shared on social media without us realizing it's fake. While foreign interference is a concern, we value and encourage free speech in our country. However, we also need to ensure that if we or the involved firms are aware of foreign-sponsored and covertly sponsored information, we take steps to manage it effectively.

Digital platforms are being misused to subvert science and spread disinformation and hate to billions of people. This global threat demands clear and coordinated global action. A policy brief on information integrity on digital platforms puts forward a framework for a concerned international response.

We are focused on attracting top talent to the private sector. Transparency is key in combating harmful content and coronavirus misinformation. Russia's involvement in US elections is unprecedented and concerning. Social media platforms are working to combat fake news and misinformation. Strengthened partnerships with government agencies are crucial in safeguarding democracy during important election cycles worldwide.

Suzanne provided an overview of the Beyond the Ballot project and the broader Defending Democratic Institutions framework, focusing on how disinformation and information operations threaten public confidence in our courts and justice system. She emphasized that while Russia is the most aggressive actor in this space, other countries and domestic voices are increasingly involved, with Russia amplifying domestic narratives. The core insight is that these information operations exploit preexisting divisions and genuine grievances, rather than creating entirely new ones, and their aim is to undermine trust in democratic institutions, including the judiciary. Key evidence and framing from her three-year inquiry is summarized as follows: - Russia’s information operations target democracy and its institutions, including the justice system, and other countries imitate Kremlin tactics. Domestic voices are also engaged, and Russia amplifies those efforts. - These operations exploit weaknesses in our own system. They lean into legitimate grievances and seek to undermine perceived integrity, impartiality, and independence of the courts; they portray the judiciary as biased or corrupt or as a tool of elites. - The attack is not limited to elections but is a year-round threat to democratic legitimacy, including the justice system, and is aimed at weakening public trust in outcomes and processes. - Historical context includes the 2016 election, where propaganda, hack-and-leak activity, and attempts to disrupt voter data integrity were observed. Suzanne describes how such activity can extend to the justice system through hacking, leaking of judicial materials, or social media campaigns that manipulate perceptions of court legitimacy. - A notable case example is Twin Falls, Idaho (2016), where social media misinformation about refugees led to public outcry before facts were clarified. Fake accounts created by the Internet Research Agency in Russia pushed narratives that the justice system was failing, targeting prosecutors, judges, and politicians. - Russia uses three channels: social media, state-sponsored media (RT, Sputnik), and official statements by Russian officials. Narratives commonly assert that the justice system is broken, tolerates crime by immigrants, is biased, serves corrupt interests, or is controlled by a political elite. - Narratives are designed to erode confidence in the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and to frame reforms as evidence of systemic collapse. Examples include RT’s coverage and other propaganda aimed at inflaming racial and political tensions. - The campaign also leverages issues around race and policing, featuring fake affinity groups that appear to support opposing sides to inflame tensions and further undermine trust in institutions. - The FBI has warned that the threat extends beyond elections to a broader assault on democracy, with a focus on information operations aimed at all democratic institutions. Concretely, the project’s ongoing work includes: researching adversary threats to democratic institutions; defending the justice system through public awareness; conducting workshops and training for state and federal courts on cybersecurity and disinformation; building a rapid response and education network with legal organizations; and civic education as a national security imperative. The objective is to rebuild public resilience against pernicious messaging, encourage informed citizen participation, and motivate the public to hold institutions accountable while accepting legitimate outcomes. In response to questions, Suzanne underscored that members of the bar have a vital role: they can educate communities, correct disinformation related to specific cases (which judges cannot easily address), and engage in close contact with courts to safeguard democratic legitimacy. She urged lawyers nationwide to be more engaged in educating the public about the justice system and the mechanisms to hold it accountable.

There are Americans involved in propaganda efforts, similar to those that supported Trump in 2016. It’s worth considering whether these individuals should face civil or criminal charges as a means of deterrence.