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- New footage from Tel Aviv is shown, including videos outside windows of what sources say they are seeing, with a claim that Fox News is not covering this damage in Tel Aviv. The discussion centers on the reality of buildings being hit near City Hall, and questions why it isn’t being widely covered by Fox News. - The conversation shifts to missile stocks and interceptors. A comment references Keith Kellogg on Fox News discussing a Wall Street Journal report about running out of interceptor missiles within four to five weeks, and a claim that there is no problem because orders were placed and allies could supply missiles. The speaker notes that UAE reportedly has about a week left of interceptor missiles and says missiles from Iran are getting through “like a sieve.” - It is argued that the U.S. has a limited stockpile because many missiles have been transferred to Israel and Ukraine over the past years, leaving the U.S. inventory low. The claim is made that continuing the war with depleted missiles would heighten national security risk and vulnerability globally. - The transcript discusses potential international responses. The speaker contends that Europe’s mobilization rhetoric (France, Greece) should not be expected to deter Iran, noting that Greece does not have a major army and that NATO-funded contingents are involved rather than independent power. The assertion is made that Iran’s strikes in Tel Aviv, Tehran, Qom, and other cities show that Iran believes it can strike back effectively, signaling a preference to fight the United States and Israel rather than submit again. - The central point is that the conflict is described as 100% about missiles and air-defense missiles, not ground forces. The speaker argues Iran likely has enough offensive missiles to prolong the conflict for months, possibly longer than U.S. capacity to sustain it, especially with Hormuz potentially shut or partially shut, which could hurt the western economy. - Admiral James Stavridis is cited by Speaker 0, noting that as the U.S. and Israel expend hundreds of precision weapons, the focus should shift to logistics and stockpiles. The discussion emphasizes the need for inventory clarity, planning, and alignment between political objectives and military capabilities. - Speaker 1 asserts that the planning should have assessed inventories, timeframes, and whether the means match the objectives. The argument states that risking all resources without sufficient offensive or defensive capacity is a dangerous gamble, suggesting the current course could be a “huge blunder.” - The conversation touches on General Dan Kane, who reportedly told the president two weeks earlier that there were not enough ammunition and it would not be pretty to win. A reference is made to Trump’s Truth Social claiming Kane’s assessment was incorrect, with talk of whether Kane did or did not say the president’s characterization was accurate. The claim is made that there are concerns about integrity and whether senior leaders would publicly contradict the administration’s framing if necessary. - A follow-up question is raised about whether admitting a ground invasion would imply insufficient missiles to sustain the mission, with Speaker 1 acknowledging that admitting ground troops would signal a lack of missiles for sustained action. - The segment then shifts to a sponsorship note about depression treatment options, promoting Ataybekli and its lead program BPL-003 (a nasal spray psychedelic-based therapy) developed for treatment-resistant depression, with background on the company, its investors, and the roadmap toward Phase 3 in 2026. It emphasizes the potential for faster, more scalable treatment sessions and invites viewers to learn more at a website, with disclaimers about not providing medical or financial advice.

The speaker asks about President Biden's conflicts of interest regarding sanctions on individuals who have done business with his family. They mention a report alleging that the First Son's company received $3,500,000 from a Russian woman. The speaker questions how Biden is navigating these conflicts and asks for an explanation of the $3,500,000. The other speaker responds by saying they have no confirmation of the report's accuracy and no further details. When asked about conflicts of interest, the speaker questions what those conflicts would be and points out that Biden has sanctioned more oligarchs than before, suggesting it is not a conflict of interest.

- The discussion frames Iranian capabilities as the current biggest threat to the US Navy, noting that Iran’s position is now stronger, with significant new efforts in the last six months supported by China and Russia. The guest emphasizes that Iranian capabilities today are far more lethal than in 2020 and that Iran has benefited from Chinese and Russian involvement, including help with integrated air defenses. - On the protests in Iran, the guest contends that Mossad, with CIA and MI6, joined the efforts to provoke the regime into a brutal crackdown, aiming to trigger a stronger US response. He argues the protests were legitimate at their core (economic grievances and reformist aims) and that the attempt to exploit them for regime change failed. He explains that, after discovering 40,000 starlight terminals used to orchestrate regime-change efforts, the intelligence community judged the operation a failure, and President Trump was advised that a broader, more forceful campaign would be required, potentially including more firepower and assets. - Regarding Russia and China’s responses to potential regime collapse in Iran, the guest asserts that Russia would intervene only if the regime seemed in danger of collapsing, and China would respond similarly, considering strategic and financial consequences. - In the Maduro Venezuela operation, the guest recounts paying off many actors to enable the abduction of Maduro and his wife, noting air defenses largely stood down due to bribes, with one battery reportedly firing and damaging a helicopter. He suggests the operation accomplished regime alteration but not a change in leadership style, since the new president reportedly will not take instructions from Washington. He speculates that continued oil income from the captured Venezuelan oil could influence outcomes, and he notes skepticism about the profitability of Venezuelan drilling for major oil corporations, who may turn to private or mercenary groups. - The “secret weapon” comment (the discombobulator) is described as an exaggeration; the guest hints at undisclosed capabilities but declines further public discussion, citing high clearance and Pentagon confidentiality. - On Iran’s protests and possible US strikes, the guest reiterates that the initial protests were economically driven and that the Mossad-CIA-MI6 effort to provoke a harsher regime response stalled, leading to the decision for a larger potential strike. He outlines a plan for a prolonged air campaign with multiple carriers and a heavy emphasis on air power over naval action, suggesting a Kosovo-like approach with extensive air sorties to degrade Iran’s air and missile defenses, using surface ships as needed but relying on air power for sustained damage. He notes that the air campaign would require time and additional assets, possibly two to three more carrier groups, and would hinge on the ability to degrade defenses to enable broader bombing operations. - When discussing Iranian capabilities against the US Navy, the guest says Iran’s current capabilities are more dangerous, with Iran receiving about 500 missiles from China and improved Russian integrated air defenses. He notes concern about long-range missiles capable of reaching US bases and questions whether Iran’s Orion missiles could reach Diego Garcia. He asserts that Russian help could be more for deterrence or limited military support rather than supplying exotic missiles like Reshnik, and that the Chinese missiles could threaten ships at sea. - On the US mobilization (Lincoln, submarines, aircraft, drones, HIMARS, Patriot/THAAD), the guest says the response is a time-buying effort to pressure negotiations, with more assets likely and ongoing dialogue with Iran. He suggests the US may pursue enriched uranium settlements, acknowledging Netanyahu’s and Trump’s positions, while noting Iran’s insistence that missile development is not negotiable and that JCPOA prospects are unlikely. - About Iran’s possible escalation strategies, the guest analyzes several options: drone swarms could threaten bases; sea mines in the Strait of Hormuz would be a last resort but remain a hazard; a swarm of boats and diesel submarines pose challenges but are not existential threats to carriers; and long-range missiles (including those supplied by China) could target US bases or ships. He emphasizes that the navy can defend against many of these threats but highlights the difficulty of countering missiles and the threat submarines pose in shallow gulf waters. - On Russia and China’s potential responses if the regime falls: Russia would likely intervene militarily or economically to prevent regime disintegration, while China could leverage financial power (including debt leverage) and maintain strategic flexibility. The Turkish role is described as a wild card; Turkey could be motivated to counter Israeli hegemony in the region, potentially drawing NATO into conflict, despite NATO’s current limited capacity. - Finally, the guest touches on broader geopolitical implications: he suggests Europe is drifting towards greater autonomy from the US, NATO’s effectiveness is questionable, and the regime’s fall could trigger wider regional instability. He argues Taiwan is a separate, less feasible target for conflict, given distance and economic stakes, and calls for more cautious rhetoric regarding Taiwan. He closes by noting that Ukraine’s fate and Europe’s stance will influence how the US and its allies manage any Iran escalation.

The speaker argues that Iran studied the wars of the last two decades and concluded that you can win by not losing. To preserve leadership, Iran has kept a core leadership alive, and the leadership has been strengthened by the strikes faced. There is a belief that there is currently a lot of support inside Iran for the regime, more than a few months ago when support appeared weaker. The speaker notes Iran’s impressive capability to manufacture and disperse ballistic missiles and drones. They point to the Strait of Hormuz as a narrow chokepoint that Iran can exploit by intermittently deploying drones, ballistic missiles, and mines to disrupt world energy flows. Iran is using this leverage while allowing oil to move through the Straits, and they are leveraging relations with China and other world powers to keep oil flows open, suggesting a strategic use of economic diplomacy. The claim is that Iran is deliberately signaling that oil can pass through but that the regime is willing to complicate that flow when it serves their aims. Politically, Iran is portrayed as knowing that a protracted war would not be popular globally, so they have found a steady-state: they can continue striking targets in the Middle East and make life uncomfortable for GCC countries. This ongoing pressure is seen as something they can sustain while external support for them remains, though the speaker expects that support to erode over time. The speaker also highlights a fissure in relations with Saudi Arabia, describing growing fractures that complicate the ability of the United States to project power against Iran. Saudi Arabia’s cooperation is deemed key for countering Iran, and the rifts undermine that dynamic. Overall, the speaker concludes that, from their perspective, there are few downsides for Iran in continuing the war. They believe Iran can maintain their efforts with minimal exertion and continue the conflict far longer than the United States and its allies can sustain, thereby preserving and potentially strengthening Iran’s position over an extended period.

The speaker discusses the alleged infiltration of the Biden administration by individuals with ties to Iran. They mention Maher Ptahr, head of intelligence programs in the White House, who has been accused of prioritizing intelligence collection efforts in favor of Iran. They also bring up Robert Malley, Biden's envoy to Iran, whose security clearance was suspended by the FBI. The speaker claims that Malley installed an Iranian national, Arianne Tabatabay, in a position at the Department of Defense. They argue that these individuals pose a threat to American priorities and call for an investigation into their actions.

The speaker says Ukraine is a bigger, more powerful country, and mentions that Vladimir called after the tanker was seized. They state that the Russian ships involved were a submarine and a destroyer, which both left very quickly when they arrived. They took over the ship, and the oil is being unloaded right now.

- Speaker 0 notes that the United States Postal Service is adding a fuel charge to every package due to fuel cost increases tied to Iran–Israel tensions and says fuel costs have jumped more than 30% since the war began. - Reuters/Financial Times mention: US inflation to surge to 4.2% on energy shock; OECD warnings. Fuel lines are long worldwide, with coverage of shortages in Slovenia, parts of Europe, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines; some countries have run out of petrol or declared a state of emergency. - Speaker 1 paraphrases Putin, saying the energy shock from the Iran war is devastating globally, harming global logistic and production chains and the fuel industry. He claims Europe will beg Russia for oil and gas, referencing a pipeline blown up by the United States. - Mike Adams (Speaker 2, Health Ranger) joins to discuss fuel and food shortages and global impacts. He asserts: energy is the primary driver of affordable food, transportation, and personal freedom; farming is hydrocarbon-intensive due to energy inputs for fertilizer and for planting/harvesting; the Strait of Hormuz constriction worsens scarcity. He argues the Strait was open before the war and that actions against Nord Stream pipelines and the Strait have created energy constraints, predicting severe economic and food shortages until Hormuz reopens. - Speaker 3 (a senator) is shown commenting on the war costs ($2,000,000,000 daily) and casualties; notes that policy decisions and actions have led to escalating prices and potential long-term impacts on Americans. - Speaker 4 and Speaker 2 discuss a pattern of energy lockdowns, global shortages, and potential government controls: universal basic income (UBI) tied to digital control via a CBDC, with quotas on food and energy consumption; off-ramps include off-grid solar power and EV adoption. They suggest this could lead to government-delivered food and fuel, and to a broader move toward centralized control. - The conversation covers the European angle: Putin and the diplomats say Europe may beg Russia for cheap energy as Nord Stream pipelines were disrupted; China–Russia energy deals and Mongolia–Northern China gas transmission are noted as supporting Chinese industry. - Speaker 4 observes European leadership as having pursued energy restrictions and nuclear shutdowns, calling it “energy suicide” and expressing sympathy for European people, while criticizing their leaders for energy policy. - Speaker 2 discusses the petrodollar system’s fragility, noting potential shifts as allies and non-allies trade outside the petrodollar; warns of inflationary effects on the U.S. and potential mass selling of U.S. Treasuries by indebted economies like Japan. - The discussion touches on broader implications: a potential shift toward AI and robotics replacing human labor, with energy scarcity viewed as a driver for social and economic controls; concerns about large-scale power disruptions and rationing, and the possibility of a 10-year horizon for significant changes in labor and energy policy. - In closing, Mike Adams emphasizes the need for viewers to be informed and distinguishes between differing levels of information sources, inviting continued engagement.

- The discussion centers on the Strait of Hormuz blockade amid a claimed ceasefire. The hosts question the ceasefire’s meaning, noting the blockade blocks Iranian ports while talk of abiding by a ceasefire continues. They describe the blockade as highly scripted and incomplete: “The US has a version of what’s going on… stopping every ship. There’s not a ship getting out.” Meanwhile, Iran appears to allow some ships to depart, and China-bound oil shipments have reportedly left the strait and were not stopped. - They compare the situation to “Japanese Kabuki theater,” with a security-guard-like role for some actors and limited real authority. The discussion emphasizes Iran’s multifaceted defense capabilities: coastal defense cruise missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, and drones (air, surface, underwater) that could threaten ships within about 200 miles of the coast. The Abraham Lincoln reportedly suffered damage within 220 miles of Iran’s coast, with Trump later acknowledging multiple attack sources. - On enforcement challenges, it’s noted that effective interdiction would require helicopters, destroyers, and other assets; however, aircraft carriers with helicopters still cover only limited areas. Tracking ships at sea is difficult without transponders, making enforcement complex. - The blockaded objective is debated. Early Trump administration moves lifted sanctions on Russia and Iran to keep oil flowing, but more recently sanctions on Russian oil have been reimposed while efforts to choke Iranian oil continue. The global oil market shows a dissonance: futures prices suggesting relief, but actual dockside prices for oil can be extremely high (up to around $140–210 per barrel). The economic impact is emphasized as potentially severe and not aligned with market signals. - There is critical discussion of Donald Trump’s leadership and decision-making: he is portrayed as emotionally volatile, with shifting beliefs and a tendency to see in headlines what he wants to see. A vivid analogy likens Trump to a child living with an alcoholic father, reacting to threats and stimuli rather than rational policy. J. D. Vance is highlighted as one of the few who has opposed Trump’s war approach and faced pressure from others close to Trump. - Diplomatic moves: Russia and China are described as stepping up efforts to broker peace, working with Saudis, Emiratis, and Iranians, and even approaching Turkey. There are signs that a peace process could be built around resurrecting or reformatting JCPOA-style arrangements, such as on-site IAEA inspections and nonproliferation commitments, potentially making them permanent. The possibility of a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah is discussed as part of broader regional negotiations. - The blockade is criticized as unsustainable, with concerns about maintenance bases (Diego Garcia) and the risk of escalation if ships are forced into closer proximity to Iran. It’s noted that China has warned it would treat interference with Chinese maritime traffic as an act of war; Iran could still route commerce through Turkmenistan and other corridors, limiting the blockade’s effectiveness. - The broader geopolitical shift is highlighted: the United States is losing influence in the Gulf. UAE resistance to Iran and the Saudis’ precarious balance are pointed out, with Iran signaling it could charge fees for entering the Gulf. The dollar’s waning influence is noted, along with rising Chinese and Russian influence in the Gulf region. - The wider consequences anticipated include energy and food shocks, with cascading economic effects globally. The prospect of extended conflict, internal U.S. political chaos, and potential impeachment pressure on Trump are discussed as factors that could influence the war’s trajectory. The hosts suggest that while a negotiated settlement could emerge, the path is fraught with contradictions, shifting alliances, and competing narratives between Washington, Tehran, and regional players.

Speaker 0 outlines steps Donald Trump has taken to create a war with Iran: first, he tore up the Iran nuclear agreement. Speaker 1 confirms, “I am announcing today that The United States will withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal.” Speaker 0 notes a second step: he has escalated crippling sanctions against Iran. Speaker 1 adds, “The sanctions kicking in at midnight Sunday target Iran's oil exports, banking, and shipping. Even though UN inspectors say Iran is still complying with the nuclear deal. The United States will pursue sanctions tougher than ever before.” Speaker 0 identifies a third step: he designated Iran's military as a terrorist organization. Speaker 2 states, “Secretary of state Mike Pompeo has announced that The US is designating the Iranian revolutionary guard as a terror group. Today, The United States is continuing to build its maximum pressure campaign against the Iranian regime. I'm announcing our intent to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including its good force, as a foreign terrorist organization.” The summary adds that, with this designation, the US can sanction “pretty much anybody who talks to or deals with or has any business whatsoever with the IRGC.” Speaker 0 lists a fourth step: he continues to deploy more and more US troops to the region. Speaker 2 reports, “Just moments ago, the Pentagon authorized an additional 1,000 American troops to The Middle East in response to growing concerns over Iran.” He also notes that “a US aircraft carrier and a bomber task force are being sent to areas closer to Iran.” Speaker 2 adds a bellicose message: “Yes. There will indeed be hell to pay. Let my message today be very clear. We are watching, and we will come after you.” Speaker 0 shifts to a political appeal, saying, “We’ve got to stop Donald Trump from starting a war with Iran. I'm asking you to join me and support my legislation, the No More Presidential Wars Act.” To participate in the third presidential debate, she states that “in order to qualify … I need at least a 130,000 people to contribute to our campaign.” She asks viewers to donate, instructing them to click the link or donate at tulsi twenty twenty dot com.

Speaker 0 argues that control over the strait is more powerful than any nuclear weapon, noting that control is clearly in Iran’s hands, with additional mining of the southern portion forcing ships to sail right next to Iran’s total control. They criticize MAGA/Trump supporters for claiming Iran must open it immediately, saying, “you can say all the words you want, but Iran still controls the strait. And that means they control the backbone of the energy of planet earth, period.” Speaker 1 responds that Trump is desperate for a solution because the situation is humiliating the United States. They recount the U.S. posture since the Carter era, referencing the Carter Doctrine: to secure the energy-producing region in exchange for security guarantees, ensuring the Strait of Hormuz remains open. They remind that in 1987, during Operation Earnest Will, the U.S. Navy reflagged the Kuwaiti tanker fleet and escorted it through the Strait of Hormuz to protect it from Iraq and Iran. They say the Iranians watched and learned, and have since developed the capabilities to shut the strait down, and that the U.S. cannot keep it open—our navy, air force, and lack of sufficient ground power can’t do it. Therefore, Iran “own this. It is theirs, and they have declared it is ours.” Speaker 1 warns that if Iran continues to shut the strait, it will cause permanent damage, including permanent economic damage globally, with Europe facing an energy crisis it won’t recover from and Asia facing serious economic harm, including China. They note that China has intervened and pressured Iran to come to the table because a significant portion of China’s energy comes from the Middle East and from countries unable to ship oil due to the closure. They conclude that China told the Iranians they must sit down and talk with the Americans, and that Iran didn’t want to come to the table because they are “winning this war,” asserting, “they’re like, keep bombing us. We don’t care. You’re not destroying us. You’re not breaking our will. We’re destroying you. We’re humiliating you.” The Iranians, according to Speaker 1, were told by the Chinese to flow oil again and to begin talks, prompting Iran to sit down with the Americans.

Trump has announced Project Freedom, an effort to escort ships out of the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz, beginning today. It would involve tanker vessels and about 100 aircraft, though the number of ships is unclear. The speaker views this as an attempt to provoke a response from Iran to justify a renewed, larger war against it, effectively daring Iran to attack as ships are escorted through the Strait. There is debate over whether the Strait is international waters. The speaker notes that maritime law grants 12 miles of territorial waters to each country, and the Strait is so narrow that Iran’s 12 miles and Oman’s 12 miles together cover the entire strait, leaving no international-water segment. The northern portion is claimed to be within Iran’s territorial waters, while the southern portion is believed to have been mined, potentially forcing ships to use the northern portion and come within Iran’s range of drones or missiles. Questions are raised about which ships would be used to escort the tankers. The operation is labeled humanitarian, but the speaker recalls Trump’s past statements about targeting civilians, bombing infrastructure in Iran, and supporting actions in Gaza, arguing that such rhetoric and actions have been condemned as war crimes. The speaker notes a pattern of deceit by the U.S. military, suggesting a possibility that humanitarian rhetoric could mask an attack plan, potentially using civilian tankers as shields or enabling U.S. naval vessels to enter the Persian Gulf for an attack. The central question is Iran’s likely response. Iran has said that no ships will pass without its permission and has the capability to harass or attack vessels. Iran has previously attacked and destroyed commercial ships attempting to transit without permission. Possible Iranian responses include attacking commercial vessels, attacking U.S. naval vessels, doing nothing, or deploying more mines and waiting for ships to hit them. The speaker argues that Trump and the Pentagon are desperate, having failed to force Iran to surrender control of the Strait through financial pressure, mass bombing, sanctions, or fomenting domestic uprisings. Iran reportedly still holds leverage over the Strait, and the United States is attempting to reshape public perception and present itself as a humanitarian actor, despite history and geography suggesting otherwise. The takeaway is that the plan could be an attempt to provoke Iran into a military response that would allow another round of war, possibly under a War Powers Act extension, with U.S. sailors potentially used as bait—an outcome described as horrific and unethical. In the broader context, the ongoing oil shortages and potential global impacts are highlighted, with warnings that delays in opening the strait could worsen shortages of oil, gas, and fertilizer, raising fears of famine in the coming years. The speaker calls for peace and for negotiation with Iran, noting that compromise seems unlikely under the current administration. The closing sentiment emphasizes staying informed and seeking peaceful resolutions.

- The discussion begins with concern about the quality of Speaker 1’s internet connection for recorded YouTube work. Speaker 1 explains that their neighborhood has a monopolist limiting updates to local software/hardware, and says their own Starlink setup is going up, with 20+ or ~30 satellites already online and deploying quickly. Speaker 1 then jokes about sponsoring revolutions abroad, noting France and the UK should be ready. - The conversation shifts to international developments, focusing on the “Iran war” and later Ukraine/Russia, and then on Trump’s visit to China. - Speaker 1 describes alleged details from Trump’s China visit: Tajikistan’s president was visiting the same day, and during Trump’s arrival only part of the route’s flags were reportedly changed from Tajik to US flags. Speaker 1 frames this as a “soft insult.” - On Xi Jinping meeting Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin at airports/tarmacs, Speaker 1 says some claims are not true and emphasizes protocol and past examples: in prior meetings (Xi and Putin; Trump arriving previously), Xi reportedly met Putin at the tarmac, sat down with the top down, and drove into the city. Speaker 1 also says that in Trump’s last China arrival, Trump reportedly had Xi waiting. - Speaker 1 assesses the Xi–Trump meeting as unprepared compared with highly structured US-style or adversarial-country meetings. They describe how security teams, working diplomats, document preparation, possible joint statements, and agenda negotiation are typically handled before leaders meet. Speaker 1 compares this to earlier dynamics seen in Anchorage (with Trump allegedly seeking speed for a PR/picture moment). - The thread links the China visit to energy leverage involving Iran and Venezuela. Speaker 1 says Venezuela’s capacity is limited (around 800,000 barrels/day) and that significantly expanding it takes time and large investment. Speaker 1 argues US refining limitations matter: US refineries were set up for heavier sour crude (described as “viscous” and “sour” due to sulfur) and the US has not built a new refinery in over 30 years, citing bureaucracy and environmental laws as reasons companies left. - Speaker 1 elaborates on why the US cannot easily expand refining quickly, citing high insurance costs for factory work and related regulatory burdens, leading factories to move elsewhere. - Speaker 0 asks whether Trump intended a different sequence: Speaker 1 says the initial idea was to seek earlier wins and use Venezuela and Iran concessions to gain leverage, but the meeting reportedly came with Trump facing weaker leverage and needing help on Iran. - Taiwan discussions: Speaker 1 says reunification preferences exist among the Taiwanese opposition party that met Xi in China, with Taiwan described as the “Republic of China” and some groups categorized as seeking reconquest/reunification. Speaker 1 discusses why supplying Taiwan for conflict is difficult across open water and notes past US War College war-game conclusions that China would win if the US fleet intervened between China and Taiwan, while US strategy (as described) aims to make invasion costly rather than “winning.” - Proxy-war framing: Speaker 1 describes Ukraine and Iran/Yemen conflict patterns as proxy dynamics, referencing Marco Rubio’s admission that one war is a proxy war. - Iran supply/blockade claims: Speaker 1 says Iran is supplied via multiple routes—ports on the Caspian connected through Russian ports, and a rail line through Pakistan to China—plus other smaller export/storage options. Speaker 1 argues Iran’s weakness has historically included refining and diesel shortages, comparing it to the US importing refined product because it cannot refine enough to meet demand. - Venezuela capacity and US-advantaged/refinery/infrastructure problems are revisited, including discussion of reserves being held in gold in the US, social spending reductions of reinvestment, and US confiscation/export restrictions on equipment replacement, leading to worn-out infrastructure and the lack of “quick fixes.” - Straits of Hormuz and alleged “fee” idea: Speaker 0 cites a White House statement that China agreed to buy American oil to diversify from Hormuz and that Iran should not charge a fee for the Straits of Hormuz. Speaker 1 responds that Iran does not charge China fees (as stated by Speaker 1), then argues China’s commitments would only be clear if China confirms them, and compares this to past statements where purchases were claimed without matching agreements. - Speaker 1 argues sanctions can be moved/bypassed by the US government, not lifted by it, and says only US Congress can remove sanctions. Speaker 1 also claims the US continues buying sanctioned Russian products, while Europeans are criticized for accepting costly resell markups. - Speaker 1 also argues Hormuz isn’t treated as international waters in their view, and that Oman involvement matters, including claims about Oman not installing tollbooths and Iran striking ships—contrasted with the idea that a long-term/perpetual fee would open global choke-point “can of worms.” - Broader geopolitical framing: Speaker 1 says the “global system” is effectively gone, arguing the US helped build it and then killed it when it no longer served US interest, citing examples like the WTO and the strategic focus on controlling key choke points. Speaker 1 contrasts sea routes with Eurasia land connectivity and high-speed rail, linking this to belt-and-road connectivity. - Back to Iran: Speaker 0 asks whether China is pressuring Iran to concede or offering Trump political support with words. Speaker 1 says China prefers status quo and would prefer an end to war without weakening American stockpiles; Speaker 1 also says Iran’s ceasefire is not a full ceasefire and that both sides continue actions. - US military capacity and escalation: Speaker 1 argues that if Trump restarts the war, missile production is “null and void” at scale, and US manufacturing/industrial ramp-up would take years, citing the “missile production is null and void” point and the difficulty of rapid industry re-shoring due to state regulations. Speaker 1 discusses rare earths as a limiting factor in a different way—refining/processing capacity rather than shortage of elements—then argues chemical/electrolysis processing is expensive, energy intensive, and environmentally complex, often causing multi-year delays similar to refineries. - Soft-power indicators from Xi’s alleged absence and flag changes are used to explain Chinese behavior toward Trump, contrasted with prior high-level airport greetings and seating/handshake optics. Speaker 1 compares seating arrangements and perceived humiliation in European/Serbia contexts as a recurring pattern of power display. - Iran-war outcome speculation: Speaker 0 proposes a 50/50 scenario: continuation of conflict with Israeli strikes (and Iran mirroring strikes in the Gulf) versus Trump walking away. Speaker 1 says Israelis are driving outcomes and that APAC donors and money make turning away difficult, arguing Trump wants out but is constrained. Speaker 1 also says Iran and even Saudis/Kuwaitis reportedly would prefer US withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. - US military withdrawal and logistics: Speaker 1 says the US fifth fleet has left, its forward headquarters is moving to Israel, and damage estimates/repair costs are discussed. Speaker 1 argues the US is drawn into a genocide-perception dynamic once bases/equipment and US involvement are present. - Historical Iraq/Kuwait/Persian Gulf narrative: Speaker 0 asks why the US wanted Saddam to invade Kuwait. Speaker 1 asserts the US wanted Iraq to enter the Persian Gulf and become positioned for broader US presence, describing US backing for conflicts involving Iran and chemical weapons channels, and claiming Kuwait engaged in slant drilling stealing Iraqi oil. Speaker 1 says the US/Soviet coalition dynamics allowed the Gulf buildup and entry point into the region. - Final escalation discussion and regional future: Speaker 0 asks whether Trump will walk away or get trapped into escalation for a “win.” Speaker 1 says Israel’s influence over the US is expected to decline, claims generational shifts among American Jews/Christians and anti-Israel demonstrations, and argues Iran and the Gulf could reshape into new blocks with improved Gulf-Iran relations if stability is prioritized. - The conversation ends with debate over perceived misconceptions about Iran’s treatment of minorities and religious/political representation, plus discussion contrasting Iran with Saudi Arabia in terms of women’s legal status and religious policing, followed by a plan to do a future live recording using appropriate software.

Biden's attempt to play both sides has backfired as he lifted sanctions on Iran, allowing them to gain billions of dollars in wealth. Iran is now just 30 days away from obtaining nuclear capability. The previous administration terminated the nuclear deal but failed to take any further action. If the election outcome had been different, a deal with Iran could have been reached within two weeks. However, Biden's decision has made Iran rich again, with China being their top oil customer. This incompetence has led to the imminent threat of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, which is unacceptable.

Speaker 0: Welcome to game plan. I'm Shivan Jan now. So far, there is only one winner in this war in West Asia, and that's Russia. Mind you, I'm not saying that this was acknowledged by the European Council president Antonio Costa. US Israeli strikes in West Asia, they have driven up the price of oil, strengthening the Kremlin's ability to fund its military campaign. Now in a sharp reversal from last year's policy of penalizing countries for buying Russian energy, US treasury secretary Scott Pessen said that The United States could unsanction other Russian oil to keep the flow of oil intact. And this is because the Strait Of Hormuz, the pivotal point from where this war is kind of converging, that is under complete Iranian control. Movement of ships has been blocked. Movement of oil has been blocked. It has shot up the oil prices, and the repercussions are being felt across the world at this point. Is the war proving to be a boon for Russia whose economy is dependent on energy exports? As the state of Hormuz gets blocked, Russia gets a free hand at selling its oil at rates that can be expounded without proper discounts as well. Is Putin the one winning in the war that US and Israel started against Iran? To discuss this with me on game plan is doctor Glenn Deesen, professor of international relations at the University of Southeastern Norway. Glenn, always a pleasure speaking with you. Thanks so much for joining me here. Trump and Putin, they held a call recently, the first time this year, and this was to discuss the discuss the ongoing hostilities in Iran. What do you think they would have discussed, and what kind of a role can Putin be playing in the ongoing war? Speaker 1: Well, I assume some of the things to discuss was obviously the the the extent to which The US and Russia targets each other because one of the things that the American media has been complaining about is the likelihood that Russia is providing intelligence to Iran for targets, but of course this is what The United States been doing for years and continues to do, that is give the Ukrainians targets to hit Russia. So I think there's a necessity to begin to discuss is appropriate and again what happens behind these doors, I don't know. But also of course there has to be some scaling back of the energy sanctions against Russia to bring this, the energy prices under control. As you suggest, they are now very much out of control. But I think also the main thing they've discussed is how to bring this war to an end because I think it's perfectly clear now that this US attack on Iran was a terrible mistake, and it appears that Putin would be the the main middleman who would might be able to bring an end to this war. But, again, it depends what can be done as what the Iranians will demand may be more than what the Americans can deliver. Speaker 0: Glenn, as you mentioned, Putin could perhaps be the main person to bring peace in this war. Putin has the highest chance of acting as peacemaker in West Asia. Is there anyone other than Putin at this point who can bring? Because just look at the optics of it. US starts a war, and I think ten days into it, he needs to make a call to Vladimir Putin to discuss that same war. How does it look for The US? Speaker 1: Well, they don't care for this, of course, but that it's similar to what to what happened with the war against Syria. That is, if you remember, back at president Obama's time, he had set these red lines, he were gonna attack Syria. It was quite obvious that this would be a disaster. So he went to the Russian president and he was able to get a deal through and which essentially took Obama's chestnuts out of the fire. So it was, you know, it it it is the reality or the optics of it isn't great given that The US has been fighting a proxy war for years against Russia, but but, know, at some point, you have to put the optics aside. Who who else would be in a position to help to negotiate this? I'm thinking, you know, perhaps China could be a middleman, but I think given that The United States, especially under the Trump administration, wants to improve bilateral ties with Russia, I I I think he's probably the best, yeah, the best bet. Speaker 0: Would it be fair to say that Putin is emerging as a winner in this ongoing West Asia war, which only seems to be expanding within the West Asian region? Speaker 1: Well, no. I think, yeah, to a large extent, I think that is correct because the energy prices are way up. The US have to scale back sanctions. The all the weapons which The US had intended to ship towards Ukraine to fight Russia is now being depleted. For European leaders, as you mentioned earlier on, to who aspire to prolong the war in Ukraine, this is an absolute disaster. And we'll see that countries that cut the energy ties or at least reduced energy ties with Russia at the best of American pressure, they of course have learned a lesson now as well that this was not a good idea that you don't necessarily put bet too much on a hegemon in decline, so countries who before paid discounts now may have to pay premium. We'll see that Iran, which I assume is getting some support from Russia sees this relationship improving dramatically. They're moving much closer, which is good for Russia because the Iranians always have some suspicions towards the Russians given well a long history they've had through the centuries of conflict. So all of this improves. You can also say that The Gulf States, the weakening of The Gulf States has also a big impact on weakening The U. S. Ability to restore its hegemony because what show what's obvious now is that the Gulf States are not getting protection instead they're becoming very vulnerable as frontline states and The US is no longer seen as that reliable. Well, if they're not going to bet their security on The United States anymore then they may not have that much pressure to sell their oil in dollars. You're not gonna have those recycled petrodollars coming back to The US, and suddenly the whole AI race with China looks a lot weaker as well. So I think across the board, a lot of things look good for Russia, but and there is a big but here, and that is I don't think that the Russians want this war nonetheless because the Russians, much like the Chinese, value stability and predictability. And what's happening in Iran now could again, if something would happen to Iran collapse, that would be a disaster for this Greater Eurasia initiative that is to integrate economies of Greater Eurasian Continent, but also this could spiral into a world war. So from this perspective, it's very dangerous and I don't doubt that the Russians therefore want to put an end to this war simply because I guess much like India, they don't want the Eurasian Continent to be too China centric, they would like to have many poles of power and this requires diversification. This means that the Russians need close ties with Iran, with India and other countries. So for the Americans to knock off Iran off the, you know, the chessboard, the greater Eurasian chessboard would be a disaster for the Russians. So, yes, I think they're prospering or benefiting from this, but they they do wanna put an end to it. Speaker 0: Understood. Glenn, let me just come to the Strait Of Hormuz. You know, the objectives of U. S. Behind starting this war, that has been questioned enough. Why did you start this war in the first place? Those are questions not just emerging, you know, globally. They're also emerging from inside The U. S. But if you look at what a win will actually look like for US, would it be the state of Hormuz? Like, which whoever controls the state of Hormuz is eventually who walks away as you know, walks away with the victory at this point because The US was looking for a change in regime. They mentioned it enough number of times. That hasn't happened and doesn't seem like it's going to happen. Is the state of Hormuz the winning factor now? Speaker 1: Well, I I I don't think any The US would be in a position to control this just given the geography. So The US obviously went into into this war with the objective of regime change. That was the goal. This was the decapitation strike, this was the hope of killing Khamenei and obviously it didn't work. I think it shouldn't have come as a surprise, but you know killing the leader of Iran only created more solidarity within the country. And also the idea that the whole armed forces would begin to disintegrate once they had been punished enough, also proven to be incorrect. So I think at the moment you see the American pivoting a bit. Some are talking about the Strait Of Moose that this should be a goal, others are saying you see a shift now towards saying well, actually what we really want to do is just degrade Iran's missile capabilities that they won't have this long range missiles. And again, you know, these are the kind of vague objectives which they can essentially declare victory today then because Iran has had many of its missiles destroyed. Also it launched a lot of its missiles at U. S. Targets which means that its missile stockpile has been reduced. So this should be a source of optimism when The U. S. Moves from this very hard line objective such as regime change and they shift in towards missiles, reducing the missile stockpiles or something like this. But the straight of our moves, I think, is beyond what what is reasonable. It's it will be too difficult. So I don't think they will But why push too hard on do Speaker 0: you feel it would be difficult if I were to just look at the bases that they have across West Asia? They have enough military might. Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, have their bases there. How difficult would it be to exert that military might over the Strait Of Hormuz? Speaker 1: Well, controlling it just means the ability to shut it down. Many countries would have the ability to shut down this narrow strait. The problem is that no one benefits from it, that is the Gulf States are hurt, Iran is hurt from it, The US and the global economy is hurt. So it becomes an exercise in self harm. The reason why the Iranians are doing this, the ability to shut down the Strait Of Hormuz is because The US has the ability to inflict a mass amount of destruction. It can go after civilian infrastructure, it can well, look what they've done to Tehran. It looks like, well, just, you know, the chemical warfare there. You've seen in terms of going after his fuel depots. They're going after the water supplies in Iran. You you see all these things. This is what America can do. Iran doesn't have that ability. They can't hit The United States. What they can do is cause economic pain. So, yes, I think The US and many of the Gulf States can also shut down the Strait Of Our Moose, but but but that's not that's it doesn't have any purpose. It doesn't have any reasoning. Speaker 0: Can they eradicate the Iranian control over the Strait Of Hormuz? I'm not talking about shutting it down, but just get rid of the Iranians from there and they then decide who gets to control and when it has to be shut and when it has to be opened and remained and kept open and secured. Can The US exert that kind of military might over the state of Hormuz to control it? Speaker 1: Then one need us to control a massive amount of Iran's territory, which is a huge territory with populated by 90,000,000 people. So this seems very unlikely and if closing down the Strait Of Hormuz would depend on very sophisticated weapon systems, will be one thing. But this can be shut down with drones which can be manufactured in apartments. It can be also shut down with small naval drones that is this essentially drone operated small torpedoes. There's it doesn't require a lot of high technology which means that The US can't take out very key infrastructure to prevent Iran from shutting this down, to force it to open. But with very cheap and easy to make weapons, the Iranians can shut it down and it's simply too much territory, too large population for The United States to shut down the these capabilities. So at some point, they're have to make peace with the Iranians and make it make sure it's in Iran's interest to keep the Strait Of Hormuz open because it is in their interest. The problem now is that Iran faces an existential threat. That is The US now threatens to destroy not just the government, but also the country. As Trump tweeted, we we will make it impossible for Iran to even rebuild as a nation. And this is what regime change means. There is no replacement government. This means the disintegration and destruction of Iran, a massive civil war which could cost hundreds of thousands of lives. So for them this is existential which is why they went to this great extent. They've never done this before because they never believed that they faced this kind of an existential threat. So if the war ends, the Iranians have no reason to shut this straight down. This is very horrible for them as well. So, no, I I don't think The US can control the straight or almost no one can control it completely because too many actors could shut it down. Speaker 0: Glenn, thanks so much for joining me here on game plan. Whether this war continues further, that only means and if it does, that's essentially what Iran is looking at because they're not capitulating. They're not giving up. They are taking a bad amount of beating. There's no doubt in that, but they are continuing with their counters nevertheless. And straight of hormones is their main play where they're exerting their pressure with whether it's mines, whether it's their own boats, whether it's their own military boats. Now energy experts have also warned that whether the Iran crisis proves a cure for Russia's economy, that depends directly on how long it lasts. But there is little to suggest that Iran is willing to capitulate that what we just discussed. They're inviting U. S. To continue the war on the other hand. That's what the statements from Iran suggest that we're waiting. Come on, on. Now in the midst of this, Russia is emerging as the winner as we just discussed. How long this lasts? It doesn't seem to be in the favor of The U. S. We'll need to wait and watch twelfth day and running. They expected it to last for about four to five weeks, whether it goes the distance or even longer. Let's wait. That was Glenn Deeson joining me here on Game Plan. Speaker 1: Thanks, Yvonne.

Ro Khanna (Speaker 1) and the other speaker debate Obama’s Iran policy and its consequences, referencing actions, deals, and geopolitical alignments. - The other speaker asserts that under Obama there were 14 wire transfers to a Swiss account linked to Hezbollah between 2014 and 2016, totaling 1.7 billion dollars, which he says Obama told Congress were frozen Iranian assets. He also claims a back channel to Tehran through Valerie Jarrett operated after Obama left office, describing it as a shadow government, and alleges pellets of cash were sent to Iran by plane. He questions why money would be sent to Iran given its alleged nuclear ambitions and sponsorship of terrorism. - Ro Khanna counters that Obama was a great statesman who left America safer, noting that 97% of enriched uranium was removed, American service members deaths were avoided, and gas prices did not rise as claimed by the other speaker. He says Obama did not give China a larger role in the region and did not harden the IRGC; instead, Obama engaged in diplomacy to bring China, Russia, and European allies on board toward a path to a non-nuclear Iran. - The other speaker insists Obama sent money to the Iranians and that they resumed enrichment. Khanna responds, “That’s not true.” The other speaker clarifies that a deal was reached to remove 97% of enriched uranium, and assets unfrozen were Iranian assets, not U.S. money, with broad international involvement (China, Russia, France, UK, Canada, the U.S.). He says Obama tried to torpedo the deal and that APEC and Netanyahu opposed it, which dragged the U.S. into more conflict in the Middle East. He argues Obama was against the Iraq War and favored normalization toward Iran, with broad global support, but claims AIPAC and Netanyahu undermined that effort. - Khanna pushes back, suggesting the claim that Obama delivered on preventing a nuclear-armed Iran is inaccurate, asserting that 10 presidents before Trump all claimed Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon, and stating that Obama delivered 97% out in some sense while the other speaker reiterates that Obama sent money to Iran. The other speaker emphasizes the world’s broad support—Russia, China, Canada, the U.K., France, and others—lost or shifted away, implying that U.S. leadership faltered and that the world coalition was lost. - The discussion shifts to what U.S. policy should be: a return to “team America,” addressing gas prices, avoiding further wars, and a preference for leadership that aligns with Israel’s stance as framed by Netanyahu and AIPAC, according to the other speaker. Khanna notes ongoing debate about who holds influence, and the dialogue ends with a mutual acknowledgment of continuing the conversation, thanking each other and Maria.

The speaker discusses alleged infiltration of the US government by individuals with ties to Iran. They mention Maher Ptahr, head of intelligence programs in the White House, who is accused of prioritizing intelligence collection efforts away from important areas such as the southern border and terrorism. They also mention Robert Malley, Biden's envoy to Iran, whose security clearance was suspended by the FBI. The speaker claims that Malley installed an Iranian national, Arianne Tabatabay, in a position at the Department of Defense. They argue that these individuals are distracting from protecting American priorities and call for an investigation into the situation.

First speaker: Iran doesn’t really need to attack American ships or force the strait to open because it could actually be advantageous for the strait to remain closed. There are floating oil reserves and cargo ships in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea that Iran could rely on. In fact, Iran has a substantial stockpile: 160,000,000 barrels of Iranian crude already floating at sea, outside the Persian Gulf, past the Strait of Hormuz into the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. That amount could fuel a country like Germany for over two months, and most of it is headed to Chinese independent refiners. Exports remain high, and the blockade is real, even if the timing is late. Do you agree that Iran is prepped for this day? Second speaker: I do agree. I think this is not harming the Iranians as much as it is harming the United States and the rest of the world. First speaker: What is Trump’s thought process? He has spoken with secretary Besant and other advisers, so he’s already sought advice. What alternative could work in Trump’s favor? Second speaker: Whenever the first round of negotiations ended, the president believed that his style of brinksmanship would produce immediate capitulation and agreement by the Iranians. The Iranians have never negotiated like that. Even the first treaty in the late 2000s took a long time to negotiate, not one and done. This administration wants short-term gains, and that isn’t possible with the Iranians. In the short term, the Iranians are in the driver’s seat. Negotiating and diplomacy are very difficult work; you don’t bully your way through. There is no unconditional surrender. There is none of that except in the president’s mind, unfortunately.

Russia is consistently portrayed as acting against American interests, particularly with its alliance with China and its invasion of Ukraine. This action, while wrong, was driven by Russia's concern over Ukraine potentially joining NATO and becoming a satellite of the United States with American weapons. The speaker argues that Ukraine's government isn't fully sovereign, alleging it was installed by a CIA coup. They highlight that during peace talks in Istanbul, a potential agreement was disrupted by the US, leading to further devastation and loss of life in Ukraine. The speaker questions why the U.S. is at war with Russia.

The speakers portray the United States as having shifted from an empire to a pirate state, with a transformation into what they call the petro gas dollar or LNG dollar. They claim the US has quietly carried out an armed robbery of the world’s oil and gas supply, hitting Russian tankers and refineries, crippling China’s oil supply, capturing major oil fields, and kidnapping or assassinating leaders, all while expanding its domination over global energy and finance. The analysis emphasizes that the US, now the world’s top producer and exporter of oil, gas, and LNG, operates with self-sufficiency but seeks to kill competition to maintain a monopoly. The claim is that the US used the Ukraine war as cover to eliminate rivals and then used the Iran war to finish off Qatar’s LNG position, forcing Europe to buy American LNG at ten times the price and turning Europe into a US energy client. As a result, European energy prices rise, euros lose value relative to the dollar, and BRICS and dedollarization efforts falter. A central strategic thread is the destruction of competing energy suppliers to create captive markets. The speakers allege that the US destroyed Nord Stream II and blew up pipelines, which not only hurt Russia but forced Europe to rely on American LNG. They argue that the US then redirected gas flows to the Gulf and Levant, sealing a role for Chevron and other US energy giants in these transactions. The Board of Peace is described as a front for a legal cover of Washington’s colonial plan, enabling energy seizures in Gaza, the Levantine Basin, and elsewhere, with Chevron’s activities framed as orchestrated groundwork for energy deals in the Levantine Basin, as well as in Venezuela and Lebanon. The narrative then claims the US intends to dominate China by cutting off its vital fuel sources, forcing China to buy American oil and gas, thereby preserving the dollar and hobbling BRICS and multipolarity. It details how the US targeted Venezuela’s oil, kidnapping Maduro and seizing oil, which previously supplied 80% of Venezuela’s oil exports to China, and how the US expanded its reach by threatening Cuba’s energy grid after Maduro’s removal. It asserts the US orchestrated a global oil blockade, with attacks on Russian energy hubs, ships, and refineries, to cripple Russia and China’s energy security, including attacks in the Caribbean, North Atlantic, Mediterranean, Black Sea, and Baltic Sea. The speakers describe Iran as being cut off from Hormuz and subjected to an escalating cycle of strikes that disrupt its toll system and port infrastructure, while Russia’s exports are disrupted by attacks on export hubs and ships, creating a 40% reduction in Russia’s seaborne oil export capacity. They claim the US is using this chaos to drive up LNG and oil prices, forcing Europe and Asia to bid on US gas while shipping dominance remains with Washington. The financial logic is that dedollarization efforts fail because the US can force energy trade to be settled in dollars, while the US economy benefits from wartime pricing and export profits. The “maritime extortion network” is described as a system where the US can move LNG on ships, changing routes as needed, and a “protection racket” via the US Navy is proposed as a price for safe passage. The monroe doctrine is reframed as moving the planet’s energy corridor into the Western Hemisphere, with the Gulf of Mexico and Washington as the key nodes, rather than the Middle East. Finally, the speakers assert that Iran’s drones, missiles, and air defenses have degraded the US air force’s bases and radar arrays, while the USS Gerald R. Ford was compelled to relocate, reinforcing the claim that Iran’s actions are challenging US military dominance and undermining the myth of invincibility. The overarching claim is that the US empire is consolidating global energy control through piracy, sanctions, and strategic energy realignments, with Chevron playing a pivotal role in every facet of this strategy.

Iran allegedly has an active plot to assassinate a US election candidate, potentially constituting election interference. The US National Security Advisor stated there will be consequences, but the speaker could not elaborate due to the ongoing situation and conversations with Israeli counterparts. The administration claims it has not lifted any sanctions on Iran; instead, it has increased pressure. However, Iran's oil exports have reportedly reached record levels of 3,200,000 barrels per day, generating approximately $90 billion a year. Despite these reports, the administration maintains that sanctions remain in place and are being enforced, and that pressure on Iran is increasing.

Iran has a history of funding terrorism, like Hamas, regardless of sanctions. The argument that the money given to Iran is fungible suggests that they could have used other funds for the recent attack.

The speaker suggests bombing Iran's oil infrastructure as a response to their alleged financing of terrorism. They believe it is time for Iran to face consequences for supporting chaos. They clarify that if war escalates, they will come after Iran. Speaker 1 seeks clarification, asking if the speaker wants the US and Israel to bomb Iran without direct evidence of their involvement in the attack. The speaker confirms this.

The speaker discusses how the current energy policies of the president have led to an increase in oil prices, which in turn may be providing Iran with more funds to support terrorist groups. Speaker 1 disagrees with this viewpoint, stating that they do not believe our actions are directly funding Iran. Speaker 0 argues that by restricting oil supply in the US and regulating the industry, the administration is indirectly contributing to higher oil prices and potentially benefiting Iran. Speaker 1 avoids commenting on this hypothetical scenario and does not provide a clear answer.