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Daniel Davis contends that Iran’s two primary objectives are to survive—politically and militarily—and to keep the Strait of Hormuz closed. Politically, Iran must maintain control of the IRGC, police, and regular army to endure assassination attempts and maintain regime viability. Militarily, Iran does not need to defeat the United States but must sustain missiles, drones, and attacks on regional assets to remain viable. Time benefits Iran: the longer the conflict lasts, the more it hurts the United States, especially given U.S. urgency to end the war and reopen Hormuz.
Davis argues the United States has a more urgent timeline due to the economic impact of a closed Hormuz, with oil prices hovering around $100 and potential further price spikes if the Strait remains shut. Iran, however, can endure months of strikes while keeping Hormuz closed, placing pressure on the Trump administration. He notes that the U.S. has destroyed much of Iran’s surface forces and air force and much of launch infrastructure, but Iran retains missiles, submarines, speedboats, drones, and a dispersed set of launch sites, allowing continued viability.
On the political front, Davis says Iran sees the Israeli-US effort as aimed at destroying the Iranian state, and that domestic opposition to the regime has rallied around the flag. He argues Trump faces significant political challenges at home, including allies unwilling to risk naval engagement and internal criticism amplified by figures like Joe Kent, who resigned as director of the National Counterterrorism Center and accused the Israeli lobby and media of orchestrating a misinformation campaign. Kent stated there was no imminent threat from Iran, arguing the war was not America-first.
Davis asserts that Trump cannot count on broad allied support to open Hormuz; allies have refused to risk their ships or crews in a mission that could fail. He cites the lack of a coherent, feasible military plan to open the Strait and the risk of escalation, while noting domestic and Gulf-state economic pressures.
In discussing potential military options, Davis questions the viability of a ground invasion of Iran. He estimates a ground campaign would require at least 500,000 to 1,000,000 troops and would face impassable terrain and fortified defenses, making a successful outcome unlikely. He argues a sustained air and naval campaign also fails to guarantee opening the Strait, given Iran’s dispersed defenses, underwater missiles, drones, submarines, and long-range artillery. He suggests the most feasible non-air/space option might involve attempts related to Yemen to keep Bab el-Mandeb open, but even that is uncertain and risky.
Regarding weapons and logistics, Davis notes the current conflict uses different inventories than those used in Ukraine, with interceptors and air-defense assets not readily available to share, while JDAMs and other munitions are limited. He observes that munitions consumption is high and could strain stockpiles, complicating long-term operations.
Finally, Davis discusses US-Israeli relations. He says there has been a public decline in support for Israel among some groups, and Joe Kent’s explicit critique of Israeli manipulation could complicate bipartisan support. He predicts that growing American casualties and economic costs from the war could lead to political pressure on Trump to adjust or disengage, potentially affecting U.S.-Israel coordination in a prolonged conflict.