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Stanislav Krapivnik and the host discuss the current phase of the war in Ukraine, focusing on the southern front around Zaporizhzhia and the broader strategic implications. - On the southern front, the Russians are advancing along the Zaporizhzhia axis, with the last defensible Ukrainian positions in the area being Arakha (Orakhivka) and Zaporizhzhia city. Gulyaipol has fallen after Russians breached a fortified eastern line by exploiting open terrain and flanking from the east; the Ukrainians’ straight-line northern assaults into Gulyaipol are described as unsustainable under heavy drone and open-ground fire. Russian forces have moved along the river edge and toward a 15-kilometer radius from Zaporizhzhia City, entering suburban zones and pressing east to overhang Arakha from the north. Zaporizhzhia City itself is an open terrain area with a major bridge over the Nieper; the speaker asserts it would be hard to hold under drone and air superiority, and predicts a ruinous but ultimately unsustainable defense there. - The Russians have established a corridor along the river edge, with continued advances toward the eastern outskirts and suburbia north of Zaporizhzhia City. From there, a potential northward push could flank from the south toward Krivyi Rih and Nikolaev, creating a threat toward Odessa if a bridgehead across Kherson is rebuilt and maintained. The argument is that taking Nikolaev is a prerequisite to threatening Odessa and that control of Kherson remains a strategic hinge. - Ukraine’s attempts to retake territory are described as costly and often ineffective PR moves, including “suicidal” assaults on Gulyaipol where fighters up on exposed ground are eliminated by drone and artillery fire. The Russians are said to have flanked Ukrainian positions with new lines north of fortified areas, rolling up fortifications and leaving Ukrainian defenders with few exits. - In the north and center, fighting around Konstantinovka continues, with a southwest push into the area and Ukraine concentrating reserves to stop it. Kosytivka is described as about 65% surrounded, Mirnograd and Pokrovsk are said to be effectively finished, though small pockets hold out. In Sumy and Kharkiv directions, new incursions are occurring but are relatively small; the border is being “flattened” or straightened as Ukraine’s reserves are used. - Weather and terrain play a critical role. Mud, freezing and thaw cycles, fog, rain, and wind hamper heavy mechanized movement and drone operations. Western equipment struggles in mud due to narrow tracks, while Russian equipment with wider tracks traverses better but still encounters problems. Drones do not fly well in fog or rain, and heavy winds impede operations; Russia is leveraging fog to move infantry in close combat. - The broader war and geopolitics are discussed. Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is a major target; European willingness to sustain support is framed as a bandage on a jugular wound, insufficient for a long-term victory. The host notes a perceived drift in European strategy, with French signals of compromise and American mediation and hints at how US priorities ( Greenland, Iceland, Iran, Cuba) could pull attention away from Ukraine. The Arashnik hypersonic system is described as capable of delivering a devastating plasma envelope and kinetic energy, with the potential to destroy bunkers and infrastructure anywhere in the world. - On the strategic horizon, there is skepticism about negotiations. The guest dismisses talk of a near-term deal and describes the last 10% of a push as the “bridge too far,” arguing that Russian gains in Donbas, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson are eroding Western leverage as they advance kilometer-by-kilometer. Zelensky is portrayed as a stationed beneficiary whose personal and backers’ financial interests may drive bargaining positions, with claims that he does not care about Ukrainians and is motivated by extraction from the conflict. - The guest contends that a gradual Russian advance, backed by logistics and local tactical wins, is more likely than a dramatic collapse, while insisting that a full-scale nuclear exchange between Russia and Europe remains unlikely unless the United States and NATO become deeply involved. The Arashnik discussion notes the potential for a limited exchange, but emphasizes Russia’s stated preference not to escalate, arguing Russia would not “want Europe” but would respond decisively if pushed. - The discussion also touches on global logistics and Western cohesion. A veteran anecdote about US military logistics in 2002 is used to illustrate how NATO’s naval and merchant fleets depend on non-Western partners for transport, underscoring European vulnerability in sustained conflict. Mercedes-Benz re-registering in Russia is noted as a sign of shifting economic realities, with wider implications for European-company strategy amid sanctions and isolation. - The program ends with a return to the practicalities of ongoing combat—daily casualties, the erosion of Ukrainian defensive lines, and the intensifying pressure on Ukrainian supply and morale—before signing off.

- New footage from Tel Aviv is shown, including videos outside windows of what sources say they are seeing, with a claim that Fox News is not covering this damage in Tel Aviv. The discussion centers on the reality of buildings being hit near City Hall, and questions why it isn’t being widely covered by Fox News. - The conversation shifts to missile stocks and interceptors. A comment references Keith Kellogg on Fox News discussing a Wall Street Journal report about running out of interceptor missiles within four to five weeks, and a claim that there is no problem because orders were placed and allies could supply missiles. The speaker notes that UAE reportedly has about a week left of interceptor missiles and says missiles from Iran are getting through “like a sieve.” - It is argued that the U.S. has a limited stockpile because many missiles have been transferred to Israel and Ukraine over the past years, leaving the U.S. inventory low. The claim is made that continuing the war with depleted missiles would heighten national security risk and vulnerability globally. - The transcript discusses potential international responses. The speaker contends that Europe’s mobilization rhetoric (France, Greece) should not be expected to deter Iran, noting that Greece does not have a major army and that NATO-funded contingents are involved rather than independent power. The assertion is made that Iran’s strikes in Tel Aviv, Tehran, Qom, and other cities show that Iran believes it can strike back effectively, signaling a preference to fight the United States and Israel rather than submit again. - The central point is that the conflict is described as 100% about missiles and air-defense missiles, not ground forces. The speaker argues Iran likely has enough offensive missiles to prolong the conflict for months, possibly longer than U.S. capacity to sustain it, especially with Hormuz potentially shut or partially shut, which could hurt the western economy. - Admiral James Stavridis is cited by Speaker 0, noting that as the U.S. and Israel expend hundreds of precision weapons, the focus should shift to logistics and stockpiles. The discussion emphasizes the need for inventory clarity, planning, and alignment between political objectives and military capabilities. - Speaker 1 asserts that the planning should have assessed inventories, timeframes, and whether the means match the objectives. The argument states that risking all resources without sufficient offensive or defensive capacity is a dangerous gamble, suggesting the current course could be a “huge blunder.” - The conversation touches on General Dan Kane, who reportedly told the president two weeks earlier that there were not enough ammunition and it would not be pretty to win. A reference is made to Trump’s Truth Social claiming Kane’s assessment was incorrect, with talk of whether Kane did or did not say the president’s characterization was accurate. The claim is made that there are concerns about integrity and whether senior leaders would publicly contradict the administration’s framing if necessary. - A follow-up question is raised about whether admitting a ground invasion would imply insufficient missiles to sustain the mission, with Speaker 1 acknowledging that admitting ground troops would signal a lack of missiles for sustained action. - The segment then shifts to a sponsorship note about depression treatment options, promoting Ataybekli and its lead program BPL-003 (a nasal spray psychedelic-based therapy) developed for treatment-resistant depression, with background on the company, its investors, and the roadmap toward Phase 3 in 2026. It emphasizes the potential for faster, more scalable treatment sessions and invites viewers to learn more at a website, with disclaimers about not providing medical or financial advice.

Speaker 0 says that Russia's strategy is to collapse morale within Ukraine and the will to fight. We've been in discussions with them about defensive weapons to be able to protect their grid, and ongoing technical conversations about the specific equipment they need, but ultimately, if that equipment is ultimately destroyed a week later after it's installed, that remains a problem, and that's been the history the last two or three years.

The speaker states that there are plans to send more weapons to Ukraine, confirming that the country will receive additional arms. The speaker emphasizes that this action is necessary: “We have to. They they have to be able to defend themselves.” The speaker asserts that Ukraine is being attacked and hit hard, describing the situation with repetition to underscore the intensity: “They're getting hit very hard now,” followed by “They're getting hit very hard.” The speaker reiterates the need for further weapon deliveries, saying, “We're gonna have to send more weapons.” The emphasis is on defensive capabilities, with a clear indication that the weapons being sent are primarily defensive in nature: “Your defensive weapons primarily.” Throughout, the message conveys that the defense of Ukraine requires continued and increased military support in the form of weapons, due to the heavy blows Ukraine is sustaining.

Nikolay Petro and Gwen were discussing the Munich Security Conference and the broader shift in global order. The core theme is the destruction or breakdown of the post–Cold War order as the world moves toward multipolarity, with the United States and Europe following diverging paths. - The transition to multipolarity is described as chaos and a vacuum of strategic thinking. From a European perspective, this is an unwanted transition into something unfamiliar, while the US debates a more pragmatic approach that may bypass traditional institutions to position itself favorably. The multipolar world would be more democratic, with more voices in actual discussion of each nation’s needs and contributions, in contrast to the hegemonic, rules-based order. - The concept of multipolarity presumes multiple poles of interest. Nations at the top of the old order feel uncomfortable; they had a lead dog (the United States) and knew where they were going. Now the lead dog may be wandering, and the rest are lost. There’s a push to engage voices from the global South, or the global majority, though the term “global South” is viewed as imprecise. - At Munich, Kaia Kallas and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (Mertz) urged order to avoid chaos. Kallas favored restoring or preserving the structures of the past, arguing the European Union should reconnect with the US and dominate collectively as the political West. Mertz used aggressive language, saying Germany’s army must be the most powerful in Europe and that the war in Ukraine will end only when Russia is exhausted economically and militarily; he argued Europe imposed unheard-of losses on Russia. - In response, the US role in Munich was anticipated to feature Marco Rubio as the delegation head, signaling a security-focused agenda rather than deep internal European discourse. The discussion suggested the US may push a strategy of returning to or reshaping a hegemonic order, pressuring Europe to align with American priorities, and highlighting that the old order is over. - There is a perception of internal German political dynamics: the rise of the anti-establishment party (IFD) could challenge the current SPD/CSU coalition, potentially altering the German stance on Russia and Europe’s strategy toward Moscow. The possibility exists that internal German shifts could counter aggressive German policy toward Russia. - In Europe, there is a tension between those who want to sacrifice more national autonomy to please the US and those who advocate diversifying ties to avoid total dependence on Washington. In practice, EU policy has often mirrored US priorities, thereby delaying a truly autonomous European strategy. - The EU’s foreign policy structure remains weak due to political diversity among member states, the need for cooperation with national governments, and resistance to surrendering power to Brussels. There is no cohesive grand strategy within the EU, making it hard to present a unified vision in a multipolar world. The EU’s reliance on crisis-driven centralization contrasts with those internal contradictions. - Ukraine’s war exposed tensions in Europe’s cohesion. Initially, there was a rallying effect and unified front against Russia, aided by US support, aiming for a rapid Russian defeat. Now the EU’s rhetoric shifts toward seeking a ceasefire and preserving what remains of Ukraine, labeling victory in terms of saving Ukraine rather than expelling Russia. EU funding for Ukraine—about €90 billion over two years—may be insufficient, with Ukraine claiming higher needs. - The discussion suggested that European leadership’s view of Russia and Putin is unstable: some European circles believe Russia could collapse economically, while others see Russia’s leadership as capable of countermeasures. Reports of France reestablishing high-level political contacts with Russia were noted as part of this flux. - The conversation contrasted backward-looking US/EU visions with a forward-looking multipolar vision promoted by BRICS, especially Russia, which could be more promising due to its forward outlook. The EU, dominated by internal divisions, struggles to articulate an autonomous multipolar path, while the United States appears intent on reviving its dominant position and reshaping the international order, sometimes in ways that delay the shift to multipolarity. - Overall, the speakers highlighted a shared but backward-looking orientation between the EU and the US, versus a forward-looking, multipolar alternative; they also underscored the strategic vacuum, internal European divisions, and the continuing tug-of-war between attempting to restore past structures and embracing a new global arrangement.

We're emphasizing to Ukraine the value of their rare earth materials as part of our support. We expect guarantees in return for the significant financial and equipment assistance we're providing. The European nations are lagging behind in their contributions, despite the closer proximity to the conflict. They should match our support, if not contribute even more, given their substantial financial resources. We're aiming to establish a deal with Ukraine where they secure our aid with their rare earth resources and other assets.

There was no policy decision to stop sending weapons to Ukraine. A review of stockpiles caused a temporary pause of certain munitions. During the review, some shipping slowed down, but didn't stop. The review has occurred, and there's been no change to the posture of providing what is available. Ukraine needs Patriot batteries, which are available in multiple European countries, including Spain and Germany. Some countries that have ordered Patriot batteries and are about to receive them could defer shipment to Ukraine instead. These are defensive weapons that would help with missile attacks, but not drone attacks.

We need to do more for Ukraine than just provide supplies. While sending aid is essential, we must engage in a broader strategic campaign to effectively combat the war. It's important to understand Russia's objectives, which include degrading Ukraine's military capabilities through various means. By analyzing these tactics, we can better identify countermeasures, articulate our needs, and communicate shortfalls to the international community.

I believe Ukraine needs support in the form of weapons and fighter pilots to win the war. We should provide F-16s and training for pilots. I want Ukraine to join NATO by 2024. We should issue an invitation and provide more weapons in December to help them fight in 2025. American-made weapons are being used effectively by the Ukrainians, benefiting both countries.

Is it possible to enforce a NATO ban on interference and close the skies to Russian aircraft? Two points: First, we're sending advanced anti-air missiles that outperform Stingers, capable of operating at night and effectively countering Russian aircraft. Second, I want to understand how Ukraine plans to address the challenge of not being able to fly, especially since a no-fly zone would apply to both sides. Given Russia's significant artillery and missile capabilities, one of Ukraine's few advantages is its ability to target these from the air.

The speaker discusses the counter offensive in Ukraine and the challenges they are facing. The lack of close air support is hindering their progress against the Russian fortifications. The speaker believes that without this support, a stalemate is likely. They also mention that the West has contributed to the problem by not providing the necessary equipment to Ukraine. The speaker suggests that negotiations or an armistice may be necessary to find a way out of the destructive war.

We must not abandon Ukraine or allow NATO to weaken. It goes against our national interests and the promises we've made. We need Congress to pass funding for NATO as soon as possible.

Larry: Lavrov claimed Ukraine attempted to attack Putin’s official residence in Novgorod with around 91 long-range drones in December; allegedly all intercepted, no proof provided, no reported injuries or damage. Lavrov said retaliation is coming, targets for retaliatory strikes and timing had been set. Putin supposedly mentioned this on a call to Trump two days before the Zelensky meeting in Florida; Yuri, a Kremlin aide, said Putin was shocked and outraged, and that it would influence Washington’s approach to working with Zelensky. Russians claim Trump was relieved that no Tomahawk missiles were provided to Ukraine. No US confirmation; Trump described the meeting with Putin as very productive, and discussions included the temporary ceasefire not being an option. Budanov had suggested it wouldn’t be the first assassination attempt on Putin, but the most consequential due to timing. The question posed: who is the target—Ukraine, Zelensky, Budanov—or a Russian false flag to justify attacks and derail negotiations. Speaker 1: Timelines. The attack allegedly began the night of the 28th and continued into the 29th. The Russians say it was an attack on one of Putin’s residences, described as terrorism. Putin hasn’t lived at his residences for three years, using the Kremlin instead, but this is not the first Ukrainian attempt to target Putin; there was a proposed attack when he flew into Kursk by helicopter. Russians are upset that this attack had no military objective, only potential assassination, and they know Putin wasn’t there. The Russians view it as real and plan to respond; Lavrov indicated that negotiations would be reexamined. Budanov claims Ukrainian intelligence has targeted Putin multiple times; the attack timing coincides with Zelensky in Florida, suggesting possible rifts or risk of undermining negotiations. The possibility of Western (American or British) intelligence involvement is raised, with speculation about CIA influence or European intelligence, particularly Britain’s MI6, given its Ukrainian roots. The question remains whether the attack was staged to derail negotiations or a genuine strike. Larry: If Ukraine did this, why would they? Ukraine might want to eliminate an obstacle to peace, though that could backfire; some argue Putin is more restrained than any immediate successor. If 91 drones were launched, Western intelligence would likely be involved, possibly undermining Trump’s approach. There is a sense of mixed messages from U.S. intelligence, with individuals like Susan Miller pushing claims of Russian interference that contradict other narratives. Zelensky stated no territory would be ceded as part of negotiations; Russia’s position is that Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk must be permanently part of the Russian Federation, elections must occur in Ukraine before negotiations, NATO must be out of Ukraine, and demilitarization is non-negotiable. Russia suggests there will be no 800,000-man army; these conditions are not open for negotiation. Russia may be willing to discuss numbers of troops for Ukraine, but not to concede core territorial goals. Speaker 0: If CIA or other elements were behind this, could it be to undermine Trump or push for a peace deal by pressuring Putin? Putin showed up in uniform with the military leadership, signaling a hard stance on land/territory, stating that negotiations should proceed without ceasing. Some argue this would trigger a stronger Russian push, while others see this as undermining Trump’s efforts. Trump and Zelensky had discussed a peace plan with 90-95% agreement, with a few thorny issues, possibly territorial. Trump characterized their call as productive; Russia reportedly agreed to support Ukraine postwar with discounted energy and resources. Lavrov’s rapid response to the attack and the potential retaliation would affect ongoing negotiations, which some view as already derailed due to Ukraine’s intransigence on concessions. Speaker 1: Could European intelligence be involved? Britain’s MI6 is seen as critical; there is a suggestion that British intelligence could have acted without American consultation. This would strain relations with Trump, especially after new security strategy. The transcript also notes a broader shift in Western posture: some European leaders are pushing for stronger defense and a more independent European stance, which might influence the dynamic around negotiations and intelligence actions. Speaker 0: Zelensky’s Christmas remark, “may he perish,” followed by an attack on Putin’s residence, prompts questions about who’s pulling Zelensky’s strings. Zelensky is described as the “highest paid actor in the world” with large sums allegedly pilfered from Ukraine’s aid; Zelensky could be expendable to those steering Ukraine’s direction. The meeting in Mar-a-Lago between Zelensky, Trump, and others occurred while the Putin residence attack was underway, suggesting an attempt to undermine negotiations. Budanov’s connection to the CIA and potential independent actions by Ukrainian intelligence raise further concerns about internal Ukrainian divisions. Speaker 1: Russia’s potential retaliation could target Ukrainian intelligence assets like the SBU headquarters in Kyiv, or European assets inside Ukraine if evidence points to Western involvement. Russia’s current military actions include continuing strikes on power infrastructure, with movements in Zaporizhzhia and around Kherson, indicating an axis of attack. Independently, Russia claims significant ground progress; Ukraine counters with claims of selective advances by Russia and a favorable propaganda edge for Ukraine. The battlefield metrics show Russia increasing manpower and maintaining multiple axes of attack, with eight or more fronts, while Ukrainian recoveries of bodies show a ratio suggesting heavy Ukrainian losses. Speaker 0: The conversation ends with expectations for retaliation, possible new European involvement, and the enduring fear that negotiations remain unsettled. The next days could reveal more about who is behind the attack, how Russia responds, and whether a path to peace remains possible, given the conflicting narratives and competing strategic interests.

Speaker 1 discusses a new anti-air missile being sent to Ukraine, which is better than a Stinger and effective at night. It is intended to help close the skies to Russian aircraft. Speaker 1 raises a question for Ukraine: Given Russia's overwhelming artillery and missiles, Ukraine's ability to counter them relies on air power. How would Ukraine manage if a no-fly zone, applicable to both sides, prevented them from flying?

The speaker believes European globalist elites are in a panic because they realize the U.S. is no longer following the same path, and there is no future in Ukraine. Ukraine will never be a NATO member, and no one will go to war with Russia. European armies are "boutique forces" not designed for serious war. The leaked German military discussion is tragic and suggests a decline in professionalism. The conversation was amateurish, with no appreciation for the gravity of providing Taurus missiles to Ukraine, which risks a serious war by attacking Russian territory with Western assistance. Putin has made it clear that Berlin could face similar attacks if such actions occur.

Russia has relative freedom in Ukraine for drone and missile operations, with good intelligence coverage. Patriot batteries transferred to Ukraine are likely to be detected and destroyed by Russia before installation. Therefore, sending Patriot batteries to Ukraine is a waste of money. At best, it will extend the war by weeks, resulting in more Ukrainian and Russian deaths, but it will not change the outcome of the war.

Europe must quickly increase support for Ukraine as artillery shells, air defense interceptors, and drone production capabilities dwindle. Europe could use proposals and potentially collateralize frozen Russian assets to act fast. The speaker is concerned about the cutoff of intelligence streams from the U.S. and pressure on allies like the UK not to use US intelligence for their own weapons. The primary purpose of US intelligence has been to help Ukrainians see Russian attacks coming and have advanced warning. Key weapon systems require U.S. satellite queuing and the military GPS system to hit targets. Without these, more Ukrainians will die, and Europe cannot replace this capability quickly.

Speaker 0: Welcome to game plan. I'm Shivan Jan now. So far, there is only one winner in this war in West Asia, and that's Russia. Mind you, I'm not saying that this was acknowledged by the European Council president Antonio Costa. US Israeli strikes in West Asia, they have driven up the price of oil, strengthening the Kremlin's ability to fund its military campaign. Now in a sharp reversal from last year's policy of penalizing countries for buying Russian energy, US treasury secretary Scott Pessen said that The United States could unsanction other Russian oil to keep the flow of oil intact. And this is because the Strait Of Hormuz, the pivotal point from where this war is kind of converging, that is under complete Iranian control. Movement of ships has been blocked. Movement of oil has been blocked. It has shot up the oil prices, and the repercussions are being felt across the world at this point. Is the war proving to be a boon for Russia whose economy is dependent on energy exports? As the state of Hormuz gets blocked, Russia gets a free hand at selling its oil at rates that can be expounded without proper discounts as well. Is Putin the one winning in the war that US and Israel started against Iran? To discuss this with me on game plan is doctor Glenn Deesen, professor of international relations at the University of Southeastern Norway. Glenn, always a pleasure speaking with you. Thanks so much for joining me here. Trump and Putin, they held a call recently, the first time this year, and this was to discuss the discuss the ongoing hostilities in Iran. What do you think they would have discussed, and what kind of a role can Putin be playing in the ongoing war? Speaker 1: Well, I assume some of the things to discuss was obviously the the the extent to which The US and Russia targets each other because one of the things that the American media has been complaining about is the likelihood that Russia is providing intelligence to Iran for targets, but of course this is what The United States been doing for years and continues to do, that is give the Ukrainians targets to hit Russia. So I think there's a necessity to begin to discuss is appropriate and again what happens behind these doors, I don't know. But also of course there has to be some scaling back of the energy sanctions against Russia to bring this, the energy prices under control. As you suggest, they are now very much out of control. But I think also the main thing they've discussed is how to bring this war to an end because I think it's perfectly clear now that this US attack on Iran was a terrible mistake, and it appears that Putin would be the the main middleman who would might be able to bring an end to this war. But, again, it depends what can be done as what the Iranians will demand may be more than what the Americans can deliver. Speaker 0: Glenn, as you mentioned, Putin could perhaps be the main person to bring peace in this war. Putin has the highest chance of acting as peacemaker in West Asia. Is there anyone other than Putin at this point who can bring? Because just look at the optics of it. US starts a war, and I think ten days into it, he needs to make a call to Vladimir Putin to discuss that same war. How does it look for The US? Speaker 1: Well, they don't care for this, of course, but that it's similar to what to what happened with the war against Syria. That is, if you remember, back at president Obama's time, he had set these red lines, he were gonna attack Syria. It was quite obvious that this would be a disaster. So he went to the Russian president and he was able to get a deal through and which essentially took Obama's chestnuts out of the fire. So it was, you know, it it it is the reality or the optics of it isn't great given that The US has been fighting a proxy war for years against Russia, but but, know, at some point, you have to put the optics aside. Who who else would be in a position to help to negotiate this? I'm thinking, you know, perhaps China could be a middleman, but I think given that The United States, especially under the Trump administration, wants to improve bilateral ties with Russia, I I I think he's probably the best, yeah, the best bet. Speaker 0: Would it be fair to say that Putin is emerging as a winner in this ongoing West Asia war, which only seems to be expanding within the West Asian region? Speaker 1: Well, no. I think, yeah, to a large extent, I think that is correct because the energy prices are way up. The US have to scale back sanctions. The all the weapons which The US had intended to ship towards Ukraine to fight Russia is now being depleted. For European leaders, as you mentioned earlier on, to who aspire to prolong the war in Ukraine, this is an absolute disaster. And we'll see that countries that cut the energy ties or at least reduced energy ties with Russia at the best of American pressure, they of course have learned a lesson now as well that this was not a good idea that you don't necessarily put bet too much on a hegemon in decline, so countries who before paid discounts now may have to pay premium. We'll see that Iran, which I assume is getting some support from Russia sees this relationship improving dramatically. They're moving much closer, which is good for Russia because the Iranians always have some suspicions towards the Russians given well a long history they've had through the centuries of conflict. So all of this improves. You can also say that The Gulf States, the weakening of The Gulf States has also a big impact on weakening The U. S. Ability to restore its hegemony because what show what's obvious now is that the Gulf States are not getting protection instead they're becoming very vulnerable as frontline states and The US is no longer seen as that reliable. Well, if they're not going to bet their security on The United States anymore then they may not have that much pressure to sell their oil in dollars. You're not gonna have those recycled petrodollars coming back to The US, and suddenly the whole AI race with China looks a lot weaker as well. So I think across the board, a lot of things look good for Russia, but and there is a big but here, and that is I don't think that the Russians want this war nonetheless because the Russians, much like the Chinese, value stability and predictability. And what's happening in Iran now could again, if something would happen to Iran collapse, that would be a disaster for this Greater Eurasia initiative that is to integrate economies of Greater Eurasian Continent, but also this could spiral into a world war. So from this perspective, it's very dangerous and I don't doubt that the Russians therefore want to put an end to this war simply because I guess much like India, they don't want the Eurasian Continent to be too China centric, they would like to have many poles of power and this requires diversification. This means that the Russians need close ties with Iran, with India and other countries. So for the Americans to knock off Iran off the, you know, the chessboard, the greater Eurasian chessboard would be a disaster for the Russians. So, yes, I think they're prospering or benefiting from this, but they they do wanna put an end to it. Speaker 0: Understood. Glenn, let me just come to the Strait Of Hormuz. You know, the objectives of U. S. Behind starting this war, that has been questioned enough. Why did you start this war in the first place? Those are questions not just emerging, you know, globally. They're also emerging from inside The U. S. But if you look at what a win will actually look like for US, would it be the state of Hormuz? Like, which whoever controls the state of Hormuz is eventually who walks away as you know, walks away with the victory at this point because The US was looking for a change in regime. They mentioned it enough number of times. That hasn't happened and doesn't seem like it's going to happen. Is the state of Hormuz the winning factor now? Speaker 1: Well, I I I don't think any The US would be in a position to control this just given the geography. So The US obviously went into into this war with the objective of regime change. That was the goal. This was the decapitation strike, this was the hope of killing Khamenei and obviously it didn't work. I think it shouldn't have come as a surprise, but you know killing the leader of Iran only created more solidarity within the country. And also the idea that the whole armed forces would begin to disintegrate once they had been punished enough, also proven to be incorrect. So I think at the moment you see the American pivoting a bit. Some are talking about the Strait Of Moose that this should be a goal, others are saying you see a shift now towards saying well, actually what we really want to do is just degrade Iran's missile capabilities that they won't have this long range missiles. And again, you know, these are the kind of vague objectives which they can essentially declare victory today then because Iran has had many of its missiles destroyed. Also it launched a lot of its missiles at U. S. Targets which means that its missile stockpile has been reduced. So this should be a source of optimism when The U. S. Moves from this very hard line objective such as regime change and they shift in towards missiles, reducing the missile stockpiles or something like this. But the straight of our moves, I think, is beyond what what is reasonable. It's it will be too difficult. So I don't think they will But why push too hard on do Speaker 0: you feel it would be difficult if I were to just look at the bases that they have across West Asia? They have enough military might. Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, have their bases there. How difficult would it be to exert that military might over the Strait Of Hormuz? Speaker 1: Well, controlling it just means the ability to shut it down. Many countries would have the ability to shut down this narrow strait. The problem is that no one benefits from it, that is the Gulf States are hurt, Iran is hurt from it, The US and the global economy is hurt. So it becomes an exercise in self harm. The reason why the Iranians are doing this, the ability to shut down the Strait Of Hormuz is because The US has the ability to inflict a mass amount of destruction. It can go after civilian infrastructure, it can well, look what they've done to Tehran. It looks like, well, just, you know, the chemical warfare there. You've seen in terms of going after his fuel depots. They're going after the water supplies in Iran. You you see all these things. This is what America can do. Iran doesn't have that ability. They can't hit The United States. What they can do is cause economic pain. So, yes, I think The US and many of the Gulf States can also shut down the Strait Of Our Moose, but but but that's not that's it doesn't have any purpose. It doesn't have any reasoning. Speaker 0: Can they eradicate the Iranian control over the Strait Of Hormuz? I'm not talking about shutting it down, but just get rid of the Iranians from there and they then decide who gets to control and when it has to be shut and when it has to be opened and remained and kept open and secured. Can The US exert that kind of military might over the state of Hormuz to control it? Speaker 1: Then one need us to control a massive amount of Iran's territory, which is a huge territory with populated by 90,000,000 people. So this seems very unlikely and if closing down the Strait Of Hormuz would depend on very sophisticated weapon systems, will be one thing. But this can be shut down with drones which can be manufactured in apartments. It can be also shut down with small naval drones that is this essentially drone operated small torpedoes. There's it doesn't require a lot of high technology which means that The US can't take out very key infrastructure to prevent Iran from shutting this down, to force it to open. But with very cheap and easy to make weapons, the Iranians can shut it down and it's simply too much territory, too large population for The United States to shut down the these capabilities. So at some point, they're have to make peace with the Iranians and make it make sure it's in Iran's interest to keep the Strait Of Hormuz open because it is in their interest. The problem now is that Iran faces an existential threat. That is The US now threatens to destroy not just the government, but also the country. As Trump tweeted, we we will make it impossible for Iran to even rebuild as a nation. And this is what regime change means. There is no replacement government. This means the disintegration and destruction of Iran, a massive civil war which could cost hundreds of thousands of lives. So for them this is existential which is why they went to this great extent. They've never done this before because they never believed that they faced this kind of an existential threat. So if the war ends, the Iranians have no reason to shut this straight down. This is very horrible for them as well. So, no, I I don't think The US can control the straight or almost no one can control it completely because too many actors could shut it down. Speaker 0: Glenn, thanks so much for joining me here on game plan. Whether this war continues further, that only means and if it does, that's essentially what Iran is looking at because they're not capitulating. They're not giving up. They are taking a bad amount of beating. There's no doubt in that, but they are continuing with their counters nevertheless. And straight of hormones is their main play where they're exerting their pressure with whether it's mines, whether it's their own boats, whether it's their own military boats. Now energy experts have also warned that whether the Iran crisis proves a cure for Russia's economy, that depends directly on how long it lasts. But there is little to suggest that Iran is willing to capitulate that what we just discussed. They're inviting U. S. To continue the war on the other hand. That's what the statements from Iran suggest that we're waiting. Come on, on. Now in the midst of this, Russia is emerging as the winner as we just discussed. How long this lasts? It doesn't seem to be in the favor of The U. S. We'll need to wait and watch twelfth day and running. They expected it to last for about four to five weeks, whether it goes the distance or even longer. Let's wait. That was Glenn Deeson joining me here on Game Plan. Speaker 1: Thanks, Yvonne.

Europe must quickly increase its support for Ukraine, especially as artillery, air defense, and drone production become more challenging. Europe could use proposals and potentially leverage frozen Russian assets to provide immediate assistance. The speaker is concerned about the cutoff of intelligence streams from the U.S. and pressure on allies not to use U.S. intelligence. U.S. intelligence has been vital for providing Ukrainians with advanced warning of Russian attacks. Additionally, certain weapon systems rely on U.S. satellite queuing and GPS for targeting. A prolonged pause in this support will result in more Ukrainian deaths, and Europe cannot rapidly replace this capability.

I am working very hard to end the savage conflict in Ukraine. Millions of Ukrainians and Russians have been needlessly killed or wounded in this horrific and brutal conflict with no end in sight. The United States has sent hundreds of billions of dollars to support Ukraine's defense with no security. Do you want to keep it going for another five years? 2,000 people are being killed every single week, or more. They're Russian young people. They're Ukrainian young people. They're not Americans, but I want it to stop. Meanwhile, Europe has sadly spent more money buying Russian oil and gas than they have spent on defending Ukraine by far. They've spent more buying Russian oil and gas than they have defending Ukraine.

The speaker discusses the danger of stopping military aid to Ukraine and the potential consequences of Russia advancing towards the capital. They mention that if Ukraine falls, it would be the end of the Europe we know, and EU membership for Ukraine would be delayed. The speaker acknowledges that their proposed solution is not ideal, but emphasizes the need to stop the war and prevent Putin from winning. They draw parallels to historical examples like Germany after World War II and express a desire for Ukraine to join NATO. The speaker acknowledges that their views may not be popular but believes it is important to speak out. They also express concern about the upcoming US presidential elections and the potential impact on global democracy and NATO.

The United States has been sending hundreds of billions of dollars to support Ukraine's defense, with no end in sight, and with no security. Do you want to keep this going for another five years? Two thousand people, or more, are being killed every single week.

Aiding Ukraine is the most cost-effective way for the US to enhance its security as the Ukrainians are the ones fighting and dying. The US and Europe provide them with weapons to resist Putin. Having been to Kyiv twice, it is clear that Ukraine is a European country with a strong desire to align with the West. It would be astonishing if the US were to abandon Ukraine at this crucial time.

Europe must quickly increase its support for Ukraine as artillery shells, air defense interceptors, and drone production capabilities dwindle. Europe could use proposals and potentially collateralize frozen Russian assets to act fast. The speaker is concerned about the cutoff of intelligence streams from the U.S. and pressure on allies like the UK not to use US intelligence for their own weapons. The primary purpose of US intelligence has been to give Ukrainians advanced warning of Russian attacks. Key weapon systems require support from US satellite queuing and the military GPS system to hit their targets. Without this support, more Ukrainians will die, and Europe cannot replace this capability quickly.

A year ago, Putin invaded Ukraine, aiming to weaken the U.S. and challenge Western dominance. Instead, the brave Ukrainians, with our help, have decimated nearly half of Russia's military. Supporting Ukraine is in our best interest and a worthy investment. We've provided effective weapons while maintaining strict oversight. This support sends a strong message to China and ensures our own military readiness with American-made equipment. The Ukrainian heroes have defended their homeland, serving the free world. Now, we must honor our commitment and provide them with the arms they need to win.