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Oil and gas prices in the United States and Europe are expected to rise sharply, driven by limits in crude-oil logistics and by OPEC+ supply shortfalls that the U.S. cannot fully offset. The transcript begins with reported jumps in U.S. fuel prices. Diesel rises steadily after the Iran war, and gasoline moves upward, then takes a major jump in 2026 (noted as $425 per gallon as of April 6, with forecasts to reach $440). The central claim is that prices will continue climbing because export demand and shipping flows will tighten effective supply. A key point discussed is tanker traffic and export capacity. The speaker references Trump’s claim about “massive numbers” of “completely empty oil tankers” heading to the U.S. to load “sweetest” oil and gas. The transcript argues that the tanker map can be misleading because tankers travel both ways, but it notes that large crude carriers (up to about 2 million barrels each) routinely head to and from the U.S. It also claims that while U.S. exports rise through end of March into April to near 5 million barrels per day, the system is constrained: overall export levels are described as hovering under about 4 million barrels per day, and can increase by roughly 1 million barrels per day mainly due to logistical limits at ports and loading berths. However, the transcript says the U.S. cannot replace the missing supply from OPEC+: OPEC+ is said to have reduced production by about 8 million barrels per day, and the U.S. “is not going to be able to cover that shortfall.” The transcript then emphasizes “stocks and flows” using U.S. EIA accounting: inventories (“stocks”) and incoming supply (“supply”). It states that the U.S. remains a net importer of crude oil. It reports imports of about 6.3 million barrels per day and exports of about 4.1 million barrels per day, leaving a net import of about 2.175 million barrels per day during the week prior to April 3. The speaker argues that the U.S. is not exporting crude oil on a net basis. A major source of confusion is said to be how the EIA labels “petroleum,” allegedly conflating crude oil with other “natural gas plant liquids” (NGLs) and other components. The transcript describes U.S. “other supply” as roughly 10 million barrels per day, largely NGLs, plus renewable fuels such as corn-based ethanol. It claims that while these categories contribute to “petroleum” exports, they are not the same as crude oil exports. NGLs are explained in detail by molecule type: ethane (about 40% of total volume) used mainly as an industrial feedstock for plastics and petrochemicals; propane (about 30%) used for heating/cooking and as LPG; and butane/isobutane (together making up most of the remainder) used in applications like lighters, rubber/synthetic products, and LPG conversions. The transcript stresses that NGLs have different end uses and cannot substitute for “oil” grades needed by refineries for gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and other outputs. The strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) is also discussed. The transcript states that SPR was “mostly drained” before the 2022 election and currently provides about 248,000 barrels per day over the last week, which it says is not enough to offset losses claimed elsewhere. The transcript describes SPR as oil stored in underground salt caverns and claims SPR contains no natural gas plant liquids. The transcript links refining constraints to oil grade differences. It argues that refineries are tuned to particular “API gravity” ranges and that crude grades differ in their proportions of gasoline, jet fuel, diesel, and heavier “bunker” fuel. It claims medium sour grades were drawn down from SPR first, while light sweet grades have been less replenished. It also claims U.S. shale produces lighter crude (about the 40–50 API range), which yields more gasoline proportionally but lacks some heavier components needed for ships and asphalt, so the U.S. exports the lighter grades and imports heavier grades. As a consequence, the transcript argues that when the U.S. increases exports—even by about 1 million barrels per day—this output comes from inventory drawdowns, tightening stocks and pushing prices higher. It also claims that inventories in gasoline and jet fuel are near the lower end of a range (gasoline described as in the bottom fifth), and that jet kerosene has been declining through the year. Finally, the transcript highlights claimed disruptions in the Persian Gulf beyond crude oil itself, including missing chemical/product flows and petrochemical impacts. It asserts that these supply-chain disruptions do not have an easy workaround, and it concludes that the situation could worsen quickly as exports pull down inventories and as the gap between oil futures prices and real market prices “resets” during the continued closure of the conflict region.

Mike Adams presents an analysis of what he calls the oil emergency of 2026 and 2027, building on work by Chris Martinson, Mike Rothman, and Rick Ruhl. He asserts there has never been a true oil glut; instead, an oil emergency is unfolding. Key points: - The Strait of Hormuz has seen a dramatic drop in tanker traffic and oil passing through. What would normally be about 16–20 million barrels per day of crude and refined products is now substantially reduced, with estimates of declines ranging from 80% to 90% in some assessments. This missing oil compounds daily, meaning ongoing shortages will worsen over time. - The situation extends beyond crude to natural gas, urea, fertilizer, helium, and sulfur, all of which are “missing from the world stage.” There is no instant recovery from these losses. - Public messaging and price manipulation: Trump administration officials are accused of artificially depressing spot oil prices to keep gasoline affordable, enabling continued consumption. The United States is allegedly selling its strategic petroleum reserves at these artificially low prices to foreign buyers, draining reserves while prices stay low. - Strategic petroleum reserves and responses: SPR use is described as a perversion of its purpose, which is to supply oil in times of war if American supplies are cut off. As reserves decline, the ability to stabilize prices through SPR releases is limited. - Price trajectory: A rigorous analysis suggests oil could rise to $180–$200 per barrel within months, potentially by the fourth quarter of the year. This projection is linked to a global oil shortage, rising prices, and constrained capital liquidity. - Capital liquidity constraints: Sustainable capital is necessary to fund oil exploration, farming, and infrastructure expansion. With rising capital costs (e.g., 30-year Treasuries above 6%, 10-year near 5%), financing for maintaining and expanding oil production becomes harder, reducing the ability to respond to shortages. - Production decline and maintenance: Typical oil wells lose about 5% of output per year if not maintained. Current capex is heavily focused on maintaining existing fields rather than expanding production, and higher costs impede maintenance, accelerating declines. Shale wells, in particular, can lose about 74% of initial production in the first year. - Middle East and regional disruption: If oil wells in the Middle East are shut down, temporary or permanent losses of 20–30% can occur. Reopening wells may yield variable results, with some wells recovering less than before. The war has damaged export infrastructure across the region, including in the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, and potential further US strikes could worsen the situation. - Global impact: The loss of Persian Gulf throughput, plus strikes on Russian oil infrastructure and other disruptions, represents a global attack on oil supply. An “air pocket” in supply could persist for months, possibly years, as infrastructure repairs take years (gas trains in Qatar, for example, may take three to five years). - U.S. and global demand dynamics: The United States is a major crude importer; reduced supply will push up prices and tighten diesel supplies, which are critical for the economy. Diesel shortages would severely impact transportation and energy-intensive sectors. - Demand and potential implosions: The trajectory of oil prices depends on the duration of the war in the Middle East and on global economic conditions. A longer war could precipitate a global depression and widespread famine by 2027, though die-off scenarios may affect demand in complex ways. - Market signals and advice: The speaker cautions that price signals alone are insufficient without supply stability. He emphasizes the risk of counterparty failure in financial systems and suggests physical gold and silver as a hedge against monetary instability (though he notes he is not providing personalized financial advice). He discusses the importance of preparedness. In summary, Adams outlines an ongoing oil shortage driven by reduced Strait of Hormuz throughput, war-related infrastructure damage, and capital constraints, arguing that shortages and price pressures will intensify through 2026 and into 2027, with potential for severe global economic and humanitarian consequences if the situation deteriorates further.

Hindi (original language summary): उस समय रूस से तेल न लेने के दबाव के बीच, कहा गया कि अगर हम तेल नहीं लेते तो कहां से लेंगे, उनके तेल की ज़रूरत थी; हम वही जगह जाते थे जहां दुनिया जा रही थी—खाड़ी में और Africa के कुछ देश शामिल थे; अगर सप्लाई कम हो जाए तो तेल की कीमत बढ़ जाती है; वही ₹one hundred लीटर सवा सौ रुपए वन जाता था; जनता पर दबाव के बीच मैंने स्थिति केंद्रित रखने की कोशिश की क्योंकि मुझे प्रधानमंत्री से स्पष्ट इंस्ट्रक्शन मिला कि देखिए भारत का कंज्यूमर है उसका हित है उसको आप केंद्र में रखें English translation: At that time there was a lot of pressure not to buy oil from Russia, and if we did not take their oil, where would we get it from; their oil was needed; we went to the places where the world was going—the Gulf and some other countries, and Africa; what happens—does oil price rise; if supply becomes less, the same ₹one hundred per liter would become ₹150 per liter; during that pressure, how did you keep your position in public? I kept the position because I had very clear instructions from the Prime Minister that look, India's consumer has its interest and you must keep it at the center.

- Speaker 0 notes that the United States Postal Service is adding a fuel charge to every package due to fuel cost increases tied to Iran–Israel tensions and says fuel costs have jumped more than 30% since the war began. - Reuters/Financial Times mention: US inflation to surge to 4.2% on energy shock; OECD warnings. Fuel lines are long worldwide, with coverage of shortages in Slovenia, parts of Europe, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines; some countries have run out of petrol or declared a state of emergency. - Speaker 1 paraphrases Putin, saying the energy shock from the Iran war is devastating globally, harming global logistic and production chains and the fuel industry. He claims Europe will beg Russia for oil and gas, referencing a pipeline blown up by the United States. - Mike Adams (Speaker 2, Health Ranger) joins to discuss fuel and food shortages and global impacts. He asserts: energy is the primary driver of affordable food, transportation, and personal freedom; farming is hydrocarbon-intensive due to energy inputs for fertilizer and for planting/harvesting; the Strait of Hormuz constriction worsens scarcity. He argues the Strait was open before the war and that actions against Nord Stream pipelines and the Strait have created energy constraints, predicting severe economic and food shortages until Hormuz reopens. - Speaker 3 (a senator) is shown commenting on the war costs ($2,000,000,000 daily) and casualties; notes that policy decisions and actions have led to escalating prices and potential long-term impacts on Americans. - Speaker 4 and Speaker 2 discuss a pattern of energy lockdowns, global shortages, and potential government controls: universal basic income (UBI) tied to digital control via a CBDC, with quotas on food and energy consumption; off-ramps include off-grid solar power and EV adoption. They suggest this could lead to government-delivered food and fuel, and to a broader move toward centralized control. - The conversation covers the European angle: Putin and the diplomats say Europe may beg Russia for cheap energy as Nord Stream pipelines were disrupted; China–Russia energy deals and Mongolia–Northern China gas transmission are noted as supporting Chinese industry. - Speaker 4 observes European leadership as having pursued energy restrictions and nuclear shutdowns, calling it “energy suicide” and expressing sympathy for European people, while criticizing their leaders for energy policy. - Speaker 2 discusses the petrodollar system’s fragility, noting potential shifts as allies and non-allies trade outside the petrodollar; warns of inflationary effects on the U.S. and potential mass selling of U.S. Treasuries by indebted economies like Japan. - The discussion touches on broader implications: a potential shift toward AI and robotics replacing human labor, with energy scarcity viewed as a driver for social and economic controls; concerns about large-scale power disruptions and rationing, and the possibility of a 10-year horizon for significant changes in labor and energy policy. - In closing, Mike Adams emphasizes the need for viewers to be informed and distinguishes between differing levels of information sources, inviting continued engagement.

The discussion centers on whether President Trump’s Fourth of July-era claims about lower gasoline prices create an “illusion,” given that gas prices remain high. The explanation given is that pump prices are influenced by a complex chain between crude oil futures and retail: refiners, distributors, and the refinery process itself. A barrel of oil trades on the open futures market at about $68, which is described as cheaper than before the war. Trump can “crow” about that, but the gas pump still shows high prices because refiners buy crude, process it in refineries, and “crack” it into gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and other products. The key metric is the “crack spread,” defined as the spread between what refiners can sell the products for and what they paid for the oil. The crack spread is described as “as high as it’s ever been,” priced as if oil were at “a hundred [or] hundred and ten dollars a barrel.” The transcript says refiners are not price setters, because product prices are set by bidding among market participants. It also claims that inventories are extremely tight: gasoline inventory is “never been lower” for the time period referenced, and diesel is “right at the bottom” of its historical range. Refineries are described as running flat out at max capacity to produce as much as possible, but the inventory level is said to drive the price. Retailers are also described as price takers, earning only a few pennies per gallon and passing through prices from distributors. A “huge disconnect” is described between downstream physical tightness and the behavior of crude oil, which the speaker says many experts find puzzling: sustained bearishness and selling pressure in crude while physical products remain as tight as ever. The speaker says they “always go with physical inventory over market prices,” implying that inventories better explain what prices consumers face. The transcript then addresses why Trump would encourage more consumption. It argues that supply and demand are linked by price in a physical commodity: lower prices raise demand. It cites a data point that in May, U.S. total gasoline/petroleum consumption was 2.6% higher than a year before. It says what is needed is for demand to be “a little bit lower” so demand and supply match. It warns that if demand stays elevated too long, supplies could dwindle into an actual shortage, especially with “ultra thin reserves” and “almost nothing left” in the strategic petroleum tank. The potential consequences described include very expensive costs for the nation, damage to the economy, and harmful effects on households.

Trump publicly demanded that the DOJ investigate oil companies for not lowering gasoline prices fast enough, accusing them of gouging customers because pump prices have not fallen in proportion to crude oil prices. The discussion characterizes Trump as making “villains” out of gas stations and oil companies, arguing that a villain is needed to assign blame. The transcript also says oil companies are being attacked while deeper issues in the physical energy system are being avoided, including claims that the Strategic Petroleum Reserve is not full, Cushing is approaching dangerous operating levels, and that Gulf shipping remains unstable with costs doubling. It connects these constraints to the importance of the Russian oil sanctions story, stating that “White House sources speaking to Redacted News” claim credible insiders say the U.S. team is negotiating a Ukraine-Russia deal and has spoken with Trump about lifting sanctions on Russian oil, with the claim that it is very likely the U.S. will next move to lift those sanctions. The transcript says a “shocking reversal” could follow because the U.S. allowed a Russian oil sanctions waiver to expire on June 17 after Trump suggested that the Iran deal was done and that reopening Hormuz would allow increased pressure on Moscow. It further states that Russian crude exports averaged about 6 million barrels per day in May, rising from previous months. Finally, the transcript contrasts public and private motivations, saying Washington says it can pressure Russia to end the war, but that Trump may instead prepare to lift sanctions and ask for Russian oil and gas again. It argues that “energy is food” and links energy costs—gasoline and diesel prices, trucking costs, fertilizer, manufacturing, heating and cooling, and supply chains—to broader system stability, concluding that if energy breaks, everything breaks with it.

Speaker 0 says Trump believed he could rapidly conquer Iran, comparing it to actions associated with Venezuela, but argues that events since then have created benefits for protecting the U.S. debt market. Speaker 0 attributes this to global chaos affecting fertilizer shortages, food issues, supply chains, and energy—oil and shortages affecting local refineries in countries like Bangladesh that cannot obtain inputs to make fertilizer. Speaker 0 claims this chaos pushes global liquidity toward safe havens, specifically the dollar, Treasuries, and the U.S. stock market. Speaker 0 also says that when oil rises internationally, countries must purchase oil in dollars, forcing them to spend local currencies to buy dollars, which he links to a rising dollar and falling local currencies in places like Korea and other countries, with capital flowing into the U.S. “temporarily.” Speaker 1 responds that any benefit is “blind luck” and describes Trump as not strategically planning “grand” schemes but acting as a “kinetic operator” and “counter puncher,” rolling with events. Speaker 1 says Trump’s adaptation helped him transition from bankruptcy to getting banks to bail him out in the 90s and credits tenacity to turning destructive situations into wins. However, Speaker 1 insists there are unintended consequences “of epic proportions,” not part of a plan, and says actions during the war were framed as inevitable victories. Speaker 1 highlights potential consequences including shortages and price hikes, while noting that people are celebrating a rapid global decline in oil prices and urging that the reasons for the decline matter. Speaker 1 claims oil prices are falling because markets are pricing in optimism based on belief in what the president says (“hopium”), and because when the Iranians closed the Strait of Hormuz, 500 or more ships became stuck in the waterway with supplies. Speaker 1 says analysts expected that when the strait reopens, a “mini glut” would occur because ships loaded before the war begin moving again and rush to exit the Middle East, depressing prices. Speaker 1 adds that only a few analysts have discussed a major factor: China, described as the largest Middle East oil consumer, “voluntarily took themselves off the market.” Speaker 1 claims China had a strategic petroleum reserve of 1.4 billion barrels at the war’s start and used it to become self-sufficient, draining at least a third of its SPR. Speaker 1 contrasts China’s above-ground, better-protected SPR infrastructure with the U.S. salt cavern approach, asserting that U.S. 340 million barrels left in SPR is “closer to 100 million barrels” due to degradation with depth. Speaker 1 says this withdrawal bought relief for the rest of the world and explains why forecasts for higher oil prices did not account for China removing itself from the market. Speaker 1 concludes that as China returns to the market, and if the Strait of Hormuz is not fully reopened, prices will be pressured by too much demand and not enough supply.

The Ukraine war caused an immediate increase in petrol and oil prices, creating a moment of choice for some countries. Powerful countries, being customers of Russia, began buying in the Gulf and Middle East, which were suppliers to other nations. This caused the suppliers to raise their prices. In this situation, one can either prioritize their own interests and have the courage to act accordingly, or succumb to the influence of powerful countries.

The speaker argues that oil is “unlimited,” stating that Middle Eastern people have messaged after the speaker posted a video claiming “everything’s unlimited.” They sent a video in Arabic in which a person explains that oil is unlimited because it has been sold for a long time and that all that is required is to drill to find oil. The speaker says oil producers “manipulate the price” and claim that “our pumps are running dry.” They add that oil-rig workers reportedly return to the same pump that was said to have run dry because they believe the narrative, and that a week later the rig is ready again, producing oil because “oil is the blood of the earth.”

The discussion highlights physical and political constraints affecting global oil and LNG supply. There are only a limited number of tankers and LNG tankers worldwide, and a large portion are currently stuck in the Persian Gulf—almost 1,600 of them. Because of this, refilling and restoring normal operations will take time: ships must be refilled, then transportation must resume, and the pipeline “will take months to actually fill in,” reflecting both logistical delays and the physical constraints of the tanker fleet. Alongside the physical issues, the discussion adds politics. It states that there is no evidence Iran would allow oil to go through with the intention of pushing oil prices back close to what they were before the war. The discussion draws an example from Vladimir Putin’s situation: Putin had been selling oil at about a $25-per-barrel level even when oil was going for $55 due to the discount required for China, and it then notes that Putin later moved to full price. The discussion then argues that Iran will similarly discover more reasons over time to want more money, framing this as a common pattern over time—people find additional reasons to need incremental increases in returns. It concludes that Iran is expected to be “in a similar boat,” seeking additional money as time progresses.

Larry Johnson and the host discuss the extraordinary and escalating tensions around Iran, the Middle East, and the United States’ role in the region. - The guests reference recent remarks by Donald Trump about Iran, noting Trump’s statement that Iran has until Tuesday to reach a deal or “I am blowing up everything,” with a quoted line describing Tuesday as “power plant day and bridge day all wrapped up in one in Iran,” followed by “open the fucking straight, you crazy bastards or you’ll be living in hell.” They describe this rhetoric as madness and suggest the rhetoric signals a potential for a severe U.S. action. - They contrast Trump’s stated plan with the capabilities and willingness of the U.S. military, arguing there are three distinct elements: what Trump wants to do, what the U.S. military can do, and what the U.S. military is willing to do. They discuss a hypothetical ground operation targeting Iran, including possible actions such as striking Natanz or a nuclear-related site, and potentially hitting a “underground missile factory” at Kesheveh, while acknowledging the risk and uncertainty of such plans. - The conversation details a Friday event in which a U.S. F-15 was shot down, and the implications for the broader operation: A-10 Warthog, F-16s, two Black Hawk helicopters (Pave Hawks), and two C-130s were reportedly lost, with speculation about additional losses. They discuss the Pentagon’s statements about casualties and the possibility that other aircraft losses were connected to a rescue attempt for a downed pilot. They estimate several U.S. airframes lost in the effort to recover one pilot and discuss the high costs and risks of attempting CSAR (combat search and rescue). - The speakers reflect on the status of U.S. combat leadership and the debates surrounding purges of senior officers. One guest emphasizes that the fired leaders (Hodney and Randy George) were not operational decision-makers for Iran and argues the purge appears political rather than war-related, describing it as part of a broader pattern of politicization of the senior ranks. - They discuss the Israeli war effort, noting significant strain from Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and questions about Israel’s manpower and reserve mobilization. They mention reports that 300,000 reservists have been activated and talk of an additional 400,000 being considered. The discussion touches on claims that Israel is attacking Iranian negotiating participants and how the U.S. could be drawn into a broader conflict. They critique the Israeli military’s leadership structure, arguing that young officers with limited experience lead a reserve-based force, which they view as contributing to questionable battlefield performance. - The Iranian strategy is analyzed as aiming to break U.S. control in the Persian Gulf and to compel adversaries to negotiate by threatening or constraining energy flows. The guests detail Iran’s actions: targeting oil facilities and ports around Haifa and Tel Aviv, Damona (near the suspected nuclear sites), and claims of missiles hitting a major building in Haifa. They describe widespread civilian disruption in Israel (bomb shelters, subway tents) and emphasize the vulnerability of Israel given its manpower challenges and reliance on U.S. and Western support. - The broader strategic landscape is assessed: Iran’s goal to control the Gulf and oil, with potential consequences for global energy markets, shipping costs, and the international economy. They discuss how Iran’s actions may integrate with China and Russia, including potential shifts in currency use (yuan) for trade and new financial arrangements, such as Deutsche Bank offering Chinese bonds. - They discuss the economic and geopolitical ripple effects beyond the battlefield: rising U.S. fuel prices (gas increasing sharply in parts of the U.S., including Florida), potential airline disruptions, and the broader risk to European energy security as sanctions and alternative energy pathways come under stress. They note that Europe’s energy strategies and alliances may be forced to adapt, potentially shifting energy flows to China or Russia, and the possibility of Europe’s economy suffering from disrupted energy supplies. - Toward the end, the speakers acknowledge the difficulty of stopping escalation and the need for major powers to negotiate new terms for the post-unipolar order. They caution that reconciliations are unlikely in the near term, warning of the potential for a broader conflict if leaders do not find a path away from continued escalation. They close with a somewhat pessimistic view, acknowledging that even if the war ends soon, the economic ramifications will be long-lasting. They joke that, at minimum, they’ll have more material to discuss next week, given Trump’s actions.

The Trump administration linked higher tariffs to India's continued purchase of Russian oil, which Washington says funds Moscow's war in Ukraine. US-India trade talks have hit a deadlock over agriculture and dairy produce. Prime Minister Narendra Modi says he is not prepared to compromise on the interests of his farmers.

Speaker 0: Welcome to game plan. I'm Shivan Jan now. So far, there is only one winner in this war in West Asia, and that's Russia. Mind you, I'm not saying that this was acknowledged by the European Council president Antonio Costa. US Israeli strikes in West Asia, they have driven up the price of oil, strengthening the Kremlin's ability to fund its military campaign. Now in a sharp reversal from last year's policy of penalizing countries for buying Russian energy, US treasury secretary Scott Pessen said that The United States could unsanction other Russian oil to keep the flow of oil intact. And this is because the Strait Of Hormuz, the pivotal point from where this war is kind of converging, that is under complete Iranian control. Movement of ships has been blocked. Movement of oil has been blocked. It has shot up the oil prices, and the repercussions are being felt across the world at this point. Is the war proving to be a boon for Russia whose economy is dependent on energy exports? As the state of Hormuz gets blocked, Russia gets a free hand at selling its oil at rates that can be expounded without proper discounts as well. Is Putin the one winning in the war that US and Israel started against Iran? To discuss this with me on game plan is doctor Glenn Deesen, professor of international relations at the University of Southeastern Norway. Glenn, always a pleasure speaking with you. Thanks so much for joining me here. Trump and Putin, they held a call recently, the first time this year, and this was to discuss the discuss the ongoing hostilities in Iran. What do you think they would have discussed, and what kind of a role can Putin be playing in the ongoing war? Speaker 1: Well, I assume some of the things to discuss was obviously the the the extent to which The US and Russia targets each other because one of the things that the American media has been complaining about is the likelihood that Russia is providing intelligence to Iran for targets, but of course this is what The United States been doing for years and continues to do, that is give the Ukrainians targets to hit Russia. So I think there's a necessity to begin to discuss is appropriate and again what happens behind these doors, I don't know. But also of course there has to be some scaling back of the energy sanctions against Russia to bring this, the energy prices under control. As you suggest, they are now very much out of control. But I think also the main thing they've discussed is how to bring this war to an end because I think it's perfectly clear now that this US attack on Iran was a terrible mistake, and it appears that Putin would be the the main middleman who would might be able to bring an end to this war. But, again, it depends what can be done as what the Iranians will demand may be more than what the Americans can deliver. Speaker 0: Glenn, as you mentioned, Putin could perhaps be the main person to bring peace in this war. Putin has the highest chance of acting as peacemaker in West Asia. Is there anyone other than Putin at this point who can bring? Because just look at the optics of it. US starts a war, and I think ten days into it, he needs to make a call to Vladimir Putin to discuss that same war. How does it look for The US? Speaker 1: Well, they don't care for this, of course, but that it's similar to what to what happened with the war against Syria. That is, if you remember, back at president Obama's time, he had set these red lines, he were gonna attack Syria. It was quite obvious that this would be a disaster. So he went to the Russian president and he was able to get a deal through and which essentially took Obama's chestnuts out of the fire. So it was, you know, it it it is the reality or the optics of it isn't great given that The US has been fighting a proxy war for years against Russia, but but, know, at some point, you have to put the optics aside. Who who else would be in a position to help to negotiate this? I'm thinking, you know, perhaps China could be a middleman, but I think given that The United States, especially under the Trump administration, wants to improve bilateral ties with Russia, I I I think he's probably the best, yeah, the best bet. Speaker 0: Would it be fair to say that Putin is emerging as a winner in this ongoing West Asia war, which only seems to be expanding within the West Asian region? Speaker 1: Well, no. I think, yeah, to a large extent, I think that is correct because the energy prices are way up. The US have to scale back sanctions. The all the weapons which The US had intended to ship towards Ukraine to fight Russia is now being depleted. For European leaders, as you mentioned earlier on, to who aspire to prolong the war in Ukraine, this is an absolute disaster. And we'll see that countries that cut the energy ties or at least reduced energy ties with Russia at the best of American pressure, they of course have learned a lesson now as well that this was not a good idea that you don't necessarily put bet too much on a hegemon in decline, so countries who before paid discounts now may have to pay premium. We'll see that Iran, which I assume is getting some support from Russia sees this relationship improving dramatically. They're moving much closer, which is good for Russia because the Iranians always have some suspicions towards the Russians given well a long history they've had through the centuries of conflict. So all of this improves. You can also say that The Gulf States, the weakening of The Gulf States has also a big impact on weakening The U. S. Ability to restore its hegemony because what show what's obvious now is that the Gulf States are not getting protection instead they're becoming very vulnerable as frontline states and The US is no longer seen as that reliable. Well, if they're not going to bet their security on The United States anymore then they may not have that much pressure to sell their oil in dollars. You're not gonna have those recycled petrodollars coming back to The US, and suddenly the whole AI race with China looks a lot weaker as well. So I think across the board, a lot of things look good for Russia, but and there is a big but here, and that is I don't think that the Russians want this war nonetheless because the Russians, much like the Chinese, value stability and predictability. And what's happening in Iran now could again, if something would happen to Iran collapse, that would be a disaster for this Greater Eurasia initiative that is to integrate economies of Greater Eurasian Continent, but also this could spiral into a world war. So from this perspective, it's very dangerous and I don't doubt that the Russians therefore want to put an end to this war simply because I guess much like India, they don't want the Eurasian Continent to be too China centric, they would like to have many poles of power and this requires diversification. This means that the Russians need close ties with Iran, with India and other countries. So for the Americans to knock off Iran off the, you know, the chessboard, the greater Eurasian chessboard would be a disaster for the Russians. So, yes, I think they're prospering or benefiting from this, but they they do wanna put an end to it. Speaker 0: Understood. Glenn, let me just come to the Strait Of Hormuz. You know, the objectives of U. S. Behind starting this war, that has been questioned enough. Why did you start this war in the first place? Those are questions not just emerging, you know, globally. They're also emerging from inside The U. S. But if you look at what a win will actually look like for US, would it be the state of Hormuz? Like, which whoever controls the state of Hormuz is eventually who walks away as you know, walks away with the victory at this point because The US was looking for a change in regime. They mentioned it enough number of times. That hasn't happened and doesn't seem like it's going to happen. Is the state of Hormuz the winning factor now? Speaker 1: Well, I I I don't think any The US would be in a position to control this just given the geography. So The US obviously went into into this war with the objective of regime change. That was the goal. This was the decapitation strike, this was the hope of killing Khamenei and obviously it didn't work. I think it shouldn't have come as a surprise, but you know killing the leader of Iran only created more solidarity within the country. And also the idea that the whole armed forces would begin to disintegrate once they had been punished enough, also proven to be incorrect. So I think at the moment you see the American pivoting a bit. Some are talking about the Strait Of Moose that this should be a goal, others are saying you see a shift now towards saying well, actually what we really want to do is just degrade Iran's missile capabilities that they won't have this long range missiles. And again, you know, these are the kind of vague objectives which they can essentially declare victory today then because Iran has had many of its missiles destroyed. Also it launched a lot of its missiles at U. S. Targets which means that its missile stockpile has been reduced. So this should be a source of optimism when The U. S. Moves from this very hard line objective such as regime change and they shift in towards missiles, reducing the missile stockpiles or something like this. But the straight of our moves, I think, is beyond what what is reasonable. It's it will be too difficult. So I don't think they will But why push too hard on do Speaker 0: you feel it would be difficult if I were to just look at the bases that they have across West Asia? They have enough military might. Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, have their bases there. How difficult would it be to exert that military might over the Strait Of Hormuz? Speaker 1: Well, controlling it just means the ability to shut it down. Many countries would have the ability to shut down this narrow strait. The problem is that no one benefits from it, that is the Gulf States are hurt, Iran is hurt from it, The US and the global economy is hurt. So it becomes an exercise in self harm. The reason why the Iranians are doing this, the ability to shut down the Strait Of Hormuz is because The US has the ability to inflict a mass amount of destruction. It can go after civilian infrastructure, it can well, look what they've done to Tehran. It looks like, well, just, you know, the chemical warfare there. You've seen in terms of going after his fuel depots. They're going after the water supplies in Iran. You you see all these things. This is what America can do. Iran doesn't have that ability. They can't hit The United States. What they can do is cause economic pain. So, yes, I think The US and many of the Gulf States can also shut down the Strait Of Our Moose, but but but that's not that's it doesn't have any purpose. It doesn't have any reasoning. Speaker 0: Can they eradicate the Iranian control over the Strait Of Hormuz? I'm not talking about shutting it down, but just get rid of the Iranians from there and they then decide who gets to control and when it has to be shut and when it has to be opened and remained and kept open and secured. Can The US exert that kind of military might over the state of Hormuz to control it? Speaker 1: Then one need us to control a massive amount of Iran's territory, which is a huge territory with populated by 90,000,000 people. So this seems very unlikely and if closing down the Strait Of Hormuz would depend on very sophisticated weapon systems, will be one thing. But this can be shut down with drones which can be manufactured in apartments. It can be also shut down with small naval drones that is this essentially drone operated small torpedoes. There's it doesn't require a lot of high technology which means that The US can't take out very key infrastructure to prevent Iran from shutting this down, to force it to open. But with very cheap and easy to make weapons, the Iranians can shut it down and it's simply too much territory, too large population for The United States to shut down the these capabilities. So at some point, they're have to make peace with the Iranians and make it make sure it's in Iran's interest to keep the Strait Of Hormuz open because it is in their interest. The problem now is that Iran faces an existential threat. That is The US now threatens to destroy not just the government, but also the country. As Trump tweeted, we we will make it impossible for Iran to even rebuild as a nation. And this is what regime change means. There is no replacement government. This means the disintegration and destruction of Iran, a massive civil war which could cost hundreds of thousands of lives. So for them this is existential which is why they went to this great extent. They've never done this before because they never believed that they faced this kind of an existential threat. So if the war ends, the Iranians have no reason to shut this straight down. This is very horrible for them as well. So, no, I I don't think The US can control the straight or almost no one can control it completely because too many actors could shut it down. Speaker 0: Glenn, thanks so much for joining me here on game plan. Whether this war continues further, that only means and if it does, that's essentially what Iran is looking at because they're not capitulating. They're not giving up. They are taking a bad amount of beating. There's no doubt in that, but they are continuing with their counters nevertheless. And straight of hormones is their main play where they're exerting their pressure with whether it's mines, whether it's their own boats, whether it's their own military boats. Now energy experts have also warned that whether the Iran crisis proves a cure for Russia's economy, that depends directly on how long it lasts. But there is little to suggest that Iran is willing to capitulate that what we just discussed. They're inviting U. S. To continue the war on the other hand. That's what the statements from Iran suggest that we're waiting. Come on, on. Now in the midst of this, Russia is emerging as the winner as we just discussed. How long this lasts? It doesn't seem to be in the favor of The U. S. We'll need to wait and watch twelfth day and running. They expected it to last for about four to five weeks, whether it goes the distance or even longer. Let's wait. That was Glenn Deeson joining me here on Game Plan. Speaker 1: Thanks, Yvonne.

The speaker expresses disappointment that India would be buying so much oil from Russia, saying, "I've I've been very disappointed that India would be buying so much oil, as you know, from Russia," and adding, "And I let them know that." He states, "We put a very big tariff on India, 50% tariff, very high tariff." He emphasizes his good relations with Modi: "I get along very well with Modi, as you know. He's great." He notes Modi "was here a couple of months ago," and recalls, "In fact, we went to the Rose Garden and it was the grass."

The discussion centers on why oil prices remain high despite supply-demand indicators that “don’t make sense.” After conversations with Philip Pilkington and Jeffrey Curry, the speaker focuses on Strait of Hormuz throughput dropping sharply and the implications for oil inventories and pricing. A report from Kepler is cited showing ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz in the last three days of 34, 48, and 38 ships, compared with about 130–140 ships before the war—roughly a third of pre-war levels. The speaker also notes American reserves are “almost depleted,” suggesting only “a couple of months” remaining if current pace continues. China is described as having demand that “hasn’t picked up,” while refinery margins appear unusually high: the price of oil is very expensive, yet margins are so high that it suggests either price gouging or that the effective per-barrel cost is significantly higher than the spot price, though exact costs for oil leaving the Strait of Hormuz are described as impossible to obtain. In response, the other speaker argues the market’s pricing must reflect more than supply normalization alone. Some oil rerouting around the Strait is attributed to countries like the UAE, but the reduction from pre-war ship levels still implies major supply constraints. The speaker proposes two possibilities: either something may soon raise shipping levels rapidly, or a major factor is on the demand side. They emphasize that demand destruction can occur through macroeconomic weakness and price effects—especially in Asia, where high oil prices for “almost four month period” can reduce consumption, and in Europe, where economic data “fell off a cliff.” A key point is the shape and speed of the WTI and Brent futures curves shifting toward contango. The futures curve is described as positioned for oversupply “in the near term,” even though the market would normally be expected to move from historic supply deficit toward normalization. The speaker highlights that the prompt spread (first two contracts) is “four pennies,” producing an extremely flat curve, and argues that it is not merely anticipating oversupply far out in time (e.g., March 2027). Instead, the market appears to be pricing a near-term demand shortfall. China is framed as the “X factor” for demand via inventory refilling, described as more political than economic. The speaker references a meeting between Trump and Xi in May and suggests a plausible short-term understanding that delays quick inventory refills and reduces disruption to oil prices. They add that China has been relatively silent since then and that China’s lack of rapid strategic reserve replenishment aligns with prices moving toward contango. The conversation explains contango as a condition where spot prices are lower than futures prices, implying the market expects oil to flood the market or otherwise be available for future delivery. The speaker elaborates that the spot price must fall relative to futures to incentivize buyers to take near-term oil and store it. They contrast this with backwardation (described as the curve previously steeply favoring immediate delivery when supply is tight), noting that backwardation existed for months but shifted too quickly and too far for supply-only explanations. The demand explanation includes global “front-loading” of economic activity after the historic closure of the Strait of Hormuz, with producers rushing to build inventories and ship goods (including plastics and agricultural inputs) before shortages and higher prices hit. After this activity, an “air pocket” is described: production and purchasing slow, and if that coincides with macroeconomic weakening—softening consumer spending and weak labor data—demand destruction accelerates. The speaker argues that energy shocks often lead to recessions, and that oil’s curve shift reflects rising seriousness about the timing and magnitude of demand decline. China’s economy is described as experiencing multiple simultaneous crises: a banking crisis, an “intractable” real estate crisis, weak May retail sales, and lending pullbacks toward major state-owned firms and the government. Government bond curves are characterized as recession-like, with low interest rates near levels from December 2024 and the 10-year bond near record lows. This is used to support the idea that China may not be refilling oil stocks because demand is weaker. The impact on the rest of the global economy is described as broad: upstream economies take a hit, while Asia has been partially supported by AI-related semiconductor and equipment demand. The speaker suggests that as the AI bubble cools, the underlying China-linked weakness will show up more clearly across highly China-exposed economies. Commodity weakness (copper, aluminum, steel) alongside oil’s curve behavior is presented as consistent with a demand-side slowdown attributed to China. Later, the discussion shifts to how financial markets and real incomes diverge. The speaker says the disconnect between stock market performance and everyday economic conditions drives political frustration, referencing the view that central bankers and politicians repeatedly claim everything is fine because the stock market is up, even while incomes for most people remain stagnant. The speaker proposes that the resolution depends either on growth returning or on political changes driven by worsening inequality and urgency as economic conditions persist. Finally, the speaker frames the broader economic cycle as globalization tied to monetary evolution and the post–World War II reserve system, running until August 2007, followed by deglobalization as part of the downswing. They argue that eventually ingenuity brings an upswing again, but politics may break sooner due to accelerating urgency, diminishing inhibitions, and rising inequality—implying a “race against time” between economic recovery and political escalation.

Afshin Ratansi introduces New Order, saying it examines how India and its allies are helping redefine the 21st-century geopolitical landscape, including coverage for RT India. He highlights several developments: China is set to send Foreign Minister Wang Yi to India for BRICS National Security Advisers’ meetings ahead of September’s BRICS summit in Delhi; Prime Minister Modi is described as having appeared at the G7 despite “collapsing” U.S.-aligned states, meeting Trump face-to-face for the first time in 16 months; Modi reportedly stressed that global maritime routes must be protected, referencing the killing of Indian merchant seamen; Trump is described as praising Modi and announcing he will visit India in the future. Ratansi also says that the Pentagon quietly dropped the word “Indo” from “Indo-Pacific Command,” reverting to the Pacific Command name used before 2018, arguing that the nameplate change does not imply reduced Indian Ocean capability, and suggesting it reflects turbulence inside U.S. strategic thinking. Ratansi then brings in Kanwal Sybil, India’s former Foreign Secretary, who joins from London. Sybil comments that the timing of the Pentagon naming change appears odd, occurring just before Modi’s meeting with Trump, and links it to broader U.S. reviews focused on deterring China and the roles assigned to partners across the Indian and Pacific Oceans. He notes that India’s navy remains indispensable for securing lines of communication, trade, and energy in the Indian Ocean due to the lack of comparable regional alternatives. Sybil adds that this could reduce pressure on India to become involved in any U.S. or Trump-led adventure against China related to Taiwan, given India’s continuous border with China and troop deployments in the Himalayas. Ratansi and Sybil discuss the death of Indian merchant seamen off the coast of Oman: Chief Engineer Patnalla Suresh, Cadet Aditya Sharma, and Sivanandan Charisiya. Sybil says the issue has not been raised on the American side and criticizes a lack of condolences. He reports that when India’s foreign minister raised the matter with Rubio, Rubio’s response was described as aggressive and peremptory, insisting the ships obey U.S. Navy orders and that any infraction would not be tolerated. Sybil also says that two days later the U.S. lifted the blockade and questions whether Rubio knew in advance, criticizing harsh diplomacy. Sybil says Modi raised the issue in the G7 where Trump was present and again in a bilateral conversation, describing Trump’s response as evasive. He adds that the U.S. firing Hellfire missiles at an unarmed commercial ship where sailors were not posing a military threat is a central question. On the Quad, Sybil states that it is “dying a slow death,” citing the inability to hold a summit and describing the Quad foreign ministers meeting in Delhi as having a tame outcome. He says U.S. signals and strategic reviews suggest less emphasis on it than before. He also argues that Quad-like port and logistics arrangements do not amount to free access to Indian ports: every request for accessing Indian ports must be politically cleared by the Indian government, and therefore does not mean India allows the U.S. to use Indian ports to attack Iran or other West Asian countries. Sybil discusses the North-South Transport Corridor and reported targeting of railways in infrastructure used in the corridor. He says he previously visited Astrakhan and described trade mechanics through the Caspian Sea and container flows, emphasizing that flourishing two-way trade and time reductions matter for exports from India to Russia. He argues that Iran’s sanctions and administrative limitations have created transit frictions, and that ending sanctions could strengthen prospects, including for Chabahar port. He says a likely aim of attacking railway lines was destroying infrastructure rather than severing communications. On sanctions and Russian energy, Sybil says India did not import Russian oil before 2022 due to economics and nearby Gulf supplies, but after the Ukraine war Russia’s discounted oil and discounts made India-Russia oil ties flourish, with Russia becoming the biggest oil supplier to India. He says U.S. waivers were used to allow access to Russian oil while interrupting global supplies might spike prices for consumers. He emphasizes that he considers it humiliating for India to be told to buy Russian oil only with permission and says Indian companies continued decisions on commercial terms. Sybil says Modi and Russia’s messages indicate India is independent and will resist pressure, while acknowledging that India may reduce supplies and may also buy more U.S. oil, describing swaps including billions of dollars of U.S. oil purchases. On the G7 and Britain/Europe, Sybil argues the G7 seeks relevance since the G20 became the main cooperation forum involving rising economies; he says the U.S. has “wrecked” the G20 and the G7 invites countries like Brazil, India, Egypt, and others to co-opt them rather than cooperate fully. He says India finds the platform useful to express Global South concerns and to steer towards the G20 agenda, while not compromising its interests as a developing economy; he cites improving relations with European countries and negotiations on technology and defense, plus improving ties with Canada. In the viewer Q&A, Ratansi and Zahra Khan respond to questions. One question asks what India would do if it got a UN Security Council seat; Ratansi says ending the UN Security Council veto is necessary so the U.S. cannot veto everything, and proposes an investigation into sanctions threatened over Russian energy imports, including why 38 million people were killed by U.S. sanctions between 1917 and 2021. Another question asks why India receives lectures on Russian oil while other Western countries do not; Ratansi cites examples including Britain, Germany, LNG via Dunkirk, and “shadow fleets,” framing it as unequal scrutiny of sovereign choices. A final question asks who might succeed Saif Gaddafi; Ratansi mentions Aisha Gaddafi and Mohammed Gaddafi in Oman as less likely, notes Haftar supporters and links to Russia and the UAE, and discusses the possibility of a successor while connecting it to broader visions involving BRICS and a “new order.”

Speaker 0: Nearly two weeks into this conflict, the official story is cracking, and the number of Americans wounded is slowly coming out. Yesterday, we reported based on our sources that the number of American wounded was at least one hundred and thirty seven. After our report ran, the Pentagon has now publicly acknowledged about one hundred and forty wounded. That confirms our sources on this. So why did it take a little news show like ours to report this information? Why wasn't Fox News reporting this information? The Pentagon I know it's really weird. Why is the mainstream media silent on this? The Pentagon finally comes out and actually admits to this. Speaker 1: Reuters comes out and reports this. Exclusive. As many as one hundred and fifty US troops wounded so far in Iran war. They just published this today, this morning. March 10. That's remarkable. Exclusive. Just curious how that's an exclusive when we reported it yesterday. Yesterday. Whatever. Hey, Reuters. Bite me. Anyway, this war is clearly not winding down no matter what the messaging says. President Trump is saying the war could end very soon. But Iran says talks with The United States are off the table for now. Tehran is prepared to keep striking as long as it takes. And they're vowing an eye for an eye. So what is an eye for an eye actually mean? Does it mean you hey, you killed our leader. We kill yours? Does it mean, hey, you killed all these girls who were the daughters of members of the the Iranian Navy at a girls school, do we also do that to you? Like, what is actually does that look like? Speaker 0: Does it mean we took out your water infrastructures or you took out ours? So we do that. Right. Your gas infrastructure, civilian infrastructure, that's that's a war crime. But we did it. Your oil infrastructure, we do that. Like, what exactly does that look like? Meanwhile, the Strait Of Hormuz is getting worse by the minute. US intelligence tracking Iranian mine laying threats now as Gulf energy infrastructure there is taking a major hit with about 1,900,000 barrels per day of refining capacity across Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and The UAE. All down. CBS now says shipping through the Strait Of Hormuz has ground to a virtual halt. Nothing getting through. That's of just a few minutes ago. And Israel's hammering Beirut's southern suburbs and Lebanon. So they've essentially invaded Lebanon. Speaker 2: And then there's the neocon political class in Washington saying the quiet part out loud. Senator Lindsey Graham is now openly talking about, you know, going back to South Carolina to tell the sons and daughters in South Carolina, you know, you gotta send your loved ones to the Middle East. That's what I'm doing here in South Carolina. I gotta tell them to go fight in the Middle East, and he's calling on other Middle East countries that have been sitting on the fence that we've supported over the years as allies. Get off the fence. Go bomb Iran. Help out with Iran. And, oh, by the way, Spain, we're pissed off at you because you don't want us using your air bases or airspace to bomb Iran. Listen. Speaker 0: To our allies step up, get our air bases out of Spain. They're not reliable. Move all those airplanes to a country that would let us use them when we're threatened by a regime like Iran. To our friends in Spain, man, you have lost your way. I don't wanna do business with you anymore. I want our air bases our air bases out of Spain into a country that will let us use them. To our Arab friends, I've tried to help you construct a new Mideast. You need to up your game here. I can't go to South Carolina and say we're fighting and you won't publicly fight. What you're doing behind the scenes, that has to stop. The double dealing of the Arab world when it comes to this stuff needs to end. I go back to South Carolina. I'm asking them to send their sons and daughters over to the Mideast. What I want you to do in The Mideast to our friends in Saudi Arabia and other places, step forward and say this is my fight too. I join America. I'm publicly involved in bringing this regime down. If you don't, you're making a great mistake, and you're gonna cut off the ability to have a better relationship with The United States. I say this as a friend. Speaker 1: Ugh. He's an odious friend. Speaker 0: Say this as a friend. Speaker 3: With friends pick up a gun and go fight yourself, you coward. Yeah. I freaking hate that. But you're calling so, like, bluntly for somebody else to go die for his stupid cause. Speaker 0: Yeah. Speaker 1: I am so curious about this. I mean, he's a liar. But how many people in South Carolina are really walking up to him and saying, who are we gonna get to fight with us? Who are we gonna get to fight Iran? Worried about this. My son can go, but who's going with him? Let's make some war playdates. Who does that? Speaker 0: Larry Johnson is a former CIA analyst, NRA gun trainer, and, he's been looking at all of this and doing some incredible writing over at his website, Sonar twenty one. Larry, thank you for joining us. Great to see you back on the show. Speaker 4: Hi, guys. Good to see you. Speaker 0: So I wanna talk about the American war wounded first because Mhmm. I know that this is, near and dear to your heart and, of course, something that you've been watching, closely. And the lies, of course, that are coming out about this. Again, I spoke to sources over the past forty eight hours that were telling us here at Redacted about 137 Americans wounded. Then the Pentagon comes out and then confirms about a hundred and forty. So right pretty much right on the nose. And does that number sound low to you? Or does that sound about right? Speaker 4: That sounds a little low. So on March 4, let's go to Germany. Stuttgart, just North West of Germany, there is a hospital called Landstuhl Regional Medical Center. Landstuhl's primary mission is to handle American war wounded. On March 4, they issued a memo telling all the pregnant women that were about to give birth that, sorry, don't come here. We're not birthing any more babies. We gotta focus on our main mission. So that was the first clue that there was there were a lot of casualties inbound. I know, without mentioning his name, somebody who was involved dealing with the combat casualties during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and he dealt with the personnel at Lunstul. And he called someone up and said, can't say anything, but there's a lot of casualties. Then 13 miles to the east of Landstuhl is an army base called Kaiserslautern. Kaiserslautern and the Stars and Stripes issued for that base had an appeal, a blood drive appeal. Hey. We need lots of people to show up and donate blood. So those that was on March 5. So I wrote about this March 6. So I wrote about this four days ago, that, yeah, we had a lot more casualties, and there are more coming, because Iran's not gonna stop. You know, right now, we're getting signals that the Trump administration is reaching out, trying, oh, hey, let's talk, let's talk cease fire. Iran's having none of it. They've been betrayed twice by Donald Trump and his group of clowns. Speaker 0: Right. Speaker 4: You know? And and so they're not ready to say no. No. They've got the world, by the testicles is the polite way of saying it, withholding the Strait Of Hormuz. They've shut down the movement of not only oil, liquid natural gas. They're the supplier of about 25%, 25 to 30% of the world's liquid natural gas, and, about 30%, 30 to 35% of the world's urea, which is used for fertilizer. Now, that may not I just learned that that may not be as important as I once thought it was because most of it comes out of Oman. Oman, you don't have to worry about things going through the Strait Of Hormuz. But on oil and liquid natural gas, huge. 94% of The Philippines depended upon the flow of gas, both liquid and the petroleum oil, out of the Persian Gulf. India, 80%. Japan, South Korea. So this is gonna have a major impact on certain economies in the world. Now there there I I I've said this ironically. I I think Vladimir Putin's sitting there going, maybe Donald Trump really does like me, because what he's done is he's making Russia rich again in a way I mean, they're getting, you know, they were selling they were forced to sell their oil previously under sanctions at, like, $55 a barrel. Now they're getting $88.90 dollars a barrel. Well, and they just opened it up to India. I mean, that story over the past forty eight hours, like, so they The United States has eased its restriction on Russian oil flowing to India. I mean, talk about an absolute disaster. Speaker 4: Well, yeah. And remember what had happened there is India was playing a double game too. You know, bricks India is the I in bricks, and Iran is the new I in bricks. And so what was India doing? Well, India was pretending to play along with The United States, but then going to Russia and saying, hey, Russia. Yeah. We'll buy we'll buy your oil, but we needed a discount because we're going against the sanctions, and we need to cover ourselves. So Russia said, okay. As a BRICS partner, we'll let you have for $55 barrel. So they got a discount. So now when all of a sudden the the the oil tap is turned off, including the liquid natural gas, India goes running back to Russia. Now remember, on, February 25-26, India was in Israel buttering up the rear end of BB, Net, and Yahoo, kissing rear end all they could. Oh, man. It was a love fest. We're partners with Israel. And then Israel attacks their BRICS partner. And what does India say? Nothing. Zero. They don't say a thing about the murdered girls. So now all of a sudden, the oil's turned off. It's nine days now with no oil coming out of there for India. They go running back to Russia. Hey, buddy. Let's let's get back together. And Russia says, sure. That's great. But it's gonna cost you $89 now a barrel. No more friends and family program. Gonna get market conditions. Speaker 0: We've had many journalist friends that have had their bank accounts shut down. We were literally in the middle of an interview with a great journalist from the gray zone who found out that his banking was just shut down. Literally, in the middle of an interview, he got a message that his banking was shut down. Well, Rumble Wallet prevents that, because Rumble can't even touch it. No one can touch it. Rumble Wallet lets you control your money, not a bank, not a government, not a tech company, not even Rumble can touch it. It's yours, only yours, yours to protect your future and your family. You can buy and save digital assets like Bitcoin, Tether Gold, and now the new USA USA app USAT, which is Tether's US regulated stablecoin all in one place. Tether Gold is real gold on the blockchain with ownership of physical gold bars, and USAT keeps your money steady against inflation. No banks needed. It's not only a wallet to buy and save, but it also allows you to support your favorite creators by easily tipping them if you want with the click of a button. There'll be no fees when you tip our channel or others, and we actually receive the tip instantly unlike other platforms where we have to wait for payouts. So support our show today and other creators by clicking the tip button on our Rumble channel. Speaker 1: Now I wanna ask you about president Trump responding to CBS News reports that there may be mines in the Strait Of Hormuz. That doesn't make a ton of sense. He says we have no indication that they did, but they better not. But they are picking and choosing who gets to go through, and their allies can go through. So why would they mine their allies? What do we make of this? Do we need to respond to this at all? Speaker 4: Yeah. I don't think they've done it yet. But let's recall the last time Iran mined the Persian Gulf. They didn't mine the Strait Of Hormuz. They mined farther up. It was 1987, 1988. Why did they do that? Well, in September 1980, when Jimmy Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski were still in office, The United States encouraged a guy named Saddam Hussein, don't know if you've ever heard of him, but they encouraged Saddam Hussein to launch a war against Iran. And then Ronald Reagan comes in with Donald Rumsfeld and Cap Weinberger, and by 1983 had provided chemical weapons, or the precursors that Iraq needed to build chemical weapons, and Iraq started using chemical weapons against Iran in 1983 and continued to do it in '84, 85, 86. During that entire time, Iran never retaliated with chemical weapons. They were not going because they saw it as an act against God. They were serious about the religion. So 'eighty seven, 'eighty eight, they start dropping mines there in the Persian Gulf. Well, at that time, they didn't have all these missiles, so the United States Navy, a Navy SEAL, a good friend of mine, set up what was called the Hercules barge, and he had a Navy SEAL unit with him, and they fought off attacks by Iranian gunboats. He had some Little Bird helicopters from the one sixtieth, the special operations wing of the Air Force. And but we ended up disrupting the Iranian plan to mine The Gulf back then. Well, we couldn't do that today. We do not have that capability because Iran would blow us out of the water with drones and with missiles. You as we've seen, it's been happening over the last ten days. So United States would be in a real pickle. Speaker 1: And especially given the rhetoric of US war hawks in power for three decades. Like Yeah. Yes. They kind of had to prepare all of this time. Did we think that they weren't paying attention when we said it to the world? Speaker 4: Well, when we're writing our own press clippings and then reading them, there is a tendency to say, god, I am great. Can you see this? How good we are? And so they really believed that our air def the Patriot air defense systems and the THAAD systems would be they they could shut down the Iranian missiles and drones. And what they discovered was, nope. They didn't work. And they worked at an even lower level than the you know, Pentagon kept foul. We're shooting down 90%.

- The video discusses energy lockdowns as a forecast reality already beginning in some countries and likely to ripple worldwide. The host emphasizes the content as potentially disturbing and cites a recent IEA report titled “sheltering from oil shocks,” along with data from multiple countries and other worst‑case scenario reports. - Core plan described: the IEA envisions energy lockdowns that require major changes in daily life and mobility. Measures include: - Working from home three out of five days per week. - Dramatically reducing driving speeds and limiting private car access to cities. - Reducing public transport use and expanding car sharing. - Assessing whether one has a “key worker” reason to travel. - Reducing air travel by 40% or requiring a strong justification for flights. - Promoting 15‑minute cities to minimize travel. - Encouraging walking or cycling, greater public transport use, and eco‑driving techniques. - Prioritizing electric vehicles, with questions raised about how this aligns with other fuel choices. - The host reiterates that these measures would be more severe than COVID lockdowns. They reference the ongoing energy disruptions: strikes on Russian oil refineries, destruction/damage to about 40 energy sites in the Middle East, Europe’s reliance on LNG with tanker reroutes to Asia due to higher payments, and broader geopolitical tensions affecting energy flows. - Worst‑case scenario categories described in the report: 1) Immediate daily survival hits: low energy caps on homes (heating limited to about 15–18°C, with rolling blackouts in winter), no air conditioning in heat waves, fridges/freezers potentially turned off, cooking restricted if power or gas are limited, water pumps and treatment plants failing, possible boiling water orders, toilets and sewage issues, and widespread darkness with limited internet/TV/charging. 2) Health system breakdown: hospitals running on diesel generators, surgeries canceled, ventilators/oxygen/dialysis impacted, home medical devices useless, ambulance and emergency services underfunded or overwhelmed. 3) Food, water, and supply chain collapse: irrigation and farming halted due to fuel shortages, processing and distribution disrupted, empty shelves and panic buying, potential black markets and rationing reminiscent of wartime scenarios, with starvation risks in weeks in some countries and severe inflation. 4) Transport and mobility lockdowns: fuel rationing (odd/even days), reduced public transport, more cycling/walking, restricted medical visits, difficulty moving goods, economic and job devastation, and unemployment possibly skyrocketing (20–40% in worst cases). 5) Economic and societal collapse: energy‑intensive sectors shut, currency printing for stimulus, social order strain including riots and migrations, education stopping (home schooling), innovation and investment freezes, potential grid or civil breakdown, and excess deaths from extreme temperatures, starvation, and illness. 6) Long‑term societal damage: prolonged crisis causing massive economic contraction, widespread disruption to infrastructure and services, and deep social disruption. - The host notes current real‑world developments that align with these concerns: numerous countries declaring emergencies, fuel supply challenges, and policy actions such as fuel rationing or travel restrictions. Examples cited include the Philippines declaring a state of emergency, Vietnam and Bangladesh facing oil issues, Slovenia introducing fuel rationing, and South Korea implementing odd‑license‑plate driving bans for public sector workers. - The video closes with warnings about the potential severity and urges viewers to prepare, arguing that comments by some media or officials predicting quick recoveries could mislead families about the risk. A sense of urgency is conveyed about taking energy and logistical precautions in light of the described scenarios.

So last year, The US ran a trade deficit with India of almost $46,000,000,000. Proof to president Trump, the relationship in his view is unfair. India imports most of its oil last year, almost 40% of its crude from Russia. Well, president Trump is saying India is helping Russia fund the war in Ukraine. Earlier this month, he accused it of not caring how many people in Ukraine are being killed by the Russian war machine. India's prime minister Narendra Modi is defiant on all of this. On Monday, his ambassador to Russia said India will continue to buy oil from wherever it gets the best deal in order to protect the interests of its 1,400,000,000.0 p

The discussion argues that India is paying a price for being a US ally. It claims that, not long ago, Trump imposed about a 50% tariff on India and attempted to dictate which energy India could buy or sell from Russia. Later, the US reversed this after needing oil prices to go lower, un-sanctioning Russian oil that India was purchasing. The speaker says that Modi or other Indian leaders would be frustrated by trying to ally with the United States. The conversation then focuses on fertilizer and food costs. The speaker states that the Indian government subsidizes fertilizer costs for farmers to keep end prices low. They claim that Israel is effectively cost-shifting by ensuring the war continues and sabotages peace deals, creating an ongoing need to subsidize higher fertilizer prices to prevent starvation. The response agrees that India will face fertilizer shortages and that subsidies may not cover total costs, so the Indian government will bear a huge expense that ultimately comes out of ordinary people’s pockets. The speaker adds that rising oil costs and shortages of diesel and LNG are worsening the situation. The transcript also reports survey-based claims: according to polls shared by Indian colleagues, most Indians oppose Trump and have become critical of the Israeli regime compared to a year ago. The speakers say this is likely to get worse as fertilizer shortages continue into 2027. One speaker, identifying as a food scientist running a food laboratory, says their published projections show some level of famine in marginalized countries including Bangladesh and Yemen, and potentially India, with Somalia and Egypt also affected. The speakers then discuss whether countries will blame political leaders. They say it is already happening that global public opinion has turned against the Israeli regime, and that as economic conditions deteriorate, anger and hostility will increasingly target the Israeli regime and the United States, since Trump is US president and the economic effects reflect broadly on the country. Finally, they argue the US is paying a heavy price militarily and economically and that its international reputation is being damaged due to the war. They reference the resignation of Joe Kent, the Trump-appointed counter-terrorism chief, who resigned at the beginning of the war; the resignation letter is described as stating that Iran was not developing a nuclear weapon, not a threat to the US, and that the war is about the Israeli/Zionist regime rather than something carried out for the American people. They conclude that as things worsen in the US, people will blame Trump, Netanyahu, and the Zionist lobby, and that the war’s costs and ongoing genocide are driving hostility worldwide.

The Strait of Hormuz has been closed for eleven weeks, and the USA is poised to resume military strikes against Iran, with Israel expected to escalate further. A nuclear power facility in the UAE was struck by drones, which they say came from the West, though the speaker argues the drones could also be from Iran, from Iraq, or a false flag launched from a secret base in Iraq. The speaker says they do not believe Iran is taking responsibility, but notes they may be wrong. Overall, the speaker frames escalation as continuing without a resolution to the Strait. A limited development occurred when about a dozen ships were allowed to pass through after Trump met with China’s President Xi, with an arrangement that also involved Iran giving China permission to allow a certain number of ships to sail through. The speaker emphasizes this does not approach normal traffic levels (such as the previous 120/day figure). They argue that the crisis is not apparent to many Westerners because shipments already contained about eight weeks’ worth of supplies (oil, gas, fertilizer, helium, sulfuric acid, polyethylene, and other inputs). With week 11 underway, the speaker claims there are few remaining ships headed to Western countries. The speaker explains that even if countries have their own oil suppliers, global refining and crude type requirements create dependency on imported heavier crude while exporting sweet light crude. They predict scarcity issues if the supply chain runs out. They highlight shortages already affecting motor oil and describe how recovery will take easily the rest of the year even if the war ends quickly. The speaker urges people to buy motor oil immediately or within two days because blenders are reporting that orders for base oils are being rejected, meaning blended engine oil will not reach shelves. The speaker reports early warnings from retailers and manufacturers (including AutoZone, Honda, Nissan, and others) that engine oil supply problems are approaching. They also give guidance on oil labeling, stating that the first number (e.g., in 5W-30, 0W-20, 10W-40) indicates viscosity at cold start, while the second number indicates viscosity at 100°C, and that the second number matters more for matching what an engine needs. They advise matching the second number to avoid major issues, and they prefer oil that is slightly off spec over running dirty oil too long. Beyond motor oil, the speaker predicts broader shortages tied to polyethylene feedstock loss from the Persian Gulf (attributed to Qatar). They connect polyethylene to many supply chain items, including car parts, machine parts, barrels, containers for food storage, industrial shipping containers, and containers used to ship oil, arguing the resulting erosion of supply will cause widespread disruption. They compare the situation to COVID supply chain shortages but argue this is different because reopening factories would not solve it and the lag time will persist for months. They state shortages could continue into 2027. They recommend people prepare backup supplies and essential parts, and encourage neighbors and family to become aware as shelves begin to empty. The speaker also forecasts rising food and transportation costs, higher travel expenses, increased shipping fees for many items, higher e-commerce prices, and more common shipping delays. They say these effects may worsen around midterms, with political blame falling on GOP and Trump. They claim strategic petroleum reserve releases and attempts to keep energy prices low cannot last indefinitely and predict gasoline could reach around $10 per gallon. They add that EV sales may rise because driving costs are lower and EVs avoid engine oil. Finally, the speaker argues that shifting energy demand to the power grid could stress infrastructure already strained by data centers, and they cite California as vulnerable due to lack of local refining and reduced oil infrastructure, plus limited nuclear power capacity. They conclude that with week 11 and no solution in sight, the situation could continue for months and recommend preparedness for oil, water, gas, solar, and battery storage.

The transcript claims the White House is trying to prevent the public from understanding what is happening “with oil and gas,” and suggests the administration is in “panic mode.” It says the Trump administration is calling on the Department of Justice to investigate alleged “price gouging at the pump.” It also says White House sources told Redacted News that the team negotiating the Ukraine-Russia deal discussed with President Trump the possibility of lifting sanctions on Russian oil, which would be a major reversal and could shock the EU, which had just introduced a new round of sanctions. The transcript frames the situation as Washington running out of “cheap options,” “spare barrels” in the Strategic Petroleum Reserves, and “political cover.” The transcript highlights Cushing, Oklahoma as the “key delivery hub” for U.S. crude futures and central to pipeline connections and refinery dependence, tying West Texas Intermediate pricing to Cushing. It claims EIA data shows commercial U.S. crude inventories fell by 6.1 million barrels last week to 412.1 million barrels (about 7% below average). It says inventories at Cushing fell to roughly 19 million barrels and that the Strategic Petroleum Reserve fell by 9.1 million barrels to 331 million. It explains “tank bottoms” as a condition where the system becomes fragile and near collapse, requiring some oil to remain for pressure, blending, flow, and quality control, and warns that pipelines and terminals could declare force majeure. It argues that a Cushing problem could spread into refinery supply issues, especially in the Midwest and interior regions that cannot bring in tanker cargoes from anywhere, leading to gasoline problems and ultimately an inflation problem. The transcript then layers in the Strait of Hormuz, saying ship traffic is running below the daily average (23 ships moving through about 20 minutes earlier) while President Trump claims everything is “fine.” It says a memorandum involving Iran, Oman, and Jordan indicates Iran is charging tolls to pass through the Strait, contradicting Trump and Marco Rubio. It claims tanker rates surged, with large crude carriers earning close to $470,000 per day to move through the Gulf and Persian Gulf via the Strait, with the price “doubled in a week,” and that oil companies are paying double due to dangers to captains and crews. It describes Trump publicly demanding DOJ investigate oil companies for not lowering gasoline prices fast enough, citing average gasoline of about $3.90 per gallon early that morning. It also mentions gas stations in Texas capping how much customers can pump at a time (described as 50). The transcript argues that tight physical energy system constraints—not sanctions policy details—are driving the need to reverse course. It claims that if sanctions on Russian oil are lifted, it would show that prior energy policy claims depended on Russian energy. It states Russian crude exports averaged about 6 million barrels per day in May and are rising. It says the transcript’s sources claim the U.S. is likely to lift sanctions next, despite a June 17 expiration of a Russian oil sanctions waiver after Trump suggested reopening Hormuz would increase pressure on Moscow. It concludes by asserting Trump is “trapped” in a panic, quietly reversing policy, blaming “big oil,” and that DOJ’s price-gouging focus is meant to distract from the broader issues involving Russia and Hormuz.