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The conversation centers on Iran, its 47-year regime, and how to think about protest, reform, and potential change from the perspective of an Iranian-American who has lived in the United States most of his life. The speakers discuss the severity of the regime, the nature of the opposition, and the calculus involved in any push for change. - Freedom and the cost of change: Freedom is described as nasty and the regime as “nasty.” The speakers assert that the regime, including the IRGC, is not likely to give up Iran in a peaceful way. They emphasize that protests and resistance have been ongoing, and that the regime has a track record of destroying opposition. They use the imagery of public executions and a ruthless approach to suppression, comparing the regime’s behavior to a brutal, game-of-thrones-like motto. - Personal history and perspective: The guest notes his life trajectory—born during the 1978 revolution, living through the Shah’s era briefly, and then the Khomeini years—giving him a long historical frame for evaluating leadership and revolution. He remarks that he has no moral authority to tell Iranians how to protest or whether to risk their families, acknowledging the severe personal stakes for those on the ground. He stresses the bravery and resilience of the Iranian people and explains the immense pressures that drive ordinary citizens to protest. - The strategic challenge of regime change: The guest asserts that the regime wants to stretch negotiations and extend days to avoid losing resources, implying a protracted endurance tactic. He insists that replacing or reforming the regime would be extremely difficult, given the depth of the regime’s networks and its long tenure. - Reza Pahlavi and leadership dynamics: The discussion revisits Reza Pahlavi, the former shah’s son, noting his recent high-profile activity, meetings in Washington, and televised statements. The guest acknowledges both praise and criticism of Reza Pahlavi, arguing that leadership in Iran would require clear, tough decisions and that those who criticize him must provide constructive counterarguments rather than ad hominem attacks. He discusses the complexity of leadership in exile and the challenges of returning to Iran to lead, including loyalty issues within the military and the risk of betrayal. - The US and foreign policy angle: The hosts debate what role the United States should play, including the consideration of strikes or sanctions. The guest uses a parable about a local offense (a killer in Miami) to illustrate how a country should commit to eliminating a threat without broad interference in other regions’ problems. He argues for public support of a targeted objective but cautions against broad, nation-building wars that could trigger larger conflicts. He also notes the influence of other actors, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, China, and European nations, on the Iran situation, suggesting a multi-layered and opaque calculus in any action. - The question of strikes and objectives: The speakers discuss whether strikes should aim to completely destroy the regime or merely pressure it, emphasizing that the intention behind any military action matters more than the action itself. They consider the risk of a dangerous power vacuum, comparing potential outcomes to Libya or Iraq, and discuss the possibility of negotiating with a different leadership that could concede to protesters’ demands while minimizing harm to the broader population. They acknowledge the difficulty of achieving a favorable outcome without risking unintended consequences. - The role of sanctions and diplomacy: The sanctions are described as byproducts of the regime’s leadership and its lack of diplomacy, with the argument that sanctions affect the Iranian people more than the ruling elite. The dialogue touches on questions of accountability for the regime’s behavior and the broader regional dynamics, including public sentiment in Iran and international responses. - Mossad and external involvement: The guest asserts that Mossad and Israel are heavily involved in Iran’s internal dynamics and protests, given the existential stakes and the perception of threats against Iranian leadership. He contends that foreign intelligence communities are active in shaping events and information, including potential misdirection and propaganda. - The broader takeaway: The discussion ends by underscoring the need for multiple options and credible leadership in Iran, the difficulty of changing a deeply entrenched regime, and the reality that any transition would be complex, potentially dangerous, and require careful, strategic consideration of long-term impacts rather than quick, sweeping actions. The host reflects on the remarkable intensity and busyness of US politics and foreign policy under a dynamic administration, noting that such a convergence of domestic and international pressures makes this period historically singular.

The speaker states that the United States is conducting an operation with a clear goal: to eliminate the threat posed by Iran’s short-range ballistic missiles and by Iran’s navy to naval assets. The speaker says the operation is focused on this objective and is progressing “quite successfully,” with the details of tactics and progress to be discussed by the Pentagon and the Department of War. Two reasons are given for acting now. First, the speaker asserts that if Iran came under attack by the United States, Israel, or another party, Iran would respond against the United States. According to the speaker, orders had been delegated down to field commanders, and within an hour of the initial attack on Iran’s leadership compound, the Iranian missile forces in the south and in the north were activated to launch. The speaker notes that those forces were “prepositioned.” Second, the speaker explains that the assessment was that if the United States stood and waited for Iran’s attack to come first, American casualties would be much higher. Therefore, the president made the decision to act preemptively. The speaker emphasizes that they knew there would be an Israeli action, and that action would precipitate an attack against American forces. The implication is that delaying a preemptive strike would result in greater casualties, potentially billions of dollars in losses, and more American lives at risk. The overarching message is that the preemptive operation aims to neutralize Iran’s short-range ballistic missiles and navy threats before they are used in consolidation with anticipated Israeli actions and any Iranian counterattacks against U.S. forces. The speaker frames the decision as prudent and anticipatory, intended to prevent higher casualties and to maintain safety for American personnel and assets. The speaker stops short of detailing specific tactical methods, pointing listeners to the Pentagon and the Department of War for a deeper discussion of tactics and progress.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the unfolding conflict with Iran, focusing on miscalculations, strategy, and potential trajectories. - Speaker 1 says the war is a major miscalculation, identifiable before it began. Signs were evident: movement of military equipment, force postures, and statements suggested that absent an eleventh-hour change by Trump, the plan was to use prepositioned forces and enablers for sustained combat. He notes this pattern matches previous experiences in which the U.S. saw a buildup as a precursor to war, citing Russia’s 2022 invasion and his own observations of earlier prepositioning, logistics, air support, refueling, and large-scale aviation assets (C-17s, C-5s, fighter jets, aircraft carriers). - He argues Iran’s leadership intended to pursue war rather than negotiation, pointing to what he calls a central missed opportunity: the Oman foreign minister’s Friday-night submissions to the Iranian negotiator offering zero reprocessing, stockpile reductions, and at least preliminary talks on long-range missiles and proxies. He asserts that if the Trump administration had accepted those terms, a ceasefire or settlement might have been possible; instead, he claims the next morning’s attack signaled that negotiations were never the aim. - Regarding U.S. objectives, Speaker 1 says the stated aims from Trump were unattainable given Iran’s resolve and the regime’s calculations that fighting a war with the U.S. is less risky than submitting to U.S. demands. He cites a New York Times report indicating Iran believed war with the U.S. was a viable risk, yet he notes Iran’s leadership now appears to be consolidating support at home and regionally after the Ayatollah’s assassination and the subsequent martyrdom of Qasem Soleimani’s successor in Iran’s internal narrative. - On battlefield dynamics, he emphasizes that Iran’s force deployment is not merely pressure but designed for use, with extensive underground facilities capable of withstanding sustained pressure. He forecasts continued high-intensity operations for a period, but warns the U.S. faces a tightening window: if the Iranian side holds firm and the U.S. cannot sustain supplies and missiles, the U.S. could reach a crisis point. - He discusses possible ceasefire dynamics and political reaction: Trump’s suggestion of a ceasefire could be “complete BS” if the Ayatollah’s position remains solid; the martyrdom and regional protests strengthen Iran’s stance. He expects continued escalation and a hardening of Iran’s demands, including sanctions relief or designation changes, should the conflict drag on. - On regional response, Speaker 1 notes that Iran has drawn regional actors into the conflict, with protests supporting Iran across Iraq, Pakistan, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. He says many Iranians—though opposed to the regime—are unlikely to embrace Israel or the United States as a path out of the crisis, given decades of antagonism and past betrayals by Western powers. - Regarding U.S. vulnerabilities, he says there are reports of U.S. casualties (three killed, five seriously wounded, others lightly wounded) though some figures are disputed; the public reporting may lag behind direct sources. He mentions possible gaps in air defense and the risk of shortages in interceptors as drones and missiles proliferate, warning that Iran could escalate if U.S. stocks are depleted. - Looking ahead, Speaker 1 argues the conflict is a battle of wills and a war of attrition. The U.S. attempted a “cheap” approach with naval and air power but no ground forces; Iran appears ready to continue long enough to force concessions. He warns the Iranian threat could extend to oil infrastructure and the broader economy if the United States or its regional partners target Iran’s energy sector, potentially broadening the conflict. - In sum, he characterizes Iran’s strategy as all-in, aiming to impose pain to compel a negotiated settlement unfavorable to the U.S., while the U.S. faces a narrowing margin to sustain supply chains, missiles, and air defenses as the conflict potentially drags on for weeks to months. He cautions that the escalation ladder remains with higher rungs available, including strikes on energy infrastructure, if the conflict widens.

John Mersheimer argues that the war against Iran is not proceeding as the United States hoped and that there is no plausible off-ramp or decisive pathway to victory. He contends that Washington cannot narrate a decisive end to the conflict the way it could have against Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, because the war has not produced a decisive Iranian collapse. Instead, Iran has an incentive to convert the fight into a protracted war of attrition and possesses the means to do so, including a broad set of missiles and drones and the ability to retaliate across the region. The result, he says, is a stalemate in which Iran would drive a hard bargain to secure sanctions relief or other concessions, and escalation by the U.S. and Israel will simply provoke Iran to escalate further. On why Iran will not settle on American terms, Mersheimer emphasizes that Iran has a strong hand and time on its side. He notes that the more time passes, the more desperate the U.S. will be to settle, which strengthens Iran’s position. He argues that even heavy bombardment would not compel Iran to quit; rather, Iran could strike back against Gulf states, Israel, and American assets with significant effect. The Gulf States are particularly vulnerable due to a small number of petroleum sites, short-range missiles, drones, and, crucially, desalination plants that provide most of their fresh water. He cites Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman as heavily dependent on desalination, implying that destroying such infrastructure would have catastrophic humanitarian and economic consequences. Iran could also target energy infrastructure, and even if the Strait of Hormuz remains open, widespread damage to Gulf energy infrastructure would devastate the regional and global economy. He warns that Israel could suffer increasing Iranian pressure as time goes on, especially as interceptors become depleted. Regarding energy and the Strait of Hormuz, Mersheimer stresses that 20% of the world’s oil and gas passes through the Persian Gulf, making the energy dimension the war’s most consequential aspect. He argues that opening the Strait of Hormuz would be exceedingly difficult, and destroying desalination and petroleum infrastructure in the Gulf States would negate any advantage of keeping the straits open. He suggests that escalation without a viable endgame will have grave economic repercussions for the world, pushing the U.S. toward a coerced end that would not be a victory. Mersheimer contends that strategic bombing or air power alone cannot win such wars. He contrasts World War II and Korea/Vietnam with the present, where there are no boots on the ground and no clear path to victory via air power alone. He notes that the deterrent value of air power is limited, and a regime change strategy is notoriously difficult without ground forces. He argues that the decapitation strategy and ongoing escalations are unlikely to produce a decisive American/Israeli victory, and could instead lead to a stalemate or American concession under economic strain. On leadership and credibility, Mersheimer critiques U.S. leadership, particularly President Trump, for ignoring warning from generals and the National Intelligence Council that regime change was unlikely to succeed. He cites General James Mattis-era warnings that there was no viable military option and notes the pre-war intelligence that suggested limited prospects for quick regime change. He points to Trump’s sometimes contradictory and inaccurate statements about Iranian capabilities, including claims that Iran possessed Tomahawk missiles and that U.S. strikes had erased Iran’s nuclear capability. He argues that such statements undermine U.S. credibility, though he distinguishes between outright lies and genuine mistaken beliefs by leaders. The discussion also covers Russia’s involvement, with Russia believed to be providing intelligence to Iran and possibly supplying matériel and oil if needed. Mersheimer asserts that the war benefits Russia strategically: it diverts U.S. resources from Europe and Ukraine, potentially worsens Ukraine’s trajectory, and could raise global energy prices that benefit Russian revenue. He suggests that Russia, and possibly China, have strong incentives to aid Iran to counter American power. Europe’s role is analyzed as largely symbolic or marginal in determining the war’s outcome. Mersheimer argues that European elites are aligned with the U.S., prioritizing NATO continuity and the maintenance of American military presence, despite the damaging consequences for Europe. He suggests a radical approach for Europe: adopt a hardball stance toward the U.S., diversify its economic and strategic relations (including with China, Russia, and India), and resist being economically manipulated or coerced by Washington. He emphasizes that Europe’s interests would be better served by reducing overreliance on the United States and pursuing a more balanced set of strategic partners. Towards the end, the hosts revisit the idea that leaders lie and that liberal democracies tend to rely more on public persuasion and propaganda, with Trump’s statements illustrating the complexities of truth in international politics. The conversation ends with a reflection on whether Europe should recalibrate its posture toward the United States and broaden its strategic hedges to protect its own interests, rather than assuming continued U.S. leadership in a costly and protracted confrontation with Iran.

The statements contend that the actions were carried out with no congressional authorization, placing them in direct violation of the Constitution, specifically Articles I and II, and that they breach international law and American law, with no concerns raised about these issues. The speaker suggests that this pattern represents a new perimeter being established by Donald Trump, portraying the current situation as lawless and characterized by an authoritarian figure in the person of Trump. It is argued that there are no remaining guardrails to constrain him, and the only limitations he follows are self-imposed, based on what might provoke a backlash or retaliation. In other words, he would only undertake operations that do not invite a response or “kickback.” According to the account, some operations have already been undertaken that did not carry potential pushback, but the Iran scenario is singled out as one of the larger cases. The contention is that, unlike previous actions, there is a solid chance that Iran could retaliate in ways the United States would prefer to avoid. There is further concern that if Iran does retaliate, the United States could be harmed back in ways that are undesirable or difficult to manage. This potential for meaningful retaliation is presented as a key reason why Trump may not have ordered certain operations up to this point. Overall, the speaker implies a shift toward more aggressive or expansive actions without the usual checks and balances, highlighting the absence of congressional authorization and the potential for significant consequences if opposing parties decide to respond forcefully. The Iran situation is emphasized as a critical turning point because of the greater likelihood of retaliation compared to previous actions, influencing Trump’s restraint or hesitation in approving further operations.

Mario: Do you think The US should attack Iran? Joel: He could do a large but limited strike designed to punish the Iranian regime, but not explicitly try to topple it. Clint (Glenn): Now it's in the national interest of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent. You think that Iran the authority enemy. Of Not America being responsible for killing thousands of Iranians. It's very strange that we don't recognize the security competition here. You're unbelievable. No legitimate security concerns for Iran. None of your rules. Mario: Gentlemen. Astonishing. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? Clint: I see that’s very dishonest. This idea that The United States and Israel are worried about the Iranian civilians. I think this is ludicrous. If anything, they're doing everything they can to fuel the violence. If we stop threatening them, perhaps we can get something in return. They stop the threat. No. Mario: Never tried we've never gone down this path at all. Joel: You’re just completely ignoring tens of billions of Iranian dollars that go funneling into terrorist organizations that kill Americans, kill our Arab allies, kill our Israeli allies. It doesn't seem to bother you. Mario: Joel, I’m gonna start with you. A pretty broad question. Do you think The US should attack Iran, and do you think they will? Joel: The president has set his own terms. He has three choices: do nothing and frame that as diplomacy; do a large but limited strike designed to punish the regime but not topple it; or go all in toward regime change. He hasn’t made regime change his explicit objective yet. I think he’ll pick option two, a large but limited strike, because negotiations aren’t designed to lead somewhere. The Iranians are not serious, in his view. Mario: Do you think Trump should go with option two, or seek regime change? Joel: He should go with number two. Regime change is something I would love to see, but it’s too big an objective with air power. If the regime is toppled by force, the risks are immense. Damaging the regime—ballistic missiles, some nuclear components—could be enough to protect citizens and allies, even if it doesn’t topple the regime. If a coup follows, that’s a risk. Mario: Glenn, you argued against regime change but acknowledged concerns about the regime’s brutality. Please respond to Joel and the broader points. Glenn: I don’t think Trump should attack. It’s very likely he will, and the objective will probably be a limited bloody nose attack that is going bombed for two or three days or, like last time, twelve, and then pull away, with an implicit understanding that if Iran retaliates, it could be a big war. There is no diplomatic solution because the Iranians reject multi-issue deals; they want nuclear issues to be separate. The Iran regime is existentially threatened, so they’ll respond. The aim should be to recognize key security concerns and pursue a broader security understanding, not just use force. Mario: Joel, respond to Glenn’s point about whether Iran must be considered an enemy and about potential diplomacy. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? No. But this regime is an enemy. The people of Iran do not have to be enemies. The supreme leader believes the United States and Israel are enemies, and for forty-seven years they say, death to America, death to Israel. The Iranian regime has decided they’re the enemy. The Iranian people largely despise the regime. Mario: If Iran agrees to stop the nuclear program, should The US accept such a deal? Is that enough? Joel: The nuclear program is almost 100% destroyed; you wouldn’t negotiate solely on that. If diplomacy exists, it would be to address threats beyond the nuclear issue—ballistic missiles, regional alliances, human rights, etc. The Iranians were willing to accept transparency around their nuclear program in JCPOA-era diplomacy, but the Americans pulled out. If a nuclear deal is possible, it would require mutual concessions; insisting on broader concessions risks collapse. Glenn: The problem is that Iran has legitimate security concerns too. The strategy after the Cold War linking security to global hegemony is problematic. There should be recognition of Iran’s legitimate security needs, not a complete defanging. We should explore a grand bargain—recognize a Palestinian state, get out of Syria, and pursue a path with Iran that reduces the threat without destroying Iran. Mario: There’s a debate about whether the Gulf states see Israel as a bigger threat than Iran now. Joel, what’s your take? Joel: Two countries—Qatar and Turkey—see Israel as an enemy. Turkey’s Erdogan has threatened Jerusalem; Qatar hosts anti-American and anti-Israel propaganda via Al Jazeera and has hosted Hamas leaders. Israel has the right to defend itself and has pursued peace deals with several Arab states, but the region remains dangerous. Israel should avoid destabilizing moves and pursue peace where possible, while recognizing the security challenges it faces. Glenn: Israel’s internal politics and policy flaws exist, but law in Israel provides equal rights to Arab citizens; policy can be improved, but not all claims of apartheid reflect law. Arabs have political rights, though issues with funding and policy remain. The West Bank is a flashpoint; Gaza is controlled by Hamas, complicating Palestinian governance. There’s a broader discussion about whether regime change in Iran is desirable given potential fragmentation and regional instability. Mario: Final question: where is Iran by year’s end? Glenn: If Trump attacks, Iran will perceive an existential threat and may strike back hard, possibly shutting the Strait of Hormuz. Russia and China may intervene to prevent complete destruction of Iran. Joel: I hope Glenn’s scenario doesn’t come true. Iran might pursue nuclear weapons as a deterrent. If the regime is weakened, the region’s stability could be jeopardized. The options remain: negotiate, strike, or regime-change—prefer a large but limited strike to deter further advancement without taking ownership of an unknown future. Mario: Thank you both. This was a vigorous, wide-ranging exchange. End of time.

We're heading toward war with Iran, with few Republicans pushing back. Bombing Iran's oil infrastructure, as Senator Graham suggests, could lead to disaster. About 20% of the world's oil passes through the Straits of Hormuz and Iran has missiles that can reach as far as 1,200 miles. If we attack Iran, our bases in Iraq and Syria will be targeted. Hezbollah, with a presence in Mexico, could cause trouble here at home. Our sanctions haven't stopped Iran from developing advanced missiles and cyber warfare capabilities. Our military isn't in a strong position to respond to a war with Iran, and our naval power may not have the impact we desire. The army is depleted and lacks the capacity for rapid deployment. Destroying Hamas means systematically rooting them out and likely causing mass civilian casualties. The support for Israel will erode as more destruction is captured coming out of Gaza.

Glenn discusses growing fears that the Russia-Ukraine conflict is approaching a “third world war,” citing weekend attacks on Moscow, claims of Western assistance to Ukraine, and attacks “coming from NATO territory” without permission from Baltic states and Finland. He notes Europe mass-producing or intending to mass-produce long-range strike weapons to strike deep inside Russia, and asks Professor John Mearsheimer how events may develop, what options Russia has, and what futures lie ahead. Mearsheimer says Ukrainians are escalating against the Russian homeland. Earlier in the war they relied mainly on missiles under limits from Europeans and Americans; now they have turned to drones and developed a significant drone force capable of striking into Russia. He argues drone damage is not enough to affect the war’s outcome meaningfully, but warns the danger is continued escalation: drone attacks rising over time, and later missiles being added, resulting in combined missile-and-drone attacks on Russia. He says the key question is what Russia will do in response. He reports that Sergei Karaganov argues Russia should strike European targets to send a signal that actions are unacceptable, starting with conventional weapons and then—if necessary—nuclear weapons. Mearsheimer says Karaganov claims that while the idea was previously a minority view, now most Russians Mearsheimer speaks to agree, arguing Russia is “fed up” and that escalating attacks on the Russian homeland are unacceptable. Glenn suggests further escalation may occur beyond retaliation, including more brutal attacks on Ukraine and conventional attacks against countries such as Germany or Estonia, and raises discussions about Ukraine possibly “liberating Moldova” from Transnistria, where thousands of Russian troops are present, as another escalation pathway. Mearsheimer frames the conflicts as lacking bargaining space—comparing them to the Iran conflict between Iran and the United States/Israel. He says both sides see the other as an existential threat, leaving no room for negotiation, and that desperation drives risky behavior. Regarding diplomacy, Glenn questions how diplomacy can fail repeatedly. Mearsheimer says there is “zero bargaining space” because Russia sees Ukraine and European positions as existential threats, while Europe and Ukraine increasingly view Russia’s success in Ukraine as an existential threat. He adds that the United States does not view Russia as an existential threat, implying Trump is willing to bargain, but Europeans and Ukrainians do not want to negotiate the deal Trump proposes. He says Trump may have “washed his hands” of a diplomatic settlement and believes the war must be settled on the battlefield. Glenn then asks whether the United States would join if Russia struck Estonia. Mearsheimer says Karaganov’s framework involves attacking NATO countries with conventional weapons, which in the past would almost guarantee U.S. involvement. He says it is unclear what Trump would do, but emphasizes that once escalation begins, nuclear weapons are in the background. He describes the escalation ladder as being “felt in the dark,” where nuclear use is a rung that everyone wants to avoid, giving nuclear threats “huge deterrent value.” Glenn returns to deterrence and escalation dynamics, suggesting NATO is overly confident Russia is deterred, while Russia waits and then takes bigger steps. Mearsheimer says even limited conventional missile strikes into NATO countries—killing hardly anyone—would be a huge step because they would strike NATO members. He also argues Russia is winning the war and that drones have slowed Russian territory gains, making progress incremental. He concludes that slow battlefield progress, no bargaining space, and rising homeland attacks make serious escalation likely, and that Russia may only need a major conventional step to trigger a “gigantic leap forward.” He further argues narrative incentives increase the risk: if the West believes Russians are losing momentum, Europeans and Ukrainians may increase attacks on Russian homeland. He says rebranding in the West could also shape decisions, including how people describe the Iran war’s objectives. Glenn pivots to Iran, saying it may be “hours away” or within 20–48 hours, and asks how it may develop. Mearsheimer says Iranian and American settlement proposals are “light years apart,” with no public evidence of behind-closed-doors concessions. He describes the sequence as a 40-day bombing campaign failing, followed by a ceasefire and a blockade strategy that also is not working; he says time is something Trump does not have because of economic consequences. He argues Trump’s choices appear to be restart bombing or cut a deal on Iran’s terms, and that returning to bombing would not cause Iranian surrender, while increasing incentives for Iran to escalate attacks across the Gulf, including threats to shut down the Red Sea and damage key infrastructure. When Glenn asks about strengthening the blockade by moving it (e.g., toward the Strait of Malacca), Mearsheimer says the location does not matter much; the blockade is not inflicting sufficient punishment to get Iran to surrender, and if the Strait of Hormuz is closed, economic damage worsens over time. He says Iran and Gulf countries are working on ways to beat the blockade, complicating any attempt to inflict punishment strong enough to force surrender. Glenn asks about the broader U.S. strategy amid multipolarity claims and the sense that diplomacy is failing. Mearsheimer says the U.S. is shifting the burden of Ukraine onto Europeans, is working to prevent crises or war in East Asia involving the U.S., and is deeply involved in fighting in the Middle East—specifically the Iran war. He concludes that the U.S. is unlikely to accept defeat in a war once involved, tying it to lessons from Vietnam: entering wars is easier than getting out, and the U.S. searches for ways to win even when defeat is recognized. He says there is reason to believe Trump may return to a massive bombing campaign driven by desperation, but that it still would not work. He adds that a “meltdown” may be overstated, drawing on historical comparison between Johnson in Vietnam and Trump’s potential political fate, while arguing Trump has “no good option.” Glenn asks about additional “cards” the U.S. could play through regional actors or proxies. Mearsheimer says no comparable proxy force exists to match what Ukraine represented, and argues that if the U.S. and Israel together could not defeat Iran, then other actors like the UAE by themselves are not positioned to take on Iran. In closing, Glenn notes fears of more escalation in both Ukraine and Iran and says the situation ahead may be “very troubling.” Mearsheimer agrees and calls the escalation ladder framing “very depressing,” ending with the theme that once conflicts begin, escalation and difficulty exiting are persistent.

The Quincy Institute’s executive vice president Trita Parsi discusses the risk that the U.S. goes to war with Iran again and how the dynamics of the last round may shape a new one. He says the risk of war has significantly gone up, though it is unclear whether it is above 50%. He argues the Beijing meeting between Trump and Xi delivered very little to the American side, noting that the Chinese statement about wanting the Strait open is described as “vanilla” and not meaningful because it depends on definitions of “open” and Iran’s control versus traffic flow. Parsi contrasts U.S. desires to “regionalize” the mechanism with China’s arrangement to get its ships out. He links recent increases in hostile rhetoric to a pattern of failures: the blockade of the blockade failing after the blockade itself and war threats failing, suggesting the Trump administration is being pushed toward another escalatory move. He also says Iran is “almost counting on an attack” while negotiations remain far apart on key issues, and he describes U.S. inflexibility in meeting “maximum demands.” On nuclear and related Chinese positions, Parsi says China’s stance aligns with the NPT and that China and other P5 states seek to preserve privileged status as nuclear weapon states. He contrasts China never saying Iran should not enrich with a hypothetical supportive signal that would have been made by calling for no enrichment. Discussing what could differ in a second round, Parsi critiques how Trump handled Iran’s “10 plan”: Trump publicly claimed the ceasefire would be based on Iran’s 10 proposal, but once negotiations started, he pursued a different approach. He then outlines U.S. hawks’ pushes for attacking Iran’s power grids and oil installations and even potentially destroying the state. He says assassinations and limited actions have not led to regime collapse, and that what has not been done is going in with ground troops, taking an island, or going after energy infrastructure. Parsi argues that targeting energy assets would prompt Iranian counter-escalation against GCC oil infrastructure, shifting the crisis from a bottleneck to a production problem that would drive oil prices above $180–$200 for a long time and throw the global economy into recession or depression. He says Trump has threatened these actions but did not carry them out. He adds that Iran expects retaliation at a higher level than before, including targeting the UAE for its role during the war and its increasing strategic partnership with Israel. He claims Iranian targeting could include companies and industries connected to Trump, such as AI and data centers used by Palantir, potentially harming the UAE’s investment as an AI hub. He also says Iran may close the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, and explore targeting undersea fiber optic cables that handle 99% of internet traffic in GCC states. He compares potential impact to a “second” Strait of Hormuz, noting Iran’s existing reliance on internal networks due to Iran’s internet being cut off. When asked about Iraq, Parsi says he has not followed it as closely but notes revelations that Israelis may have set up air bases in Iraq with U.S. pressure, and that GCC states and Iraq territories were used in attacks against Iran, whether voluntarily, without full knowledge, or under coercion. He argues this fits a broader view of Iraq becoming weak and unable to resist U.S. demands. He says it is plausible that Iran could use Iraq as a theater for horizontal escalation, though he does not know if it is likely in the first or second round. He says the U.S. underestimated Iranian horizontal escalation and attributes part of the miscalculation to Israeli efforts to depict Iran as weaker than it is. Parsi further explains Trump’s worldview: he says Iran’s refusal to talk directly with Trump reinforced an American belief that Iran was weak and would not escalate. He argues that Trump expected the war not to last more than four days, though he was mistaken. On U.S. primacy and multipolarity, Parsi argues that the U.S. did not achieve a military or political win in Iran: the U.S. “lost it,” with Iran establishing escalation dominance and the U.S. begging for a ceasefire. He says global repercussions include fuel shortages and energy crises across Australia and countries in South Asia and East Asia dependent on Persian Gulf oil. He adds that if the U.S. cannot establish escalation dominance in the Persian Gulf and is not willing to pay the price to open the Strait of Hormuz, this undermines questions about U.S. ability to sustain primacy and hegemony. In diplomacy, he emphasizes that military options are limited and costly, because defending islands and taking control of the straits would require actions and troop presence the U.S. is not willing to sustain. He claims diplomatic options are more promising, arguing Trump may be in a better position than previous presidents because he is willing to put all sanctions on the table and lift primary sanctions, which he says are executive-order based and do not require Congress, unlike secondary sanctions imposed by Congress. Parsi says sanctions relief beyond the JCPOA matters, and notes that in Iran’s last proposal Iran became open to a “moratorium” framing of not enriching for 12 years, a “remarkable shift.” He says the talks are currently deadlocked over Iran’s 60% stockpile but that both sides have shown some flexibility on other points. He also says Iran needs sanctions relief even more after the war, citing $300,000,000,000 in damages. Addressing Iran’s trust and the Strait of Hormuz, Parsi says Iran is unlikely to give up control, arguing it can reopen and reclose the strait due to assets along its coastline. He discusses a GCC proposal for an “environmental management fee” that he describes as functioning as a toll. He says any such payment would not compare to the scale of investments Iran could attract if sanctions were lifted. Finally, Parsi argues that peace depends on shifting rhetoric from zero-sum, hegemonic messaging toward diplomacy-based expectations of mutual concessions. He says Trump’s counterproductive social media rhetoric can disrupt breakthroughs and raises Iranian questions about his discipline and trustworthiness, while also claiming Trump is uniquely capable of making statements that break political taboos, including saying he wants Iran to flourish.

Initiating a crisis to go to war with Iran is challenging. If compromise fails, starting a war through covert means may be best for US interests. Historical examples show wars began after specific incidents, not just sanctions. Increasing pressure on Iran, like mysterious submarine incidents, could be an option. Using covert actions against Iran could escalate if needed.

Speaker 0 questions the rationale for the war, noting that “the intelligence did not suggest that an attack was imminent from Iran,” and asking, “What is left? Why are we at war with Iran?” He also remarks that “the nuclear program isn’t the reason” and that he never expected to hear Ted Cruz talking about nukes. Speaker 1 suggests the simplest explanation given, which has been backtracked, is that “Israel made us do it, that Bibi decided on this timeline, Netanyahu decided he wanted to attack, and he convinced Trump to join him by scaring Trump into believing that US assets in the region would be at risk, and so Trump was better off just joining Netanyahu.” He adds that this may not be the full explanation, but it’s a plausible one. He notes that “the nuclear program is not part of their targeting campaign,” and that “harder line leadership is taking hold,” with the Strait of Hormuz “still being shut down even as we get their navy.” He asks what remains as the explanation, suggesting it might be that Israel forced the United States’ hand and questions, “How weak does that make The United States look? How weak are we if our allies can force us into wars of choice that are bad for US national security interests?”

The speaker believes it is difficult for a U.S. president to initiate war with Iran. If compromise with Iran is not possible, the traditional method of America entering wars would be best for U.S. interests. Drawing historical parallels, the speaker notes that Presidents Roosevelt, Wilson, Johnson, and Lincoln waited for events like Pearl Harbor, the Lusitania, the Gulf of Tonkin, and the attack on Fort Sumter to justify military action. If the Iranians do not compromise, it would be best if they started the war. The U.S. could increase pressure through covert means, such as causing Iranian submarines to sink, or escalating existing covert operations. The speaker is not advocating for these actions, but suggests that sanctions are not the only option.

In this discussion with Glenn, Professor John Mearsheimer analyzes the U.S. handling of the Iran war under Trump, the role of Israel and the lobby, and the broader implications for the international system as power shifts from unipolar to multipolar. Key points on U.S. strategy and diplomacy - Trump’s approach is a unique form of diplomacy: he pursued a ceasefire grounded in Iran’s 10-point plan as a starting point for negotiations, then moved to a blockade of Iranian ports and allowed escalation elsewhere. The aim, according to the speakers, was to gain breathing space to rearm and regroup, and to press Iran into concessions. - The absence of a viable military option: there is no credible American military path to victory in the Iran war. Escalation would be Iranian-dominant, and further escalation would damage the world economy, creating political and economic consequences domestically and internationally. - The administration’s diplomacy is hampered by incompetence, notably in Ukraine-Russia diplomacy, which erodes confidence in negotiating with Iran as well. The Israeli lobby adds pressure to avoid a peace that acknowledges Iran’s gains. - Four goals in the war, from an Israeli perspective, are regime change, eliminating Iran’s nuclear enrichment, destroying long-range missiles, and stopping Iranian support for Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Israel and its lobby view the situation as existential and push for continued pressure unless Iran is decisively defeated. From the U.S. perspective, this means consensus among allies is fragile and often subordinated to domestic and lobby pressures. The strategic logic of the blockade and escalation - The blockade is not a war-winning instrument. The naval option is constrained by ship counts, wear on assets, potential Chinese escorts, and reciprocal Iranian actions (Iran already captured ships in retaliation). Iran’s tolerance for pain is high, and the blockade is not a reliable lever to force compliance. - Air power failed to defeat Iran, confirming that the war cannot be won through bombing alone. Ground invasion is unlikely due to limited American combat troops, political will, and public tolerance for casualties. Consequently, the U.S. has turned to naval coercion via the Strait of Hormuz and global oil interdictions, but this too is unlikely to compel a definitive Iranian capitulation. - A ceasefire is seen as essential to halt the fighting and begin negotiations; however, the ceasefire has not achieved meaningful negotiations because the blockade remains in place, and Iran has demanded its end as a condition to return to talks. Possible Iranian responses and risk dynamics - If the United States were to resume massive bombing, Iran could launch a “Goderdammerung” response—shutting down the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, attacking energy infrastructure and desalination plants, and wrecking the world economy. This would imply a broader regional and global calamity, with Iran threatening to pull down others with it. - The Iranians are expected to leverage the Strait of Hormuz and toll revenues, and to press for sanctions relief and ongoing control of the Strait as bargaining chips. The blockade may inflict pain, but Iran has shown a high capacity to tolerate it, making the naval option unlikely to deliver victory. Europe, diplomacy, and the evolving alliance system - Elbridge Colby’s remarks suggest Europe should take primary responsibility for conventional and Ukraine support, reflecting U.S. weapon stock depletion and a shift toward East Asia as the priority theater. This signals a “buck-passing” of security obligations and a withdrawal of the United States from Europe at the conventional level. - The Colby framework implies the U.S. is reorienting away from Europe and toward East Asia, potentially weakening NATO cohesion as American weapons support diminishes. This could push Europe to diversify security arrangements and rely less on U.S. guarantees. - There is a broader pattern of “divorcing” from allies: as the Gulf, Europe, and Ukraine face continued pressures, the alliance system frays. The U.S. may seek to offload security burdens, while Russia and China adapt by intensifying their own strategic ties and exploiting the rifts within Western alliances. The multipolar world and regional flashpoints - The discussion emphasizes that the world has moved from a post–Cold War unipolar moment to a multipolar system, with East Asia (China) as the primary U.S. strategic focus, but with persistent, volatile conflicts in Europe (Russia-Ukraine) and the Middle East (Israel-Iran, and allied networks like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis). - The speakers stress the interconnections among conflicts: resolving Israel-Iran involves Hezbollah and Hamas; resolving Ukraine involves European commitments and American supplies; and the evolving alliance structures—where the U.S. may reduce its conventional footprint in Europe—could heighten tensions or provoke Russian reactions. Final reflections - The conversation closes by acknowledging the plastic, uncertain moment in world politics: many possible futures depend on diplomacy, leadership choices, and how quickly new equilibria are formed among emerging great powers. The two speakers stress that avoiding a major conflagration will require careful diplomacy, recognition of interlinked flashpoints, and a willingness to rethink traditional alliance structures in a multipolar world.

In this discussion, Speaker 0 interviews Scott Ritter, a former UN weapons inspector and US Marine Corps intelligence officer, about the implications of a phone call between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin and the broader geopolitics around Ukraine, Iran, and energy. - On the Trump-Putin call and diplomacy with the US: Ritter notes that Trump initiated the call, and Russia has kept a diplomatic channel open with the United States, despite tensions and distrust. Russia reportedly invited figures like Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to continue diplomacy. He interprets Russia’s openness as a strategic move to maintain influence in decision-making, particularly with the US seeking Russian assistance on energy and conflict termination in Ukraine and Iran. - Russia’s behavior in response to Western strikes and its strategic calculus: Ritter argues Russia has deliberately avoided a rapid military overreaction to Western actions (e.g., UK strikes on Bryansk using Storm Shadow missiles and Flamingo systems) to prevent elevating Ukrainian nationalism or provoking a harsher Western stance. He suggests Russia can legally justify countermeasures against British facilities tied to Storm Shadow and Flamingo production, but chooses restraint to avoid elevating domestic political backlash and to exploit diplomatic openings. - Economic dimensions and sanctions: He contends Russia benefits from the lifting of oil sanctions, with Russia able to sell crude at much higher market prices, improving its budget and war finances without further escalation. This is framed as a strategic reward for keeping the diplomatic channel open and for not overreacting militarily. - The strategic objective in Ukraine and the West: Ritter states Russia aims to remove Ukrainian nationalism from Europe’s security equation and to establish Ukraine as a neutral party. He argues that Russian actions, including potential pressure on Ukraine and Western states, are designed to compel a settlement more favorable to Moscow, with less emphasis on Ukrainian terms. - The Iran context and US leverage: The conversation posits that Russia’s phone call with Trump could enable further discussions with Kushner and Witkoff on terms that reflect Russian objectives, given the US’s urgent need for Russian help on energy and geopolitical cover. Ritter suggests Moscow could pressure Iran to negotiate in a way that aligns with broader Russian goals and reduces US influence, including potentially linking Ukraine settlements to Iran’s termination or moderation. - Off-ramps and the Iranian war: In Iran, the sole off-ramp is one Iran accepts; the US and Israel no longer control the process. Ritter argues that US strategies (e.g., general Cain’s claims about missile successes) are misguided, with Iran reportedly evading decisive pressure and maintaining leverage. The path forward would involve Russia acting as mediator and engaging Iranian leadership more directly, while the US’s ability to impose a decisive settlement appears limited. - US military options and feasibility: Ritter points out the limits of US military options in Iran and the Strait of Hormuz. He argues that large-scale ground involvement (e.g., 80,000 Marines to seize territories around Hormuz) is impractical given resource constraints, political risk, and logistical challenges. He criticizes the reliance on bombing campaigns with insufficient precision munitions and questions target selection and legality, highlighting a historical precedent where strategic air campaigns did not compel German surrender in World War II. - Broader geopolitical consequences and alliances: The discussion covers how a perceived US strategic defeat could reshape global alignments. Ritter foresees BRICS strengthening as the US loses credibility, with China advancing in Taiwan and the South China Sea, and Russia expanding influence in the Middle East. He suggests Iran could emerge as a regional power, while Israel’s nuclear program could come under renewed pressure. Russia’s involvement in the Middle East, grounded in a strategic framework with Iran, provides Moscow with diplomatic legitimacy to lecture Gulf states. - Lavrov’s stance and Gulf politics: The speakers address Lavrov’s public admonition of Gulf states for pressuring Iran and seeking Western support, arguing this reflects Russia’s adherence to its diplomatic framework and a legally grounded position. Russia’s recent strategic framework with Iran underpins its legitimacy to influence Gulf behavior. - Closing assessment: Ritter emphasizes that the war’s trajectory is being driven by Iranian resilience and US strategic miscalculations. He maintains that Russia’s role as mediator and its leverage over energy markets position Moscow to shape outcomes, while the United States appears increasingly constrained, resource-drained, and vulnerable to strategic defeats on multiple fronts. The result could be a reordering of global alliances and regional power dynamics, with Russia and Iran gaining greater influence and the US recalibrating its priorities accordingly.

We seem to be heading to war with Iran, with little pushback from Republicans. War with Iran could mean Armageddon, with no appreciation for the implications for the US, Europe, and the Middle East. Twenty percent of the world's oil passes through the Straits of Hormuz, and Iran has missiles that can reach 1,200 miles with precision. If we bomb Iran, our bases in Iraq and Syria will be targeted. Hezbollah has a large operation in Mexico, and their agents could cause trouble here at home. If we attack Iran, Russia will not sit by quietly. Sanctions haven't stopped Iran's military development. Our military is at a weak point. If the US enters this conflict, it will be difficult for Russia and Turkey not to also come into this fight against us.

Alastair Crook discusses with the host the evolving US strategy toward Iran, the credibility of Iran’s deterrence, the role of Israel and Gulf states, and what is known about Iran’s domestic unrest. - Trump’s strategy toward Iran has shifted. Initially, he sought a big, quick victory with minimal entanglement, including a possible attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June and assistance from Israel to identify a gap to exploit. Crook says Trump hoped for a toppling of the Iranian leadership via a “Maduro-style” operation that could be quickly achieved with outside support. Over time, outcomes did not align with those hopes, and the plan became far more complicated. - The naval armada near Iran was intended as a pressure point but, from the Pentagon’s view, is more of a liability. The armada is loaded with Tomahawk missiles rather than air defense missiles; estimates suggest 300-350 Tomahawks among two destroyers and one carrier. Iran has countermeasures: anti-ship missiles along the coast, submarines (including mini-submarines) with anti-ship missiles, and fast attack craft. Drones threaten the fleet, and the air defense burden would be high if a drone swarm attacked. Hormuz could be shut by Iran in the event of war, a long-term strategic lever that Iran has signaled. - Iran’s deterrence has matured: any attack by Israel or the US could trigger full-scale war and Hormuz closure. Symbolic exchanges were proposed by intermediaries (an empty IRGC building and an attack on a US base), but Iran rejected such symbolic moves, insisting on a broader, sustained response if attacked. - Israel’s posture and constraints: Israel has told the US it does not view the nuclear issue as the sole determinant, but instead urges action to destroy Iran’s ballistic missile system and deter future threats. Netanyahu, meeting with Whitlock, indicated opposition to any nuclear deal if the US does not secure certain Israeli demands, warning that without Israeli endorsement, a US deal would fail. Israel insists on conditions that make a broader deal nonviable for the US. - The Arabs’ restraint: Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, do not want direct involvement in an attack on Iran, including airspace use or refueling. Several factors influence their position: fear of Iranian retaliation, concerns about broader regional instability, and shifts in regional alignments. Saudi Arabia has grown more anti-Israel, viewing Israel as destabilizing and expressing concerns about the region’s security order. There is also a fear that a major war could trigger an Arab Spring-like upheaval in Gulf monarchies. - Iran’s internal unrest: The insurrection in Iran involved trained insurgents (MEK operatives trained by the Americans in Armenia and Kurds trained in Northeastern Syria) and some Baluch participants. Corridors through Turkey and Kurdish groups facilitated their entry into Kermanshah Province. The strategy aimed at creating chaos to provoke a Western intervention, with reports that attackers were paid (roughly $5-$10) to inflame violence, burn buildings, attack ambulances, and kill. The Iranian government reports nearly 3,000 killed during the protests, with about 150 more unidentified; the majority of casualties were security forces due to exchange of fire. The narrative contrasts with outside accounts, noting the opposition did not lead to defections from key state institutions, and Israeli intelligence assessment reportedly concluded the unrest did not threaten the regime’s collapse. - Regional and great-power dynamics: Russia and China have signaled opposition to letting Iran be pressured by the United States, with discussions in Russia about offering a nuclear umbrella or naval support for Iran, though official policies are unclear.Originally planned joint exercises near Hormuz were paused; there are ongoing considerations of Chinese/Russian involvement that would complicate US options. A Chinese-Russian naval presence near Iran could limit US maneuvering. A recent drone shot down by the USS Lincoln reflects continued attempts at signaling and potential negotiation. - Overall assessment: Trump faces a dilemma between projecting strength and avoiding a costly escalation, with Israeli opposition complicating any potential US move. The US cannot easily sustain pressure without risking market turmoil and broad regional and great-power entanglements. The likely trajectory involves continued “negotiations about negotiations” rather than immediate, decisive action, while Iran’s deterrence and regional recalibrations constrain what any use of force might achieve.

Mario and the Professor discuss the scale and spread of the current oil and energy shock and its broad economic and geopolitical ripple effects. - Severity and scope: The Professor calls the crisis “pretty catastrophic,” possibly the biggest oil crisis experienced, potentially surpassing the 1970s shocks. He notes a gap between Washington rhetoric and underlying economic reality and emphasizes the war’s effects beyond oil, including fertilizer and helium, all of which pass through the Strait of Hormuz or related chokepoints. - U.S. economic backdrop (before the war): The Professor provides a pre-war table: - U.S. GDP growth in 2024 was 2.3%, 2025 about the same after a dip in 2024 to 2.2%. - Jobs: 2024 added 2.2 million; 2025 added 185,000, with tariffs contributing to a manufacturing job loss of 108,000. - Productivity declined from 3% to 2.1% in 2025. - He argues the U.S. economy was already slowing and that the war exacerbates existing weaknesses rather than creating a boom. - Immediate physical and downstream effects: - The closure of the Strait of Hormuz affects more than oil: up to 20% of world oil, a third of fertilizer, and helium used in chip manufacturing (notably in Taiwan) pass through the strait. - The closure’s ripple effects include fertilizer shortages and higher prices (fertilizer up about 50%), and broader supply chain dislocations as related infrastructure and inventories (oil, fertilizers, helium) become depleted and must be rebuilt. - Relative impact by region: The U.S. is more insulated from physical shocks than many others, but financial markets (stocks and bonds) are hit, with higher interest rates and a rising 10- and 30-year bond yield. Europe and Asia face larger direct physical disruptions; India, Taiwan, and others bear notable hits due to fertilizer and helium supply constraints. - Global energy and political dynamics: - The U.S. remains a net importer of oil, though it is a net exporter of petroleum products; fertilizer reliance and pricing reflect broader global constraints. - The professor highlights the political costs: protectionism (tariffs), militarism (increased defense spending and involvement), and interventionism (policy actions). He notes polling is negative on these directions, suggesting policy headwinds for the administration. - The escalation and motivations for war: - A theory discussed is that the war was driven by a belief in decapitating Iran’s leadership to force regime change, a strategy the professor says many experts have warned against. He cites New York Times reporting that Mossad and Netanyahu supported decapitation, but that former Mossad leadership and U.S. intelligence warned it would not work; the escalation suggests a divergence between theory and outcome. - He acknowledges another view that controlling Hormuz could economically benefit the U.S., but ranks it as a lesser driver than regime-change objectives. - Possible outcomes and scenarios: - If the Houthis control the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and the Beber/Mendeb is blocked, the consequences would intensify; the professor describes a “freeway turned into a toll road” scenario in Hormuz and greater disruption in the Gulf, including potential attacks on desalination plants. - The economic signaling would likely worsen: downward revisions to growth, higher import prices, and increased financial market strain; a prolonged closure would intensify these effects. - The escalation ladder and endgame: - The professor warns that escalating with boots on the ground would favor Iran and could trigger widespread disruption of Gulf infrastructure, desalination, and regional stability. He suggests Russia would be a clear beneficiary in such a scenario. - He concludes with a stark warning: if Hormuz and the Beber/Mendeb remain closed, and desalination and critical infrastructure are attacked, the situation could resemble or exceed the scale of the 2008 financial crisis—“look like a birthday party” compared with what could unfold. - Overall takeaway: The crisis is multi-faceted, with immediate physical shortages (oil, fertilizer, helium) and cascading financial and political costs. The duration and depth depend on how long chokepoints stay closed and whether escalation occurs, with the potential for severe global economic and geopolitical consequences.

John Mearsheimer and Glenn (Speaker 0) discuss the current state of the international system, its shifts since World War II, and the implications for U.S. foreign policy, Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. - Structural changes since the Cold War: Mearsheimer argues fundamental changes are underway in the international system due to two forces: evolving structural dynamics and the rise and actions of Donald Trump. The Cold War produced a bipolar order with the United States shaping a Western security architecture (NATO, European Community) designed to wage the Cold War. After 1989–1991, the Western order expanded globally during the unipolar moment, with NATO enlargement, EU expansion, and globalization (including China joining the WTO). From 2017, the world has entered a multipolar era with three great powers, and East Asia becomes the United States’ most important region outside the Western Hemisphere, overtaking Europe and the Persian Gulf. - East Asia as a priority: The U.S. pivot to East Asia (explicitly discussed by Clinton and then pursued under Trump) reorients strategic priorities away from Europe in a multipolar world where China is a peer competitor. This shift redefines where the U.S. focuses its resources and attention. - Trump as a destabilizing factor: Trump’s presidency is described as sui generis—a one-man wrecking ball that amplified unilateralism and contempt for international law, institutions, and allies. After initial containment of China in his first term, Trump’s policies intensified a unilateral approach. The Iran war decision (February 28) is presented as a catastrophic misstep that worsened U.S. positions globally and risked destabilizing the region further. - Three major strands of American policy causing trouble: NATO expansion, the global war on terror, and the Iran war. NATO expanded eastward in the 1990s and 2000s, culminating in Ukraine’s entry in 2022, aggravating Russia and complicating U.S.–Russia relations and European security. The global war on terror led to Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts and other interventions (Libya), generating domestic fatigue and a populist backlash that helped propel Trump. The February 28 Iran invasion created a broader, more consequential set of regional and global ramifications, with China, Russia, and Europe pressuring limits on U.S. actions. - The Iran war: Mearsheimer stresses that Iran presents a more dangerous theater than Iraq because the stakes are higher globally, with potential for a worldwide depression and cascading economic impacts, particularly in Asia. He outlines three options for ending or de-escalating the Iran conflict: (1) maintain the status quo with ongoing blockades; (2) blockade plus bombing, which risks catastrophic economic damage and Iranian retaliation; (3) cut a deal with Iran, which would be politically difficult in Washington given Israeli influence and the desire to avoid conceding that Iran “wins.” He asserts that the blockade alone won’t force surrender, bombing would escalate risk and deplete U.S. military capacity, and the only viable path is a negotiated settlement, though domestic and allied opposition makes this hard. - Israel–Iran–U.S. dynamics: The relationship between the United States and Israel creates a “tag team” dynamic, with Israel viewing Iran as an existential threat. If Iran preserves its nuclear enrichment capability, it could push Israel toward considering nuclear options, which raises the possibility of catastrophic outcomes. Trump’s rhetoric has even hinted at extreme objectives against Iran, complicating efforts to reach a deal. Mearsheimer emphasizes the influential role of the Israeli lobby in U.S. policy and notes the broader risk of nuclear escalation in the region. - Ukraine and nuclear deterrence: The Ukraine war has surprised many by showing Ukraine’s ability to threaten Russian strategic forces with Western support, which underscores Karaganov’s point about Europeans underestimating the nuclear dimension of security and deterrence. Mearsheimer highlights that the current era features a complex web of regional and great-power interdependencies—Russia, China, Iran, and European security architectures are all interlinked, affecting and being affected by one another. - Conclusion and outlook: The discussion emphasizes that managing security competition, rather than relying solely on military solutions, is essential. The speakers warn that the contemporary shift toward multipolarity and the interwoven regional dynamics heighten the risk of escalation and miscalculation, making prudent diplomacy and restraint crucial to avoiding a broader catastrophe. They acknowledge the difficulty of achieving lasting peace in the Middle East given domestic political constraints and the powerful influence of regional actors, but stress the necessity of recognizing the geopolitical realities of a world in which power is distributed more unevenly than in the Cold War.

Zhang Shueqin is discussed as a predictor known for predicting Trump’s reelection, Vance as VP pick, and a US–Iran war. The conversation centers on why he predicted a US attack on Iran and how it might unfold. Key reasoning about Iran war - The strongest evidence, according to Zhang, is the January 2020 US assassination of Qasem Soleimani, who led Iranian proxies. He argues that killing an Iranian envoy to the region amounted to a declaration of war, and that if Trump had won reelection in 2020, he would have most certainly declared war on Iran. - In the war’s first month, the US focus was decapitation of Iranian leadership, aiming to force surrender and regime change. Iran proved resilient and creative, leading the US to shift to a phase of attrition, attempting to cripple Iran’s war-financing capacity and oil exports to China, and to control Hormuz. This included a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. - The war is expected to be slow and world-news-muted, with efforts to pressure Iran economically and diplomatically to force a settlement. There is no off-ramp seen for the US because consequences are vast for regional players. Actors and interests in the region - Regional players: UAE, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Kuwait, viewed as wanting Iran defeated and the war prolonged. Iran’s leadership wants relief from sanctions and to retain Hormuz as leverage. - The United States: aims to sustain the petrodollar system; fears that if Gulf states decouple from the dollar or shift currencies, the American economy could suffer. The US would prefer to press sanctions and blockade to compel cooperation and debt-financing from global actors. - Israel: sees the conflict as an opportunity for its Greater Israel project, hoping regional chaos would redraw borders after the conflict. - China: wants an end to the conflict to protect global trade and its energy interests, and to preserve balance in its relations with Iran, the GCC, and other players. China’s leverage includes pressure on Iran and economic guarantees that encourage a ceasefire, while seeking to minimize direct conflict with GCC states. - Russia and others: Russia is discussed as arming and supporting Iran in a broader economic/military contest with the US; geopolitics involve maritime skirmishes and energy strikes in a wider economic war. World War III framework and economic warfare - Zhang argues we are already in World War III, but the war is economic and strategic rather than traditional kinetic warfare. The main combatants are the US and Russia in the maritime and energy sphere, with China central to US debt-financing and global trade stability. - Economic warfare includes targeting oil refineries, shipping lanes, and export capabilities; the purpose is to force political settlements and shift global economic order. - The US strategy is described as creating global chaos while maintaining North American focus, exporting conflict to Europe and East Asia to defend empire interests, and using debt and weapons sales to manage global markets. China, the US, and future diplomacy - A Trump visit to Beijing is framed as potentially signaling a rapprochement, followed by cooperation in three areas: trade (China buying more Western Hemisphere LNG and resources), Taiwan status (reaffirming one China policy), and AI collaboration. The larger aim is described as turning China into an economic vassal to the US empire. - Europe is described as already largely vassalized by US policy, with the war in Ukraine illustrating this subordination; popular discontent is rising (e.g., in Germany with the AfD), but European leadership remains aligned with Washington’s agenda. Iranian and European responses - Iran, facing economic pressures and geopolitical isolation, initially led the war, but China’s mediation and pressure contributed to a ceasefire. There is a rift between Iran’s political leadership and its military leadership over how to proceed with the war. - Europeans could escalate involvement in a broader conflict, but the US strategy appears to rely on Europe fighting longer against Russia while the US profits through arms sales and financial mechanisms. European leadership, according to the discussion, remains cautious and influenced by external powers. Israel’s position and the broader arc - Israel is depicted as pursuing a death-cult, eschatological strategy that could unify Jews globally but increase regional instability. The greater aim is for Israel to benefit from regional chaos, while risking broader conflict. Future trajectories and civilizational decline - The discussion suggests that, in the short term, the US may appear to win economically, especially through debt-financed global demand for US energy and weapons, but in the mid- to long-term, imperial decline could lead to civil conflict within the US, driven by factional struggles between Wall Street financiers and tech oligarchs backing AI surveillance/state power. - The potential for a third Trump term is linked to deeper internal conflicts and the acceleration of violence or civil unrest, with religion offered by some as a potential stabilizing force in American society. - Three symptoms of imperial decline are privatization, financialization, and individualization; yet the speaker believes a Christian-nationalist revival could renew the republic. Closing stance - Across the discussion, the US empire is portrayed as pursuing an expansive, conflict-driven strategy to sustain power, while global players seek various economic and strategic outcomes. The overall forecast emphasizes ongoing, multi-front tensions with no easy peace, and a complex interplay among US, European, Middle Eastern, Russian, and Chinese interests.

Scott Ritter argues that indicators suggest a major US military action against Iran is being prepared, with US naval forces and air power in the region and discussions of precision strikes against Iranian officials. He assessment that the move toward war seems likely, noting Iran’s capabilities to retaliate in multiple devastating ways: Iran can terminate regional energy production at will and inflict horrific harm on American bases, potentially killing hundreds or thousands of American service members; Iran could also deliver near-lethal damage to Israel. He warns that the US could suffer losses of ships, including an aircraft carrier. Israel reportedly has told the US it is prepared to absorb up to 700 Iranian ballistic missiles if the US ensures removal of the Iranian regime from power. Ritter contends the US lacks the means to remove Iran’s military and civilian leadership from power, especially after telegraphing a strike. He recalls the 2006 or 2008-style dynamic where Iran would respond forcefully if attacked, including a possible knockout strike against Israel with long-term consequences for regional energy security and the global economy. He discusses Iran’s preparedness, including underground command posts and buried enrichment capabilities (citing Ferdow as an example) and the likelihood that Iran has continuity plans that would withstand decapitation attempts. He asserts Iran would respond by disrupting energy and possibly Hormuz, with a broad, existential resilience against disruption. On the objective of potential operations, Ritter believes the aim would be to destroy Iran’s national-level command and control, suppress regional security institutions, and enable uprisings in various regions (Balochistan, Arab regions, Azeris, MEK-supported factions). He notes the CIA-backed groups and a possible attempt to resurrect a monarchy, suggesting Trump may have been influenced by expatriate anti-regime voices. He says Iran is prepared for such moves, including networks in Northern Iraq, Kurdish forces, and other regional proxies, and anticipates a surge of paramilitary activity, assassination campaigns, and widespread sabotage to create chaos and fracture the country. Ritter asserts that Russia and China would resist a US-Israeli strike against Iran. Russia has strategic ties with Iran and could push for Iranian retaliation against US assets, including the possibility of shooting down US B-2 bombers to humiliate American military superiority. He argues that Moscow and Beijing would support Iran to blunt US actions, including potential disruptions of US naval power or shipping. Regarding a possible off-ramp, Ritter suggests that an off-ramp would require the US to claim it forced concessions and to double down on sanctions, avoiding another large-scale strike. He cites that a “deal” from Trump would resemble a gangland arrangement rather than a treaty, warning that Iran should seek a comprehensive treaty based on international law rather than a high-pressure bargain. He contends Iran should avoid preemptive strikes that might invite nuclear retaliation, though he believes Iran could justify self-defense under UN Article 51 if threatened imminently. In closing, Ritter states that the situation is dangerous, with surveillance and reconnaissance ongoing, and notes that while war seems likely, an off-ramp could still be presented through sanctions and political messaging rather than immediate military action. He acknowledges the tension and pressures on both sides, and offers a cautious, war-weary perspective.

The discussion centers on Iran’s response to the latest US peace terms and the broader trajectory of the conflict. Iran publicly rejected the terms, calling them “completely unrealistic” and signaling that they would not open the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, the claim is made that the rumblings from US outlets and the president’s rhetoric suggested closeness to a deal, but those impressions are challenged as inconsistent with Iran’s stance. Project Freedom is said to have been shelved after Saudi Arabia reportedly refused to allow US forces to use its airspace and a key regional airbase, making the Trump administration’s stated option to advance that plan unworkable. The host asks where things stand on the escalation ladder. Professor Robert Pape, director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats, describes the situation as a trap. He argues that the fundamental issues in play have not changed since the bombs began falling about seventy days ago. He praises the US military’s tactical performance—air, naval, and leadership-target strikes—but criticizes the strategy as fundamentally flawed. According to Pape, tactical successes do not yield meaningful strategic results, and Iran’s power is growing due to geography and cheap technologies like drones and mines. He notes that even after sinking Iran’s navy, the impact was negligible because Iran’s power persists and expands, especially given a Gulf-wide vulnerability to Hormuz. A critical development discussed is Iran’s action near the UAE, striking a pipeline that bypassed Hormuz and moved nearly 2,000,000 barrels of oil per day. This demonstrated Iran’s capacity to inflict damage despite a naval blockade, contributing to Gulf states’ reluctance to participate in or support US actions. The implication is that US punitive measures—hitting energy infrastructure or power grids—are unlikely to force Iran to kneel and may instead provoke greater retaliation. Pape warns that the escalation could drag on for months, with consequences such as rising gasoline prices in the US, potentially reaching about $6 in May or higher in some places like Chicago. The conversation turns to more immediate developments: fresh drone attacks around Kishem Island with Iran claiming air defenses intercepted the assaults; Iranian officials reportedly require compensation for damages and the withdrawal of all US forces from the Gulf as preconditions for ending the war. Pape reframes these attacks as part of Iran’s effort to keep the United States off balance and off leadership leverage, suggesting that Trump’s approach—driven by civilian leadership and charisma—misses the realities of great-power politics. He discusses the broader risk of increased Gulf infrastructure targeting if the US escalates, including the potential for higher gas prices and substantial infrastructure repair costs. The interview ends with reflections on the limits of punishment as a strategy, the enduring influence of Iran’s geopolitical position, and the likelihood that even if further force is used, it may not yield the desired strategic outcome. The speakers acknowledge the difficulty of predicting exact moves but emphasize the persistence of the escalation trap and the real-world consequences for energy markets and regional stability.

The conversation centers on Iran’s current crisis and the likelihood, timing, and aims of potential U.S. and Israeli actions against Iran. The speakers discuss whether protests inside Iran are driving any attack plans or if those plans were made beforehand, and what the objectives might be if war occurs. Key points and claims, preserved as stated: - The Iranian regime is described as facing its worst crisis since 1979, with reports of thousands dead, and questions about whether the U.S. and possibly Israel will strike Iran, and what their objectives would be (regime change vs installing a new leader under the supreme leader). - The interviewer introduces Trita Parsi, noting his nuanced, non-dual position and his personal history of fleeing Iran around the revolution. - The analysts discuss whether a war plan against Iran existed before the protests; Speaker 1 (Parsi) argues the plan was made prior to the protests and that the protests did not cause the decision. He says the Israelis intended to provoke the U.S. into war, but the sequence shifted so the United States would lead with Israel in a supporting role. He notes Netanyahu’s unusual quiet and suggests a deliberate effort to present this as Trump’s war, not Israel’s, though he believes the plan originated in Washington in late December at the White House. - The protests are said to be organic and not instigated from abroad, with possible slight slowing of plans due to the protests. The rationale for striking Iran initially emphasized Israeli concerns about Iranian missile capabilities and their potential rebuilding of missiles and, ambiguously, nuclear ambitions; there was no credible media evidence presented to support new nuclear development claims, according to Speaker 1. - The justification for an attack is viewed as a pretext tied to “unfinished business,” with the broader aim of addressing Iran’s missile program and perceived threats, rather than the protests alone. The discussion notes that pro-Iran regime factions in the U.S. may find protests more persuasive among centrist Democrats, but less so among MAGA or core Trump supporters. - The origins of the protests are described as organic, driven by currency collapse and sanctions, which Speaker 1 connects to decades of sanctions and the economic crisis in Iran. He states sanctions were designed to produce desperation to create a window for outside intervention, though he emphasizes this does not mean the protests are purely externally driven. - The role of sanctions is elaborated: Pompeo’s “maximum pressure” statement is cited as intentional to create conditions for regime change, with Speaker 0 highlighting the destruction of Iran’s economy as a method to weaken the regime and empower opposition. Speaker 1 agrees the sanctions contributed to economic distress but stresses that the protests’ roots are broader than the economy alone. - The discussion considers whether the protests could be used to justify external action and whether a regional or global backlash could ensue, including refugee flows and regional instability affecting Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and GCC states. It’s noted that the U.S. and some regional actors would prefer to avoid a total collapse of Iran, while Israel would welcome greater upheaval if it constrains Iranian capabilities. - The question of a power vacuum inside Iran is addressed. Speaker 1 argues there is no obvious internal opposition strong enough to quickly replace the regime; MeK is excluded as a coalition partner in current Iran opposition movements. The Pahlavi (Reza Pallavi) faction is discussed as a possible figurehead outside Iran, with debate about his domestic support. The MEK is described as outside any coalition due to its history. - Pallavi’s potential role: Speaker 1 suggests Pallavi has gained closer ties with Israel and some pro-Israel circles in Washington, but emphasizes that domestic support inside Iran remains uncertain and difficult to gauge. Pallavi says he would seek a democratically elected leader if the regime falls; Speaker 1 cautions that words alone are insufficient without proven ability to secure loyalty from security forces and to persuade key societal sectors. - The Shah’s legacy and comparison: The Shah’s regime is described as highly repressive but comparatively more open socially and economically, though with a discredited political system. The current regime disperses power within a more complex system where the supreme leader is central but not incomparable to past autocrats. - The potential for separatism and regional spillover is discussed, including Kurdish separatism in western Iran. Speaker 1 clarifies that the Kurdish group is not part of the protests but a separate element taking advantage of the situation; the risk of civil war if the state collapses is acknowledged as a nightmare scenario. - The possibility of a Maduro-like approach (managed transition through elite elements) is considered. While channels of communication exist, Speaker 1 doubts the same dynamics as Venezuela; Iran lacks internal continuity in the security establishment, making a similar path unlikely. - Military retaliation dynamics are examined: Iran’s response to limited U.S. strikes could be symbolic or broader, including potential strikes on U.S. bases in the region. The possibility that Israel would push the United States to target Iran’s military capabilities rather than just decapitation is discussed, with notes about potential after-effects and regional reactions. - The 12-day war context and Iran’s current military capabilities: There is debate about whether Iran’s military could be a greater threat to U.S. bases than previously believed and about how easily Iranian missile launches could be located and neutralized. - The closing forecast: The likely trajectory depends on the next few days. A limited, negotiated strike could lead to negotiations and a transformed regime with lifted sanctions, perhaps avoiding a wholesale regime change; a more aggressive or decapitating approach could provoke substantial instability and regional repercussions. The conversation ends with a personal note of concern for Parsi’s family in Iran. - Final reflection: The interview ends with expressions of concern for family safety and a mutual appreciation for the discussion.

It is difficult for the United States to initiate a crisis and go to war with Iran. If compromise is not possible, the traditional way for America to go to war would be in the best interest of the country. Historical examples show that events like Pearl Harbor, the Lusitania episode, the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the explosion of the USS Maine, and the attack on Fort Sumter led to the US entering wars. Therefore, if Iran does not compromise, it would be preferable for someone else to start the war.

"Here's something you're never taught in school. Here in the good old US Of A, all of your wars have been fake." The video centers on the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, an American think tank established in 1985, whose mission is "to advance a balanced and realistic understanding of American interests in The Middle East and to promote the policies that secure them." Its board includes Henry Kissinger, Richard Pearl, Condoleezza Rice, George Shultz, James Woolsey. The speaker notes: "crisis initiation is really tough, and it's very hard for me to see how The United States, president can get us to war with Iran." He adds: "The traditional way that America gets to war is what's best for US interests." He cites alleged false flags: "False flag." Pearl Harbor, Lusitania, Gulf Of Tonkin, Maine, Fort Sumter. "If the Iranians aren't gonna compromise, it would be best if somebody else started the war." "This is how America goes to war." "One can combine other means of pressure with sanctions." "We could step up the pressure." "They're in the game of doing that to everybody." "We are in the game of using covert means against the Iranians." "We could get nastier with that." "you don't know when World War three is gonna break out, but when it does, you'll know why."

"The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. This is an American think tank out of Washington DC. It was established in 1985, and it says the mission statement of the institute, quote, is to advance a balanced and realistic understanding of American interests in The Middle East and to promote the policies that secure them. Not about what's right and wrong over there. It's just whatever secures the American interests over in The Middle East, and we all know what those interests are. You've got Henry Kissinger, Richard Pearl, Condoleezza Rice, George Shultz, James Woolsey. It's a fun crowd. And it doesn't matter which president you think you're voting for. It's gonna change everything. People that have been part of this particular think tank have served senior positions in the administrations of every president this country has had since George h w Bush. Some of you may have seen this video, but again, considering the things that are going on right now, it's very it's more relevant now than it's ever been. So we're gonna go ahead and watch this, and I just wanna say upfront, you're gonna wanna have to make yourself resist the urge to punch your screen because you're gonna wanna punch this guy." "crisis initiation is really tough, and it's very hard for me to see how The United States, president can get us to war with Iran." "He just said that. You aren't hearing things he literally said. Crisis initiation's tough, and how's The United States president gonna get to war with Iran? Because wars don't just happen. They make the war." "The traditional way that America goes to war is what's best for the interests." "Some people might think that mister Roosevelt wanted to get us into World War two, as David mentioned. You may recall we had to wait for Pearl Harbor. False flag." "Some people might think that mister Wilson wanted to get us into World War one. You may recall he had to wait for the Lusitania episode. False flag." "Some people might think that mister Johnson wanted to send troops to Vietnam. You may recall he had to wait for the Gulf Of Tonkin episode. Total false flag." "We didn't go to war with Spain until the USS until the Maine exploded. Probably also a false flag." "May I point out that mister Lincoln did not feel he could call out the federal army until Fort Sumter was attacked, which is why he ordered the commander of Fort Sumter to do exactly that thing which the South Carolinians had said would cause an attack. Also a false flag." "Do you see a pattern here?" "So if in fact the Iranians aren't gonna compromise, it would be best if somebody else started the war." "Period." "If the Iranians don't compromise, it would be best if someone started this war because that is how America goes to war." "One can combine other means of pressure with sanctions. I mentioned that explosion on August 17. We could step up the pressure." "We are in the game of using covert means against the Iranians. We we could get nastier with that." "This is how America goes to war. You don't know when World War three is gonna break out, but when it does, you'll know why."