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There are concerns about the security of electronic voting machines, as they can potentially be hacked without detection. While there is no evidence of this happening, it cannot be proven that it hasn't or won't happen in the future. Instances of machine errors have been reported, such as recording extra votes for a candidate or subtracting votes instead of adding them. It is unknown how many instances went unnoticed and what impact they had on elections. Legislation is being proposed to require a paper trail for every electronic machine, similar to ATM receipts, to ensure transparency and allow for verification. An investigation is also being requested to assess the effectiveness of voting machines and improve election systems.

In this video, the speaker discusses the importance of securing election systems. They highlight the risk of connecting these systems to the internet, as it can make them vulnerable to hacking. The speaker suggests that using paper ballots might be a smarter option, as they cannot be hacked like computer systems. By having something tangible to hold on to, like a piece of paper, we can ensure the integrity of the election process.

"The use of some 19,000 electronic voting machines in the city of Chicago and Cook County primary on March 21 is now under intense scrutiny." "The US company that makes the machines, Sequoia, was bought in 2005 by Smartmatic, a private company primarily owned by Venezuelan businessmen." "I think that American elections ought to be run by American companies and ought to be run by American citizens, not Venezuelan nationals." "We believe this is a national security issue. There is no way that companies belonging to non US corporations should have access to our elections." "In the case of, Smartmatic, there are a number of unanswered questions." "Certainly, our government should know."

The speaker raises concerns about the security of the tabulation machines and the process of transferring votes. They question whether the votes can be manipulated before being saved on a flash drive and if the flash drive can be swapped. They also mention the issue of trusting the county commissioner to not edit the contents of the flash drive. The speaker highlights the importance of the digital devices that hold cryptographic keys, emphasizing that if these keys are lost, the entire precinct's security is compromised. They give an example of a theft in Philadelphia before the election, where USB drives and a laptop were stolen from a key precinct, potentially impacting the legitimacy of the election results.

At the Capitol, we witnessed the hacking of outdated election machines, which are used in many states. This raises concerns as only three companies control these machines, making them vulnerable to hacking. Researchers have discovered serious security flaws, including backdoors, in voting machines used by 43% of American voters. These companies refuse to answer questions about their cybersecurity practices, and the larger companies avoid answering any questions altogether. Additionally, five states lack a paper trail, making it impossible to verify the legitimacy of the voting machine results. This undermines the notion of cybersecurity in our elections.

A Microsoft certified security expert provided evidence of a Dominion vote counting machine in a swing state with a wireless card connected to a thermostat's wireless network. The IP address traced back to a city in China, linked to a Chinese corporation involved in questionable dealings with American politicians. There is a thick binder of documented evidence showing foreign access and interference in the election, including public statements from the FBI and DHS warning about Iran's involvement. The evidence is undeniable, and those questioning it should argue with the FBI and DHS. The photographs and IPs provide conclusive proof of foreign interference in the voting systems.

The speaker states they are investigating dangerous and negative consequences with the "best of the best." They claim electronic voting systems have been vulnerable to hackers for a long time and open to exploitation, allowing manipulation of vote results. This vulnerability purportedly reinforces the need for paper ballots nationwide, so voters can have faith in election integrity.

We demonstrated how easily election machines can be hacked, raising concerns about the limited number of companies controlling voting technology. 43% of American voters use machines with security flaws, and some states lack a paper trail to verify results. The lack of transparency in cybersecurity practices is alarming.

The speaker, a computer science professor, warns that the electronic voting systems used in the US are vulnerable to sabotage and cyber attacks that can change votes. Through their research, they have repeatedly hacked voting machines and found ways for attackers to manipulate them. They emphasize that these vulnerabilities are within reach for America's enemies. While some states have secure voting technology, others are alarmingly vulnerable, putting the entire nation at risk. The speaker debunks the belief that voting machines are secure because they are not connected to the internet, explaining that many machines have wireless modems for faster result uploading. They conclude that it is only a matter of time before these vulnerabilities are exploited.

The video discusses the vulnerabilities of a specific voting machine, the ES&S Model 650, and the potential for hacking and manipulation of election results. The machine lacks security measures and can be easily accessed through a serial console on the back, providing full root access. With physical access, someone could rewrite the machine's code to manipulate vote counts. The machine's operating system has never received security patches and can be compromised by simply plugging in a zip disk. The video highlights the lack of security in these machines and the potential for widespread hacking.

In this video, the speakers discuss the risks associated with modems in voting machines. They highlight concerns about hacking and the potential for cheating in future elections. ES&S, a voting machine manufacturer, claims that their modems are separated from the public internet by firewalls. However, last summer, ES&S voting systems were found online in some precincts across 11 states. Cellular modems are commonly used to transmit election results, but this introduces vulnerabilities. Intruders can intercept data between the cell tower and voting machines, allowing them to alter votes and software. Despite claims that voting machines are not connected to the internet, many new machines have wireless modems for faster result uploads, raising concerns about their security during elections.

The speaker, a well-versed American patriot, has been aware of the sketchiness of the election systems for about 15 or 16 years. They have been working with a group of people who have uncovered some significant findings. In 2018, the Dallas election had irregularities, which prompted the Texas governor to form a panel to investigate. This panel hired a cybersecurity group to study the irregularities, specifically on Dominion Machines. Over the past two years, this group has reverse-engineered the process of stealing an election using this equipment. The speaker has been associated with them since August and has been actively supporting their efforts for the past 4 or 5 months.

In this video, the speaker discusses the importance of securing election systems. They highlight the risk of connecting these systems to the internet, as it can make them vulnerable to hacking. The speaker suggests that using paper ballots might be a smarter option, as they cannot be hacked like computer systems. By having something tangible to hold on to, like a piece of paper, it becomes more difficult for entities like Russia to interfere with the election process.

The speaker raises concerns about a bill and the governor's office being connected to a vendor. They question why certain information wasn't released earlier and express curiosity about the lack of a fiscal note. They mention that cybersecurity experts and voters are against the bill for various reasons. Speaker 1 highlights instances of hacking and anomalies in previous elections, emphasizing the lack of paper trail and source code access. They also mention the encryption of timestamps, which could compromise the secrecy of votes. The speaker concludes by mentioning a recent flaw discovered in the machines.

Jordan Conrad from Gateway Plumbing questions Miss Hobbs about the election in Arizona, specifically mentioning secret machine testing in Maricopa County and discrepancies in mailing ballot signatures. He asks if she authorized the testing and if she is aware of the signature issues. Jordan criticizes Miss Hobbs for overseeing elections in Maricopa County and Arizona.

The transcript presents a broad, multi-voiced warning about the vulnerability of U.S. voting systems and the ease with which they can be hacked, hacked-stopping demonstrations, and the security gaps that remain even as elections continue. Key points and claims: - Virginia stopped using touch screen voting because it is “so vulnerable,” and multiple speakers argue that all voting machines must be examined to prevent hacking and attacks. Speaker 0, Speaker 1, and others emphasize systemic vulnerability across states. - Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering, with examples that even hackers with limited knowledge can breach machines in minutes (Speaker 2, Speaker 3). - In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas allegedly deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from one candidate to another (Speaker 4). - The largest voting machine vendors are accused of cybersecurity violations, including directing that remote access software be installed, which would make machines attractive to fraudsters and hackers (Speaker 5). - Across the country, voting machines are described as easily hackable, with contention that three companies control many systems and that individual machines pose significant risk (Speaker 2, Speaker 6). - Many states use antiquated machines vulnerable to hacking, with demonstrations showing how easily workers could hack electronic voting machines (Speakers 7, 2). - A substantial portion of American voters use machines researchers say have serious security flaws, including backdoors (Speaker 5). Some states reportedly have no paper trail or only partial paper records (Speaker 5, various). - Aging systems are noted as failing due to use of unsupported software such as Windows XP/2000, increasing vulnerability to cyber attacks (Speaker 9). An observed concern is that 40 states use machines at least a decade old (Speaker 9). - Specific past intrusions are cited: Illinois and Arizona in 2016 had election websites hacked, with malware installed and sensitive voter information downloaded (Speaker 4). - There is debate about whether votes were changed in the 2016 election; one speaker notes that experts say you cannot claim—without forensic analysis—that votes were not changed (Speaker 17, 18). - The existence of paper records is contested: some jurisdictions lack verifiable paper trails, undermining the ability to prove results are legitimate (Speaker 5, 9). - Some devices rely on cellular modems to transmit results after elections, creating additional avenues for interception and manipulation; vendors acknowledge modems but vary in how they frame Internet connectivity (Speakers 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21). The debate covers whether cellular transmissions truly isolate from the Internet or provide a backdoor, with demonstrations showing that modems can be connected to Internet networks and could be exploited. - The “programming” phase of elections—where memory cards are prepared with candidates and contests—can be a vector for spread of rogue software if an attacker compromises the election management system (Speaker 11, Speaker 10). - A scenario is outlined in which an attacker identifies weak swing states, probes them, hacks the election management system or outside vendors, spreads malicious code to machines, and alters a portion of votes; the assumption is that many jurisdictions will not rigorously use paper records to verify computer results (Speaker 10). - A Virginia governor’s anecdote is shared: after a hack demonstrated off-site by experts, all machines were decertified and replaced with paper ballots (Speaker 16). Overall impression: the discussion paints a picture of pervasive vulnerability, aging and diverse systems, reliance on modems and networked components, potential for targeted manipulation in close elections, and the need for upgrades and robust forensic capabilities, while noting contested claims about the extent of past interference.

The video discusses concerns about the potential manipulation of votes in election software. It questions whether proper validation processes were followed, such as having observers from both parties present during the transmission of SD cards and the transportation of ballots. The speaker also mentions the use of election night reporting data and emphasizes that there is no human entry of totals, which eliminates the possibility of human error.

In this video, the speaker discusses the issue of Dominion machines and their accuracy in counting ballots. They question why in heavily Democratic areas, the mail-in ballots are always on target and within 1 mic, while in Republican areas, the mail-in ballots are often out of calibration. The speaker suggests that the machines allow human intervention, where a person can interpret the ballot if the machine is unsure. This raises concerns about the accuracy and integrity of the voting process.

Cybersecurity experts agree that electronic voting machines are dangerous and obsolete. These machines can be easily hacked, as demonstrated by a computer scientist who has hacked multiple machines and even turned one into a video game console. The vulnerability of these machines puts our election infrastructure at risk of sabotage and cyberattacks. In the 2016 election, millions of Americans voted on paperless electronic machines. The speaker reveals a step-by-step process for hacking these machines and stealing votes. The solution proposed is to use paper ballots, which can be quickly scanned and verified by humans. It is emphasized that all elections should be run with paper ballots and audits. The importance of having a paper backup system is highlighted. The concise transcript emphasizes the need to replace electronic voting machines with paper ballots for secure and reliable elections.

Maggie Pesaro, a resident of Kingman, expresses her concerns about the use of electronic voting machines in elections. She mentions a 53-minute video by Tori Morris, a private contractor with extensive qualifications in various fields. Morris provides detailed information and evidence regarding the lack of lawful accreditation for these machines since 2017. She emphasizes the importance of freedom and urges viewers to watch the video before making a decision.

The speaker states that the best investigators are pursuing election integrity. They claim there is evidence that electronic voting systems have been vulnerable to hackers for a long time and can be exploited to manipulate vote results. This vulnerability allegedly drives the mandate to implement paper ballots across the country, so voters can have faith in election integrity.

The speaker discusses the potential vulnerabilities of electronic voting machines. They mention instances where machines recorded extra votes for a candidate or subtracted votes instead of adding them. These issues were caught and corrected, but it raises concerns about undetected instances and their impact on elections. The speaker emphasizes the need for a paper trail to ensure transparency and accountability. They mention legislation proposed by Rush Holt and Hillary Clinton that calls for electronic machines to provide a printed receipt for voters to verify their choices. They also highlight a case where 4,500 votes were lost due to a machine malfunction. The speaker requests an investigation by the Government Accountability Office to assess the effectiveness of voting machines.

Contrary to the current political narrative, the speaker emphasizes that voting machines are not connected to the internet and the Department of Homeland Security claims the 2020 election was secure. However, in 2018, there were instances of electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleting or switching votes. The speaker mentions that hackers were able to breach these machines easily, even with limited knowledge and resources. They also mention the concern of remote access software making the machines vulnerable to fraudsters and hackers. The speaker then addresses the controversy surrounding Dominion, stating that there were no switched or deleted votes involving their machines and that the company has no ties to communism or China. However, there are concerns that some machines may be connected to the internet despite being designed as closed systems.

The speaker states that the "best of the best" are investigating election integrity. They claim there is evidence that electronic voting systems have been vulnerable to hackers and exploitation, allowing for the manipulation of vote results. This allegedly supports the mandate to implement paper ballots nationwide, with the goal of restoring voters' faith in election integrity.

Maggie Pesaro, a resident of Kingman, raises concerns about the use of electronic voting machines in elections. She shares a 53-minute video featuring Tori Morris, a private contractor with extensive experience in gathering and analyzing foreign intelligence. Morris discusses her qualifications and provides detailed evidence that the machines have not been lawfully accredited since 2017. The hardware of the machines has not been examined in Michigan since then. Pesaro urges viewers to watch the video before making any decisions and emphasizes the importance of valuing freedom.