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He states, "Zelenskyy does not represent the opinion of Ukrainians as his democratic mandate expired in the 2024." He adds, "He received it in 2019 under the promise to find common ground with Russia and secure peace." "Today, it is president Trump who fulfills Zelenskyy's pre election promises." Therefore, "for Ukraine and Ukrainians, he has a thousand times more right to be called our president than the self proclaimed and deceitful Zelensky." He argues that "neither president Trump nor European leaders, and certainly not the self proclaimed Zelenskyy, can decide Ukraine's future without Ukrainians." He notes that "This right was simply stolen from us by canceling elections and using punitive measures to forbid speaking about peace." He warns that "On Monday, Zelensky will again be in the Oval Office, once more pushing the agenda of perpetual war."

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The speaker compliments the president on his shirt and mentions that Trump won. They ask the president what he plans to do to stop the war in Ukraine once he becomes the 47th president. The president responds by saying that he would start by calling two people: Putin and Zelensky. He would arrange a meeting and guarantee that he could work out a deal. The president mentions that he knows exactly what he would say to each person and that a deal would be made within 24 hours.

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Сценарий: стать президентом Украины и договариваться с Путиным. Он говорит: «я иду на вы» и предлагает пересмотреть отношения с 1991 года по Черноморскому флоту, ТОЗЛ и газовым войнам, определить причины и следствия. Цель — сменить курс Украины: «Украина больше никогда не будет представлять угрозы для Российской Федерации» на взаимных условиях; нужен арбитраж и запрет на применение военной силы; «не должны быть… 13 не должны быть» — символическое единство русских, украинцев и белорусов. Конкретика: «четыре области, Крым на сегодня июньский ультиматум Путина 26-го года и обеспечение прав русскоязычного населения и церкви.» «Я отдаю четыре области и Крым, и не признаю их российскими. Отдаю на условиях ФРГ и ГДР.» Вывод войск к границе, подписание мирного соглашения, перестройка отношений; учёт Беларуси. Затем совместный молебен за погибших и возложение цветов; если Россия воздержится — возложу со своей стороны. Scenario: imagine you are Ukraine’s president negotiating with Putin. He says: “я иду на вы” and proposes to review relations since 1991 over the Black Sea Fleet division, TOZL, and gas wars, to determine causes and consequences. The goal is to change Ukraine’s course: “Ukraine will never again threaten the Russian Federation” on mutual terms; an arbitration system and a ban on the use of force; “not supposed to be… 13 not supposed to be” — symbolic unity of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. Concrete: “four regions, Crimea on the June 26th year ultimatum” and “I give up four regions and Crimea, and do not recognize them as Russian. I give up on the terms of the FRG and GDR.” Withdraw troops to the border, sign a peace agreement, and rebuild relations; Belarus accounted for. Then a joint prayer for the dead and laying flowers; if Russia abstains — I will lay flowers from my side.

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Checklist for summary approach: - Identify core positions: whether Russia views current tensions as war, and its stated objectives. - Track key diplomatic milestones and proposals: Minsk, Istanbul, security guarantees, doctrine on NATO. - Capture stated justifications for actions: language rights, minority protections, UN Charter references, self-determination. - Note referenced U.S./NATO actions and perceived aims, plus Russia’s response signals (including hypersonic test). - Highlight backchannel diplomacy and statements about negotiations, including who may negotiate and under what terms. - Preserve notable claims about casualties, rhetoric around “massacres,” and contentious episodes (Bucha, Navalny). - Exclude evaluation or commentary; reproduce claims as presented. - Maintain chronological and thematic flow to reflect interview emphasis. - Keep to 556–695 words; translate if needed (English here). Summary: Lavrov states that Russia would not describe the relationship with the United States as a war, expressing a desire for normal relations with all countries, especially the United States, and noting that President Putin respects the American people, history, and achievements, while hoping for cooperation “for the sake of the universe.” He argues that Washington’s support for Ukraine amounts to active participation in a conflict with Russia and characterizes the fighting in Ukraine as a “hybrid war,” asserting Ukrainians could not use long-range, modern weapons without direct American servicemen. He contends that Western officials have suggested that “the attack is the best defense” and warns that statements by Pentagon/NATO figures about limited or even nuclear-echo threats are dangerous, insisting that red lines are being moved and that Russia did not start the war, only a “special military operation” designed to end Kyiv’s actions against Donbas. He emphasizes Russia’s readiness for peaceful solutions based on Russia’s security interests, and the protection of Russian-speaking people in Ukraine—specifically their language, religious rights, and education—rights which he says have been eroded by Ukrainian legislation since 2017 (including bans on Russian education, Russian media, Russian language, and later restrictions on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church). He invokes the UN Charter and international law, arguing that true respect for the Charter requires consideration of the right to self-determination and equal state sovereignty. He contends that referenda in Crimea led to reunification with Russia after Crimeans rejected Kyiv’s coup in 2014; Donbas, initially labeled terrorists by Kyiv, was fought over until Minsk agreements were signed in 2015, which he says were sabotaged by the post-coup Ukrainian government. He asserts that Minsk envisaged territorial integrity for Ukraine minus Crimea, with Russian language rights and local self-governance in certain Donbas areas, plus economic ties with Russia, and emphasizes that Russia offered security guarantees to Ukraine—ultimately rejected when negotiations shifted to Istanbul in April 2022. In Istanbul, Lavrov says the Ukrainian delegation proposed “principles” for peace, which Russia accepted, including non-bloc status for Ukraine and collective security guarantees that would exclude NATO. He notes Boris Johnson’s alleged encouragement to continue fighting and claims the West has pursued a line of conduct that excludes meaningful negotiation, with Zelenskyy later banning negotiations by decree and advancing a “peace formula” and a “Victory Plan.” Russia’s position remains that no NATO bases or foreign troops on Ukrainian soil are acceptable, and that any settlement must reflect the realities on the ground, including updated constitutional changes in Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson, and Zaporozhye after their incorporation into the Russian Federation. Lavrov characterizes Western sanctions as unprecedented and says Russia must become more self-reliant, seeking cooperation with non-hostile states to counter sanctions. He argues that Western leaders aim to preserve a “rules-based” order that ensures U.S. dominance, pointing to NATO’s Indo-Pacific ambitions and ongoing security strategies that extend beyond Europe. He insists Russia seeks no war with anybody but warns against a presumed willingness in the United States to risk nuclear escalation, stressing that a limited or even threatened nuclear exchange would be catastrophic. He notes that backchannel communications exist but that there has been little meaningful dialogue with the Biden administration, and he observes Western fatigue with the Ukraine issue, while maintaining that Russia seeks a negotiated settlement grounded in Istanbul’s principles and in recognition of Russia’s security concerns, the rights of Russian-speaking populations, and an end to NATO expansion on Russia’s borders.

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The speaker believes Vladimir Putin wants peace. Despite raining missiles, Putin's dream was to take over the whole country, but the speaker believes that because of them, Putin won't achieve this. The speaker states they don't trust many people, including the interviewer, accusing them of dishonesty and asking "fake questions." The speaker believes Putin respects them, and that is why Putin won't take over all of Ukraine, even though that was his original intention. The speaker concludes that the war should never have happened.

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Speaker 1 hopes for a Trump–Putin meeting but notes, "As usual, we have no public information or public explanation of anything from the White House." He adds, "we, live in, not in a democracy, but in an imperium right now, one person rule." Russia's terms are laid out: "Russia has put on the table for years, actually, its terms for coming to an end of this war. Basically, Russia has said, that it has national security concerns. The expansion of NATO was the cause of the war in Ukraine. The US led coup in February 2014 was the provocation that led onward to war in Ukraine." He contends, "If Trump comes to this meeting with the honesty and says, yes, The United States should stop provoking Russia, stop trying to weaken Russia, stop trying to divide Russia, then there could be peace." Conversely, "If the president comes as he is want to do with demands. You must stop this and that. There will not be peace." "The problem is we have a intemperate president absolutely, without any kind of stability who does not speak to the public, and who does not engage in any kind of political deliberation. He just makes orders."

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We are open to dialogue with the new US administration regarding the Ukrainian conflict. The key is to address the root causes of the conflict. The aim should not be a temporary ceasefire or a chance to regroup, but a lasting peace that respects the lawful interests of all people and nationalities in the region. We will advocate for the interests of Russia and its people, which is the primary objective of the special military operation.

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Presidents Putin, Zelensky, and Biden should prioritize peace for Ukraine by agreeing to its neutrality. This means Ukraine would not join NATO or form military alliances with Russia, addressing security concerns for both the US and NATO, as well as Russia. By ensuring there are no Russian or NATO troops on each other's borders, the Ukrainian people can live in peace.

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The speaker discusses the collapse of the Soviet Union and the expectations of Russian leadership regarding cooperation with the West. They highlight the broken promises of NATO expansion and the negative response from the West towards Russia. The speaker also mentions the events leading up to the conflict in Ukraine, including the coup and the failure to implement the Minsk agreements. They express their willingness to resolve the conflict peacefully but emphasize the need to protect Russian interests and the people of Donbas.

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«Я иду на вы.» Он призывает подвести итоги с 1991 года по Черноморский флот, ТУЗЛ и газовые войны, пересмотреть причинно-следственные связи. «Я полон решимости сменить направление внешней и внутренней политики Украины, то что я называю словом проектность украинскую.» Украина «больше никогда не будет представлять угрозы для Российской Федерации со своей территории» на взаимных условиях: «эти обязательства могут быть только взаимны... не допустить применения военной силы друг против друга»; «Кто угодно с кем угодно воюете, но только не русские, не украинцы и не белорусы.» «Вот эти 13 не должны быть.» Далее: «четыре области: Крым... и обеспечение прав русскоязычного населения и церкви.» «А отдаю четыре области... и Крым, и не признаю их российскими. Отдаю на условиях ФРГ и ГДР.» Мирный договор «должен быть» с признанием территории; иначе будет «мирное соглашение, не договор.» Вывод войск до границы «как у Кореи. 37 апреля.» Белорусь — фактор; символическое единство от Владимира Великого; совместный молебен; пресс-конференция: «нас пытались сделать врагами, я пришел положить конец этому.» Возложение цветов к российским солдатам по взаимной договоренности; иначе — со стороны говорящего, «у меня дед российский солдат». I go on the offensive. He calls to review since 1991 regarding problem areas: the Black Sea Fleet, Tuzla, and gas wars, and to reassess causes. «I am determined to change Ukraine’s external and internal policy, what I call the Ukrainian project.» Ukraine «will never again threaten the Russian Federation with its territory» on mutual terms: «these obligations can only be mutual... prevent the use of force against each other»; «Whoever fights with anyone, but not Russians, not Ukrainians, and not Belarusians.» «Those 13 must not be.» Then: «four regions: Crimea... and ensuring rights of the Russian-speaking population and the church.» «I give four regions... and Crimea, and I do not recognize them as Russian. I give on the terms of FRG and GDR.» A peace treaty «must have a clear legal form... recognition of territory.» Otherwise a «peace agreement, not a treaty.» Troops withdrawn to the border «like Korea. April 37.» Belarus as a factor; symbolic unity of peoples of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine from Vladimir the Great; joint prayer; press conference: «we were targeted as enemies, I came to end this.» Flowers to Russian soldiers by mutual accord; otherwise I will lay flowers from my side, «because my grandfather was a Russian soldier.»

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The speaker believes Putin's recent actions suggest he may not want to end the war, but also states that Putin wants peace. The speaker asserts that if it weren't for them, Putin would want to take over all of Ukraine. The speaker believes Putin saw the Afghanistan situation and thought it was his chance to take Ukraine, which was "the apple of his eye." The speaker claims that Putin's first choice was to take all of Ukraine, but he didn't act during the speaker's term. The speaker believes Putin respects them, and because of that, Putin won't take over the entire country. The speaker does not trust many people, including the interviewer, but believes Putin respects them. The speaker concludes the war never should have happened and blames incompetent people.

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I am ready to leave my post as president if it means peace for Ukraine. If it is absolutely necessary for me to leave for peace to occur, then I am willing to do so. I am also ready to exchange my position for NATO membership immediately, if those are the conditions required. I won't belabor the point any further.

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"Peace in Ukraine is possible now." "The war started eleven years ago when The United States backed a violent coup to overthrow the Ukrainian government of president Viktor Yanukovych." "Why did The United States want NATO enlargement? Because The United States wanted to dominate Russia." "It was based on autonomy for Eastern Ukraine, the ethnically Russian part of Ukraine." "The United States and Germany ignored the treaty." "Do not accept neutrality. Fight on." "The Ukraine war can end now based on neutrality of Ukraine. Just say it. Neutrality." "Diplomacy where Europe and Russia sit down and undertake collective security, recognizing that Russia does not want NATO or NATO troops on its border, and Russia recognizing that Europe does not want Russian troops in Ukraine."

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Алексей Арестович заявляет, что патриот украинцев и русских народов не должны воевать. Он предлагает мир с Россией на условиях переговоров: «Я отдаю четыре области. И Крым.» и создание арбитражной системы, установление нейтрального статуса Украины. Он считает проектность Украины ключевым вопросом и говорит, что смена проекта необходима. Говоря о политике, он планирует баллотироваться, но только при условии радикальной смены курса; иначе «меня загонят FPV». Его отношение к Зеленскому претерпело резкую эволюцию: «посадите его пожизненно, если придёте к власти», затем он признал маргинализацию и сменил риторику. В Украине у него санкции; он «живу через YouTube». Он обвиняет внутренние элиты в коррупции и утверждает существование «сеток» из офиса президента, Порошенко и российской стороны. Он восхваляет Путина как «самого последовательного и рационального политика», предлагает встречи с Козаком и идею коллективного иска против Запада. Он говорит о нейтральности и символическом единстве Руси. Alexey Arrestovich states that patriots of Ukrainians and Russians should not fight. He proposes peace with Russia on negotiation terms: «I give four regions. And Crimea.» and the creation of an arbitration system, establishing a neutral status for Ukraine. He views Ukraine’s “project-ness” as key and says a change of project is necessary. Talking about politics, he plans to run, but only if there is a radical shift; otherwise «they will push me to FPV.» His stance toward Zelensky has undergone a sharp evolution: «lock him up for life if you come to power,» then he acknowledged marginalization and changed rhetoric. In Ukraine he faces sanctions; he «lives via YouTube.» He accuses domestic elites of corruption and asserts the existence of “nets” from the presidential office, Poroshenko, and the Russian side. He hails Putin as «the most coherent and rational politician,» proposes meetings with Kozak and the idea of a collective lawsuit against the West. He speaks of neutrality and symbolic unity of Rus'.

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We are not officially at war with the United States, though the conflict in Ukraine is a dangerous hybrid war fueled by US weaponry. Attacks on mainland Russia necessitate responses. Threats of preemptive strikes and limited nuclear exchanges are deeply concerning, as are repeated attempts to disregard Russia's red lines. We initiated the Ukraine operation to end the war against the Donbas region, where the rights of Russian-speaking people have been systematically violated. The West's focus on Ukraine's territorial integrity ignores the UN Charter's emphasis on self-determination and human rights. The unveiling of our hypersonic weapon system signals our readiness to defend our interests. While we maintain several communication channels with the US, meaningful dialogue is lacking. We seek a negotiated settlement based on Ukraine's neutral status and respect for the rights of all its people. A return to the Istanbul principles, albeit with current realities considered, remains our goal. We want peace, but will not allow our security interests to be jeopardized.

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To restart talks, Zelensky needs to say he wants peace. He doesn't need to say negative things about me. He simply has to state, "I want to make peace. I don't want to fight this war any longer." His people are dying, and he needs to understand he doesn't hold the strong cards in this situation.

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General Harald Kuyat discusses the origins, dynamics, and potential endgame of the Ukraine war, emphasizing that the conflict is the product of long-term political developments beginning after the Cold War rather than a single moment. He points to early post-Cold War efforts to integrate Russia into a more stable European security order, noting Bush’s Mainz speech in May 1989, which aimed to reassure Soviet security interests and propose confidence-building measures such as open skies and CSCE expansion. As NATO expanded in the 1990s, Russia sought a buffer zone to manage crises near former Warsaw Pact states and the Baltic region, a concept reflected in the NATO-Russia Founding Act. The crucial mistake, in his view, was suspending this mechanism, a move that has contributed to today’s tensions. Kuyat highlights turning points in the 2000s: the ABM Treaty’s termination in 2001, the INF Treaty’s withdrawal, and the Open Skies Treaty’s departure; the 2008 Bucharest summit, where Ukraine and Georgia were pressured for NATO membership, a move that foreshadowed later crises. He notes warnings about red lines and Crimea’s annexation followed those developments. He contends that the war could have been avoided or ended earlier if 2021-2022 draft treaties and Istanbul negotiations had been pursued seriously, and argues that Europeans bore responsibility for not advancing peace proposals during those moments. Regarding current U.S. policy, Kuyat asserts that he believes former President Trump’s effort to end the fighting is sincere, aiming to end killings and seek peace for historical recognition. He says Europeans failed to end the war with their own proposals over the past four years, and that military victory over Russia was never feasible. He stresses that the goal must be to end the conflict and suffering as early as possible, not to secure a decisive military victory. He recalls that negotiations could have progressed if Europe had embraced negotiations instead of prolonging the conflict. On the prospects for peace, Kuyat discusses concessions and security guarantees, including Ukraine’s neutrality and the possible deployment of NATO-country troops in a manner framed as reassurance rather than combat troops. He notes that both sides must be willing to make concessions and that negotiations must begin soon to avoid a military decision by Russia. He recalls a 2023/2024 proposal for negotiated peace with a small group, which he believes deserves consideration, and emphasizes that a lasting settlement would require mutual security guarantees and a mechanism for enforcement. Regarding Russia’s objectives, Kuyat states that Russia seeks to avoid NATO proximity to its borders and maintain a buffer zone; it views Donetsk and Luhansk as regions with Russian-speaking populations and as independent states should they be recognized, potentially under UN trusteeship. He suggests Russia might accept recognizing these regions as independent rather than reincorporating them into Ukraine, while Ukraine would withdraw from parts of Donetsk, and Russia would maintain access to its land corridor to Crimea. He notes that a peace settlement would require both sides to concede and that the European approach should also offer security guarantees for Russia and acknowledge Russia’s interests. He acknowledges that Russia’s goal includes a regime change objective, which complicates negotiations, and stresses that any durable peace must involve direct talks, possibly with American mentorship, and must include a long-term security framework. On European strategy, Kuyat argues Europe should strengthen its own security, reduce overreliance on the United States, and build a balanced, Europe-centered NATO pillar while maintaining the indivisibility of allied security. He warns against a perpetual European commitment to Ukraine’s reconstruction beyond what the United States is willing to support, and urges Europe to act more confidently for its own security interests. He also warns that without timely negotiations, the conflict could spread beyond four regions and threaten critical Black Sea access, potentially tying Ukraine’s fate to broader regional security concerns. In conclusion, Kuyat reiterates the need for an eventual peace order that includes direct talks with Russia, robust UN monitoring for any demilitarized zones, and a framework that ensures long-term normalization of Russia–Ukraine relations, while Europe strengthens its own security posture within a renewed European security order.

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Speaker 1 argues that 'this will be a peace agreement, not a ceasefire,' forcing the U.S., Russia, and Europe to define peace beyond a halt. He says the war reflects 'an unnecessary set of provocations from the West, not the unprovoked war of aggression by Russia.' He favors Ukraine's security through neutrality, insisting 'Ukraine's real security is neutrality' and 'Neutrality is desirable.' He envisions a monitored security arrangement via the UN Security Council, with 'Russia is one of the guarantors of peace because it's got security interests that need to be respected alongside Ukraine.' He notes 'there was no treaty to end World War II' and that 'promises unfulfilled by the West of no NATO enlargement.' He criticizes Western leadership as 'a gang of the rankest amateurs' and laments 'the Russophobia is rampant and wild' in Europe, urging renewed collective security discussions.

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Checklist for summary approach: - Identify and order the core claims and chronology of events. - Preserve the speaker’s key assertions and specific examples, including quoted phrases where appears in the transcript. - Highlight unique or surprising points (e.g., alleged coups, Minsk II interpretation). - Exclude repetition, filler, and off-topic content. - Avoid commentary on truthfulness; present claims as stated. - Translate only if needed (not needed here); keep the summary within 380–476 words. The speaker argues that the United States has repeatedly acted to redraw borders and topple governments without UN authorization, and that Western powers have treated international agreements as tools to serve their interests. He cites the Belgrade bombing for seventy-eight days as the first post-World War II European war that aimed to break Serbia, create Kosovo as an enclave, and install a NATO base in the Balkans, describing it as a NATO mission without UN authority. He lists additional interventions: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, with the assertion that the Obama and Hillary Clinton era tasked the CIA to overthrow Bashar al-Assad, and that NATO illegally bombed Libya to topple Muammar Gaddafi. He also recounts Kyiv in February 2014, stating that the United States overthrew Yanukovych together with right-wing Ukrainian forces, noting that this occurred after the EU had reached an agreement for early elections, a government of national unity, and a stand-down by both sides. He emphasizes that the next day the opposition asserted disagreement, and the United States immediately backed the new government, ignoring the prior constitutional agreement. In 2015, he contends the Russians did not seek Donbas restoration but peace through negotiations. Minsk II, a UN Security Council unanimously adopted treaty, was signed by the Ukrainian government and guaranteed explicitly by Germany and France. He states that it was laughed at inside the US government, despite the UN endorsement. He cites Angela Merkel’s later remark in a desight-era interview after the 2022 escalation, claiming she said Minsk II was “a holding pattern to give Ukraine time to build its strength.” He counters that Minsk II was a UN Security Council unanimously adopted treaty meant to end the war. He asserts familiarity with the United States government and urges distrust, arguing that both sides should sit down publicly and present their terms “in front of the whole world” for judgment. He calls for clear terms: “We’re not going to overthrow governments anymore,” and asks the United States to say “We accept this agreement,” and Russia to say “We’re not stepping one foot farther than whatever the boundary is actually reached,” with NATO not enlarging. He envisions putting the terms on paper for the world to see, asserting that “once in a while, treaties actually hold.”

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Speaker 0: He asks about comparisons to World War II and what Hitler did in Czechoslovakia. Initially, he takes some territory. He appeased Putin the same way they appeased Hitler. But then, especially if he takes the defensive line in Donbas, which Ukraine still holds at the moment, it puts Putin in a better position to continue invading more and more territory out of Ukraine over the next ten, fifteen years rather than trying to achieve it all in the next few months or next couple of years? Speaker 1: It’s wildly insulting to compare Putin to Hitler for obvious reasons. But regarding territory, for seven years before Russia invaded, Russia was on board with the Minsk Accords, brokered in February 2015. The Minsk Accords would have left all of Ukraine intact; Ukraine would have kept the Donbas. All Ukraine had to do was pass some laws in its parliament enshrining autonomous rights for the ethnic Russian regions of the Donbas, letting them speak the Russian language, letting them select their own judges, letting them have trade with Russia if they wanted to. And yes, that Minsk accord, if it had been implemented, would have kept Ukraine out of NATO. So this idea that Russia’s bent on conquest not only in Ukraine but everywhere is totally undermined by the available evidence. Russia was fine with even the Donbas staying in Ukraine as long as the cultural rights of Ukrainians of ethnic Russians in the Donbas were respected and if Ukraine stayed out of NATO. And if you want to say that that’s imperialist for Russia to demand the Ukraine side of NATO, would we ever accept Canada or Mexico being in a hostile military alliance led by Russia and China? Of course not. And by the way, Ukraine not being in NATO was, for a long time, the majority public position inside of Ukraine, if you look at polls, and it was enshrined in Ukraine’s declaration of state sovereignty, which said that Ukraine will be a permanently neutral state. So these were not radical demands by Putin at all. It was just ultraradicals in Ukraine—the ultranationalists, like groups like the Azov battalion, Right Sector, Vubota—which refused to accept the compromise of Minsk. You read the memoir of Angela Merkel; they all say the same thing. It was a hostility inside of Ukraine that prevented Minsk from being implemented. And had Minsk been implemented, I think you would have avoided this war. So in short, the idea that Putin has territorial designs in Ukraine is undermined by the available evidence, which then shows how completely idiotic it is to believe he has territorial designs beyond Ukraine as well.

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Russia occupied parts of Ukraine, including Crimea, starting in 2014. During the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations, no one stopped him as people died on the contact line. In 2019, I signed a ceasefire deal with Macron, Merkel, and him, but he broke it, killing people and not exchanging prisoners. We need diplomacy to end the destruction of Ukraine. We have problems during the war, like everyone else. We are staying strong and thankful for the support, but we are not winning. You have given us billions of dollars in military equipment. I have said thank you many times to the American people. We want to stop the war, but we want a ceasefire with guarantees. Ask our people about a ceasefire. Obama gave us sheets, but Trump gave us javelins. Without your support, we have no cards.

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The Alaska summit reinforced my belief that “president Putin agreed that Russia would accept security guarantees for Ukraine,” a key point to consider. “I'm optimistic that, collectively, we can reach an agreement that would deter any future aggression against Ukraine,” though I also note, “I actually think there won't be. I think that's even over overrated, largely overrated.” European nations are gonna take a lot of the burden; “we're gonna help them, and we're gonna make it very secure.” We also need to discuss “the possible exchanges of territory taken into consideration the current line of contact.” That means “the war zone, the war lines that are pretty obvious, very sad, actually, to look at them.” The next step: “a trilateral meeting, and that will be worked out.” “I have a feeling you and president Putin are gonna work something out.” Ultimately, Zelensky and the Ukrainian people, with Putin, must decide. “I'll set up a meeting with President Putin.” “All of us would obviously prefer an immediate ceasefire … maybe something like that could happen.” “As of this moment, it's not happening.” “I believe a peace agreement … is very attainable,” and “The next step would be for a trilateral meeting, and that will be worked out.”

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Speaker: Russia will never accept a freeze. This is just a White House fantasy, a wet dream. It's this Wall Street Journal. Everybody else repeats it. Russia has made it clear, 100% clear, that there will be no freeze, that for this war to end, Ukraine must leave all of Russian territory. And from the Russian perspective, that's total totality of Kherson, so the totality of Zaporizhzhia, the totality of Donetsk, and the totality of Lugansk. No if, ands, or buts. And let's just make this even more clear to your American audience, or your western audience. You know, in The United States, I'm somebody who took an oath to uphold and defend the constitution of The United States Of America. That's it. That's all America's about. We're a constitutional republic, and if you remove the constitution, we're nothing. We don't exist as The United States. So we take the constitution seriously. Why can't we respect the fact that the Russians take their constitution seriously? And because they were constitutionally viable from the Russian perspective, referendum in Kyrgyzstan, Zaporizhzhia, Lugansk, and Donetsk in September 2022, Russia absorbed these territories into the Russian land. It's part of Russia. Vladimir Putin cannot cannot, is incapable of giving up Russian territory as part of any deal. Constitutionally, it can't be done. He's not a dictator. You know? He is the president. He is bound by the constitution. So I don't know why people continue to repeat this absolute direct, this absolute nonsense. Russia will never give up its territory ever in a million years. It will never happen.

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I'm aligned with the US and the world, and I want to end this conflict. It's hard to make a deal with so much hatred. I could be tough, but that won't get us anywhere. For four years, tough talk didn't stop Putin. Diplomacy is the path to peace. Others didn't stop Putin from occupying parts of Ukraine since 2014. We signed ceasefire and gas contracts, but he broke them, killing people and not exchanging prisoners. I am trying to end the destruction of your country. Everyone has problems during war, even you. You've allowed yourself to be in a bad position. You're gambling with lives and World War III, and that's disrespectful to the US. You haven't said thank you, and campaigned against us. Your country is in trouble and not winning. If we are out, you will be fighting on your own.

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Спикер представляет гипотетический сценарий: стать президентом Украины и ехать в Москву «на вы» — не поклон, а принцип. Он предлагает пересмотреть причины конфликта с 1991 года: раздел Черноморского флота, ТУЗЛы, газовые войны, и выработать причинно-следственные выводы. Он намерен радикально сменить внешнюю и внутреннюю политику, чтобы «Украина больше никогда не будет... представлять угрозы для Российской Федерации» на время каденции, с взаимными обязательствами и арбитражом отношений. Он настаивает, чтобы «никто... но только не русские, не украинцы, не белорусы» не убивал друг друга, подчеркивая символическое единство народов. Конкретика: «отдаю четыре области и Крым. И не признаю их российскими. Отдаю на условиях ФРГ и ГДР», вывожу войска к границе и подписываю мирное соглашение, но без полного признания территории. Беларусь — ключевой фактор. Предлагает совместный молебен за погибших и возложение цветов российским солдатам с обеих сторон. Speaker presents a hypothetical scenario: becoming Ukraine's president and going to Moscow “on the offensive” — not a bow, but a principle. He proposes revisiting the causes of the conflict since 1991: the division of the Black Sea Fleet, TUZLs, gas wars, and drawing causal-consequential conclusions. He intends a radical shift in Ukraine's foreign and domestic policy to ensure “Ukraine will never again threaten the Russian Federation” during his term, with mutual obligations and an arbitration-based framework. He insists that “nobody... but only Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians” should not kill each other, stressing symbolic unity of peoples. Specifics: “I give four oblasts and Crimea. And I do not recognize them as Russian. I give them on the terms of FRG and GDR,” withdraws troops to the border and signs a peace agreement, but without full territorial recognition. Belarus is a key factor. Proposes a joint prayer for the dead and laying flowers for Russian soldiers from both sides.
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