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For the past few decades, authoritarian countries have been trying to undermine Western societies by fueling divisions. Recently, Russian propagandists have been spreading systematic misinformation through social media, particularly regarding vaccination and climate change. They have found support from right-wing extremists in the US and certain political circles in Europe. The Russians also sought to influence the Brexit vote, as it weakens the European Union. Their goal is to exacerbate social tensions and divisions, while undermining citizens' ability to discern truth from falsehood. The "eye of Moscow" now resides in our smartphones, which can be exploited by both Russian propagandists and advertisers.

McCarthy accuses the US of being infiltrated by foreign forces, specifically Russian-linked Twitter accounts. These accounts, allegedly connected to bots and trolls, are said to be impersonating Americans and spreading false information. The Russian influence tracker, Hamilton 68, monitors these networks and their impact on social media. The release of the Nunes memo was heavily promoted by Russian bots, with the hashtag #ReleaseTheMemo trending. Russian bots have also been involved in manipulating discussions around the Parkland shooting. The goal of these bots is to create political discord and influence public opinion. McCarthy's investigation into the 600 Russian-linked accounts has sparked controversy and raised concerns about Russian interference in US politics.

The speaker states that the "Russian story" would be called a covert influence campaign if they were doing it. The speaker also claims they would be the last to say they've never tried a covert influence campaign.

The Justice Department launched an election threats task force to combat threats against election workers. The FBI and ATF are investigating a school shooting in Winder, Georgia. Two Russian employees of RT are charged with conspiring to commit money laundering and violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act by failing to disclose RT's ties to social media influencers who amplified US divisions to weaken opposition to Russian interests in Ukraine. The Justice Department is seizing 32 internet domains used by Russian actors to spread disinformation and state-sponsored narratives to influence the 2024 US presidential election, aiming for Russia's preferred outcome. Iran is also increasing efforts to influence elections, including attempts to compromise former President Trump's campaign. The Justice Department has taken enforcement actions against individuals threatening election workers in multiple states, including prison sentences for bomb threats and death threats. The Election Threats Task Force is partnering with state and local officials and the FBI will host federal partners at its headquarters command center to address election-related issues. Russia's interference involves increased sophistication, AI, and cyber techniques. The goal is to undermine confidence in democratic institutions and values. The Special Counsel is following Justice Department policies, including election sensitivities.

It appears that the efforts by the New York Post and Steve Bannon to dig up dirt on Joe Biden resemble a Russian disinformation campaign, as confirmed by the Trump intelligence community. Russian operative Andrei Derkash and Russian intelligence have been trying to denigrate Biden, with Derkash being identified as a known Russian intelligence operative by the Treasury Department. The warning that Rudy Giuliani is being manipulated by Russian intelligence, followed by the emergence of suspiciously obtained emails, suggests collusion with Russian intelligence by the President. This is collusion in plain sight, without the need for special investigations.

Speakers discuss the severity and novelty of threats to the United States’ political system, focusing on Russian interference and the digital domain. - All acknowledge that the country faced a cataclysmic disruption to its political system that is unlike prior experiences. Speaker 2 notes, as a Vietnam veteran, that fundamental institutions were jeopardized then but proved resilient, and expresses hope for a similar outcome now. - Speaker 1 emphasizes two points: (1) Vladimir Putin’s determination to shape political landscapes inside Russia and abroad, and (2) the consequential role of the digital domain, which allowed Russian intelligence to exploit and manipulate more effectively, culminating in the twenty sixteen election. - They note that Russian interference historically involved exploiting elections, but never with such aggression, directness, or multidimensional methods. The Internet and modern technology serve as a huge enabler for influencing opinion and undermining fundamental systems. - There is a discussion of whether this manipulation was unforeseen. Speaker 2 indicates it goes back to the Soviet era with attempts to influence elections, but the magnitude in twenty sixteen was unprecedented. The digital environment provides malefactors with more opportunities to attack and influence. - The panel explains active measures as fabricating or propagating stories (even patently false ones) to advance a narrative, color perceptions, and lend legitimacy to political actors. They note that the Russians focused on specific voter blocks in states like Wisconsin and Michigan, with estimates that 70,000–80,000 votes could have swung the election. - They discuss methods beyond information operations, including collecting information (e.g., DNC and DCCC email breaches) and money-related tactics: money laundering, disguising funding sources for political actions, and potential extortion or blackmail. They stress that collusion is a tool in the Russians’ kit and that they recruit or exploit individuals where openings exist. - Following the money is highlighted as essential across national security domains; FBI financial investigators and intelligence analysts play key roles, and there is confidence that Mueller and others will trace financial pathways to uncover motivations. - The distinction between cyber warfare and conventional warfare is acknowledged: there are no tanks or planes, but the cyber realm constitutes a war for democracy. A robust response is needed to strengthen the cyber environment, including proposals for a congressional independent commission to assess and strategize future protections, involving engineers, technologists, scientists, and private sector input. - They reflect on why the nation did not respond with the immediacy seen after physical attacks (e.g., 9/11). The lack of a physical rubble-like trigger makes cyber threats harder to mobilize a national response. Leadership issues are cited: when the White House diminishes the CIA, FBI, NSA, or intelligence and law enforcement, it undermines efforts to address the threat. - They recount briefings to the president-elect in January, noting high confidence levels in assessments that did not rely on the dossier; the bigger concern is a perceived indifference to the Russian threat and the denigration of security institutions. - They stress the importance of institutional integrity: the press, law enforcement, and intelligence are pillars of democracy, and denigration of these institutions undermines U.S. credibility abroad. They advocate for stronger checks and balances and reiterate their commitment to truthful reporting and protecting the country. - The speakers, experienced and apolitical, emphasize loyalty to the Constitution and the need for decisive leadership and sustained commitment to democratic institutions, despite political challenges. They conclude with a solemn commitment to safeguard the country and its democratic framework.

The Russians have weaponized social media by manipulating public opinion through biased or fake stories. However, domestic disinformation is also a significant issue. In 2016, the Russian efforts may not have been very sophisticated, but they learned that they don't need to create content themselves as there are people in the US who will do it. There were two types of disinformation attacks in 2016, with the Internet Research Agency taking over existing groups in the US and pushing radical positions. While foreign influence gets a lot of attention, the majority of problems in the information environment are domestic. The domestic threat of disinformation is considered the most significant immediate threat to the 2020 election.

Voters, not Vladimir Putin, should decide who the American president is. The Russians offered, the campaign accepted, and the president used Russian help. The dossier alleges collusion and assistance. Vladimir Putin doesn't want one of the speakers to be president. Russia, China, and Iran have been involved in the election. Seventeen intelligence agencies have confirmed this. Fifty security officials who served in Republican administrations have said that Donald is unfit to be the commander in chief. The smear on Joe Biden comes from the Kremlin. The president is unwilling to confront Putin, even when Russia puts bounties on the heads of American soldiers in Afghanistan. There are several factors that contributed to the low to moderate confidence in the judgment.

The letter highlighted characteristics of a Russian information campaign but did not confirm it as Russian disinformation. The intent was to express uncertainty about the origins of the information, not to assert it as fact. The distinction between information and disinformation was emphasized, suggesting that media oversimplified the message. The impact of the letter on the election dynamics is unclear, but it aimed to raise awareness of potential manipulation by foreign entities. The propagation of the narrative through media mirrored tactics seen in past Russian campaigns, which often seek to create divisions. The discussion acknowledges that while the information was used by Biden, the original intent was to caution against possible foreign influence.

Vladimir Putin's interference in our past election is a topic we don't discuss often. However, it is important to acknowledge that he has meddled in various ways, such as funding political parties, candidates, and bribing government officials in different countries. This is his modus operandi, as he despises democracy, particularly in the West, and holds a strong animosity towards us. Looking ahead to 2024, it is crucial to address this issue and have more conversations about it.

The speaker discusses whether the Russian campaign successfully divided the United States or if the divisions already existed and were exploited. They explain that Putin takes advantage of existing weaknesses and divisive narratives. They emphasize that the campaign to undermine democracy did not start or end with the 2016 election and that it extends beyond elections. The speaker believes that Putin's main objective is to weaken the US, but they also think that his primary audience is his own population. They mention the importance of the justice system and how Putin has been undermining public trust in it. The speaker has been raising awareness among judges about this campaign and has been working to defend against disinformation and cybersecurity threats.

Voters in America should decide the president, not Vladimir Putin. The Russians offered, the campaign accepted, and the president used their help. The allegation is that they colluded. Putin doesn't want me to be president. Russia, China, and Iran have been involved in this election. 17 intelligence agencies confirmed it. Fifty former national security officials said Trump is unfit to be commander in chief. The smear on Joe Biden comes from the Kremlin. Trump is unwilling to confront Putin, who put bounties on American soldiers in Afghanistan. The confidence in this judgment is low to moderate due to various factors.

The Russians have weaponized social media by manipulating public opinion through biased or fake stories. However, domestic disinformation is also a significant issue. In 2016, the Russian efforts may not have been very sophisticated, but they learned that they don't need to create the content themselves as there are people in the US who will do it. There were two types of disinformation attacks in 2016: the Internet Research Agency created personas to take over existing US groups and push radical positions. However, the majority of these problems are domestic, related to how we interact online, political speech, amplification, and how politicians use platforms. The domestic threat of disinformation is the most significant immediate threat to the 2020 election.

Russia uses missiles and cyber attacks to interfere with elections and hide truths. They host events like the World Cup to distract from human rights abuses. Trump's support helps Russia weaken the world.

RT is funding right-leaning bloggers and YouTube personalities, including Jordan Peterson and Tucker Carlson. The purpose is to amplify messages that destabilize democracies.

The Kremlin playbook outlines various methods a foreign adversary might use to influence individuals. These methods include financial incentives, romantic entanglements, and compromising situations. Compromise can be intentionally set up or occur inadvertently through surveillance, where someone unknowingly becomes part of a compromising situation. This captured information can then be used for coercion.

The Russians weaponized social media by manipulating public opinion with biased or fake stories. Domestic disinformation is a bigger issue than foreign efforts. In 2016, the Russian content wasn't very persuasive, but they learned they could use existing US content. The focus should shift from foreign to domestic disinformation, as most problems stem from how we interact online and the norms around political speech. The biggest threat to the 2020 election is domestic disinformation, not foreign influence. The impact of foreign interference is minimal compared to the overwhelming domestic disinformation in the US landscape.

The speakers claim that America is under attack by Russian bots on Twitter, which are part of an ongoing attack by the Russian government. These bots are flooding Twitter, targeting Americans, and attempting to fan the flames of political discord by creating echo chambers and alternate realities. The speakers reference Hamilton 68, a website tracking Russian-linked Twitter accounts, as evidence of this activity. They claim this dashboard shows Russian bots are involved in various topics, from political narratives to school shootings. However, another speaker alleges that Hamilton 68 is a fraud. They claim the list of accounts it tracks are not Russian bots, but rather ordinary Americans, and that Hamilton 68 is misrepresenting organic opinions as Russian influence. Some speakers claim they are personally targeted by Russian bots. A dashboard at securingdemocracy.org is suggested for tracking Russian activity. A video by Matt Orphala is praised. Negative news about vaccines is said to be amplified by Russian bots.

The same network of Russian bots and trolls used in 2016 was observed amplifying both pro-Kavanaugh and anti-Kavanaugh sentiments on social media.

The speaker claims that after the war on terror, the US and UK military employed counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and counter-populism tactics, initially used in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, against the American people following the 2016 populist revolutions. These tactics allegedly included social media manipulation to foment revolutions and censorship to repress conflicting opinions. The speaker cites Russiagate and the Hunter Biden laptop situation as examples of these tactics, along with the mobilization of the intelligence community. They further claim that the Agency for International Development has overseen a takeover of independent investigative journalism in Europe and worldwide via OCCRP and other supposedly independent organizations to control information and major news media.

Flood a country's public square with sewage, raise questions, spread dirt, plant conspiracy theories to make citizens doubt leaders, media, institutions, and truth.

The letter indicated that the situation had characteristics of a Russian information campaign, but it did not confirm it as Russian disinformation. The intent was to highlight the patterns seen in past Russian operations, not to assert that this instance was definitively Russian. The media often simplifies complex issues into sound bites, which can mislead the public. The discussion acknowledges that while the letter pointed out these characteristics, it’s unclear if it influenced the election or Biden’s campaign. The focus remains on the nature of the information dissemination, which aligns with tactics used by Russian campaigns to create division.

Suzanne provided an overview of the Beyond the Ballot project and the broader Defending Democratic Institutions framework, focusing on how disinformation and information operations threaten public confidence in our courts and justice system. She emphasized that while Russia is the most aggressive actor in this space, other countries and domestic voices are increasingly involved, with Russia amplifying domestic narratives. The core insight is that these information operations exploit preexisting divisions and genuine grievances, rather than creating entirely new ones, and their aim is to undermine trust in democratic institutions, including the judiciary. Key evidence and framing from her three-year inquiry is summarized as follows: - Russia’s information operations target democracy and its institutions, including the justice system, and other countries imitate Kremlin tactics. Domestic voices are also engaged, and Russia amplifies those efforts. - These operations exploit weaknesses in our own system. They lean into legitimate grievances and seek to undermine perceived integrity, impartiality, and independence of the courts; they portray the judiciary as biased or corrupt or as a tool of elites. - The attack is not limited to elections but is a year-round threat to democratic legitimacy, including the justice system, and is aimed at weakening public trust in outcomes and processes. - Historical context includes the 2016 election, where propaganda, hack-and-leak activity, and attempts to disrupt voter data integrity were observed. Suzanne describes how such activity can extend to the justice system through hacking, leaking of judicial materials, or social media campaigns that manipulate perceptions of court legitimacy. - A notable case example is Twin Falls, Idaho (2016), where social media misinformation about refugees led to public outcry before facts were clarified. Fake accounts created by the Internet Research Agency in Russia pushed narratives that the justice system was failing, targeting prosecutors, judges, and politicians. - Russia uses three channels: social media, state-sponsored media (RT, Sputnik), and official statements by Russian officials. Narratives commonly assert that the justice system is broken, tolerates crime by immigrants, is biased, serves corrupt interests, or is controlled by a political elite. - Narratives are designed to erode confidence in the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and to frame reforms as evidence of systemic collapse. Examples include RT’s coverage and other propaganda aimed at inflaming racial and political tensions. - The campaign also leverages issues around race and policing, featuring fake affinity groups that appear to support opposing sides to inflame tensions and further undermine trust in institutions. - The FBI has warned that the threat extends beyond elections to a broader assault on democracy, with a focus on information operations aimed at all democratic institutions. Concretely, the project’s ongoing work includes: researching adversary threats to democratic institutions; defending the justice system through public awareness; conducting workshops and training for state and federal courts on cybersecurity and disinformation; building a rapid response and education network with legal organizations; and civic education as a national security imperative. The objective is to rebuild public resilience against pernicious messaging, encourage informed citizen participation, and motivate the public to hold institutions accountable while accepting legitimate outcomes. In response to questions, Suzanne underscored that members of the bar have a vital role: they can educate communities, correct disinformation related to specific cases (which judges cannot easily address), and engage in close contact with courts to safeguard democratic legitimacy. She urged lawyers nationwide to be more engaged in educating the public about the justice system and the mechanisms to hold it accountable.

The Alliance for Securing Democracy is developing tools and strategies to counter attacks on the U.S. and its allies. They are tracking the toolkit Russia is using to undermine democracies. Their dashboard tracks Russian active measures and can be found at dashboard.securingdemocracy.org.