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Ray McGovern recounts a long, inside view of U.S.–Soviet/Russian arms control and how it shaped or hindered security over decades, tying personal experience to broader strategic lessons. - Continuity and historical perspective. McGovern notes that, after decades in the CIA, he has witnessed both continuity and change in U.S. strategy across eras and administrations. He emphasizes that serious arms control and verification work has often depended on skilled, principled diplomacy even amid bureaucratic friction and political constraints. - Early arms-control work and verification. As chief of the Soviet Foreign Policy Branch in the CIA during the SALT era, he helped support Kissinger and Nixon while recognizing that the Russians faced pressure from both arms racing and concerns about China’s progress. He recalls briefing the Moscow delegation and the importance of verification: “Trust but verify.” He describes witnessing the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty negotiations and the process of uncovering Russian cheating (a radar at Krasnoyarsk later identified as ABM-related). The experience reinforced the value of independent verification mechanisms. - Personal anecdotes about diplomacy and decision-making. McGovern shares instances illustrating how diplomacy operated in practice: Kissinger touring Moscow covertly to broker deals; ambassador Beam's reaction in Helsinki; the sense that a president’s trusted aides could push forward arms-control progress even amid Senate resistance. He stresses the role of credible, informed analysis about the Soviet Union and Gorbachev, and the way that genuine engagement with Moscow helped reduce tensions at key moments (e.g., the late-1970s/early-1980s path toward detente and arms control). - Key treaties and turning points. He highlights several milestones: - ABM Treaty (1972): limiting ABM sites to two, then one, to preserve deterrence stability; verification challenges and the Russians’ willingness to negotiate under pressure. - Reykjavik and the late-1980s era: Reagan’s willingness to pursue arms-control breakthroughs; the shift that helped lead to meaningful reductions. - INF Treaty (1991/1992 onward) and its later withdrawal under Trump: the collapse of a pillar of strategic stability and its consequences for future arms control. - New START (2011): described as “really good” in limiting offensive missiles; its expiry topic is central to the current security calculation. Putin’s public suggestion to extend the treaty for another year, conditional on U.S. reciprocity, is noted; Trump’s stance is portrayed as uncertain or inconsistent. - The broader security architecture and indivisible security. McGovern stresses that “there is no security without mutual security” and points to the OSCE concept of indivisible security—no country should increase its security at the expense of others. He argues that NATO expansion and security dynamics in Europe have undermined mutual security and contributed to the current fragility in the security architecture. - Ukraine, NATO, and the stakes of perception. He contends that Moscow viewed NATO expansion and Ukraine’s trajectory as threats to its core security interests, contributing to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. He argues that Americans are often not educated about mutual security principles, which fuels misperceptions and escalatory dynamics. - Putin as a cautious actor and the risk of leadership reliability. McGovern describes Putin as a cautious statesman who aims to protect Russia’s core interests and avoid existential risk. He suggests Putin is calculating the reliability of U.S. leadership, especially under Trump, whose unpredictability complicates trust and predictability in negotiations. He notes Trump’s perceived narcissism and the possibility that Trump’s motivations in pursuing a peace process could be mixed with personal prestige or political gain. - Current and near-term outlook. The discussion touches on the likelihood of renewed arms-control leverage if U.S. and Russian leaders can agree on Ukraine-related constraints and verify compliance. It also notes that the broader trend—toward weaker, inconsistent adherence to treaties and a perceived decline in diplomacy—risks fueling a renewed arms race and greater instability. - Closing sentiment. McGovern underscores that genuine arms-control diplomacy, mutual restraint, and credible verification are essential for reducing the security dilemma that drives dangerous competition. He frames Putin as a potential hinge for stabilizing relations if U.S. leadership can articulate and sustain a credible, reciprocal security posture. Overall, the dialogue weaves historical memory with current geopolitics, stressing that lasting security rests on mutual restraint, verifiable agreements, and a shared understanding of indivisible security—even as political winds shift and alliances realign.

Glenn: Welcome back. Stanislav Krappivnik, a former US military officer, born in Dolbaz and recently returned, joins us again. Stanislav: Always a pleasure, Glenn. Glenn: In the last two days, Russians entered the strategic city of Orekhov in the Saporiyansko region, which may indicate that if this falls, the whole region might begin to collapse. In Slaviansk, the last Donetsk conglomeration, there are real advances that, if successful in circling the region, could mean the entirety of Donbas falls. Is the Russian spring offensive already begun? Stanislav: It’s hard to say, partly because mud season is ongoing in those areas. The South is still mud-prone; the terrain there is different from Haryakov and Sudirmy, where ground is firmer, forested. In the South, there’s black earth with fewer trees, causing severe mud this time of year. If the melt is fast, flooding can occur; if slow, the ground acts like a sponge and mud persists as water seeps down. Nightly freezes persist while daytime temperatures rise above zero. Weather affects movement and logistics. He notes that the briefings from the Russian command vary from independent mappers, suggesting either undisclosed advances or battlefield confusion. The Russian high command’s reports and geolocations may not always align with independent assessments. If credible, Russia’s forces from the South may have entered Ariakhov, with two parallel rows advancing toward Ariyakara and a long urban sprawl to the south. There is a gray zone because Ukrainian claims differ from Russian assertions. Ukrainians often withhold confirmations for long periods; e.g., Gudaiipoya/Gulyaporiya discrepancies show how contested reports can be. Stanislav says it’s not clear that this is a bold, continuous offensive up and down the lines. A big push would require enough armored vehicles, artillery, and aviation, which he has not seen yet, though it could be developing. Ukrainians have conducted desperate counteractions not just to retake territory but to disrupt Russian preparation for a potential spring offensive. If he were in command, he would launch a big spring offensive, at least partially toward Sumy, which is about 14 kilometers from Kharkiv. Sumy would be a key logistics hub and could cut off Kharkiv from the west, accelerating the fall of the region. He explains that Kharkiv could be surrounded by blowing bridges from the south and encircling through Sumy to the west and the east along the Russian line toward Bianka and the Big Water Reserve. He mentions continuing Russian movement in the north and the city of Kasatirivka, which has been split by a river; all bridges were blown about a month ago, complicating approaches. North of Slaviansk, the gates of Krasnyomar require closing first. There are contested claims about Yaman, with Russians saying around 50% controlled vs. Ukrainians claiming 10–15%. The central concern is the Russian push in the south, where Yemen sits in a triangle formed by the Oka and the Sri Bianca rivers, and Russian forces are closing in from the north as well. Crossing Yamana is expected to fall; it’s a matter of time, though how long remains uncertain. Glenn: Ukraine does not withdraw after encirclement. There’s a rational explanation tied to PR wars: if the US and Europeans lose interest in Ukraine, weapons and money dry up, and Zelensky appears addicted to PR victories to keep support. Do you think the war in the headlines affects Western support? How does the Iran conflict influence Ukraine, given weapon and money dynamics? Stanislav: There’s additional pressure on Western governments from the military and certain military societies not to rush into direct NATO engagement or a large-scale conflict with Iran. He notes Iran’s demonstrated ability to strike American bases and key targets, and that Iran’s actions have shown the US and its allies that American power isn’t unlimited. He argues Iran’s strikes and the broader Middle East conflict complicate Western calculations, as American bases and interests face increased threats. He asserts that Iran has shown it can strike at American bases and that American casualties would be far higher than reported. He claims Iran’s actions press Western governments to reconsider involvement in the region and to reassess commitments to allies such as the Saudis, who reportedly told American bases to stand down. He also discusses how Russia’s deterrence posture could shift in response to ongoing Iran–US tensions, and suggests that if Russia sees an opportunity to restore deterrence, it might be tempted to push back more forcefully. Glenn: Russia’s approach to diplomacy with Europe and the US is complex. Macron’s bid to join a Russia–US–Ukraine format could spoil negotiations. Belgium’s stance on Russian assets and broader EU politics complicate any settlement. Stanislav: He explains distrust in European leadership, questioning whom to trust in Europe. He suggests that a broader reform in European leadership and doctrine is unlikely soon. He notes that among European politicians, there’s disagreement and strategic posturing, with some populist voices but institutional leadership often failing to present a coherent strategy. Glenn: What about China and Russia’s support for Iran? How might that evolve? Stanislav: Russia previously explored a mutual defense pact with Iran; the document lacks substance, and real support has been practical, including MiG-29s, Su-30s, and S-400s, along with jamming systems enabling Iran to counter US satellites and missiles. He describes Iran’s military buildup and how Russia’s support has extended to drone technology and air defenses. He predicts Syria could reemerge as a battleground, especially if Iran’s militancy expands and if the US and Israel are drawn into broader conflict. He suggests China may reassess its stance and consider leveraging its position as US capabilities wane, potentially viewing Taiwan’s reunification as a strategic opportunity. Glenn: Any final thoughts? Stanislav: He emphasizes the high level of risk and unpredictability in the current international security environment, with multiple actors pursuing aggressive strategies and the potential for rapid shifts in alliances and deterrence calculations. He notes Iran’s broader influence and the risks to regional stability, hinting at a world where war remains a possible, though increasingly costly, option for major powers.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor discusses the likelihood and dynamics of a potential new war involving Iran, the Middle East, and broader great-power competition. - On a possible Iran strike: MacGregor says there will be a resumption of the war, though he cannot predict timing. He cites Western attempts to destabilize Iran (Mossad, CIA, MI6-backed unrest) and argues Iran is more cohesive now than it was forty years ago, with demonstrations representing a small minority and not a broad collapse of support for the government. He contends that those who want to destroy Iran or empower Israel believe the regime can be toppled with Western support and Israeli action, but he asserts that such a regime change is unlikely and that Iran will respond forcefully if attacked. He notes that current deployments are heavy on airpower with limited naval presence, and he suggests Israel’s broader goals (Gaza, Lebanon, Syria) will not be achievable without addressing Iran. - Regional actors and incentives: Netanyahu’s regional aims require confronting Iran, and Turkish involvement with the Kurds could influence the balance. He describes a recent Kurdish incursion into northern Iran that Iran suppressed, aided by Turkish coordination. He frames BRICS as militarizing in reaction to Western actions, including in Venezuela, Russia, and Ukraine, and says disrupting the Persian Gulf oil flow would harm China, prompting cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkey against Iran to undermine the One Belt, One Road project. He also argues that BRICS countries—Russia, China, India—will not easily align with U.S. plans if Washington proceeds toward war. - Russian and Chinese calculations: On Russia and China, MacGregor says they have supplied Iran with military tech and missile/radar capabilities and helped counteract efforts to disrupt Iran with Starlink. He believes many Iranians still oppose regime collapse and that a broader war would risk escalation with Russia and China backing Iran. He cites Moscow’s withdrawal of Russian personnel from Israel and the sense in Moscow that Trump is unreliable, leading Russia to hedge against U.S. actions. He notes Russians are concerned about Europe and envision potential conflicts with Europe, while he questions U.S. strategy and end states. - No first-use and nuclear considerations: MacGregor discusses the idea of no-first-use (NNU) as a potential framework to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation, suggesting a multilateral agreement among the major nuclear powers (US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, Britain, France). He posits that such an agreement could advance diplomacy, including on Korea, and reduce the likelihood of Armageddon. He mentions that Trump could leverage such a stance, though he notes Trump’s tendency to pursue more aggressive policies in other areas. - Europe and NATO: He argues Europe is unprepared for renewed large-scale conflict and has disarmed substantially over decades. He criticizes Britain and France for rhetoric and capability gaps and suggests the United States is fatigued with European demands, though he doubts Europe could sustain a conflict against Russia. - Venezuela and domestic budget: He emphasizes the futility of long wars in certain contexts (Venezuela) and the mismatch between spending and real capability gains. He references the defense budget as largely consumed by fixed costs like veterans’ medical care and pensions, arguing that simply increasing the budget does not guarantee meaningful strategic gains. He notes the role of special operations as valuable but not decisive in major wars. - Concluding view: MacGregor reiterates that war in the region is likely, with many overlapping alarms and uncertainties about timing, leadership decisions, and the risk of escalation. He stresses that both Russia and China have stakes in the outcome and that the Middle East conflict could influence global alignments and deterrence dynamics. He closes by underscoring the potential importance of no-first-use diplomacy and broader nuclear risk reduction as a path forward.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and the host discuss rising tensions around Venezuela and the broader implications for U.S. strategy and global balance of power. MacGregor argues the Navy’s buildup off Venezuela signals more than intimidation: there is a willingness to intervene in Venezuela, with plans to intervene having been “on the shelf for years.” He notes Hugo Chavez’s legacy and Venezuela’s potential ties to China and Russia make it a longstanding potential target, but he questions the practicality and aims of any proposed operation given Venezuela’s size and population (about 30 million, many along the coast). The host presses on objective clarity, asking what political-military goal is sought and whether it is attainable, warning that war is unpredictable and that the president has not articulated a specific objective. MacGregor expands on the ambiguity, pointing out that there is no expressed U.S. objective from the president, and he likens the situation to LBJ’s Vietnam-era ambiguity—“we’re going to support the legitimate government and fight communism” as a slogan, not a military objective. He underscores a concern that there is no workable exit strategy or realistic plan, and he cautions about the risk of unintended consequences. He highlights the Beltway chatter about narcoterrorism, but notes that bombing Venezuela without a clear, attainable objective invites failure. He then outlines possible wider consequences: CIA operatives, potential involvement of MI6, and mercenary forces could be drawn in if a conflict escalates. He observes two Russian destroyers off the coast of Venezuela as a signaling move, framing it as Moscow signaling that Washington’s actions push Moscow to respond. The conversation moves to how Russian actions in Ukraine shape a multipolar world order—“the post rules-based liberal order”—and how Russia could respond if U.S. actions trigger a clash near Venezuela, risking a broader confrontation. MacGregor stresses Russia’s capability to threaten a broad swath of Europe and the potential for Latin American states to realign with Russia if Washington presses too hard. On objectives tied to resources, MacGregor contends that Washington believes it “owns the entire Western Hemisphere” and that Venezuela’s resources (oil, gas, lithium, rare earths) are a tempting collateral. He argues this ignores the limits of U.S. ground forces and the illegitimacy of unilateral resource exploitation, comparing potential actions to Cortez’s arrival in the Americas. He asserts there is no solid strategy, no coherent plan to substitute for the current leadership’s approach, and notes the long-standing history of failed interventions. The Ukrainian conflict is invoked to illustrate the dangers of escalation and misperception. MacGregor criticizes Zelensky for actions that he says could constitute war crimes and notes that if a broader U.S.–Russia clash develops due to Venezuela, the “slow boil” in Ukraine could intensify. He contends Moscow has restrained itself to some degree, but questions whether American restraint will be interpreted as weakness. He argues Europe should recognize Russia’s legitimate security interests and that Europe’s leadership is vulnerable to internal pressures, migration, and political shifts. He predicts changes in leadership in France and Britain that could alter the trajectory of European policy toward Russia, while noting Poland’s precarious position and Hungary/Slovakia’s peace-oriented stances. Regarding U.S. leadership, MacGregor criticizes Trump’s strategy as unpredictable and focused on optics, suggesting the president could offload some conflicts to Europe but is surrounded by advisers pushing adversarial postures on Korea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. He contrasts this with the need for a sober, calculated approach that recognizes limits and emphasizes long-term strategic priorities over short-term “greatness” theater. He laments a lack of a coherent scientific, industrial, and economic strategy in Washington, describing an economy driven by short-term profits and financial capitalists, with limited productive investment outside of a few exceptions like Elon Musk. He uses the analogy of a locomotive running out of steam, arguing that without a real plan, debt and multipolar realignments will push the U.S. toward crisis. In closing, MacGregor reiterates that the current approach risks triggering a costly, destabilizing conflict and that the United States would benefit from stepping back, acknowledging limits, and pursuing a more organized path to a multipolar order rather than ad hoc interventions and prestige-driven military commitments.

Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson joins the program with host Glenn to discuss the escalating tensions around Iran, the U.S. leadership, and the broader geopolitical and economic implications. The conversation centers on what is driving recent White House actions, the potential paths forward, and the risks of cascading consequences. Key points and insights: - Trump’s countdown to strike Iran: Wilkerson interprets Trump’s 48-hour, then 5-, then 10-day countdowns on Iran’s energy facilities as an attempt to buy time rather than a clear plan for escalation. He suggests Trump is trying to stall and manage narratives while lacking a credible path out of the crisis. - Reasons Trump is escalating: Wilkerson argues Trump is “buying time to be buying time,” unable to articulate a feasible exit strategy. He posits that the main driver of the escalation is a realization by Trump that he’s deeply entangled, with Bibi Netanyahu as the principal ally who would abandon him in a crisis. - Global force posture and limits: The administration is assembling various special operations forces (e.g., 1st SOG, rangers from multiple locations) and delivery/ extraction capabilities, but Wilkerson believes a full invasion is not feasible and would risk impeachment. He notes the use of dispersed forces and high-end delivery systems akin to operations in Venezuela, stressing the operational and strategic implausibility of a large-scale invasion of Iran. - Iranian diplomacy and leadership: Wilkerson cites Iranian diplomacy as sidelined by U.S. actions. He highlights a UN emergency meeting where Iraqi officials criticized the U.S. and Israel for “two bullying nuclear weapons regimes” and condemned the “torpedoing of diplomacy,” pointing to the broader frustration with the international handling of the Palestinian-Israeli situation. He criticizes Witkoff and Kushner as ineffective in negotiating with Iran and notes a strong Iranian stance emphasizing an end to what they view as aggression. - Domestic political dynamics: Wilkerson criticizes both U.S. parties for their current leadership, accusing figures like Keane, Hagel, and Trump of mismanaging the crisis. He rails against the influence of evangelical and political figures who advocate Old Testament-style rhetoric in modern policy, arguing it contributes to destructive escalation. - Economic and global ripple effects: The war threatens the global economy, with consequences such as disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz impacting helium, urea, and broader trade. Wilkerson warns that the world could experience a global recession, potentially spiraling into a depression, due to shipping bottlenecks and energy-price shocks. - Strait of Hormuz and strategic chokepoints: A recurring theme is the vulnerability created by critical chokepoints. Wilkerson references his naval analysis of global straits and identifies Hormuz as a significant vulnerability, though not necessarily the most critical, with Bab el-Mandeb potentially more serious. - Israel’s situation and nuclear considerations: Discussion turns to Israel’s military situation in Gaza and Lebanon, Netanyahu’s political decisions, and the potential for Israel to face internal collapse or drastic shifts. Wilkerson raises the hypothetical that Iran could seek a nuclear deterrent if faced with existential threats and notes concerns about how the U.S. and Israel might respond to an Iranian nuclear capability. - Possible exit routes and diplomacy: When pressed for a pathway out, Wilkerson suggests a drastic but unlikely option: declare victory and leave, lifting sanctions and pressuring allies to do the same, including pressuring Europe to support rebuilding Iran. He emphasizes this as a potentially politically expedient exit for Trump, though he doubts it will happen. - Nuclear entanglements and further escalation: The conversation turns to the risk of nuclear exchange if Iran develops a deterrent and if Israel or the U.S. decide to escalate further. Wilkerson outlines a scenario in which limited U.S. forces strike Gulf targets, provoking Iranian retaliation that could escalate into a broader regional conflict with nuclear implications, given multiple nuclear powers’ capabilities. - Long-term outlook: Wilkerson references the broader implications for the global order, noting the dangers of imperial hubris post-Cold War, and warns that multiple dimensions—military, economic, and diplomatic—are converging toward a dangerous crossroads. He asserts that the current trajectory could threaten global stability and the viability of traditional alliance structures. In sum, Wilkerson presents a troubling synthesis: Trump’s incremental escalation appears aimed at time-buying without a credible exit; Iran’s leadership responds with strategic diplomacy and potential deterrence considerations; Israel faces internal and regional pressures; and the global economy and critical chokepoints amplify the risk that the conflict could spiral into a larger, harder-to-control crisis. He emphasizes the dangerous mix of leadership missteps, strategic miscalculations, and existential stakes that could reshuffle the regional and global order.

According to the Pentagon, providing weapons to Ukraine that could strike targets within Russia carried a 50% chance of nuclear exchange. Despite this assessment, the US proceeded. Russia warned that a large aerospace attack would be considered a first strike, triggering a nuclear response. The speakers discuss the implications of attacks on the Kremlin and the potential consequences of nuclear war, including the vulnerability of nuclear power plants. They claim that a nuclear meltdown would render the Earth uninhabitable for millions of years. They also discuss European leaders' willingness to continue the war against Russia, despite the risk of escalation. They assert that globalists are willing to risk nuclear war for a "reset" and believe it is survivable. They criticize the current approach as "insanity" and "rolling the dice" with nuclear war.

The discussion covers Iran, its regional threats, and potential US actions, along with broader geopolitical implications. - Iranian capabilities and external support: The on-hand capabilities are said to be far more lethal and the Iranian position stronger, with enormous recent investment by Iran, notably with Chinese and Russian involvement over the last six months. Russia is aiding integrated air defenses and China has reportedly provided missiles; the exact mix and ranges are not fully disclosed. The panelists expect Iranian air and missile defenses to work much better with Russian and Chinese assistance this time. - Protests in Iran and US strike calculations: The protests were described as legitimate initially, driven by economic distress, with two groups present: reform-minded and more conservative elements. The Mossad, with CIA and MI6, allegedly joined to provoke brutality by the regime, aiming to push it toward a brutal crackdown and to exploit the protests as a regime-change opportunity. It was claimed that 40,000 starlight terminals were smuggled in to orchestrate protests but were discovered and eliminated, marking the operation as a failure. Consequently, strikes were deemed impractical unless more firepower and longer duration were available, leading to a predicted extended air campaign rather than a quick strike. - Maduro kidnapping and Venezuela: The operation involved paying off those in the way and exploiting air defenses; one air-defense battery fired, hitting a helicopter but not bringing it down. The new president in Venezuela reportedly refuses to take instructions from Washington, raising questions about regime-change outcomes. There is speculation about continued income from oil captured and sold illegally, and about who will protect Venezuelan oil interests as drilling resumes, including potential mercenaries and maverick oil groups. The oil leadership reportedly lacks interest in going down there unless it is highly profitable. - Secret weapon discussions: The “discombobulator” and other secret weapons mentioned by Trump are described as exaggerated; the speaker notes there are weapons kept secret for dire circumstances but declines to elaborate beyond public knowledge, given high-level clearance. - Iran-focused air campaign planning: The US would rely on a prolonged air campaign, potentially comparable to the Kosovo campaign in 1999, avoiding nuclear weapons and using extensive air power with support from bases in Europe and the region. The Navy would be complemented by the Air Force with a long campaign, while the Navy would need replenishment and time to rearm. - Missile and weapon capabilities: Iran’s capabilities have evolved, aided by Chinese missiles (allegedly hundreds) and Russian support. The range of missiles questions whether they can reach Diego Garcia, with concerns about more capable missiles hitting US bases in the region. Russia’s supply of Reshnik missiles (hypersonic, multiple warheads) is viewed as unlikely; the focus is on Iranian missiles that can threaten ships and bases in the Middle East. - US force posture and diplomacy: The force buildup (aircraft, submarines, drones, THAAD, Patriot) signals a “play for time” strategy while pursuing negotiations, including enriched uranium discussions. There is debate about what agreement might be possible on enriched uranium and JCPOA-related issues; Iran reportedly rejects several Netanyahu/Trump demand points, including missile constraints as a non-starter. - Russia, China, and Turkey as wild cards: Russia would likely intervene militarily only if Iran’s regime faces collapse; China would likely use economic means and some political leverage. Turkey is seen as a wild card; it could join a regional confrontation and potentially align against Israel or the US, with NATO’s response viewed as uncertain and largely lacking a unified, decisive stance. - Nuclear arms and START: The May suspension of START is mentioned; Russia claims willingness to extend, while the US has not responded, raising concerns about unconstrained Russian nuclear activity if treaties lapse. - Ukraine and Taiwan implications: European nerves and NATO dynamics are evolving; the Europeans are portrayed as vacillating between opposing and challenging Trump-era policies, with NATO potentially facing existential questions. A strike on Iran could shift focus away from Ukraine and Taiwan, empowering adversaries, or strengthen deterrence depending on actions and diplomacy. The speaker suggests that, pragmatically, Taiwan poses a far more difficult strategic challenge and that escalation there would be highly unrewarding, potentially increasing China’s incentives to avoid direct conflict.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and Glenn discuss the current strategic picture across Ukraine, the Russia–China–Iran axis, and the broader Western political environment. On Russia and Ukraine: - MacGregor notes a major “Cauldron battles” situation in Southeastern Ukraine, with remaining Ukrainian forces being encircled and largely annihilated by precision strike weapons, and a Russian swarm anticipated to complete the encirclement. - He identifies two focal points of Russian activity: Odessa (where Russian special operations are reportedly active at night, Odessa largely undefended with air defenses degraded) and Kharkov, with ongoing pressure toward Kyiv. He emphasizes that none of these alone solves the core problem of removing Zelenskyy’s government in Kyiv, which he describes as a facade Europeans seek to preserve. - Russia has increased its force size, adding reservists and training new draftees; options for Moscow appear to be Odessa, Kharkov, and Kyiv. Putin is watching Western European political developments to gauge timing, potentially waiting for Western government changes to move decisively. - MacGregor argues NATO is effectively irrelevant to Russia’s calculus and asserts the United States does not want a war with Russia over Ukraine, giving Moscow more freedom of action than Western audiences realize. On Russia–China relations and Europe: - Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are pursuing a bilateral strategy to mutually reinforce military and economic capabilities, forming a large continental fortress against the United States. The two powers seek to strengthen ties as they view the U.S. as increasingly belligerent. - MacGregor contends that European leaders, including Starmer, Macron, and Metz, are aligned with globalist and financial elites (referencing ties to BlackRock and others) and that personal relationships between leaders are not meaningful in the international arena; strategic interests drive policy. - He argues that many European elites’ rhetoric about Russia serves to deflect from domestic vulnerabilities and to mobilize anti-Russian sentiment as political cover. On the Middle East and Iran: - The talk about Iran is framed as not serious; MacGregor describes a plan to escalate toward regime change in Iran, driven by U.S., Israeli, and allied intelligence communities, despite Iranian resistance and regional risk. - He claims Mossad, MI6, and CIA influenced President Trump regarding Iran’s fragility, while Iran’s internal protests (economic grievances) were legitimate and quickly mischaracterized as attempts to overthrow the government. He asserts Chinese and Russian assistance helped Iran counter covert efforts, including providing satellite imagery and assisting integrated air and missile defenses. - The declared Western goal is to destroy Iran as a nation-state, with the Iranian leadership prepared to respond with full use of capabilities if attacked. He suggests a potential air and missile campaign could target the regime and strategic hubs, with the United States likely relying on high-altitude precision strikes and long-range missiles, while questioning the effectiveness and survivability of U.S. platforms like B-52s against Iranian defenses. - China and Russia are depicted as unlikely to allow Iran to be pulverized; they could intervene if Iran is near disintegration, possibly through non-nuclear actions such as a collision at sea, leveraging their submarine capabilities and influence. On European political legitimacy and future: - MacGregor connects the Epstein-related discourse in Europe to a broader critique of ruling elites, comparing the potential for political upheaval to late-18th-century France. He argues that as publics grow disillusioned with elites, there could be a crisis of political legitimacy and a shift toward more realistic leadership, with potential upheaval in Britain, France, and Germany. On Putin and future moves: - He suggests Putin views the possibility of reconciliation with Washington as unlikely, having reached somber conclusions about the prospects for meaningful agreement. He predicts Russia will act on its terms, potentially advancing toward the Dnieper River, Odessa, and perhaps Kyiv, while noting Russia does not intend to govern Western Ukraine long-term. He emphasizes that events will unfold on Russian terms, with European irrelevance in the decision-making process fading as Moscow executes its plans.

Speaker 0 argues that feeding their enemy is unprecedented in history and rejects the notion that it is consistent with Jewish morality, saying, “that isn’t” Jewish morality. He recalls October 1973 during the Yom Kippur War, when Henry Kissinger instituted an arms embargo against them, and explains that “an a four Skyhawk was parked at Telenorf Air Base with some interesting weapons under its wings,” and that they told the Americans to “take your eye in the sky and take a good look at the airplane that’s on that runway.” He continues that the next day “the airlift started to the to Israel,” describing an arms airlift, and notes that they “threatened their We threatened to use unconventional weapons,” and that they indicated, “So in other words, we threatened their We threatened to use unconventional weapons. I’ll leave it at that.” He asserts a policy stance: “is this what you’re want us to threaten now?,” and responds, “I said, absolutely. Except this time, I want us to go forward with it if necessary. If they think we’re bluffing, we go forward with it.” He states that, regarding existential threats, “as far as I’m concerned, when we are faced with an existential threat, we have the right to use any and all weapons in our disposal to eliminate that existential threat.” The speaker then contends that many people “don’t know anything about nuclear weapons at all. What they are, how they can be used,” and expresses fatigue with euphemisms, declaring, “I’m tired of using euphemisms. I’m tired of saying, well, we have something, you know, in the basement, but we won’t be the first to introduce, nuclear weapons in The Middle East. It’s enough already.” In sum, Speaker 0 highlights a historical precedent of threatening and delivering arms to counter existential threats, asserts the right to use any and all weapons if needed, and calls out the lack of public understanding and reluctance to acknowledge the potential introduction of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

Ashwin Rutansi hosts Going Underground, opening with a claim that Dubai was hit harder by Iranian retaliation than anywhere else in the region outside Israel, and noting this broadcast marks 73 years since the CIA’s MKUltra program. He frames the USA and what it represents as a malign influence, and argues the US propaganda system has failed to spin defeats in multiple wars, including the Iran conflict. He says the world recognizes Israel’s genocide in Gaza despite NATO attempts to shield it, and notes that US public opinion shows disapproval of Israel. Netanyahu is accused of tightly controlling the media and cracking down on protests. Rutansi then welcomes Avram Berg (Israel’s former president, speaker in the Knesset, professor at NYU Abu Dhabi and Notre Dame Jerusalem) who speaks from Jerusalem. The discussion concentrates on the power dynamic between Netanyahu and Trump, and whether Netanyahu was surprised by Trump’s ceasefire declaration, plus how Netanyahu might retaliate if the ceasefire were sabotaged. Speaker 1 (Avram Berg) characterizes the situation as highly serious and delicate. He suggests the war’s origins and triggers are unclear, describing a “divorce” in the relationship between Trump and Israel: Trump’s ceasefire move is seen as coordinated or at least not fully aligned with Israel. Berg notes Netanyahu has not publicly spoken yet, and might frame the ceasefire as coordinated with him, but he views the immediate outcome as neither side having real winners and sees Iran as having survived strongly. He suggests China is rising in the background. Rutansi asks how secure Netanyahu is if the ceasefire persisted, recalling Israel’s aggressive actions in Lebanon after Trump’s ceasefire announcement and Trump’s retreat from conditions. Berg replies that politically, Israel has an election looming; the war was a strategic move for internal politics—Israelis rally around the government during wartime—yet Netanyahu may not gain politically from this round and could face backlash in upcoming elections. Berg also argues Netanyahu’s broader agenda—weakening Iran, disarming Hezbollah, and stopping Hamas—has failed across these fronts, leaving Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran still viable or intact. The host probes whether Netanyahu needs a false flag or propaganda to counter what Trump’s supporters might claim. Berg distinguishes substance from rhetoric, noting Hezbollah in the north is a problem for Lebanon and Syria; Iran’s threat was real but not existential for Israel, and suggests diplomacy and balancing could have handled it better. Berg emphasizes that war without political settlement is wasteful and results in casualties across many sides. Rutansi notes growing global hatred of Israel, while Berg refrains from embracing Hamas/Hezbollah as liberation movements, warning against falling into such narratives. Berg acknowledges global resentment of Israel but doubts a wholesale shift in allegiance toward Hamas or Hezbollah. The host asks about Epstein-related intelligence rumors and Trump’s leverage. Berg dismisses Epstein-related conspiracy as gossip rather than serious political leverage, insisting on reasoning over sensationalism. He does acknowledge Epstein’s notoriety but rejects tying it to concrete policy influence. When the discussion turns to nuclear weapons, Berg asserts Israel’s nuclear capability remains officially unacknowledged domestically, recounting past suppression of open debate on the topic. Berg argues that Iran’s perceived threats and regional rivalries push towards deterrence and urges a Middle East no-weapon agreement to reduce risk. He contends the broader regional security architecture must discourage all nuclear powers, including Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and neighboring states, with energy collaboration coupled with non-proliferation. On whether Netanyahu would use a nuclear weapon to stay out of jail, Berg says no, arguing the strategic logic of nuclear use deters first use and that leaders know once a nuclear device is used, it invites retaliation. He views Netanyahu as unlikely to employ a nuclear weapon. Rutansi closes, promising continued coverage of the Trump-Netanyahu-Iran dynamic, while Berg declines to dive into conspiracy theories, reiterating that discourse should be grounded in arguments, values, and policy.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor discusses the escalating tensions over Iran and the possibility of drastic military action. He notes that President Trump says the deadline for Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz and negotiate a ceasefire is tomorrow, and that if they don’t, “the entire country will be taken out in one night,” raising questions about whether a nuclear weapon is at the ready. The discussion suggests that Trump’s line may be hyperbolic, with Speaker 1 positing that a nuclear weapon is unlikely and that conventional methods or power-grid disruption could be used to “take out the entire country” without permanently ending the war. He invokes George Kennan’s view on nuclear weapons and argues the goal is not to wage a nuclear exchange but to disrupt Iran’s energy infrastructure; he questions whether such measures would be permanent or decisive. The conversation shifts to censorship and satellite imagery. Speaker 2 reports that Planet Labs received a U.S. request to blackout images in and around Iran dating back to March 6, possibly earlier, with threats of sanctions if companies don’t comply. The panel discusses how to verify reality amid conflicting signals. The panel turns to a tactical assessment of potential actions around the Strait of Hormuz. Speaker 1 predicts Trump would pursue a coordinated air force and naval air strikes aimed at destroying petrochemical plants and energy infrastructure to deprive the government of power, though he doubts this would alter the strategic outcome given Iran’s continental capacity and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) capabilities. He explains Iran’s ability to use satellites and strike systems to counter, and notes Iran’s large force structure within the country. He warns that even if power is disrupted, Iran can respond and that the Gulf states would be affected due to a loss of energy and desalination capacity, potentially threatening regional stability and the Gulf’s populations. The discussion broadens to regional dynamics and Israel. Speaker 2 cites Trump’s remark about scrapping the Obama-era Iran nuclear deal to prioritize Israel, suggesting this shift contributed to the current conflict. Speaker 1 argues the global economy could enter a depression, highlighting how energy, plastics, fertilizer, and feedstock shortages would ripple through the Global South, Japan, Korea, and Europe as energy prices rise and supply chains falter. He asserts that oil is a global commodity and that a price rise worldwide is likely; he predicts a stock market crash and a long-term energy system rebuild. The hosts pivot to financial consequences and media appeals, with Speaker 0 promoting gold and silver investments through Lear Capital, citing Ed Dowd’s view on panic buying and shortages of fertilizer and energy, and predicting higher prices. The discussion notes a claim that about $42 billion has been spent on the conflict so far, with spending accelerating. On leadership and assessment of U.S. strategy, Speaker 1 raises concerns about President Trump’s current mental acuity and notes that some U.S. leaders are calling for a 60-day limit on hostilities without a formal declaration of war. He argues that Israel’s aims dominate the U.S. stance, complicating potential compromises with Iran and wider regional settlements. He asserts Israel seeks to expand its influence and dominance in the region, which undermines potential settlements and constrains U.S. options. In Israel, Speaker 1 explains that Hezbollah is not out of action and has launched rockets into Northern Israel; Israeli public unrest and evacuation patterns hint at severe internal strain. He contends that Israel relies heavily on U.S. support, which could be leveraged for broader regional aims, but may be unsustainable given regional opposition to Israel’s expansion. He suggests Arab populations and governing elites in the Gulf and Egypt grow discontent with Western-backed leadership. Finally, the panel probes the potential use of ground forces and the plausibility of a doomsday scenario, with Speaker 1 arguing that a large, sustained ground operation in the Gulf is unlikely to change the outcome without comprehensive disruption of Iranian strike systems and satellite networks. He emphasizes that a nuclear option would be catastrophic, and expresses concern about Israeli actions and regional reactions, including possible involvement by Russia, China, and other powers. Colonel MacGregor closes by pointing readers to his Substack for ongoing strategic analysis and reiterates the anticipated economic and geopolitical upheaval from the conflict.

Countries with significant military influence, especially nuclear powers, have a special responsibility. Instead of escalating conflict, they should engage in direct dialogue, similar to how disputes were resolved in old Westerns.

The speakers express alarm about the possibility of global war, particularly nuclear war, and are surprised by the media and political establishment's apparent indifference. One speaker believes Trump deserves credit for acknowledging the severity of nuclear war, based on his briefings as president. He signaled that current weapons are far more dangerous than those used in Japan. The speakers criticize foreign policy think tanks like the Atlantic Council for suggesting the potential acceptability of tactical nuclear weapons, deeming this viewpoint "crazy." They argue that individuals labeled as "crazy" are less dangerous than those shaping American foreign policy orthodoxy. They attribute this to the corrupting influence of unchecked power held by the U.S. for decades, leading to a detached and megalomaniacal dogma.

Scott Ritter and the interviewer discuss the looming end of the New START treaty and the broader implications for global arms control, stability, and security. - The New START treaty, described by Ritter as the remaining nuclear arms control framework, expires, and without a moratorium on deployed caps or a new treaty, the risk of nuclear war between the United States and Russia, and also with China, could rise significantly. Ritter calls this “earth ending significant” and says the six-decade arms-control legacy would be at risk if no replacement is negotiated. - Ritter emphasizes that New START has provided a framework of stability through on-site inspections, data exchange, and verifiable limits. He notes that the treaty’s value rests on confidence that numbers are correct, which requires robust verification, something he argues was compromised by the lack of inspections in the last two years and by political gamesmanship during negotiations. Rose Gutermiller’s warning about needing a confidence baseline for a potential one-year moratorium is highlighted. - The historical arc of arms control is traced from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the ABM treaty, which Ritter says was foundational because it established the concept of mutually assured destruction. He argues that many subsequent arms-control efforts, including START and particularly INF, were intertwined with the ABM framework and mutual deterrence. The INF treaty is highlighted as the occasion where Ritter was the first ground-based weapons inspector in the Soviet Union, underscoring the value of on-site verification. - Ritter recounts how START was negotiated amid a collapsing Soviet Union, and how post-Soviet realities (nuclear weapons in former Soviet states under Russian control) affected negotiations. He contends that Soviet/Russian leaders perceived START as potentially “bullying” and that Western confidence in Russian strategic deterrence diminished after the end of the Cold War, which contributed to tensions over missile defenses and strategic postures. - The dialogue reviews the evolution of U.S.-Russian relations and how perceptions of threat or weakness influenced policy. Ritter recalls that Russian leadership warned of consequences when the ABM treaty was abandoned and that fear and respect shaped early arms-control cooperation. He asserts that American arrogance toward Russia, including dismissive attitudes toward Russian concerns about missile defenses, harmed trust and contributed to instability. - The involvement of China is treated as a separate but connected issue. China’s position, as outlined in its white paper, is not seeking an arms race and endorses a “no first use” policy, but argues that the United States and Russia must first resolve their bilateral arms-control arrangements before China would join in a broader framework. China argues for all parties to reduce numbers, while insisting China should not be treated as a mere subset of a U.S.-Russia framework. - Ritter asserts that the current U.S. approach to modernization and expansion of strategic forces could precipitate a three-way arms race (U.S., Russia, China) and notes a planned shift in U.S. posture, including potential reactivation of underground testing and revamping warhead delivery systems. He argues that if the process proceeds, other nations might follow with their own nuclear programs, eroding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework and undermining decades of nonproliferation efforts. - He contrasts the current situation with past arms-control muscle memory. He laments the loss of experienced negotiators and Russian area expertise, arguing that today’s policymakers and some academics treat arms control as transactional or overly adversarial rather than as a reciprocal, trust-based process. He claims there is a shortage of genuine arms-control specialists and describes a culture in which the media and academia have overlooked or mischaracterized Russia’s behavior, often blaming Moscow for cheating when, in his view, the problem lies with Western overreach and a lack of mutual understanding. - The conversation ends on a bleak note: without renewed treaties, verification, and mutual recognition of security concerns, the world could regress to a “Wild West” dynamic of proliferation and competition, with Europe’s security umbrella eroded and a broader risk of renewed testing, modernization, and potential conflict. Overall, the discussion frames the expiry of New START as a pivotal moment with potentially catastrophic consequences for strategic stability, arguing for renewed arms-control engagement, better verification, and a recognition of the intertwined histories and motivations of the United States, Russia, and China.

Colonel Richard Black, a combat veteran, warns of the growing risk of a nuclear accident due to the US nuclear doctrine allowing the president to launch a strike at any time. He criticizes the aggressive US nuclear stance compared to Russia's defensive doctrine. Black discusses the war in Ukraine, highlighting unnecessary bloodshed and US/NATO involvement. He mentions recent aggressive actions like sabotaging the Nord Stream pipeline and proposing Western troop involvement in Ukraine. Black expresses concern over escalating tensions and the potential for a nuclear mishap due to reckless actions.

Do not deploy or spread this weapon, avoid using it as a threat, and maintain it solely for nuclear disarmament. This is a good strategy, but it should not be the only one to ensure world peace and prevent the last war. Ukraine has given up its third most powerful nuclear arsenal.