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I was asked this week if I see Ukraine as an equal member in the peace process, and I didn't say "yes." However, Ukraine will have a seat at the table. I will never accept any decisions between the United States and Russia about Ukraine without Ukraine present. This is our war, and these are our human losses. We are thankful for all the support and unity from the USA, including bipartisan support. However, no leader in the world can make a deal with Putin about Ukraine without Ukraine being involved.

Bolton says there have been positive developments; 'Trump rejected the idea of a ceasefire because I think a ceasefire is very dangerous for Ukraine.' A ceasefire could harden lines into a de facto boundary. 'As long as Europe and The United States are providing Ukraine with the necessary resources, that fighting while negotiating is Ukraine's best interest.' He adds Russia 'needs a ceasefire' given their damage. On security guarantees, he questions what 'air support' would mean: would it include ground troops, bombers, or transport? 'Nothing's agreed to until everything's agreed to.' Putin demands: 'the remaining 30% of the Donetsk oblast province that we don't yet control.' Article Five: 'Attack on one shall be considered an attack on all' and 'such action as it deems necessary,' including non-military measures. Trump's remark: 'for me' points to 'the two most important words' and 'Let me help you get the Nobel Peace Prize.'

The panelists discuss whether recent developments around Ukraine, NATO security guarantees, and Western support can produce a peace agreement acceptable to Russia and Ukraine, and what the war’s trajectory might look like by year-end and beyond. Initial reactions and sticking points - Speaker 1 sees potential in recent moves if true and reliable, arguing Ukraine is signaling goodwill to the United States, but remains skeptical that a peace deal will satisfy both sides given core demands over territory and Donbas control. He emphasizes the Donbas as the central unresolved issue. - Speaker 2 notes Putin’s need to show tangible gains to save face, arguing the war is being fought to achieve declared goals and that Russia will not sign a deal unless it secures substantial results. Security guarantees, no-fly zones, and peacekeeping - The discussion centers on two main proposed points: U.S. security guarantees (including possible no-fly zone enforcement) and a European-led peacekeeping force in Ukraine. There is debate about how binding such guarantees would be and whether Russia would accept them, with concerns about the Budapest Memorandum’s history of non-fulfillment versus what a new, more comprehensive, legally binding framework might look like. - Speaker 1 points out that even a robust security package would require Russian agreement, which he doubts will be forthcoming given Moscow’s current aims. He underscores that Europe’s and the U.S.’s support for Ukraine is contingent on political will, which could waver, but he notes Ukraine’s trust gap with U.S. guarantees given past experiences. - Speaker 2 stresses that Putin’s aims include defeating NATO and achieving a U.S.-level accommodation (a “Yalta 2.0” style deal) while keeping Western control over Europe at arm’s length. He argues Putin would accept U.S. and possibly some European troops but not a formal NATO presence on Ukrainian soil, especially in western Donbas or beyond. Budapest memorandum vs. new guarantees - Both sides discuss the difference between a nonbinding Budapest Memorandum and a more robust, legally binding security guarantee. Speaker 1 highlights Ukraine’s past trust in security assurances despite U.S. and European failures to honor them, suggesting skepticism about the enforceability of any new guarantees. Speaker 2 suggests that a stronger, more binding arrangement could be essential for Russia to accept any settlement, but that Moscow would still resist concessions over full Donbas control. On-the-ground realities and war dynamics - The panelists agree Russia is advancing on multiple fronts, though the pace and strategic significance of gains vary. They discuss Ukraine’s ability to sustain the fight through Western weapons flows and domestic production (including drones and shells). They acknowledge the risk of Western fatigue and the potential for a more protracted war, even as Ukraine builds its own capabilities to prolong the conflict. - The West’s long-term willingness to fund and arm Ukraine is debated: Speaker 1 argues Europe’s economy is strained but notes continued political support for Ukraine, which could outlast Russia’s economic stamina. Speaker 2 emphasizes that Russia’s economy is fragile mainly in the provinces, while Moscow and Saint Petersburg remain relatively insulated; he also points to BRICS support (China and India) as sustaining Moscow politically and economically. Economic and strategic pressures - The role of energy revenues and sanctions is debated. Speaker 1 suggests Russia can be pressured economically to seek a deal, while Speaker 2 counters that Russia’s economy is adapting, with China and India providing strategic support that helps Moscow resist Western coercion. They discuss shadow fleet strikes and global energy markets as tools to erode Russia’s war-finance capability. - There is disagreement about whether, over time, economic pressure alone could force regime change in Russia. Speaker 1 is skeptical that penalties will trigger a voluntary Russian withdrawal, while Speaker 2 argues that sustained economic and political pressure, combined with Western unity, could push toward a settlement. Strategies and potential outcomes - Putin’s internal calculus is described as existential: he seeks a win that he can publicly claim to legitimize his rule and justify the costs of the war to the Russian people and elites. This shapes his openness to concessions and to the kinds of guarantees he would accept. - Alexander posits that a near-term peace could emerge from a deal brokered at high levels (potentially involving Trump and Putin) that reshapes European security with U.S. leadership and BRICS engagement, while Paul emphasizes that any credible end to the conflict would require Ukraine and Russia to agree to a swap-like territorial arrangement and to accept a new security framework that deters renewed aggression. End-of-year and longer-term outlooks - By year-end, the panel agrees it is unlikely that a major peace agreement will be realized under the current conditions; any real breakthrough would depend on significant concessions, including Donbas arrangements, and a credible security guarantee framework. - By the end of next year, both expect a continuation of a contested balance: Ukraine likely to press for stronger Western guarantees and EU integration, Russia seeking to preserve Donbas gains while navigating internal and external pressures. Alexander envisions two “wins” emerging: the United States under Trump coordinating a broader peace framework, and China leveraging its economic influence to shape Europe’s response. Paul anticipates a gradual trajectory with ongoing military and economic pressures and a continued stalemate unless a major concession reshapes incentives on both sides.

"Ukraine is an artificial state that was shaped at Stalin's will." "NATO expansion eastward is a violation of the promise you all were made in 1990." "In 02/2008, the doors of NATO were opened for Ukraine." "Maidan and a coup in Ukraine." "denazification. After gaining independence, Ukraine began to search, as some Western analysts say, its identity." "The president of Ukraine stood up with the entire parliament of Canada and applauded this man." "the dollar is the cornerstone of The United States power." "BRICS countries accounted for only 16% in 1992, but now their share is greater than that of the G7." "the world should be a single whole, security should be shared, rather than a meant for the golden billion." "We are ready for negotiations indeed."

What if Russia breaks the ceasefire or peace talks? What do we do then? Okay, what if they broke it? I don't know. They broke it with Biden because they didn't respect him, or Obama. They respect me.

Speaker 1 hopes for a Trump–Putin meeting but notes, "As usual, we have no public information or public explanation of anything from the White House." He adds, "we, live in, not in a democracy, but in an imperium right now, one person rule." Russia's terms are laid out: "Russia has put on the table for years, actually, its terms for coming to an end of this war. Basically, Russia has said, that it has national security concerns. The expansion of NATO was the cause of the war in Ukraine. The US led coup in February 2014 was the provocation that led onward to war in Ukraine." He contends, "If Trump comes to this meeting with the honesty and says, yes, The United States should stop provoking Russia, stop trying to weaken Russia, stop trying to divide Russia, then there could be peace." Conversely, "If the president comes as he is want to do with demands. You must stop this and that. There will not be peace." "The problem is we have a intemperate president absolutely, without any kind of stability who does not speak to the public, and who does not engage in any kind of political deliberation. He just makes orders."

Russia will remain a dangerous opponent for a long time, and we must include Ukraine in NATO. The only way to have trusting relations with Moscow is through a decisive defeat and a reset in Russia, where the Russian population and politics abandon their deeply rooted imperial, aggressive, and colonial ideas.

I don't know how a trilateral summit with Presidents Zelensky and Putin would work, they don't like each other and the US should never have allowed this situation to happen. I've stopped many wars, even some nobody's heard about. Ukraine wants to stop this war more than anyone. Negotiations should be between Ukraine and Russia, not Russia and the US. The US helps us because we are defending the line. If we fall, Russia will target the Baltics and Poland, and eventually, American soldiers will have to fight. Many Ukrainian cities are still standing. People are working, and children are going to school, even if it's difficult. Ukraine is fighting and living, despite Putin's claims. He has lost many soldiers and hasn't destroyed us.

«Я иду на вы.» Он призывает подвести итоги с 1991 года по Черноморский флот, ТУЗЛ и газовые войны, пересмотреть причинно-следственные связи. «Я полон решимости сменить направление внешней и внутренней политики Украины, то что я называю словом проектность украинскую.» Украина «больше никогда не будет представлять угрозы для Российской Федерации со своей территории» на взаимных условиях: «эти обязательства могут быть только взаимны... не допустить применения военной силы друг против друга»; «Кто угодно с кем угодно воюете, но только не русские, не украинцы и не белорусы.» «Вот эти 13 не должны быть.» Далее: «четыре области: Крым... и обеспечение прав русскоязычного населения и церкви.» «А отдаю четыре области... и Крым, и не признаю их российскими. Отдаю на условиях ФРГ и ГДР.» Мирный договор «должен быть» с признанием территории; иначе будет «мирное соглашение, не договор.» Вывод войск до границы «как у Кореи. 37 апреля.» Белорусь — фактор; символическое единство от Владимира Великого; совместный молебен; пресс-конференция: «нас пытались сделать врагами, я пришел положить конец этому.» Возложение цветов к российским солдатам по взаимной договоренности; иначе — со стороны говорящего, «у меня дед российский солдат». I go on the offensive. He calls to review since 1991 regarding problem areas: the Black Sea Fleet, Tuzla, and gas wars, and to reassess causes. «I am determined to change Ukraine’s external and internal policy, what I call the Ukrainian project.» Ukraine «will never again threaten the Russian Federation with its territory» on mutual terms: «these obligations can only be mutual... prevent the use of force against each other»; «Whoever fights with anyone, but not Russians, not Ukrainians, and not Belarusians.» «Those 13 must not be.» Then: «four regions: Crimea... and ensuring rights of the Russian-speaking population and the church.» «I give four regions... and Crimea, and I do not recognize them as Russian. I give on the terms of FRG and GDR.» A peace treaty «must have a clear legal form... recognition of territory.» Otherwise a «peace agreement, not a treaty.» Troops withdrawn to the border «like Korea. April 37.» Belarus as a factor; symbolic unity of peoples of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine from Vladimir the Great; joint prayer; press conference: «we were targeted as enemies, I came to end this.» Flowers to Russian soldiers by mutual accord; otherwise I will lay flowers from my side, «because my grandfather was a Russian soldier.»

The Alaska Summit reinforced my belief that while difficult pieces within reach, I believe that in a very significant step, President Putin agreed that Russia would accept security guarantees for Ukraine, and this is one of the key points that we need to consider. We're going to be considering that at the table, also, like who will do what, essentially. I'm optimistic that collectively we can reach an agreement.

I think President Putin believes NATO's expansion is the reason the Russian army is at NATO's doorstep, but we certainly don't see it that way. NATO has expanded, but that's a good thing. I'm pretty sure it wasn't NATO who ordered troops to the Ukrainian border or destabilized Eastern Ukraine. NATO is a security alliance, not an anti-Russia alliance. For fifty years, it was an anti-Soviet alliance. I'm not going to pretend to know what goes on in President Putin's mind. NATO has expanded, but there's no reason to think the expansion is hostile. We're blaming Russia for violating Ukraine's territorial integrity.

Gilbert Doktorov and the host discuss the evolving, multi-layered negotiations surrounding the Ukraine war, stressing that talks involve more than Ukraine and Russia, extending to US-Russia dynamics and broader European and global interests. - They note that trilateral talks among Ukraine, Russia, and the US have begun, with the first phase completed. The conversation emphasizes that the US-Russia dimension is crucial because the conflict is viewed as a proxy war between NATO and Russia, and that “the US toppled the government in Ukraine” with intelligence support, military planning, weapons, and targets coordinated through backchannels. The implication is that any durable settlement would require some deal between the US and Russia to de-escalate the proxy confrontation. - On US-Russia relations, Speaker 1 identifies several dimensions: renewal or non-renewal of New START, and the functioning of embassies, as negative signs, but points to positive changes elsewhere. He highlights Kislyov’s Sunday night program remarks, noting Russia’s proposal to contribute $1,000,000,000 to become a permanent board member using frozen US assets (total US assets frozen around $5 billion in equivalent value). He mentions that Trump was asked about using frozen assets and reportedly declined, but the implication is that Moscow views this as a potential lever. Kislyov also notes that the additional $4,000,000,000 in frozen assets would be allocated to reconstruction in Palestine, and that Russia’s participation on the board would influence regional diplomacy, including with Palestinians and Israelis. - The discussion suggests that the absence of official diplomacy (e.g., embassies) does not necessarily indicate a lack of progress, arguing that backchannels between Putin and Trump are functioning well. The speakers discuss the broader context of Russia’s strategic posture, including alleged advancements in space-based and other new military capabilities that are not fully captured by New START, and the sense from Moscow that the US is preparing a space-based missile system that would enable first strikes, a point the Russians emphasize in public discourse. - On Ukraine, Zelensky’s stance is described as uncompromising: Ukraine will not cede territory and will demand security guarantees, which could undermine a neutral status. The dialogue suggests Zelensky is using a posture of firmness to buy time for negotiations, with Ukrainian leadership potentially exchanging assurances for a broader settlement that could include regime change and financial support for reconstruction. - The potential for compromise is discussed in terms of strategic timing and leverage. The Russians’ primary interest is regime change, and there could be an understanding with Trump about a democratic replacement in Ukraine, possibly replacing Zelensky with a pro-Russian administration under conditions tied to substantial monetary reparations for reconstruction. The timing and mechanism, including potential referenda or buyouts, are considered critical elements that could determine the settlement’s architecture. - The European role is analyzed as increasingly fraught. Europe’s diplomatic engagement has been limited, but Moscow is open to leveraging European assets in a peace process. Lavrov’s stated position that talks with Ursula von der Leyen’s European Commission leadership are unlikely, and the broader fragmentation within Europe (France, Germany, Finland, the EU leadership) are highlighted as complicating factors. There is speculation about European figures who could bridge talks, such as Finland’s Stubb, though there is skepticism about Kalas’s leadership within the EU. - The speakers speculate that Davos and Trump’s stance have reshaped European perceptions of US leadership, with European elites increasingly questioning the reliability of US-backed security guarantees. The conversation closes with an expectation that the year 2025 will be dominated by Trump as a central variable in resolving global issues, and that Moscow remains optimistic about achieving a settlement with Washington while signaling a tougher stance toward Ukraine if needed. Overall, the discussion portrays a complex, interwoven set of negotiations across US-Russia, Ukraine-Russia, and European dynamics, with backchannels, asset controls, potential regime-change considerations, and timing as key levers for reaching any settlement.

Мы против расширения НАТО и размещения ударных систем у наших границ. Если все хотят мира, почему не отказаться от этого? Мы готовы создать условия для повышения доверия и безопасности.

I am not the pen pal, but the phone pal of Poroshenko and Arseny Yacineuk and now the speaker. For the past 4 years, I have been on the phone with them for 2 to 3 hours a week. Some in Europe argue that Russia already controlled Ukraine before these presidents came into power, so why bother with sanctions? Last year, I was authorized to say that we would provide $1 billion, but only if the chief prosecutor was fired. We are not playing games, we know that if we give the EU an excuse, at least 5 countries will want to leave. We are working on a detailed roadmap for Ukraine's political steps and security guarantees from Russia. It won't be easy, but I am convinced they will do it.

We are preparing for a counter offensive with Ukraine that we have been planning for 4 or 5 months. At the same time, we are starting talks with the Ukrainian government and officials in Kyiv about the country's future.

I see the hatred for Putin, making a deal tough. I want peace and am aligned with the world. I can be tough, but deals require more than that. Previous chest-thumping didn't work, diplomacy is needed. Trump's engaging in diplomacy. Russia occupied parts of Ukraine, nobody stopped them. Ceasefires were signed but broken, prisoners weren't exchanged. What kind of diplomacy are we even talking about? I'm trying to end the destruction of your country, but don't come here and start a fight. You're forcing conscripts to the front lines. Be thankful I'm trying to resolve this conflict. You should be appreciating the country that's backing you far more than a lot of people said they should have, and has given you billions of dollars in military equipment. Be thankful. You don't have the cards. If we get a ceasefire, you'd want to take it.

the potential placement of the troops in Ukraine, well, that was one of the root causes for the, Ukrainians' desire to join NATO. So should there any troops be placed in Ukraine, especially now in the course of the military action, we would treat those as, righteous calls for an attack, a righteous target that we will aim for. These statements articulate that troop deployment in Ukraine is a root cause of NATO interest and that any future deployment would be deemed a righteous target for attack. The lines frame external troop presence as a driver of escalation, implying such deployments would be treated as legitimate military objectives by the speaker. The overall message ties NATO membership to aggressive responses to troop placements.

Checklist for summary approach: - Identify and order the core claims and chronology of events. - Preserve the speaker’s key assertions and specific examples, including quoted phrases where appears in the transcript. - Highlight unique or surprising points (e.g., alleged coups, Minsk II interpretation). - Exclude repetition, filler, and off-topic content. - Avoid commentary on truthfulness; present claims as stated. - Translate only if needed (not needed here); keep the summary within 380–476 words. The speaker argues that the United States has repeatedly acted to redraw borders and topple governments without UN authorization, and that Western powers have treated international agreements as tools to serve their interests. He cites the Belgrade bombing for seventy-eight days as the first post-World War II European war that aimed to break Serbia, create Kosovo as an enclave, and install a NATO base in the Balkans, describing it as a NATO mission without UN authority. He lists additional interventions: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, with the assertion that the Obama and Hillary Clinton era tasked the CIA to overthrow Bashar al-Assad, and that NATO illegally bombed Libya to topple Muammar Gaddafi. He also recounts Kyiv in February 2014, stating that the United States overthrew Yanukovych together with right-wing Ukrainian forces, noting that this occurred after the EU had reached an agreement for early elections, a government of national unity, and a stand-down by both sides. He emphasizes that the next day the opposition asserted disagreement, and the United States immediately backed the new government, ignoring the prior constitutional agreement. In 2015, he contends the Russians did not seek Donbas restoration but peace through negotiations. Minsk II, a UN Security Council unanimously adopted treaty, was signed by the Ukrainian government and guaranteed explicitly by Germany and France. He states that it was laughed at inside the US government, despite the UN endorsement. He cites Angela Merkel’s later remark in a desight-era interview after the 2022 escalation, claiming she said Minsk II was “a holding pattern to give Ukraine time to build its strength.” He counters that Minsk II was a UN Security Council unanimously adopted treaty meant to end the war. He asserts familiarity with the United States government and urges distrust, arguing that both sides should sit down publicly and present their terms “in front of the whole world” for judgment. He calls for clear terms: “We’re not going to overthrow governments anymore,” and asks the United States to say “We accept this agreement,” and Russia to say “We’re not stepping one foot farther than whatever the boundary is actually reached,” with NATO not enlarging. He envisions putting the terms on paper for the world to see, asserting that “once in a while, treaties actually hold.”

And one of the things at the table was one of the gentlemen who's a great guy, but he said, I said I I hope I didn't insult him. 'let's meet in another month or two, and let's see if we can start, you know, making some what.' 'He that a month or two? You're gonna have another 40,000 people dead in a month or two. You have to do it tonight.' 'And I did, actually. I called, president Putin, and we're trying to work out a meeting with president Zelensky. We'll see what happens there.' 'And then if that works out if it works out, then I'll go to the trilap and close it up.'

It's surprising that a call between Trump and Putin occurred, and even more so that negotiations were discussed as the meeting concluded, leaving many unable to react. This raises concerns that Trump and Putin might reach agreements without considering the interests of Ukraine and Europe. This development comes after the new US Defense Minister, Pete Haxhes, during his visit, stated firmly that US troops would not participate in security arrangements in Ukraine. The US also doesn't believe that NATO membership is a realistic outcome of negotiations. Haxhes dismissed Ukraine's hopes of regaining all occupied territories, including Crimea, calling it unrealistic.

I met with the opposition and the foreign minister this weekend. It's up to the Ukrainian people to decide the path forward, but discussions are happening. These are more than discussions. Top US officials are on the ground, discussing a plan to broker a future government, involving the UN. The US is midwifing the process. These are private diplomatic conversations where we discuss UN involvement. It's dishonest to say we don't have an opinion. There's a difference between private discussions and our public position. As diplomats, we discuss a range of options. Saying privately you're cooking up a deal, then saying publicly it's up to Ukrainians, those are different positions. Diplomatic discussions are sensitive, but those are totally different positions. You're overstating a private phone call.

The Alaska summit reinforced my belief that “president Putin agreed that Russia would accept security guarantees for Ukraine,” a key point to consider. “I'm optimistic that, collectively, we can reach an agreement that would deter any future aggression against Ukraine,” though I also note, “I actually think there won't be. I think that's even over overrated, largely overrated.” European nations are gonna take a lot of the burden; “we're gonna help them, and we're gonna make it very secure.” We also need to discuss “the possible exchanges of territory taken into consideration the current line of contact.” That means “the war zone, the war lines that are pretty obvious, very sad, actually, to look at them.” The next step: “a trilateral meeting, and that will be worked out.” “I have a feeling you and president Putin are gonna work something out.” Ultimately, Zelensky and the Ukrainian people, with Putin, must decide. “I'll set up a meeting with President Putin.” “All of us would obviously prefer an immediate ceasefire … maybe something like that could happen.” “As of this moment, it's not happening.” “I believe a peace agreement … is very attainable,” and “The next step would be for a trilateral meeting, and that will be worked out.”

Speaker 0: This thing over with. You see the hatred he's got for Putin. It's very tough for me to make a deal with that kind of hate. I'm aligned with the world. I wanna get the things set. If you want me to be tough? I could be tougher than any human being you've ever seen, but you're never gonna get a deal that way. Speaker 1: For four years in The United States Of America... we had a president who stood up at press conferences and talked tough about Vladimir Putin, and then Putin invaded Ukraine. The path to peace... is engaging in diplomacy. Speaker 2: He occupied it, our parts, big parts of Ukraine, parts of East and Crimea. So 2014. We signed ceasefire, gas contract, but after that, he broken the ceasefire, he killed our people, and he didn't exchange prisoners. What kind of diplomacy? Speaker 0: You should be thanking the president for trying to bring it into this conference. Speaker 2: We have problems. Speaker 0: You're gambling with World War three. You have the cards. With us, you have the cards. Without us you don't have any cards. I gave you the javelins to take out all those tanks. Obama gave you sheets. What if Russia breaks his fire?

I'm aligned with the US and the world, and I want to end this conflict. It's hard to make a deal with so much hatred. I could be tough, but that won't get us anywhere. For four years, tough talk didn't stop Putin. Diplomacy is the path to peace. Others didn't stop Putin from occupying parts of Ukraine since 2014. We signed ceasefire and gas contracts, but he broke them, killing people and not exchanging prisoners. I am trying to end the destruction of your country. Everyone has problems during war, even you. You've allowed yourself to be in a bad position. You're gambling with lives and World War III, and that's disrespectful to the US. You haven't said thank you, and campaigned against us. Your country is in trouble and not winning. If we are out, you will be fighting on your own.

I'm thankful to the American people, President Trump, and Congress for the support you've given us these last three years. We are strategic partners, and we need to be honest with each other to stop Putin. I respect President Trump's desire to end this war, but no one wants it more than we do. We need him and our European partners to pressure Putin. I respect President Trump and the American people, and I don't believe we've done anything wrong. We need to openly discuss Ukraine's position. We are ready to sign the minerals deal as a first step towards security guarantees, but it’s not enough. I wanted to share my thoughts with the President because this is sensitive for our people, who want to know America is on our side. I want a just and lasting peace with security guarantees.