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Europe should have been negotiating with Russia, but now that Trump is, some are in an uproar. If the US stops sending arms and funding, the war will end. This all stems from American arrogance, going back decades to the US declaring itself the sole superpower and expanding NATO eastward, ignoring Russian concerns. The US participated in a violent coup in Ukraine in 2014, further escalating tensions. Europe needs a grown-up foreign policy, not one based on hate speech or Russophobia, but real diplomacy. NATO should have been disbanded in 1991. The US sees this as a game, but for Russia, it's about core national security.

Glenn (Speaker 0) argues that the idea Russia started the war merely for territory is nonsense and that NATO’s involvement is not genuinely helping Ukraine; he says “This is NATO’s war. Nothing we’re doing is actually helping Ukraine. They’re an instrument. They’re a tool.” He contends the conflict began as a failure to build a common European security architecture, and that Russian demands are high, making a peace settlement unlikely. He defines victory in a war of attrition as exhausting the adversary first, suggesting Russia would prefer a neutral Ukraine without NATO, and that if Ukraine remains in NATO orbit, Russia would rather take Odessa. He asserts that NATO expansion revived Cold War logic and that Ukraine’s neutrality was the original Russian objective. He argues that Ukraine’s current war losses and economic strain indicate Russia’s advantage, and claims NATO support has not truly helped Ukraine, noting that in his view NATO and Western actions have been a driver of the conflict, including claims about Istanbul, Minsk, and the 2014 coup. Jonathan (Speaker 1) pushes back on several points. He says the war is not solely about territory and disputes Glenn’s claim that NATO’s role is responsible for the conflict. He emphasizes that if this were simply about NATO, NATO could have destroyed Russia by arming Ukraine more aggressively, yet “they could have done it so much more, effectively,” implying NATO has not fully acted. He sees both sides as losing in a prolonged attritional battle and notes that neither side has achieved decisive victory due to limits on production, economies, and allied support. He argues the conflict is about more than territory and rejects the idea that NATO guarantees Ukraine’s security; he questions whether NATO would credibly defend an attacked ally in Europe. He says the Maidan movement in 2014 was organic and not fully orchestrated by the US, though he concedes US influence existed. He disputes Glenn’s claims about Western NGOs and American orchestration, and he highlights that many Ukrainians initially favored non-NATO paths, with polls showing limited appetite for NATO membership before 2014. He also contends that Ukraine’s future lies beyond mere territorial concessions, pointing to the EU’s role and the broader security order, and he warns that negotiations with a “mafia cabal” running Moscow are unlikely to yield lasting peace, arguing that Putin’s governance frames negotiations as instrumental and potentially destabilizing. Speaker 2 (moderator) asks for reactions to ongoing developments, including Trump and Kushner’s involvement, Putin’s aides’ statements about known positions and lack of progress, and questions about what Russia truly seeks: Donbas control or preventing Ukraine from joining NATO. The participants discuss definitions of “winning” in a war of attrition, the role and credibility of NATO guarantees, and the strategic importance of neutrality versus alliance membership. They debate whether Russia values a neutral Ukraine with security guarantees or insists on broader concessions, and whether Ukraine could ever be secure without a credible deterrent. Glenn asserts that there was never credible deterrence in Ukraine prior to 2014, while Jonathan argues that NATO’s efficacy and unity are questionable, with concerns about member states’ commitments and the real level of Western support. On NATO and security guarantees, Glenn maintains that true security for Ukraine would come from a non-NATO arrangement that prevents Ukraine from becoming a future proxy battleground, suggesting limited, carefully designed guarantees could be acceptable, but that any path toward NATO-like intrusion would be unacceptable. Jonathan says NATO is not delivering credible security and emphasizes that EU membership and security arrangements also factor into Russia’s calculations, with the European Union potentially offering security commitments if Ukraine joined, though that possibility remains contentious for Moscow. They discuss the costs of war, civilian impact, and the global economic ripple effects, including potential impacts on food prices and shipping routes if Russia responds to Ukrainian actions against its maritime traffic. Towards the end, they forecast no immediate peace and emphasize unpredictability due to Western political shifts, central bank asset issues, and external actors like China, North Korea, and Trump’s stance. Glenn predicts Ukraine’s military unraveling and a weakening economy, while Jonathan stresses that a peace deal remains unlikely under current leadership, with outcomes dependent on Western resolve and external support. The conversation closes with a sense that the next months will be dangerous and uncertain, with the broader international order potentially shifting as the conflict persists.

Glenn: Welcome back. Stanislav Krappivnik, a former US military officer, born in Dolbaz and recently returned, joins us again. Stanislav: Always a pleasure, Glenn. Glenn: In the last two days, Russians entered the strategic city of Orekhov in the Saporiyansko region, which may indicate that if this falls, the whole region might begin to collapse. In Slaviansk, the last Donetsk conglomeration, there are real advances that, if successful in circling the region, could mean the entirety of Donbas falls. Is the Russian spring offensive already begun? Stanislav: It’s hard to say, partly because mud season is ongoing in those areas. The South is still mud-prone; the terrain there is different from Haryakov and Sudirmy, where ground is firmer, forested. In the South, there’s black earth with fewer trees, causing severe mud this time of year. If the melt is fast, flooding can occur; if slow, the ground acts like a sponge and mud persists as water seeps down. Nightly freezes persist while daytime temperatures rise above zero. Weather affects movement and logistics. He notes that the briefings from the Russian command vary from independent mappers, suggesting either undisclosed advances or battlefield confusion. The Russian high command’s reports and geolocations may not always align with independent assessments. If credible, Russia’s forces from the South may have entered Ariakhov, with two parallel rows advancing toward Ariyakara and a long urban sprawl to the south. There is a gray zone because Ukrainian claims differ from Russian assertions. Ukrainians often withhold confirmations for long periods; e.g., Gudaiipoya/Gulyaporiya discrepancies show how contested reports can be. Stanislav says it’s not clear that this is a bold, continuous offensive up and down the lines. A big push would require enough armored vehicles, artillery, and aviation, which he has not seen yet, though it could be developing. Ukrainians have conducted desperate counteractions not just to retake territory but to disrupt Russian preparation for a potential spring offensive. If he were in command, he would launch a big spring offensive, at least partially toward Sumy, which is about 14 kilometers from Kharkiv. Sumy would be a key logistics hub and could cut off Kharkiv from the west, accelerating the fall of the region. He explains that Kharkiv could be surrounded by blowing bridges from the south and encircling through Sumy to the west and the east along the Russian line toward Bianka and the Big Water Reserve. He mentions continuing Russian movement in the north and the city of Kasatirivka, which has been split by a river; all bridges were blown about a month ago, complicating approaches. North of Slaviansk, the gates of Krasnyomar require closing first. There are contested claims about Yaman, with Russians saying around 50% controlled vs. Ukrainians claiming 10–15%. The central concern is the Russian push in the south, where Yemen sits in a triangle formed by the Oka and the Sri Bianca rivers, and Russian forces are closing in from the north as well. Crossing Yamana is expected to fall; it’s a matter of time, though how long remains uncertain. Glenn: Ukraine does not withdraw after encirclement. There’s a rational explanation tied to PR wars: if the US and Europeans lose interest in Ukraine, weapons and money dry up, and Zelensky appears addicted to PR victories to keep support. Do you think the war in the headlines affects Western support? How does the Iran conflict influence Ukraine, given weapon and money dynamics? Stanislav: There’s additional pressure on Western governments from the military and certain military societies not to rush into direct NATO engagement or a large-scale conflict with Iran. He notes Iran’s demonstrated ability to strike American bases and key targets, and that Iran’s actions have shown the US and its allies that American power isn’t unlimited. He argues Iran’s strikes and the broader Middle East conflict complicate Western calculations, as American bases and interests face increased threats. He asserts that Iran has shown it can strike at American bases and that American casualties would be far higher than reported. He claims Iran’s actions press Western governments to reconsider involvement in the region and to reassess commitments to allies such as the Saudis, who reportedly told American bases to stand down. He also discusses how Russia’s deterrence posture could shift in response to ongoing Iran–US tensions, and suggests that if Russia sees an opportunity to restore deterrence, it might be tempted to push back more forcefully. Glenn: Russia’s approach to diplomacy with Europe and the US is complex. Macron’s bid to join a Russia–US–Ukraine format could spoil negotiations. Belgium’s stance on Russian assets and broader EU politics complicate any settlement. Stanislav: He explains distrust in European leadership, questioning whom to trust in Europe. He suggests that a broader reform in European leadership and doctrine is unlikely soon. He notes that among European politicians, there’s disagreement and strategic posturing, with some populist voices but institutional leadership often failing to present a coherent strategy. Glenn: What about China and Russia’s support for Iran? How might that evolve? Stanislav: Russia previously explored a mutual defense pact with Iran; the document lacks substance, and real support has been practical, including MiG-29s, Su-30s, and S-400s, along with jamming systems enabling Iran to counter US satellites and missiles. He describes Iran’s military buildup and how Russia’s support has extended to drone technology and air defenses. He predicts Syria could reemerge as a battleground, especially if Iran’s militancy expands and if the US and Israel are drawn into broader conflict. He suggests China may reassess its stance and consider leveraging its position as US capabilities wane, potentially viewing Taiwan’s reunification as a strategic opportunity. Glenn: Any final thoughts? Stanislav: He emphasizes the high level of risk and unpredictability in the current international security environment, with multiple actors pursuing aggressive strategies and the potential for rapid shifts in alliances and deterrence calculations. He notes Iran’s broader influence and the risks to regional stability, hinting at a world where war remains a possible, though increasingly costly, option for major powers.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor discusses the likelihood and dynamics of a potential new war involving Iran, the Middle East, and broader great-power competition. - On a possible Iran strike: MacGregor says there will be a resumption of the war, though he cannot predict timing. He cites Western attempts to destabilize Iran (Mossad, CIA, MI6-backed unrest) and argues Iran is more cohesive now than it was forty years ago, with demonstrations representing a small minority and not a broad collapse of support for the government. He contends that those who want to destroy Iran or empower Israel believe the regime can be toppled with Western support and Israeli action, but he asserts that such a regime change is unlikely and that Iran will respond forcefully if attacked. He notes that current deployments are heavy on airpower with limited naval presence, and he suggests Israel’s broader goals (Gaza, Lebanon, Syria) will not be achievable without addressing Iran. - Regional actors and incentives: Netanyahu’s regional aims require confronting Iran, and Turkish involvement with the Kurds could influence the balance. He describes a recent Kurdish incursion into northern Iran that Iran suppressed, aided by Turkish coordination. He frames BRICS as militarizing in reaction to Western actions, including in Venezuela, Russia, and Ukraine, and says disrupting the Persian Gulf oil flow would harm China, prompting cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkey against Iran to undermine the One Belt, One Road project. He also argues that BRICS countries—Russia, China, India—will not easily align with U.S. plans if Washington proceeds toward war. - Russian and Chinese calculations: On Russia and China, MacGregor says they have supplied Iran with military tech and missile/radar capabilities and helped counteract efforts to disrupt Iran with Starlink. He believes many Iranians still oppose regime collapse and that a broader war would risk escalation with Russia and China backing Iran. He cites Moscow’s withdrawal of Russian personnel from Israel and the sense in Moscow that Trump is unreliable, leading Russia to hedge against U.S. actions. He notes Russians are concerned about Europe and envision potential conflicts with Europe, while he questions U.S. strategy and end states. - No first-use and nuclear considerations: MacGregor discusses the idea of no-first-use (NNU) as a potential framework to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation, suggesting a multilateral agreement among the major nuclear powers (US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, Britain, France). He posits that such an agreement could advance diplomacy, including on Korea, and reduce the likelihood of Armageddon. He mentions that Trump could leverage such a stance, though he notes Trump’s tendency to pursue more aggressive policies in other areas. - Europe and NATO: He argues Europe is unprepared for renewed large-scale conflict and has disarmed substantially over decades. He criticizes Britain and France for rhetoric and capability gaps and suggests the United States is fatigued with European demands, though he doubts Europe could sustain a conflict against Russia. - Venezuela and domestic budget: He emphasizes the futility of long wars in certain contexts (Venezuela) and the mismatch between spending and real capability gains. He references the defense budget as largely consumed by fixed costs like veterans’ medical care and pensions, arguing that simply increasing the budget does not guarantee meaningful strategic gains. He notes the role of special operations as valuable but not decisive in major wars. - Concluding view: MacGregor reiterates that war in the region is likely, with many overlapping alarms and uncertainties about timing, leadership decisions, and the risk of escalation. He stresses that both Russia and China have stakes in the outcome and that the Middle East conflict could influence global alignments and deterrence dynamics. He closes by underscoring the potential importance of no-first-use diplomacy and broader nuclear risk reduction as a path forward.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and the host discuss rising tensions around Venezuela and the broader implications for U.S. strategy and global balance of power. MacGregor argues the Navy’s buildup off Venezuela signals more than intimidation: there is a willingness to intervene in Venezuela, with plans to intervene having been “on the shelf for years.” He notes Hugo Chavez’s legacy and Venezuela’s potential ties to China and Russia make it a longstanding potential target, but he questions the practicality and aims of any proposed operation given Venezuela’s size and population (about 30 million, many along the coast). The host presses on objective clarity, asking what political-military goal is sought and whether it is attainable, warning that war is unpredictable and that the president has not articulated a specific objective. MacGregor expands on the ambiguity, pointing out that there is no expressed U.S. objective from the president, and he likens the situation to LBJ’s Vietnam-era ambiguity—“we’re going to support the legitimate government and fight communism” as a slogan, not a military objective. He underscores a concern that there is no workable exit strategy or realistic plan, and he cautions about the risk of unintended consequences. He highlights the Beltway chatter about narcoterrorism, but notes that bombing Venezuela without a clear, attainable objective invites failure. He then outlines possible wider consequences: CIA operatives, potential involvement of MI6, and mercenary forces could be drawn in if a conflict escalates. He observes two Russian destroyers off the coast of Venezuela as a signaling move, framing it as Moscow signaling that Washington’s actions push Moscow to respond. The conversation moves to how Russian actions in Ukraine shape a multipolar world order—“the post rules-based liberal order”—and how Russia could respond if U.S. actions trigger a clash near Venezuela, risking a broader confrontation. MacGregor stresses Russia’s capability to threaten a broad swath of Europe and the potential for Latin American states to realign with Russia if Washington presses too hard. On objectives tied to resources, MacGregor contends that Washington believes it “owns the entire Western Hemisphere” and that Venezuela’s resources (oil, gas, lithium, rare earths) are a tempting collateral. He argues this ignores the limits of U.S. ground forces and the illegitimacy of unilateral resource exploitation, comparing potential actions to Cortez’s arrival in the Americas. He asserts there is no solid strategy, no coherent plan to substitute for the current leadership’s approach, and notes the long-standing history of failed interventions. The Ukrainian conflict is invoked to illustrate the dangers of escalation and misperception. MacGregor criticizes Zelensky for actions that he says could constitute war crimes and notes that if a broader U.S.–Russia clash develops due to Venezuela, the “slow boil” in Ukraine could intensify. He contends Moscow has restrained itself to some degree, but questions whether American restraint will be interpreted as weakness. He argues Europe should recognize Russia’s legitimate security interests and that Europe’s leadership is vulnerable to internal pressures, migration, and political shifts. He predicts changes in leadership in France and Britain that could alter the trajectory of European policy toward Russia, while noting Poland’s precarious position and Hungary/Slovakia’s peace-oriented stances. Regarding U.S. leadership, MacGregor criticizes Trump’s strategy as unpredictable and focused on optics, suggesting the president could offload some conflicts to Europe but is surrounded by advisers pushing adversarial postures on Korea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. He contrasts this with the need for a sober, calculated approach that recognizes limits and emphasizes long-term strategic priorities over short-term “greatness” theater. He laments a lack of a coherent scientific, industrial, and economic strategy in Washington, describing an economy driven by short-term profits and financial capitalists, with limited productive investment outside of a few exceptions like Elon Musk. He uses the analogy of a locomotive running out of steam, arguing that without a real plan, debt and multipolar realignments will push the U.S. toward crisis. In closing, MacGregor reiterates that the current approach risks triggering a costly, destabilizing conflict and that the United States would benefit from stepping back, acknowledging limits, and pursuing a more organized path to a multipolar order rather than ad hoc interventions and prestige-driven military commitments.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and Glenn discussed the trajectory of NATO and Western policy, focusing on Ukraine, Russia, and the broader shift in global power. MacGregor argued that NATO would not survive a Ukrainian crisis and that Russia would intervene, a view he had held publicly in January 2022 before the invasion. He traced his assessment to his extensive experience with NATO and the Warsaw Pact, noting three core conclusions from his career: the Warsaw Pact was unlikely to attack; NATO was a coalition of largely unprepared, limited-liability partners; and Germany was the only major power with the capability to fight effectively against the Soviets, while other Western militaries were fragmented and insufficiently integrated. MacGregor emphasized that Ukraine, being small and lacking the industrial base and manpower needed to outlast Russia, was not in a position to prevail. He highlighted Russia’s unity of command and language, contrasting it with the internal power dynamics and competing national agendas within NATO. He acknowledged that the Russian army at the start of the conflict was designed for territorial defense, not the mission it faced, and noted that it took about a year to build up into a force capable of sustained operations. He also criticized “wishful thinking” in Washington and European capitals about NATO and the European Union, describing a pervasive failure to acknowledge the realities on the ground. Discussion turned to European strategy and American politics. MacGregor argued that Europe has subscribed to an outdated notion of hegemonic peace delivered by NATO, while the United States has grown more powerful, pursuing interests beyond Europe. He attributed much of the Beltway’s stance to the money and power of think tanks and donors who benefit from ongoing confrontation with Russia, China, and Iran, and to a lack of a cohesive national strategy in the Trump administration. He criticized the Beltway for rewarding adherence to a fixed narrative rather than encouraging strategic recalibration, suggesting that President Trump’s instincts might favor ending costly engagements in Europe, though he criticized the administration for lacking a clear strategy and for being surrounded by insiders resistant to change. On Greenland and broader leverage, MacGregor argued that Trump’s approach reflected a view of Greenland as a near-term real estate decision within the security framework, while noting that the broader pivot to Asia had not materialized. He contended that Obama’s pivot to Asia implied a much larger, expensive expansion in Asia that did not materialize after the political will and funding did not align. He insisted there was no real strategy to manage the global balance of power, and asserted that Europe’s fragmentation would intensify unless larger political entities emerged to subsume the smaller nations. Turning to the Russia-Ukraine war, MacGregor warned against the optimism of a ceasefire as a lasting solution, arguing that Russia’s ultimate objective is a security architecture preventing future Ukrainian offensives and reducing threats to southern and northern Russia. He suggested possible outcomes for Odessa—either a forceful capture, or administration as a neutral, free port to prevent its use for military purposes—and stressed that Western negotiations were unlikely to yield productive terms under current conditions. He recalled historical lessons, such as the Brest-Litovsk negotiation in 1918, to illustrate that intractable conflicts could end only through decisive action. MacGregor concluded by arguing that Zelensky’s leadership and the Western push to escalate support for Ukraine contribute to a self-perpetuating conflict, while asserting that a stabilizing change would require a capable, decisive power to alter the current dynamic. He asserted that Trump, while sincere, is a prisoner of powerful domestic and foreign interests and could be unable to deliver a strategic reset without significant structural changes in Washington. He closed with a stark assessment: without decisive action, the conflict risks prolonging and deepening, and the West remains locked in a paralysis regarding Ukraine.

The speaker argues that Russia is winning the war in Ukraine due to superior weaponry and manpower, and Ukraine's dependence on Western support. He claims Trump will likely end the "Biden pipeline" of weaponry. A negotiated settlement is unlikely because Russia's demands—Ukraine's neutrality, demilitarization, and acceptance of Russian annexation of Crimea and four oblasts—are unacceptable to Ukraine and the West. The speaker believes Ukraine is losing and should cut a deal now to minimize losses, but nationalism and Western Russophobia prevent this. He dismisses the idea that Russia threatens to dominate Europe, calling it a "ridiculous argument" given their struggles in Eastern Ukraine. He says Putin wants to restore the Soviet empire, but Putin has stated that recreating the Soviet Union makes no sense. He views NATO expansion into Ukraine as the "taproot" of the war, analogous to the US Monroe Doctrine. He argues that the US foreign policy establishment is incompetent and has driven Russia into China's arms, undermining US strategic interests. He says the decision to bring NATO to Ukraine was made in 2008, and backing off is unacceptable to the US and the West. He claims the US has a special relationship with Israel that has no parallel in recorded history, and the Israel lobby has awesome power and profoundly influences US foreign policy in the Middle East. He says the Israelis are executing a genocide in Gaza, and the goal is ethnic cleansing. He believes the world will be dominated by the US, China, and Russia in the next 10 years.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the Ukraine conflict as part of a broader geopolitical strategy attributed to a globalist elite. Speaker 1 contends that globalists in the White House, in Congress, and in European capitals want BlackRock to take over Ukraine to strip its resources and subjugate it to a globalist agenda, and they also aim to destroy Russia. The claim is that the war has never been about Ukraine itself, but about destroying Russia. According to Speaker 1, the people in charge failed to perform strategic analysis, underestimating Russia by treating it as if it were the post-Soviet state of 1992—weak and prostrate. The reference to John McCain’s description of Russia as “Spain with a gas station” is invoked to illustrate this hubris. The argument continues that Russians warned against NATO on their border and about the dangers of Western actions in Eastern Ukraine, but these concerns were ignored. Speaker 1 asserts that the outcome is a dangerous, ongoing war that could become regional or global, with a consequence that the White House is not fully grasping. He predicts a massive Russian offensive when ground conditions permit, foreseeing that much of what is currently identified as Ukraine—especially the Kyiv government—will be swept away. He claims the Kyiv government represents the interests of the globalist elite seeking resources to exploit, not the Ukrainian people. The discussion shifts to broader economic implications, including the potential loss of the petrodollar as Putin engages with Saudi Arabia and China. Speaker 1 frames the war as both military and financial, suggesting that BRICS could expand dramatically and move to a gold-backed currency, whether a single currency or a basket. He asserts that this shift threatens the current global financial system and that the globalists are desperate as a result. The speaker fears that once Ukraine’s fate becomes clear, there will be pressure to deploy US forces into Western Ukraine, with Polish and possibly Romanian troops, which would escalate into a full-scale war with Russia. According to Speaker 1, Putin has shown restraint and does not want a war with the West, but intervention in Western Ukraine could end in open conflict. Speaker 1 also argues that Putin has repeatedly warned against advancing the border toward Russia and transforming Ukraine into a hostile actor, framing what happens in Ukraine as an existential strategic interest to the United States. He contrasts this with a claim that Biden’s stance has prioritized regime change in Russia and the division of Russia to exploit it, while alleging that oligarchs like Kolomovsky, Soros, and others are part of this globalist project. The discussion concludes with criticisms of U.S. military recruitment practices, suggesting the Army and Marines are not prepared for such a conflict, including comments about recruitment of illegals encouraged by the administration.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and Glenn discuss the unfolding Iran war three days in, arguing that the conflict has become a regional war with global economic and strategic reverberations. Key points and allegations: - Iran has targeted at least 27 bases and port facilities across the region, from Kirlik Airbase to Dubai, effectively regionalizing the war. Oil markets anticipate disruption; Europe’s open price rose about 20% on expectations of supply cuts, with a potential rise above $100 per barrel. - In the Gulf, inexpensive drones have breached what appear to be expensive air and missile defenses, affecting airstrips and airports. A large expatriate workforce in the UAE (about 4.6 million Indians and many Europeans and Americans) is stranded, highlighting economic disruption. Oil infrastructure damage is just beginning, with some Saudi refineries struck; more damage anticipated. - The war’s consequences extend beyond Iran and Israel, potentially affecting India, Northeast Asia, Turkey, and Europe. The conflict did not begin with a joint US-Israeli attack; it began with an Israeli attack, with Rubio (Secretary of State-like comment) indicating that Israel started it, which the US later joined due to perceived insufficient posture. - Reports indicate three F-15s were downed; casualties include American sailors and Marines, though the exact numbers are unclear. - The rhetoric from Secretary Hagel (likely Hagerty) and Trump about Iran as a state sponsor tied to Israel is criticized as incautious. MacGregor argues the focus should be on Pakistan and Syria (where remnants of ISIS/Al Qaeda reside), noting Pakistan’s long-standing role as an incubator of radical Islam. He views the war as primarily about Israel’s aim to destroy Iran to enable greater Israeli regional hegemony, with the US fully committed. - He predicts a long regional war and warns that logistics will be decisive: missiles are finite, and the US may exhaust its stock; many missiles used in Ukraine reduce available stock for Iran-related defense. He notes Hypersonic missiles and decoys complicate defense capabilities. - European involvement is uncertain; Britain’s rapid response is unclear, and the broader European willingness to intervene remains doubtful. China and Russia are viewed as potentially pivotal if they decide to intervene; India is suggested as a potential mediator, given cultural ties and BRICS interests. - The US’s strategic credibility and military power are questioned. MacGregor contends the US has shown unreliability, damaging its legitimacy and triggering broader regional and global realignments. He emphasizes that the world is moving toward a new order, with the end of Sykes-Picot-era maps and shifting alliances; Gulf monarchies may seek US withdrawal. - Iran’s resilience is stressed: even if the supreme leader was killed, unity of command remains, and Iran’s dispersed military network complicates US efforts. Iran’s survival could enhance its regional influence; the longer the conflict lasts, the weaker the US and Israel appear, and the stronger Iran, Turkey, and others may become. - The possibility of an escalation to nuclear warfare is raised: if Israel uses a tactical nuclear weapon to stop Iran’s missiles, Russia and China might intervene; this could force a broader confrontation. MacGregor doubts Israel’s ability to sustain a large front and warns this could lead to a strategic pivot by major powers. - On outcomes and endgames: Iran seeks US withdrawal from the region; the US’s presence is likely to be forced out as Gulf states demand it. The interview suggests a collapse of US influence and a reshaping of the Middle East, with Persia re-emerging stronger. Israel’s survival is uncertain; extended fronts and exhaustion are anticipated. - Trump’s role is described as constrained by Netanyahu: Trump is not a free agent, and there is little expectation of near-term strategic change in Washington. The potential for a negotiated end is deemed unlikely so long as Iran remains intact and steadfast. Overall, the conversation frames the conflict as a turning point: a regional war with profound economic and geopolitical ripple effects, signaling the decline of US military hegemony in the Middle East and the possible reconfiguration of global power blocs, with Iran poised to gain relative strength if the conflict persists.

The conversation centers on a view that the United States has failed in its proxy conflicts with Russia and Iran and that power is shifting to a multipolar world led by non-Western states. Stanislav Krapivnik argues that Russia’s pivot away from the West undercuts Western unity and that Europe is increasingly exposed as the West’s policies erode, with Russia becoming a leading anti-Western force for years to come. He frames the shift as not just multipolar but anti-Western in direction, noting that Russia’s stance has turned against the West and that the West’s “genocidal” actions and moral claims have damaged its legitimacy. He also asserts that the West’s actions have helped bring to power leadership in both Russia and Iran who are less amenable to Western influence. He highlights Trump’s regime-change actions as reflecting realignments away from West-facing regimes and notes the long-running Iranian threat as a consequence of Western policy. Key points covered include: - The shift from a Western-centered world order to a multipolar order led by non-Western powers, with Russia and Iran resisting U.S. and European influence. - Russia’s movement away from Western integration toward an anti-Western bloc, and the idea that the West’s moral posture has deteriorated, with calls that Europe’s rulers have failed to uphold moral standards while supporting aggressive actions. - Iran’s history of being pro-Western but ultimately rejecting Western dominance after regime-change attempts and pro-West leadership were removed; the discussion notes that Iran has demonstrated resilience by countering Western pressure and has weakened American influence in the region by striking American targets and allied interests. - Ukraine as a proxy conflict, with NATO involvement, and the view that Western leaders are pushing Ukraine into escalating confrontations with Russia. The speaker cites evidence that NATO and U.S. forces are deeply involved, including drone and missile strikes attributed to American planning or directive, and suggests that Europe’s leadership is moving toward broader war, despite public appeals for limited engagement. - The role of Turkey and the Baltic states: Turkey’s shifting position and its anger over Ukrainian actions; the Baltic states’ treatment of Russian minorities and the geopolitical risk of escalation if Estonia’s airspace is used for drone strikes against Russia, seen as potentially triggering a larger European conflict. - The argument that Europe’s security architecture is collapsing under its own hubris and dependence on the United States, with accusations that European populations are being molded toward war, militarization, and possibly even mobilization and conscription in several states (Germany, Poland, etc.). - The claim that deterrence must be reasserted; the speaker argues for making an example of Estonia as a warning to deter further cross-border aggression and to prevent a larger war, asserting that Europe’s leaders are too eager to escalate, risking a broader confrontation with Russia. - The broader cultural and historical analysis of Europe’s relation to Russia, including Peter the Great’s attempts to connect with Western Europe and Russia’s long-standing pendulum between East and West, with the speaker asserting that today Russia views itself as separate from Europe, forming a distinct civilization and political orientation. - The potential for a larger war in the near term if European leadership does not adopt a more prudent approach; the speaker warns that Orban’s political fate could accelerate conflict, and emphasizes that Europe must acknowledge deterrence realities or face nuclear risks. - The closing remarks echo Easter greetings, with the speaker returning to the grim prognosis of European demographic and political trajectories, highlighting a view that Western policy has empowered elites while threatening mass casualties and societal upheaval in Europe.

Apparently, the strategy is to weaken Russia, which is essentially a state of war. The aim is to remove Putin, replace his administration, and potentially divide Russia. This stems from the neoconservative movement, which has always been anti-Soviet and anti-Russian, pushing for a strong, challenging America. However, America can't challenge Russia, especially since the U.S. military isn't ready for war. The U.S. is using the Ukrainian military as cannon fodder, fighting over pride and fear of a Russian/Chinese economic takeover. America shouldn't go to war for trade, even if it means becoming number two or three economically. The world is multipolar, but the U.S. hasn't accepted this. People don't realize how destructive even a limited war would be. The situation is much more dangerous than people realize because America is too prideful and arrogant and will be nasty when it doesn't get its way in Ukraine.

Speaker 0: Decision on whether to supply Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine or sell them to NATO and let them sell them to Ukraine. Speaker 1: Yeah. I've sort of made a decision pretty much if if if you consider. Yeah. I I think I wanna find out what they're doing with them. Yes. Speaker 0: Yes. Speaker 2: Donald Trump's recent statement to the press about mulling over sending Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine has elicited a response from the Kremlin today. Putin announced that the peace process with the Trump administration to end the Ukraine war is officially, quote, unquote, exhausted. Trump and Putin have had a very, you know, strange relationship, a little touch and go since Trump returned to the presidency. At first, to end the Ukraine war on his very first day in office, Trump has meandered a bit on the issue and is now apparently settling on the Biden administration's policy of arming Ukraine and NATO to the hilt. But can Tomahawk cruise missiles even make much of a difference given that the Russian military has achieved supremacy on the battlefield and maintained that dominance for at least the last year and a half, maybe even longer, if you will. We're now joined by, and we're so pleased he's with us, retired US Army colonel Douglas MacGregor. He's the author of I'm sorry. We also have Brandon Weichert with us, the author of Ukraine. Go cross wires there, a disaster of their own making, how the West lost to Ukraine. Thank you both for being with us. Speaker 3: Sure. Speaker 4: Thank you for having me. Speaker 2: Colonel McGregor, welcome to the show. We're so glad to especially have your perspective on this. And what we're gonna kinda do is a tour, if you will, around the globe because there's several, ongoing and pending conflicts. Right? So let's start with this breaking news out of Russia where Putin says that these talks, these negotiations are exhausted. Are they, as a matter of fact, exhausted, colonel? Speaker 3: Well, I think he was referring specifically to what happened in Alaska. And I think president Trump showed up, you know, in grandiose fashion with the goal of overwhelming, president Putin and his team with his charm and grace and power, and it all failed miserably. President Trump never really listened carefully to anything the Russians said to him. He didn't read any of the material that was pertinent to the discussion. He came completely unprepared, and that was the the message that came out after the meeting. So the Russians were very disappointed. If you don't read their proposals, you don't read what they're doing and what they're trying to accomplish, then you're not gonna get very far. So now, president Trump has completed his transformation into Joe Biden. He's become another version of Joe Biden. Speaker 2: What it is so unexpected. And, you know, it's hard for a lot of a lot of Trump voters to hear because specifically part of voting for him and the mandate that he had going into this term was in these conflicts. Right? Specifically, the one in Ukraine. He didn't start any new conflicts while in office in the first term. Why this version of Trump this term? I know you, like I, look into the hiring, the administration, the pressures from the outside on the president. What is influencing where he is now on Ukraine, colonel MacGregor? Speaker 3: Well, that's a that's a difficult question. I mean, first of all, he grossly underestimated the complexity of the of the war. If you don't understand the foundations for the conflict, how this conflict came about, I mean, I I was standing around listening to someone like Brzezinski in the nineteen nineties trying to tell president Clinton that it was critical to address Ukraine's borders because Eastern Ukraine was, quote, unquote, Russified and effectively not Ukrainian. Nobody would listen to Brzezinski, and so we walked away from that very problem. And in the run up to this thing back in 2014, I was on several different programs, and I pointed to the electoral map, And it showed you who voted for what where. It was very obvious that the East and the Northeast voted to stay with the Russian pro Russian candidate, and everybody else voted against the pro Russian candidate. So none of this should come as a surprise, but I don't think president Trump is aware of any of that. I don't think he studied any of that. And so he's got a lot of people around him pushing him in the direction of the status quo. He went through this during his first term, disappointed all of us because he could never quite escape from the Washington status quo. So he simply returned to it, and I don't see anything positive occurring in the near future. Speaker 2: That's sort of the same as well, with other agencies like the the DOJ, which I wanna get into a little bit later. Brandon, you've been writing about this as a national interest. So what what do you make of it? Speaker 4: Well, I think that right now, this is a lot of vamping from Trump. I think the colonel is a 100% correct when he says Trump really didn't come prepared to the Alaska meeting. I think ultimately Trump's default is to still try to get a deal with Putin on things like rare earth mineral development and trade. I think it's very important to note, I believe it was Friday or Thursday of last week, Putin was on a stage at an event and he reiterated his desire to reopen trade relations with The United States and he wants to do a deal with Trump on multiple other fronts. So that's a positive thing. But ultimately, I think that people need to realize that Trump says a lot of stuff in the moment. The follow through is the question. I am very skeptical that he's actually going to follow through on the Tomahawk transfer if only because logistically, it's not practical. Ukraine lacks the launchers. They lack the training. The the targeting data has to come exclusively and be approved exclusively by the Pentagon, which means that Trump will be on the hook even more for Joe Biden's war, which runs against what he says he wants to get done, which is peace. Regardless of whether it's been exhausted or not that process, Trump I think default wants peace. So I think this is a lot of bluster and I think ultimately it will not lead to the Tomahawk transfer. Last of all because we don't have enough of these Tomahawks. Right? I mean, that that is a a finite amount. I think we have about 3,500 left in our arsenal. We have 400 we're sending to the Japanese Navy, and we're gonna need these systems for any other potential contingency in South America or God forbid another Middle East contingency or certainly in the Indo Pacific. So I think that at some point, the reality will hit, you know, hit the cameras and Trump will not actually follow through on this. Speaker 2: So speaking of South America, let's head that way. Colonel McGregor, I I don't know if you know. I've been covering this pretty extensively what's been going on with the Trump administration's actions on Venezuela. So a bit of breaking news. Today, the US State Department claims that Venezuela is planning to attack their embassy, which has a small maintenance and security board other than, you know, diplomatic staff. Meanwhile, Maduro's regime argues they're just foiled a right wing terrorist plot that's that was planning to stage a false flag against the US embassy to give the US Navy fleet. There's a lot off in Venezuela's coast the impetus to attack Maduro. I've been getting some pushback, you know, on this reporting related to Venezuela, because, you know, Trump's base largely doesn't want any new conflicts. They're afraid this is sort of foreign influence wanting wanting him to go there. Are we justified in what Trump is doing as far as the buildup and what we are hearing is an impending invasion? Is it is the Trump administration justified in this action, colonel MacGregor, in Venezuela? Speaker 3: No. I I don't think there's any, pressing pressing need for us to invade or attack Venezuela at all. But we have to go back and look at his actions to this point. He's just suspended diplomatic relations with Venezuela, which is usually a signal of some sort of impending military action. I don't know what he's being told. I don't know what sort of briefing he's received, what sort of planning has been discussed, but we need to keep a few things in mind. First of all, the Venezuelan people, whether they love or do not love Maduro, are very proud of their country, and they have a long history of rebelling against foreign influence, particularly against Spain. And they're not likely to take, an invasion or an intervention of any kind from The United States lately. Secondly, they've got about 400,000 people in the militias, but they can expect, at least a 100,000 or more paramilitaries to come in from Brazil and Colombia and other Latin American states. It's why the whole thing could result in a Latin American crusade against The United States. And finally, we ought to keep in mind that the coastline is 1,700 miles long. That's almost as long as the border between The United States and Mexico. The border with Brazil and with Colombia is each of them are about 1,380 kilometers long. You start running the math and you're dealing with an area the size of Germany and and France combined. This is not something that one should sink one's teeth in without carefully considering the consequences. So I don't know what the underlying assumptions are, but my own experience is that they're usually a series of what we call rosy scenarios and assume things that just aren't true. So I I'm very concerned we'll get into it. We'll waste a lot of time and money. We'll poison the well down there. If we really want access to the oil and and gas, I think we can get it without invading the place. And they also have emerald mines and gold mines. So I think they'd be happy to do business with us. But this obsession with regime change is very dangerous, and I think it's unnecessary. Speaker 2: That is definitely what it seems they're going for. When I talk to my sources, ChromaGregor, and then I'll get your take on it, Brandon, they say it's a four pronged issue. Right? That it's the drug that, of course, the drugs that come through Venezuela into The United States, Trend Aragua, which we know the ODNI and Tulsi Gabbard, DNI, Tulsi Gabbard was briefed on specifically, that the right of trend in Aragua and how they were flooded into the country, counterintelligence issues, a Venezuelan influence in, you know, in some of our intelligence operations, and, just the narco terrorist state that it is. But you feel that given even if all of that is true and the Venezuela oh, excuse me, in the election fraud. Right? The election interference via the Smartmatic software. Given all that, you still feel it's not best to invade, colonel. You how do we handle it? How do we counter these threats coming from Venezuela? Speaker 3: Well, first of all, you secure your borders. You secure your coastal waters. You get control of the people who are inside The United States. We have an estimated 50,000,000 illegals. Somewhere between twenty five and thirty million of them poured into the country, thanks to president Biden's betrayal of the American people and his decision to open the borders with the help of mister Mayorkas that facilitated this massive invasion. I would start at home. The drug problem is not down in Venezuela. The drug problem is here in The United States. If you're serious, anybody who deals in drugs or is involved in human trafficking, particularly child trafficking, should face, the death penalty. Unless you do those kinds of things, you're not gonna fundamentally change the problem here. Now as the narco state title, I think, is a lot of nonsense. The drugs overwhelmingly come out of Colombia. They don't come out of Venezuela. A very small amount goes through Venezuela. I'm sure there are generals in the Venezuelan army that are skimming off the top and putting extra cash in their banks, but it's not a big it's not a big source from our standpoint. We have a much more serious problem in Mexico right now. Mexico is effectively an organized crime state, and I don't think, what Maduro is doing is is really, in that same category. On the other hand, I think Maduro is courting the Chinese and the Russians. And I think he's doing that because he feels threatened by us, and he's looking for whatever assistance or support he can get. And right now, given our behavior towards the Russians in Ukraine, it makes infinite sense for the Russians to cultivate a proxy against us in Central And South America. This is the way things are done, unfortunately. We there are consequences for our actions. I don't think we've thought any of them through. Speaker 2: Well, in in in talking about turning this into a broader conflict or a bigger problem, I I I I know, Brandon, you had heard that that Russia basically told Maduro, don't look to us. Don't come to us. But now this was a couple weeks ago. Yep. Yep. Like you just said, colonel MacGregor, things have changed a little bit. Right? Especially looking at what Putin said today. So will Russia now come to Venezuela's aid, to Maduro's aid? Speaker 3: I think it's distinctly possible, but it's not going to be overt. It'll be clandestine. It'll be behind the scenes. The Chinese are also gonna do business with Maduro. They have an interest in the largest known vindicated oil reserves in the world. The bottom line is and this you go back to this tomahawk thing, which I think Brandon talked about. It's very, very important. The tomahawk is a devastating weapon. Can they be shot down? Absolutely. The Serbs shot them down back in 1999 during this Kosovo air campaign. However, it carries a pretty substantial warhead, roughly a thousand pounds. It has a range of roughly a thousand miles. And I think president Trump has finally been briefed on that, and he has said, yeah. I I wanna know where they're going to fire them, whom they're going to target. Well, the Ukrainians have targeted almost exclusively whatever they could in terms of Russian civilian infrastructure and Russian civilians. They've killed them as often and as much as they could. So the notion if you're gonna give these things to these people or you're gonna shoot for them, you can expect the worst, and that would precipitate a terrible response from the Russians. I don't think we understand how seriously attacks on Russian cities is gonna be taken by the Russians. So I would say, they will provide the Venezuelans with enough to do damage to us if if it's required, but I don't think they expect the Venezuelans to overwhelm us or march into America. That's Mexico's job right now with organized crime. That's where I think we have a much more serious problem. Speaker 4: I I agree with the colonel on that. I think also there's an issue. Now I happen to think we we because of the election fraud that you talk a lot about, Emerald, I think there is a threat in Maduro, and I I do think that that there is a more serious threat than we realize coming out of that sort of left wing miasma in Latin America. And I I think the colonel's correct though in saying that we're we're making it worse with some of our actions. I will point out on the technical side. I broke this story last week. The Venezuelan government, the military Padrino, the the defense minister there, claimed that his radar systems actually detected a tranche of US Marine Corps f 35 b's using these Russian made radars that they have. This is not the first time, by the way, a Russian made radar system using these really and I'm not going get into the technical details here, but using really innovative ways of detecting American stealth planes. It's not the first time a Russian system has been able to do this. And so we are now deploying large relatively large number of f 35 b's into the region. Obviously, it's a build up for some kind of strike package. And there are other countermeasures that the f 35 b has in the event it's detected. But I will point out that this plane is supposed to be basically invisible, and we think the Venezuelans are so technologically inferior, we do need to be preparing our forces for the fact that the Venezuelans will be using innovative tactics, in order to stymie our advances over their territory. It's not to say we can't defeat them, but we are not prepared, I don't think, for for having these systems, seen on radar by the Venezuelans, and that is something the Russians have helped the Venezuelans do. Speaker 2: Very complex. Before we run out of time, do wanna get your thoughts, colonel MacGregor, on, the expectation that Israel will strike Iran again. Will we again come to their aid? And do you think we should? Speaker 3: Well, first of all, stealth can delay detection but cannot resist it. Yeah. I think the stealth is grossly exaggerated in terms of its value. It causes an enormous price tag Yeah. When you buy the damn plane. And the f 35, from a readiness standpoint, is a disaster anyway. So, you know, I I think we have to understand that, yes, mister Netanyahu has to fight Iran. Iran has to be balkanized and reduced to rubble the way the Israelis with help from us and the British have reduced Syria to chaos, broken up into different parts. This is an Israeli strategy for the region. It's always been there. If you can balkanize your neighbors, your neighbors don't threaten you. Now I don't subscribe to the Israeli view that Iran is this permanent existential threat that has to be destroyed, but it doesn't matter what I think. What matters is what they think. They think Iran is a permanent existential threat and therefore must be destroyed. Your question is, will they find a way to attack Iran? The answer is yes. Sooner rather than later. The longer they wait, the more robust and capable Iran becomes. And, I think that's in the near term that we'll see we'll see some trigger. Somehow, there'll be a trigger and Iran will strike. And will we support them? Absolutely. We're already moving assets into the region along with large quantities of missiles and ammunition, but our inventories, as I'm sure you're aware, are limited. We fired a lot of missiles. We don't have a surge capacity in the industrial base. We need one. Our factories are not operating twenty four hours a day, seven days a week. The Russian factories are. Their manufacturing base can keep up. And by the way, the Chinese are right there with them. They have the largest manufacturing base in the world. So if it comes down to who could produce and fire the most missiles, well, we're gonna lose that game, and Israel is gonna lose with us. But right now, I don't see any evidence that anyone's worried about that. Speaker 4: Yeah. Speaker 2: You know what? Colonel McGregor, I I I don't know if I feel any safer after you joined us today. It is very concerning. It's it's a concerning situation we find ourselves in, and I feel like so many people because they feel the election turned out the way they wanted to wanted it to, are not concerned anymore. Right? But we are in Speaker 1: a finite amount of time and there's still great pressures upon the president. There are many voices whispering in his ear. And so we constantly have to be calling out what we Speaker 2: see and explaining to people why it matters. Speaker 3: Remember, this president has said this. Everybody dealing with the administration has said this. It's a very transactional administration. Yep. Follow the money. Who has poured billions into his campaign and bought the White House and Congress for him? When you understand those facts in, you can explain the policy positions. Speaker 1: And I think that's also why we're, the leading conversation we're seeing on acts and social media. Right now, Colonel McGregor, thank you so much for joining us today. We hope you'll come back soon. Speaker 3: Sure. Thank you. Speaker 2: And, Brandon, as always, good to see you, my friend. Thank you. Speaker 4: See you again. Nice to meet you, colonel. Speaker 3: Very nice to see you. Bye bye.

The speaker believes European globalist elites are in a panic because they realize the U.S. is no longer following the same path, and there is no future in Ukraine. Ukraine will never be a NATO member, and no one will go to war with Russia. European armies are "boutique forces" not designed for serious war. The leaked German military discussion is tragic and suggests a decline in professionalism. The conversation was amateurish, with no appreciation for the gravity of providing Taurus missiles to Ukraine, which risks a serious war by attacking Russian territory with Western assistance. Putin has made it clear that Berlin could face similar attacks if such actions occur.

The UK is seen as irresponsible, echoing the attitudes of the 19th-century British Empire and causing global tensions. Recent comments by President Macron are also viewed as reckless. Zelensky is perceived as a threat because he seems to be pushing for a full-scale war between NATO and Russia. The belief is that if the conflict remains between Ukraine and Russia, Ukraine will ultimately lose. Zelensky's actions appear aimed at drawing NATO into a broader conflict.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor discusses the evolving and unclear state of the U.S. war posture in the Persian Gulf, challenging the repeated claim that “we’ve already won.” He notes that each time President Trump makes lines about victory, Iran responds with substantial missile and drone attacks, calling into question whether Tehran’s defeat is real. He says inside sources suggest Iran’s ballistic-missile capability may have been reduced from 100% to around 70%, and their air defenses have been effective against unmanned surveillance aircraft, but Iran “has always been willing to absorb the strikes,” believing the payoff justifies the damage. MacGregor questions why the campaign, which has involved significant air and missile strikes, would move to ground troops when such a shift would require overcoming robust Iranian air defenses, a deep intelligence-surveillance network, and potential shoulder-fired missiles. He argues the administration’s narrative lacks a truthful assessment from the U.S. side and suggests the president is desperate, facing domestic and international humiliation if he admits the truth. He criticizes the unilateral pressure on Iran and the Europeans, noting commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has plunged (15 million barrels of oil a day offline) and Lloyds of London won’t insure ships through the Strait, highlighting how the economic and logistical costs of war already bite far beyond Iran. The host, Glenn, and MacGregor discuss the broader strategic context: Israel’s pressure and neocon aims to remove Iran as a threat, and the possibility that the war’s aftershocks would realign regional power. MacGregor asserts that the war’s sold premise—“short campaign, Iran off the board, Israel safe”—was never credible, and that Gulf Arab states have discovered they cannot rely on the U.S. to guarantee their security indefinitely. He notes the Chinese mediation offer via Pakistan has not been seriously engaged by the U.S., while Russia remains opposed to the Ukrainian war and skeptical about Western aims. He predicts Iran would seek to end Western involvement by moving to a negotiated settlement if possible, but believes the U.S. is not prepared to walk away, given domestic and pro-Israel pressures. On the regional and global implications, MacGregor emphasizes that NATO’s relevance has faded in the post–Cold War era and that European publics are largely indifferent to long-term U.S. troop deployments abroad, especially if they threaten domestic economies. He foresees a possible shift toward a “petro-yuan” backed by gold as an alternative to the dollar, noting China’s gold hoarding and new energy-finance dynamics. He argues the Gulf Emirates have bet on the U.S. staying engaged, but their security dependence is fading as the U.S. signals a potential withdrawal. Regarding Russia and Europe, MacGregor says Russia understands how the U.S. government operates less than Americans do, blaming “Zionist billionaires” and financial capitalists who control much of Western policy. He contends Russia and China will back Iran, and that NATO is effectively finished, having “died on the battlefields of Ukraine.” He suggests Europe must rethink its strategy toward Russia, abandon the weaponization of relationships with Moscow, and foster cooperation with their powerful neighbor rather than treating Russia as an existential threat. In closing, MacGregor contends there are two possible paths: (1) Trump announces unilateral end to U.S. involvement and opens negotiations with Iran, which he believes is unlikely due to the Israel connection; or (2) the U.S. escalates with ground operations in the Gulf, which MacGregor views as impractical given the need to neutralize Iran’s comprehensive strike networks and the terrain of key islands. He predicts the Iranians hold the strategic initiative and that the administration faces a “train to hell” scenario if it pushes forward. The discussion repeatedly returns to the central tension: can Washington disengage and accept settlement, or will it double down in a costly, potentially unsustainable confrontation that reshapes regional and global power dynamics?

The Ukrainian drone attack on Moscow is alarming. The Russians are surprised that the US hasn't intervened to stop Ukraine, who they see as a rogue organization. The Russians want an end to this conflict and have several options, including securing more territory or crushing Ukraine entirely. Putin, a judicious leader, faces a decision point: how far to go to guarantee Russia's security? He doesn't want to rule Ukrainians, but some advisors are pushing for a complete takeover. The Ukrainian government is evil and has needlessly sacrificed its own people, leading to a strategic inflection point in the history of Europe. The key is for Trump to follow his instincts and disengage, as any war will expand and the US is overstretched.

The speaker dismisses Western predictions of Russia's collapse, citing historical invasions that failed. Ukraine is described as a Western tool and a future source of terrorism due to its use as a "laundering machine." The speaker accuses the British Secret Service of orchestrating attacks on Russian strategic bombers and warns that further aggression could lead to Russia demolishing Britain with nuclear strikes. Russia possesses the capacity to damage Western interests globally through asymmetrical responses, but refrains due to moral principles. The speaker denies Russian involvement in attacks like the Skripal poisoning, questioning the British narrative. African countries are increasingly partnering with Russia and China due to Western exploitation, with Russia offering security and lacking a colonial past. The U.S. failure against the Houthis reflects a misunderstanding of modern warfare. The speaker believes globalists are a "Satanist cult" aiming to reduce the world population and are experimenting with societal destruction in the West through deindustrialization, "sex revolution," and promotion of LGBT ideologies to destroy the family unit. The Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan is framed as a U.S. failure that enriched individuals and enabled drug trafficking.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and Glenn discuss the current strategic picture across Ukraine, the Russia–China–Iran axis, and the broader Western political environment. On Russia and Ukraine: - MacGregor notes a major “Cauldron battles” situation in Southeastern Ukraine, with remaining Ukrainian forces being encircled and largely annihilated by precision strike weapons, and a Russian swarm anticipated to complete the encirclement. - He identifies two focal points of Russian activity: Odessa (where Russian special operations are reportedly active at night, Odessa largely undefended with air defenses degraded) and Kharkov, with ongoing pressure toward Kyiv. He emphasizes that none of these alone solves the core problem of removing Zelenskyy’s government in Kyiv, which he describes as a facade Europeans seek to preserve. - Russia has increased its force size, adding reservists and training new draftees; options for Moscow appear to be Odessa, Kharkov, and Kyiv. Putin is watching Western European political developments to gauge timing, potentially waiting for Western government changes to move decisively. - MacGregor argues NATO is effectively irrelevant to Russia’s calculus and asserts the United States does not want a war with Russia over Ukraine, giving Moscow more freedom of action than Western audiences realize. On Russia–China relations and Europe: - Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are pursuing a bilateral strategy to mutually reinforce military and economic capabilities, forming a large continental fortress against the United States. The two powers seek to strengthen ties as they view the U.S. as increasingly belligerent. - MacGregor contends that European leaders, including Starmer, Macron, and Metz, are aligned with globalist and financial elites (referencing ties to BlackRock and others) and that personal relationships between leaders are not meaningful in the international arena; strategic interests drive policy. - He argues that many European elites’ rhetoric about Russia serves to deflect from domestic vulnerabilities and to mobilize anti-Russian sentiment as political cover. On the Middle East and Iran: - The talk about Iran is framed as not serious; MacGregor describes a plan to escalate toward regime change in Iran, driven by U.S., Israeli, and allied intelligence communities, despite Iranian resistance and regional risk. - He claims Mossad, MI6, and CIA influenced President Trump regarding Iran’s fragility, while Iran’s internal protests (economic grievances) were legitimate and quickly mischaracterized as attempts to overthrow the government. He asserts Chinese and Russian assistance helped Iran counter covert efforts, including providing satellite imagery and assisting integrated air and missile defenses. - The declared Western goal is to destroy Iran as a nation-state, with the Iranian leadership prepared to respond with full use of capabilities if attacked. He suggests a potential air and missile campaign could target the regime and strategic hubs, with the United States likely relying on high-altitude precision strikes and long-range missiles, while questioning the effectiveness and survivability of U.S. platforms like B-52s against Iranian defenses. - China and Russia are depicted as unlikely to allow Iran to be pulverized; they could intervene if Iran is near disintegration, possibly through non-nuclear actions such as a collision at sea, leveraging their submarine capabilities and influence. On European political legitimacy and future: - MacGregor connects the Epstein-related discourse in Europe to a broader critique of ruling elites, comparing the potential for political upheaval to late-18th-century France. He argues that as publics grow disillusioned with elites, there could be a crisis of political legitimacy and a shift toward more realistic leadership, with potential upheaval in Britain, France, and Germany. On Putin and future moves: - He suggests Putin views the possibility of reconciliation with Washington as unlikely, having reached somber conclusions about the prospects for meaningful agreement. He predicts Russia will act on its terms, potentially advancing toward the Dnieper River, Odessa, and perhaps Kyiv, while noting Russia does not intend to govern Western Ukraine long-term. He emphasizes that events will unfold on Russian terms, with European irrelevance in the decision-making process fading as Moscow executes its plans.

In this discussion, Colonel Douglas MacGregor argues that the Islamabad peace talks were likely a fabrication and that Iran showed no real interest in negotiating. He asserts there was no evidence of Iranian intent to negotiate in the last talks, and notes that Vice President Harris’s momentary outside call during a meeting suggested to him that Netanyahu, not Trump, was effectively in charge of decisions affecting the conflict. He claims the White House comments about a possible ceasefire or talks are “nonsense” or designed to calm markets, and predicts the Iranian ceasefire deadline (3 AM Iranian time) would not yield a negotiated halt to hostilities. He says Iran is preparing for renewed attacks and for the possibility of a quicker American strike. MacGregor frames the conflict in strategic terms, contrasting American offensive power with Iran’s defense-focused posture. He describes the United States as a power that “banks on the offense, the ability to attack beyond its normal limits,” while Iran operates from within its borders with substantial underground storage and a defense-oriented program. He emphasizes Iran’s capability to wage a long-range, dispersed defense and to strike from 500 to 1,000 miles beyond its borders, complicating sustained air and naval operations. He believes the opening phase of any renewed U.S. campaign will be “far more intense”—more sorties, missiles, and bombings aimed at targets that could influence the outcome, focusing on infrastructure to degrade the Iranian state rather than merely military targets. Regarding resources, MacGregor estimates the Iranians have substantial unmanned systems (perhaps 45–50,000) and missiles (15–20,000, possibly more) with ongoing underground production capacity, aided by external resupply from China and Russia. He suggests the United States may have replenished some missile stocks, including air-to-surface missiles and anti-missile stocks, but questions the current readiness of destroyed radars and other critical C4ISR assets. He anticipates greater use of carpet bombing and destruction of critical infrastructure (bridges, power plants, desalination and oil infrastructure), describing this as an effort to destroy the state. On ground forces, he notes reports that President Trump has been reluctant to use them and expresses skepticism about their usefulness in the Gulf, given supply and medical evacuation challenges. He mentions potential but limited appetite for ground operations by Special Operations forces and the Army/Marines. MacGregor discusses global repercussions, warning that Iranian destruction could trigger famine due to Gulf-region fertilizer supply chains, rising fuel prices, and energy insecurity worldwide. He claims Europe is already facing energy crises and political upheaval, predicting governments will be overthrown as they confront shortages and the realities of energy dependency, and asserts the petrodollar system is dead or in decline, with China potentially stepping in as a financial hub. He argues that the multipolar shift will constrain U.S. power and that Europe should re-engage with Moscow, possibly under a new arrangement akin to a Manchurian-style convention to manage straits and regional influence. In the European and Asian context, he says NATO is finished and warns that Western media have misrepresented Russia’s intentions, instead blaming Western leaders for the escalation. He criticizes Western support for Ukraine, arguing that Ukrainian actions have been complicit in wider war costs, and he contends the broader goal of Israel’s regional plans has driven U.S. policy toward Iran. He predicts open revolutions or political turnover in Western Europe, calls for Europe to move away from wind/solar dependence in favor of more traditional energy sources, and urges a diplomatic resolution to end the war with Iran through mediation rather than continued conflict. Toward the end, MacGregor casts Trump as trapped by a Washington status quo and the Israel lobby, expresses pessimism about congressional restraint, and reiterates his view that the current approach is unsustainable. He closes by reiterating the need to end the hostilities and find a different path forward, arguing that Iran should logically oversee a new, negotiated framework for the region.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor contends Ukraine has lost the war. 'Ukraine has lost the war,' and 'The Ukrainian war against Russia, which is a proxy war on the part of Washington against Russia is lost.' He says Russians are advancing as Ukrainian troops dwindle and Zelenskyy tours Europe for funds. He expects the Russians to push west toward Danube bridges, possibly to Odessa or Kyiv, noting fortress-city defenses are collapsing as Ukrainian soldiers surrender or retreat. He calls the war 'over' and blames Western misjudgment, arguing there is no strategy—only a 'wish list'—from 'globalists' who want to destroy Russia; Ukraine is a tool. He cites BRICS, de-dollarizing, and 'the dollar is poison.' He warns of 60-90 days of volatility and says Putin seeks to end the war and avoid ruling non-Russians. In Alaska, Putin may be polite; NATO is a 'herd of cats,' with limited outcomes and talks on nuclear matters.

Ray McGovern, a former CIA officer who chaired the National Intelligence Estimate and prepared daily briefs for the president, discusses the newly released US national security strategy and its implications for the war in Ukraine, as well as broader US-Russia and US-Europe dynamics. - McGovern notes a dramatic shift in the national security strategy’s emphasis. He observes it prioritizes the Western Hemisphere, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, with Russia treated as part of Europe. He contrasts this with past eras, recalling Paul Wolfowitz’s post–Gulf War doctrine, which asserted US primacy and the ability to act that Russia could not stop, and he emphasizes the stark difference between that era and the current document. - He recounts a historical anecdote from 1991–1992: Wolfowitz’s belief that the US could win where others could not, followed by a warning to General Wesley Clark that Russia would challenge US primacy as times changed. He points to subsequent US actions in Iraq (2003) and Syria (2015) as evidence of a shift in capability to project power, and he argues that in 2022 Russia halted US plans by preventing NATO expansion into Ukraine. - McGovern interprets the current strategy as signaling a recalibration: the US may be acknowledging a changing balance of power, with a focus on deterring Russia and stabilizing relations with Moscow, while recognizing that Europe is central to strategic calculations. He stresses that Russia’s core principle, in its view, is to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, and he underscores that the strategy doc frames core interests as seeking strategic stability with Russia and a negotiated modus vivendi, though he notes these appear as a “castaway” in the Europe section. - He discusses ongoing high-level discussions in Berlin involving Witkoff (Wittkop) and Jared Kushner, and Zelenskyy’s positions on NATO membership and security assurances. He recalls past European reactions, including Rubio’s role in watering down European talking points and US–Russian negotiations, suggesting a pattern of European concessions followed by US–Russian engagement that sidelines European voices. - McGovern argues that Russia has “won the war” on the battlefield and that Moscow’s tactic is gradual, minimizing Ukrainian casualties while consolidating control over parts of Donetsk and other territorial objectives. He asserts Putin’s priority is to maintain a workable relationship with the United States, with Ukraine as a secondary concern. He also notes Trump’s stated interest in improving US-Russia relations, including a willingness to consider extending New START, and he highlights that Moscow would react to whether Trump commits to the treaty’s limits for another year, which would influence Moscow’s strategic calculations. - The discussion covers the internal US debate over how to handle Ukraine and whether to pursue negotiations with Russia. McGovern argues that the reality of Russia’s position and Ukraine’s losses complicate any simple “win” scenario for Ukraine, and he suggests that a negotiated settlement might eventually emerge if a durable US–Russia relationship can be pursued, given Russia’s advances on the battlefield and its leverage in European security. - They discuss John Mearsheimer’s realist perspective, arguing that Western expansion toward Ukraine contributed to the conflict, and that voices emphasizing NATO enlargement as the sole cause are contested. McGovern mentions Obama’s warnings not to give Ukraine illusions of prevailing against Russia and to avoid escalation, and he contrasts this with Stoltenberg’s statements about Russia’s preconditions for peace. - They also critique EU moves to seize Russian assets to fund Ukraine, suggesting that European leaders may be acting to preserve political power rather than align with the public’s long-term interests, and question whether such measures will endure or provoke wider political backlash. - In closing, McGovern reiterates that Russia has the upper hand for now, with the war’s outcome dependent on political decisions in Washington and Moscow, particularly whether Trump can extend New START, and whether European and US policymakers can sustain a realistic approach to security guarantees and the balance of power in Europe. The conversation ends with a cautious note about the potential for a settlement but ongoing uncertainties about the strategic environment and transatlantic politics.

The speaker asserts that Russia is winning the war in Ukraine, and Ukraine is doomed due to a lack of weaponry, manpower, and Western support. A negotiated settlement is impossible because Russia's demands—Ukraine's neutrality, demilitarization, and acceptance of Russian annexation of Crimea and four oblasts—are unacceptable to Ukraine and the West. The speaker believes Ukraine should cut a deal now to minimize losses, but nationalism and Russophobia prevent this. The speaker argues that NATO expansion into Ukraine is the taproot of the war, analogous to America's Monroe Doctrine. He believes the West mistakenly thinks Russia is a mortal threat to dominate Europe. Putin pines for the Soviet era and wants to restore it. The speaker says that during the Cold War, he thought that the Soviets were not ten feet tall. He also says that the decision to bring Ukraine into NATO was made in 2008. The speaker thinks that the US believed that they could shove it down their throat. The speaker believes that the US has driven the Russians into the arms of the Chinese. He says that the American foreign policy establishment is incompetent. The speaker says that the US has a special relationship with Israel that has no parallel in recorded history. He also says that the Israel lobby is an incredibly powerful interest group. The speaker defines the Israeli actions in Gaza as genocide. He says that the Israelis have long been interested in expelling the Palestinian population from Greater Israel. The speaker believes that the international system will continue to be dominated by the United States, China, and Russia. He thinks that the US and China will remain the two most powerful countries on the planet.