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Mario and Malcolm discuss the evolving drone warfare landscape and the strategic implications for the United States, Iran, Ukraine, and Gulf states. Malcolm argues that Iran’s drone arsenal represents a persistent, low-cost threat with an 88,000 Shahid drone inventory at the lowest cost, and mass production estimated at 7,000. He notes Iran has destroyed roughly $5,000,000,000 of technology, underscoring the waste associated with high-value defenses. He contends the conflict “is gonna come down to rifles and knives and drones,” and suggests the U.S. and its allies have limited tolerance for the level of death this entails. He emphasizes the learning curve for anti-Shahid drones, estimating 35 to 45 days to train someone to fly such drones, and notes that combat veterans and Ukrainian international legionnaires could assist with training in Ukraine, Abu Dhabi, and beyond. They discuss defense markets and training pipelines. Mario recalls speaking with a U.S.-based VC in Ukraine who might be tapped to bolster defense industry interests; Malcolm reiterates that Ukrainian-made, locally developed systems dominate, and that Western companies must avoid partnerships that involve theft of technology. He stresses that Ukrainians own the drone industry, and that the U.S. has historically relied on foreign-made drones for ISR rather than attack, contrasting Ukraine’s trajectory from reconnaissance to drones used for direct attack and artillery fusion. Malcolm criticizes the U.S. approach to drones, arguing that the U.S. military has not adapted to modern drone warfare and that Ukraine’s battlefield experiences demonstrate rapid adaptation and innovating countermeasures, such as drone drop kits and improvised aerial bombs. He explains the progression: drones used for surveillance evolved into attack platforms, counter-drone tactics, and drone-enabled artillery. He provides detailed examples: using DJI drones for reconnaissance early on, then using drone-based bombing, counter-jamming techniques, and fiber-optic lines to guide munitions. He notes Ukrainian Sea Baby Magura drones and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) that attacked Russian ships, and describes a dramatic incident where a Ukrainian drone disabled a Russian submarine tail by docking behind it and flooding it with explosive force. The conversation shifts to recent strikes on Gulf-based assets. Mario asks about Zelensky’s visits to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, and why Gulf defense preparedness appeared slow. Malcolm suggests the U.S. misreads regional resilience and that Gulf states will adapt using homegrown drone capabilities, with examples such as Kuwait buying thousands of Ukrainian drones and the UAE potentially building domestic drone factories. He cautions against overreliance on “wonder weapons” and emphasizes practical measures like machine guns, shotguns, and ground-based defenses, noting that 50-caliber weapons and simple tactics can counter Shahid drones if properly deployed. He asserts that the Gulf states will need to supplement their arsenals with practical, scalable training and production rather than expensive foreign capabilities. Malcolm discusses the strategic logic behind any potential concessions with Iran. He argues that Iran has geography, topography, history, and manpower advantages, and that Donald Trump’s threats to bomb Iran’s infrastructure are unlikely to force concessions. He claims Iran would not negotiate under U.S. pressure and that the Strait of Hormuz (SOH) would remain a focal point of conflict. He contends that Trump’s approach risks escalating toward broader conflict, and that Iran could respond by leveraging the Houthis or other regional proxies to disrupt shipping and Gulf economies, potentially closing the Red Sea and Suez Canal if alignments shift. They touch on Russia’s role, noting Moscow’s financial and strategic interests in the region. Malcolm argues Putin benefits from the conflict and that Trump’s priorities are tied to accumulating frozen Russian assets and broader political maneuvering, sometimes at odds with the publicized goal of restraining Iran. He observes that Russia’s drones, weapons components, and intelligence could be flowing to Iran, influencing the Gulf theater. The discussion closes with a broader warning: the war’s consequences will be felt for years or generations, with energy prices, inflation, and global economic disruption, and only a realignment of strategy—embracing distributed defenses, domestic production, and adaptable tactics—will shape outcomes. They acknowledge the difficulty of predicting concessions, the complexity of Gulf politics, and the precarious balance between deterrence and escalation.

- The conversation opens with a discussion of escalating dynamics in the Ukraine conflict as a new year begins, focusing on how the rules of war have shifted over the past four years, including the depth of NATO involvement and when actions cross into direct war. The speakers note that political leadership has largely been exempt from the war, but Russia has had opportunities to strike Ukrainian leaders that have been avoided, raising questions about future targets and the diplomatic path. - Speaker 1 argues that the political leadership has indeed been outside the war, and that voices inside Russia are growing more critical. They challenge the Western portrayal of Vladimir Putin as a dictator, suggesting Putin has restrained destruction that could hit the West, and asserting that the West and Zelenskyy have grown comfortable with exemptions. They warn that continued escalation could lead to a nuclear conflict with Europe at risk due to its geographic compactness, citing the potential fallout from attacks on American nuclear bases and the broader geopolitical consequences. - The discussion moves to the potential consequences of Western strikes on energy infrastructure and frontline energy targets, including refineries and civilian vessels. The speakers examine how Russia might respond if its assets are attacked at sea or in the Black Sea, and the possibility of Russia forcing Ukraine to lose access to the Black Sea through strategic military actions. The analysis includes a few provocative specifics: British and European actors allegedly orchestrating or enabling attacks, the role of third-country-flagged ships, and the idea that reflagging to Russian flags could be treated as an act of war by Russia. - The dialogue delves into the operational dynamics of the Mediterranean and Black Sea theatres, noting incidents such as sunflowers and other oil cargo damage, the Caspian transit company's facilities, and the implications for Turkish oil revenue and Western economies. The speakers argue that Western powers are drawing in broader international actors and that the war could expand beyond Ukraine, potentially dragging in NATO ships and submarines in a conflict at sea. They warn that if escalation continues, it could trigger a broader, more destructive war in Europe. - The conversation shifts to the likely trajectory of the battlefield, with Speaker 1 offering a grim assessment: the Donbas front and the Zaporozhye region are nearing collapse for Ukrainian forces, with Russian forces dominating missile and drone capabilities and outmaneuvering on three axes. The analysis suggests that within two to three months, upper-river-front areas, including the Zaporozhzhia and surrounding Donbas fronts, could be fully compromised, leaving only a few large urban pockets. The absence of civilian protection and the encirclement of cities would accelerate Ukrainian withdrawals and surrender, while Russia could enhance pressure on remaining fronts, including Donbas and Sumy, Kharkiv, and Dnieper regions, as weather and terrain favor Russian movements. - The speakers discuss the impact of collapsing command posts and morale, likening the abandonment of Gudai Poia to a sign of impending broader collapse, with open terrain making Ukrainian forces vulnerable to rapid Russian breakthroughs. They suggest that strategic fortifications will be overwhelmed as the front line collapses and supply lines are severed, with a predicted sequence of encirclements and city sieges. - The US role is analyzed as both a negotiator and strategist, with the assertion that the United States has long led the proxy dimension of the conflict and continues to influence targeting and weapons delivery. The discussion questions the coherence of US policy under Trump versus Biden, arguing the conflict remains a US-led enterprise despite attempts to reframe or outsources it. The speakers describe the US as hedging its bets through ongoing military support, budgets, and intelligence cooperation, while insisting that Ukraine remains a core objective of US hegemony. - A critical examination of European Union leadership follows, with strong claims that the EU is increasingly tyrannical and undemocratic, sanctioning dissidents andSuppressing speech. The dialogue condemns the deplatforming of individuals and argues that the EU’s leadership has undermined diplomacy and negotiated peace, instead pushing toward a broader confrontation with Russia. The speakers suggest that several European countries and elites are pursuing escalating policies to maintain power, even at the risk of deepening European instability and economic collapse. - The conversation ends with reflections on broader historical patterns, invoking Kennan’s warnings about NATO expansion and the risk of Russian backlash, and noting the potential for the EU to fracture under pressure. The participants acknowledge the risk of a wider conflict that could redefine global power and economic structures, while expressing concern about censorship, deplatforming, and the erosion of diplomacy as barriers to resolving the crisis. They conclude with a cautious note to prepare for worst-case scenarios and hope for, but not rely on, better circumstances in the near term.

Die Andromeda liegt verlassen in einem Hafen auf Rügen, nachdem das Bundeskriminalamt die Navigationstechnik ausgebaut hat, um die letzten Standorte des Schiffs zu ermitteln. Die Yacht ist nicht mehr seetüchtig und wurde während der Ermittlungen auf mögliche Verbindungen zu Sprengstoffanschlägen untersucht. Auf dem Schiff fanden die Ermittler Sprengstoffreste, und es wird vermutet, dass eine Gruppe von sechs Personen an Bord war, um Sprengladungen an den Nord Stream Pipelines zu platzieren. Ein ehemaliger Kampfschwimmer äußert Zweifel, dass der gesamte Sprengstoff nur mit der Andromeda transportiert wurde, und vermutet, dass die Spuren absichtlich gelegt wurden, um die Ermittler in die Irre zu führen. Geheimdienste haben die Saboteure als mögliche Russen oder Ukrainer identifiziert, während Russland die USA und Großbritannien beschuldigt. --- The Andromeda lies abandoned in a harbor on Rügen after the Federal Criminal Police removed its navigation equipment to trace the ship's last locations. The yacht is no longer seaworthy and was examined for possible connections to explosive attacks. Investigators found traces of explosives on board, and it is suspected that a group of six was aboard to place charges on the Nord Stream pipelines. A former combat diver doubts that all the explosives were transported solely by the Andromeda and believes the traces may have been intentionally planted to mislead investigators. Intelligence agencies have identified the saboteurs as potential Russians or Ukrainians, while Russia accuses the USA and the UK.

On September 2, the Israelis carried out a terrorist attack on the main boat of the global Shumad Flotilde, the family, as it was anchored in Tunis. To understand, we go back on September 2, when two Israeli spy plane, namely a Gulfstream, Narshan Eitan and a Narshan Shavut, were spotted gathering intelligence on Tunisia, Wild two C-one 130 type cargo plane landed in Malta and in the American Sigonella Air Base. Involvement is The US flight of a MQ-4C, Triton over the area, most likely to support the Israeli commando. The aim of this attack? Determ the activists from continuing towards Gaza. The family was just hit by a bomb on the front of the vessel. Every boat needs to be on watch for an attack.

Blowing up the Nord Stream pipelines means the U.S. is directly at war with the largest nuclear power, which could have consequences. Russia could sever undersea internet cables, preventing banks in London from communicating with banks in New York. This could cause economic collapse and lead to world crisis conditions. It is unknown if those responsible, like Torian Nuland, have considered these effects, or if that was the intention.

Lucas Wilhelm and Tom Colmer discovered the abandoned ship Andromeda in a deserted harbor on Rugen. The yacht became notable after investigators from the federal criminal police removed its navigation technology during an investigation into a possible plot involving explosives on the Nord Stream pipelines. Experts believe a group of six may have used the Andromeda for this purpose. Investigators found remnants of explosives on board, suggesting they were stored in boxes. A former combat diver expressed skepticism about using the Andromeda solely for transporting explosives, citing logistical challenges. Intelligence agencies suspect the saboteurs could be Russians or Ukrainians, with accusations flying between Russia, the USA, and Great Britain. The investigation into the Andromeda remains ongoing.

This is not just a nuclear carrier or nuclear weapons carrier. This is a nuclear missile or nuclear submarine drone. Because it's in the water, it can carry a much larger payload than something flying through the air. So you've got two systems now operating with nuclear reactors in them. This is a whole new level of technology. The US created a nuclear missile once. It was nuclear powered. It was contamination in flight. Everything around was contaminated. They had to back off. They couldn't master the technology. But it was traceable too because of the radiation. It was leaking everywhere. These systems don't leak radiation. They're very effective. And what they are, first of all, just to understand, is they're second strike systems. So if The US, in this case, starts getting feisty and psychotic and tries to because The US, by the way, does have a policy of first strike, whether it's from space or whether it's missile bound or whether it's submarines out of coast. If The US thinks that they can decapitate the Russian leadership and somehow take out all the Russian missiles that are on tracked carriers, on rail carriers, on ships all over the place. But let's assume somehow they decide they can do this. You've got two issues here. One, you've got the Poseidon, which may already be in place or can be launched from a carrier and travel over three, four, five days to get in place and then explode and create a wave. I mean, if they could actually put a 100 megaton explosion, I mean, a city buster missile is one megaton. 10 megatons is something that you wipe out the entirety of something like the size of New York. If they could put a 100 megaton warhead as has been proposed, you'd be facing a 200 meter wave, a 150, 200 meter wave that would destroy most anything in its path. And that considering 80%, almost 80% of the American population lives on either of the East or the West Coast, the majority being on the East Coast, that's one of those vengeance weapons that would just destroy The US effectively as a country. Then you've got the Borovayashnik, which can fly for weeks, months maybe. Who knows nobody knows exactly how long it can actually fly. If tensions are growing very high, you put a five, six, 10 of those up in the air, and they're just doing circles and waiting for command. So the enemy knows that if they do a decapitating strike, they're gonna get wet. They're gonna get a surprise.

A drone carrying a significant amount of explosives approached the Olenegorsky Gorniak ship, causing it to be hit. The drone was reported to have carried nearly half a metric ton of explosives. According to a Ukrainian source, there may have been around 100 Russian soldiers or personnel on board at the time of the strike.

In 2016 Russia announced a new type of torpedo called Poseidon. It is 20 meters long and 2 meters in diameter, three times the size of a conventional torpedo. This torpedo uses a small nuclear reactor as propulsion, and it has a limited range. Poseidon is expected to carry a 2 megaton nuclear warhead. It can be launched from a submarine or from a special vessel. Poseidon travels slowly and is not easily detected, moving underwater before it detonates. The nuclear explosion would cause radioactive contamination and could have long-term effects.

The speaker argues that a network of locations along a specific fault line, including Kamchatka off Russia’s coast and Prince William Sound in Alaska, are connected by an “old world” technology that generates and channels enormous energy from the Earth. They describe these sites as gateways or power lines created by an ancient civilization, with volcanoes and underwater features acting as energy release points. The narrative weaves together multiple earthquakes and military sites to support this claim. Key points include: - Kamchatka Peninsula earthquake: The speaker notes a massive 8.8 magnitude earthquake on 07/29/2025 off Kamchatka, saying this occurred four weeks after they exposed the location as an “old world gate,” and suggesting the quake is part of a broader pattern tied to the fault line they have discussed in previous episodes (episodes 131 and 132). They question whether something underground was destroyed or turned on, creating a powerful event. - Historical earthquake pattern: The speaker highlights three of the top eight largest earthquakes ever recorded as occurring along the same fault line: 1952 (nine-point-0) near the Kert Islands, 1964 (nine-point-two) in Prince William Sound, Alaska, and a later event in 1966–a timeline they use to argue that an ongoing operation was enabled in the 1960s. - Old world technology and energy: The central claim is that an old world technology exists beneath the water, connected to a massive power line that releases energy through volcanic calderas. They posit that certain earthquakes are not random but are results of this energy being harvested or directed. - Military bases and installations: The speaker asserts that these quake-prone locations are highly militarized, citing Russian bases with surveillance networks, coastal communication systems, and missile defense platforms. They suggest these bases were either discovered or established in connection with the old world technology. - Alaska and a key building: The Buckner Building (Alaska) is discussed, described as built in 1953 and left after the 1964 earthquake; the speaker claims its purpose was tied to an operation that enabled the quake, with the building operating until 1966 before the military pulled out. - Start One agreement and underwater facilities: They reference the Start One treaty (1990s), claiming it included on-site inspections and six publicly documented underwater old world facilities, implying that the United States and Russia know what is happening in restricted underwater locations. - Tarjinskaya Bay and the closed town: The speaker points to Tarjinskaya Bay as an ancient old world volcanic crater where a restricted, closed city sits, hosting Russia’s important nuclear submarine base and underground warhead tunnels. They imply this site is deliberately closed to the public and tied to the ongoing energy operation. - Conclusion and call to action: The speaker maintains that they are uncovering concrete evidence of the old world’s presence, gate locations, and energy manipulation, urging further exploration and promising more discoveries as they continue their investigation. Throughout, the speaker links the earthquakes, military sites, underwater facilities, and restricted towns as part of a coherent narrative about an ancient technology still active and being exploited along this fault line.

A drone carrying a large amount of explosives hit the Olenegorsky Gorniak ship, causing significant damage. The drone approached the ship slowly, alarming the Russians. According to a Ukrainian source, the explosive payload weighed almost half a metric ton. It is believed that around 100 Russian soldiers or personnel were on board when the strike occurred.

After Russia invaded Ukraine, the Nord Stream pipelines exploded under the Baltic Sea. Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh revealed that the US and CIA blew up the pipelines to stop Russian gas supplies to Germany. The US wanted to promote its own gas exports to Europe. The operation involved planting bombs during NATO drills and detonating them remotely. The destruction of the pipelines led to increased gas prices in Europe, benefiting US gas producers. The US government's massive financial aid to Ukraine is also questioned.

This man doesn't yet know he's being watched, marked for death by Ukrainian military intelligence, unwittingly recruited as a suicide bomber to drive a vehicle to Crimea and cross the peninsula's bridge. The hybrid Chevy he's transporting appears ordinary, but its battery compartment conceals a 130 kilograms of Finnish made explosives, which were packed into it on the territory of Ukraine and then passed through many customs ports throughout European cities. The bomb was designated to detonate remotely as the vehicle crossed the Crimean Bridge. This was the plan of Ukrainian military intelligence: recruit a Ukraine sympathizer to drive the rigged vehicle to Crimea through Georgia. "He said that I would need to send him documents, my passport, individual insurance account number, and driver's license. I sent him all of this, after which, he said that I would need to go to Mineral Nivode to customs and find out what documents would be needed to clear the car through customs. After which, I would need to go to Levantov City to the Federal Financing Monitoring Service, the state automobile inspectorate, and find out what documents would be needed to register it in Russia. After which, she said that I would need to go to where this car was supposed to arrive. Then I was supposed to pick up the car there and drive it to the Republic Of Crimea via the Crimean Bridge." The driver was detained by FSB officers. The driver was promised $2,500 for the job. Russian forensic specialists are now examining the vehicle to identify others in on the plot. This strategy is no novelty for Ukraine's military intelligence. In October 2022, a bomb hidden on a truck killed five people on the Crimean Bridge. Since then, Russian security services have intercepted numerous similar plots. "It's terrible. They definitely took advantage of me, without even thinking for a second about what would happen to me, to my family, to anyone else. I don't know how the people who plan it do all this work. But in my opinion, they don't understand at all that our border is locked, how people work here." In every case, drivers believed they were doing legitimate business with their contacts from Ukraine, which they found via Telegram and throughout other messenger apps. None of them realized they were just expendable and sent one way. And while their gullibility and sympathy for Kyiv's authorities didn't cost them their lives, they have forfeited their freedom.

The Andromeda, an abandoned yacht in a deserted harbor on Rugen, gained notoriety after investigators from the federal criminal police boarded it. The ship, once part of a charter fleet, is now stripped of its navigation technology. Investigators suspect that a group of six used the 15-meter yacht to transport explosives for an operation involving the Nord Stream pipelines. Remnants of explosives were found on board, and the yacht underwent a thorough three-day inspection. A former combat diver expressed skepticism about the practicality of using the Andromeda solely for transporting explosives, suggesting that the evidence might have been planted to mislead investigators. Intelligence agencies suspect the saboteurs may be Russian or Ukrainian, with accusations flying between Russia, the USA, and Great Britain. The case remains under investigation.

The Nord Stream pipelines, which carry natural gas from Russia to Western Europe, have been breached, resulting in a massive release of methane into the Baltic Sea. Swedish officials recorded two undersea explosions equivalent to hundreds of pounds of TNT near the leaks, leading to accusations of industrial terrorism. The prime suspect would be Vladimir Putin, but it would be self-destructive for Putin to destroy his own pipelines, which are a source of power, wealth, and leverage over Europe. Joe Biden had suggested in early February that "there will be no longer a Nord Stream two. We we will bring an end to it." Victoria Newland at the State Department made similar statements. A Polish politician, Radek Sikorski, posted "Thank you, USA" after the explosions. A new pipeline, the Baltic pipe, was inaugurated in Poland, carrying non-Russian natural gas. The White House press secretary noted the destruction highlights the importance of transitioning to clean energy.

After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the Nord Stream pipelines exploded under the Baltic Sea, with suspicions of sabotage by Putin. Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh revealed a US-led mission to destroy the pipelines, impacting European gas supplies. US opposition to Nord Stream 2 aimed to promote American gas exports. The US Navy's divers reportedly planted bombs during NATO drills to blow up the pipelines. The explosions led to increased gas costs in Europe, benefiting US gas producers. The aftermath of the attacks remains unresolved, with implications for European economies and US taxpayers. Next, the focus shifts to US aid sent to Ukraine.

Vladimir Putin would never blow up his own energy pipelines as they are crucial for Russia's power and leverage over other countries. However, other countries, including the US, have suggested the possibility of sabotaging the Nord Stream pipelines. Joe Biden and Toria Nuland both hinted at stopping Nord Stream if Russia invades Ukraine. While it's hard to believe that the Biden administration would engage in such extreme actions, close allies like Radek Sikorski have thanked the US for the pipeline explosions. The White House has not denied responsibility and instead emphasizes the need for clean energy and reducing gas consumption. If the Biden administration is indeed responsible, it would be a destructive act consistent with their tendency to tear down rather than build.

Glenn and Stanislav Krapivnik discuss a string of escalating security and geopolitical crises with a focus on drone incidents, NATO-Russia tensions, and the broader international energy and security implications. - Baltic drone incidents: Glenn asks about an attack on a key Russian port in the Baltic Sea, noting drones entered from NATO territory through the Baltic States and may have circumvented Belarus. Stanislav explains that two drones hit targets in the Baltics—one at an Estonian power-plant chimney and another at a separate object in Latvia—and suggests dozens of drones may have flown through airspace, possibly from Ukraine via Poland and the Baltics or launched from the pre-Baltics. He argues this is not a one-off event and raises two possibilities: either NATO member states have incompetent security, or they are directly engaged, with the more likely conclusion that the pre-Baltic states are direct participants in the war. - Deterrence and red lines: The conversation notes that NATO has aimed to pressure Russia economically (targeting energy, shipping, and oil). Glenn asks how these actions affect sentiment and Kremlin incentives. Stanislav counters that Tallinn and other Baltic leadership have crossed red lines, citing past incidents (Estonia drone attack on Skowabur Air Base) and suggesting Estonian actions are part of a broader pattern of Russophobia. He argues that Estonia’s leadership and policies threaten deterrence calculations and calls for accountability, positing that deterrence must be reset against Estonia given the perceived egregious escalations. - Interconnected conflicts and the Iran-Russia axis: The speakers discuss Sergei Lavrov’s remarks about a potential third world war linked to Iran and Russia. Stanislav asserts that conflicts are becoming highly interconnected, with the West having fomented them through proxies and direct actions. He asserts that Western leaders, whom he characterizes as pursuing broad war aims, are willing to sacrifice lives for geopolitical objectives, and he highlights ongoing cross-border terrorism and sanctions on supply chains. He emphasizes that Russia has long been involved in Iran’s military upgrades and drones, noting that Russian components power Iranian drones. He also points to the potential for China to align with expanding conflict dynamics, suggesting that Russia has already embedded itself in supporting Iran and that a fall of Iran would threaten Russia’s regional borders, especially along the Kazakhstani frontier. - Energy, fertilizer, and economic shocks: Stanislav draws on his supply-chain experience to describe the cascading effects of war on energy and fertilizer. He explains the logistical challenges of large-scale industrial repair after missile strikes, including the long lead times for steel, valves, and large refinery components, and argues that Europe’s gas and steel supply are constrained. He notes Russia’s restriction on diesel exports and Qatar’s role in fertilizer, highlighting how Europe has become dependent on Russian and Qatari supplies and is now left vulnerable by policy choices. He foresees a multi-year disruption of energy, fertilizer, and food supplies, warning of price spikes and potential starvation in parts of Europe and beyond as planting seasons approach. He highlights that fertilizer production relies on natural gas and that gas-rich regions are facing supply limitations, which would prolong and intensify food insecurity and economic disruption. - Gulf energy states and strategic calculations: The discussion turns to the Gulf, describing Gulf states as corporate-like entities run by wealthy families. Stanislav speculates on the strategic calculations of states like Qatar and the UAE, including the possibility that political and economic incentives could shape decisions about involvement in broader regional conflict, arms supplies, or island and maritime control. He argues that damage to energy infrastructure, maritime chokepoints, and desalination plants could have devastating regional consequences, potentially forcing costly rebuilding campaigns over several years. - Military capability and future risks: Stanislav critiques U.S. military capability for large-scale ground campaigns, arguing that the U.S. is not a traditional land-power and that a sustained invasion of Iran would face enormous logistical and manpower challenges. He emphasizes the scale and difficulty of mobilizing, training, and sustaining a large force in conflict terrain, particularly in Iran’s mountainous, fortified landscape. He also discusses the domestic constraints of U.S. recruitment, obesity rates, and the challenges of sustaining a 21st-century volunteer force in a major war. - Final reflections on leadership and narrative: The conversation closes with a discussion of Trump-era war briefs, characterizing them as short, sensational videos focused on explosions rather than reality, and a broader critique of political leadership and messaging in wartime decision-making. Glenn and Stanislav note the risk that political leaders may oversell battlefield successes and struggle to withdraw from costly, escalating commitments. In sum, the discussion centers on cross-border drone activity and its implications for NATO-Russia dynamics, the widening economic and energy-security consequences of contemporary conflicts, the deepening Iran-Russia alignment, and the daunting logistical and strategic challenges of any potential military escalation in the Middle East, including Iran.

The first speaker discusses a massive earthquake that occurred on 07/29/2025, a magnitude 8.8 event off Russia’s Kamchatka Peninsula in the Aleutian subduction zone. They claim this location had just been covered previously as a “gate possibly built by the old world to give the entire world free energy,” with volcanoes described as the energy being released from a massive power line. They ask whether something underground was destroyed or activated, and whether Yellowstone should be covered. They suggest that military bases in the area, found from the old world, are masking a fault line and that a power line from the old world may be involved. They reference earlier episodes that discussed the fault line generating enormous power and speculate that someone knows how to harvest it. The speaker asserts that four weeks after exposing this location, the sixth-largest earthquake ever recorded struck, tying with two others, and claims confirmation that something began in the 1960s involving old-world technology that was unlocked after World War II. They state that three of the eight largest earthquakes ever recorded occurred in this area (1952 Kuril Islands, 1964 Prince William Sound, Alaska), and that these events are not random. They describe a pattern: the 1952 earthquake near the Kuril Islands is militarized by Russia, with bases, sensors, coastal communications, and missile defense platforms; an airbase was found in 1941, eleven years before the 1952 quake. They connect the 1964 Alaska quake to a similar pattern: a military location built in 1953, eleven years before the quake, and a Buckner Building used for thirteen years until 1966, after which the military pulled out. They question what happened there and suggest an operation in the 1960s that resulted in the 1964 earthquake. The speaker then turns to the 07/29/2025 event, noting its timing relative to geopolitical moves—specifically the United States pressuring Russia on Ukraine ceasefire deadlines. They describe the quake as part of a larger, coordinated activity “right here off the coastline,” with all events occurring near the same fault line and all shocks exceeding magnitude 2.5 within 24 hours. They propose that this is not a series of aftershocks but a targeted operation, and they highlight the proximity to the Raibachi Nuclear Submarine Base, a submarine base located underwater, suggesting underwater facilities and storage halls. They claim a Start One Agreement from 1991, under which the U.S. and Soviet Union declared over sixty start sites, including six publicly documented submarine underwater facilities. They describe a closed town near a Russian nuclear submarine base—Tarjinskaya Bay—citing their website, which mentions finding an ancient old-world volcanic crater there and explains restricted access. They argue that the location is an old-world site with powerful energy capabilities, built on a volcanic caldera, and that there are underground warhead tunnels and climate-controlled storage areas connected by two access tunnels. The second speaker reinforces these points, listing support and Patreon mentions, and then the first speaker reiterates that the evidence points to a deliberate exploitation of an old-world power network, with multiple confirmations across locations and times. They conclude by saying: this is no longer a theory; the painting is becoming clearer, and they are just getting started.

The speakers discuss the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and the recent sabotage on it. While there is no direct evidence, many believe Russia is responsible. The speakers point to Russia's motive and past behavior as indicators. European leaders, experts, and NATO all suspect Russia's involvement. The sabotage could escalate tensions and potentially lead to a military response. The situation has changed the nature of the war in Ukraine and raises concerns about the use of nuclear weapons. Overall, the consensus is that Russia is the likely culprit behind the pipeline attack.

Dmitry Sims junior hosts lieutenant general Abty Alaudinov, hero of Russia, hero of the Chechen Republic, hero of the Donetsk People’s Republic, commander of the Akhmet Special Forces, and deputy head of the main military political directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The conversation centers on the current phase of the conflict, Russia’s strategy, the role of Western support, and comparisons with Israeli actions in Gaza and other theaters. Key points and claims: - Russia’s combat capability and strategy - Alaudinov states that “overall, all troops of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Defense are engaged in active offensive operations across all sectors where we’re positioned,” with the most intense fighting around Pokrovsk, seen as the key point to break through to operational space. He notes progress in sectors where the Ahmad (Akhmet) special forces operate and emphasizes a broader offensive plan while maintaining an “active defense” to engage the entire front line and stretch the enemy’s resources. - He asserts that “only Russia is advancing” along the 1,000-kilometer line of contact and attributes slower offensive tempo to preserving personnel and avoiding a sharp breakthrough that could trigger NATO involvement. He argues the primary damage comes from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on both sides, and contends a rapid thrust would yield enormous losses. - Perceived signs of enemy strain - The speaker describes Ukraine as gradually crumbling under pressure, with Pokrovsk, Kupiansk, and the surrounding agglomeration “gradually falling apart.” He claims Russia liberates one or two settlements daily and that NATO support—drones and equipment—has not changed the overall dynamics; Ukraine cannot hold the front despite the influx of foreign weapons. - Western/NATO support - Alaudinov asserts that NATO testing is ongoing on Ukraine with drones, weapons, electronic warfare, etc., and that Trump’s shifting rhetoric does not reduce the flow of weapons or support. He contends that American support persists even as political statements change, and he notes deep American-NATO involvement via think tanks, satellites, and arms supplies that reach the front. - Drones and the changing nature of war - He emphasizes drones as the central element of modern warfare, while not negating the continued relevance of artillery and tanks. He argues: “a tank worth millions of dollars can be destroyed by a drone that costs $500,” and stresses the need to compete economically in war, deploying cheaper, effective unmanned systems to exhaust the enemy’s resources. - He claims Russia has a layered drone system for deep reconnaissance and strike with various warhead levels, ranges, and maneuverability, enabling operations from closest to farthest sectors and allowing “all targets” to be hit today. He asserts Russia is ahead of NATO in unmanned aviation. - Mobilization and tactics - Refuting Western depictions of “meat assaults,” he notes Russia conducted only one mobilization (300,000) and has continued advancing, while Ukraine has mobilized for years and still struggles. He attributes Ukraine’s resilience to nationalist formations behind mobilized troops, and he suggests that without NATO support, Ukraine would not sustain the front for many days. - Mercenaries and comparisons to Israeli actions - He characterizes Western mercenaries as having arrived with false expectations and being killed off in large numbers; Ukrainians are described as having strong spirit, but NATO soldiers lack endurance in the same way. Israeli mercenaries are described as capable in some contexts but not decisive against Russia. - On Gaza and the Israeli army, Alaudinov accuses Israel of “a fascist state” with tactics that spare no one, arguing Russia fights only those who fight with weapons and does not target women, children, or elders. He contrasts this with alleged Israeli actions in Gaza, saying Israel has no tactics and destroys civilians. - Nuclear considerations and doctrine - He asserts Russia is a nuclear power with substantial combat experience and advances in missiles like Zircon that could sink carriers, arguing NATO did not account for Russia’s capabilities when initiating the conflict. He presents a broader critique of Western policy and the so-called “deep state,” alleging far-reaching political dynamics involving Israel, Epstein, and compromise among Western leadership. - Closing perspective - The discussion closes with the host thanking Alaudinov for the detailed analysis of the operation and broader geopolitical commentary, including views on Israel, Gaza, Iran, and U.S. roles.

Speaker describes Russia’s nuclear underwater weapon project, the Status Six oceanic multipurpose system, codenamed Poseidon. Public reports begin in September 2015. Poseidon is an unmanned torpedo-shaped drone that can be loaded onto and launched by a submarine, or remain dormant in a box on the ocean floor until activated. Once armed, it has a range of 10,000 kilometers and travels slowly across the ocean for weeks or months to avoid detection, then accelerates to over 100 miles per hour when near an enemy coastline to detonate its nuclear bomb before detection. The bomb carried by Poseidon is allegedly the most powerful nuclear device ever created, capable of 200 megatons of explosive power and detonated underwater. For comparison, the Tsar Bomba, the largest tested nuclear device, was 50 megatons. The Poseidon bomb is described as a cobalt bomb designed to unleash more radioactive fallout than a normal nuclear bomb, making the resulting wave both enormous and highly radioactive. A 200-megaton underwater detonation is said to unleash a 500-meter-high tsunami toward an enemy coastline, far taller than most structures. The comparison notes that the Empire State Building would be minuscule beside such a wave, and even the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami maxed at about 30 meters, which Poseidon’s 500-meter wave would exceed by a wide margin. The tsunami would deliver catastrophic devastation, with highly radioactive water contaminating ground and drinking water. The transcript states that the Russian Navy has allegedly ordered 30 Poseidon armed drones, with half assigned to the Northern Fleet in the Arctic Ocean and half to the Pacific Fleet based in Vladivostok. Poseidon is described as a weapon of last resort, intended to be used only when all other hope in a war seems lost, and once initiated there is “never any going back.” The speakers emphasize Poseidon’s purpose as a last-ditch option designed to circumvent capable US and European missile defense systems. The description includes a hypothetical modeling finding from the University of Washington: a 100-megaton underwater detonation off the coast of Long Island would flood Long Island, New York City, and portions of surrounding states; Poseidon’s 200-megaton capacity would double that destructive potential, creating a far larger, more radioactive flood. The overall portrayal frames Poseidon as an extraordinarily powerful, nuclear underwater weapon with dramatic strategic implications, reserved for extreme scenarios.

Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Rabkinov said that documents related to attacks on Saint Petersburg could prompt Russia to use nuclear weapons in a worst-case scenario, including against countries that possess nuclear weapons, not only against Ukraine. The transcript argues that NATO is launching the attacks and that Ukraine lacks nuclear weapons. The claims are tied to events during the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum, attended by over 130 countries and more than 22,000 people. The transcript describes drone strikes beginning as the forum was taking place, including video said to show drones crossing the city and targeting a highly populated civilian area. It also cites reports of a civilian bus being attacked and states seven civilian casualties and eleven injured from a Ukrainian Armed Forces drone strike. The discussion contrasts Russia’s nuclear signaling with President Volodymyr Zelensky’s stance that he has been open to peace negotiations and is meeting with NATO head Mark Rutte. The transcript criticizes Zelensky’s messaging style, reiterates that he continues promoting NATO membership, and describes his warning that “big trouble” would come if Ukraine is denied membership. It also says Zelensky claims readiness for direct negotiations with Putin while purportedly maintaining obstacles to those talks. Professor Robert Pape, director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats at the University of Chicago, argues that an “escalation trap” has been unfolding for about three years, with parallels to earlier dynamics seen in other conflicts. He says Putin pursued what he expected to be a quick victory but Ukraine “stiffened,” and that both sides have nearly irreconcilable objectives. Pape highlights that Putin has nuclear weapons and that Ukraine now has the capability to strike deep into Russia, which he frames as making escalation extremely dangerous. The transcript connects escalation risk to Ukraine’s increased drone capacity, stating Ukraine has drone manufacturing capabilities and that donor involvement—specifically mentioning Jennifer Pritzker—is part of how drone production and precision targeting have expanded. It emphasizes that drones are relatively inexpensive and that smaller funding streams could still enable effective drone campaigns, describing long-distance precision and the ability to steer drones directly into targets. The conversation also draws parallels to the Iran conflict, describing how the use of drones disrupted business and civilian-linked activities around the Gulf and how the Saint Petersburg Economic Forum is likened to Russia’s “Davos,” with an aim described as disrupting strategic investors rather than targeting the forum’s attendees directly. Pape and others argue for restraint and off-ramps to prevent being dragged into escalation traps. The transcript argues that Europe should push for a clear line to end the war, comparing it to ending the Korean War through a defined line of contact rather than leaving it to the decision of one party. It claims the “line of contact” has not moved meaningfully over several years and says Europe should publicly decide what line it supports, tying funding to an armistice and freezing the conflict. The transcript also references the idea that an earlier peace framework around the Ankara agreement was scuttled, and it concludes by arguing that without a defined settlement line, multiple actors keep escalation traps active, with repeated calls to ask why Europe and others are not publicly demanding the needed end conditions.

The speaker says reports indicate the location is anywhere from just under 200 to 300 feet deep, but claims of 1,000 feet are likely propaganda. He compares the situation to the plot of the latest Top Gun movie, where multiple bombs are used for penetration. Another speaker confirms the discussion is about penetrating up to 200 feet below the surface. David Burke, a former Top Gun instructor and retired US Marine Corps officer, states that penetrating the location can be done and that no cave is deep enough to defend against the American military. He affirms the description of the weapon system and aircraft is accurate and that while it's a hard problem, it is solvable with this system.

Glenn and Professor John Mearsheimer discuss recent strikes in Ukraine, Western involvement, NATO’s role, and broader US grand strategy amid escalating pressures involving Russia, Ukraine, and Iran. On the bombing of Kyiv, including claims by Kyiv’s mayor Vitali Klitschko that it was the worst bombing of Kyiv in the entire war, Mearsheimer says that the prevailing explanation for the massive attack is that it was a reprisal for Ukrainian drone attacks into Russia. He argues that while it could be interpreted as a “classic punishment campaign,” it actually targeted military-industrial or strategic targets rather than civilians. He notes that Kyiv Independent reported 20 Ukrainians killed and says the number is “not a large number” and does not indicate a punishment campaign designed to kill civilians. He adds that Russia has conducted massive strikes against military-industrial targets before and that he does not see the attack as fitting a direct response to Ukrainian drone attacks against Russia’s “heartland,” though he suggests Russia may frame it that way for domestic public relations purposes. Glenn raises questions about NATO involvement, noting disputes about NATO participation and reporting about “two Russian pranksters” contacting an Estonian presidential advisor and obtaining coordinates relating to attacks on St. Petersburg. Mearsheimer responds by stressing that NATO is deeply involved and cites the G7 declaration issued after a June 17 meeting in France. He says the G7 countries stated they would accelerate support for Ukraine’s long-range bombing campaign into Russia and would ramp up economic pressure on Russia. He also says Western intelligence, drones, and drone development support have been provided to Ukraine, and that Western support likely includes helping plan drone offensives. He points out that Ukrainian drones have flown over the Baltic states without Russian reaction, but that Russia has said it will attack drone launch sites if drones are launched from Baltic territory—so he says Baltic states do not allow Ukraine to launch drones from their territory, though he believes Russia would retaliate if that changed. Mearsheimer discusses proposals attributed to Sergei Karaganov about attacking Europe with conventional weapons first and then, if necessary, turning to nuclear weapons. Mearsheimer argues Russia is unlikely to take that “Karaganov road” right away because it believes it can parry drone attacks effectively in the short term and because battlefield conditions matter. He says Russia is moving slowly but steadily toward conquering all of Donbass, leaving little to conquer, and argues that these incentives reduce pressure to escalate into Europe or consider nuclear options immediately. He adds that if Western rhetoric were true that Russia is losing and suffering massive casualties, the Karaganov approach might seem more plausible, but he says that is not what is happening on the battlefield. Glenn argues that Western leaders talk about bringing war to Russia and increasing “pain,” but that restraint has existed because Russia can absorb limited punishment without major impact. He warns that if the capacity to absorb punishment disappears, Russia may strike NATO states, raising the risk of major escalation. He then asks why Western elites are becoming more open about deep strikes inside Russia, including mentions such as a NATO-linked strategy reward for targeting Russian airfields, and whether this openness serves to normalize attacks, reduce fear of retaliation, or shift political incentives. Mearsheimer replies that Western elites have convinced themselves that Putin is a “congenital aggressor,” and that Russia’s ambitions and inevitability of conflict narratives have become entrenched. He says these stories can fit elite motivations such as supporting defense spending and keeping Americans involved, but argues the belief may be driven more by unconscious self-persuasion than coordinated strategy. He describes a security dilemma spiral: if Europeans and Russians believe war is inevitable, each side prepares for the same war, and each side’s defensive actions look offensive to the other. He says he sees no way out of the spiral at present. They then debate Western claims that Ukraine is winning. Glenn points to battlefield reports suggesting extreme casualty ratios—like 1 to 20 or 1 to 40 in Ukrainian-to-Russian dead—while also seeing Ukraine recapture territory. He says these accounts do not “add up,” citing perceived contradictions about rationality, deterrence assumptions, and political narratives. Mearsheimer focuses on casualty numbers and discusses a New York Times piece, saying it cited a CSIS study and reported around 450,000 Russians dead and between 125,000 and 150,000 Ukrainians dead, resulting in a “three to one” ratio. He says that ratio is “simply unbelievable” because the main battlefield killer is artillery, and that Russian artillery advantage is estimated at 5 to 1, 7 to 1, or even 10 to 1 across much of the war. He argues Ukraine has launched many offensives—citing Kursk and the June 4, 2023 offensive, plus earlier offensives in Kherson and Kharkiv—so the claim that Ukraine has mainly been defensive does not fit. He adds that he thinks Ukrainian losses are likely much higher, possibly around a million men killed in action, and says the New York Times numbers underpin decisions about escalating support for Ukraine. Mearsheimer expands to explain “truth as first casualty,” saying propaganda turns casualty measurement into a success indicator. He compares to Vietnam, where body counts were treated as an indicator of winning despite internal knowledge of deep trouble, and says the process created a fantasy world. He argues that today’s Ukraine narrative is similarly sustained and that Western elites increasingly believe they are doing well, reinforced by perceived Russian setbacks and slow Russian progress. He says the only likely way to dispel the narrative is a Russian battlefield victory: if Russia rolls up Donbass, Zaporizhia, and Kherson and then moves further, it becomes harder to sustain the existing story. Turning to Iran, Glenn asks how US success should be measured in a conflict without a ground war comparable to Ukraine or Vietnam. Mearsheimer says the US is not going to win the war but that two goals must be achieved. He defines goal one as opening the strait so oil flows, including Iranian oil, with payment in dollars and flooding the market. He defines goal two as achieving a nuclear deal, “some variant of the JCPOA,” because the nuclear issue is central while there will be no agreement on missiles or on supporting proxies like Hezbollah, Hamas, or the Houthis, and no immediate regime change. He emphasizes that the Memorandum of Understanding structured negotiations so that first the Strait would be opened and shooting would end, and that bombing ended by April 8th after which the conflict shifted to blockade. He argues that while opening the strait is largely achieved, the nuclear issue remains unresolved alongside major economic issues advantageous to Iran: reparations (including a $300 billion fund), frozen assets (over $100 billion), lifting sanctions, and the “toll booth” issue. He says powerful incentives exist for the West to reach a nuclear deal because Iran has the capability to build a bomb and lack of a revised nuclear framework would increase the risk of Israeli nuclear use. He adds that the Iranians wanted the nuclear issue at the end of negotiations because keeping leverage for later mattered after the strait had opened, leaving leverage with the nuclear issue. Finally, Glenn asks Mearsheimer to define US grand strategy now. Mearsheimer says earlier grand strategy during the Cold War focused on Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf as three key strategic regions outside the Western Hemisphere. He says in the multipolar world the principal threat is China, driving a pivot to Asia. He argues that under Trump, the Western Hemisphere is given high priority through social engineering and military engagement, despite no serious threats there at present. He says the US is also deeply involved in the Persian Gulf, with a major conflict with Iran, and reengaging in Ukraine as well as maintaining East Asia as a “pacing threat.” He concludes that the United States is not prioritizing and that this “militarized state” across multiple regions is not workable long term. He closes by adding two points: the debt problem and the weakness of the American manufacturing base. He argues the Ukraine war shows that in any prolonged war the US needs a large industrial base and depleted stocks can take a long time to replenish; therefore, planning for long wars—like a potential conflict in Asia—requires prioritization.