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A resolution is being introduced to consider an attack on NATO if Russia or its proxy, Belarus, detonates a nuclear device in Ukraine. The belief is that such an attack would irradiate Europe and harm NATO allies. The urgency stems from President Biden's acknowledgment of the threat of Putin using tactical nuclear weapons. The counter offensive in Ukraine is progressing slowly, but thousands of well-trained forces are ready to join the battle. The focus is on the potential use of nuclear weapons by Putin, and the message is clear: NATO will respond massively, and a war with NATO will ensue. The resolution aims to deter Russia and provide clarity on the consequences of such actions.

The idea of Ukraine joining a Western military alliance is unacceptable to any Russian leader. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990, Gorbachev agreed to let Germany unify and join NATO, with the condition that NATO wouldn't expand eastward. However, NATO quickly moved to East Germany and later expanded to Russia's borders under Clinton. The new Ukrainian government voted overwhelmingly to join NATO, which Russia sees as a strategic threat. They believe Petro Poroshenko's government is not protecting Ukraine but rather threatening it with a major war. This situation poses a serious threat to Russia, and any Russian leader would have to react accordingly.

Speaker 0: The discussion reports that Russia has covertly tested three new weapon systems over the past twenty-eight days, with two of them described as complete game changers. These tests are said to be causing nerves inside NATO, and none of these three have been made public by President Putin, who typically announces such developments. One system, however, is not being kept secret. Speaker 0: According to the report, Russian President Putin just rolled out their most advanced hypersonic missiles to date. These missiles are described as "no one can shoot down"—at least in the view of the speaker—unless future assessments prove otherwise. The specific system named is the Orenshik Oreshnik hypersonic missiles. They are set for combat duty by the end of the year, and they are characterized as capable of extremely high speeds and long-range strikes. The deployment of these missiles is framed as something NATO will be watching very closely. The report suggests that European leaders are exhibiting a willingness to engage in war-related actions, with two particularly troubling points highlighted: the idea that they want to be part of the conflict and the accompanying casualties. It is claimed that they want to participate in the death and destruction in the European Union and in The UK. Speaker 0: The report specifically notes German Chancellor Mertz saying that they are ready to draft young men to war if they cannot reach their volunteer numbers, effectively suggesting compulsory service to fight Russia. Speaker 0: It is also stated that the UK is telling its populace to prepare to sacrifice their sons and daughters, and the speaker emphasizes that "Sons and daughters, colleagues, veterans will all have a part to play, to build, to serve, and if necessary, to fight." The speaker adds that more families will know what sacrifice for our nation means. Speaker 1: The accompanying commentary underscores the need to explain the changing threat and the necessity of staying ahead of it, reinforcing the idea that sacrifice and readiness are central to national defense in the current context.

If Putin attacks a NATO ally, we will defend every part of NATO as required by treaty. It's important to clarify that we do not seek American troops to engage in combat in Russia or against Russia.

The discussion focused on multiple current geopolitical developments: Iran’s ongoing funeral proceedings for Ali Khamenei, Iran–Israel tensions around ceasefire negotiations, and the risks of escalation involving Russia, NATO, and Ukraine. Regarding Iran, the conversation cited a New York Times report that the United States was worried Israel might kill Arachi and Ghalibaf. The claim was that the Americans warned Iran through Pakistan and Qatar—via negotiations mediated by Pakistan—that Israel may assassinate them. The report also alleged that Ghalibaf’s plane, while returning from negotiations, made an emergency landing in the north after Israeli fighter jets were spotted in Iraqi airspace near or entering Iranian airspace, after which the plane drove to Tehran. Netanyahu’s press office denied the claim. The funeral context was described as a multi-day event underway, with world leaders including Medvedev in Iran. The question raised was whether Israel might assassinate Mustafa Khamenei (or other Iranian leaders) during the funeral. The response suggested it would be “too much” due to the large international delegation and the reputational and collateral-damage concerns such an assassination would create, while also arguing the news indicates Israel “becoming more reckless” if the claims were true. The discussion also touched on the idea that international warnings and mediation could be either real or “political theater,” but either way could damage U.S.–Israel relations by suggesting Israel is “extremely reckless” and that Americans felt the need to warn Iran about potential Israeli intent. On negotiations, the conversation shifted to the Strait of Hormuz. It noted that Europeans accepted Iran would charge a fee, with a Bloomberg report saying they want standardization and not pay more than countries like China or Russia. The U.S. was described as still trying to convince Iran not to charge a fee, offering unfreezing of $6 billion in exchange for Iran not charging a fee; Iran rejected the offer. The response argued Iran would interpret the situation as establishing new “realities on the ground,” and would position the charge as a fee tied to assistance and other concerns rather than a simple toll. It also argued that trust issues make the U.S. asset-unfreezing proposal “absurd,” and that renegotiation and sanctions returning would lead Iran to avoid trading control of the strait for “empty promises.” Broader regional tensions were listed: Lebanon on edge with Hezbollah; the Lebanese government seeking to disarm Hezbollah; mobilizations in Yemen involving Saudi-supported factions and Iran-aligned Houthis; and a crackdown in Iraq on figures close to Iran aligned with anti-corruption efforts. The discussion concluded the outlook was not good and that both sides would try to do something with the MOU rather than implementing it fully as outlined. The conversation then moved to Ukraine and Russia. It cited a Telegraph report claiming U.S. intelligence warned Poland that Russia may prepare a limited provocation on Polish territory within months to test NATO resolve, including missile/drone strikes on critical infrastructure, cyber/hybrid attacks, or a small cross-border incursion from Kaliningrad or Belarus disguised as accidental GPS failure or a rescue mission, followed by leverage via withdrawal and demands to end Western aid to Ukraine. The response expressed skepticism due to elaborateness and the vulnerability of Kaliningrad, but acknowledged the possibility that Russia could strike a European country given prior arguments that weapons sent to fight Russia are legitimate targets and the European build-up. It also argued that Article 5 does not automatically force all NATO countries to go to war and that each country can decide its response, while warning escalation—including the possibility of tactical nuclear weapons—could be difficult to control if NATO becomes directly involved. Additional updates were discussed: Bloomberg said Prime Minister Tusk urged Poland to be cautious with further aid for Ukraine at an upcoming NATO summit; Medvedev commented that Finland lifted its ban on hosting nuclear weapons; and the Lithuanian president initiated a constitutional amendment to remove restrictions on nuclear weapon deployment to participate in NATO’s collective nuclear deterrence. The response connected these changes to perceptions of increased targeting risk and the idea that expanded deterrence can increase danger rather than reduce it, describing Finland as becoming a frontline close to St. Petersburg and arguing European “reassurance” had become politically impossible. Finally, the discussion summarized the Ukraine war. It claimed Ukrainians were “going from bad to worse,” contested claims that Ukraine is retaking territory and that Russians are taking larger casualties, and emphasized exchange ratios and map changes as evidence. It described specific battlefield concerns: increased exposure around Zaporizhzhia, Russian pressure and vulnerability near Orekhova, Russian advances threatening supply lines, and the fall of Konstantinovka and Krasny Liman in the north that would enable a pincer affecting Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. It also highlighted Russia’s talk of needing a bigger buffer zone and potential territorial aims beyond Donbas, including references to Novorossiya. The response added that Russia’s attacks behind the front include energy infrastructure and fuel logistics, targeting gas stations and transportation routes in order to disrupt Ukraine’s logistics, while arguing Ukraine has not yet collapsed but could unravel quickly once it begins. The segment ended with thanks and a brief aside about a parrot in the office.

**Original Language Summary:** Обсуждается возможность разрешения киевскому режиму наносить удары по территории России западным вооружением большой дальности. Подчеркивается, что украинская армия не может самостоятельно наносить удары современными высокоточными системами большой дальности без разведданных со спутников НАТО и внесения полетных заданий военнослужащими стран НАТО. Разрешение на такие удары будет означать прямое участие стран НАТО в войне на Украине, что существенно изменит суть конфликта и потребует от России принятия соответствующих решений, исходя из создаваемых угроз. **English Translation:** The possibility of allowing the Kyiv regime to strike Russian territory with long-range Western weapons is being discussed. It is emphasized that the Ukrainian army cannot independently carry out strikes with modern high-precision long-range systems without intelligence data from NATO satellites and the entry of flight missions by NATO member states' military personnel. Permission for such strikes would mean the direct participation of NATO countries in the war in Ukraine, which would significantly change the nature of the conflict and require Russia to make appropriate decisions based on the threats created.

If Putin attacks a NATO ally, we will defend every part of NATO as required by treaty. It's important to clarify that we do not seek American troops to fight in Russia or against Russia.

If the USA and UK launch a coordinated missile attack on Russia, destroying major cities and killing Putin and military leaders, Russia's "Dead Hand" system would activate. Sensors would confirm the nuclear strike via radiation, heat, and seismic activity. If no response comes from Moscow's command center, Dead Hand will assume leadership is eliminated. The system will then autonomously launch approximately 4,000 nuclear missiles at the USA and its NATO allies. This automated retaliation system ensures Russia retaliates, even in death, triggering global devastation. The use of nuclear weapons guarantees widespread destruction, highlighting the fragile balance of power.

This is not just a nuclear carrier or nuclear weapons carrier. This is a nuclear missile or nuclear submarine drone. Because it's in the water, it can carry a much larger payload than something flying through the air. So you've got two systems now operating with nuclear reactors in them. This is a whole new level of technology. The US created a nuclear missile once. It was nuclear powered. It was contamination in flight. Everything around was contaminated. They had to back off. They couldn't master the technology. But it was traceable too because of the radiation. It was leaking everywhere. These systems don't leak radiation. They're very effective. And what they are, first of all, just to understand, is they're second strike systems. So if The US, in this case, starts getting feisty and psychotic and tries to because The US, by the way, does have a policy of first strike, whether it's from space or whether it's missile bound or whether it's submarines out of coast. If The US thinks that they can decapitate the Russian leadership and somehow take out all the Russian missiles that are on tracked carriers, on rail carriers, on ships all over the place. But let's assume somehow they decide they can do this. You've got two issues here. One, you've got the Poseidon, which may already be in place or can be launched from a carrier and travel over three, four, five days to get in place and then explode and create a wave. I mean, if they could actually put a 100 megaton explosion, I mean, a city buster missile is one megaton. 10 megatons is something that you wipe out the entirety of something like the size of New York. If they could put a 100 megaton warhead as has been proposed, you'd be facing a 200 meter wave, a 150, 200 meter wave that would destroy most anything in its path. And that considering 80%, almost 80% of the American population lives on either of the East or the West Coast, the majority being on the East Coast, that's one of those vengeance weapons that would just destroy The US effectively as a country. Then you've got the Borovayashnik, which can fly for weeks, months maybe. Who knows nobody knows exactly how long it can actually fly. If tensions are growing very high, you put a five, six, 10 of those up in the air, and they're just doing circles and waiting for command. So the enemy knows that if they do a decapitating strike, they're gonna get wet. They're gonna get a surprise.

The conversation centers on accelerating attacks involving drones and long-range strike rhetoric, and what this implies for Western involvement, escalation dynamics, and potential nuclear red lines. Scott Ritter argues that Western involvement is direct and that the attacks would not be taking place without it. He claims the technologies used are developed by the West for Ukraine, intelligence is provided exclusively by the West for Ukraine, and manufacturing is conducted outside Ukraine to avoid Russian interdiction. He frames the attacks as “collective West escalating against Russia,” and links this to NATO nations being engaged in combat operations aimed at Russia’s “existential threat.” Ritter also argues that Western leaders have crossed any prior threshold of caution long ago, citing public statements by Germany, France, Great Britain, and others about engaging Russia in open armed conflict by the end of the decade (2029–2030). He says Germany’s defense minister, Pistorius, is openly asserting that Russia is an enemy and needs preparation for war, including preparations for long-range strike missions inside Russia. Ritter states that Russia has managed escalation through repeated “red line” crossings and resets, which he portrays as designed to draw Russian overreaction and mobilize Western support for Ukraine, while Russia’s battlefield advantage continues. He references a recently published report by the special inspector general of operation Atlantic Resolve, saying it concludes Russia maintains operational and strategic dominance “across the spectrum” of the conflict. A major focus is Sergei Karaganov’s role and influence. Ritter describes Karaganov as advising Russian presidents from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin and says that in 2023 Karaganov articulated the need for a decisive counter to the West, including favoring preemptive nuclear use against strategies calling for the strategic defeat of Russia. Ritter says Karaganov’s calculation was that no American leader would trade “Boston for Poznan,” and he claims this logic appears in Russian nuclear posture. He says Putin publicly disagreed with Karaganov, but that in 2024 Karaganov was appointed to head review processes for the Kremlin’s strategic nuclear posture review, and in 2025 Russia published a new strategic nuclear posture aligned with what Ritter calls the “Karagunov doctrine.” Ritter claims this doctrine empowers Russia to treat conventional strikes into Russia’s strategic depth as a nuclear attack when nuclear powers provide conventional capability to non-nuclear powers that strike Russia’s strategic infrastructure. On current drone activity, Ritter claims drones have expanded through Baltic routes, with attacks near or involving Moscow and Saint Petersburg-area airspace impacts and closures affecting flights out of Polkava. He discusses Russian statements that Ukraine is preparing strikes from Latvian territory and says such claims shift from possibility to probability or certainty. Ritter argues Russia is beyond “managed escalation” and that damage equations have changed, making long-term consequences unavoidable for Russia’s infrastructure and reserves if threats continue. He reports an interview in Moscow with someone affiliated with a Russian Duma committee on protecting energy infrastructure from drone attacks, stating the person said damage had been minimal in the past and mitigated through repair, but Ritter argues the situation has now changed. Ritter estimates that 10–20% of Russia’s export production capacity has been damaged beyond what it was in November, that repairs will take months, and that reserves carrying Russia through this process may be depleted if Russia does not “nip this in the bud now.” He connects this to a sense of Russian decision-making urgency, citing the atmosphere around May 9 and describing Russian messaging about “unconditional surrender,” including references to RT and statements by Dmitry Medvedev. The transcript also addresses NATO member-state escalation risks. Ritter argues Kaliningrad may be treated as a flashpoint and describes prior warnings against attacking Kaliningrad by saying Russia would “instantly kill” attackers and their command staff. He claims the rationale is that attacking Kaliningrad would force outcomes that could “eradicate” the Baltic states and questions what NATO would do afterward. He criticizes rhetoric and describes it as provoking Russia into action, arguing that patience and pragmatism are misunderstood as weakness. On diplomatic possibilities, Ritter says he sees “no hope” in the EU in the short term for meaningful diplomacy while militaries discuss war. He argues China offers the best diplomatic pathway, saying China could contact Trump and communicate that this is not a bluff, potentially forcing European reconsideration. He says the United States lacks an effective one-on-one channel with Putin and argues that the United States should pressure Europe and tell Ukraine the war is finished. In concluding remarks, Ritter emphasizes escalation control and warns that once escalation management is diluted, it becomes difficult to restore status quo. He frames the situation as moving toward direct confrontation and says peace requires prompt action, while continuing to discuss these issues through independent media.

Gilbert Doktorov says Russia appears to be “painted itself into a corner” because NATO attacks have shifted from “small pinpricks” to long-range drones and missiles directed with Western targeting and satellite support, and because NATO countries are no longer deterred—striking Russia with what he describes as impunity. He argues this forces Russia toward escalation, since otherwise attacks would intensify and NATO would be more convinced Russia will not respond, leading Europeans to talk openly about war. Doktorov describes spending a month in Petersburg and meeting people across society, including a leading notary and the successor to Century 21 in Russia’s real estate brokerage sector, as well as a working-class moving company head. He says they expressed the same core view: people are thinking “why is Putin dragging it out?” and that polls are skewed because they ask the wrong question. He claims sentiment would change if the question were “do you approve of the conduct of the war,” predicting about 20% in favor and 80% against. He adds that dissatisfaction is widespread but people are not demonstrating in the streets. He also emphasizes hardships from the war near border provinces and in Crimea, saying life has become miserable due to drone risks and transport problems. He recounts friends with a small hillside home in Feodosia-area Crimea who have limited supplies, unreliable access, communication cutoffs, and effects from disruptions such as closures of the Crimean Bridge. He contrasts this with an observation of busy restaurant life in central Petersburg during a warm day, saying the war feels distant in daily scenes but awareness becomes unavoidable after events such as drone attacks on a fuel storage/refinery near Vasilievsky Island that produced black plumes. He also states war weariness is omnipresent and cites encountering double amputees being assisted in a bank. When discussing options for the Kremlin, Doktorov argues that Western and Zelensky strategies to “bait” Russians into revolt do not fit Russia as a pre-revolutionary situation; he characterizes a possible outcome as a “palace coup” where people close to the Kremlin overthrow President Putin, describing this as one outcome rather than a public uprising. He says the people he spoke with did not directly call for violent escalation or bomb “the hell out of” anyone, and he suggests the only way to end the war “tomorrow without capitulating” could be major escalation. He also suggests Putin might come around to changing policy. Doktorov critiques what he portrays as the repetitive cult-of-personality nature of Putin’s speeches, saying that “nothing comes out” of them and that his view now focuses on actions. He warns that by the end of the year Western-supplied missiles and drones will be ready in serial production for Kyiv. On Zelensky’s threats against Belarus, Doktorov says major Western media largely did not pay attention, but that La Libre Belgique ran extensive coverage. He reports that the threatened measures against Lukashenko were framed as imposed during Zelensky’s G7 meeting, and that Zelensky’s ultimatum included deactivating Belarusian border devices enabling Russian targeting or facing Belarusian deactivation by force and attacks on “500 sites” in Belarus. Doktorov says Lukashenko delayed response, then met with emissaries, and afterward indicated a change in the war’s nature, interpreting this as a signal of extreme retaliation. Regarding possible strategy, Doktorov argues Russia should focus on the “proxy”—Ukraine—rather than attacking European countries producing munitions, calling it more counterproductive and risky to strike European producers. He argues removing the proxy would force European war preparations to stop because European populations and politics would resist sending troops. He also claims Russia is trying to eliminate military coordination and intelligence centers and that continued attacks on Russian refineries are materially affecting Russia’s economy, including record demand for gas canisters. In closing, Doktorov points to political concerns ahead of Duma elections on September 20, including a scandal in the Duma where a United Russia member distorted Zyuganov’s speech about the banking system and then issued an official apology. He interprets this as alarm inside United Russia about losing the elections, saying it could be “political death” for the communists.

Recent discussions in the UK and US suggest that Ukraine may be allowed to strike deep into Russian territory using Western long-range weapons. This marks a significant escalation, as Ukraine currently lacks the capability to effectively use these systems without NATO support. If NATO countries decide to proceed, it would mean direct involvement in the conflict, fundamentally altering its nature. The delivery of thousands of precision missiles to Ukraine raises concerns about potential Russian retaliation, which could lead to a broader conflict involving nuclear weapons. Putin has warned that such actions would be considered a declaration of war. The situation is precarious, with the risk of escalating tensions leading to catastrophic consequences, including nuclear warfare. The urgency of the moment calls for heightened awareness and preparation for potential global instability.

In a wide-ranging interview, Professor Sergei Karaganov, a prominent Russian foreign policy scholar, provides his perspective on the current security crisis, Russia’s strategic posture, and possible futures for Europe and the world. On the trajectory of the conflict and world order - Karaganov argues that the conflict signifies a broader systemic shift, describing it as a “fourth world war” that began in Ukraine with American efforts to undermine Russia and European participation, spreading now to the Middle East and South Asia. - He frames the wider struggle as a gradual replacement of a unipolar Western order with multipolar dynamics, warning that diplomacy has been insufficient and that the European elites are leading their states toward a major war. - He emphasizes the need to prevent horizontal escalation and to stop the war in Europe, extending concerns to destabilization across a vast swath of the globe. On NATO, Ukraine, and escalation - He notes unprecedented Western support for actions on Russian soil, including missile attacks and political backing for operations on territory Russia considers vital, including aspects of its nuclear triad and early warning systems. - He criticizes Western decision-makers for misjudging the scope of the conflict, arguing that the war is not only about Ukraine but about a broader confrontation with the Old West. Russia’s strategic aims and deterrence - A central theme is the need to “win” this war to halt the bloodletting in Ukraine and to prevent further escalation and casualties on both sides. - He calls for escalating to deter and punish Western elites, arguing for a reevaluation and expansion of Russia’s nuclear doctrine to threaten European elites and bunkers with limited, targeted nuclear strikes if necessary. - He advocates shifting from a doctrine that assumes no victories in nuclear war to one in which “there will be victories” and where Russia would reserve the right to use nuclear weapons against European adversaries if deterrence fails. - He also suggests delegating some command authority for European theater to a dedicated commander who could authorize such actions, including nuclear use, if necessary. On arms control, diplomacy, and prospects for peace - Karaganov argues for moving away from arms-control constraints as part of a broader strategic realignment and emphasizes the need to deter and potentially punish adversaries with credible force. - He dismisses the “Spirit of Alaska” as a trap and warns that peace would only be possible if European elites are removed or replaced, implying that diplomacy would be possible only after such changes. - He maintains that a truce could be possible, but not a peace, unless European elites are replaced by more restrained governance and a rethink of Western strategic posture. - He asserts that Minsk was a mistake and criticizes attempts to extend deterrence to European allies, labeling such proposals as disastrous for Russia and European stability. On Europe, modernization, and Russia’s future - He contends that Europe has historically been a source of conflict and that Europe must be kept at a distance; Europe should not determine Russia’s future course. - He rejects European integration as Russia’s path, arguing that Europe remains valuable culturally but cannot dictate Russia’s strategic choices. - He positions Russia as inherently Eurasian, with external cultural roots in the Byzantine, Muslim, and Buddhist worlds, and deems Europe as a historical phase that should be left behind for Russia’s future development. On diplomacy and concrete steps - He notes that diplomacy could still have a chance, but the endgame would involve the elimination of the Kyiv regime, restoration of Russian-controlled lands in the south and east of Ukraine, and breaking the will of European elites to pursue aggression. - He reiterates a preference for avoiding a direct European invasion and expresses a desire to avoid a full-scale nuclear exchange, while insisting that Russia must be prepared to act decisively if Western adversaries continue their aggression.

Russia is summoning the US ambassador to hold the United States accountable for attacks on Crimea, threatening punishment. This follows reports of Putin threatening US territories, according to Russian news. Russia is requesting dialogue with the US to discuss nuclear war and de-escalation. Russia is considering changing its nuclear doctrine to allow preemptive attacks if threatened. Putin also says Russia will potentially deliver weapons to North Korea and other US enemies due to the US, Ukraine, and Russia situation. This news comes as US members of Congress are reportedly saying this is an overdrive.

Gilbert Doktorov discusses volume two of his war diaries, noting that volume three will likely come out between six and eight weeks from the time of the interview, depending on production in Arizona. He argues that 2024 was a period of transition from a Special Military Operation (SMO) to a war with the West, encompassing the United States and Europe, and accompanied by a new Russian nuclear doctrine published in November. This doctrine lowered the threshold for Russian use of nuclear weapons against those supplying long-range weapons to Ukraine, reflecting a shift from threats centered on ICBMs to concerns about medium-range missiles, particularly those deployed by the United States and Germany. Key events shaping this shift include long-range missiles such as Taurus missiles discussed by German air force leaders in March 2024, which Russia intercepted and published; the intent to use Taurus missiles to destroy the Kerch Bridge; and the broader implications of Western missile supply for Russian security. Putin’s interview with Tadel Zerubian in St. Petersburg helped assemble these pieces into a new strategic framework. Doktorov asserts that these developments culminated in a revised nuclear doctrine in 2024, changing how Russia perceives its strategic threats and the potential use of nuclear force. Doktorov notes personal changes in 2024, with daily interviews becoming a routine and a shift toward integrating breaking news into analysis. He emphasizes that volume two includes many references and links to these interviews, though not full transcripts to avoid ballooning the volume. He contrasts volume two with volume one, asserting volume two’s emphasis on ongoing discussions rather than simple interviews. In 2025, the focus of his commentary shifted to negotiations: are negotiations real and substantial, or just hot air? This became a driving theme for volume two, while 2025 is also identified as the year of Trump, which altered how issues on the battlefield were interpreted and evaluated. The host then frames the current context (2026) as NATO’s overt involvement, with surveillance drones over Russia’s Black Sea coast and predictable strikes, plus attacks on the Baltic coast near Saint Petersburg. He asks how long this can continue given Kremlin pressures and potential escalatory responses. Doktorov argues that Putin is not Russia itself in a monolithic, democratic sense, but a political actor with elections approaching and with a circle of advisers who range from liberal to conservative. He critiques the tendency to treat Putin as the sole arbiter of Russia, urging the use of the same analytic techniques applied to France or the United States to understand Russia’s internal dynamics and the legitimacy of its governance. Regarding deterrence and potential Russian responses, Doktorov rejects the notion of necessary plausible deniability for Russia. He contends that Russia could respond by targeting military assets in the Baltics or German outposts, arguing there is no reason to apologize for asserting rights in Eurasia. He cites Sergei Karaganov as a proponent of taking decisive action and suggests Russia has both the capability and the will to counter Western actions. The discussion covers the German chancellor Merz’s push for European military leadership versus von der Leyen’s leadership in Brussels, the risk of Germany attempting to dominate Europe militarily, and the broader implications for Europe’s cohesion and future projections. The conversation turns to the United States’ role, with Trump’s stance on NATO funding and defense commitments questioned. Doktorov suggests Europe should not expect U.S. military rescue if provoked by Russia, given U.S. demands for European defense spending. They discuss a UK-led group forming a naval alliance against Russia, while considering the possibility of a naval blockade and Russia’s willingness to defend its shadow fleet. Finally, they touch on Europe’s broader global stance, including threats of sanctions against Israel for grain purchases from Russia, and EU attempts to influence energy markets and East Asia. Doktorov argues that Europe has become ideologically driven and increasingly irrelevant as a geopolitical power, warning that European leadership’s irrational policies, censorship, and centralized power undermine credibility. In closing, Doktorov predicts that the war will eventually end without U.S. reconciliation, with Russia achieving its minimal objectives along the Dnieper and Nederseh, and he suggests a five-year horizon for Europe and the United States to catch up before a decisive confrontation. The host and Doktorov acknowledge the escalating danger and the potential for a major conflict unless a dramatic shift occurs.

Russian officials, including the Russian Duma and Sergey Lavrov speaking on behalf of President Vladimir Putin, said violent and massive attacks will strike Ukrainian targets. The Russian Duma also called on Putin for a massive response. The discussion focused on how Ukrainian drone attacks inside Russia increase pressure on Putin and the Russian government to escalate further in Ukraine. Over the past few months, there have been major Ukrainian drone attacks, with civilian casualties rising in Luhansk, where a college was hit and 21 students were killed last month. In response, Russia ramped up bombardment of Kyiv and said it would do more. A new attack was described as having psychological impact, with “black smoke” and “black rain” falling on Moscow. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, a total of 555 Ukrainian drones were shot down across Russia, and at least one person was killed in Rostov in the south. The attack was described as major and particularly large. The expected next Russian escalation was linked to discussions after the Luhansk attack last month: firing the Ereshnik hypersonic missile. It was stated that Russia may have fired one or two recently, including at underground military headquarters in Kyiv, where it is described as known that US and NATO military officers help Ukraine direct the war and carry out drone attacks inside Russia. The transcript also stated that Russian authorities frame this as not only Ukrainian attacks but also NATO involvement, noting Lavrov’s comments about strong responses. It was said Lavrov is usually relatively measured, but the current rhetoric appears bigger. After the Luhansk attack, Russia issued a notice telling Western countries not to evacuate diplomats and other personnel in Kyiv, which was interpreted as a warning to withdraw military personnel from underground military headquarters. Russian officials were also said to discuss targeting decision-making centers, described as referring to underground military commands rather than the parliament or Zelensky’s residence, implying the need for major missile strikes to hit underground targets at a larger scale, particularly in strikes on Kyiv.

John Mearsheimer and Glenn (Speaker 0) discuss the current state of the international system, its shifts since World War II, and the implications for U.S. foreign policy, Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. - Structural changes since the Cold War: Mearsheimer argues fundamental changes are underway in the international system due to two forces: evolving structural dynamics and the rise and actions of Donald Trump. The Cold War produced a bipolar order with the United States shaping a Western security architecture (NATO, European Community) designed to wage the Cold War. After 1989–1991, the Western order expanded globally during the unipolar moment, with NATO enlargement, EU expansion, and globalization (including China joining the WTO). From 2017, the world has entered a multipolar era with three great powers, and East Asia becomes the United States’ most important region outside the Western Hemisphere, overtaking Europe and the Persian Gulf. - East Asia as a priority: The U.S. pivot to East Asia (explicitly discussed by Clinton and then pursued under Trump) reorients strategic priorities away from Europe in a multipolar world where China is a peer competitor. This shift redefines where the U.S. focuses its resources and attention. - Trump as a destabilizing factor: Trump’s presidency is described as sui generis—a one-man wrecking ball that amplified unilateralism and contempt for international law, institutions, and allies. After initial containment of China in his first term, Trump’s policies intensified a unilateral approach. The Iran war decision (February 28) is presented as a catastrophic misstep that worsened U.S. positions globally and risked destabilizing the region further. - Three major strands of American policy causing trouble: NATO expansion, the global war on terror, and the Iran war. NATO expanded eastward in the 1990s and 2000s, culminating in Ukraine’s entry in 2022, aggravating Russia and complicating U.S.–Russia relations and European security. The global war on terror led to Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts and other interventions (Libya), generating domestic fatigue and a populist backlash that helped propel Trump. The February 28 Iran invasion created a broader, more consequential set of regional and global ramifications, with China, Russia, and Europe pressuring limits on U.S. actions. - The Iran war: Mearsheimer stresses that Iran presents a more dangerous theater than Iraq because the stakes are higher globally, with potential for a worldwide depression and cascading economic impacts, particularly in Asia. He outlines three options for ending or de-escalating the Iran conflict: (1) maintain the status quo with ongoing blockades; (2) blockade plus bombing, which risks catastrophic economic damage and Iranian retaliation; (3) cut a deal with Iran, which would be politically difficult in Washington given Israeli influence and the desire to avoid conceding that Iran “wins.” He asserts that the blockade alone won’t force surrender, bombing would escalate risk and deplete U.S. military capacity, and the only viable path is a negotiated settlement, though domestic and allied opposition makes this hard. - Israel–Iran–U.S. dynamics: The relationship between the United States and Israel creates a “tag team” dynamic, with Israel viewing Iran as an existential threat. If Iran preserves its nuclear enrichment capability, it could push Israel toward considering nuclear options, which raises the possibility of catastrophic outcomes. Trump’s rhetoric has even hinted at extreme objectives against Iran, complicating efforts to reach a deal. Mearsheimer emphasizes the influential role of the Israeli lobby in U.S. policy and notes the broader risk of nuclear escalation in the region. - Ukraine and nuclear deterrence: The Ukraine war has surprised many by showing Ukraine’s ability to threaten Russian strategic forces with Western support, which underscores Karaganov’s point about Europeans underestimating the nuclear dimension of security and deterrence. Mearsheimer highlights that the current era features a complex web of regional and great-power interdependencies—Russia, China, Iran, and European security architectures are all interlinked, affecting and being affected by one another. - Conclusion and outlook: The discussion emphasizes that managing security competition, rather than relying solely on military solutions, is essential. The speakers warn that the contemporary shift toward multipolarity and the interwoven regional dynamics heighten the risk of escalation and miscalculation, making prudent diplomacy and restraint crucial to avoiding a broader catastrophe. They acknowledge the difficulty of achieving lasting peace in the Middle East given domestic political constraints and the powerful influence of regional actors, but stress the necessity of recognizing the geopolitical realities of a world in which power is distributed more unevenly than in the Cold War.

**Original Language Summary:** Обсуждается возможность разрешения киевскому режиму наносить удары по территории России западным оружием большой дальности. Подчеркивается, что украинская армия не может самостоятельно наносить такие удары из-за отсутствия необходимых разведданных и возможности вносить полетные задания в ракетные системы. Это требует участия военнослужащих стран НАТО. В случае принятия решения о нанесении таких ударов, это будет означать прямое участие стран НАТО в войне на Украине, что существенно изменит суть конфликта и потребует от России принятия соответствующих решений, исходя из создаваемых угроз. **English Translation:** The possibility of allowing the Kyiv regime to strike Russian territory with long-range Western weapons is being discussed. It is emphasized that the Ukrainian army cannot independently carry out such strikes due to the lack of necessary intelligence data and the ability to enter flight missions into missile systems. This requires the participation of NATO military personnel. If a decision is made to carry out such strikes, it would mean the direct participation of NATO countries in the war in Ukraine, which would significantly change the nature of the conflict and require Russia to make appropriate decisions based on the threats created.

Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Rabkinov said that documents related to attacks on Saint Petersburg could prompt Russia to use nuclear weapons in a worst-case scenario, including against countries that possess nuclear weapons, not only against Ukraine. The transcript argues that NATO is launching the attacks and that Ukraine lacks nuclear weapons. The claims are tied to events during the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum, attended by over 130 countries and more than 22,000 people. The transcript describes drone strikes beginning as the forum was taking place, including video said to show drones crossing the city and targeting a highly populated civilian area. It also cites reports of a civilian bus being attacked and states seven civilian casualties and eleven injured from a Ukrainian Armed Forces drone strike. The discussion contrasts Russia’s nuclear signaling with President Volodymyr Zelensky’s stance that he has been open to peace negotiations and is meeting with NATO head Mark Rutte. The transcript criticizes Zelensky’s messaging style, reiterates that he continues promoting NATO membership, and describes his warning that “big trouble” would come if Ukraine is denied membership. It also says Zelensky claims readiness for direct negotiations with Putin while purportedly maintaining obstacles to those talks. Professor Robert Pape, director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats at the University of Chicago, argues that an “escalation trap” has been unfolding for about three years, with parallels to earlier dynamics seen in other conflicts. He says Putin pursued what he expected to be a quick victory but Ukraine “stiffened,” and that both sides have nearly irreconcilable objectives. Pape highlights that Putin has nuclear weapons and that Ukraine now has the capability to strike deep into Russia, which he frames as making escalation extremely dangerous. The transcript connects escalation risk to Ukraine’s increased drone capacity, stating Ukraine has drone manufacturing capabilities and that donor involvement—specifically mentioning Jennifer Pritzker—is part of how drone production and precision targeting have expanded. It emphasizes that drones are relatively inexpensive and that smaller funding streams could still enable effective drone campaigns, describing long-distance precision and the ability to steer drones directly into targets. The conversation also draws parallels to the Iran conflict, describing how the use of drones disrupted business and civilian-linked activities around the Gulf and how the Saint Petersburg Economic Forum is likened to Russia’s “Davos,” with an aim described as disrupting strategic investors rather than targeting the forum’s attendees directly. Pape and others argue for restraint and off-ramps to prevent being dragged into escalation traps. The transcript argues that Europe should push for a clear line to end the war, comparing it to ending the Korean War through a defined line of contact rather than leaving it to the decision of one party. It claims the “line of contact” has not moved meaningfully over several years and says Europe should publicly decide what line it supports, tying funding to an armistice and freezing the conflict. The transcript also references the idea that an earlier peace framework around the Ankara agreement was scuttled, and it concludes by arguing that without a defined settlement line, multiple actors keep escalation traps active, with repeated calls to ask why Europe and others are not publicly demanding the needed end conditions.

The interview is delayed and then resumes, with discussion shifting to major international developments. On Iran-related negotiations scheduled for Saturday, July 11, Speaker 4 says the Pakistanis believe talks will resume by then, but multiple parties (Iranians, the U.S., Israel) can still disrupt events before that date. Speaker 4 says the first thing to check is whether the parties meet; if they meet, the MOU remains viable. He lists unresolved issues including failure of the United States to fulfill Article 1, efforts to control Iran’s duties under Article 5, Iran not relenting, and the issue of unfreezing assets. Speaker 1 adds that total relief of all sanctions is also still on the table, and raises the ongoing Lebanon issue. On maritime activity near the Strait of Hormuz, Speaker 1 cites a UKMTO statement claiming the southern route is open again for all traffic, with a corridor expanded for day or night travel if ships keep AIS on, radar on, and lights on. The threat level is described as substantial due to mine danger areas and concern about naval forces hailing ships over VHF. Speaker 4 says he is monitoring ship tracking and describes container ships and other cargo vessels returning, with most traffic going through Iranian channels and only one or two via Omani channels. The conversation then turns to a Netanyahu–Trump meeting during the NATO summit context. Speaker 1 relays an Axios report quoting a senior Trump official: Netanyahu made promises about the Iran war that didn’t come to pass, showing trust is broken, and the report’s leak is framed as significant. Speaker 4 references criticism of Netanyahu coming through reports attributed to Barak Ravid. Both discuss that any public warmth may mask deeper concerns, and they emphasize that what matters is what happens afterward. Speaker 1 worries about U.S. decisions that could greenlight Israel in Lebanon and undermine negotiations with Iran due to Israel’s violations of ceasefire and MOU language that Speaker 1 says is tied to Lebanon. Speaker 1 describes conversations with people from Lebanon (Laith Malouf of Free Palestine TV, and Sharmeen Narwani of The Cradle) and explains his focus on what the Lebanese government is thinking. He argues the Lebanese government’s actions contradict the MOU Iran made with the U.S. regarding Lebanon and references leaked clauses that he says require the Lebanese army to disarm Hezbollah across all Lebanon, which he says could trigger civil war. Speaker 4 replies that the deal represented only a portion of Lebanon’s population, with the rest split among Sunni and Shia Muslims and the Druze. Speaker 1 also relays an Axios item saying Netanyahu urged Trump to reign in Erdogan over increasingly anti-Israel rhetoric, and asked Trump to avoid approving weapon sales that would help Turkey modernize its air force. Discussion includes claims of mutual hostile rhetoric and disagreements between Israel and Turkey, as well as debate over whether economic escalation like oil pressure should occur. A clip of Trump’s comments is discussed, describing threats to attack Iran’s infrastructure and promises about enriched uranium. Speaker 1 then reads Iran’s response, attributed to Muhammad Bagheri, criticizing the threats and urging respect, with a statement that the Iranian people are “strangers to the language of threats” and warning of response “in another language.” Speaker 4 says the language was prohibited in the MOU and frames it as a violation, while Speaker 1 counters that violations may not be expected to be perfect in an MOU context. The transcript then focuses heavily on the scale of Ali Khamenei’s funeral as reported by Al Jazeera and other estimates: Speaker 1 cites projections of 14 to 20 million across Iraq and Iran over the entire period, and gives specific city estimates: Iran 15 million, Qom 2 to 4 million, Iraq 3 to 5 million, and Mashhad 7 to 10 million, with combined attendance projected around 30 to 40 million. Speaker 4 responds that the size indicates Sayyed Ali Mohammed’s unpopularity. Speaker 1 describes a viral post and a quote broadcast on Iranian national television from a person who says they were previously against the government, engaged in protests, and now begs forgiveness, portraying a shift in sentiment after the war. Speaker 4 compares the funeral’s impact to the U.S. unity shift after December 7, 1941, and says it will affect Iranian culture for the next 50 years. Speaker 1 agrees, adding that even critics may mourn and respect due to the defense of the country and the war’s narrative. Israel/Iran-related moral and protest comparisons appear next, including discussion of alleged violence by Israeli police and prisons versus claims about Iranian guards. The conversation then reports a new maritime incident: Speaker 1 says an unknown projectile hit a Qatari-owned LNG tanker, Al-Raqayat, on the port side near the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz, causing fire with no casualties or environmental impact reported. Authorities advise vessels transit with caution, report suspicious activity to UKMTO, and Speaker 1 frames the incident as showing escalation risk despite ongoing negotiations. On Ukraine, Speaker 1 relays comments attributed to Russian spokesperson Peskov calling it “a war,” and Zelensky’s statements about nuclear weapons as a form of security and vulnerability if lacking them. Speaker 1 connects this to reports that Ukraine may consider obtaining a nuclear capability and mentions a large Russian attack allegedly with drones intercepted but few or no missiles intercepted. Trump’s remarks are also discussed, including a claim that a 90-minute call with Putin and efforts by Trump could bring talks to an end, and that NATO summit discussions may help. Speaker 4 responds by shifting to arguments about escalation and retaliation patterns, then provides a long historical breakdown of Russia’s shifts in tactics and force posture: from early invasion framed as special military operation, to mobilizations, shifting operational focus (e.g., Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Pokrovsk), the Kursk invasion, and later expansion across multiple regions. Speaker 4 claims Kyiv has been struck repeatedly and discusses air defense failures, and he asserts Russia has reserves while Ukraine does not. The transcript then returns to military, economic, and political pressures. Zelensky’s Financial Times quote is read: once attacks reach “1,000 flying towards Moscow” Putin will “feel it personally,” and farther from Moscow means closer to ending the war. Speaker 4 counters with skepticism about Ukraine’s ability to match Russia’s scale of attacks, and discusses glide bombs and claimed casualty impacts. Speaker 1 asks about pressure from energy infrastructure strikes and oil market impacts, while Speaker 4 says Russia exports increase, premiums are obtained, and the broader oil-market impact is limited. Additional regional updates include Lebanon: the Lebanese president denies reports of meeting Netanyahu and says he would immediately leave if in the same room while Israeli attacks and violations continue. Speaker 1 also cites a Lebanese government preliminary report placing direct damage from the war between $3 billion and $4 billion, excluding indirect economic losses of $16 billion, and Speaker 4 responds by calling the deaths “priceless.” Yemen is described as a major development: Speaker 1 says Saudi imposed a blockade preventing Iranian airplanes from going to Yemen for the first time in 11 years, and Iran breached it with an Iranian Mahan air flight to Sana’a transporting injured people and a high-level delegation. The conversation frames this as strategically favorable for Iran, with proxy-war consequences and ongoing clashes linked to Houthi activity and Saudi-backed forces. Speaker 4 adds that Yemen heating up could affect Saudi exits through Bab el-Mandab and change logistics depending on where oil is being sold. On Gaza, Speaker 1 discusses claims that Hamas government bodies resigned or were dissolved and describes other circulating reports (from Emirati outlets) saying these were false and that Hamas instead renovated an emergency committee into an interim committee led by Abdul Hadi al-Aqra (as stated). Speaker 4 accepts this alternative framing as more credible, and Speaker 1 says Hamas aims to expand political control in Gaza and the West Bank. Speaker 1 adds news that an International Security Force presence (described as Trump’s “peace” border force) may bring 20,000 personnel mostly from Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, and Albania, while Gaza continues to be bombed. The episode ends with discussion of negotiation prospects: Speaker 1 argues Trump needs a political win after the Iran war and is more optimistic about Ukraine negotiations, while Speaker 4 says Europe may push confrontation with Russia and risks of escalation at sea. Both agree that the conflict’s end may happen while Trump is still president, but not on Trump’s terms, and they conclude after exchanging commentary on future tracking tools and other unrelated remarks.

Mario and the Colonel discuss the latest developments in the Ukraine-Russia conflict and their implications for peace negotiations and the battlefield. - The hosts walk through conflicting claims about an alleged Ukrainian drone attack on Putin’s residence, timed with Zelenskyy’s meeting with Trump. Ukraine denied the claims; Russia asserted the opposite; a CIA report then said the drones targeted a Russian military base in the region and that this wasn’t the first time such a base had been targeted. The Colonel notes that all sides may be using disinformation, and no one can say with authority what happened. He emphasizes that what matters is how each side uses the information to bolster its position and public support, including Lavrov’s stated threat of retaliation. He argues the military reality on the ground continues to be unfavorable for Ukraine, and that Russia will use any incident to justify gains or concessions on its terms. - On negotiations, the 90–95% of an agreement reportedly already accepted is contrasted with two sticking points: security guarantees and territory. Zelenskyy is said to be nearing some form of security guarantee solution, but Donbas territorial concessions remain unresolved. The Colonel suggests evaluating who benefits from the alleged incident; if true, it could be used to sabotage peace talks. He notes competing narratives: Ukraine seeks to portray Russia as untrustworthy, while Russia portrays Ukraine as the aggressor and untrustworthy, both using the incident to justify their positions. He questions whether any side actually benefits, proposing that Russia might use the event domestically to rally support and push negotiations toward its terms. - The discussion moves to strategic weapons and timing. They note the Arashnik missiles in Belarus, described as nuclear-capable, with high speed and multiple warheads. The Colonel says Russia has signaled willingness to escalate but would likely reserve Arashniks for decisive moments or major escalations, possibly a clash with NATO, rather than using them routinely. He cites Putin’s statements about negotiating or taking actions by force and explains that Russia’s leadership appears to have reached a point where battlefield gains could be prioritized if diplomacy stalls. - On Ukraine’s ability to advance, the Colonel argues that Russia prioritizes territorial gains but is not constrained by time, with large manpower advantages and sustained firepower. He asserts Russia’s advance has accelerated over 2024–2025 and could continue, potentially enabling breakthroughs even if the Donbas remains a long-term objective. He contrasts this with potential Ukrainian vulnerabilities, including troop losses, desertions, and mobilization limits, suggesting Ukraine could face a collapse in the front line by spring or summer, though there is uncertainty about exact outcomes. - Regarding Ukraine’s effort to disrupt Russia’s economy by targeting the Black Sea fleet and shipping, the Colonel is skeptical that such actions would decisively affect Russia, given Russia’s diversification away from sea-based revenues and Ukraine’s parallel economic strains, including power shortages and refineries. He emphasizes that neither side’s economic measures have produced a decisive effect, and that Russia has prepared countermeasures. - Trump’s post claiming that “Putin’s attack bluster” shows Russia stands in the way of peace is discussed. The Colonel says Trump is echoing Western lines and that such rhetoric will not by itself alter the course of negotiations; an eventual settlement requires both sides to agree on terms, not slogans. - On possible Russian retaliation, the Colonel suggests targeted responses within Kyiv’s power sector or leadership and possibly infrastructure, but he cautions against predicting escalation, noting Russia’s risk-averse tendencies and potential to strike second- and third-tier Ukrainian leaders or critical infrastructure if deemed necessary for domestic purposes. - Looking ahead twelve months, the Colonel predicts continued war, potential major battlefield moves with accelerating territorial changes, and the possibility of a breakthrough or a sharp escalation. He warns that a purely defensive posture will not win and that the pace of Russian advances could lead to significant shifts by late 2026, with Donbas negotiations remaining unsettled. He concludes that the conflict is likely to continue, with hybrid warfare and broader Western responses shaping developments.

Americans believe a potential World War III would only concern Europe, reflecting a US-centric geopolitical strategy based on the assumption of safety across the ocean. Russia has its own doctrine for using nuclear weapons and is making adjustments to it. The speaker claims Americans view WWIII as bad because they don't want Europe to suffer, reflecting a master-servant mentality where others, including Ukrainians and now Europeans, are expected to "die for them." Speculation exists about allowing Ukraine to use not only Storm Shadow but also American long-range missiles. An anonymous source in Washington said they are looking into Ukraine's request positively. The speaker warns that "playing with fire" is dangerous for adults entrusted with nuclear weapons in the West.

The discussion claims Europe, including the EU, Germany, and the UK, is escalating toward direct war with Russia, pointing to “mobilization” already underway. It asserts that new long-range missile testing systems—described as including 250 kg warheads—are being used to help Ukraine “bomb Moscow directly,” portrayed as a “going away present” tied to Keir Starmer’s departure. It also claims Germany delivered 6,000 new medium-range drones to Ukraine, citing drone strikes on civilian infrastructure inside Moscow and referencing attacks from the previous week. Vladimir Putin is cited as saying the West is preparing for war with Russia, using offensive budgets and a pattern in which Western threats force Russia to act for self-defense, followed by accusations meant to justify continued aggressive policy. The transcript also quotes remarks about Ukraine being made into an “anti-Russian regime” through a coup and about the war in Donbas being started using aviation, artillery, and attacks against civilians. It says Russia tried to “talk reason” for eight years before being “forced” to come to the rescue of people described as part of the “Russian world,” including Russian-language communities. Former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter responds after recently visiting St. Petersburg, Moscow, and front-line areas including Lugansk, Donetsk, and Zaporozhye. He says there are “two mindsets” in major cities, but argues the West is running “major information warfare” using Ukraine as a proxy. He describes drone strikes on Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Voronezh as harassment, claiming they do not cripple Russia or break morale, including describing an incident when 500 drones were launched and residents “just get on with their lives.” He claims some Russians believe Putin’s lack of decisive response shows weakness, while others believe Putin’s pragmatism shows weakness and Russia must “double down,” and he asserts that Putin listens more to front-line soldiers than elites. Ritter claims Russians are advancing decisively and threatening captures including Slovyansk and Kramatorsk before summer, with Donetsk falling and then Zaporizhzhia Front falling. He says Ukrainian drone warfare is ongoing and dangerous, including attacks on civilian infrastructure and vehicles on the highway linking Mariupol with Crimea, and he reports effects like closed gas stations, gas shortages, and areas without electricity and water. He describes what he portrays as Ukrainian use of civilians as human shields, including people remaining in liberated areas and being targeted by drones, artillery, and mortars. He recounts visiting refugee camps and claims elders hid in basements for 20–30 days without food or water, with those who ventured outside allegedly killed, and that Russian soldiers then evacuated them under attack. He also asserts drone warfare complicates logistics but does not stymie Russian advances. On weapons and supply, Ritter states that Hornet drones used in attacks were American-made and that a company funded by Eric Schmidt is linked to them. He further claims drones use Starlink terminals and describes how AI chips allocate battery power to target-finding and then transition to “free kill mode.” He claims these capabilities drive civilians off highways so military traffic is struck. When asked about life in towns after Russian advance, he says he stayed close to the front only briefly, emphasizes that returning to the gray zone is dangerous, and describes the process of clearing buildings for civilians in basements. He says wars have changed due to drones, making movement and tactics slower and different. On the cost of the conflict, the transcript cites David Petraeus as claiming Russia is outnumbered and cannot sustain the war. Ritter rejects the claim as “full of it” and argues there is rough parity in overall troop numbers, while noting Ukraine’s casualties and emphasis on drone troops. He describes Russian assaults as supported by drones and precision artillery rather than “human wave” attacks, while claiming Wagner operations used prisoner “human wave” assaults in 2022–2023 and that Wagner casualties are not incorporated into Russian official numbers. He says Russia’s advantage has shifted from “12 to 1” toward “two or three to one,” and provides a daily claim that Russians kill 1,000 to 2,000 Ukrainians, implying Russian casualties as well. He also argues drone warfare has moved ahead of training for some Russian units, leading to heavy casualties when officers use outdated tactics against FPV drone threats. He cites a commander, Abdi Al-Adinov of Akhmed Special Forces, as using modern warfare methods and achieving advances with relatively low casualties. He says Russia is developing counter-drone capabilities, including interceptor drones, but scaling them takes time and money. Ritter concludes that Russia is advancing and inflicting horrific casualties but pays a heavy price, and says Petraeus is correct that Russia has lost more men than the United States lost in World War II.

The CIA last November briefed Congress that there's a greater than 50% chance of a nuclear war between Russia and The United States, based on releasing ATAKEMS missiles to Ukraine for long-range strikes into Russia. Those strikes would have violated Russia's new nuclear doctrine and red lines. STRATCOM's director of plans briefed a Washington DC think tank that The United States is prepared for nuclear exchange with Russia, meaning nuclear war, and that The United States thought they would win. A senior Democrat asked if the CIA said the Russians were bluffing; the answer was no—the CIA said the exact opposite. The scary part is Biden administration officials were in the room and said, "Oh, we're ready for that. If the Russians wanna play, we're ready." "We're ready to go to nuclear war with them. This is the insanity that existed in November."

Glenn and Professor John Mearsheimer discuss recent strikes in Ukraine, Western involvement, NATO’s role, and broader US grand strategy amid escalating pressures involving Russia, Ukraine, and Iran. On the bombing of Kyiv, including claims by Kyiv’s mayor Vitali Klitschko that it was the worst bombing of Kyiv in the entire war, Mearsheimer says that the prevailing explanation for the massive attack is that it was a reprisal for Ukrainian drone attacks into Russia. He argues that while it could be interpreted as a “classic punishment campaign,” it actually targeted military-industrial or strategic targets rather than civilians. He notes that Kyiv Independent reported 20 Ukrainians killed and says the number is “not a large number” and does not indicate a punishment campaign designed to kill civilians. He adds that Russia has conducted massive strikes against military-industrial targets before and that he does not see the attack as fitting a direct response to Ukrainian drone attacks against Russia’s “heartland,” though he suggests Russia may frame it that way for domestic public relations purposes. Glenn raises questions about NATO involvement, noting disputes about NATO participation and reporting about “two Russian pranksters” contacting an Estonian presidential advisor and obtaining coordinates relating to attacks on St. Petersburg. Mearsheimer responds by stressing that NATO is deeply involved and cites the G7 declaration issued after a June 17 meeting in France. He says the G7 countries stated they would accelerate support for Ukraine’s long-range bombing campaign into Russia and would ramp up economic pressure on Russia. He also says Western intelligence, drones, and drone development support have been provided to Ukraine, and that Western support likely includes helping plan drone offensives. He points out that Ukrainian drones have flown over the Baltic states without Russian reaction, but that Russia has said it will attack drone launch sites if drones are launched from Baltic territory—so he says Baltic states do not allow Ukraine to launch drones from their territory, though he believes Russia would retaliate if that changed. Mearsheimer discusses proposals attributed to Sergei Karaganov about attacking Europe with conventional weapons first and then, if necessary, turning to nuclear weapons. Mearsheimer argues Russia is unlikely to take that “Karaganov road” right away because it believes it can parry drone attacks effectively in the short term and because battlefield conditions matter. He says Russia is moving slowly but steadily toward conquering all of Donbass, leaving little to conquer, and argues that these incentives reduce pressure to escalate into Europe or consider nuclear options immediately. He adds that if Western rhetoric were true that Russia is losing and suffering massive casualties, the Karaganov approach might seem more plausible, but he says that is not what is happening on the battlefield. Glenn argues that Western leaders talk about bringing war to Russia and increasing “pain,” but that restraint has existed because Russia can absorb limited punishment without major impact. He warns that if the capacity to absorb punishment disappears, Russia may strike NATO states, raising the risk of major escalation. He then asks why Western elites are becoming more open about deep strikes inside Russia, including mentions such as a NATO-linked strategy reward for targeting Russian airfields, and whether this openness serves to normalize attacks, reduce fear of retaliation, or shift political incentives. Mearsheimer replies that Western elites have convinced themselves that Putin is a “congenital aggressor,” and that Russia’s ambitions and inevitability of conflict narratives have become entrenched. He says these stories can fit elite motivations such as supporting defense spending and keeping Americans involved, but argues the belief may be driven more by unconscious self-persuasion than coordinated strategy. He describes a security dilemma spiral: if Europeans and Russians believe war is inevitable, each side prepares for the same war, and each side’s defensive actions look offensive to the other. He says he sees no way out of the spiral at present. They then debate Western claims that Ukraine is winning. Glenn points to battlefield reports suggesting extreme casualty ratios—like 1 to 20 or 1 to 40 in Ukrainian-to-Russian dead—while also seeing Ukraine recapture territory. He says these accounts do not “add up,” citing perceived contradictions about rationality, deterrence assumptions, and political narratives. Mearsheimer focuses on casualty numbers and discusses a New York Times piece, saying it cited a CSIS study and reported around 450,000 Russians dead and between 125,000 and 150,000 Ukrainians dead, resulting in a “three to one” ratio. He says that ratio is “simply unbelievable” because the main battlefield killer is artillery, and that Russian artillery advantage is estimated at 5 to 1, 7 to 1, or even 10 to 1 across much of the war. He argues Ukraine has launched many offensives—citing Kursk and the June 4, 2023 offensive, plus earlier offensives in Kherson and Kharkiv—so the claim that Ukraine has mainly been defensive does not fit. He adds that he thinks Ukrainian losses are likely much higher, possibly around a million men killed in action, and says the New York Times numbers underpin decisions about escalating support for Ukraine. Mearsheimer expands to explain “truth as first casualty,” saying propaganda turns casualty measurement into a success indicator. He compares to Vietnam, where body counts were treated as an indicator of winning despite internal knowledge of deep trouble, and says the process created a fantasy world. He argues that today’s Ukraine narrative is similarly sustained and that Western elites increasingly believe they are doing well, reinforced by perceived Russian setbacks and slow Russian progress. He says the only likely way to dispel the narrative is a Russian battlefield victory: if Russia rolls up Donbass, Zaporizhia, and Kherson and then moves further, it becomes harder to sustain the existing story. Turning to Iran, Glenn asks how US success should be measured in a conflict without a ground war comparable to Ukraine or Vietnam. Mearsheimer says the US is not going to win the war but that two goals must be achieved. He defines goal one as opening the strait so oil flows, including Iranian oil, with payment in dollars and flooding the market. He defines goal two as achieving a nuclear deal, “some variant of the JCPOA,” because the nuclear issue is central while there will be no agreement on missiles or on supporting proxies like Hezbollah, Hamas, or the Houthis, and no immediate regime change. He emphasizes that the Memorandum of Understanding structured negotiations so that first the Strait would be opened and shooting would end, and that bombing ended by April 8th after which the conflict shifted to blockade. He argues that while opening the strait is largely achieved, the nuclear issue remains unresolved alongside major economic issues advantageous to Iran: reparations (including a $300 billion fund), frozen assets (over $100 billion), lifting sanctions, and the “toll booth” issue. He says powerful incentives exist for the West to reach a nuclear deal because Iran has the capability to build a bomb and lack of a revised nuclear framework would increase the risk of Israeli nuclear use. He adds that the Iranians wanted the nuclear issue at the end of negotiations because keeping leverage for later mattered after the strait had opened, leaving leverage with the nuclear issue. Finally, Glenn asks Mearsheimer to define US grand strategy now. Mearsheimer says earlier grand strategy during the Cold War focused on Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf as three key strategic regions outside the Western Hemisphere. He says in the multipolar world the principal threat is China, driving a pivot to Asia. He argues that under Trump, the Western Hemisphere is given high priority through social engineering and military engagement, despite no serious threats there at present. He says the US is also deeply involved in the Persian Gulf, with a major conflict with Iran, and reengaging in Ukraine as well as maintaining East Asia as a “pacing threat.” He concludes that the United States is not prioritizing and that this “militarized state” across multiple regions is not workable long term. He closes by adding two points: the debt problem and the weakness of the American manufacturing base. He argues the Ukraine war shows that in any prolonged war the US needs a large industrial base and depleted stocks can take a long time to replenish; therefore, planning for long wars—like a potential conflict in Asia—requires prioritization.