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A resolution is being introduced to consider an attack on NATO if Russia or its proxy, Belarus, detonates a nuclear device in Ukraine. The belief is that such an attack would irradiate Europe and harm NATO allies. The urgency stems from President Biden's acknowledgment of the threat of Putin using tactical nuclear weapons. The counter offensive in Ukraine is progressing slowly, but thousands of well-trained forces are ready to join the battle. The focus is on the potential use of nuclear weapons by Putin, and the message is clear: NATO will respond massively, and a war with NATO will ensue. The resolution aims to deter Russia and provide clarity on the consequences of such actions.

NATO has expanded eastward, but claims it is not a threat to Russia. The Russian army's proximity to NATO is due to NATO's expansion, not Russia's. NATO insists it is a defensive alliance, while Russia's actions in Ukraine are seen as aggressive. The debate centers on whether NATO's expansion is perceived as hostile by Russia.

Stanislav Krapivnik, a former US army officer from Donbas, returns to discuss the escalation of NATO-Russia proxy warfare, the role of drones, and potential strategic escalations. The conversation centers on how Europe is contributing to deep strikes in Russia, especially against energy installations, and the resulting danger of a broader conflict. Key points and claims, as presented: - Drones and deep strikes: The EU, through its defense alignment, aims to overwhelm Russian air defenses and threaten strategic assets, including nuclear-capable targets, by using long-range drones. The objective is to degrade Russian defensive systems and the production rate of missiles, potentially opening the path to strikes on radars, early warning systems, strategic assets like bombers, and even nuclear submarines in port. - Nuclear war risk: The interviewee asserts that by mid-to-late summer there could be a zone of possible nuclear war if ground warfare arises or escalates due to Western actions. He notes that Russia’s anti-aircraft and early warning capabilities are limited to manageable scopes, with occasional corridors allowing strikes in, and that Europe’s current strategy could push the conflict toward a nuclear dimension. - Deterrence and first strikes: The discussion contrasts U.S. first-strike doctrine with other nations’ second-strike assurances. The speaker argues that in a blinded Russia, the logic for targeted first strikes becomes stronger for the other side, while lamenting that Europe’s leadership might be pushing toward a nuclear exchange. He cites studies suggesting that as few as 47 key targets could collapse the U.S. in a nuclear context, highlighting the fragility of a high-tech economy under nuclear disruption. - European psyche and policy: There is criticism of what the speaker describes as a mass psychosis in Europe, where warnings about striking Russia’s early radar or deterrent systems are dismissed in favor of defending Ukraine. The rhetoric suggests deep political and media reinforcement of pro-Ukraine narratives, with limited space for risk discussion about nuclear consequences. - Energy installations and economy: While drone strikes have targeted oil facilities, the speaker notes that most damage has been to storage facilities rather than critical infrastructure like pipelines or refineries. Refineries are large, and damage to some vessels can take longer to repair. Russia’s production has not been significantly reduced, but the attacks are accelerating a shift of energy facilities eastward toward Asia, while Europe faces higher oil prices on the spot market and potential disruptions to gas routes like TurkStream and Caspian Pipeline Authority, with broader economic impact on Southeastern Europe and Turkey. - Russia’s response and drone modernization: The Russian military has reorganized its drone capabilities, forming dedicated drone battalions and establishing new schools to standardize and professionalize drone operations. The move encompasses reconnaissance, kamikaze, bombing, and supply drones, with adjustments after initial disorganization. Ukrainians reportedly helped inspire and provide drone countermeasures, and Russia’s modernization integrates drones with air defenses. - Zelensky and Victory Day threat: The possibility of Zelensky threatening to strike Moscow’s Victory Day parade is discussed. The guest suggests Zelensky would want to be at the head of such a move, while acknowledging the uncertainty of who controls decisions in Kyiv and the level of Western involvement. The parade’s downscaled format is noted, but the broader question remains whether such a strike could occur. The guest asserts that Russian deterrence may have been eroded, and Western actors might not take credible deterrence seriously until an incident occurs. - Africa and Mali: Russia’s activities in Africa, especially Mali, are described as significant. Mali’s leadership under Asimi Goata is navigating between Western and Russian influence. Russian forces, including elements from the former Wagner group now under the Russian defense ministry, are described as rebuilding Mali’s military and supporting a campaign by jihadist groups. The situation includes rapid, mobile “flying columns” that can cause chaos but lack staying power against organized defenses. Russian drones and aviation (including ME-20 aircraft) are reportedly effective, and Mali is moving toward energy and resource development, including three nuclear power plants proposed by Russia to Elektrify the country. France’s position is framed as colonial, with Mali’s uranium, gold, and other resources creating strategic interest. Burkina Faso’s involvement and regional dynamics involving Niger are cited as part of a broader, expanding conflict network across Africa. - Global frontlines and war risk: The guest argues that multiple frontlines are forming—Ukraine, the Persian Gulf, and Western Africa—and that they could merge into a single broader conflict if not stopped. He asserts that the West is driving this escalation, and he characterizes Western public sentiment as often indifferent to Ukrainian casualties, focusing instead on political or financial gains from the conflict. - Frontline realities: On the ground, Ukraine has tactical successes but limited staying power due to heavy casualties and supply problems. Russian forces are reportedly stronger in Donbas, Kherson, and Sumy, while Ukrainian forces face difficult conditions, including open fields and heavy artillery advantages for the Russians. Drone warfare has prompted reorganized Russian drone corps, with improved training and standardized units. The discussion ends with a warning that the conflict has global implications, with fronts expanding and risks of a broader, possibly world-scale war if not curtailed. The interviewee emphasizes that the West’s actions are fueling escalation and that African theaters, particularly Mali, are becoming an integral part of the wider confrontation.

In Ukraine, there were military biological programs experimenting with deadly pathogens like coronavirus, anthrax, cholera, and African pig plague. They are now trying to hide the evidence, but we believe they were creating components for a biological weapon. This poses a direct threat to Russia's safety. Ukraine and their US supporters rejected these claims, but their actions were bold and brazen.

The idea of Ukraine joining a Western military alliance is unacceptable to any Russian leader. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990, Gorbachev agreed to let Germany unify and join NATO, with the condition that NATO wouldn't expand eastward. However, NATO quickly moved to East Germany and later expanded to Russia's borders under Clinton. The new Ukrainian government voted overwhelmingly to join NATO, which Russia sees as a strategic threat. They believe Petro Poroshenko's government is not protecting Ukraine but rather threatening it with a major war. This situation poses a serious threat to Russia, and any Russian leader would have to react accordingly.

Speaker 0: The discussion reports that Russia has covertly tested three new weapon systems over the past twenty-eight days, with two of them described as complete game changers. These tests are said to be causing nerves inside NATO, and none of these three have been made public by President Putin, who typically announces such developments. One system, however, is not being kept secret. Speaker 0: According to the report, Russian President Putin just rolled out their most advanced hypersonic missiles to date. These missiles are described as "no one can shoot down"—at least in the view of the speaker—unless future assessments prove otherwise. The specific system named is the Orenshik Oreshnik hypersonic missiles. They are set for combat duty by the end of the year, and they are characterized as capable of extremely high speeds and long-range strikes. The deployment of these missiles is framed as something NATO will be watching very closely. The report suggests that European leaders are exhibiting a willingness to engage in war-related actions, with two particularly troubling points highlighted: the idea that they want to be part of the conflict and the accompanying casualties. It is claimed that they want to participate in the death and destruction in the European Union and in The UK. Speaker 0: The report specifically notes German Chancellor Mertz saying that they are ready to draft young men to war if they cannot reach their volunteer numbers, effectively suggesting compulsory service to fight Russia. Speaker 0: It is also stated that the UK is telling its populace to prepare to sacrifice their sons and daughters, and the speaker emphasizes that "Sons and daughters, colleagues, veterans will all have a part to play, to build, to serve, and if necessary, to fight." The speaker adds that more families will know what sacrifice for our nation means. Speaker 1: The accompanying commentary underscores the need to explain the changing threat and the necessity of staying ahead of it, reinforcing the idea that sacrifice and readiness are central to national defense in the current context.

If Putin attacks a NATO ally, we will defend every part of NATO as required by treaty. It's important to clarify that we do not seek American troops to engage in combat in Russia or against Russia.

**Original Language Summary:** Обсуждается возможность разрешения киевскому режиму наносить удары по территории России западным вооружением большой дальности. Подчеркивается, что украинская армия не может самостоятельно наносить удары современными высокоточными системами большой дальности без разведданных со спутников НАТО и внесения полетных заданий военнослужащими стран НАТО. Разрешение на такие удары будет означать прямое участие стран НАТО в войне на Украине, что существенно изменит суть конфликта и потребует от России принятия соответствующих решений, исходя из создаваемых угроз. **English Translation:** The possibility of allowing the Kyiv regime to strike Russian territory with long-range Western weapons is being discussed. It is emphasized that the Ukrainian army cannot independently carry out strikes with modern high-precision long-range systems without intelligence data from NATO satellites and the entry of flight missions by NATO member states' military personnel. Permission for such strikes would mean the direct participation of NATO countries in the war in Ukraine, which would significantly change the nature of the conflict and require Russia to make appropriate decisions based on the threats created.

If Putin attacks a NATO ally, we will defend every part of NATO as required by treaty. It's important to clarify that we do not seek American troops to fight in Russia or against Russia.

If the USA and UK launch a coordinated missile attack on Russia, destroying major cities and killing Putin and military leaders, Russia's "Dead Hand" system would activate. Sensors would confirm the nuclear strike via radiation, heat, and seismic activity. If no response comes from Moscow's command center, Dead Hand will assume leadership is eliminated. The system will then autonomously launch approximately 4,000 nuclear missiles at the USA and its NATO allies. This automated retaliation system ensures Russia retaliates, even in death, triggering global devastation. The use of nuclear weapons guarantees widespread destruction, highlighting the fragile balance of power.

This is not just a nuclear carrier or nuclear weapons carrier. This is a nuclear missile or nuclear submarine drone. Because it's in the water, it can carry a much larger payload than something flying through the air. So you've got two systems now operating with nuclear reactors in them. This is a whole new level of technology. The US created a nuclear missile once. It was nuclear powered. It was contamination in flight. Everything around was contaminated. They had to back off. They couldn't master the technology. But it was traceable too because of the radiation. It was leaking everywhere. These systems don't leak radiation. They're very effective. And what they are, first of all, just to understand, is they're second strike systems. So if The US, in this case, starts getting feisty and psychotic and tries to because The US, by the way, does have a policy of first strike, whether it's from space or whether it's missile bound or whether it's submarines out of coast. If The US thinks that they can decapitate the Russian leadership and somehow take out all the Russian missiles that are on tracked carriers, on rail carriers, on ships all over the place. But let's assume somehow they decide they can do this. You've got two issues here. One, you've got the Poseidon, which may already be in place or can be launched from a carrier and travel over three, four, five days to get in place and then explode and create a wave. I mean, if they could actually put a 100 megaton explosion, I mean, a city buster missile is one megaton. 10 megatons is something that you wipe out the entirety of something like the size of New York. If they could put a 100 megaton warhead as has been proposed, you'd be facing a 200 meter wave, a 150, 200 meter wave that would destroy most anything in its path. And that considering 80%, almost 80% of the American population lives on either of the East or the West Coast, the majority being on the East Coast, that's one of those vengeance weapons that would just destroy The US effectively as a country. Then you've got the Borovayashnik, which can fly for weeks, months maybe. Who knows nobody knows exactly how long it can actually fly. If tensions are growing very high, you put a five, six, 10 of those up in the air, and they're just doing circles and waiting for command. So the enemy knows that if they do a decapitating strike, they're gonna get wet. They're gonna get a surprise.

The conversation centers on accelerating attacks involving drones and long-range strike rhetoric, and what this implies for Western involvement, escalation dynamics, and potential nuclear red lines. Scott Ritter argues that Western involvement is direct and that the attacks would not be taking place without it. He claims the technologies used are developed by the West for Ukraine, intelligence is provided exclusively by the West for Ukraine, and manufacturing is conducted outside Ukraine to avoid Russian interdiction. He frames the attacks as “collective West escalating against Russia,” and links this to NATO nations being engaged in combat operations aimed at Russia’s “existential threat.” Ritter also argues that Western leaders have crossed any prior threshold of caution long ago, citing public statements by Germany, France, Great Britain, and others about engaging Russia in open armed conflict by the end of the decade (2029–2030). He says Germany’s defense minister, Pistorius, is openly asserting that Russia is an enemy and needs preparation for war, including preparations for long-range strike missions inside Russia. Ritter states that Russia has managed escalation through repeated “red line” crossings and resets, which he portrays as designed to draw Russian overreaction and mobilize Western support for Ukraine, while Russia’s battlefield advantage continues. He references a recently published report by the special inspector general of operation Atlantic Resolve, saying it concludes Russia maintains operational and strategic dominance “across the spectrum” of the conflict. A major focus is Sergei Karaganov’s role and influence. Ritter describes Karaganov as advising Russian presidents from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin and says that in 2023 Karaganov articulated the need for a decisive counter to the West, including favoring preemptive nuclear use against strategies calling for the strategic defeat of Russia. Ritter says Karaganov’s calculation was that no American leader would trade “Boston for Poznan,” and he claims this logic appears in Russian nuclear posture. He says Putin publicly disagreed with Karaganov, but that in 2024 Karaganov was appointed to head review processes for the Kremlin’s strategic nuclear posture review, and in 2025 Russia published a new strategic nuclear posture aligned with what Ritter calls the “Karagunov doctrine.” Ritter claims this doctrine empowers Russia to treat conventional strikes into Russia’s strategic depth as a nuclear attack when nuclear powers provide conventional capability to non-nuclear powers that strike Russia’s strategic infrastructure. On current drone activity, Ritter claims drones have expanded through Baltic routes, with attacks near or involving Moscow and Saint Petersburg-area airspace impacts and closures affecting flights out of Polkava. He discusses Russian statements that Ukraine is preparing strikes from Latvian territory and says such claims shift from possibility to probability or certainty. Ritter argues Russia is beyond “managed escalation” and that damage equations have changed, making long-term consequences unavoidable for Russia’s infrastructure and reserves if threats continue. He reports an interview in Moscow with someone affiliated with a Russian Duma committee on protecting energy infrastructure from drone attacks, stating the person said damage had been minimal in the past and mitigated through repair, but Ritter argues the situation has now changed. Ritter estimates that 10–20% of Russia’s export production capacity has been damaged beyond what it was in November, that repairs will take months, and that reserves carrying Russia through this process may be depleted if Russia does not “nip this in the bud now.” He connects this to a sense of Russian decision-making urgency, citing the atmosphere around May 9 and describing Russian messaging about “unconditional surrender,” including references to RT and statements by Dmitry Medvedev. The transcript also addresses NATO member-state escalation risks. Ritter argues Kaliningrad may be treated as a flashpoint and describes prior warnings against attacking Kaliningrad by saying Russia would “instantly kill” attackers and their command staff. He claims the rationale is that attacking Kaliningrad would force outcomes that could “eradicate” the Baltic states and questions what NATO would do afterward. He criticizes rhetoric and describes it as provoking Russia into action, arguing that patience and pragmatism are misunderstood as weakness. On diplomatic possibilities, Ritter says he sees “no hope” in the EU in the short term for meaningful diplomacy while militaries discuss war. He argues China offers the best diplomatic pathway, saying China could contact Trump and communicate that this is not a bluff, potentially forcing European reconsideration. He says the United States lacks an effective one-on-one channel with Putin and argues that the United States should pressure Europe and tell Ukraine the war is finished. In concluding remarks, Ritter emphasizes escalation control and warns that once escalation management is diluted, it becomes difficult to restore status quo. He frames the situation as moving toward direct confrontation and says peace requires prompt action, while continuing to discuss these issues through independent media.

Recent discussions in the UK and US suggest that Ukraine may be allowed to strike deep into Russian territory using Western long-range weapons. This marks a significant escalation, as Ukraine currently lacks the capability to effectively use these systems without NATO support. If NATO countries decide to proceed, it would mean direct involvement in the conflict, fundamentally altering its nature. The delivery of thousands of precision missiles to Ukraine raises concerns about potential Russian retaliation, which could lead to a broader conflict involving nuclear weapons. Putin has warned that such actions would be considered a declaration of war. The situation is precarious, with the risk of escalating tensions leading to catastrophic consequences, including nuclear warfare. The urgency of the moment calls for heightened awareness and preparation for potential global instability.

In a wide-ranging interview, Professor Sergei Karaganov, a prominent Russian foreign policy scholar, provides his perspective on the current security crisis, Russia’s strategic posture, and possible futures for Europe and the world. On the trajectory of the conflict and world order - Karaganov argues that the conflict signifies a broader systemic shift, describing it as a “fourth world war” that began in Ukraine with American efforts to undermine Russia and European participation, spreading now to the Middle East and South Asia. - He frames the wider struggle as a gradual replacement of a unipolar Western order with multipolar dynamics, warning that diplomacy has been insufficient and that the European elites are leading their states toward a major war. - He emphasizes the need to prevent horizontal escalation and to stop the war in Europe, extending concerns to destabilization across a vast swath of the globe. On NATO, Ukraine, and escalation - He notes unprecedented Western support for actions on Russian soil, including missile attacks and political backing for operations on territory Russia considers vital, including aspects of its nuclear triad and early warning systems. - He criticizes Western decision-makers for misjudging the scope of the conflict, arguing that the war is not only about Ukraine but about a broader confrontation with the Old West. Russia’s strategic aims and deterrence - A central theme is the need to “win” this war to halt the bloodletting in Ukraine and to prevent further escalation and casualties on both sides. - He calls for escalating to deter and punish Western elites, arguing for a reevaluation and expansion of Russia’s nuclear doctrine to threaten European elites and bunkers with limited, targeted nuclear strikes if necessary. - He advocates shifting from a doctrine that assumes no victories in nuclear war to one in which “there will be victories” and where Russia would reserve the right to use nuclear weapons against European adversaries if deterrence fails. - He also suggests delegating some command authority for European theater to a dedicated commander who could authorize such actions, including nuclear use, if necessary. On arms control, diplomacy, and prospects for peace - Karaganov argues for moving away from arms-control constraints as part of a broader strategic realignment and emphasizes the need to deter and potentially punish adversaries with credible force. - He dismisses the “Spirit of Alaska” as a trap and warns that peace would only be possible if European elites are removed or replaced, implying that diplomacy would be possible only after such changes. - He maintains that a truce could be possible, but not a peace, unless European elites are replaced by more restrained governance and a rethink of Western strategic posture. - He asserts that Minsk was a mistake and criticizes attempts to extend deterrence to European allies, labeling such proposals as disastrous for Russia and European stability. On Europe, modernization, and Russia’s future - He contends that Europe has historically been a source of conflict and that Europe must be kept at a distance; Europe should not determine Russia’s future course. - He rejects European integration as Russia’s path, arguing that Europe remains valuable culturally but cannot dictate Russia’s strategic choices. - He positions Russia as inherently Eurasian, with external cultural roots in the Byzantine, Muslim, and Buddhist worlds, and deems Europe as a historical phase that should be left behind for Russia’s future development. On diplomacy and concrete steps - He notes that diplomacy could still have a chance, but the endgame would involve the elimination of the Kyiv regime, restoration of Russian-controlled lands in the south and east of Ukraine, and breaking the will of European elites to pursue aggression. - He reiterates a preference for avoiding a direct European invasion and expresses a desire to avoid a full-scale nuclear exchange, while insisting that Russia must be prepared to act decisively if Western adversaries continue their aggression.

We've seen five waves of NATO expansion, with military bases and attack systems now deployed in Romania and Poland. Ukraine is also being considered for NATO membership. We didn't threaten anyone; they came to our borders. Instead of treating Russia as a potential ally and building trust, they kept breaking us up and expanding NATO to the East. We expressed our concerns, but they didn't care. We prioritize our own security.

Russia is summoning the US ambassador to hold the United States accountable for attacks on Crimea, threatening punishment. This follows reports of Putin threatening US territories, according to Russian news. Russia is requesting dialogue with the US to discuss nuclear war and de-escalation. Russia is considering changing its nuclear doctrine to allow preemptive attacks if threatened. Putin also says Russia will potentially deliver weapons to North Korea and other US enemies due to the US, Ukraine, and Russia situation. This news comes as US members of Congress are reportedly saying this is an overdrive.

Gilbert Doktorov discusses volume two of his war diaries, noting that volume three will likely come out between six and eight weeks from the time of the interview, depending on production in Arizona. He argues that 2024 was a period of transition from a Special Military Operation (SMO) to a war with the West, encompassing the United States and Europe, and accompanied by a new Russian nuclear doctrine published in November. This doctrine lowered the threshold for Russian use of nuclear weapons against those supplying long-range weapons to Ukraine, reflecting a shift from threats centered on ICBMs to concerns about medium-range missiles, particularly those deployed by the United States and Germany. Key events shaping this shift include long-range missiles such as Taurus missiles discussed by German air force leaders in March 2024, which Russia intercepted and published; the intent to use Taurus missiles to destroy the Kerch Bridge; and the broader implications of Western missile supply for Russian security. Putin’s interview with Tadel Zerubian in St. Petersburg helped assemble these pieces into a new strategic framework. Doktorov asserts that these developments culminated in a revised nuclear doctrine in 2024, changing how Russia perceives its strategic threats and the potential use of nuclear force. Doktorov notes personal changes in 2024, with daily interviews becoming a routine and a shift toward integrating breaking news into analysis. He emphasizes that volume two includes many references and links to these interviews, though not full transcripts to avoid ballooning the volume. He contrasts volume two with volume one, asserting volume two’s emphasis on ongoing discussions rather than simple interviews. In 2025, the focus of his commentary shifted to negotiations: are negotiations real and substantial, or just hot air? This became a driving theme for volume two, while 2025 is also identified as the year of Trump, which altered how issues on the battlefield were interpreted and evaluated. The host then frames the current context (2026) as NATO’s overt involvement, with surveillance drones over Russia’s Black Sea coast and predictable strikes, plus attacks on the Baltic coast near Saint Petersburg. He asks how long this can continue given Kremlin pressures and potential escalatory responses. Doktorov argues that Putin is not Russia itself in a monolithic, democratic sense, but a political actor with elections approaching and with a circle of advisers who range from liberal to conservative. He critiques the tendency to treat Putin as the sole arbiter of Russia, urging the use of the same analytic techniques applied to France or the United States to understand Russia’s internal dynamics and the legitimacy of its governance. Regarding deterrence and potential Russian responses, Doktorov rejects the notion of necessary plausible deniability for Russia. He contends that Russia could respond by targeting military assets in the Baltics or German outposts, arguing there is no reason to apologize for asserting rights in Eurasia. He cites Sergei Karaganov as a proponent of taking decisive action and suggests Russia has both the capability and the will to counter Western actions. The discussion covers the German chancellor Merz’s push for European military leadership versus von der Leyen’s leadership in Brussels, the risk of Germany attempting to dominate Europe militarily, and the broader implications for Europe’s cohesion and future projections. The conversation turns to the United States’ role, with Trump’s stance on NATO funding and defense commitments questioned. Doktorov suggests Europe should not expect U.S. military rescue if provoked by Russia, given U.S. demands for European defense spending. They discuss a UK-led group forming a naval alliance against Russia, while considering the possibility of a naval blockade and Russia’s willingness to defend its shadow fleet. Finally, they touch on Europe’s broader global stance, including threats of sanctions against Israel for grain purchases from Russia, and EU attempts to influence energy markets and East Asia. Doktorov argues that Europe has become ideologically driven and increasingly irrelevant as a geopolitical power, warning that European leadership’s irrational policies, censorship, and centralized power undermine credibility. In closing, Doktorov predicts that the war will eventually end without U.S. reconciliation, with Russia achieving its minimal objectives along the Dnieper and Nederseh, and he suggests a five-year horizon for Europe and the United States to catch up before a decisive confrontation. The host and Doktorov acknowledge the escalating danger and the potential for a major conflict unless a dramatic shift occurs.

John Mearsheimer and Glenn (Speaker 0) discuss the current state of the international system, its shifts since World War II, and the implications for U.S. foreign policy, Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. - Structural changes since the Cold War: Mearsheimer argues fundamental changes are underway in the international system due to two forces: evolving structural dynamics and the rise and actions of Donald Trump. The Cold War produced a bipolar order with the United States shaping a Western security architecture (NATO, European Community) designed to wage the Cold War. After 1989–1991, the Western order expanded globally during the unipolar moment, with NATO enlargement, EU expansion, and globalization (including China joining the WTO). From 2017, the world has entered a multipolar era with three great powers, and East Asia becomes the United States’ most important region outside the Western Hemisphere, overtaking Europe and the Persian Gulf. - East Asia as a priority: The U.S. pivot to East Asia (explicitly discussed by Clinton and then pursued under Trump) reorients strategic priorities away from Europe in a multipolar world where China is a peer competitor. This shift redefines where the U.S. focuses its resources and attention. - Trump as a destabilizing factor: Trump’s presidency is described as sui generis—a one-man wrecking ball that amplified unilateralism and contempt for international law, institutions, and allies. After initial containment of China in his first term, Trump’s policies intensified a unilateral approach. The Iran war decision (February 28) is presented as a catastrophic misstep that worsened U.S. positions globally and risked destabilizing the region further. - Three major strands of American policy causing trouble: NATO expansion, the global war on terror, and the Iran war. NATO expanded eastward in the 1990s and 2000s, culminating in Ukraine’s entry in 2022, aggravating Russia and complicating U.S.–Russia relations and European security. The global war on terror led to Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts and other interventions (Libya), generating domestic fatigue and a populist backlash that helped propel Trump. The February 28 Iran invasion created a broader, more consequential set of regional and global ramifications, with China, Russia, and Europe pressuring limits on U.S. actions. - The Iran war: Mearsheimer stresses that Iran presents a more dangerous theater than Iraq because the stakes are higher globally, with potential for a worldwide depression and cascading economic impacts, particularly in Asia. He outlines three options for ending or de-escalating the Iran conflict: (1) maintain the status quo with ongoing blockades; (2) blockade plus bombing, which risks catastrophic economic damage and Iranian retaliation; (3) cut a deal with Iran, which would be politically difficult in Washington given Israeli influence and the desire to avoid conceding that Iran “wins.” He asserts that the blockade alone won’t force surrender, bombing would escalate risk and deplete U.S. military capacity, and the only viable path is a negotiated settlement, though domestic and allied opposition makes this hard. - Israel–Iran–U.S. dynamics: The relationship between the United States and Israel creates a “tag team” dynamic, with Israel viewing Iran as an existential threat. If Iran preserves its nuclear enrichment capability, it could push Israel toward considering nuclear options, which raises the possibility of catastrophic outcomes. Trump’s rhetoric has even hinted at extreme objectives against Iran, complicating efforts to reach a deal. Mearsheimer emphasizes the influential role of the Israeli lobby in U.S. policy and notes the broader risk of nuclear escalation in the region. - Ukraine and nuclear deterrence: The Ukraine war has surprised many by showing Ukraine’s ability to threaten Russian strategic forces with Western support, which underscores Karaganov’s point about Europeans underestimating the nuclear dimension of security and deterrence. Mearsheimer highlights that the current era features a complex web of regional and great-power interdependencies—Russia, China, Iran, and European security architectures are all interlinked, affecting and being affected by one another. - Conclusion and outlook: The discussion emphasizes that managing security competition, rather than relying solely on military solutions, is essential. The speakers warn that the contemporary shift toward multipolarity and the interwoven regional dynamics heighten the risk of escalation and miscalculation, making prudent diplomacy and restraint crucial to avoiding a broader catastrophe. They acknowledge the difficulty of achieving lasting peace in the Middle East given domestic political constraints and the powerful influence of regional actors, but stress the necessity of recognizing the geopolitical realities of a world in which power is distributed more unevenly than in the Cold War.

**Original Language Summary:** Обсуждается возможность разрешения киевскому режиму наносить удары по территории России западным оружием большой дальности. Подчеркивается, что украинская армия не может самостоятельно наносить такие удары из-за отсутствия необходимых разведданных и возможности вносить полетные задания в ракетные системы. Это требует участия военнослужащих стран НАТО. В случае принятия решения о нанесении таких ударов, это будет означать прямое участие стран НАТО в войне на Украине, что существенно изменит суть конфликта и потребует от России принятия соответствующих решений, исходя из создаваемых угроз. **English Translation:** The possibility of allowing the Kyiv regime to strike Russian territory with long-range Western weapons is being discussed. It is emphasized that the Ukrainian army cannot independently carry out such strikes due to the lack of necessary intelligence data and the ability to enter flight missions into missile systems. This requires the participation of NATO military personnel. If a decision is made to carry out such strikes, it would mean the direct participation of NATO countries in the war in Ukraine, which would significantly change the nature of the conflict and require Russia to make appropriate decisions based on the threats created.

To instigate a wider war, Putin must guarantee Iran protection under Russia's nuclear umbrella, deterring the US from using nuclear weapons during a potential invasion. With this assurance, Iran could provoke America through actions like Hezbollah attacks on Israel, expanding its nuclear program, or disrupting Red Sea shipping. Simultaneously, with the US distracted by Ukraine and Iran, North Korea could threaten to invade South Korea, where 30,000 US troops are stationed. This threat would force the US to divert resources to South Korea and potentially bribe North Korea. Putin has assured North Korea of protection in the event of war.

Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Rabkinov said that documents related to attacks on Saint Petersburg could prompt Russia to use nuclear weapons in a worst-case scenario, including against countries that possess nuclear weapons, not only against Ukraine. The transcript argues that NATO is launching the attacks and that Ukraine lacks nuclear weapons. The claims are tied to events during the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum, attended by over 130 countries and more than 22,000 people. The transcript describes drone strikes beginning as the forum was taking place, including video said to show drones crossing the city and targeting a highly populated civilian area. It also cites reports of a civilian bus being attacked and states seven civilian casualties and eleven injured from a Ukrainian Armed Forces drone strike. The discussion contrasts Russia’s nuclear signaling with President Volodymyr Zelensky’s stance that he has been open to peace negotiations and is meeting with NATO head Mark Rutte. The transcript criticizes Zelensky’s messaging style, reiterates that he continues promoting NATO membership, and describes his warning that “big trouble” would come if Ukraine is denied membership. It also says Zelensky claims readiness for direct negotiations with Putin while purportedly maintaining obstacles to those talks. Professor Robert Pape, director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats at the University of Chicago, argues that an “escalation trap” has been unfolding for about three years, with parallels to earlier dynamics seen in other conflicts. He says Putin pursued what he expected to be a quick victory but Ukraine “stiffened,” and that both sides have nearly irreconcilable objectives. Pape highlights that Putin has nuclear weapons and that Ukraine now has the capability to strike deep into Russia, which he frames as making escalation extremely dangerous. The transcript connects escalation risk to Ukraine’s increased drone capacity, stating Ukraine has drone manufacturing capabilities and that donor involvement—specifically mentioning Jennifer Pritzker—is part of how drone production and precision targeting have expanded. It emphasizes that drones are relatively inexpensive and that smaller funding streams could still enable effective drone campaigns, describing long-distance precision and the ability to steer drones directly into targets. The conversation also draws parallels to the Iran conflict, describing how the use of drones disrupted business and civilian-linked activities around the Gulf and how the Saint Petersburg Economic Forum is likened to Russia’s “Davos,” with an aim described as disrupting strategic investors rather than targeting the forum’s attendees directly. Pape and others argue for restraint and off-ramps to prevent being dragged into escalation traps. The transcript argues that Europe should push for a clear line to end the war, comparing it to ending the Korean War through a defined line of contact rather than leaving it to the decision of one party. It claims the “line of contact” has not moved meaningfully over several years and says Europe should publicly decide what line it supports, tying funding to an armistice and freezing the conflict. The transcript also references the idea that an earlier peace framework around the Ankara agreement was scuttled, and it concludes by arguing that without a defined settlement line, multiple actors keep escalation traps active, with repeated calls to ask why Europe and others are not publicly demanding the needed end conditions.

It is commonly said in the West that Russia had nothing to fear regarding Ukraine joining NATO because NATO was not actively incorporating Ukraine. While technically true, this is wrong in practice. The U.S. was arming and training Ukrainians and forming closer diplomatic ties, which spooked Russia. Events that especially alarmed Russia included Ukraine's military using drones against Russian forces in Donbas, the British driving a destroyer through Russian territorial waters in the Black Sea, and U.S. bombers flying near the Russian coast. These events, coupled with the de facto integration of Ukraine into NATO, pushed Russia to its boiling point, according to Sergei Lavrov. This culminated in the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, escalating the conflict from a civil war in Eastern Ukraine to a real war.

Mario and the Colonel discuss the latest developments in the Ukraine-Russia conflict and their implications for peace negotiations and the battlefield. - The hosts walk through conflicting claims about an alleged Ukrainian drone attack on Putin’s residence, timed with Zelenskyy’s meeting with Trump. Ukraine denied the claims; Russia asserted the opposite; a CIA report then said the drones targeted a Russian military base in the region and that this wasn’t the first time such a base had been targeted. The Colonel notes that all sides may be using disinformation, and no one can say with authority what happened. He emphasizes that what matters is how each side uses the information to bolster its position and public support, including Lavrov’s stated threat of retaliation. He argues the military reality on the ground continues to be unfavorable for Ukraine, and that Russia will use any incident to justify gains or concessions on its terms. - On negotiations, the 90–95% of an agreement reportedly already accepted is contrasted with two sticking points: security guarantees and territory. Zelenskyy is said to be nearing some form of security guarantee solution, but Donbas territorial concessions remain unresolved. The Colonel suggests evaluating who benefits from the alleged incident; if true, it could be used to sabotage peace talks. He notes competing narratives: Ukraine seeks to portray Russia as untrustworthy, while Russia portrays Ukraine as the aggressor and untrustworthy, both using the incident to justify their positions. He questions whether any side actually benefits, proposing that Russia might use the event domestically to rally support and push negotiations toward its terms. - The discussion moves to strategic weapons and timing. They note the Arashnik missiles in Belarus, described as nuclear-capable, with high speed and multiple warheads. The Colonel says Russia has signaled willingness to escalate but would likely reserve Arashniks for decisive moments or major escalations, possibly a clash with NATO, rather than using them routinely. He cites Putin’s statements about negotiating or taking actions by force and explains that Russia’s leadership appears to have reached a point where battlefield gains could be prioritized if diplomacy stalls. - On Ukraine’s ability to advance, the Colonel argues that Russia prioritizes territorial gains but is not constrained by time, with large manpower advantages and sustained firepower. He asserts Russia’s advance has accelerated over 2024–2025 and could continue, potentially enabling breakthroughs even if the Donbas remains a long-term objective. He contrasts this with potential Ukrainian vulnerabilities, including troop losses, desertions, and mobilization limits, suggesting Ukraine could face a collapse in the front line by spring or summer, though there is uncertainty about exact outcomes. - Regarding Ukraine’s effort to disrupt Russia’s economy by targeting the Black Sea fleet and shipping, the Colonel is skeptical that such actions would decisively affect Russia, given Russia’s diversification away from sea-based revenues and Ukraine’s parallel economic strains, including power shortages and refineries. He emphasizes that neither side’s economic measures have produced a decisive effect, and that Russia has prepared countermeasures. - Trump’s post claiming that “Putin’s attack bluster” shows Russia stands in the way of peace is discussed. The Colonel says Trump is echoing Western lines and that such rhetoric will not by itself alter the course of negotiations; an eventual settlement requires both sides to agree on terms, not slogans. - On possible Russian retaliation, the Colonel suggests targeted responses within Kyiv’s power sector or leadership and possibly infrastructure, but he cautions against predicting escalation, noting Russia’s risk-averse tendencies and potential to strike second- and third-tier Ukrainian leaders or critical infrastructure if deemed necessary for domestic purposes. - Looking ahead twelve months, the Colonel predicts continued war, potential major battlefield moves with accelerating territorial changes, and the possibility of a breakthrough or a sharp escalation. He warns that a purely defensive posture will not win and that the pace of Russian advances could lead to significant shifts by late 2026, with Donbas negotiations remaining unsettled. He concludes that the conflict is likely to continue, with hybrid warfare and broader Western responses shaping developments.

Americans believe a potential World War III would only concern Europe, reflecting a US-centric geopolitical strategy based on the assumption of safety across the ocean. Russia has its own doctrine for using nuclear weapons and is making adjustments to it. The speaker claims Americans view WWIII as bad because they don't want Europe to suffer, reflecting a master-servant mentality where others, including Ukrainians and now Europeans, are expected to "die for them." Speculation exists about allowing Ukraine to use not only Storm Shadow but also American long-range missiles. An anonymous source in Washington said they are looking into Ukraine's request positively. The speaker warns that "playing with fire" is dangerous for adults entrusted with nuclear weapons in the West.

The CIA last November briefed Congress that there's a greater than 50% chance of a nuclear war between Russia and The United States, based on releasing ATAKEMS missiles to Ukraine for long-range strikes into Russia. Those strikes would have violated Russia's new nuclear doctrine and red lines. STRATCOM's director of plans briefed a Washington DC think tank that The United States is prepared for nuclear exchange with Russia, meaning nuclear war, and that The United States thought they would win. A senior Democrat asked if the CIA said the Russians were bluffing; the answer was no—the CIA said the exact opposite. The scary part is Biden administration officials were in the room and said, "Oh, we're ready for that. If the Russians wanna play, we're ready." "We're ready to go to nuclear war with them. This is the insanity that existed in November."