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Speaker 0: So, again, mister president, I'd like to thank you very much. And we'll speak to you very soon and probably see you again very soon. Thank you very much, Vladimir. And next time in Moscow. Oh, that's an interesting one. I don't know. I'll get a little heat on that one, but I I could see it possibly happening. Thank you very much, Vladimir. And thank you all. Thank you.

I met with Putin before or after becoming president, and we discussed NATO potentially fracturing. He seemed excited about the idea of causing problems for NATO.

Ray McGovern recounts a long, inside view of U.S.–Soviet/Russian arms control and how it shaped or hindered security over decades, tying personal experience to broader strategic lessons. - Continuity and historical perspective. McGovern notes that, after decades in the CIA, he has witnessed both continuity and change in U.S. strategy across eras and administrations. He emphasizes that serious arms control and verification work has often depended on skilled, principled diplomacy even amid bureaucratic friction and political constraints. - Early arms-control work and verification. As chief of the Soviet Foreign Policy Branch in the CIA during the SALT era, he helped support Kissinger and Nixon while recognizing that the Russians faced pressure from both arms racing and concerns about China’s progress. He recalls briefing the Moscow delegation and the importance of verification: “Trust but verify.” He describes witnessing the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty negotiations and the process of uncovering Russian cheating (a radar at Krasnoyarsk later identified as ABM-related). The experience reinforced the value of independent verification mechanisms. - Personal anecdotes about diplomacy and decision-making. McGovern shares instances illustrating how diplomacy operated in practice: Kissinger touring Moscow covertly to broker deals; ambassador Beam's reaction in Helsinki; the sense that a president’s trusted aides could push forward arms-control progress even amid Senate resistance. He stresses the role of credible, informed analysis about the Soviet Union and Gorbachev, and the way that genuine engagement with Moscow helped reduce tensions at key moments (e.g., the late-1970s/early-1980s path toward detente and arms control). - Key treaties and turning points. He highlights several milestones: - ABM Treaty (1972): limiting ABM sites to two, then one, to preserve deterrence stability; verification challenges and the Russians’ willingness to negotiate under pressure. - Reykjavik and the late-1980s era: Reagan’s willingness to pursue arms-control breakthroughs; the shift that helped lead to meaningful reductions. - INF Treaty (1991/1992 onward) and its later withdrawal under Trump: the collapse of a pillar of strategic stability and its consequences for future arms control. - New START (2011): described as “really good” in limiting offensive missiles; its expiry topic is central to the current security calculation. Putin’s public suggestion to extend the treaty for another year, conditional on U.S. reciprocity, is noted; Trump’s stance is portrayed as uncertain or inconsistent. - The broader security architecture and indivisible security. McGovern stresses that “there is no security without mutual security” and points to the OSCE concept of indivisible security—no country should increase its security at the expense of others. He argues that NATO expansion and security dynamics in Europe have undermined mutual security and contributed to the current fragility in the security architecture. - Ukraine, NATO, and the stakes of perception. He contends that Moscow viewed NATO expansion and Ukraine’s trajectory as threats to its core security interests, contributing to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. He argues that Americans are often not educated about mutual security principles, which fuels misperceptions and escalatory dynamics. - Putin as a cautious actor and the risk of leadership reliability. McGovern describes Putin as a cautious statesman who aims to protect Russia’s core interests and avoid existential risk. He suggests Putin is calculating the reliability of U.S. leadership, especially under Trump, whose unpredictability complicates trust and predictability in negotiations. He notes Trump’s perceived narcissism and the possibility that Trump’s motivations in pursuing a peace process could be mixed with personal prestige or political gain. - Current and near-term outlook. The discussion touches on the likelihood of renewed arms-control leverage if U.S. and Russian leaders can agree on Ukraine-related constraints and verify compliance. It also notes that the broader trend—toward weaker, inconsistent adherence to treaties and a perceived decline in diplomacy—risks fueling a renewed arms race and greater instability. - Closing sentiment. McGovern underscores that genuine arms-control diplomacy, mutual restraint, and credible verification are essential for reducing the security dilemma that drives dangerous competition. He frames Putin as a potential hinge for stabilizing relations if U.S. leadership can articulate and sustain a credible, reciprocal security posture. Overall, the dialogue weaves historical memory with current geopolitics, stressing that lasting security rests on mutual restraint, verifiable agreements, and a shared understanding of indivisible security—even as political winds shift and alliances realign.

I'm glad to be working with you all to make this deal happen. The Ukrainian people on both sides are trying to stop a world war. We need to provide you with weaponry because Russia is not a threat and has always hated us. I'm trying to make a deal here, so whose side are you on? We're about action, not empty words. Diplomacy is what makes America strong. We had a ceasefire, but it was broken. I believe you should be grateful and not act disrespectfully. You were campaigning on the other side, but now you're on the right side, so you should be thankful. We're getting you $350 million, and without us, this would be over quickly. We had a ceasefire, but you're not listening. We've been helping you destroy tanks, while others have only given you sheets. Wars don't happen under my watch. Now, let's get some lunch, and then we'll sign the papers. Do you have your pen?

Gorbachev has made various statements that seem contradictory. While he has quoted promises made by Americans regarding NATO not expanding beyond Germany after the Cold War, the reality is that many Central and Eastern European countries are now NATO members. This raises questions about trustworthiness. Gorbachev's comments suggest he acknowledges these broken promises, though he may not directly reference Baker’s quote. Ultimately, there are documented minutes from meetings that clarify what was discussed, providing a clearer understanding of the commitments made at that time.

Speaker 0: And I'm convinced that mister Witkoff conveys the information in this context with me and with other members of the Russian leadership that is that originates from The US president, not not anything else. And our talks in Anchorage showed it was clear from the context of our talks that information is relayed a quite correct

I want to say that you are the ally I've been hoping for my entire life. Not one American has died defending Ukraine. You've taken our weapons and you've been very effective, and I'm grateful to have you as our ally. However, I don't know if we can ever do business with Zelensky again. The way he handled the meeting and confronted the president was over the top. The relationship between Ukraine and America is vitally important, but I'm uncertain if Zelensky can make a deal with the United States after his recent behavior.

In the past two weeks, we've probably had more progress in ending this war than we have in the past three and a half years. And I think the fact that we're around this table today is is very much symbolic in the sense that it's team Europe and team United States helping Ukraine. And the progress that we're looking out of this meeting is about the security guarantees.

I want to clarify that Jake Sullivan and I have had discussions and met. For our adversaries who believe they can exploit this transition between administrations, they are mistaken. We are united and working closely together as one team with the United States during this transition.

What if Russia breaks the ceasefire or peace talks? What do we do then? Okay, what if they broke it? I don't know. They broke it with Biden because they didn't respect him, or Obama. They respect me.

Okay, so what happens if Russia breaks the ceasefire or these talks? It's a valid question to ask. What if a bomb drops on your head right now? What if they broke the agreement? With Biden and Obama, they didn't respect them, but they respect me.

It's an honor to have President Zelenskyy of Ukraine here. We've been working closely together for a long time, and we've negotiated a fair deal that will benefit both our countries and the world. I've also had good discussions with President Putin, and we're trying to bring the conflict in Ukraine to a close. Too many soldiers are dying, and we want to see the money used for rebuilding instead. The previous administration didn't engage with Russia, but I believe if I were president, this war would have never happened. We're providing great equipment to Ukraine, and their soldiers have been incredibly brave. We're going to sign an agreement soon, and I think we're close to a deal to stop the shooting. It's an exciting moment, and I appreciate everyone being here.

I meet with the president frequently, and each time, he is alert and engaged. He does his homework, stays informed on serious issues, and is actively involved in discussions about war, peace, and critical decisions. If the American people have concerns about his capability to make important decisions, especially regarding nuclear weapons, they can feel reassured.

I know Putin well, and we had a remarkably good, blunt relationship. I'd describe it as brutally blunt. While never physical, I believe in being brutally honest with people in private. It's also important to avoid embarrassing them publicly if you want their cooperation. In my experience, most leaders appreciated my honesty about our interests and objectives. They also valued discretion when possible. Putin, specifically, never reneged on a personal agreement he made with me. Behind closed doors, he kept his word and could be trusted.

I meet frequently with the president, and each time he is alert, engaged, and well-informed. He thoroughly prepares for discussions on serious matters, including war and peace. If the American people have concerns about his decision-making, particularly regarding critical issues like nuclear weapons, they can feel reassured.

I found it interesting that Putin didn't criticize Joe Biden or NATO during our conversation. As an American, it would feel strange to badmouth the American president to a foreign leader, even if I have doubts about Biden's presidency. It just doesn't sit right with me. Maybe I'm just old-fashioned.

It’s an honor to have President Zelenskyy of Ukraine here. We've been working closely together for a long time and have negotiated a fair deal to obtain rare earth minerals that we need for AI, weapons, and our military. I've also had good discussions with President Putin to try and bring the war to a close. If I were president, this war would have never happened. We've given Ukraine great equipment and credit to their brave soldiers. We're going to sign the agreement shortly, and I think we're fairly close to a deal to stop the shooting. I hope this document will be the first step to real security guarantees for Ukraine. We count on America's continued support, including licenses for air defense and your strong position to stop Putin.

The Alaska Summit reinforced my belief that while difficult pieces within reach, I believe that in a very significant step, President Putin agreed that Russia would accept security guarantees for Ukraine, and this is one of the key points that we need to consider. We're going to be considering that at the table, also, like who will do what, essentially. I'm optimistic that collectively we can reach an agreement.

And I can tell you, and I I hope that he will also hear this, that strange though it may seem, but throughout these days, both during informal and formal talks, there was not one case when anyone voiced a negative opinion about the current US administration, not once during these four days. All of all the people that I talked to supported the meeting that we had in Anchorage, and they all expressed hope that the position held by president Trump and the position held by Russia and all the other parties will lead to an end of this conflict. So that is something that I'm saying without any kind of irony. And since I'm saying this publicly and everyone in the world will hear this, It is a direct it is a direct confirmation of the fact that it's true because all of those people will hear me.

I signed the exchange of prisons agreement, but the other party didn't follow through. What kind of diplomacy are we even talking about here? I'm referring to the diplomacy that will prevent your country from being destroyed. With all due respect, it's disrespectful to come into the Oval Office and try to argue this point in front of the American media. Right now, you're forcing conscripts to the front lines due to manpower problems. You should be thanking the president for intervening.

"Our position is that we're going to have an operation that works." "We want Russia to be involved in it." "We made some progress today consistent with both of our objectives with neither side giving up the things that were most important to it." "We made some progress today on that, and we recognized that some of the things that needed to be decided, neither of us could in good conscience decide without giving our military leaders the chance to work through that." "So we agreed that this week this week, our military leaders would be keep working." "That is all I can tell you." "The more we say about it, the worse it'll be." "We are moving toward peace." "The first and most important thing is make peace in Bosnia." "That has not been done yet." "There is no relationship between two"

I have always emphasized to leaders like Deng Xiaoping and others that it is never a wise decision to underestimate the American people.

- "We have begun preliminary mobilization of long-range bombers, aerial refueling aircraft, and forward support units." "US S Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group is moving from the South China Sea to the Middle East, to deter Seigou and provide immediate striking capability." "On the other hand, Iran side is entering the highest state of defense readiness, including a long-range air defense system like Barzriv(?) and a virtual air defense network, and a regional force including Hizballah Shiite faction prepared to oppose the US military air operations." "They are prepared to resist our air campaigns." China and Russia are watching our next moves. "What is that?" "That is the judgment above." "Damn, the protracted conflict in the Middle East would not give China room to move toward Taiwan; all would be delayed, and a single strike would end it." "The United States will cut the backbone of the system." "Are other powers ready to respond to that scale of reaction?" "Moscow speaks, Beijing watches; neither side will shed blood for Teheran." "What matters is what happens after Revolutionary Guards first act, and what fills the vacuum." "Your and my move—as long as your AIM and ideas bring— I am prepared to transition." "Never forget, it was us who raised you from a nameless origin; AIMs will defend Israel’s line against these wild men, and will continue to do so." "We have targeted Odesa's ideas, energy facilities, bridges, and other critical infrastructure." "From cities’ iron-walled defenses, distant from the front lines, ground forces maintain the line while these attacks keep draining Ukraine’s economy. Support is cut." "We will strip away what remains in the dirty chains and, in the end, the key will kneel at negotiation." "Together we hope to cooperate; we mark moments of strength daily." "That is a signal to the world that both nations move forward with resolve." "Coordination is not mere exchange; it is building trust and sharing objectives." "China must act with confidence and restraint, and there is no need to showcase force."

President Putin wants to see that as much as I do. So, again, mister president, I'd like to thank you very much, and we'll speak to you very soon and probably see you again very soon. Thank you very much, Vladimir. And next time in Moscow. Oh, that's an interesting one. I don't know. I'll get a little heat on that one, but I, I could see it possibly happening. Thank you very much, Vladimir. And thank you all. Thank

Scott Ritter and the interviewer discuss the looming end of the New START treaty and the broader implications for global arms control, stability, and security. - The New START treaty, described by Ritter as the remaining nuclear arms control framework, expires, and without a moratorium on deployed caps or a new treaty, the risk of nuclear war between the United States and Russia, and also with China, could rise significantly. Ritter calls this “earth ending significant” and says the six-decade arms-control legacy would be at risk if no replacement is negotiated. - Ritter emphasizes that New START has provided a framework of stability through on-site inspections, data exchange, and verifiable limits. He notes that the treaty’s value rests on confidence that numbers are correct, which requires robust verification, something he argues was compromised by the lack of inspections in the last two years and by political gamesmanship during negotiations. Rose Gutermiller’s warning about needing a confidence baseline for a potential one-year moratorium is highlighted. - The historical arc of arms control is traced from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the ABM treaty, which Ritter says was foundational because it established the concept of mutually assured destruction. He argues that many subsequent arms-control efforts, including START and particularly INF, were intertwined with the ABM framework and mutual deterrence. The INF treaty is highlighted as the occasion where Ritter was the first ground-based weapons inspector in the Soviet Union, underscoring the value of on-site verification. - Ritter recounts how START was negotiated amid a collapsing Soviet Union, and how post-Soviet realities (nuclear weapons in former Soviet states under Russian control) affected negotiations. He contends that Soviet/Russian leaders perceived START as potentially “bullying” and that Western confidence in Russian strategic deterrence diminished after the end of the Cold War, which contributed to tensions over missile defenses and strategic postures. - The dialogue reviews the evolution of U.S.-Russian relations and how perceptions of threat or weakness influenced policy. Ritter recalls that Russian leadership warned of consequences when the ABM treaty was abandoned and that fear and respect shaped early arms-control cooperation. He asserts that American arrogance toward Russia, including dismissive attitudes toward Russian concerns about missile defenses, harmed trust and contributed to instability. - The involvement of China is treated as a separate but connected issue. China’s position, as outlined in its white paper, is not seeking an arms race and endorses a “no first use” policy, but argues that the United States and Russia must first resolve their bilateral arms-control arrangements before China would join in a broader framework. China argues for all parties to reduce numbers, while insisting China should not be treated as a mere subset of a U.S.-Russia framework. - Ritter asserts that the current U.S. approach to modernization and expansion of strategic forces could precipitate a three-way arms race (U.S., Russia, China) and notes a planned shift in U.S. posture, including potential reactivation of underground testing and revamping warhead delivery systems. He argues that if the process proceeds, other nations might follow with their own nuclear programs, eroding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework and undermining decades of nonproliferation efforts. - He contrasts the current situation with past arms-control muscle memory. He laments the loss of experienced negotiators and Russian area expertise, arguing that today’s policymakers and some academics treat arms control as transactional or overly adversarial rather than as a reciprocal, trust-based process. He claims there is a shortage of genuine arms-control specialists and describes a culture in which the media and academia have overlooked or mischaracterized Russia’s behavior, often blaming Moscow for cheating when, in his view, the problem lies with Western overreach and a lack of mutual understanding. - The conversation ends on a bleak note: without renewed treaties, verification, and mutual recognition of security concerns, the world could regress to a “Wild West” dynamic of proliferation and competition, with Europe’s security umbrella eroded and a broader risk of renewed testing, modernization, and potential conflict. Overall, the discussion frames the expiry of New START as a pivotal moment with potentially catastrophic consequences for strategic stability, arguing for renewed arms-control engagement, better verification, and a recognition of the intertwined histories and motivations of the United States, Russia, and China.