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Two Republican US senators have suggested using nuclear weapons against Russia, which raises serious concerns about the implications of thermonuclear war. It's crucial to recognize that Russia possesses a comparable nuclear arsenal, including hypersonic missiles that can evade detection and reach major US cities like San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York. In Virginia, for instance, a nuclear conflict would devastate Northern Virginia, annihilating areas such as Loudoun, Prince William, and Fairfax counties, with the Pentagon in Arlington becoming a lifeless wasteland. The potential loss of life in the nation's capital would be catastrophic.

Stanislav Krapivnik, a former US army officer from Donbas, returns to discuss the escalation of NATO-Russia proxy warfare, the role of drones, and potential strategic escalations. The conversation centers on how Europe is contributing to deep strikes in Russia, especially against energy installations, and the resulting danger of a broader conflict. Key points and claims, as presented: - Drones and deep strikes: The EU, through its defense alignment, aims to overwhelm Russian air defenses and threaten strategic assets, including nuclear-capable targets, by using long-range drones. The objective is to degrade Russian defensive systems and the production rate of missiles, potentially opening the path to strikes on radars, early warning systems, strategic assets like bombers, and even nuclear submarines in port. - Nuclear war risk: The interviewee asserts that by mid-to-late summer there could be a zone of possible nuclear war if ground warfare arises or escalates due to Western actions. He notes that Russia’s anti-aircraft and early warning capabilities are limited to manageable scopes, with occasional corridors allowing strikes in, and that Europe’s current strategy could push the conflict toward a nuclear dimension. - Deterrence and first strikes: The discussion contrasts U.S. first-strike doctrine with other nations’ second-strike assurances. The speaker argues that in a blinded Russia, the logic for targeted first strikes becomes stronger for the other side, while lamenting that Europe’s leadership might be pushing toward a nuclear exchange. He cites studies suggesting that as few as 47 key targets could collapse the U.S. in a nuclear context, highlighting the fragility of a high-tech economy under nuclear disruption. - European psyche and policy: There is criticism of what the speaker describes as a mass psychosis in Europe, where warnings about striking Russia’s early radar or deterrent systems are dismissed in favor of defending Ukraine. The rhetoric suggests deep political and media reinforcement of pro-Ukraine narratives, with limited space for risk discussion about nuclear consequences. - Energy installations and economy: While drone strikes have targeted oil facilities, the speaker notes that most damage has been to storage facilities rather than critical infrastructure like pipelines or refineries. Refineries are large, and damage to some vessels can take longer to repair. Russia’s production has not been significantly reduced, but the attacks are accelerating a shift of energy facilities eastward toward Asia, while Europe faces higher oil prices on the spot market and potential disruptions to gas routes like TurkStream and Caspian Pipeline Authority, with broader economic impact on Southeastern Europe and Turkey. - Russia’s response and drone modernization: The Russian military has reorganized its drone capabilities, forming dedicated drone battalions and establishing new schools to standardize and professionalize drone operations. The move encompasses reconnaissance, kamikaze, bombing, and supply drones, with adjustments after initial disorganization. Ukrainians reportedly helped inspire and provide drone countermeasures, and Russia’s modernization integrates drones with air defenses. - Zelensky and Victory Day threat: The possibility of Zelensky threatening to strike Moscow’s Victory Day parade is discussed. The guest suggests Zelensky would want to be at the head of such a move, while acknowledging the uncertainty of who controls decisions in Kyiv and the level of Western involvement. The parade’s downscaled format is noted, but the broader question remains whether such a strike could occur. The guest asserts that Russian deterrence may have been eroded, and Western actors might not take credible deterrence seriously until an incident occurs. - Africa and Mali: Russia’s activities in Africa, especially Mali, are described as significant. Mali’s leadership under Asimi Goata is navigating between Western and Russian influence. Russian forces, including elements from the former Wagner group now under the Russian defense ministry, are described as rebuilding Mali’s military and supporting a campaign by jihadist groups. The situation includes rapid, mobile “flying columns” that can cause chaos but lack staying power against organized defenses. Russian drones and aviation (including ME-20 aircraft) are reportedly effective, and Mali is moving toward energy and resource development, including three nuclear power plants proposed by Russia to Elektrify the country. France’s position is framed as colonial, with Mali’s uranium, gold, and other resources creating strategic interest. Burkina Faso’s involvement and regional dynamics involving Niger are cited as part of a broader, expanding conflict network across Africa. - Global frontlines and war risk: The guest argues that multiple frontlines are forming—Ukraine, the Persian Gulf, and Western Africa—and that they could merge into a single broader conflict if not stopped. He asserts that the West is driving this escalation, and he characterizes Western public sentiment as often indifferent to Ukrainian casualties, focusing instead on political or financial gains from the conflict. - Frontline realities: On the ground, Ukraine has tactical successes but limited staying power due to heavy casualties and supply problems. Russian forces are reportedly stronger in Donbas, Kherson, and Sumy, while Ukrainian forces face difficult conditions, including open fields and heavy artillery advantages for the Russians. Drone warfare has prompted reorganized Russian drone corps, with improved training and standardized units. The discussion ends with a warning that the conflict has global implications, with fronts expanding and risks of a broader, possibly world-scale war if not curtailed. The interviewee emphasizes that the West’s actions are fueling escalation and that African theaters, particularly Mali, are becoming an integral part of the wider confrontation.

In the short term, admitting the Baltic states to NATO could cause significant concern in US-Russian relations. The speaker believes this move could provoke a strong reaction from Russia, although not necessarily a military one. They also mention the idea of Europe becoming "NATOized" like Finland. English Translation: Admitting the Baltic states to NATO could cause concern in US-Russian relations, potentially leading to a strong reaction from Russia. The speaker also mentions the concept of Europe becoming "NATOized" like Finland.

Two Republican US senators have suggested using nuclear weapons against Russia, which raises serious concerns about the implications of thermonuclear war. It's crucial to understand that Russia has comparable nuclear capabilities, including hypersonic missiles that can evade detection and reach major US cities like San Francisco, New York, and Washington, D.C. In Virginia, a nuclear conflict could lead to the annihilation of Northern Virginia, with areas like Loudoun, Prince William, and Arlington facing devastating destruction. The Pentagon would be obliterated, leaving no human life in the vicinity, and the nation's capital would be similarly affected.

Speaker 0: The discussion reports that Russia has covertly tested three new weapon systems over the past twenty-eight days, with two of them described as complete game changers. These tests are said to be causing nerves inside NATO, and none of these three have been made public by President Putin, who typically announces such developments. One system, however, is not being kept secret. Speaker 0: According to the report, Russian President Putin just rolled out their most advanced hypersonic missiles to date. These missiles are described as "no one can shoot down"—at least in the view of the speaker—unless future assessments prove otherwise. The specific system named is the Orenshik Oreshnik hypersonic missiles. They are set for combat duty by the end of the year, and they are characterized as capable of extremely high speeds and long-range strikes. The deployment of these missiles is framed as something NATO will be watching very closely. The report suggests that European leaders are exhibiting a willingness to engage in war-related actions, with two particularly troubling points highlighted: the idea that they want to be part of the conflict and the accompanying casualties. It is claimed that they want to participate in the death and destruction in the European Union and in The UK. Speaker 0: The report specifically notes German Chancellor Mertz saying that they are ready to draft young men to war if they cannot reach their volunteer numbers, effectively suggesting compulsory service to fight Russia. Speaker 0: It is also stated that the UK is telling its populace to prepare to sacrifice their sons and daughters, and the speaker emphasizes that "Sons and daughters, colleagues, veterans will all have a part to play, to build, to serve, and if necessary, to fight." The speaker adds that more families will know what sacrifice for our nation means. Speaker 1: The accompanying commentary underscores the need to explain the changing threat and the necessity of staying ahead of it, reinforcing the idea that sacrifice and readiness are central to national defense in the current context.

Scott Ritter discusses the widening role of European drones in the Ukraine conflict and the potential Russian response. He argues that Russia is aiming to elevate the conflict this year and may prepare a summer offensive, moving from shadow policy to official action. He contends Europe is acting as an active participant by supplying drones and intelligence to strike Russia’s depth, calling it an act of war and warning that there will be consequences if it continues. He believes a decisive Russian strike could deter Europe and force a reckoning about European military capability and funding, suggesting that a single, devastating blow to the identified target set could end Europe’s ability to support Ukraine’s drone war. The conversation then moves to potential targets for a Russian strike. Ritter rejects the idea of token “warning strikes,” arguing that Russia should strike decisively to obliterate the targeted systems and demonstrate that it can alter the strategic balance. He posits that a large strike against not only the Baltic states and Finland but also Germany could occur, and contemplates the U.S. response, noting that NATO’s Article 5 may not be triggered since the actions are by individual European nations rather than a collective NATO decision on drones. He predicts that under a Trump administration, the U.S. might withdraw support if Europe provokes a broader conflict, which could hasten NATO’s demise. He asserts that a decisive summer offensive by Russia could bring Donbas under its control and escalate implications for European security and U.S. commitment. On the Ukraine battlefield, Ritter cites indicators of a spring Russian offensive, with front preparation, control of critical terrain, and attrition of Ukrainian forces through well-planned cause-and-effect operations. He notes Ukraine has exhausted its reserves and that if Russia seizes Sloviansk and Popasna, much of Donbas could fall. He also comments on Hungary’s elections and their impact, dismissing the significance of Hungary’s influence on European or Ukrainian battlefield outcomes, arguing that the €90 billion aid package does not resolve Europe’s structural problems and may not significantly strengthen Ukraine. Ritter discusses the wider geopolitical consequences, including the Iran situation and its economic impact on Europe, arguing that European energy security has deteriorated and that NATO’s unity is strained. He claims the U.S. is abandoning NATO in practice, and Europe is left with insufficient defense capabilities. He also questions whether the U.S. would sustain a renewed conflict with Iran, arguing the risk of a large-scale war would be economically devastating for both continents and would likely push Europe toward peace negotiations with Russia and Iran. Regarding China, Ritter contends the U.S. rhetoric on sanctioning Chinese energy flows has had little practical effect, as China continues to source Iranian oil and resist U.S. pressure. He emphasizes that China views energy security as vital to its economy and will respond prudently, maintaining that American posturing has not restricted Chinese energy imports. Finally, Ritter suggests negotiations continue intermittently with Iran and Russia, with Islamabad’s technical teams working toward a final peace agreement and Trump seeking a narrative of victory through a peace deal. He asserts that Russia may have a strategic window to secure a settlement, with Trump wanting to present himself as pivotal in achieving peace. He concludes that the conflict could be moving toward a Russian advantage as Iran’s war and European economic strain ripple through.

The discussion focused on multiple current geopolitical developments: Iran’s ongoing funeral proceedings for Ali Khamenei, Iran–Israel tensions around ceasefire negotiations, and the risks of escalation involving Russia, NATO, and Ukraine. Regarding Iran, the conversation cited a New York Times report that the United States was worried Israel might kill Arachi and Ghalibaf. The claim was that the Americans warned Iran through Pakistan and Qatar—via negotiations mediated by Pakistan—that Israel may assassinate them. The report also alleged that Ghalibaf’s plane, while returning from negotiations, made an emergency landing in the north after Israeli fighter jets were spotted in Iraqi airspace near or entering Iranian airspace, after which the plane drove to Tehran. Netanyahu’s press office denied the claim. The funeral context was described as a multi-day event underway, with world leaders including Medvedev in Iran. The question raised was whether Israel might assassinate Mustafa Khamenei (or other Iranian leaders) during the funeral. The response suggested it would be “too much” due to the large international delegation and the reputational and collateral-damage concerns such an assassination would create, while also arguing the news indicates Israel “becoming more reckless” if the claims were true. The discussion also touched on the idea that international warnings and mediation could be either real or “political theater,” but either way could damage U.S.–Israel relations by suggesting Israel is “extremely reckless” and that Americans felt the need to warn Iran about potential Israeli intent. On negotiations, the conversation shifted to the Strait of Hormuz. It noted that Europeans accepted Iran would charge a fee, with a Bloomberg report saying they want standardization and not pay more than countries like China or Russia. The U.S. was described as still trying to convince Iran not to charge a fee, offering unfreezing of $6 billion in exchange for Iran not charging a fee; Iran rejected the offer. The response argued Iran would interpret the situation as establishing new “realities on the ground,” and would position the charge as a fee tied to assistance and other concerns rather than a simple toll. It also argued that trust issues make the U.S. asset-unfreezing proposal “absurd,” and that renegotiation and sanctions returning would lead Iran to avoid trading control of the strait for “empty promises.” Broader regional tensions were listed: Lebanon on edge with Hezbollah; the Lebanese government seeking to disarm Hezbollah; mobilizations in Yemen involving Saudi-supported factions and Iran-aligned Houthis; and a crackdown in Iraq on figures close to Iran aligned with anti-corruption efforts. The discussion concluded the outlook was not good and that both sides would try to do something with the MOU rather than implementing it fully as outlined. The conversation then moved to Ukraine and Russia. It cited a Telegraph report claiming U.S. intelligence warned Poland that Russia may prepare a limited provocation on Polish territory within months to test NATO resolve, including missile/drone strikes on critical infrastructure, cyber/hybrid attacks, or a small cross-border incursion from Kaliningrad or Belarus disguised as accidental GPS failure or a rescue mission, followed by leverage via withdrawal and demands to end Western aid to Ukraine. The response expressed skepticism due to elaborateness and the vulnerability of Kaliningrad, but acknowledged the possibility that Russia could strike a European country given prior arguments that weapons sent to fight Russia are legitimate targets and the European build-up. It also argued that Article 5 does not automatically force all NATO countries to go to war and that each country can decide its response, while warning escalation—including the possibility of tactical nuclear weapons—could be difficult to control if NATO becomes directly involved. Additional updates were discussed: Bloomberg said Prime Minister Tusk urged Poland to be cautious with further aid for Ukraine at an upcoming NATO summit; Medvedev commented that Finland lifted its ban on hosting nuclear weapons; and the Lithuanian president initiated a constitutional amendment to remove restrictions on nuclear weapon deployment to participate in NATO’s collective nuclear deterrence. The response connected these changes to perceptions of increased targeting risk and the idea that expanded deterrence can increase danger rather than reduce it, describing Finland as becoming a frontline close to St. Petersburg and arguing European “reassurance” had become politically impossible. Finally, the discussion summarized the Ukraine war. It claimed Ukrainians were “going from bad to worse,” contested claims that Ukraine is retaking territory and that Russians are taking larger casualties, and emphasized exchange ratios and map changes as evidence. It described specific battlefield concerns: increased exposure around Zaporizhzhia, Russian pressure and vulnerability near Orekhova, Russian advances threatening supply lines, and the fall of Konstantinovka and Krasny Liman in the north that would enable a pincer affecting Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. It also highlighted Russia’s talk of needing a bigger buffer zone and potential territorial aims beyond Donbas, including references to Novorossiya. The response added that Russia’s attacks behind the front include energy infrastructure and fuel logistics, targeting gas stations and transportation routes in order to disrupt Ukraine’s logistics, while arguing Ukraine has not yet collapsed but could unravel quickly once it begins. The segment ended with thanks and a brief aside about a parrot in the office.

**Original Language Summary:** Обсуждается возможность разрешения киевскому режиму наносить удары по территории России западным вооружением большой дальности. Подчеркивается, что украинская армия не может самостоятельно наносить удары современными высокоточными системами большой дальности без разведданных со спутников НАТО и внесения полетных заданий военнослужащими стран НАТО. Разрешение на такие удары будет означать прямое участие стран НАТО в войне на Украине, что существенно изменит суть конфликта и потребует от России принятия соответствующих решений, исходя из создаваемых угроз. **English Translation:** The possibility of allowing the Kyiv regime to strike Russian territory with long-range Western weapons is being discussed. It is emphasized that the Ukrainian army cannot independently carry out strikes with modern high-precision long-range systems without intelligence data from NATO satellites and the entry of flight missions by NATO member states' military personnel. Permission for such strikes would mean the direct participation of NATO countries in the war in Ukraine, which would significantly change the nature of the conflict and require Russia to make appropriate decisions based on the threats created.

Blowing up the Nord Stream pipelines means the U.S. is directly at war with the largest nuclear power, which could have consequences. Russia could sever undersea internet cables, preventing banks in London from communicating with banks in New York. This could cause economic collapse and lead to world crisis conditions. It is unknown if those responsible, like Torian Nuland, have considered these effects, or if that was the intention.

Professor Jeffrey Sachs discusses a second open letter to German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, republished in German media, explaining that he wrote it because the situation in Ukraine is worse than six months earlier. He contrasts the letter he wrote previously (December 2025), when he described war mongering and escalation and urged Germany to act diplomatically due to its power and historical responsibilities, with a period in January 2026 when he saw “glimmers of hope” after Merz publicly said Russia is part of Europe and that Europe must speak with Russia. He says that European leaders then began publicly considering a new envoy or diplomatic mediator, but that no process produced results, and he highlights that he views the proposed chief diplomat, Kaja Kallas, as unacceptable to both sides for what he describes as anti-Russian hostility. In recent weeks, Sachs says escalation has come through increased rhetoric and specific events. He points to the Ukrainian attack on a girls’ school in Starobilsk with many student deaths and claims Europe responded with denial or silence, rather than apology or explanation. He also describes Russia, through Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, warning in a call with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio that Russia would attack Kyiv, targeting control centers and operational areas, and advising Western diplomats to take safety measures and evacuate. Sachs says the attack had not yet occurred at the time he spoke but that it was expected. He adds that he sees other contested and unexplained incidents—such as drones in Baltic airspace and a drone hitting near the Ukraine border in Romania—as raising tension. He also cites Baltic-state rhetoric about possibly attacking Kaliningrad or using it as a base for drone operations into northwest Russia and characterizes all of this as irresponsible behavior in a nuclear age. He says he places principal responsibility on Europe, arguing Europe shows minimal interest in diplomacy and only “whines” when the U.S. and Russia speak, while a union of 450 million should be able to find someone to talk to Russia. Sachs argues diplomacy is correct but emphasizes Germany’s particular responsibility tied to specific commitments from 1990 onward. He states that German reunification terms—approved by the Soviet Union and other occupying powers—required that Germany not take advantage of reunification by moving military forces eastward into Central and Eastern Europe, and he says Germany and the United States violated those commitments by moving NATO forces east, including toward Ukraine and Georgia. He claims this long-standing duplicity underlies rising tensions over more than 30 years, and he says his letter cites six episodes of Germany not following through honestly. He further urges Europe to express condolences or apologize for the Starobilsk girls’ school attack and calls for civility, honesty, humanity, and discussion rather than further war-mongering and hate speech. He says NATO countries have key responsibility in resolving the conflict because he links the security competition to NATO decisions and earlier actions affecting Ukraine’s neutrality. He references the 2008 Bucharest NATO summit, describing NATO’s commitment to enlarge to Ukraine and Georgia as reckless and as a declaration of war in how Russia would see it. He also recounts a 2021 proposal involving a draft security arrangement between Russia and the U.S., and he says that in his call with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, he pushed for the U.S. to commit to no further NATO enlargement, while he describes Sullivan’s response as saying it would not lead to war and would be handled diplomatically. Sachs then recounts events in 2014 and 2015: he says an agreement involving Germany, France, and Poland to prevent a coup was followed by a violent coup; he says Germany went along with the post-coup direction. He also says that in 2015, during the Minsk II process, Germany and France negotiated an autonomy-based arrangement for ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine, Germany presented itself as a guarantor, but later reneged. He claims that the West did not want Ukraine’s unitary structure weakened and that the Minsk II endorsement by the UN Security Council was later ignored. He argues that Merz has a responsibility to know these histories and act by contacting President Putin before Europe is embroiled in another war. In response, Glenn emphasizes Germany as a guarantor in 2014 then walking back, says Minsk efforts were sabotaged for years, and claims multiple diplomatic paths were blocked, including possibilities for negotiation after 2021. Glenn says Russia now escalates directly against Europe given increased rhetoric and potential direct attacks. Sachs concludes that governments appear to avoid open discussion, diplomacy, and communication, and he says leadership and institutions are “hunkered down,” leaving falsehoods unresolved. He hopes to discuss positive developments in the future.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss a series of escalating tensions and strategic assessments around Ukraine, NATO, Russia, and the United States. - Nightfall concept and implications: The British Ministry of Defence announced a new deep-strike ballistic missile for Ukraine, Nightfall, intended to carry a 200 kilogram warhead with a 500 kilometer range to strike Moscow. Scott Ritter says Nightfall is a joke: it is still developing, with a budget around £9,000,000, no production facility, no prototype built or tested, and a target of producing 10 missiles a month at about £800,000 each. He argues the idea is not a real weapon but an underfinanced concept, and that Russia will watch with interest while the plan remains insufficient to matter. - Britain’s strategic credibility and potential retaliation: Ritter contends that Britain could strike Moscow with such missiles only once before Russia responds decisively, potentially even with nuclear weapons. He asserts Russia resents Britain as a “failing power” and believes there is “great hatred” toward Britain among Russia’s political elite; he predicts Russia would not tolerate continued British escalation. - Western troop commitments and feasibility: The discussion also covers the idea of sending British troops to Ukraine. Ritter asserts that Britain cannot deploy 7,600 troops nor sustain them logistically or politically; he describes the British military as incapable of a rapid deployment and notes the overall size and combat-readiness of the British forces as insufficient for sustained operations. - The “keep Ukraine in the fight” plan: The speakers discuss the UK’s strategy to keep Ukraine in conflict as a political/propaganda effort, rather than a path to victory. Ritter calls much of Ukraine’s and Western rhetoric “the theater of the absurd” and says many actions by Ukraine are designed for propaganda rather than strategic success. He highlights drone strikes on Caspian oil rigs as demonstrative of “propaganda purposes.” He also notes that Russia’s response includes power and water outages across Ukraine and a strong retaliatory capability. - Arashnik and Russia’s nuclear posture: They discuss Russia’s Arashnik program, noting that initial launches were treated as test missiles, with a brigade deployed in Belarus and other units being prepared for fielding. Ritter asserts that Arashnik is now a permanent part of Russia’s strategic posture, and that Russia is deploying production-quality missiles, though exact production rates are uncertain. - Arms control and the European security architecture: Ritter claims there is a “total disconnect from reality” in Europe, asserting arms control is effectively dead. He argues Russia has advantages in intermediate and strategic nuclear forces, while U.S. forces are aging and expensive to modernize; he predicts a coming arms race with Russia holding an advantage. He is critical of attempts at extending New START and expresses belief that arms control is no longer feasible given the current political environment and U.S. leadership. - The Alaska “spirit” and U.S. foreign policy: The conversation discusses the 2024-25 era, with mentions of Donald Trump and the CIA’s role in anti-Russian operations. Ritter argues that U.S. actions, including cyber and drone activities against Russian targets (oil refineries and military assets), reflect a CIA-led strategy against Russia. He contends that Trump’s approach has shifted over time from tentative peace prospects to aggressive posturing, and that American leadership lacks trustworthiness in negotiations. - Intelligence and operational transparency: The dialogue touches on the May 2024 and June 2025 attacks on Russian deterrence assets (e.g., Engels base, and the Kerch Bridge operation). Ritter argues that the intelligence community (notably MI6 and the CIA) uses psychological operations to undermine Putin, but that Russia’s restraint and measured responses indicate limited willingness to escalate beyond a point. - Toward a broader European security collapse: Ritter foresees NATO’s dissolution or “death,” suggesting that the United States will pursue bilateral arrangements with European states as NATO weakens. He predicts Greenland and broader European security would become dominated by U.S. strategic interests, diminishing European autonomy. - On Trump’s transformation and democracy in the U.S.: The speakers debate Trump’s evolution, with Ritter arguing that Trump’s rhetoric and actions reveal a long-standing pattern of deceit and anti-democratic behavior, including alleged manipulation of elections and the undermining of international law. He depicts a grim view of the constitutional republic’s future, suggesting that Trump has consolidated power in ways that erode checks and balances. - Final reflections: The conversation closes with a weighing of whether peace can be achieved given deep mistrust, the CIA’s alleged influence in Ukraine, and the wider geopolitical shifts. Both acknowledge growing instability, the potential end of NATO as a cohesive alliance, and the possibility of a broader, more dangerous security environment if current trajectories persist.

Recent discussions in the UK and US suggest that Ukraine may be allowed to strike deep into Russian territory using Western long-range weapons. This marks a significant escalation, as Ukraine currently lacks the capability to effectively use these systems without NATO support. If NATO countries decide to proceed, it would mean direct involvement in the conflict, fundamentally altering its nature. The delivery of thousands of precision missiles to Ukraine raises concerns about potential Russian retaliation, which could lead to a broader conflict involving nuclear weapons. Putin has warned that such actions would be considered a declaration of war. The situation is precarious, with the risk of escalating tensions leading to catastrophic consequences, including nuclear warfare. The urgency of the moment calls for heightened awareness and preparation for potential global instability.

We are on the brink of a crisis as Russian submarines armed with unstoppable missiles could destroy major US cities in just five minutes. The Russians, who suffered heavy losses in World War 2, are prepared for nuclear war. Despite the majority of Americans opposing a conflict with Russia, Joe Biden is advocating for an escalated war. The consequences of a nuclear war would be catastrophic, turning cities into toxic ruins and causing the end of civilization as we know it. This impending disaster is driven by the globalist agenda of George Soros, the Rockefellers, and the Rothschilds, who seek global domination through a New World Order.

NATO's response to the use of Sarin gas in Syria raises questions about their actions if such an attack were to occur on European soil. Will they intervene or remain passive? And if they do intervene, how far are they willing to go? The possibility of a direct confrontation with Vladimir Putin looms.

За Белгород, Донбасс и Крокос! Для победы России необходимо ввести полярные задания в стратегические ядерные ракеты и нацелить их на города США! Ярс, Сармат и Посейдон — готовим к запуску! Вашингтон, мы идем за тобой! --- For Belgorod, Donbass, and Krokos! To achieve victory for Russia, we need to implement polar missions in our strategic nuclear missiles and target them at U.S. cities! Yars, Sarmat, and Poseidon — preparing for launch! Washington, we are coming for you!

Retired Royal Navy Commodore Steve Jeremy discussed his article, “The Coming War with Russia,” arguing that European leaders are preparing for war without fully accounting for the costs and consequences. He said Europeans assume Russia will “sit quietly” until a future readiness point, while Europe continues to develop and provide missiles, cruise missiles, and drones to attack into Russia without Russian reaction. Jeremy contrasted this with Russian statements and intent, including comments attributed to Putin that Russia would prepare as well if Europeans were preparing for war. Jeremy argued that, for Russia, the conflict would be a defensive war linked to protecting itself from NATO expansion and military infrastructure moving closer to Russian borders—an issue he said Russia has raised for years. He said Europeans appear to interpret Russian actions as colonial ambition, rather than as defensive posture. He also suggested that Russia would respond early, including a suspicion that the 2022 move into the Donbas was influenced by the idea that waiting would become more damaging, because Russia would face greater forces later. Jeremy’s scenario began with Russia striking European production facilities in Germany, France, and Britain where drones and cruise missiles are developed for use against Russia. He then suggested that European governments could invoke NATO’s Article 5, but that Article 5 does not guarantee collective action—leading some nations, he said, to provide “warm words” but no monetary support. He further suggested the United States might stand back, predicting that Europeans could find themselves “on their own,” because he believed American concerns would include the risk of a land war on the European continent and reluctance to send American soldiers to fight and die in Europe against Russia. He next predicted that the E3 (Germany, Britain, and France) might respond with air attacks against Russia, but that they would face effective air defenses and heavy aircraft losses, drawing on the S-400 and S-500 systems. He said Russia would then target Europe’s energy infrastructure similarly to approaches used in Ukraine, and that sanctions and reduced Russian oil and gas supplies could quickly produce an energy crisis, then an economic crisis. He argued that, at that stage, “the only thing” left might be to sue for peace because offensive options would not work. He described the scenario as a scenario rather than a forecast, intended to show potential costs that he said Europeans have not thought through publicly. In response, Glenn questioned assumptions about escalation control and war being fought elsewhere. He compared past eras where NATO had “complete and total escalation control,” to what he argued would be a new situation without such control once missiles began entering Russia and retaliation began. He also asked how the war would be fought, emphasizing what he saw as a Russian preference for systematic, gradual frontline fighting and “bleeding out” an adversary. Jeremy replied that the key error is believing the war can be contained in Ukraine. He used Clausewitz, arguing the nature of war must be understood, and said Russia views the conflict as existential. He described a likely Russian approach as defensive: securing Ukraine positions while defending behind lines, then conducting destruction of attacks similar to what he said happened in the first year of the war after a strategic withdrawal. He asserted Russia would focus on defense and deterrence rather than offensive tank advances into Western direction. He also emphasized European vulnerability: he said Europe has limited defense against ballistic missiles and “no defense whatsoever” against hypersonic missiles, describing Europe as “naked.” Jeremy extended his scenario by suggesting Russia could escalate by threatening or conducting energy strikes in a more graduated or tailored way, potentially including a blockade. He claimed Europe lacks anti-submarine warfare forces to defend against Russian submarines, and that threats alone could turn off shipping and insurance, rapidly disrupting fuel delivery and leading to broad economic harm. He suggested the most consequential open question would be what Britain and France do regarding nuclear deterrence, framing it as a binary choice. Both speakers repeatedly returned to the need for strategy and public debate rather than closed narratives, discussing how public discourse can label alternative assessments as supportive of Russia or Ukraine depending on which side is described as “winning.” Jeremy argued that diplomacy is possible and should be pursued, calling for a public debate about risks of escalation and “a plan B” involving talks and alternative European strategic architecture. He proposed that alternative media contributes by reopening discussion on risks and diplomacy. The conversation ended with both speakers expressing agreement that boycotts of diplomacy and pressure on the public to avoid discussion are contributing factors, and that clear strategic thinking and public debate are needed to avoid a war they said Europeans did not ask for.

Two Republican senators suggest using nuclear weapons against Russia, sparking concerns about the devastating impact of a thermonuclear war. Russia's hypersonic missiles can bypass US defenses and target major cities like San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. With a powerful fleet of nuclear submarines, Virginia, including Northern Virginia and the Pentagon in Arlington County, would face total annihilation. The nation's capital would be devoid of human life in the aftermath.

According to a FAS and NRDC survey, there are approximately 23,300 nuclear weapons stored at 111 sites in 14 countries. A nuclear war could begin with an exchange of strikes, escalating into a tactical nuclear war in Europe. Russia could send 300 nuclear warheads to hit NATO bases, and NATO would respond with about 180. Casualties at this stage: 2.6 million. NATO might then launch a strategic nuclear strike of 600 warheads at Russian nuclear forces, prompting Russia to respond with missiles. Priority targets include missile silos, military installations, cities, and industrial plants. Russia and NATO would strike 30 of each other's most populated cities, resulting in 34.1 million deaths and 57.4 million injuries. Radioactive fallout would spread radiation, causing acute radiation sickness and potentially 27 million more deaths. A nuclear winter and famine could follow, devastating the biosphere, especially the Equatorial Zone. Scientists estimate that about five billion people could die within two years, underscoring the need for global cooperation to prevent nuclear war.

New York City would be destroyed if a war broke out, making it uninhabitable for centuries. Russia's survival depends on preventing NATO from advancing into Ukraine. American leaders prioritize personal gain over the well-being of the country. Speaking out against war comes at a cost. Ukraine's conflict does not affect the US, yet risks lives needlessly. Military officials prioritize career advancement over the interests of the American people.

**Original Language Summary:** Обсуждается возможность разрешения киевскому режиму наносить удары по территории России западным оружием большой дальности. Подчеркивается, что украинская армия не может самостоятельно наносить такие удары из-за отсутствия необходимых разведданных и возможности вносить полетные задания в ракетные системы. Это требует участия военнослужащих стран НАТО. В случае принятия решения о нанесении таких ударов, это будет означать прямое участие стран НАТО в войне на Украине, что существенно изменит суть конфликта и потребует от России принятия соответствующих решений, исходя из создаваемых угроз. **English Translation:** The possibility of allowing the Kyiv regime to strike Russian territory with long-range Western weapons is being discussed. It is emphasized that the Ukrainian army cannot independently carry out such strikes due to the lack of necessary intelligence data and the ability to enter flight missions into missile systems. This requires the participation of NATO military personnel. If a decision is made to carry out such strikes, it would mean the direct participation of NATO countries in the war in Ukraine, which would significantly change the nature of the conflict and require Russia to make appropriate decisions based on the threats created.

Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Rabkinov said that documents related to attacks on Saint Petersburg could prompt Russia to use nuclear weapons in a worst-case scenario, including against countries that possess nuclear weapons, not only against Ukraine. The transcript argues that NATO is launching the attacks and that Ukraine lacks nuclear weapons. The claims are tied to events during the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum, attended by over 130 countries and more than 22,000 people. The transcript describes drone strikes beginning as the forum was taking place, including video said to show drones crossing the city and targeting a highly populated civilian area. It also cites reports of a civilian bus being attacked and states seven civilian casualties and eleven injured from a Ukrainian Armed Forces drone strike. The discussion contrasts Russia’s nuclear signaling with President Volodymyr Zelensky’s stance that he has been open to peace negotiations and is meeting with NATO head Mark Rutte. The transcript criticizes Zelensky’s messaging style, reiterates that he continues promoting NATO membership, and describes his warning that “big trouble” would come if Ukraine is denied membership. It also says Zelensky claims readiness for direct negotiations with Putin while purportedly maintaining obstacles to those talks. Professor Robert Pape, director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats at the University of Chicago, argues that an “escalation trap” has been unfolding for about three years, with parallels to earlier dynamics seen in other conflicts. He says Putin pursued what he expected to be a quick victory but Ukraine “stiffened,” and that both sides have nearly irreconcilable objectives. Pape highlights that Putin has nuclear weapons and that Ukraine now has the capability to strike deep into Russia, which he frames as making escalation extremely dangerous. The transcript connects escalation risk to Ukraine’s increased drone capacity, stating Ukraine has drone manufacturing capabilities and that donor involvement—specifically mentioning Jennifer Pritzker—is part of how drone production and precision targeting have expanded. It emphasizes that drones are relatively inexpensive and that smaller funding streams could still enable effective drone campaigns, describing long-distance precision and the ability to steer drones directly into targets. The conversation also draws parallels to the Iran conflict, describing how the use of drones disrupted business and civilian-linked activities around the Gulf and how the Saint Petersburg Economic Forum is likened to Russia’s “Davos,” with an aim described as disrupting strategic investors rather than targeting the forum’s attendees directly. Pape and others argue for restraint and off-ramps to prevent being dragged into escalation traps. The transcript argues that Europe should push for a clear line to end the war, comparing it to ending the Korean War through a defined line of contact rather than leaving it to the decision of one party. It claims the “line of contact” has not moved meaningfully over several years and says Europe should publicly decide what line it supports, tying funding to an armistice and freezing the conflict. The transcript also references the idea that an earlier peace framework around the Ankara agreement was scuttled, and it concludes by arguing that without a defined settlement line, multiple actors keep escalation traps active, with repeated calls to ask why Europe and others are not publicly demanding the needed end conditions.

Americans believe a potential World War III would only concern Europe, reflecting a US-centric geopolitical strategy based on the assumption of safety across the ocean. Russia has its own doctrine for using nuclear weapons and is making adjustments to it. The speaker claims Americans view WWIII as bad because they don't want Europe to suffer, reflecting a master-servant mentality where others, including Ukrainians and now Europeans, are expected to "die for them." Speculation exists about allowing Ukraine to use not only Storm Shadow but also American long-range missiles. An anonymous source in Washington said they are looking into Ukraine's request positively. The speaker warns that "playing with fire" is dangerous for adults entrusted with nuclear weapons in the West.

The discussion claims Europe, including the EU, Germany, and the UK, is escalating toward direct war with Russia, pointing to “mobilization” already underway. It asserts that new long-range missile testing systems—described as including 250 kg warheads—are being used to help Ukraine “bomb Moscow directly,” portrayed as a “going away present” tied to Keir Starmer’s departure. It also claims Germany delivered 6,000 new medium-range drones to Ukraine, citing drone strikes on civilian infrastructure inside Moscow and referencing attacks from the previous week. Vladimir Putin is cited as saying the West is preparing for war with Russia, using offensive budgets and a pattern in which Western threats force Russia to act for self-defense, followed by accusations meant to justify continued aggressive policy. The transcript also quotes remarks about Ukraine being made into an “anti-Russian regime” through a coup and about the war in Donbas being started using aviation, artillery, and attacks against civilians. It says Russia tried to “talk reason” for eight years before being “forced” to come to the rescue of people described as part of the “Russian world,” including Russian-language communities. Former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter responds after recently visiting St. Petersburg, Moscow, and front-line areas including Lugansk, Donetsk, and Zaporozhye. He says there are “two mindsets” in major cities, but argues the West is running “major information warfare” using Ukraine as a proxy. He describes drone strikes on Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Voronezh as harassment, claiming they do not cripple Russia or break morale, including describing an incident when 500 drones were launched and residents “just get on with their lives.” He claims some Russians believe Putin’s lack of decisive response shows weakness, while others believe Putin’s pragmatism shows weakness and Russia must “double down,” and he asserts that Putin listens more to front-line soldiers than elites. Ritter claims Russians are advancing decisively and threatening captures including Slovyansk and Kramatorsk before summer, with Donetsk falling and then Zaporizhzhia Front falling. He says Ukrainian drone warfare is ongoing and dangerous, including attacks on civilian infrastructure and vehicles on the highway linking Mariupol with Crimea, and he reports effects like closed gas stations, gas shortages, and areas without electricity and water. He describes what he portrays as Ukrainian use of civilians as human shields, including people remaining in liberated areas and being targeted by drones, artillery, and mortars. He recounts visiting refugee camps and claims elders hid in basements for 20–30 days without food or water, with those who ventured outside allegedly killed, and that Russian soldiers then evacuated them under attack. He also asserts drone warfare complicates logistics but does not stymie Russian advances. On weapons and supply, Ritter states that Hornet drones used in attacks were American-made and that a company funded by Eric Schmidt is linked to them. He further claims drones use Starlink terminals and describes how AI chips allocate battery power to target-finding and then transition to “free kill mode.” He claims these capabilities drive civilians off highways so military traffic is struck. When asked about life in towns after Russian advance, he says he stayed close to the front only briefly, emphasizes that returning to the gray zone is dangerous, and describes the process of clearing buildings for civilians in basements. He says wars have changed due to drones, making movement and tactics slower and different. On the cost of the conflict, the transcript cites David Petraeus as claiming Russia is outnumbered and cannot sustain the war. Ritter rejects the claim as “full of it” and argues there is rough parity in overall troop numbers, while noting Ukraine’s casualties and emphasis on drone troops. He describes Russian assaults as supported by drones and precision artillery rather than “human wave” attacks, while claiming Wagner operations used prisoner “human wave” assaults in 2022–2023 and that Wagner casualties are not incorporated into Russian official numbers. He says Russia’s advantage has shifted from “12 to 1” toward “two or three to one,” and provides a daily claim that Russians kill 1,000 to 2,000 Ukrainians, implying Russian casualties as well. He also argues drone warfare has moved ahead of training for some Russian units, leading to heavy casualties when officers use outdated tactics against FPV drone threats. He cites a commander, Abdi Al-Adinov of Akhmed Special Forces, as using modern warfare methods and achieving advances with relatively low casualties. He says Russia is developing counter-drone capabilities, including interceptor drones, but scaling them takes time and money. Ritter concludes that Russia is advancing and inflicting horrific casualties but pays a heavy price, and says Petraeus is correct that Russia has lost more men than the United States lost in World War II.

The CIA last November briefed Congress that there's a greater than 50% chance of a nuclear war between Russia and The United States, based on releasing ATAKEMS missiles to Ukraine for long-range strikes into Russia. Those strikes would have violated Russia's new nuclear doctrine and red lines. STRATCOM's director of plans briefed a Washington DC think tank that The United States is prepared for nuclear exchange with Russia, meaning nuclear war, and that The United States thought they would win. A senior Democrat asked if the CIA said the Russians were bluffing; the answer was no—the CIA said the exact opposite. The scary part is Biden administration officials were in the room and said, "Oh, we're ready for that. If the Russians wanna play, we're ready." "We're ready to go to nuclear war with them. This is the insanity that existed in November."

The speaker states: "Is developing now ballistic missiles that are intercontinental ballistic missiles for 8,000 kilometers range." They add: "They add another 3,000 kilometers and they've got under their gun, under their atomic guns, the New York City in Target, Washington, Boston, Miami, Mar A Lago." "That is a very great danger." "You don't want to be under the nuclear gun of these people who are not necessarily rational and who chant Death to America." These observations underscore concerns about strategic stability and the potential impact on major U.S. metropolitan areas.