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Ukraine has been a path of invasion into Russia. To avoid this, Gorbachev agreed to allow Germany to reunify under NATO, but only if NATO didn't expand eastward. Despite this agreement, NATO expanded, and the US withdrew from nuclear weapons treaties, placing missile systems near Moscow. In 2014, the US allegedly overthrew Ukraine's government, leading Russia to annex Crimea to protect its naval base. When the new Ukrainian government attacked ethnic Russians, Russia intervened to protect them. Zelenskyy was elected on a promise of peace by signing the Minsk Accords, but he refused to sign the agreement. Russia intervened, seeking negotiations to keep Ukraine out of NATO. A treaty was drafted, but allegedly, Joe Biden sent Boris Johnson to force Ukraine to abandon it. The result has been a catastrophic loss of life, with the world viewing the US as the aggressor.

The panelists discuss whether recent developments around Ukraine, NATO security guarantees, and Western support can produce a peace agreement acceptable to Russia and Ukraine, and what the war’s trajectory might look like by year-end and beyond. Initial reactions and sticking points - Speaker 1 sees potential in recent moves if true and reliable, arguing Ukraine is signaling goodwill to the United States, but remains skeptical that a peace deal will satisfy both sides given core demands over territory and Donbas control. He emphasizes the Donbas as the central unresolved issue. - Speaker 2 notes Putin’s need to show tangible gains to save face, arguing the war is being fought to achieve declared goals and that Russia will not sign a deal unless it secures substantial results. Security guarantees, no-fly zones, and peacekeeping - The discussion centers on two main proposed points: U.S. security guarantees (including possible no-fly zone enforcement) and a European-led peacekeeping force in Ukraine. There is debate about how binding such guarantees would be and whether Russia would accept them, with concerns about the Budapest Memorandum’s history of non-fulfillment versus what a new, more comprehensive, legally binding framework might look like. - Speaker 1 points out that even a robust security package would require Russian agreement, which he doubts will be forthcoming given Moscow’s current aims. He underscores that Europe’s and the U.S.’s support for Ukraine is contingent on political will, which could waver, but he notes Ukraine’s trust gap with U.S. guarantees given past experiences. - Speaker 2 stresses that Putin’s aims include defeating NATO and achieving a U.S.-level accommodation (a “Yalta 2.0” style deal) while keeping Western control over Europe at arm’s length. He argues Putin would accept U.S. and possibly some European troops but not a formal NATO presence on Ukrainian soil, especially in western Donbas or beyond. Budapest memorandum vs. new guarantees - Both sides discuss the difference between a nonbinding Budapest Memorandum and a more robust, legally binding security guarantee. Speaker 1 highlights Ukraine’s past trust in security assurances despite U.S. and European failures to honor them, suggesting skepticism about the enforceability of any new guarantees. Speaker 2 suggests that a stronger, more binding arrangement could be essential for Russia to accept any settlement, but that Moscow would still resist concessions over full Donbas control. On-the-ground realities and war dynamics - The panelists agree Russia is advancing on multiple fronts, though the pace and strategic significance of gains vary. They discuss Ukraine’s ability to sustain the fight through Western weapons flows and domestic production (including drones and shells). They acknowledge the risk of Western fatigue and the potential for a more protracted war, even as Ukraine builds its own capabilities to prolong the conflict. - The West’s long-term willingness to fund and arm Ukraine is debated: Speaker 1 argues Europe’s economy is strained but notes continued political support for Ukraine, which could outlast Russia’s economic stamina. Speaker 2 emphasizes that Russia’s economy is fragile mainly in the provinces, while Moscow and Saint Petersburg remain relatively insulated; he also points to BRICS support (China and India) as sustaining Moscow politically and economically. Economic and strategic pressures - The role of energy revenues and sanctions is debated. Speaker 1 suggests Russia can be pressured economically to seek a deal, while Speaker 2 counters that Russia’s economy is adapting, with China and India providing strategic support that helps Moscow resist Western coercion. They discuss shadow fleet strikes and global energy markets as tools to erode Russia’s war-finance capability. - There is disagreement about whether, over time, economic pressure alone could force regime change in Russia. Speaker 1 is skeptical that penalties will trigger a voluntary Russian withdrawal, while Speaker 2 argues that sustained economic and political pressure, combined with Western unity, could push toward a settlement. Strategies and potential outcomes - Putin’s internal calculus is described as existential: he seeks a win that he can publicly claim to legitimize his rule and justify the costs of the war to the Russian people and elites. This shapes his openness to concessions and to the kinds of guarantees he would accept. - Alexander posits that a near-term peace could emerge from a deal brokered at high levels (potentially involving Trump and Putin) that reshapes European security with U.S. leadership and BRICS engagement, while Paul emphasizes that any credible end to the conflict would require Ukraine and Russia to agree to a swap-like territorial arrangement and to accept a new security framework that deters renewed aggression. End-of-year and longer-term outlooks - By year-end, the panel agrees it is unlikely that a major peace agreement will be realized under the current conditions; any real breakthrough would depend on significant concessions, including Donbas arrangements, and a credible security guarantee framework. - By the end of next year, both expect a continuation of a contested balance: Ukraine likely to press for stronger Western guarantees and EU integration, Russia seeking to preserve Donbas gains while navigating internal and external pressures. Alexander envisions two “wins” emerging: the United States under Trump coordinating a broader peace framework, and China leveraging its economic influence to shape Europe’s response. Paul anticipates a gradual trajectory with ongoing military and economic pressures and a continued stalemate unless a major concession reshapes incentives on both sides.

Biden and Austin admitted that the purpose of the war in Ukraine was not about Ukrainian freedom, but rather to exhaust the Russian army and engage in a proxy war. The US repeatedly prevented Zelensky from signing the Minsk Accords, which could have prevented the war. The speaker believes that the US deliberately provoked Russia and that the war could have been avoided. They argue that the US's actions have led to negative consequences, such as pushing Russia towards China and risking the dollar's status as the world reserve currency. Additionally, the speaker highlights the danger of provoking a nuclear superpower and questions why the conflict was not resolved peacefully from the start.

In April 2022, Biden dispatched Johnson to Ukraine to pressure Zelensky into abandoning a peace agreement with Russia. This agreement, which would have kept Donbas and Lugansk within Ukraine, was reached as Russia began withdrawing troops. Simultaneously, Biden declared his aim was regime change in Russia, while Defense Secretary Austin stated the U.S. sought to exhaust the Russian army. These objectives diverge significantly from the stated goal of protecting Ukraine's sovereignty.

Russia invaded Ukraine with only 40,000 troops, indicating they did not aim to take over the entire country. Instead, they wanted to bring Ukraine to the negotiating table. In March 2022, Ukrainian President Zelensky and Russian President Putin agreed on a peace agreement based on the Minsk Accords. However, President Biden sent Boris Johnson to Ukraine to sabotage the agreement, leading to war. Since then, 350,000 Ukrainian children and 40-50,000 Russians have died. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin questioned the purpose of the war, while Biden stated it was for regime change in Russia. This conflict is essentially a proxy struggle between Russia and the United States, with the US committing $113 billion to Ukraine, far surpassing the budgets of other organizations.

Putin initially sought to avoid war and aimed for a diplomatic solution before February 24, 2022. After the conflict began, he engaged in negotiations with Ukraine, focusing on NATO expansion and seeking a neutral Ukraine, without intentions to annex further territory aside from Crimea. However, the U.S. and U.K. influenced Zelensky to abandon negotiations, believing Ukraine and the West could win the war. Initially, this seemed plausible in 2022, but by 2023, the situation has shifted, indicating a challenging year for Ukraine and a potential advantage for Russia in the conflict.

Putin's intention in the war was to keep NATO, meaning the United States, off Russia's border. After the Soviet Union ended in 1991, the US decided to continue NATO's eastward expansion, formally deciding in 1994 to include Ukraine and Georgia. This expansion began in 1999 and continued in 2004, upsetting Russia. In 2008, the US pushed for NATO enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia, which border Russia. Russia protested, fearing the US would react similarly if Russia placed military bases near its borders. In 2014, the US actively worked to overthrow Yanukovych in Ukraine, and later, Ukraine refused to enforce the Minsk agreement, leading to conflict in the Donbas. Putin's initial war intention was to force Zelenskyy to negotiate neutrality, but Ukraine withdrew from near agreement due to US influence, leading to a proxy war with significant Ukrainian casualties.

Negotiations with Russia in Istanbul were successful, even to the point of opening a champagne bottle in celebration. The agreement was 90% ready for a direct meeting between Putin and Zelensky, with only the size of Ukrainian armed forces in peacetime remaining. However, after the discovery of Bucha, Zelensky was shocked and the negotiations were halted. A meeting scheduled for April 9th was canceled. The speaker doesn't know if Boris Johnson's visit to Kyiv influenced this decision. Although Russia showed readiness to continue negotiations, Ukraine declined. The speaker now believes an agreement at that time was impossible, as Putin could reframe the conflict as a war against the West, opening a "Pandora's box" of global issues. The speaker views the current situation as a new "Thirty Years' War," signaling the end of the modern era.

Putin's intention in the war was to keep NATO, meaning the United States, off Russia's border. After the Soviet Union ended in 1991, NATO agreed not to move eastward, but the US later decided to enlarge NATO eastward to Ukraine and Georgia. Despite Russia's unhappiness, NATO enlargement continued. In 2008, the US pushed for NATO enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia, leading to protests from Russia. The US then installed missile systems in Poland and Romania. In 2014, the US actively worked to overthrow the Russia-leaning Yanukovych government in Ukraine. Later, Ukraine, supported by the US, refused to enforce the Minsk Two agreement, which would have given autonomy to Russian-speaking regions. In 2022, the US asserted its right to place missile systems anywhere, leading to the war. Putin's initial aim was to negotiate Ukraine's neutrality, but Ukraine withdrew from near-agreement due to US influence, furthering the proxy war.

- The discussion centers on whether European actions against Russia amount to a NATO-wide escalation and could lead to direct confrontation with Russia outside Ukraine, given recent attacks on Russian energy infrastructure and civilian ships in the Black Sea, including a Russian oil tanker in the Mediterranean with reports of drones launched from Greece. Putin reportedly vowed retaliation, and the guests consider how European and U.S./NATO support for Ukraine factors into this dynamic. - Daniel Davis argues that a segment of the Western alliance wants a conflict with Russia, framing it as peace on their terms from a position of weakness. He says there is little consideration for Russia’s security requirements or a mutually acceptable peace, and that ignoring Russia’s security concerns has driven the current cycle of escalation. He notes that Western actions since 2021–2022 have ignored the Russian side and pursued war aims on Western terms, contributing to a deteriorating situation and increasing casualties on the Ukrainian side. - Davis contends that Russia has been reticent to respond to many provocations with significant actions outside Ukraine, implying that Moscow has avoided a full-scale escalation that could threaten NATO. He predicts that Putin will respond to Western strikes on Russian targets, possibly increasing pressure on Odessa and other civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, with a tit-for-tat pattern as Russia leverages its greater capacity to hit Western shipping and infrastructure. - He asserts that since 2023, the West’s approach has not reversed the battlefield dynamics; sanctions, intelligence inputs, and heavy weapon transfers have not pushed Russia out of Ukraine and have allowed NATO and European stockpiles to deplete while Russia continues to build up in key categories (missiles, air defense, logistics). He claims Europe’s commitment of large sums to Ukraine will further strain their economies and shorten their stockpiles, potentially weakening Western readiness for a wider conflict. - The guest stresses that Russia’s strategy appears to be “go slow” in Ukraine to maintain pressure without triggering a broader European or NATO intervention, while building up stockpiles to prepare for a possible expansion of war if needed. He notes that Russia has generated a stockpile advantage in missiles (including Oreshniks) and air defense that could be decisive in a broader conventional war. - The discussion covers Oreshnik missiles, with Davis explaining Russia’s aim to maximize production and use if needed, not merely deter. He argues that Western air defenses would be ineffective against such systems and that Russia’s broader stockpiling and production could outpace Western depletion. He suggests Russia’s buildup is intended to enable a decisive move if NATO or Western forces escalate, and that the West’s capacity to sustain prolonged high-tempo combat is limited. - Both speakers discuss Odessa as a likely target if Russia deems it necessary to retaliate against Western support for Ukraine, noting that recent strikes on bridges, trains, and energy facilities in the region indicate growing Russian intent to disrupt Ukraine’s rear and logistics in the event of a front-line escalation. They consider whether Russia could seize Odessa if Western concessions are not forthcoming, and whether European leaders would respond decisively if Russia moves against Ukrainian ports. - The hosts warn that Western rhetoric about a “just and lasting peace” may be misaligned with Russia’s goals and that the risk of a broader conflict—potentially involving nuclear considerations—exists if provocations continue. They caution that if the conflict widens, all sides—Russia, Ukraine, Europe, and the United States—could suffer heavy losses, and express concern about the potential for miscalculation as new weapons systems and security arrangements come into play before the year ends.

The United States also wants to end this conflict. And before Putin launched his full invasion, we used every tool we could to try to prevent it. We used every tool diplomatically to prevent this war from starting. Did we really? Nope. The exact opposite is the case. The Russians were desperate to avoid a war. All you have to do is go back and look at the 12/17/2021 letter that Putin sent to both he and Stoltenberg, the head of NATO, and to president Biden, suggesting a deal and talking about getting together to figure out how to shut this conflict down and avoid a war. And we basically in fact, it was Tony Blinken who gave the Russians the high sign. We told them we're not interested, and we continued to push and push and push. And then when the Russians invaded on 02/24/2022, the Russians immediately thereafter sent a signal to the Ukrainians that they wanted to start peace negotiations. They wanted to end the war. This is right after they started it. Why? Because the Russians had no interest in a war. And, the peace negotiations were moving along quite well. There was no final agreement for sure, and one can never be certain that an agreement would have been worked out. But they were making major progress for sure, throughout March and early April. And lo and behold, The United States and the British basically tell the Ukrainians that they should walk away from the negotiations.

Putin's intention in the war was to keep NATO, meaning the United States, off of Russia's border. In 1994, President Clinton signed off on NATO enlargement to the East, including Ukraine and Georgia. Russia was unhappy with the enlargement, especially with the Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Slovakia in 2004. In 2008, the US pushed for NATO enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia. In 2010, the US put Aegis missile systems in Poland and Romania. Also in 2010, Viktor Yanukovych was elected in Ukraine on a platform of neutrality. In 2014, the US worked to overthrow Yanukovych, as evidenced by a phone call involving Victoria Newland and the US Ambassador. The Minsk agreement, calling for autonomy for Russian-speaking regions, was not enforced by the US and Ukraine. In January 2022, Blinken told Lavrov that the US reserves the right to put missile systems wherever it wants. The war's initial intention was to force Zelensky to negotiate neutrality, which nearly happened, but Ukraine walked away, allegedly due to US influence. The US senators view the conflict as a proxy war where no Americans are dying.

Jeffrey Sachs and the host discuss the four-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and reference the 12-year anniversary of the NATO-backed coup in Ukraine. They frame the conflict as humanitarian and strategic disaster, arguing it risks Europe and potentially nuclear escalation. They question why the war persists given high stakes. Sachs argues the war started from Western delusions in the 1990s that the US could bring Russia into a US-led world and reduce Russia to a secondary power or even fragment it. He cites Zbigniew Brzezinski’s 1990s predictions of a divided Russia as evidence of “triumphalism” and says when Russia resisted Western demands after 2014 and 2022, those resistances were used by Western politicians to justify prolonging the conflict. He condemns Boris Johnson for saying Ukraine could not sign a peace with Russia without threatening Western hegemony, calling the situation “millions of lives” lost over a game of Western dominance. He characterizes European leaders as complicit, noting resistance to NATO enlargement in Europe but eventual acquiescence, and criticizes German leadership (Merkel, Scholz, and Scholz’s successor, Mertz/Merz?—context suggests Olaf Scholz and then Olaf Scholz and Friedrich Merz) for lack of truthful or constructive intervention. He emphasizes that the push for NATO enlargement and the Maidan coup signaled a failure by Europe to prevent war, with specific reference to the 2008 Bucharest Summit (NATO enlargement), the 2014 Maidan coup and the 2015 Minsk agreements, which Sachs claims Germany and France did not enforce. He asserts Merkel initially resisted but capitulated on enlargement, and that Minsk II was treated as a holding period to build Ukraine’s strength for war, a point he attributes to Merkel’s later statements. He argues Germany bears high responsibility as the largest EU member and a central actor in these decisions. Sachs then discusses what could have prevented the war, arguing that Germany should have counseled peace with Putin and engaged directly with the goal of avoiding escalation. He asserts that Merkel, Merkel’s successors, and the German leadership failed to prevent the conflict, calling for German initiative to seek peace. The conversation shifts to the possibility of negotiated settlement. The host notes Russia views NATO expansion and Ukraine’s invasion as existential threats, while Ukraine sees an existential threat from the invasion. The host asks what settlements might look like and what role the US and Europe should play. Sachs reiterates Germany as the key actor and calls for direct diplomacy between Germany and Russia to explore peace, suggesting a need for a political settlement and a reconsideration of Ukraine’s status. Sachs expands the discussion to global order. He references Brzezinski’s The Grand Chessboard, describing how Russia’s shift toward Eurasia and China challenged Western assumptions. He argues the West’s sanctions failed to keep Russia aligned with Europe, pushing Russia toward China and India, and turning the world toward multipolarity. He characterizes the US as a declining hegemon and Europe as demoralized and divided, with BRICS and other regions seeking prosperity through partnerships with China, India, and Russia. He argues that Europe should move away from Russophobia and toward collective security. The hosts touch on Joe Biden’s 1997 Atlantic Council remarks and Joseph Chamberlain’s imperial rhetoric as examples of misjudgments about global power dynamics. Sachs concludes by underscoring the need for a more realistic approach to the world order to avoid further conflict, and the host agrees to continue the discussion in the future.

The discussion centers on why achieving a durable peace in Ukraine remains elusive, with participants insisting that every side seeks terms favorable to itself and that genuine compromise is seldom forthcoming. Putin’s true aims are debated. Jonathan argues that Putin’s primary concern is internal regime security rather than territory. He suggests that Ukraine’s shift toward Western political and democratic norms threatens Putin’s rule and his business model, making Ukraine a strategic buffer that could inspire similar Western reforms within Russia. He contends that the issue is not NATO expansion per se, but the regime’s fear of democratic influence emanating from Ukraine. Mark, by contrast, views the conflict as driven by a broader geopolitical contest, with Russia aiming to erase Kyiv’s Western alignment and to neutralize Ukraine as a political threat, a stance he says is explicitly stated by Russian representatives. He also emphasizes that for Russia, security guarantees and territorial concessions would be unacceptable if they leave anti‑Russian regimes in control of eastern Ukraine. The panelists repeatedly acknowledge that, in practice, peace negotiations are framed as a contest of terms. Rubio’s remark is cited to illustrate the perception that all parties want peace “on their terms,” and that Russia has repeatedly rejected deals that require concessions on its core objectives. A recurring theme is that Russia would prefer a permanent settlement that keeps Ukraine out of NATO and restores a neutral status for Ukraine, effectively precluding Kyiv’s future alignment with Western security structures. There is broad agreement that, on the battlefield, Russia has not achieved a straightforward, decisive victory and that the conflict is complex and protracted. Yet there is disagreement about whether Russia is “winning” or whether the front lines indicate a longer stalemate, with some arguing that Russia remains capable of imposing strategic costs and that the West has faced limits in providing advanced weapons or decisive deterrence. The discussion also touches on escalation risk, with some participants highlighting the risk of nuclear confrontation and the perception that Western powers, especially the United States, have been cautious in delivering the most potent capabilities to Kyiv. US and Western roles are examined in depth. Jonathan contends that the conflict has evolved into a US/NATO proxy dynamic, with the West providing support while avoiding a direct confrontation that could trigger a broader war. He argues that the Biden administration has pursued a cautious, incremental approach to armament and economic pressure to avoid escalation, while still trying to prevent a Ukrainian defeat. Mark challenges this, suggesting that Western policy has often been framed as preventing Ukraine’s collapse rather than decisively countering Russian goals, and he asserts that the U.S. has pursued objectives that do not aim for Moscow’s overthrow but instead for preserving a client state in Kyiv. The conversation also covers the Budapest Memorandum, the history of Western guarantees, and questions about whether Western promises would be reliable in a crisis. The role of NGOs, civil society, and media is debated. Jonathan explains that, prior to the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian media was a mosaic with significant oligarchic influence, but that independent voices gained strength after 2014 and became more robust under pressure from government and oligarchs. He argues that Western funding for NGOs has aimed to promote democratic values and press freedom, though he concedes that some Western projects lacked a clear strategic objective. Mark counters by arguing that Russia also used civil society and NGOs as tools, though he asserts that Western leverage and funding were far more extensive and impactful. The debate includes a critique of US funding patterns and the potential for foreign influence shaping political outcomes. The participants discuss the possibility of freezing lines as a path to peace. They deem it unlikely: Mark says NATO presence near Russia’s borders remains unacceptable, and Jonathan notes that such a freeze would leave large Russian-leaning regions in Ukraine under a regime Moscow views as hostile. They acknowledge the political and military infeasibility of a durable ceasefire under the current conditions, given the entrenched positions and fortifications in Donbas, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia. Looking ahead, the panelists foresee a long, possibly generational conflict unless there is a dramatic shift. Mark argues that the ultimate settlement would require regime change in Kyiv, while Jonathan suggests that both sides see no real path to a negotiated end under current terms, forecasting endurance of hostilities with periodic escalation and continued diplomacy as a façade that fails to yield a decisive peace. They anticipate Europe’s ongoing rearmament and potential domestic political shifts that could influence the trajectory of the conflict, with the broader global balance affected as countries reassess alliances and deterrence strategies.

Putin's intention in the war wasn't to take over Ukraine, but to keep NATO, meaning the United States, off Russia's border. After the Soviet Union's end in 1991, an agreement stated NATO wouldn't move eastward, but the US decided to expand NATO eastward, formally deciding in 1994 to include Ukraine and Georgia. NATO enlargement began in 1999, upsetting Russia. By 2008, the US pushed for NATO expansion to Ukraine and Georgia, which Russia protested, drawing a parallel to a hypothetical military base on the US border. In 2014, the US actively worked to overthrow Yanukovych. Putin's intention was to force Zelensky to negotiate neutrality, which initially occurred, but Ukraine withdrew from the agreement, reportedly due to US influence. The US aimed to isolate Russia by controlling the Black Sea, viewing it as a proxy war, while the consequences included significant Ukrainian casualties.

Naftali Bennett said that Boris Johnson interfered and prevented Ukrainians from signing a deal at the end of negotiations. Ukrainian representative Karakami confirmed that Johnson advised stopping negotiations to win the war militarily. According to Speaker 1, the Ukrainians began asking for advice and it became clear that Putin's main condition was in an annex. This condition included limits on the weapons systems Ukraine could have, which would have neutralized them as a military force. Russia would not have similar constraints, such as pulling back or having a buffer zone. People inside and outside Ukraine questioned whether it was a good deal, and that's when it fell apart.

Russia has been invaded three times through Ukraine, and they don't want Ukraine to join NATO. Gorbachev agreed to German reunification under NATO with the promise that NATO wouldn't expand eastward. However, in 1997, plans were made to move NATO eastward, incorporating 15 countries and surrounding the Soviet Union. NATO expanded into 14 new nations and withdrew from nuclear weapons treaties with Russia, placing missile systems in Romania and Poland. The U.S. allegedly overthrew the Ukrainian government in 2014, installing a Western-sympathetic government. Russia then entered Crimea to protect its warm water port. The new Ukrainian government allegedly began killing ethnic Russians in Donbas and Lugans. The Minsk Accords, designed to keep NATO out of Ukraine, were refused by the Ukrainian parliament. Zelenskyy was elected in 2019 promising to sign the Accords, but allegedly pivoted due to threats from ultra-rightists and the U.S. Russia then intervened, aiming to negotiate. A treaty guaranteeing Ukraine wouldn't join NATO was allegedly signed, but Boris Johnson, allegedly under Joe Biden's direction, forced Zelenskyy to abandon it.

Putin initially tried to prevent the war and sought a diplomatic solution. He negotiated with Ukraine, focusing on Crimea. However, his main concern was NATO expansion into Ukraine. If Ukraine had remained neutral, the war might have been avoided. But the US and UK intervened, pressuring Ukraine to abandon negotiations. In 2022, it seemed possible for Ukraine and the West to win, but 2023 has been disastrous for Ukraine, and now it appears Russia will emerge victorious.

Naftali Bennett said that Boris Johnson interfered and prevented Ukrainians from signing a deal with Russia. Ukrainian representative Karakami confirmed that Johnson advised stopping negotiations to win the war militarily. According to Speaker 1, the Ukrainians began asking for advice late in the negotiation process. It became clear that Putin's main condition, buried in an annex, would limit the kinds of weapons systems Ukraine could have, effectively neutering it militarily. Russia would face no similar constraints, such as pulling back or creating a buffer zone. Questions arose about whether this was a good deal, at which point the deal fell apart.

Speaker 0 argues that this is not an attack by Putin on Ukraine in the way it is commonly framed. The speaker references 1990, stating that on 02/09/1990 James Baker III told Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not move eastward if Germany unified, and that Gorbachev agreed, ending World War II. The speaker asserts that the US then cheated starting in 1994 when Clinton signed off on a plan to expand NATO all the way to Ukraine, marking the rise of the neocons and identifying Clinton as the first agent of this. NATO expansion began in 1999 with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, at which point Russia did not see a direct threat. The speaker notes the US-led bombing of Serbia in 1999 as problematic, describing it as NATO bombing Belgrade for seventy-eight straight days to break the country apart, which Russia did not like. Putin became president, and the Russians initially tolerated and complained but were largely subdued. The speaker claims Putin started out pro-European and pro-American, even suggesting joining NATO when there was some mutual respect. After 9/11 and the Afghan conflict, Russia supported the effort to root out terror. Two decisive actions are highlighted: in 2002, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, described as perhaps the most decisive event rarely discussed in this context. This led to the US placing missile systems in Eastern Europe, which Russia views as a direct threat. The speaker mentions a soft regime change operation in Ukraine in 2004-2005, followed by Yanukovych winning the election in 2009 and becoming president in 2010 on the basis of neutrality for Ukraine. This calmed tensions because the US was pushing NATO, while Ukrainian public opinion reportedly did not want NATO membership, citing a divided country between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians and a desire to stay away from certain conflicts. In 02/22/2014, the United States allegedly participated in the overthrow of Yanukovych, described as a typical US regime change operation. The Russians supposedly intercepted a call between Victoria Nuland (then at the State Department, now at Columbia University) and Jeffrey Piot, the US ambassador to Ukraine, discussing who would be in the next government. The speaker asserts that after these events, the US said NATO would enlarge, while Putin repeatedly warned to stop, noting that promises were made not to enlarge NATO. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia are listed as having joined NATO in 2004, before the broader enlargement. The speaker accuses the US of rejecting the basic idea of not expanding NATO to Russia’s border while placing missile systems after breaking a treaty, including walking out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019. On 12/15/2021, Putin allegedly proposed a draft Russia-US security agreement with no NATO enlargement, which the speaker says he communicated to the White House, urging negotiations to avoid war. The speaker claims Jake Sullivan asserted an open-door policy for NATO enlargement, calling it “bullshit,” and asserts that they refused negotiations, leading to the special military operation, with Zelensky offering neutrality and Western leaders pushing Ukraine to fight, resulting in “600,000 deaths now of Ukrainians.”

Putin claimed to have a document outlining a peace agreement with Ukraine, which he showed during negotiations in Istanbul. The agreement was called the Permanent Agreement on Ukraine and Security Guarantees, consisting of 18 articles covering everything from military equipment to personnel. However, Putin did not make the document public. The Ukrainian delegation aimed to prolong the process, while the Russian delegation wanted to pressure Ukraine into signing the agreement, particularly by ensuring Ukraine's non-membership in NATO. Ukraine refused this point due to the need for constitutional changes and lack of trust in Russia's commitment. The lack of preparation and uncertainty led Ukraine to only work towards an agreement with 100% assurance that history would not repeat itself. Boris Johnson's visit to Kyiv further complicated matters, as he stated that no agreements would be signed, suggesting a preference for continued conflict.

Putin claims he wants to negotiate the war, but Zelensky refuses. Historically, Ukraine has faced invasions, including from Hitler. After the Soviet Union's fall, Gorbachev allowed Germany to reunify under NATO, seeking a commitment not to expand NATO eastward. However, NATO expanded into 14 countries, and the U.S. withdrew from nuclear treaties. In 2014, the U.S. supported a government change in Ukraine, prompting Russia to annex Crimea. Zelensky, elected on a peace platform, was pressured not to sign the Minsk Accords. When Russia invaded with a small force, they sought negotiations, but U.S. intervention led to the treaty's collapse. The conflict has resulted in significant casualties, with Ukraine suffering heavily. The perception is that the U.S. appears as the aggressor in this situation.

Putin's intention in the war was to force Zelensky to negotiate—Neutrality. "The idea was to keep NATO. And what is NATO? It's The United States off of Russia's border. No more, no less." When the Soviet Union ended in 1991, an agreement was made that NATO will not move one inch eastward, but "the decision was taken formally in 1994 when president Clinton signed off on NATO enlargement to the East, all the way to Ukraine and into Georgia." Enlargement continued: 1999 (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic); 2004 (Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia). Putin said "stop" in 02/2007; in 02/2008, "The United States jammed down Europe's throat enlargement of NATO to Ukraine and to Georgia." 02/2010, Yanukovych neutrality; US overthrow in 2014; Minsk accords; "autonomy for the Russian speaking regions" in the East. "Blinken told Lavrov in January 2022, The United States reserves the right to put missile systems wherever it wants." The war started; "Ukraine walked away unilaterally from a near agreement" because "The United States told them to." It's the pure proxy war; and "a million Ukrainians have died or been severely"

Naftali Bennett said that Boris Johnson interfered and prevented Ukrainians from signing a deal at the end of negotiations. Ukrainian representative Karakami confirmed that Johnson advised stopping negotiations to win the war militarily. According to Speaker 1, the Ukrainians began asking for advice late in the process. It became clear that Putin's main condition, buried in an annex, would limit the kinds of weapons systems Ukraine could have, effectively neutering it as a military force. Russia would face no similar constraints, such as pulling back or creating a buffer zone. Questions arose about whether it was a good deal, and the deal fell apart.

They were ready to end the war if we took a neutral stance like Finland and promised not to join NATO. When we returned to Istanbul, Boris Johnson came to Kyiv and said we wouldn't sign anything with them and let's just fight. But as soon as we called on them to sit down, the next day they would already be sitting, waiting with a delegation.