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Speaker 0 asks if the US will freeze the $6 billion that was unlocked for Iran in exchange for prisoners, considering Iran's support for Hamas. Speaker 1 responds that none of that money has been spent yet. Speaker 0 then asks if the US will prevent Iran from using the money for their activities, to which Speaker 1 reiterates that none of the money has been spent.

The day starts with the 10 Iranian plan being accepted by President Donald Trump as the basis for negotiation. JD Vance was headed to Islamabad to lead the American negotiating team, with former leaders persona non grata toward Iran. The speaker notes this contrasted with what happened the last time Iran negotiated with Kushner and Witkoff. Lebanon was in a ceasefire on paper, written by the prime minister of Pakistan, whose efforts were praised. If the 10-point plan was the basis for negotiation, this represented a major victory for the Islamic Republic, a point echoed in a Moscow conference addressed by the Iranian ambassador in those terms. But by sunset, the situation “appeared to have gone to hell in a handcart.” Just before going on air, Tehran’s air defenses were engaged with what were said to be American bombers, implying the ceasefire didn’t even last twelve hours. The Islamabad negotiation is now in grave doubt. In an RT interview, the question was asked whether Iran had really won as claimed. The response asserts that the greatest superpower cannot achieve its objectives and thus has lost; if the U.S. “definitely lost,” then Iran has won. Iran is described as a global south emerging country under sanctions for forty-seven years, surviving two nuclear superpowers (regional and global). The speaker contrasts Trump’s regime-change talk for Iran with Afghanistan’s experience, noting the U.S. spent a trillion dollars to remove the Taliban only for the Taliban to return to power as the U.S. withdrew. There is a claim of “replacing one Khamenei with a second Khamenei,” with the son being less moderate than the father, and referencing the dead father, mother, wife, and children from the initial American attack. The speaker recounts an attack on a 169-schoolgirl incident near Bandar Abbas, asking listeners to imagine daughters or granddaughters incinerated in an instant, and labels it a day of infamy akin to Pearl Harbor. Iran was allegedly negotiating with “the sneak attackers,” with thousands of Iranian civilians killed, mosques and churches destroyed, and even a synagogue destroyed; the speaker notes having filmed a synagogue outside of which there are “100 synagogues in Iran,” with Jews in Iran and a million Christians having an honored place in the Islamic Republic. The claim is that these acts occurred while the United States and Israel bombed, killed front-rank commanders, and destroyed the leader of the Iranian revolution, achieving nothing. The speaker contrasts Trump’s harsh rhetoric against Obama over the JCPOA with Trump’s support for a 10-point plan that supposedly is less restrictive than the JCPOA, including allowing Iran to charge a toll on every tanker through the Strait of Hormuz, potentially earning about a hundred billion dollars per year in perpetuity, and criticizing Obama for returning Iran’s own money. Trump is said to claim Lebanon was included in the ceasefire, but the plan and the prime minister of Pakistan say Lebanon is included; nonetheless, Israel launches a frenzy of violence on Lebanon, including bombing a funeral, with a death toll rising. The speech notes Israeli attacks on Beirut, and describes a seventy-two-hour bombardment and the Arab League’s response, with the UAE allegedly attacking two Iranian islands eight hours after the ceasefire, threatening a broader war between Iran and the UAE. The Strait of Hormuz is claimed closed again, despite Trump’s boast of unblocking it, and oil prices are cited at $144 per barrel, with implications for Russia, Europe, and Asia if prices surge. The speaker asks where this is heading and reflects that, while exultant in the morning, the evening leaves doubt about resolution. The commentary concludes that this is a global crisis bigger than past financial crashes, and introduces Professor Syed Muhammad Marandi as the guest to explain further after a break.

The conversation began with Mario interviewing Pepe and discussing a developing story about comments and reporting around Israel and Pakistan. A producer said people in Pakistan were sending screenshots from TV coverage, and Mario noted that his prior Pakistan appearances were often “about Imran Khan,” but this time it gained positive traction and attracted “a lot of people talking.” Mario and his guest then focused on the reports Pepe provided and that they both discussed yesterday: that Israelis were looking into or potentially considering an assassination strike on Pakistani leaders, including General Asim Munir. The guest described Pakistan’s global intelligence network and argued that Pakistani services likely tapped into information through many channels, saying Pakistanis are highly educated and monitor conversations. He said he was told that information included that Bibi Netanyahu personally ordered efforts to put Muneer “in his place,” potentially including killing him, and that Pakistani intelligence took precautions. He added that if Israel attempted an assassination attempt, it would be expected to happen in Pakistan so blame could be shifted to a local dissident group, and he said General Muneer was aware and precautions were taken. They then shifted to broader regional developments and Pakistan’s role in coordinating security and diplomatic efforts, describing cooperation that included Iran. The guest said Pakistan and Iran had reduced high-profile Iranian leader assassinations after Pakistan directly approached Iranians with information about how Israel targeted them and what steps to take. He also described a chain of phone calls and guarantees related to a deal in which Muneer spoke to MBS in Saudi Arabia, with Qatar also agreeing, leading to the deal moving forward despite uncertainty tied to US involvement. He also mentioned a Pakistani foreign minister-organized meeting in Cairo with Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia to form “foundations” of a new Persian Gulf security architecture. He framed a motivation as ensuring access to oil for Pakistan and its needs. Mario asked whether Israelis would conduct such operations without American approval, and the guest said Israel “doesn’t always come seek permission” and sometimes does what it wants without regard to whether the United States cares. Mario referenced the Qatar attack and argued that prior red lines appeared to be crossed, making the idea of an Israeli strike in Qatar seem less surprising than earlier. Next, they discussed reports about Lebanon and Syria. Mario cited a Ynet report that Netanyahu would hold security consultations about concerns over possible Syrian forces entering Lebanon following Trump’s remarks. The guest responded that he considered it logistically implausible for al-Shara, with “barely existing” military capacity, to execute such actions, arguing that complex logistics and resupply could not be done overnight. They also noted that even if buildups were not reported in the press, other states and intelligence systems would monitor them, with Hezbollah and Iran receiving intelligence. Mario then said monitoring would focus on logistics, equipment, and supply lines on the Lebanese-Syrian border. On the Iranian side, the conversation turned to mixed statements around the MOU and the Strait of Hormuz. The guest described Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson issuing a statement that mistrust remains due to contradictory US messages, referencing vigilance based on past experiences. Mario discussed Trump’s claims that Iran would not charge tolls, insurance costs, or other charges for ships traveling the Strait of Hormuz, while also stating the US would release some of Iran-controlled funds for US-purchased food for Iranian farmers and ranchers. The guest said Iran was skeptical of US messaging. They also discussed the IAEA—US assertions about inspectors and Iran’s reported rejection of plans to grant access—along with a reported figure that the Trump administration sought $672 million to eliminate Iran’s nuclear-materials fund, support IAEA inspections, and expand counter-proliferation efforts. They then moved to shipping and oil flows. Mario said shipping firms were willing to move but hesitant to return to refilling, due to uncertainty and concern that the war could restart. He referenced marine tracking showing limited destinations and said oil production claims did not reflect full flows. He explained oil tanker types (Suez class and VLCC), questioned the “19 million barrels” figure by comparing it to daily pre-war exports from the Strait of Hormuz (about 20 million) and claimed current outgoing amounts were “10 to 15 million.” They discussed ceasefires in Lebanon, an Iran-US MOU, and the idea that oil prices had been supported partly by China drawing down its reserves. The guest and Mario said markets may have priced recovery, but shipping behavior suggested continued uncertainty. The discussion also included energy policy and diesel/jets concerns, citing a detailed message from an operator describing Chris Wright as “badly out of his depth,” asserting the US faces a diesel, jet fuel, and crude oil positioning crisis, and that the US’s reliance on certain crude quality affects refinery outputs and stock levels. On Lebanon negotiations, Mario described Lebanese army concerns about Israeli proposals for pilot zones in areas the IDF did not control, saying the Lebanese government wanted focus on territory under IDF control and that meetings were “ugly.” They also discussed controversy over the Lebanese delegation refusing to take an official opening photo with the US state department delegation. The conversation then returned to Turkey. Mario described Erdogan’s speech criticizing Israel and Trump’s remarks calling Erdogan a friend who stayed out of the war, including Erdogan’s NATO role and the F-35/F-110 engine saga. They discussed claims that Turkey wanted F-110 engines and F-35s and US efforts to certify Turkey’s compliance with American law, with a claim that Israel would be “livid” if Turkey received F-35s. The guest argued that even if Turkey pursued alternatives, the F-35 deal could become leverage and might depend on Netanyahu’s behavior. Mario and the guest also referenced political and media issues: they discussed alleged shifts against Israel in Democratic and Republican voices and mentioned New York City congressional primary outcomes involving candidates supported by APAC or linked to other political networks. They ended with discussion of a reported book excerpt involving alleged calls between Trump and Netanyahu, including a claim that Trump told Netanyahu “all the jews are sick of you” while pushing acceptance of a Gaza peace plan, and they debated who the information source might be. The recap concluded with additional plans for upcoming guests and topics, including Iran-related discussions, Middle East actors, and other current events.

The US will have oversight and control over the funds sent to Iran, ensuring they are used for the intended purposes. If Iran tries to misuse the money, action will be taken to freeze the funds again. The regime will not have access to the money or the power to decide where it goes. Two transactions were made by Iran in Oman using the previously frozen funds, but the details are unknown at this time.

The discussion centers on how an Iran war would affect global economies, and why energy-price dynamics may not be a sustainable path to stability. The professor says that even without a war, energy prices are expected to remain very high through the rest of the year due to existing delays. He argues the situation would worsen because a war is “breaking out very soon,” possibly by Sunday or Monday, with “no real negotiations” so any negotiation could not affect the military or peace situation. He describes conditions for preconditions to negotiations as impossible to meet. He says one requirement is that Iran be given back confiscated Iranian funds, including “many billions of dollars” intervened by the United States and references stablecoin. He states the United States cannot return any money because Congress has set positions including “Not one penny for Iran,” characterizing Iran as a terrorist country. He also says the United States has repeatedly reneged on prior commitments, giving an example that Trump annulled an Obama administration atomic weapons contract, so Iran would not concede without return in advance. According to the professor, market expectations are being driven by announcements and the belief that a peaceful negotiation might be reached, citing stocks and bonds rising and a perceived chance to profit when markets open Monday or Tuesday. He claims the announcements are aimed at creating that expectation rather than producing a durable settlement. He describes alleged U.S. messaging to Netanyahu about allowing attacks, and says the war secretary Hegseth spoke with Oman and Qatar. He states that if Oman did not agree not to join Iran in imposing tariffs (presented as Iran’s effort to obtain reparations for illegal attacks), the U.S. would “let Netanyahu kill you,” and that this reportedly ended negotiations. He predicts Iran is not ready and that the peak of the war will come as the build-up since Trump took office. He argues the conflict would create shortages of oil, fertilizer, sulfur, chemicals, and helium, plunging the world into a depression “worse than the nineteen thirties.” He cites ExxonMobil’s estimates of pushing oil prices to “over the hundred fifty, hundred sixty dollar a barrel range,” causing chemical industry shutdowns throughout Asia and the global South and Europe, blocking fertilizer exports, and reducing agricultural yields amid extreme-weather conditions. He says fertilizer blockades and agricultural disruption would drive food price increases and industry closures. He then describes an economic mechanism: chemical-industry closures reduce demand for oil, so oil prices might fall to “maybe a hundred twenty, a hundred thirty dollars a barrel,” but he expects “large scale defaults and bankruptcy.” He says debt leverage across economies would turn an industrial depression into a financial crisis because companies depend on lending and credit, and that collateralized debt obligations have created patterns resembling the 2008 bank crisis. He states central banks cannot “simply create more credit” because banks would avoid lending to prevent turning economies into a “Ponzi scheme.” He also argues U.S. negotiation demands are designed to prevent serious talks, describing Trump’s stated premise that nothing will happen until Iran transfers all atomic weapons as a “red herring” and likening it to a deal-breaker. He says sanctions aimed to starve Iran have not worked since they were first put in place in 1979, and that the U.S. intends to provoke Iran into a defensive response. The professor expands from economics to international law and institutions. He claims U.S. attacks would treat civilian activity as military, referencing alleged attacks on fishermen in other regions and arguing similar logic would apply in the Strait of Hormuz. He says the UN is a “casualty” because it has been unable to enforce its charter, blocked through U.S. veto power, and says the alternative would require “a new United Nations” independent of the United States, with China, Russia, and Iran as leading members. He proposes a broader strategy focused on control of the global oil trade, stating the U.S. aims to prevent other countries from using alternative supplies by destroying oil facilities and weaponizing the oil trade. He links this to actions involving Nord Stream, sanctions, and scenarios involving Venezuela and grain trade. He states Venezuela oil revenue is paid into a Florida bank account under Donald Trump’s direction and says the same approach is sought for Iran. He further claims the U.S. would aim to restrict alternative energy (wind and solar), portray it as rival to oil, and maintain dependence on U.S. LNG and oil exports. He concludes that chaos is used to lock in foreign dependency and that a U.S.-centered outcome would involve closed European industry, subsidies or market opening demands, and client political alignments. He predicts Europe would relocate industry outside Europe but not necessarily to the U.S., while still facing political revulsion and seeking an alternative system as the depression deepens. He also says future wars would be air wars with missiles, bombs, and drones rather than invasions.

The discussion focuses on a proposed $300 billion figure for rebuilding Iran, compared to the earlier $1.8 billion mentioned in the agreement. The speaker argues that, regardless of where one might challenge specific points, the central issue is that Iran could not have developed a nuclear weapon without the U.S. knowing it. The speaker distinguishes the amounts: the money in the agreement was about $1.78 billion, while the figure of $300 billion is what is being talked about giving Iranians. The $1.78 billion is described as Iranian money, not American money. It allegedly comes from a weapons-related deal from the 1970s, when the Shah was still in power: the Shah did not receive the weapons, but Iran paid for them. When a new administration took over, the parties went to court, and they won—specifically on the interest that would accumulate each day that payment was not made. The speaker adds that, to protect American taxpayers, President Obama decided it was better to place the $1.8 billion at stake to gain credibility needed to carry out other actions that constrained Iran’s behavior. The transcript also highlights a point “a lot of people aren’t aware of” regarding Ayatollah Khomeini. It says Khomeini supported the negotiations and backed efforts to reach an agreement. Opponents who argued against negotiation—saying that if Khomeini negotiated with the “great Satan” he would regret it—are described as having been contradicted by Khomeini, who stated they would pursue a structure that could work for both Iran and the other side. The speaker says Khomeini faced internal political backlash for taking this position, including references to removing him.

Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and an award-winning author, discussed developments around the Iran war and the prospect of a near-term diplomatic breakthrough. Parsi addressed whether the Trump administration is attempting to expel him personally after his criticisms. He said it is not simply “the Trump administration,” but that there are elements inside and outside the government attempting to escalate pressure toward deportation. He referenced pro-Israeli social media influencers pushing for it, including an AI video depicting his deportation. He said a recent investigation claim in the Free Press was denied within hours by the State Department, which he described as unusual. Parsi argued this is part of a long-term pattern: for 25 years he said neocons and warmongers in Washington have tried to cancel, silence, discredit, and accuse him of being an Iranian agent, but that this is the first moment he has seen a more public push toward deportation. He also said other elements inside the administration pushed back, making the situation more complicated than a single unified effort. He then discussed how discourse around wars has deteriorated, not only in the United States but also internationally, describing it as driven by team-slogan logic rather than explanation and context. Parsi argued that wars of choice require eliminating nuance and context, which he said leads to attacks on those who explain alternative perspectives. He emphasized that moralism can become counterproductive by preventing discussion of opponents’ security concerns and undermining compromise and peace. Parsi connected this to earlier U.S. policy toward Iran, saying decision-makers misread Iran’s behavior by assuming Iran is weaker and fears war more than surrender. He said he tried to communicate that Iran would not surrender, that it fears surrender more than war, and that it likely would absorb pain if it viewed the threat as existential. He argued the fundamentals of the approach were erroneous and that the resulting negotiation dynamics differ from the terms originally imagined. He also described how intelligence and evidence can be ignored when groupthink and only listening to certain voices, such as Israelis, leads to miscalculation—especially regarding options like closing or disrupting the Strait of Hormuz and striking Gulf Cooperation Council states. On strategy and propaganda, Parsi contrasted earlier public rational debate with more coercive moral framing. He cited examples from Afghanistan and broader great-power practice of selling war as peace, including using women’s rights narratives and prominent collaborations between political and celebrity figures. He said this moral framing functions to block strategic discussion and prevents evaluation of whether interventions serve stated objectives. In shifting to the current Iran talks, Parsi responded to the claim that a peace deal could be signed within 24 hours. He said he believes it is “different,” describing it as the “39th time,” but closer than ever based on conversations with “folks on both sides.” He said the proposal is back in Iran’s court and that delays stem from the internal need for buy-in across Iran’s dispersed power structure, particularly under a new Supreme Leader whose authority is not fully established. He said hardline elements that would never agree are part of the challenge, but that signals suggest the majority has already agreed in substance. Parsi said the Iranian foreign minister, U.S. President Donald Trump’s retweet of the Iranian foreign minister, and Pakistan’s prime minister’s messaging all point to momentum—while emphasizing the process is still a memorandum of understanding and a “pit stop” toward a final deal, not an end to the war. He warned sabotage could occur, including through attacks elsewhere such as Lebanon, which he said could destabilize the diplomatic process even without direct action against either party. Regarding what is in the MOU, Parsi said Iran’s position is that it needs U.S. buy-in through an exchange affecting leverage. He said Iran views opening the Strait of Hormuz—described as major leverage, more than a 60% enriched uranium stockpile—as part of what is being given up, and it argues the U.S. blockade (he called it counterproductive to the U.S.) is being removed. He said Iran is asking for 12 billion upfront, with an additional 12 billion at the end tied to the MOU. He also said some funds were previously supposed to be released in connection with a prisoner exchange in August 2022, but that the deal was reneged after the Mahsa Amini protests began, meaning Iran does not want to renegotiate those promised first amounts. He said the U.S. side has avoided direct release for reasons including avoiding comparison to Obama-era actions, so others proposed a workaround where a third party provides equivalent funds initially, followed by accounting later. Parsi said Iran appears to be moving toward accepting an approach that ensures it receives the money even if it is not unfreezing directly by the U.S. He added that ambiguity about key terms—like “open” regarding the Strait of Hormuz—could allow both sides to interpret commitments domestically, but that too much vagueness could make the agreement like “Swiss cheese.” On the Strait of Hormuz, Parsi distinguished between the idea of reopening while it is not closed—potentially involving fees/tolls or administrative management rather than full restoration of prior arrangements—and he said legal disputes about whether it is international waters or Iranian/Omani waters shape how the language can be framed. He said he does not expect Iran to give up control entirely and instead expects a change from the pre-existing status quo. Finally, Parsi discussed regional security after Iran’s direct attack on Israel following Israel’s bombing of Lebanon, which he described as an attempt to establish extended deterrence, or “the new equation,” backed by large-scale Iranian capability rather than limited attacks attributed to the Houthis. He said Israel’s subsequent actions—striking Iran and later Southern Lebanon rather than Beirut—do not prove the equation is fully established, though it could increase the perceived cost of further escalation. He said that if an MOU is agreed, it is unlikely Iran would do so without a region-wide ceasefire, especially because restarting war in Lebanon could spill over into Iran. He argued Iran’s priorities include shrinking U.S. military presence in the region, diversified security arrangements for GCC states, and deeper economic and security rehabilitation for Iran—moving away from a decades-long U.S. organizing principle of containment and isolation.

Trump has announced Project Freedom, an effort to escort ships out of the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz, beginning today. It would involve tanker vessels and about 100 aircraft, though the number of ships is unclear. The speaker views this as an attempt to provoke a response from Iran to justify a renewed, larger war against it, effectively daring Iran to attack as ships are escorted through the Strait. There is debate over whether the Strait is international waters. The speaker notes that maritime law grants 12 miles of territorial waters to each country, and the Strait is so narrow that Iran’s 12 miles and Oman’s 12 miles together cover the entire strait, leaving no international-water segment. The northern portion is claimed to be within Iran’s territorial waters, while the southern portion is believed to have been mined, potentially forcing ships to use the northern portion and come within Iran’s range of drones or missiles. Questions are raised about which ships would be used to escort the tankers. The operation is labeled humanitarian, but the speaker recalls Trump’s past statements about targeting civilians, bombing infrastructure in Iran, and supporting actions in Gaza, arguing that such rhetoric and actions have been condemned as war crimes. The speaker notes a pattern of deceit by the U.S. military, suggesting a possibility that humanitarian rhetoric could mask an attack plan, potentially using civilian tankers as shields or enabling U.S. naval vessels to enter the Persian Gulf for an attack. The central question is Iran’s likely response. Iran has said that no ships will pass without its permission and has the capability to harass or attack vessels. Iran has previously attacked and destroyed commercial ships attempting to transit without permission. Possible Iranian responses include attacking commercial vessels, attacking U.S. naval vessels, doing nothing, or deploying more mines and waiting for ships to hit them. The speaker argues that Trump and the Pentagon are desperate, having failed to force Iran to surrender control of the Strait through financial pressure, mass bombing, sanctions, or fomenting domestic uprisings. Iran reportedly still holds leverage over the Strait, and the United States is attempting to reshape public perception and present itself as a humanitarian actor, despite history and geography suggesting otherwise. The takeaway is that the plan could be an attempt to provoke Iran into a military response that would allow another round of war, possibly under a War Powers Act extension, with U.S. sailors potentially used as bait—an outcome described as horrific and unethical. In the broader context, the ongoing oil shortages and potential global impacts are highlighted, with warnings that delays in opening the strait could worsen shortages of oil, gas, and fertilizer, raising fears of famine in the coming years. The speaker calls for peace and for negotiation with Iran, noting that compromise seems unlikely under the current administration. The closing sentiment emphasizes staying informed and seeking peaceful resolutions.

On Monday, June 15, the discussion centers on whether peace could break out in Iran following a Trump announcement that a deal has been reached, and how sustainable it is given the painful concessions involved and uncertainty about U.S. ability to implement such agreements—especially with Iran. Professor Jeffrey Sachs says the parties have said an agreement has been signed by Iran, the United States, and Pakistan as mediator, but the details are unknown and the agreement comes in stages, making it potentially fragile and able to fall apart “quite easily.” He reports that all sides involved say there will be a ceasefire, described by Pakistan as a “permanent end to hostilities.” Israel is not included as a formal party, and he argues Israel would likely not accept at least one “crucial term” claimed about the agreement, including a cessation of fighting in Lebanon. Exactly what Lebanon terms are is unclear, but he says Israel may try to undermine the agreement by continuing bombing or by using claims such as Hezbollah shooting drones or missiles into Israel as a pretext, contributing to fragility. Sachs describes the framework as two broad phases. The first phase is to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and international oil and gas traffic. The second phase concerns nuclear issues over about 60 days, in which Iran would “in some sense irrevocably” refrain from producing or procuring a nuclear weapon, while U.S. and other international economic sanctions would be dropped. He says, based on announcements, the agreement does not include other demands the U.S. had previously put on the table regarding Iran’s missile systems or support for groups such as Hezbollah. He highlights uncertainty about governance of the Strait. Iran claims it is not an “international waterway,” but a shared waterway with Oman with co-responsibility, and it is unclear whether this is inscribed in the agreement. Trump says no tolls will be charged, and Iran had claimed tolls of $1 a barrel; sources also suggest that tolls may be dropped. On assets, he says statements indicate the U.S. will unfreeze Iranian assets, with $25 billion mentioned, but which assets, why, and under what authority remains unclear. He adds that there appears to be an arrangement in which Iranian and Omani control over the Strait continues and tolls are not charged, while the U.S. unfreezes significant amounts of frozen assets. Sachs then argues the broader war accomplished “absolutely nothing,” calling it useless and harmful, resulting in death and harm without substantive achievement. He says it weakened Israel diplomatically and that the U.S. lost “any aura of strength and invincibility,” while he characterizes the overall outcome as lose-lose for the U.S. and Israel, and “battered” for Iran. He notes rumors and public dispute over whether the ceasefire will hold, including claims it could fail quickly, while also stating that he would not conclude that fighting is inevitably a ruse. In response to concerns about concessions, Sachs and the interviewer discuss how distinctions between tolls and fees matter operationally and legally, and how painful concessions could provoke opposition once details emerge. They also describe opposition from the Zionist lobby in the U.S. and criticism directed at what the U.S. did, including claims of a unilateral launch without public backing or congressional backing and with stated goals not achieved. The conversation shifts to broader U.S. strategic limits and power dynamics. Sachs argues the U.S. executive branch lacks operative norms against war and portrays U.S. leadership as operating with “gangster mentality,” emphasizing action without legal or moral compunction beyond victory. He argues that military and economic pressures have not produced strategic leverage and that the U.S. economic blockade and “economic war” have hurt Iran, with Iran seeking asset releases as bargaining leverage. On whether the Iran ceasefire could be a turning point, Sachs says the world is changing and that U.S. ability to impose military victory and enforce hegemonic control has reached limits across key theaters. He cites the U.S.-Iran-Middle East, Ukraine, and China as areas where he says the U.S. cannot impose its will militarily, and he argues this reflects a broader end to U.S. unipolar dominance. He discusses balancing dynamics, rejects the myth of enduring U.S. technological superiority, and argues that advanced technologies are widespread and that countries such as Iran and Russia can make sophisticated weaponry. The interviewer agrees that adversaries moving closer to each other, combined with failure of unipolar assumptions, suggests policies must reflect reality. The discussion ends by emphasizing that these wars signal not only an end to the post-Cold War hegemonic era but also the broader shift in Western technological dominance.

On Thursday, June 18, the host discussed key political updates and focused on the day’s MOU related developments. First, the host said Donald Trump signed the MOU in person in Versailles yesterday, two days early. They claimed the live signing was supposed to be in Geneva, and that JD Vance digitally signed it while Trump did not sign it there. The host said the U.S. still wants Vance to go for a live signing, but Iran responded that the matter is finished because “we all signed it” and there is no need to go to Geneva. The host added that Netanyahu posted that he was meeting with his head of Mossad, and comments included speculation about potential threats and assassinations. The host said the host was concerned about being a “sitting duck” during a live trip and suggested the “blue and white country” could “ruin it.” Second, the host said the 14-point MOU was released and reviewed specific points they had not seen widely. They said the U.S. will work with regional allies to develop a $300 billion reconstruction fund. They said the MOU states up to $100 billion in frozen assets will be released to Iran, contrasting this with claims by Vance and Trump that money would not exchange hands and with their understanding of the prior “24 billion with 12 billion up front, and then another 12 later.” The host argued that closing the Strait of Hormuz was leverage and that Iran could keep it closed even if the U.S. left, framing this as the reason the U.S. is paying. They said the MOU also provides that, upon signing, the U.S. Treasury will issue waivers for export of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products, and derivatives, and associated services including banking transactions, insurance, and transportation. They said the MOU includes waivers for all sanctioned exports. Finally, the host said the MOU states Iran will maintain the current nuclear-program status quo and “doesn’t bar them from owning their enriched uranium,” and cited ABC News and an older commitment described as avoiding nuclear weapons development for 50 years. Third, the host claimed the “blue and white country” published a map showing the IDF 10 kilometers deep in Lebanon and said they are not leaving. The host referenced an MOU statement that the U.S. and its allies will leave Lebanon and Iran and that permanent termination of military operations on all fronts is stated, while arguing that events within 24 hours show violations. They also described Iranian leverage to “walk away” by suggesting prior actions by the “blue and white country” already undermined the agreement. The host also said Netanyahu plans to use Mark Levin and pro-Israel senators to influence the final deal, implying Trump signed early due to distrust. The host stated that a foreign prime minister told Trump the U.S. president had “no effing judgment,” and that the prime minister is planning a public pressure campaign using U.S. Senate influence and right-wing media to shape policy, which the host characterized as influence operations requiring FARA registration. The host then listed stories they planned to watch, including who appears in Geneva on Friday, Trump’s reactions before then, continued pressure and bombing in Lebanon, media campaigns, and which senators publicly back the “blue and white country.”

People point out that after a major sell-off in markets—described as $1.3 trillion sold off in the afternoon—the Dow ends the day green. A claim is made that markets had “exploded to the upside” earlier on under “false hope” of a deal with Iran, then later suffered a sudden, headline-free plunge: the S&P 500 erased its gains and fell more than 2% from its daily high, in a “plummet” that is described as wiping out $1.3 trillion in about two hours. The sell-off is linked in the discussion to events surrounding an Apache helicopter incident. A tweet attributed to President Trump says he was informed by the military that Iran shot down a “highly sophisticated Apache helicopter” while patrolling over the Strait of Hormuz; Trump’s statement says two pilots were involved and “both are safe and uninjured,” and that the United States “must, of necessity, respond to this attack.” The conversation then cites conflicting claims from “sources” and reports about whether casualties occurred. The discussion also states that casualty numbers have been classified. Video is discussed: an RT post is referenced claiming to show an Apache helicopter forcing a crash. Colonel Daniel Davis, host of The Deep Dive, says the video “is definitely not” of an Apache helicopter going down and claims it is from the second or third day of a prior war when a Shahid drone hit a U.S. base. He describes a Shahid drone as a “point target” that travels from point A to point B and says hitting a moving helicopter is “nearly impossible,” adding that a helicopter hit by such a drone would be “obliterated” and “nobody would have survived.” Davis argues the event “doesn’t seem plausible” and suggests it could serve as an “excuse” for a U.S. attack, with “tankers going up in the air” presented as part of what could be “in the works.” Questions are raised about the location: the transcript suggests the incident might be over land rather than only over the Straits of Hormuz, and speculates about whether it was over international waters. Israeli sources are also said to be telling “Redacted” that a U.S. refueling aircraft took off from Israel, described as “large tankers used for big strikes.” The discussion moves to negotiations and messaging. It mentions Iran’s statement: “If we are attacked by the United States, we will respond with a massive attack on our own.” It also discusses an asserted report about “unfrozen three billion dollars in assets” allegedly moved from the UAE to Iran as part of a deal, while the U.S. withholds additional frozen assets. The transcript contrasts this with President Trump’s position on NBC News, attributed to Kristen Welker: Trump is described as categorically saying the U.S. will not release frozen funds up front and that any future steps would depend on Iranian behavior. The transcript also recalls “Operation True Promise Five,” described as an attack by Iran on Israeli military bases. Israel is said to claim nothing got through, though video is referenced as showing things did get through. The conversation includes a claim about low intercept rates versus higher rates being asserted publicly. Finally, the transcript references alleged U.S.-Israel coordination: it says President Trump warned Benjamin Netanyahu not to attack Iran or launch any response, and describes Netanyahu launching a response anyway. The discussion claims Vice President Vance is trying to push toward a negotiated settlement, while Trump is said to have “headwinds” from him that could undermine progress—connecting that concern to the purported “helicopter incident.” It ends with continued skepticism, noting that the incident is supported mainly by a “piece of paper” and a statement, not wreckage or verified evidence, and that convenient explanations are offered about how pilots could have been recovered without visible remains.

The speaker questions whether individuals have the right to use money as they please, stating that the money belongs to the Islamic Republic of Iran. They inquire if the money will be used for purposes beyond humanitarian aid and address the needs of the Iranian people.

The U.S. will oversee where the money goes, ensuring it's used for valid purposes. If Iran diverts funds, action will be taken. The regime won't have access to the money, which will be used for goods like medical equipment and food. Iran made two transactions from frozen funds in Oman, but details are unknown.

Iran's access to frozen funds may indirectly support malign activities, despite claims of strict oversight. The money, accumulated under the Trump administration, can only be used for humanitarian purposes. Critics argue that freeing up these funds allows Iran to redirect resources towards terrorism. However, there is no concrete evidence of this happening. If misuse is detected, the funds can be frozen immediately.

The discussion centers on multiple claims about the U.S., Israel, Iran, and regional conflicts. One topic is a reported “cool story” from Channel 15 J about a CIA and Musa plan to arm the Kurds to cause regime change. Channel 15 J claims JD Vance learned of the secret plan and immediately told Erdogan, leading Erdogan to reject plans to arm the Kurds to fight Iran; the plan then failed after details were leaked to Erdogan. The speakers discuss whether a vice president could leak information to sabotage a president’s plans and whether the story could be driven by Israelis trying to discredit Vance. They connect this to long-standing U.S.-Turkey contention over arming Kurds, saying Turkey has bombed Kurds and that Erdogan would likely make a fuss. They further mention that the Kurds were said to be armed “to march on Tehran,” which the speakers frame as unlikely and as suggesting “desperation.” A second major topic is the funeral in Tehran and the possibility of an Israeli attempt to assassinate Mustafa Khamenei during or around the ceremony. The speakers say airspace is being closed in Tehran. They cite comments from Professor Izadi, who said he does not know if Mustafa will show up but hopes he does not and would not be surprised by an Israeli attempt. They also mention the expected presence of Russian Dmitry Medvedev and possibly a high-level Chinese representative, with China’s participation used as context for fears of an attack. The conversation shifts to internal Iranian politics and reactions to an MOU. One professor, Behrooz Gamari Tabrizi, is described as critical of aspects of the MOU and as explaining Iran’s governance as decentralized with factions presenting options to the Supreme Leader rather than a single autocratic command. The speakers reference a statement attributed to the Supreme National Council (described as more than two-thirds of its members) stating there are issues with the MOU but that the Supreme Leader decided to proceed anyway. They say the professor identified a “loud minority” within Iran that thinks continuing war would better serve Iran, including arguments that the U.S. and Israel did not suffer enough to deter future aggression. They also debate a translation dispute about comments from Ghalibaf regarding purchases from the United States, with one speaker asserting translators differed: one account says there was no commitment to buy U.S. products, while another says agricultural purchasing authorization was already agreed under President Raisi and was not new. Another portion covers media and messaging within Iran, including claims that Iranian media does not disperse news effectively and comparisons to Iran International as well as discussion of how external funding and surveys were used to influence perceptions of Iranian public support. They contrast claims of an anonymously conducted survey with claims that conventional polling indicated majority support for the government. On unfreezing of Iranian assets, the speakers cite Al Arabiya about a preliminary agreement to release $3 billion of frozen Iranian assets, followed by a report (I-24) from a U.S. official saying no frozen funds would be released unless Iran meets MOU requirements, that release would require U.S. approval, and that funds would be used to purchase U.S. agricultural products. They discuss a quoted MOU clause stating the U.S. would make funds available for use upon implementation of the MOU, with procedures mutually agreed during negotiations, and argue that the U.S. is trying to impose conditions Iran is not accepting. They further discuss claims that Pakistan is working with Saudi and Qatar to release funds directly to Iran, arguing there is nothing in the MOU preventing third-party release. The speakers also discuss negotiations in Doha focused on Strait-related issues, saying the U.S. message is “think bigger” and that sanctions relief under a broader deal would be more valuable than charging tolls on shipping. They mention a one-week understanding to avoid further clashes in the Strait while negotiations continue, and that talks also cover frozen assets and a Lebanese ceasefire. They dispute how sanctions are lifted, distinguishing between oil-and-related waivers already addressed in the MOU and broader secondary sanctions that allow broader access to the global economy. Regarding potential escalation, the Wall Street Journal is cited as saying Trump considered returning to full-scale war with Iran, holding discussions with Heketh and General Kane, but decided to continue diplomatic negotiations and potentially delay an August 18 deadline. They also mention a question to JD Vance about committing the U.S. would not return to combat operations before the MOU’s 60-day clock ends, with JD Vance giving a “nothing answer.” The speakers add that U.S. force withdrawals were not rescinded, and discuss logistical and fuel constraints as reasons abrupt reversal would be difficult. The conversation also references a report that Iran hit Israel’s Haifa oil refinery harder than authorities initially admitted, with claims of destruction of gasoline storage and major losses in domestic production, alongside a dispute over source credibility and claims that other reporting describes only limited disruption. Finally, they discuss the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve, saying there is a “legal danger line” at 252.4 million barrels and that the U.S. is about 325 million barrels; drawing down 73 million barrels would trigger limited drawdown authority. They connect this to the idea that renewed bombing campaigns would stress aviation fuel demand, forcing further drawdowns and creating major economic and political risks. The speakers conclude that while talk of war exists, continuing full war is portrayed as extremely costly and constrained in the short term.

Ro Khanna (Speaker 1) and the other speaker debate Obama’s Iran policy and its consequences, referencing actions, deals, and geopolitical alignments. - The other speaker asserts that under Obama there were 14 wire transfers to a Swiss account linked to Hezbollah between 2014 and 2016, totaling 1.7 billion dollars, which he says Obama told Congress were frozen Iranian assets. He also claims a back channel to Tehran through Valerie Jarrett operated after Obama left office, describing it as a shadow government, and alleges pellets of cash were sent to Iran by plane. He questions why money would be sent to Iran given its alleged nuclear ambitions and sponsorship of terrorism. - Ro Khanna counters that Obama was a great statesman who left America safer, noting that 97% of enriched uranium was removed, American service members deaths were avoided, and gas prices did not rise as claimed by the other speaker. He says Obama did not give China a larger role in the region and did not harden the IRGC; instead, Obama engaged in diplomacy to bring China, Russia, and European allies on board toward a path to a non-nuclear Iran. - The other speaker insists Obama sent money to the Iranians and that they resumed enrichment. Khanna responds, “That’s not true.” The other speaker clarifies that a deal was reached to remove 97% of enriched uranium, and assets unfrozen were Iranian assets, not U.S. money, with broad international involvement (China, Russia, France, UK, Canada, the U.S.). He says Obama tried to torpedo the deal and that APEC and Netanyahu opposed it, which dragged the U.S. into more conflict in the Middle East. He argues Obama was against the Iraq War and favored normalization toward Iran, with broad global support, but claims AIPAC and Netanyahu undermined that effort. - Khanna pushes back, suggesting the claim that Obama delivered on preventing a nuclear-armed Iran is inaccurate, asserting that 10 presidents before Trump all claimed Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon, and stating that Obama delivered 97% out in some sense while the other speaker reiterates that Obama sent money to Iran. The other speaker emphasizes the world’s broad support—Russia, China, Canada, the U.K., France, and others—lost or shifted away, implying that U.S. leadership faltered and that the world coalition was lost. - The discussion shifts to what U.S. policy should be: a return to “team America,” addressing gas prices, avoiding further wars, and a preference for leadership that aligns with Israel’s stance as framed by Netanyahu and AIPAC, according to the other speaker. Khanna notes ongoing debate about who holds influence, and the dialogue ends with a mutual acknowledgment of continuing the conversation, thanking each other and Maria.

The speaker emphasizes that the funds being released to Iran are not a payment or ransom, but rather Iranian money that had been frozen. The U.S. will have oversight to ensure the funds are used for humanitarian purposes only. The speaker acknowledges that bad actors like Iran may continue to wrongfully detain Americans in the future, but this deal is focused on bringing home the innocent Americans currently detained. The speaker also addresses concerns about the potential misuse of funds, stating that there will be strict restrictions and oversight to prevent that. The U.S. will continue to hold Iran accountable for its destabilizing actions and human rights abuses.

The transcript discusses Bloomberg’s claim that the United States has acquired the text of an Iran-related Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that, in the speaker’s framing, represents US concessions to Iran and Iran’s “decisive victory.” The speaker says the MOU includes terms such as the US lifting its naval blockade on Iran immediately upon signing, and pledging to withdraw US forces from the region within 30 days of the final agreement. The speaker interprets “the region” as the entire Middle East, implying US forces would leave places including Kuwait, Iraq, the UAE, Qatar, and also withdraw from the Arabian Sea and the Sea of Oman. The speaker highlights additional points attributed to the MOU: Iran agreeing it will never produce nuclear weapons; the US halting all economic sanctions against Iranian oil and related banking services, allowing Iran to sell oil at normal market prices; and the US releasing frozen Iranian funds and assets, described as “many tens of billions of dollars,” with figures such as 24 billion mentioned and estimates about portions released before Friday. The speaker also claims the Israeli lobby opposes the agreement and wants “endless war,” alleging that Israel would continue bombing and expanding territory. The transcript then proposes two possible paths for President Trump. One path is that Trump is pressured or threatened into backing away from the agreement, blaming Iran, and supporting perpetual war. The other path is that Trump keeps his word, signs the deal, and the Strait of Hormuz reopens, with improvements to oil availability taking time rather than happening instantly. The speaker asks what would determine which path Trump takes, arguing that a key factor may be new claims that Iran has multiple nuclear weapons. The speaker says the nuclear-weapon claim emerged within about two weeks prior to the discussion, citing investigative journalist Pepe Escobar and former CIA case officer Larry Johnson. According to the transcript, they received the information from a high-ranking Pakistani official stating that Iran has multiple nuclear warheads and is prepared to demonstrate them, and possibly to use them. The speaker claims that after this information surfaced, Trump began changing his public tone toward Iran, including slamming Netanyahu and criticizing bombing in Lebanon—specifically apartment complexes—and saying not everyone in those buildings is Hezbollah. The speaker further claims that US posture toward Israel is shifting, including KC-135 refueling planes being pulled out, and argues these signals align with Trump distancing from Netanyahu’s campaign. The speaker states that the world would supposedly learn “the truth” within days if Trump reverses course and bombs Iran again; if Trump continues supporting the peace memorandum and signs it on Friday, the speaker interprets that as evidence Trump believes Iran has nuclear weapons and that Iran is prepared to demonstrate or use them. The speaker also emphasizes that one MOU point says that by Friday Iran will agree it will “never produce nuclear weapons,” and argues this does not necessarily address acquiring nuclear weapons already produced elsewhere, naming Pakistan, Russia, and North Korea as potential sources. The transcript expands on Pakistan’s alleged role, suggesting Pakistan may be handing warheads to Iran and that the information could plausibly come from Pakistan because Pakistan is the origin of the warheads. The speaker speculates Iran could attach nuclear weapons to its existing ballistic missile delivery technology. The speaker argues Trump may now be more afraid of Iran’s nuclear capability than of Netanyahu using alleged “Epstein files” or other compromising material, and suggests that advancing a “224 law” in Congress is intended to bypass presidential control over intelligence sharing with Israel. Additional claims in the transcript include speculation about the lack of visible wreckage from a recently reported crash involving a B-52 bomber, with comparisons to alleged missing airplane evidence related to 9/11. The speaker also mentions the Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline, saying it has been mostly completed for decades but is not functional largely due to sanctions blocking financial transfers, and that lifting sanctions could allow gas to flow, benefiting Pakistan economically. The speaker concludes that the situation is at a major pivot point shaped by Trump’s decision, framing possible outcomes as either catastrophic continuation of conflict or movement toward peace that would benefit oil and energy supplies, with the speaker urging readiness and calling for peace while asserting many lives are at stake.

The U.S. will oversee where the money goes to prevent Iran from diverting funds. If they do, action will be taken. The regime cannot access the money directly. Iran made two transactions from frozen funds in Oman, but details are not available at the moment.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the impact of restrictions on Iranian funds. Speaker 1 questions if the funds' fungibility is affected, but Speaker 0 clarifies that the money belongs to Iran. They debate White House talking points and misunderstandings about US taxpayer money. Speaker 0 emphasizes that the funds are not US taxpayer money and criticizes claims that suggest otherwise. Speaker 1 argues that restrictions make it easier for Iran to access funds. The conversation ends with a disagreement on the use of the term "straw man argument." Translation: The speakers discuss restrictions on Iranian funds and clarify that the money belongs to Iran, not US taxpayers. They debate misconceptions about the origin of the funds and their impact on Iran's spending.

The speaker is asked why they won't admit that the US doesn't plan to give the money to Iran. In response, the speaker explains that they have always had the power to oversee how the funds are distributed and they have the option to withhold it if they choose to.

Iran has a history of funding terrorism, like Hamas, regardless of sanctions. The argument that the money given to Iran is fungible suggests that they could have used other funds for the recent attack.

There are concerns about possible violence outside an embassy, reminiscent of past incidents like Benghazi and Tehran in 1979. Additionally, there are reports that over $1 billion of US taxpayer money may have been used to support Hamas under President Biden. A report suggests that the United Nations Relief and Work Agency received this funding, which was cut off by former President Trump due to its links to Hamas. Senator Marsha Blackburn plans to introduce legislation to halt funding until Iran is expelled from the UN and investigated for violations. The State Department denies these claims, stating that the UNRWA has measures in place to prevent funds from benefiting terrorists. However, evidence suggests that Hamas weapons were found at relief group schools, and teachers employed by the aid group in Gaza and the West Bank promoted hatred and terrorism. The Biden administration is seeking an additional $260 million for this group.

Yannis Varoufakis (founder of DiEM25 and former finance minister of Greece) and Glenn discuss the implications of a signed U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU) framed as a “Versailles Treaty.” Varoufakis argues the name reflects a dialectical inversion: the U.S., which presents itself as the winner, is putting up up to $300 billion to reconstruct its victims. He says Congress would face obstacles in approving it and that the MOU is not a done deal; he describes it as light years away from Iranian bank accounts receiving dollars. Still, he says signing the MOU is symbolically crucial—an “unequivocal victory” for Iran at the diplomatic level and a temporary surrender by the Trump administration. Varoufakis links the agreement to broader Middle East shifts. He claims the Abraham Accords’ original design is “dead in the water” because the Gulf Council states are effectively left on their own. He also says Europeans have been “spectacularly” left out and that the MOU may produce a rupture within U.S.-Israel relations: Netanyahu could wreck the deal, while Netanyahu’s actions are also creating a split between the Israeli establishment and the Republican Party. He maintains these developments are significant regardless of whether the MOU evolves into a treaty. On U.S. motivations, Glenn suggests the Americans may be buying time to get oil back to markets, noting Trump’s comments about only having four weeks of oil left. Varoufakis replies that “theater” should not be underestimated, describing how the language used by J.D. Vance signals that an Israeli-skeptic faction within MAGA has the upper hand following the Trump administration’s MOU with Iran. He connects this to internal U.S. political pressures affecting Trump’s constituency and to Vance’s stance against Israel-driven policy in Washington. When asked which of the MOU’s points is least likely to be implemented, Varoufakis identifies transferring monies to Iranian bank accounts as the hardest due to Congress’s control and opposition from Democrats and pro-Israeli Republicans. He argues the key obstacle is granting Iran access to frozen Iranian dollars. He says this would be difficult for Trump, predicting political backlash framed as Trump going back on his word and doing worse than what Trump accused Obama of doing in 2015. He says other items may be harder or easier, but the money transfer is the least likely. Varoufakis adds that Lebanon is tied to a ceasefire and Israel ending its blockade involving south Lebanon and removal of Israeli troops from south Lebanon. He calls this part of the MOU a major diplomatic victory for Iran and Hezbollah, supported by an origin story that he attributes to Israel’s 1982 invasion of South Lebanon. He argues Congress cannot take away the Lebanon ceasefire component, though the money transfer could be delayed. Discussing how the Gulf states might respond, Varoufakis describes the MOU as relief mixed with existential dread. He says the Gulf states recognize their strategic error in putting “all their eggs” in the U.S. security umbrella. He argues Iran can threaten Hormuz closure and is enabled to charge fees through “insurance cost” mechanisms, citing that about 30 vessels crossed the Strait of Hormuz and were charged. He also claims Iranian cheap drones and missiles can be produced in large numbers, while Israeli/U.S. defenses are expensive and limited in scale. Varoufakis distinguishes among Gulf states. He says Qatar and Oman lean toward de-escalation with Iran, while the UAE has a confrontational stance and is closely allied with Israel. He argues Saudi Arabia moved toward accommodation with Iran after 2019 attacks on Saudi petroleum facilities by Iran and its Houthi allies, using China as a go-between to establish a detente. He claims Saudi purchasing of American weaponry has waned recently, with deals being pursued with France and Canada, suggesting Gulf states may seek alternative arms sources. On the “petrodollar” system, Varoufakis argues U.S. hegemony relies on recycling Gulf surpluses into the United States, and he claims the Gulf states function like vassals within a dollar empire. He says Washington signaled anxiety about reduced petrodollar recycling through U.S. Treasury swap lines to the Gulf states, interpreting this as a move to prop up U.S. money markets rather than a bailout for Gulf liquidity. He cites agreements he says totaled $3.5 trillion to $3.7 trillion flowing from the Gulf to the U.S. within 18 months, with parts directed to AI investments and weapons purchases, and he says this flow dried up when the Iran war began. Varoufakis also argues Europe has been irrelevant during the Iran war and suggests U.S. military posture toward Europe may change following a review of U.S. military commitment to Europe by Pete Hegseth. He says the U.S. would relocate military spending from Europe toward West Asia or the Far East while using legally grounded bilateral basing agreements. He argues Europe lacks energy planning and a coherent energy union, and he frames Europe as dependent on expensive U.S. fossil fuels rather than Russia’s gas, while lacking discussion about decarbonization and electrification. When asked about Ukraine, Varoufakis says he does not predict outcomes but rejects the idea that the U.S. can subcontract the war to Europeans. He argues Europeans cannot supply the intelligence and data he says the U.S. provides and cannot afford the cost. He claims European budgets are under strain and cites repayment burdens for the NextGenerationEU recovery fund and constraints on further borrowing for Ukraine. His “hunch” is that after Iran, Trump may propose a Russia-Ukraine peace deal “take it or leave it,” and if rejected he would switch off briefings and data sharing. Finally, Glenn asks why France and Germany still oppose ending the Ukraine war despite the Iran defeat. Varoufakis gives two reasons: he says they lack a growth model (with the Green Deal spending failing to materialize and German Greens declining) and weaponry becomes the remaining growth channel; and he says a peace plan would be immediately vetoed by Baltic states and Finland (and possibly Poland and others), because they have learned to maintain tension between NATO and Russia and would humiliate any proposal. He concludes by saying he sees no learning from history within the German establishment.