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The Global Engagement Center, supported by allies, exposes Russian disinformation campaigns worldwide. Collaborating with tech companies, we combat false stories. Our focus is on getting truth to Russia amid a ban on independent news.

The speaker discusses the use of sock puppets on Twitter and Facebook, as well as defensive and offensive tactics employed by anti-disinformation operatives. They mention techniques like doxxing and deception, and the use of merchandise sites to gather information. The speaker also talks about checking potentially malicious content sites, takedowns, and ensuring machine security.

The FBI alerted our team about the presence of Russian propaganda in the 2016 election. They informed us that there might be a release of similar content soon.

McCarthy accuses the US of being infiltrated by foreign forces, specifically Russian-linked Twitter accounts. These accounts, allegedly connected to bots and trolls, are said to be impersonating Americans and spreading false information. The Russian influence tracker, Hamilton 68, monitors these networks and their impact on social media. The release of the Nunes memo was heavily promoted by Russian bots, with the hashtag #ReleaseTheMemo trending. Russian bots have also been involved in manipulating discussions around the Parkland shooting. The goal of these bots is to create political discord and influence public opinion. McCarthy's investigation into the 600 Russian-linked accounts has sparked controversy and raised concerns about Russian interference in US politics.

The FBI alerted our team about the possibility of a Russian propaganda dump similar to what happened in the 2016 election. They advised us to be on high alert.

The speaker states that the "Russian story" would be called a covert influence campaign if they were doing it. The speaker also claims they would be the last to say they've never tried a covert influence campaign.

The speaker serves on the armed services committee, overseeing cyber efforts and receiving quarterly classified briefings. After a recent briefing from the intelligence committee and Department of Defense, the speaker believes that the listeners and Tim Pool were victims of a Russian malign influence campaign. The speaker emphasizes that they were not involved or solicitous, but rather the victims. The speaker feels obligated to share this perception, based on access to intelligence and evidence, because the listeners and Tim Pool have been unfairly smeared. The speaker believes it's clear they were victims of Russian election interference, and that's how it should be portrayed.

Speakers discuss the severity and novelty of threats to the United States’ political system, focusing on Russian interference and the digital domain. - All acknowledge that the country faced a cataclysmic disruption to its political system that is unlike prior experiences. Speaker 2 notes, as a Vietnam veteran, that fundamental institutions were jeopardized then but proved resilient, and expresses hope for a similar outcome now. - Speaker 1 emphasizes two points: (1) Vladimir Putin’s determination to shape political landscapes inside Russia and abroad, and (2) the consequential role of the digital domain, which allowed Russian intelligence to exploit and manipulate more effectively, culminating in the twenty sixteen election. - They note that Russian interference historically involved exploiting elections, but never with such aggression, directness, or multidimensional methods. The Internet and modern technology serve as a huge enabler for influencing opinion and undermining fundamental systems. - There is a discussion of whether this manipulation was unforeseen. Speaker 2 indicates it goes back to the Soviet era with attempts to influence elections, but the magnitude in twenty sixteen was unprecedented. The digital environment provides malefactors with more opportunities to attack and influence. - The panel explains active measures as fabricating or propagating stories (even patently false ones) to advance a narrative, color perceptions, and lend legitimacy to political actors. They note that the Russians focused on specific voter blocks in states like Wisconsin and Michigan, with estimates that 70,000–80,000 votes could have swung the election. - They discuss methods beyond information operations, including collecting information (e.g., DNC and DCCC email breaches) and money-related tactics: money laundering, disguising funding sources for political actions, and potential extortion or blackmail. They stress that collusion is a tool in the Russians’ kit and that they recruit or exploit individuals where openings exist. - Following the money is highlighted as essential across national security domains; FBI financial investigators and intelligence analysts play key roles, and there is confidence that Mueller and others will trace financial pathways to uncover motivations. - The distinction between cyber warfare and conventional warfare is acknowledged: there are no tanks or planes, but the cyber realm constitutes a war for democracy. A robust response is needed to strengthen the cyber environment, including proposals for a congressional independent commission to assess and strategize future protections, involving engineers, technologists, scientists, and private sector input. - They reflect on why the nation did not respond with the immediacy seen after physical attacks (e.g., 9/11). The lack of a physical rubble-like trigger makes cyber threats harder to mobilize a national response. Leadership issues are cited: when the White House diminishes the CIA, FBI, NSA, or intelligence and law enforcement, it undermines efforts to address the threat. - They recount briefings to the president-elect in January, noting high confidence levels in assessments that did not rely on the dossier; the bigger concern is a perceived indifference to the Russian threat and the denigration of security institutions. - They stress the importance of institutional integrity: the press, law enforcement, and intelligence are pillars of democracy, and denigration of these institutions undermines U.S. credibility abroad. They advocate for stronger checks and balances and reiterate their commitment to truthful reporting and protecting the country. - The speakers, experienced and apolitical, emphasize loyalty to the Constitution and the need for decisive leadership and sustained commitment to democratic institutions, despite political challenges. They conclude with a solemn commitment to safeguard the country and its democratic framework.

A website called Hamilton Sixty Eight was created to track Russian accounts. The speaker asserts that the website identifies current Russian bots that are disseminating information. The speaker questions the accuracy of this claim, stating, "That's bull."

We created the website Hamilton 68 to track Russian accounts. There are Russian bots spreading misinformation on our website.

We're advocating for talent to join the private sector. Transparency is crucial in combating harmful content and misinformation. Russia's involvement in election interference is unprecedented. Platforms are taking steps to combat misinformation and protect democracy. Stronger partnerships with government agencies are being formed. Coordination is key in decreasing fake news dissemination. 2018 is crucial for elections worldwide, and efforts are being made to safeguard their integrity.

Hey guys, my name is Olesia and I'm a former employee of the so called Troll Fabric in Kyiv, Ukraine. Today I want to tell you something about this structure and some reasons why I have left this job. I may be wrong but I think it's the first time somebody published insider materials on this topic since 2019 when a journalist infiltrated the office in Kyiv to make a report about it. And back then I did realize that it was a troll fabric. But, you know, I told myself it's okay because I always supported President Zelenskyy and I still do. At first the job was focused on supporting President Zelenskyy online, like writing positive comments or posts, etc. So, we were mostly working on Facebook and Instagram. As time passed, I was transferred from the Ukrainian department, which worked for Ukrainian audience, to the English speaking department, which were focused on the English speaking public, like Americans and Europeans. But the doubts remain the same. Support for president Zelenskyy, support for Ukraine and Ukrainian Warfork. We also had French, German, and Italian departments. I heard some other officers in were hiring people who spoke Finnish and also Swedish and Estonian. About a half year ago our main chef in command, Andrei Borisovich Jermak, paid us a visit. I'm pretty sure you have heard of the head of President Zelensky office. Really it was an unusual event for the main figure behind our project to come visit the office. So he came with some English speaking officials who were introduced to us as the American partners. We were told that they were very important guests but no further details. Some of my colleagues told me that they were CIA. During the visit, they said that our field of work is expanding and we were told that our new target was The United States Of America, especially the upcoming elections. Long story short, we were asked to do everything to prevent Donald Trump from winning the elections. So basically, this topic added to our main lines of work. Since then, each of us had to post at least three or five posts daily, posing as Americans and Europeans, criticizing Donald Trump and praising Biden. The Americans have even organized a few lectures for us to get a better understanding of American politics and American mindset and main social and politics issues. Then we were occupied with the topics for the job which sounded like this. Unlike Trump, Biden is a smart and experienced politician. Unlike Trump, Biden will never betray NATO partners. Trump will alienate our partners. Also, Biden will not abandon Ukraine, and Biden will protect democracy while Trump is Putin's puppet. I honestly tried to convince myself it's okay since Biden is a clear option for Ukraine. But, you know, it was too much for me. Some of my colleagues felt really nervous too. One thing is to work for the best interest of my country, but interfering in US politics is a whole other thing.

At the observatory, we observe and document haters, extremists, and entities, studying their patterns, organization, and activities. We've noticed a small but vocal group of about 20 to 22 entities, along with three political groups, who are organizing things behind the scenes. By entities, we mean individuals, particularly influential ones who operate mainly on social media.

We learn about DC leaks and the connection to APT 28, a Russian military intelligence hacking group. The morning the Hunter Biden story broke in the New York Post, it was confusing. We didn't know what to believe, but it seemed like a possible hacking campaign by APT 28. Despite that, I didn't feel comfortable removing the content from Twitter.

The speaker asserts that Russia interfered in the 2016 election with purpose, sophistication, and overwhelming technical efforts via an active measures campaign driven from the top of the Russian government. This is a high confidence judgment of the entire intelligence community. The speaker confirms that entities beyond the DNC and DCCC were targeted, including government, non-governmental, and near-governmental agencies like nonprofits. The speaker estimates that the Russians specifically targeted hundreds, possibly over a thousand, entities.

Russian bots are everywhere. Russian-linked accounts are bots. Hamilton 68 knows they're Russian bots. The whole thing was a fraud.

Hamilton 68, a German Marshall Fund project, tracks trending hashtags and topics among Russian bots. In late September/early October, trending hashtags included "Take a knee," "Boycott the NFL," "NFL," and "MAGA." The trending hashtags also included "Steelers," referencing Alejandro Villanueva. According to the speaker, Villanueva, an Army Special Forces veteran, made an exception and stayed in the runway during the anthem. The speaker claims that before the president landed in DC after a Friday night speech in Huntsville, Russian bots were already promoting "Take a knee." While Hamilton 68 identifies these bots, most social media users do not.

The speaker discusses a use case involving a government agency and a network analysis tool. They explain how the tool can identify coordinated attacks and misinformation by analyzing events, such as the sharing of an image on social media. The tool can build a network of accounts involved in spreading the information and identify patterns. In this case, the tool discovered a network spreading Russian propaganda and misinformation about the Nord Stream pipeline. The speaker demonstrates how the tool can counteract the narrative by generating tweets in Arabic that provide a different perspective. They also mention the potential for the tool to create knowledge across different networks and incorporate multimodal content like images and videos.

We created a website called Hamilton 68 to track Russian accounts. Our website shows that there are currently Russian bots spreading information.

The speakers claim that America is under attack by Russian bots on Twitter, which are part of an ongoing attack by the Russian government. These bots are flooding Twitter, targeting Americans, and attempting to fan the flames of political discord by creating echo chambers and alternate realities. The speakers reference Hamilton 68, a website tracking Russian-linked Twitter accounts, as evidence of this activity. They claim this dashboard shows Russian bots are involved in various topics, from political narratives to school shootings. However, another speaker alleges that Hamilton 68 is a fraud. They claim the list of accounts it tracks are not Russian bots, but rather ordinary Americans, and that Hamilton 68 is misrepresenting organic opinions as Russian influence. Some speakers claim they are personally targeted by Russian bots. A dashboard at securingdemocracy.org is suggested for tracking Russian activity. A video by Matt Orphala is praised. Negative news about vaccines is said to be amplified by Russian bots.

The speaker discusses the activities of a group called CTIL (Cyber Threat Intelligence League) and their efforts to combat misinformation and disinformation on social media platforms. The whistleblower reveals that CTIL used Python code to scrape records from Twitter and tracked incidents of disinformation. They also worked on counter messaging, encouraging mask-wearing, and building an amplification network. The speaker mentions that some CTIL members took extreme measures to conceal their identities. The group's activities received little attention until now, but Wired published an article about CTIL, highlighting their work against misinformation. The speaker concludes by mentioning the upcoming testimony to Congress and refers to Matt Taibbi's perspective on the matter.

The speaker works with the German Marshall Fund, which tracks Russian activities. The speaker directs the audience to hamilton68.com, a site created to monitor Russian trolls and bot armies. The goal is to provide the public with information to help them distinguish between legitimate speech and speech originating outside the country intended to create chaos. The speaker acknowledges the difficulty the country will face in discerning the origins and intent of different types of speech.

We were covering an article about 55,000 Democrat NGOs discovered to be contributing to campaigns, moving things around, and pushing propaganda. It was discovered through AI that to figure out where the money's coming from, you have to go through layers and layers, and it's all funneling down to one group or another. It's a giant propaganda machine, a giant regime change machine.

The Alliance for Securing Democracy is developing tools and strategies to counter attacks on the U.S. and its allies. They are tracking the toolkit Russia is using to undermine democracies. Their dashboard tracks Russian active measures and can be found at dashboard.securingdemocracy.org.