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The Global Engagement Center, supported by allies, exposes Russian disinformation campaigns worldwide. Collaborating with tech companies, we combat false stories. Our focus is on getting truth to Russia amid a ban on independent news.

Russia is employing familiar tactics to influence public opinion, including leaking information that supports their national interests, such as denigrating Vice President Biden and boosting President Trump. They are also using social media to spread divisive narratives on various political issues in the United States. Russia's overt media is being utilized to promote narratives that align with their national interests. Additionally, they are sponsoring proxy websites that mimic legitimate sources to disseminate information. Furthermore, Russia is employing unwitting US individuals to lend credibility to the information they distribute, making it appear less obvious that it originates from Russia.

Disinformation on social media platforms poses challenges to democracy, bolstering authoritarians and silencing opposition. Countering disinformation is crucial for a thriving democracy. The steps countering disinformation guide provides 9 thematic sections and a comprehensive intervention database to promote information integrity and strengthen societal resilience. Key takeaways include the need for a whole of society approach, prioritizing programs addressing disinformation and societal cleavages, and utilizing mixed methods like fact checking and monitoring. Establishing norms, regulations, and better content moderation is essential. Political parties should be discouraged from engaging in disinformation. Explore the interventions database for organizations, projects, and donors combating disinformation worldwide.

The FBI alerted our team about the possibility of a Russian propaganda dump similar to what happened in the 2016 election. They advised us to be on high alert.

Speakers discuss the severity and novelty of threats to the United States’ political system, focusing on Russian interference and the digital domain. - All acknowledge that the country faced a cataclysmic disruption to its political system that is unlike prior experiences. Speaker 2 notes, as a Vietnam veteran, that fundamental institutions were jeopardized then but proved resilient, and expresses hope for a similar outcome now. - Speaker 1 emphasizes two points: (1) Vladimir Putin’s determination to shape political landscapes inside Russia and abroad, and (2) the consequential role of the digital domain, which allowed Russian intelligence to exploit and manipulate more effectively, culminating in the twenty sixteen election. - They note that Russian interference historically involved exploiting elections, but never with such aggression, directness, or multidimensional methods. The Internet and modern technology serve as a huge enabler for influencing opinion and undermining fundamental systems. - There is a discussion of whether this manipulation was unforeseen. Speaker 2 indicates it goes back to the Soviet era with attempts to influence elections, but the magnitude in twenty sixteen was unprecedented. The digital environment provides malefactors with more opportunities to attack and influence. - The panel explains active measures as fabricating or propagating stories (even patently false ones) to advance a narrative, color perceptions, and lend legitimacy to political actors. They note that the Russians focused on specific voter blocks in states like Wisconsin and Michigan, with estimates that 70,000–80,000 votes could have swung the election. - They discuss methods beyond information operations, including collecting information (e.g., DNC and DCCC email breaches) and money-related tactics: money laundering, disguising funding sources for political actions, and potential extortion or blackmail. They stress that collusion is a tool in the Russians’ kit and that they recruit or exploit individuals where openings exist. - Following the money is highlighted as essential across national security domains; FBI financial investigators and intelligence analysts play key roles, and there is confidence that Mueller and others will trace financial pathways to uncover motivations. - The distinction between cyber warfare and conventional warfare is acknowledged: there are no tanks or planes, but the cyber realm constitutes a war for democracy. A robust response is needed to strengthen the cyber environment, including proposals for a congressional independent commission to assess and strategize future protections, involving engineers, technologists, scientists, and private sector input. - They reflect on why the nation did not respond with the immediacy seen after physical attacks (e.g., 9/11). The lack of a physical rubble-like trigger makes cyber threats harder to mobilize a national response. Leadership issues are cited: when the White House diminishes the CIA, FBI, NSA, or intelligence and law enforcement, it undermines efforts to address the threat. - They recount briefings to the president-elect in January, noting high confidence levels in assessments that did not rely on the dossier; the bigger concern is a perceived indifference to the Russian threat and the denigration of security institutions. - They stress the importance of institutional integrity: the press, law enforcement, and intelligence are pillars of democracy, and denigration of these institutions undermines U.S. credibility abroad. They advocate for stronger checks and balances and reiterate their commitment to truthful reporting and protecting the country. - The speakers, experienced and apolitical, emphasize loyalty to the Constitution and the need for decisive leadership and sustained commitment to democratic institutions, despite political challenges. They conclude with a solemn commitment to safeguard the country and its democratic framework.

A website called Hamilton Sixty Eight was created to track Russian accounts. The speaker asserts that the website identifies current Russian bots that are disseminating information. The speaker questions the accuracy of this claim, stating, "That's bull."

We created the website Hamilton 68 to track Russian accounts. There are Russian bots spreading misinformation on our website.

The Russians have weaponized social media by manipulating public opinion through biased or fake stories. However, domestic disinformation is also a significant issue. In 2016, the Russian efforts may not have been very sophisticated, but they learned that they don't need to create content themselves as there are people in the US who will do it. There were two types of disinformation attacks in 2016, with the Internet Research Agency taking over existing groups in the US and pushing radical positions. While foreign influence gets a lot of attention, the majority of problems in the information environment are domestic. The domestic threat of disinformation is considered the most significant immediate threat to the 2020 election.

We will inform our colleagues about Russia's actions in the Baltics, Ukraine, and Georgia. We plan to make 2017 a year of offense against Putin, who we believe hacked our elections and is undermining democracy worldwide. We advocate for new sanctions targeting Putin personally, his energy and banking sectors. We just visited Ukraine, where we witnessed the impact of Russian interference. We will push for tougher sanctions on Russia for attacking the US through hacking, treating it as an act of war. We urge stronger sanctions on Russia for their attack on the US.

The Alliance For Securing Democracy's advisory council, including high-profile figures like Jake Sullivan and John Podesta, labeled WalkAway as linked to Russian bots. They also mentioned Mike Morell, Mike Chertoff, Rick Leggett, and Mike Rogers. Despite most members being European, they accused WalkAway of having Russian connections.

Disinformation on social media undermines democracy, empowering authoritarianism and silencing opposition. To combat this, the CEPS countering disinformation guide offers nine key strategies and a database of interventions aimed at enhancing information integrity and societal resilience. Developed by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, International Republican Institute, and National Democratic Institute with USAID support, the guide emphasizes a whole-of-society approach. It highlights the need for urgency in collective action, balancing resources between institutions and civil society, and employing mixed methods like fact-checking and monitoring. Additionally, it stresses the importance of establishing norms, legal frameworks, and improved social media moderation to foster a healthy information environment. Political parties should also be discouraged from engaging in disinformation. For further resources, explore the interventions database.

The threat of disinformation and foreign interference is growing. To combat this, we are introducing the European Democracy Shield. This initiative will identify and counter information manipulation, work with national agencies, detect foreign interference, enhance AI deepfake detection, and promote resilience.

The Russians have weaponized social media by manipulating public opinion through biased or fake stories. However, domestic disinformation is also a significant issue. In 2016, the Russian efforts may not have been very sophisticated, but they learned that they don't need to create the content themselves as there are people in the US who will do it. There were two types of disinformation attacks in 2016: the Internet Research Agency created personas to take over existing US groups and push radical positions. However, the majority of these problems are domestic, related to how we interact online, political speech, amplification, and how politicians use platforms. The domestic threat of disinformation is the most significant immediate threat to the 2020 election.

RT is funding right-leaning bloggers and YouTube personalities, including Jordan Peterson and Tucker Carlson. The purpose is to amplify messages that destabilize democracies.

A new entity, the American Sunlight Project, has been created by Nina Jankovic to combat disinformation. She believes anti-disinformation organizations need a rapid response unit. Jankovic previously worked on anti-Russian disinformation in Eastern Europe, funded by Soros' foundations.

This week, an initiative was launched with companies and nonprofits to improve research and understanding of how automated processes curate online experiences. This is important for understanding online mis- and disinformation, a challenge that leaders must address. While it's easy to dismiss disinformation, ignoring it poses a threat to valued norms. How can wars end if people believe their reasons are legal and noble? How can climate change be tackled if people don't believe it exists? How are human rights upheld when people are subject to hateful rhetoric? The goals of those who perpetuate disinformation are to cause chaos, reduce the ability to defend, disband communities, and collapse countries' collective strength. There is an opportunity to ensure these weapons of war do not become an established part of warfare. Despite facing many battles, there is cause for optimism because for every new weapon, there is a new tool to overcome it. We have the means; we just need the collective will.

The speaker works with the German Marshall Fund and a group that tracks Russian activities, aiming for transparency. Hamilton 68, also involving General Hayden, is a resource to monitor Russian trolls and bot armies. The goal is to provide public access to this information, enabling informed decision-making. The speaker jokingly comments on General Hayden's improved appearance. The website is Hamilton68.com.

The speaker discusses a use case involving a government agency and a network analysis tool. They explain how the tool can identify coordinated attacks and misinformation by analyzing events, such as the sharing of an image on social media. The tool can build a network of accounts involved in spreading the information and identify patterns. In this case, the tool discovered a network spreading Russian propaganda and misinformation about the Nord Stream pipeline. The speaker demonstrates how the tool can counteract the narrative by generating tweets in Arabic that provide a different perspective. They also mention the potential for the tool to create knowledge across different networks and incorporate multimodal content like images and videos.

We created a website called Hamilton 68 to track Russian accounts. Our website shows that there are currently Russian bots spreading information.

The speakers claim that America is under attack by Russian bots on Twitter, which are part of an ongoing attack by the Russian government. These bots are flooding Twitter, targeting Americans, and attempting to fan the flames of political discord by creating echo chambers and alternate realities. The speakers reference Hamilton 68, a website tracking Russian-linked Twitter accounts, as evidence of this activity. They claim this dashboard shows Russian bots are involved in various topics, from political narratives to school shootings. However, another speaker alleges that Hamilton 68 is a fraud. They claim the list of accounts it tracks are not Russian bots, but rather ordinary Americans, and that Hamilton 68 is misrepresenting organic opinions as Russian influence. Some speakers claim they are personally targeted by Russian bots. A dashboard at securingdemocracy.org is suggested for tracking Russian activity. A video by Matt Orphala is praised. Negative news about vaccines is said to be amplified by Russian bots.

The speaker works with the German Marshall Fund, which tracks Russian activities. The speaker directs the audience to hamilton68.com, a site created to monitor Russian trolls and bot armies. The goal is to provide the public with information to help them distinguish between legitimate speech and speech originating outside the country intended to create chaos. The speaker acknowledges the difficulty the country will face in discerning the origins and intent of different types of speech.

We were covering an article about 55,000 Democrat NGOs discovered to be contributing to campaigns, moving things around, and pushing propaganda. It was discovered through AI that to figure out where the money's coming from, you have to go through layers and layers, and it's all funneling down to one group or another. It's a giant propaganda machine, a giant regime change machine.

The Biden administration plans to bring together democracies in a transatlantic summit to address threats to democracy. The European Union also wants to establish a transatlantic digital marketplace and work together against disinformation. Mainstream platforms like Twitter and Facebook have started labeling misinformation, and there is hope that nefarious movements will decline. The EU's Democracy Action Plan, which includes introducing costs for spreading disinformation, is seen as a game changer. The Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act proposed by the European Commission are steps in the right direction. Collaboration between governments, civil society, and industry is crucial, as disinformation is a growing threat that requires a collective response.

Suzanne provided an overview of the Beyond the Ballot project and the broader Defending Democratic Institutions framework, focusing on how disinformation and information operations threaten public confidence in our courts and justice system. She emphasized that while Russia is the most aggressive actor in this space, other countries and domestic voices are increasingly involved, with Russia amplifying domestic narratives. The core insight is that these information operations exploit preexisting divisions and genuine grievances, rather than creating entirely new ones, and their aim is to undermine trust in democratic institutions, including the judiciary. Key evidence and framing from her three-year inquiry is summarized as follows: - Russia’s information operations target democracy and its institutions, including the justice system, and other countries imitate Kremlin tactics. Domestic voices are also engaged, and Russia amplifies those efforts. - These operations exploit weaknesses in our own system. They lean into legitimate grievances and seek to undermine perceived integrity, impartiality, and independence of the courts; they portray the judiciary as biased or corrupt or as a tool of elites. - The attack is not limited to elections but is a year-round threat to democratic legitimacy, including the justice system, and is aimed at weakening public trust in outcomes and processes. - Historical context includes the 2016 election, where propaganda, hack-and-leak activity, and attempts to disrupt voter data integrity were observed. Suzanne describes how such activity can extend to the justice system through hacking, leaking of judicial materials, or social media campaigns that manipulate perceptions of court legitimacy. - A notable case example is Twin Falls, Idaho (2016), where social media misinformation about refugees led to public outcry before facts were clarified. Fake accounts created by the Internet Research Agency in Russia pushed narratives that the justice system was failing, targeting prosecutors, judges, and politicians. - Russia uses three channels: social media, state-sponsored media (RT, Sputnik), and official statements by Russian officials. Narratives commonly assert that the justice system is broken, tolerates crime by immigrants, is biased, serves corrupt interests, or is controlled by a political elite. - Narratives are designed to erode confidence in the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and to frame reforms as evidence of systemic collapse. Examples include RT’s coverage and other propaganda aimed at inflaming racial and political tensions. - The campaign also leverages issues around race and policing, featuring fake affinity groups that appear to support opposing sides to inflame tensions and further undermine trust in institutions. - The FBI has warned that the threat extends beyond elections to a broader assault on democracy, with a focus on information operations aimed at all democratic institutions. Concretely, the project’s ongoing work includes: researching adversary threats to democratic institutions; defending the justice system through public awareness; conducting workshops and training for state and federal courts on cybersecurity and disinformation; building a rapid response and education network with legal organizations; and civic education as a national security imperative. The objective is to rebuild public resilience against pernicious messaging, encourage informed citizen participation, and motivate the public to hold institutions accountable while accepting legitimate outcomes. In response to questions, Suzanne underscored that members of the bar have a vital role: they can educate communities, correct disinformation related to specific cases (which judges cannot easily address), and engage in close contact with courts to safeguard democratic legitimacy. She urged lawyers nationwide to be more engaged in educating the public about the justice system and the mechanisms to hold it accountable.